The Wall Street Journal, February 22
Notable & Quotable: Thom Tillis on Ukraine
‘The world is watching. The strength of our alliances are on the line and the future of democracy and the world is on the line if we do anything less than defeat Vladimir Putin.’
Sen. Thom Tillis (R., N.C.) speaking on the Senate floor Feb. 20:
Full text :
There is no moral person on this planet who can consider Putin to have a legitimate reason to effect this sort of carnage. And I saw it firsthand, and I will never be able to forget it. And what the American people and the world population will never be able to forget either is the aftermath of appeasing Vladimir Putin. Ladies and gentlemen, China is already helping Russia. North Korea has sent thousands of troops, and North Korea don’t [sic] really care about life. They’ve allowed 4,000 to 5,000 of their soldiers die on the battlefield within six weeks of getting on the ground. They are throwing body after body after body, trying to kill and break the will of the Ukrainian people. And it’s just unacceptable.
So look, I’m a Republican. I support President Trump, and I believe that most of his policies on national security are right. I believe his instincts are pretty good. But what I’m telling you—whoever believes that there is any space for Vladimir Putin and the future of a stable globe better go to Ukraine. They better go to Europe. They better invest the time to understand that this man is a cancer and the greatest threat to democracy in my lifetime. And it will be a cancer that spreads into the South China Sea, into Taiwan, and metastasize across the globe. So ladies and gentlemen, when I tell you that Vladimir Putin is a liar, a murderer and a man responsible for ordering the systematic torture, kidnapping and rape of innocent civilians, believe me, because the evidence is mile high. So for those of us who have invested to [sic] time and understand this, believe me when I tell you this is important to every single one of you. If you believe that Ukraine is a country an ocean away and not relevant to our national security, think again. The world is small. The world is watching. The strength of our alliances are on the line and the future of democracy and the world is on the line if we do anything less than defeat Vladimir Putin.
The Guardian, February 22
US envoy to Ukraine hails Zelenskyy as ‘embattled and courageous leader’
Keith Kellogg takes different tone from Trump, who contrasted ‘very good talks’ with Putin with cooler relationship with Ukraine’s leader
Extraits:
The US envoy to Ukraine, Gen Keith Kellogg, has praised Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “the embattled and courageous leader of a nation at war”, striking a dramatically different tone from Donald Trump, who has called Ukraine’s president a “dictator”.
Kellogg left Kyiv on Friday after a three-day visit. Posting on social media, he said he had engaged in “extensive and positive discussions” with Zelenskyy and his “talented national security team”. “A long and intense day with the senior leadership of Ukraine,” he said.
The general’s upbeat remarks are in glaring contrast to those of the US president and his entourage, who have heaped abuse on Zelenskyy during a tumultuous week. Trump claimed Ukraine was to blame for starting the war with Russia, and accused Zelenskyy of doing “a terrible job”. (…)
Kellogg is known to be the most pro-Ukrainian of Trump’s senior team. Nevertheless, the difference in rhetoric suggests a chaotic and contradictory approach to foreign policy from a White House that has dumped Ukraine as an ally and publicly sided with Moscow. (…)
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22. Februar
Trump verstört mit Lügen und Halbwahrheiten über die Ukraine. Dennoch gibt es keine Alternative zu den Friedensgesprächen
Drei Jahre schaute der Westen zu, wie Russland die Ukraine zermürbt. Da ist ein Frieden auf der Basis der machtpolitischen Realitäten besser.
Extraits:
Donald Trump hat Wort gehalten. Zwar endete der Ukraine-Krieg nicht einen Tag nach seiner Wahl, wie er gar vollmundig angekündigt hatte. Aber nur einen Monat nach seiner Vereidigung beginnen Gespräche zwischen den USA und Russland. In den Begriffen der Diplomatie ist das geradezu Lichtgeschwindigkeit.
Das ist auch deutlich mehr, als sein Vorgänger Joe Biden hinbekommen hat – ganz zu schweigen von den Europäern. Diese kritisieren zwar laut, dass sie bei den Verhandlungen nicht dabei sind. Aber sie hatten drei Jahre Zeit, das Sterben zu stoppen.
Es waren drei Jahre der halbherzigen Unterstützung Kiews. Zwar gab es Geld und Waffen, aber im Verhältnis zum gesamteuropäischen Bruttoinlandprodukt in einem beschämend geringen Ausmass.
An grossen Worten fehlte es nie, an entschlossenen Taten schon. Daher spricht aus ihrem trotzigen Gegen-Gipfel zu den russisch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen mehr verletzte Eitelkeit als die Sorge um das Wohl der Ukraine.
Die US-Regierung tut gut daran, die europäischen Empfindlichkeiten zu ignorieren und sich auf Moskau zu konzentrieren. Wladimir Putin befindet sich in einer Position der Stärke. Seine Truppen rücken im zentralen Frontabschnitt vor. Der Nachschub ist vorerst gesichert; die Wirtschaft kollabiert auch im vierten Kriegsjahr nicht.
Natürlich sterben die russischen Soldaten wie die Fliegen. Das aber hat den Kreml noch nie sonderlich bekümmert. Putin kann es sich leisten, abzuwarten. Er benötigt keinen Frieden, wenigstens nicht jetzt.
Trump umschmeichelt daher den Zaren. Dass er direkt mit Washington verhandeln kann, ist für ihn der Jackpot. Denn der Kreml sieht sich auf Augenhöhe mit den USA. Die EU, diesen komplizierten Bund ewig uneiniger Staaten, betrachtet Putin (wie vor ihm Jelzin) nicht als gleichwertig.
Russland huldigt dem klassischen Grossmachtdenken. Die Idee, Europa unter den Grossen aufzuteilen, ohne die Kleinen beizuziehen, gefällt Putin und Trump. Dieser attackiert mit einer verstörenden Mischung aus Halbwahrheiten und Lügen Wolodimir Selenski, weil der zu Recht einen Platz am Verhandlungstisch verlangt.
Aber noch ist es zu früh, zu behaupten, dass der US-Präsident die Ukraine im Stich lässt. Wäre dem so, müsste er nicht verhandeln, sondern könnte den Kurs Bidens fortsetzen: Kiew bekam zu wenig zum Leben und zu viel zum Sterben. Fatalistisch schaute der Westen zu, wie Moskau die Ukraine zermürbt.
Da ist selbst ein prekärerer Frieden auf der Basis der machtpolitischen Realitäten besser. Ohnehin stehen die Verhandlungen erst am Anfang. Statt alles zu zerreden, sollte man erst ihr Resultat abwarten.
Trump will den Krieg schnell beenden, weil er ihn als Ablenkung betrachtet. Im Zentrum seines Denkens steht China. Darin ist er bemerkenswert konsistent. Manchmal ist er das pure Gegenteil des sprunghaften Sonnenkönigs, als der er gerne porträtiert wird.
Schon am G-7-Gipfel 2017 beklagte sich der Präsident, dass die Ukraine auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das sei keine Angelegenheit der Amerikaner und der Japaner, beschied er die Europäer. Diese waren also gewarnt. Dennoch vertrödelten sie acht wertvolle Jahre.
Militärische Macht bedeutet auch diplomatische Stärke. Die Europäer ignorierten das lange und müssen sich daher mit den billigen Plätzen begnügen. (…)
Vielleicht wiederholt sich München 1938, und man reagiert auf die Unverschämtheiten eines Diktators wieder mit Appeasement. Das ist möglich. Doch für Trump geht es jetzt vor allem darum, dass Putin nicht den Gesprächen den Rücken kehrt. So scheint sich das Weisse Haus darauf einzulassen, auch andere Fragen zu besprechen: die europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur etwa oder den Nahen Osten. Am Ende könnte hier der eigentliche Sprengstoff liegen.
Trump ist ein gebranntes Kind. In seiner ersten Amtszeit traf er sich mit dem nordkoreanischen Machthaber Kim Jong Un, weil er glaubte, dieser sei zu einem «Deal» bereit: Verzicht auf Atomwaffen gegen Aufhebung der Sanktionen. Doch Kim hatte nichts dergleichen im Sinn. Am Schluss stand Trump blamiert da.
Eine solche Pleite kann er sich mit Putin nicht leisten. Trump hat sich unter hohen Erfolgsdruck gesetzt. Ein Diktatfrieden zu Putins Bedingungen liesse ihn genauso schwach aussehen wie gar keine Vereinbarung.
In diesem Kontext sind zwei Zugeständnisse zu sehen, die Trump vor Gesprächsbeginn gemacht hat. Washington schliesst einen Beitritt der Ukraine zur Nato aus und akzeptiert, dass Moskau die besetzten Gebiete vorderhand behält.
So gross sind die Konzessionen allerdings nicht. Erstens gab Moskau noch nie Gebiete preis, die es mit Waffengewalt erobert hat. Zweitens dachte Washington nie auch nur im Traum daran, ein förmliches Schutzversprechen für Kiew abzugeben.
Auch die Europäer waren nie dazu bereit, die ukrainische Freiheit mit dem eigenen Leben zu verteidigen. Das hindert sie freilich nicht daran, die angebliche amerikanische Nachgiebigkeit zu verurteilen. Heuchelei in Sicherheitsfragen war schon immer eine Untugend der Europäer.
Trump baut Partnerschaften nicht auf Werten auf, sondern auf Nutzen. Auch das ist keine neue Erkenntnis. Dafür hätte es jedenfalls keine Brandrede von Vizepräsident Vance in München gebraucht. Weil aber die Europäer unfähig sind, strategisch zu handeln, arbeiten sie sich jedes Mal aufs Neue an den Provokationen Washingtons ab. Das wirkt reichlich infantil.
Dabei liegt in dem opportunistischen Umgang mit Bündnissen auch eine Chance. Wenn sich die Europäer verpflichten, einen Waffenstillstand zu überwachen, wird Trump den Wert der Nato genauso umstandslos anerkennen, wie er sie jetzt beiseiteschiebt.
Bisher konnten sich die Europäer nie auf eine gemeinsame Schutztruppe verständigen. Auch das gehört zum Kollateralnutzen von Trumps Blitz-Diplomatie. Er schafft Handlungszwänge. Gegenwärtig werden exorbitante Truppenstärken genannt, die angeblich zur Kontrolle der Demarkationslinie nötig sind. Die Aufgabe der nächsten Monate wird darin bestehen, das Wünschbare an das Machbare anzupassen.
Dass die personellen Ressourcen der Nato ohne die USA überschaubar sind, ist unbestritten. Daher sollten Länder wie Deutschland die Wehrpflicht wieder einführen. (…) Das wird zu mehr Schulden führen, aber Europa muss jetzt seine Machtbasis stärken.
Wenn die EU nicht nur kritisieren, sondern auch handeln will, gibt sie der Ukraine eine konkrete Perspektive: weniger als eine Vollmitgliedschaft, mehr als eine Assoziierung. Das wäre auch ein Angebot an die Türkei.
Putin wird sich den Kontinent nicht untertan machen, sofern Europa (inklusive der Schweiz) die Kraft zu einem neuen Marshall-Plan aufbringt. Dazu gehört der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine. Alle wollen ihr helfen, aber jeder wird entschuldigend auf seine leeren Kassen verweisen. Deshalb ist der wichtigste Beitrag, den die EU zum Frieden leisten kann, die Stärkung ihrer Wirtschaftskraft. Ob Green Deal oder Lieferkettengesetz: Die Abschreckungsfähigkeit des Bürokratiemonsters Brüssel ist gering. Ohne robustes Wachstum gibt es auf Dauer keine angemessene Verteidigung.
Bei Trump weiss man nie, woran man ist.
Europa benötigt daher eine Rückversicherung für den Fall, dass die USA ihre Schutzgarantie inklusive Nuklearschirm aufkündigen. Atomwaffen sind die ultimative Lebensversicherung. Diese hat an Aktualität nichts verloren, wie der Ukraine-Krieg in aller Brutalität aufzeigt.
Seit zehn Jahren diskutiert Europa, ob die Nuklearmächte Grossbritannien und Frankreich einen Reserve-Schirm aufspannen können. Seit zehn Jahren hakt es an zwei Punkten. Paris und London wollen ihre alleinige Verfügungsgewalt über die Waffen nicht aufgeben. Berlin und die anderen Staaten wollen möglichst wenig für den Schutz zahlen. Es ist das typische europäische Strategie-Mikado: Wer sich zuerst bewegt, hat verloren.
Trump ist wirklich nicht das grösste Problem, das der alte Kontinent heute hat.
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/trumps-ukraine-diplomatie-endlich-wird-verhandelt-ld.1871612
The Wall Street Journal, February 21
Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—And Its Past
The memory of Soviet-era famines, mass killings and other traumas makes Ukraine determined not to return to Russian rule.
Yaroslav Trofimov is the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal. His new novel “No Country for Love,” based on his family’s history in mid-20th century Ukraine, was published this month by Little, Brown.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/21-fevrier-3.pdf
The Wall Street Journal, February 20
Trump Tilts Toward a Ukraine Sellout
He puts more pressure on Kyiv for a deal than he does on the Kremlin.
Full text :
One challenge in the Trump era is distinguishing when the President is popping off for attention from when his remarks indicate a real change in policy and priorities. President Trump’s rhetorical assault on Ukraine in recent days appears to be the latter, and perhaps it is a sign of an ugly settlement to come.
Mr. Trump on Tuesday mimicked Russian propaganda by claiming Ukraine had started the war with Russia and that Kyiv is little better than the Kremlin because it hasn’t held a wartime election. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky replied on Wednesday that Mr. Trump was living in a “disinformation space,” which may have been imprudent but was accurate.
Mr. Trump escalated on Wednesday, as he usually does, calling Mr. Zelensky a “dictator,” and suggesting Ukraine’s leader snookered the U.S. into supporting a war “that couldn’t be won, that never had to start.” Mr. Zelensky “refuses to have Elections, is very low in Ukrainian Polls, and the only thing he was good at was playing Biden ‘like a fiddle.’”
It’s tempting to dismiss this exchange as mere rhetoric, but it has the feel of political intention for Mr. Trump. He may be trashing Ukraine’s democracy to make voters think there’s no real difference between the Kremlin and Kyiv. He may think this will make it easier to sell a peace deal that betrays Ukraine.
We doubt most Americans will overlook his false moral equivalence. Mr. Putin’s war of conquest started three years ago this month when Russian troops rolled over the border and tried to capture Kyiv. The war began not because Mr. Putin had legitimate security fears—but because the aging former KGB agent wants to reassemble most of the Soviet empire he saw crumble as a young man.
Ukraine has delayed elections while it is operating under martial law and fighting a war for survival. Its constitution allows this, and Britain under Nazi siege didn’t hold an election during World War II. Was Churchill a dictator?
Ukraine’s democracy is fragile and would be stronger if it could affiliate with Western institutions like the European Union. The only dictator in the war is Mr. Putin, who poisons exiled Russians on foreign soil and banishes opponents to Arctic prison camps. Call us when he holds a free election.
Mr. Trump may also think he can turn Ukrainians against Mr. Zelensky. But the irony is that Mr. Trump’s lashing may have the opposite effect, especially if they see Mr. Zelensky opposing a bad deal forced on them by a U.S.-Russia pact that includes no credible security guarantee against future Russian marauding.
The U.S. has a profound interest in denying Mr. Putin a new perch on more of the NATO border, which is the real reason America has been right to arm Ukraine. A deal that amounts to Ukrainian surrender will be a blow to American power that will radiate to the Pacific and the Middle East. It would be the opposite of Mr. Trump’s promise to restore a golden age of U.S. prestige and world calm.
The oddity so far is that Mr. Trump seems to want a “peace” deal more than Mr. Putin does, which is the opposite of leverage in any negotiation. Mr. Trump wants to be able to claim he brought peace as he promised as a candidate, but a cautionary tale is Joe Biden.
President Biden tried to wash his hands of Afghanistan, but instead his retreat set in motion a chain of global crises that defined his Presidency. Mr. Biden tried to sell his withdrawal as a triumph of military logistics, but the public knew better. Americans may have a similar reaction if they see Russia emerge triumphant and realize this wasn’t the peace they had in mind.
Last week Mr. Trump said Ukraine can’t join NATO and must give up much of its territory to Russia—concessions to Mr. Putin with nothing in return. Mr. Putin’s response this week has been more drone attacks on Ukraine. And here we thought Mr. Trump doesn’t like being played.
The better strategy than beating up Ukraine is making clear to Mr. Putin the arms and pressure he’ll face if the Russian doesn’t wind down the war to accept a durable peace. As it stands now, Mr. Trump’s seeming desperation for a deal is a risk to Ukraine, Europe, U.S. interests—and his own Presidency.
The Wall Street Journal, February 20
The Rapid Rehab of Vladimir Putin
The Russian marauder has become an ostensible peace-maker in a month.
Extraits:
President Trump campaigned on ending the war in Ukraine, and his negotiators on Tuesday began the process with a meeting in Saudi Arabia between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart. Global politics can be an ugly business, but the looming rehabilitation of Vladimir Putin is especially hard to take.
Mr. Trump said last week after a phone call with Mr. Putin that he’s convinced the Russian dictator wants “peace.” He didn’t say what kind of peace Mr. Putin has in mind, though if history is a guide it won’t be what most Americans understand by the word.
The Kremlin overlord in 2022 started the biggest land war in Europe since Hitler, and his “special military operation” has killed or maimed hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. His missiles have targeted apartment houses and train stations. His forces have tried to freeze Ukrainian civilians into surrender by crippling electric-power plants.
His troops have kidnapped hundreds of Ukrainian-born children from their parents to new homes in Russia. They have tortured and executed Ukrainian troops in violation of every rule of international warfare.
Russian hit squads have also been dispatched to assassinate enemies of his rule at home and abroad. This includes killing Alexander Litvinenko with polonium in London and an attempted murder of a former spy in Salisbury, U.K., with Novichok nerve gas that killed an innocent bystander. The British government has said it believes Mr. Putin ordered the Novichok attack.
No one should forget the death of Alexei Navalny, the brave opposition politician who was poisoned abroad, then arrested upon his return and killed in prison. Numerous Russians are taken by a sudden and mysterious desire to leap from tall buildings to their deaths.
Mr. Putin has been charged with war crimes by an international court, and the U.S. sanctioned his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in 2022 as one of the “architects of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Mr. Lavrov sat across the table from Mr. Rubio on Tuesday and denied that Russia targets Ukrainian power plants despite mountains of evidence.
We realize that the ruthless men who rule much of the world can’t be ignored. But usually those men aren’t rewarded with a visit to the U.S., as Mr. Trump hinted last week, before they’ve made any compromises. Visits with Soviet leaders during the Cold War at least had some preparation to assume the U.S. would get something from the diplomacy. Any peace Mr. Putin strikes has to be made with all of his legacy of destruction in mind.
The Economist, February 20
Three years on : Which countries provide the most, and least, support to Ukraine?
A ranking of bilateral aid shows how European countries compare with America
Full text :
AMONG THE many complaints made by President Donald Trump is that America has been much more generous than European countries in providing military and economic aid to Ukraine. On February 12th he claimed that America had given Ukraine $350bn in aid, whereas the Europeans had provided just $100bn—and that in the form of loans rather than grants.
The disparity, he avers, justifies his demand that America should take control of an estimated $500bn-worth of rare-earth and other minerals in Ukraine—not as a means to ensure future support but as back payment for past assistance.
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, retorted on February 18th that “financially and militarily, Europe has brought more to the table than anyone else. And we will step up.” Who is right?
The most authoritative numbers are compiled regularly by the Kiel Institute, a German think-tank. Its latest report, published on February 14th, shows that European contributions—individually from governments and collectively from European institutions—outstrip America’s aid.
Start with the grand total (see chart 1 and 2). Countries worldwide have allocated €267bn ($280bn) in aid to Ukraine, or roughly €80bn per year. America remains the single most important donor by a wide margin but European countries, including the EU, have collectively surpassed its efforts, with €132bn in allocated aid compared with America’s €114bn (although America remains slightly ahead on military aid). Add other commitments yet to be delivered or specified and the gap grows yet wider. However, almost 90% of the financial aid from EU institutions has been in the form of loans (albeit with very generous terms). Roughly 60% of America’s financial aid is given as grants.
Our third chart shows how this has cumulated over time. European support has remained relatively stable since 2022, while American aid has been far more volatile. Its support slowed in 2023 and 2024 amid partisan wrangling in Congress, then picked up again with the passage of a new supplemental bill, and accelerated at the end of Joe Biden’s term.
Europe’s biggest donor is Germany, which has provided some €17bn (including financial, humanitarian and military aid and excluding what is channeled through EU donors). Britain is second, with €15bn, followed by Denmark (see chart 4). But Europe’s biggest economies have the capacity to do much more. Annual commitments by Germany and Britain, along with America, work out to just 0.2% of their GDPs. “Aid to Ukraine thus looks more like a minor political pet project rather than a major fiscal effort,” concludes the Kiel report.
Indeed, in 1990 Germany allocated a greater share of its GDP to support Kuwait than it has for a war on Europe’s doorstep. Similarly, America committed significantly more money per year during the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq wars.
As a share of their output, the Baltic and Nordic states stand out (see chart 5). Estonia and Denmark, for example, have committed more than 2% of their pre-war GDP to supporting Ukraine in bilateral aid.
Generally speaking, the closer a country’s capital is to Russia, the higher its aid to Ukraine as a share of GDP (see chart 6). For example, Latvia and Lithuania—whose capitals are both less than 1,000km from Moscow—contributed 2% of their pre-war GDP. Japan, however, provides more bilateral aid than France, Italy and Spain in absolute terms and as a share of its GDP, despite being more than twice as distant from Moscow.
European leaders have been sent a clear message by the Trump administration: “Stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” as the defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it. European countries are already doing more than America to aid Ukraine. If America pulls further funding, they will need to do more still.■
The Wall Street Journal, February 19
The War Over the War
Expect a sloppy Ukraine outcome as the West reorients itself to reality.
Full text :
https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/19-fevrier-1.pdf
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19. Februar
Putins Maximalziele: „Es ist ein Weltkrieg, denn Putin will die Weltordnung ändern“
Moskau feiert die Gespräche in Riad. Dabei geht es nicht allein um die Ukraine. Der frühere russische Diplomat Boris Bondarew rechnet mit einem baldigen Schritt gegen die NATO.
Extraits:
(…) Putin „macht es professionell“, sagt Boris Bondarew der F.A.Z. Der langjährige russische Diplomat, der zuletzt in Genf als Abrüstungsfachmann tätig war, quittierte im Mai 2022 den Dienst aus Protest gegen den russischen Angriffskrieg und lebt nun in der Schweiz. „Er kämpft weiter und hat einfach abgewartet, bis die Amerikaner auf ihn zugehen.“ Putins Unterhändler würden nun sondieren, was die Amerikaner böten und dann mehr und mehr einfordern. Derweil wirke Putin weiter schmeichelnd auf Trump ein.
Auf amerikanischer Seite laufe dagegen ein „Festival der Unprofessionalität“, sagt Bondarew. Es sei unklar, was die Amerikaner wollten, wie Trumps „Deal“ aussehen solle, ob sie überhaupt verstünden, warum Putin den Krieg begonnen habe. „Er will die Weltordnung umbauen“, sagt Bondarew über seinen früheren Chef. Dazu gelte es vor allem, die Amerikaner zum Rückzug aus Europa zu bewegen und die NATO zu erledigen, um dann den einzelnen Ländern seine Bedingungen zu diktieren.
Am Freitag ist Bondarew in seiner Heimat zum „ausländischen Agenten“ erklärt worden und muss stets mit Racheakten der russischen Geheimdienste rechnen. „Putin verachtet Schwache“, sagt Bondarew. So werde Putin zum Beispiel Deutschland wieder Gas verkaufen, aber für mehr Geld als früher, und im Bedarfsfall mit einem Raketenschlag drohen, wenn keine Hilfe der Verbündeten zu erwarten sei. „Darauf läuft es hinaus.“
Den Kampf gegen die NATO aufnehmen müsse Putin dafür nicht, sagt der frühere Diplomat. Er rechnet mit einer „Salamitaktik“: Es reiche beispielsweise wie 2008 gegen Georgien unter dem Vorwand, Russen zu helfen, eine „Operation zur Friedenserzwingung“ zu beginnen und Truppen in ein baltisches Land zu schicken. Wenn sich dann erweise, dass das Bündnis nicht mehr willens sei einzugreifen und „nicht wegen einer solchen Kleinigkeit einen Krieg zu beginnen“, sei das Ziel erreicht, die NATO als Papiertiger zu entlarven. Dann wäre die Bündnisverpflichtung aus Artikel 5 wirklich so leer, wie Putins Scharfmacher schon postulieren. Dann würden sich etliche europäische Länder Moskau zuwenden.
Denkt auch der Kriegsherr so? Putin hält sich bedeckt. Zweifel an der Entschlossenheit der NATO äußerte im vergangenen März der belarussische Machthaber Alexandr Lukaschenko. „Fremde Leute“, sagte Lukaschenko damals über deutsche und amerikanische Truppen, würden „Litauen nicht schützen“, sondern „in der ersten ernsten Situation vom Schlachtfeld fliehen“. Bondarew sagt, sollte der russische Vorstoß doch auf Gegenwehr der Verbündeten stoße, ziehe Putin seine Truppen eben zurück und erkläre, das Ziel der Operation sei erreicht. (…)
Sollte nun der amerikanische Rückhalt fraglich sein, sei der Anreiz für den 72 Jahre alten Putin groß, möglichst rasch zu handeln, warnt Bondarew. Putin werde älter, Russland wirtschaftlich schwächer, die amerikanische Regierung könne sich wieder ändern. Putin könne und wolle seine Armee nicht auseinandergehen lassen. „Er will den Moment nicht verpassen“, vermutet der frühere Diplomat.
Der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj warnte auf der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, Russland werde im Sommer 100.000 bis 150.000 Soldaten vor allem in Belarus zusammenziehen und bereite schon für das nächste Jahr einen Krieg gegen NATO-Länder vor. Auch Bondarew entwirft ein Szenario, in dem Trumps Deal zur Ukraine Putin gibt, was dieser verlangt: die „Demilitarisierung“ und „Entnazifizierung“ der Ukraine. Das käme einer Auflösung der ukrainischen Armee und Neuwahlen gleich, bei denen Putin seine Leute in Kiew unterbringt. Millionen Ukrainer würden dann fliehen, vor allem nach Deutschland, vermutet Bondarew. (…)
Putins früherer Diplomat sieht das Kernproblem darin, dass der Westen in einer Mischung aus Angst, Konfliktscheu und Komfortdenken die Ukrainer viel zu zögerlich unterstützt habe und sich noch nicht einmal darüber einig war, dass Putin den Krieg verlieren müsse. „Die Ukraine hätte für euch den Krieg gewonnen, wenn ihr dem Land gleich genügend Panzer, Artillerie und Flugzeuge gegeben hättet,“ sagt Bondarew. „Aber wenn der Westen nicht will, dass Putin verliert, sind alle Konferenzen wie die in München vergebens. Das ist kein Krieg um Land, um den Donbass. Es ist ein Weltkrieg, denn Putin will die Weltordnung ändern. Jeden Tag bekommt Europa Weckrufe. Aber es wacht nicht auf.“
L’Express, 17 février
Alissa Ganieva, romancière russe : “Vladimir Poutine a transformé ce pays en un monstre”
Livres. Pour l’écrivaine, exilée depuis 2022 , à part des grandes villes prospères comme Moscou ou Saint-Petersbourg, le reste du pays “vit dans des conditions déplorables”.
Extraits:
D’une auteure russe qui s’affiche sur les réseaux sociaux avec un sweat-shirt sur lequel figure un coeur aux couleurs de l’Ukraine, on peut déduire deux choses : qu’elle est particulièrement courageuse; et qu’elle ne vit plus en Russie. Alissa Ganieva a pris la route de l’exil au lendemain de l’invasion de l’Ukraine, en février 2022, certaine qu’elle ne pourrait plus jamais prendre la parole librement dans son pays. Originaire du Daghestan, une région du Caucase, l’écrivaine de 39 ans a travaillé comme journaliste littéraire à Moscou avant de publier plusieurs romans ayant pour décor la région dans laquelle elle a grandi. Ce n’est pas le cas de Sentiments offensés, qui paraît aujourd’hui en France, une satire féroce de la société russe publiée dans le pays de Poutine en 2018. Dans une ville de province, un ministre s’effondre par une nuit de pluie en pleine rue, comme foudroyé. Sa maitresse est aux abois, de même que sa femme et tous les notables de la ville, tandis que chacun spécule sur l’identité du corbeau qui menaçait le potentat d’embarassantes révélations. L’intrigue est le prétexte à un jeu de massacre. Ganieva dissèque avec une ironie ravageuse les turpitudes d’une société phagocytée par la corruption, le népotisme, les dénonciations, le culte du chef jusqu’à l’absurde, l’instrumentalisation de l’histoire, de l’Eglise, et le déni collectif – lequel continue de faire son oeuvre aujourd’hui.
Désormais journaliste freelance basée dans un pays d’Asie centrale, la romancière revient sur la genèse, la réception et la toile de fond de ce livre dont elle se dit certaine qu’il “ne pourrait plus paraître dans la Russie actuelle”.
L’Express : Quelle était votre intention lors de l’écriture du livre?
Alissa Ganieva : J’étais surprise, en tant que critique littéraire, de voir qu’un grand nombre d’auteurs russes évitaient de traiter des problèmes politiques et sociaux contemporains. Le faire revenait pour eux à se comporter en journaliste, alors que par le passé les romanciers russes ont toujours dépeint les problèmes de leur temps. Tolstoï s’intéressait aux guerres contre le Japon, dans les Balkans, aux conflits entre hommes politiques. J’ai voulu renouer avec cela, non sans une certaine anxiété car je sentais que le pays se transformait en un monstre et courrait au-devant d’une catastrophe. (…)
Quand les choses se sont-elles dégradées ?
Après 2014 et l’annexion de la Crimée. Ensuite, le Covid a constitué un très bon prétexte pour interdire les événements dans la rue, tels que les manifestations. Puis a eu lieu l’extension du règne de Poutine [NDLR : une réforme de la Constitution en 2021 lui permet de se maintenir au pouvoir jusqu’en 2038], et l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022 a tout changé.
Quelles ont été les réactions au livre?
Des lecteurs m’ont dit que j’exagérais, que les choses n’étaient pas si graves, que les dénonciations étaient des cas isolés, que les lois répressives étaient certes absurdes, mais peu utilisées… Mais le récit ressemblait trop à leurs propres vies, ce n’était pas une lecture très confortable. Ils n’ont pas aimé le côté satirique du roman, qui a été publié dans une maison d’édition de Moscou très reconnue. Je n’imagine pas un instant qu’il serait à nouveau possible de le publier aujourd’hui.
Vous n’avez pas eu de souci avec les autorités à sa sortie?
Non, en 2018 la Russie prétendait être un pays pacifique, ouvert sur le monde. Le pays avait accueilli la Coupe de monde de football, des supporters étaient venus du monde entier. Le nombre de prisonniers politiques s’allongeait, mais leurs noms restaient inconnus. Si vous écriviez sur ces sujets, vous étiez mal vu dans la communauté artistique, mais vous pouviez le faire du moment que vous ne mentionniez pas Poutine. (…)
Dans le livre, vous racontez une visite du dirigeant du pays, qui n’est donc pas nommé, et la façon dont les autorités locales se hâtent de camoufler tous les problèmes de la ville, jusqu’aux médecins qui prennent la place des patients dans les lits d’hôpitaux. C’est une situation véridique?
C’est une histoire que vous pouviez observer dans n’importe quelle ville de province russe dès lors qu’un représentant du pouvoir la visitait. Les autorités locales faisaient tout pour présenter une façade et donner l’illusion que tout allait bien. C’est un paradoxe de la Russie, où l’on trouve de grandes villes prospères comme Moscou ou Saint-Petersbourg quand le reste du pays vit dans des conditions déplorables. Il existe toujours des régions sans chauffage, sans tout-à-l’égout, où les toilettes consistent en des cabines en bois. Les revenus des gens y sont dérisoires, ils ont juste de quoi s’acheter quelques denrées et n’ont pas les moyens de voyager ou de donner une éducation correcte à leurs enfants. Cela donne un argument à ceux qui veulent adopter une attitude paternaliste envers les Russes, qu’ils voient comme une population soumise, de serfs, incapable d’apprendre et de distinguer le bien du mal. Il a toujours également été plus facile de persécuter les gens originaires des ces régions, comme la Sibérie. Beaucoup de prisonniers politiques, souvent très jeunes, venaient de ces petites villes à l’époque soviétique. (…)
Vous dépeignez également l’infortune d’un professeur d’histoire arrêté pour avoir sous-entendu que les nazis avaient été autant mis en difficulté par le froid glacial de la Russie que par ses soldats lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale…
Une histoire très ordinaire, même si elle a un caractère fictionnel. Il existe une loi qui vise à criminaliser toute comparaison entre Hitler et Staline ou tout rabaissement du rôle de l’armée soviétique. Par exemple, il est interdit d’évoquer le viol de femmes allemandes par les soldats russes, de même que les accords entre Staline et Hitler pour se partager l’Europe [Le pacte germano-soviétique, en août 1939]. A la télévision, on expliquait que les purges de Staline n’étaient pas si massives, la répression pas si terrible. Tous les côtés négatifs de l’Histoire sont mis sous le tapis, les livres qui l’enseignent aujourd’hui sont bien différents de ceux qu’on avait dans les années 1990, qui étaient plus critiques envers l’URSS et la Russie. (…)
Vous relatez également la glorification du passé tsariste à travers un peintre qui représente les puissants de la ville dans des atours d’époque…
Oui, parce que dans sa tête, Poutine prolonge d’un côté l’empire soviétique, le réenforce, et de l’autre, il se situe dans la lignée de l’ère prébolchevique et du tsarisme. Poutine adore Alexandre III [1845-1894], un tsar réactionnaire qui a tout fait pour empêcher les réformes et s’appuyait sur le même triumvirat que l’on retrouve aujourd’hui : l’Eglise, l’Etat et les valeurs traditionnelles. (…)
Vous entrevoyez la possibilité d’un changement?
Aujourd’hui, pas vraiment. La Russie est devenue une dictature, il est quasi impossible d’y faire quoi que ce soit. Si vous donnez 1 rouble à la Fondation anticorruption de Navalny, vous irez en prison le lendemain pour terrorisme et extrémisme, et ce pour plusieurs années. Le nombre de policiers et de militaires par habitants en Russie reste l’un des plus élevés au monde. Il y a quelques années, une fenêtre pour le changement s’était ouverte, lors des grandes manifestations contre Poutine [de 2011 à 2014 essentiellement]. Mais on a laissé passer cette chance et le pouvoir s’est renforcé chaque année depuis.
Un discours que l’on entend consiste à dire qu’il est impossible pour la Russie d’être une démocratie en raison de sa dimension, qu’il est nécessaire d’avoir un pouvoir fort pour maintenir l’unité du pays, mais le fédéralisme pourrait vraiment marcher, s’il était mis en place de façon honnête, pas juste dans la forme. Dans les années 1990, personne n’était préparé à la chute de l’Union soviétique, la pauvreté était immense et la période est restée un traumatisme pour bien des Russes, ce qui a justifié à leurs yeux le fait de vouloir reconstituer l’empire, comme si c’était un paradis perdu. Mais il finira par y avoir d’autres opportunités pour le changement. La nouvelle génération est plus ouverte. C’est une période très importante. Toutes les forces démocratiques doivent se tenir prêtes.
Sentiments offensés, par Alissa Ganieva. Gallimard, 256 p., 22 €.
The Wall Street Journal, February 15
NATO Is Ukraine’s Future and Always Will Be
An illusory concession to Vladimir Putin clears the way for the business that really matters.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/15-fevrier-2.pdf
Le Point, 15 février
😕 L’Europe hors jeu : Trump et Poutine négocient l’avenir de l’Ukraine sans nous
CHRONIQUE. Les Européens tombent des nues en constatant que Trump et Poutine négocient entre eux l’avenir de l’Ukraine et d’une partie du continent. Qu’attendons-nous pour nous réveiller ?
Extraits:
Le plus étonnant dans les annonces récentes de Donald Trump sur l’Ukraine, c’est… l’étonnement des Européens. Depuis des mois, non seulement nous savions qu’élu, il entrerait rapidement en contact avec Poutine pour mettre fin à la guerre, mais nous connaissions plus ou moins les termes sur la base desquels il entreprendrait cette démarche. Le surprenant n’est donc pas là, mais dans l’impréparation des Européens, qui donnent l’impression de tomber des nues. (…)
Pourtant, tout était clair : Trump entendait passer par-dessus la tête de l’Ukraine et des alliés européens pour aboutir à un accord dont il demanderait ensuite à ceux-ci d’assumer la responsabilité financière et militaire. Qu’avons-nous fait pour avoir notre mot à dire, pour poser nos conditions ou, à défaut, pour nous y préparer ? Rien.
Comme le lapin dans les phares de la voiture, nous avons attendu l’inévitable, que nous abordons dans les pires conditions. L’Allemagne est aux abonnés absents pour plusieurs mois et la France ne vaut pas beaucoup mieux. Je comprends aujourd’hui les années 1930, lorsque des dirigeants intelligents et patriotes ont pu aller au désastre les yeux ouverts sans faire ce qu’ils savaient nécessaire au fond d’eux-mêmes. Les circonstances sont certes moins tragiques, mais ce lâche renoncement de nos pays présage mal de leur avenir dans le monde de fer qui vient.
Avec Trump ou avec Kamala Harris, je l’avais écrit dans mes chroniques, les États-Unis voulaient s’extraire d’un conflit qui n’était pas leur priorité et où ils ne s’étaient engagés que du fait de l’incapacité des Européens d’apporter un soutien militaire à la victime d’une agression russe dont ils ne pouvaient accepter un éventuel succès. D’ailleurs, ils étaient toujours restés discrets sur les questions territoriales contrairement aux déclarations va-t-en-guerre de certains Européens et ils s’étaient opposés à l’entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan.
La vraie différence entre les deux candidats portait sur la méthode. (…)
C’est la tactique de négociation de Trump qui peut soulever des inquiétudes. Qu’il dévoile d’emblée les points principaux de la position américaine peut encore se justifier dans la mesure où elle correspond, d’une part, à la situation sur le champ de bataille et, d’autre part, aux lignes rouges russes. Ç’aurait été du temps perdu, par exemple, de se battre sur l’entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan, dont on sait depuis longtemps qu’elle est inacceptable par Moscou. Or, Trump veut aller vite. C’est même là le problème essentiel.
En effet, d’expérience, je peux prédire que la Russie conduira la négociation à sa manière, c’est-à-dire, après avoir empoché les concessions américaines, ligne par ligne en ne cédant pas sur le moindre détail. (…)
Revenons aux Européens. Ils doivent maintenant être éveillés et comprendre ce qui les menace. Du moins, on l’espère. Pourquoi Français, Britanniques, Polonais et quelques autres ne se réunissent-ils pas de toute urgence pour définir une position et prendre les dispositions qui s’imposent ? Que feront-ils si la négociation échoue et si les États-Unis renoncent à soutenir l’Ukraine ? Et si elle réussit et si on leur demande de fournir une force sur le territoire de ce pays ? (…) Si c’est une force de combat, quels devraient être sa taille, son mandat et sa mission ? Les questions – il y en a beaucoup d’autres – sont multiples, concrètes et graves. Attendrons-nous passivement que le parrain américain nous dicte notre rôle, dont il aura défini avec la Russie la forme et le fond ? Je le crains.
Or, ce qui se passe aujourd’hui à Washington dépasse de loin la guerre en Ukraine. La réhabilitation spectaculaire de Poutine n’est rien moins que l’affirmation de relations internationales dont le seul fondement est le rapport de force le plus nu et le plus brutal. Le gendarme américain a rejoint les brigands. Le rêve européen d’une société fondée sur le droit international et le compromis s’évanouit. C’est la jungle. À nous de prendre la mesure de la gravité du moment pour y survivre.
The Wall Street Journal, February 14
Vance Wields Threat of Sanctions, Military Action to Push Putin Into Ukraine Deal
In interview with The Wall Street Journal, vice president says Ukraine must have ‘sovereign independence’
Extraits:
PARIS—Vice President JD Vance said Thursday that the U.S. would hit Moscow with sanctions and potentially military action if Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t agree to a peace deal with Ukraine that guarantees Kyiv’s long-term independence.
Vance said the option of sending U.S. troops to Ukraine if Moscow failed to negotiate in good faith remained “on the table,” striking a far tougher tone than did Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who on Wednesday suggested the U.S. wouldn’t commit forces.
“There are economic tools of leverage, there are of course military tools of leverage” the U.S. could use against Putin, Vance said.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal hours after President Trump said he would start negotiating with Putin to end the war in Ukraine, Vance said: “I think there is a deal that is going to come out of this that’s going to shock a lot of people.”
The vice president’s remarks, coming a day before a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, offered the Trump administration’s strongest-yet support for Kyiv in the face of Russian demands that it disarm and replace the current government.
“The president is not going to go in this with blinders on,” Vance said. “He’s going to say, ‘Everything is on the table, let’s make a deal.’”
On Thursday, Trump told reporters that Ukraine would be a party to talks with Russia, a key demand of Zelensky’s. But Trump also said that Russia should be allowed back into the Group of Seven club of wealthy countries and that membership for Ukraine in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was something Russia couldn’t allow. (…)
The Economist, February 13
An interview with Volodymyr Zelensky : Ukraine fears being cut out of talks between America and Russia
Hours before Trump’s call with Putin, we spoke to an apprehensive Volodymyr Zelensky
Extraits:
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY, Ukraine’s man of action, doesn’t take to limbo easily. His five and a half years as president have been a series of brutal tests. But the waiting game is the most palpably frustrating. Three weeks after Donald Trump took office, the Ukrainian president still doesn’t know what his plans are for Ukraine. Mr Zelensky reveals only minimal contact with the new leader of the free world: just “a couple of calls” since a meeting in September. He says he is “sure” Mr Trump has no oven-ready peace plan. How could there be when no one has been consulting Ukraine about it? He is not being informed about contacts between the White House and the Kremlin; what he knows he gets from the press like everyone else. There are “probably” some ideas that he should know about, but he’s yet to be told about them. “We haven’t seen them, and we haven’t heard any proposals.” The fear for Ukraine is that a deal between Mr Trump and Vladimir Putin could be done over his head.
President Zelensky is in an oddly upbeat mood during an hour-long conversation in his presidential compound in Kyiv. His face is tired, but he has been keeping fit, the calloused palms of his hands testifying to the 7am gym sessions he squeezes in after sleepless nights of military reports and explosions. He even occasionally laughs, subduing the angrier edges of his personality, in what appears to be a communications push ahead of the Munich Security Conference that starts on February 14th. This conference could be the Trump team’s signal to snap into action, he suggests. “There will be two large delegations [America’s and Ukraine’s], there will be meetings.” Yet the mood music is ominous. Just a few hours after this interview, the American president declared on social media that there is “little to show” for support of Ukraine. “This war MUST and WILL end soon,” he wrote. Mr Zelensky confirms he will sit down in Munich with Mr Trump’s deputy, J.D. Vance, a man who once claimed to “not care what happens to Ukraine one way or another”.
Mr Zelensky sidesteps that insult. “Honestly, I think the vice-president of the United States today is focused on domestic issues,” he says. Ditto the rest of the Trump team. But he admits he still doesn’t understand the new administration’s real intentions. “We will be able to discuss some things at the meeting, and then I will find out their vision. I think the most important thing is that they hear our vision.” He warns the Americans not to keep Ukraine out of the loop. That has been Mr Putin’s aim from the start, he thinks, and he worries the White House could be easily misled: “If Russia is left alone with America, Putin with Trump, or their teams, they will receive manipulative information.”
The Ukrainian president is clearly concerned by some of the early signals coming from Team Trump. In January Marco Rubio, now secretary of state, suggested that both Russia and Ukraine must make “concessions” for peace. Too much, the Ukrainian president says, is being asked of the non-aggressor. Readiness to sit down with “the killer” (Mr Putin) is compromise enough. “Imagine that Hitler wasn’t destroyed…Imagine that after everything he did to the Jews…people said, okay, let’s look for a compromise.” Mr Putin, he says, has “acted like Hitler” and the wrong type of diplomacy would rehabilitate him. Ukraine is ready to negotiate, but only with security guarantees that could hold Russia back from fresh aggression. A history of broken deals has shown that talks and ceasefires alone will not work. “Without a security guarantee, it’s zero…[Putin] doesn’t want any peace.”
The trouble is that America and some European states appear unwilling or unable to make credible commitments of the kind Mr Zelensky is demanding. He admits that Nato membership is unlikely because of opposition from America, Germany and Hungary—though, he says, the latter would snap into line if ever Mr Trump asked. “No one is giving up.” But if the door remains shut, Ukraine must “build NATO on its territory”, meaning, he explains, a strengthened Ukrainian army. (…)
Mr Zelensky has a warning for those who think that a quick deal undercutting Ukraine will make their lives easier. Western leaders focused exclusively on domestic politics are “delusional,” he says. Mr Putin is coming for them too, he claims. “No one understands what war is until it comes to your home. I don’t want to scare anyone. It will come. I’m just telling you the facts.” (…)
Amid this moment of peril he insists that his own position is secure and he has public support. But there is growing dissent in the ranks, and he hints at it. “There are people who are very patriotic, and there are people who are not.” He dodges a question about his own future, and whether he will seek re-election, once an election can be held. That is not on his mind, he insists, perhaps unconvincingly. He is disdainful of comments made by Mr Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, General Keith Kellogg, that Ukraine could hold elections during wartime. How could you run them in a city like Kharkiv, under daily Russian bombardment? “It’s interesting when General Kellogg thinks about the elections. He’s 82 [in fact, 80] years old, and he thinks about the elections in Ukraine.” The Ukrainian president insists that power has not poisoned him. That, after all, is what sets him apart from the man in the Kremlin. “And I have time, he doesn’t. He will definitely die soon.”
Mr Zelensky says he is determined that Mr Putin will not use a new American presidency to sideline Ukraine. “Look, I will not let Putin win. This is what I live by.” Ukraine’s president is sticking by his guns to get the maximum he can in the way of security guarantees. Less obvious is what, if anything, he can do if Mr Trump cuts a deal without him.■
The Economist, February 11
The transparent battlefield : The added dangers of fighting in Ukraine when everything is visible
There is no more fog of war
Large excerpts:
For centuries the “fog of war”, the inability to see through the confusion of combat, has been a given. No longer. The front lines in the war between Russia and Ukraine are now saturated with surveillance drones livestreaming video footage in real time. Everyone can see pretty much everything. Armies are having to work out how to fight on what is being called the transparent battlefield.
The surveillance is layered. Orbiting satellites scan the Earth from space. Tactical drones have ranges of 200km or more. Smaller surveillance drones relay sightings to the operators of first-person view drones (FPVs), which carry a small munition to attack soldiers on the ground. Add a thermal-imaging camera and soldiers can also be spotted at night.
“Darwin”, an FPV operator in Ukraine’s 92nd Brigade, says the changes that the drones have wrought are colossal. Three years ago, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, a drone team could operate in open fields. Now they hide in the woods and don’t leave their positions during the day. “Before, operations could be carefully planned,” he says. “Now every mission is a lottery, you can be lucky or unlucky.”
Reconnaissance and foot patrols from forward positions have virtually ceased and it is increasingly perilous to evacuate the wounded or retrieve the dead. Infantry avoid gathering in large groups. Open ground is a killing zone, speed the only protection. Soldiers use quadbikes and motorcycles to outrun the reaction time of an FPV operator. And though it is impossible to move, it is also dangerous to stay in one place. Fortified trench systems are obvious targets. Armoured vehicles have been virtually neutralised. “When a tank appears it’s like dropping a plate of food in front of a table of hungry drone operators,” says Darwin.
To disrupt the omnipresent drones, Russians and Ukrainians are engaged in an electronic-warfare arms race. (…)
Bad weather and night afford some protection. Wind and rain hamper drone flight, cloud and fog reduce visibility. It’s harder to orient a drone in the dark, says Darwin. Thermal cameras can see soldiers at night, but not at any great distance.
Long-standing tactics have been upended. “One of the most obvious”, says Glib Voloskyi, an analyst for Come Back Alive, one of the largest volunteer organisations raising money to donate equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces, “is that it’s hard to achieve surprise.” It is also almost impossible to achieve local force superiority: to gather and concentrate troops for an attack. The lethality of fire is greater because targets are easily identified, and artillery adjustments can be made quickly. The transparent battlefield gives the defender the advantage. “Offensive operations,” says Mr Voloskyi, “are a really nasty business.”
Infantry now operate in small groups, which are harder to spot. The Russians have been able to make advances in recent months by sending handfuls of soldiers forward to gain a foothold. Most are picked off by the drones; this incremental nibbling, says Mr Voloskyi, is working in part because the Russian tolerance for casualties is high and refuseniks are shot.
AI is being used to analyse surveillance data and cross-reference it with signals intelligence and open-source information, like Russian soldiers’ social-media posts, which can reveal their positions. But object-recognition software is in the early stages. Mr Voloskyi says AI can generate false signals, muddling the picture, “and this might actually decrease transparency”. There is a difference, he points out, between seeing something and understanding what you are looking at. Last summer the Russians saw the Ukrainian build-up of troops in the Sumy area, but never imagined they would attack across the border into the Kursk region. “That’s the problem with transparency,” says Mr Voloskyi. “You can see actions, but you don’t necessarily correctly interpret them.” ■
Le Point, 3 février, article payant
« Je vais mourir ? » : à Pokrovsk, le calvaire des soldats ukrainiens blessés
REPORTAGE. Les envoyés spéciaux du Point ont pu passer 24 heures dans un poste médical avancé ukrainien, au plus près du front et des troupes russes.
Extraits:
La veille, il y avait encore un cochon à l’arrière de la maison. Dans le jardin potager, les cultures fanent sur pied. Les sillons tracés dans la terre noire attendent d’être semés, mais les propriétaires sont partis, cédant de bon gré leur ferme aux militaires. Entouré de remises pour les outils et d’un garage pour les engins agricoles, un conteneur vert sombre recouvert de treillis de camouflage et monté sur châssis occupe le centre de la courette. Une rampe métallique grillagée mène à son entrée.
Il pourrait s’agir d’une roulotte, dont les roues auraient été immobilisées, de clapiers ou même d’une remise mobile, mais, à l’intérieur, dans la lumière blanche des néons, deux lits en enfilade, placés sous les spots et reliés à des instruments médicaux, forment le bloc opératoire d’un point de stabilisation mobile. Les blessés sont amenés dans ce poste médical avancé, le plus proche de la zone des combats, pour y être stabilisés avant d’être transportés en ambulance vers un hôpital militaire où ils reçoivent les soins adéquats. Les premières heures sont cruciales pour la survie des blessés de guerre.
Les forces russes contournent par le sud la ville de Pokrovsk. (…) L’intérêt stratégique de Pokrovsk et des routes qui y mènent ainsi que le projet de contrôler l’entièreté du territoire de la région de Donetsk expliquent que l’état-major russe y concentre une partie importante de ses forces.
Pokrovsk et ses alentours constituent ainsi la zone la plus disputée de la ligne de front. Les combats qui s’y déroulent font des victimes par dizaines chaque jour. Les Russes tomberaient en plus grand nombre, mais le camp ukrainien subit aussi des pertes colossales, sur lesquelles Kiev refuse de communiquer. Pour la seule journée de jeudi 23 janvier, Kiev a dénombré, sur l’ensemble de la ligne de front, plus de 100 bombes guidées larguées par des avions russes, 5 400 obus tirés par les canons ennemis et 2 500 attaques avec des drones kamikazes. Mais c’est la portion des alentours de Pokrovsk qui a subi le plus grand nombre de ces assauts : un déferlement de violence.
La nuit est tombée depuis longtemps quand surgissent deux ambulances au bout de la cour. Les médecins ont été prévenus et attendent dans le froid au pied de leur conteneur médicalisé, à côté des brancards, alors que les blessés qui ne peuvent se lever sont débarqués, puis transbahutés en civière vers les châlits. En tout, ce sont quatre militaires qui ont été fauchés par des bombes sur leurs positions au sud-ouest de Pokrovsk. Le soldat le plus mal en point est hissé sur un brancard vers le conteneur, suivi par Andréi, qui tente, lui, de monter la rampe comme s’il était valide. Les pansements enserrent ses mains comme deux moufles ensanglantées.
Les infirmiers l’aident d’abord à s’allonger avant de le déshabiller. Sous le choc, il s’exprime confusément et interpelle de mystérieux interlocuteurs invisibles. « Quelle langue parlent-ils, à l’assaut, à l’assaut ! C’est du russe ! » L’anesthésiste calme le blessé, qui s’endort peu à peu sous l’effet des sédatifs. « Le choc et l’adrénaline rendent les blessés imprévisibles, commente Marik, et parfois même dangereux. Notre premier geste, avant même d’observer le patient, c’est de le désarmer. »
La blessure remonte à plus de six heures, mais le soldat n’a pu quitter sa position plus tôt à cause de la proximité des Russes. Il était retranché dans un blindage, le souterrain fortifié d’une tranchée, lorsque les soldats russes ont donné l’assaut et jeté une grenade au fond de l’abri. Il a protégé son visage dans ses mains et perdu des doigts.
Dans le deuxième lit en enfilade, Sergey grimace de douleur. Alors que Marik, l’anesthésiste, procède calmement à une première injection de kétamine, autant pour relaxer son patient que pour atténuer la douleur, les vêtements de Sergey sont rapidement découpés, mis en charpie : le pantalon d’abord, puis la veste, les couches de laine et les sous-vêtements. En quelques minutes, Sergey est nu comme un ver, tout blanc sous la lumière éblouissante à l’exception des piqûres de sang noirci sur ses mains et son visage. Au milieu de son tibia, un trou béant, d’où débordent, mélangés, les chairs boursouflées et les os déchiquetés.
Ironie du sort, Sergey a mal utilisé son garrot, le tourniquet, qui n’a pas bloqué la circulation sanguine, lui sauvant ainsi la jambe car, explique Marik, si le membre n’est pas irrigué pendant plusieurs heures, il meurt. « La blessure est grave, précise-t-il, mais sa jambe sera sauvée. Sergey sera opéré puis immobilisé durant plusieurs mois. » Andrei a lui aussi été sauvé pour avoir mal placé son tourniquet. (…)
Les militaires blessés ne se plaignent pas, parfois pas assez, et minimisent souvent leurs problèmes. Certains se sentent coupables de quitter leurs camarades. Comme Vassil, venu pour une petite plaie dans le dos, qui ne veut pas déranger, voudrait juste un pansement, mais qui dévoile sous l’omoplate un trou immense qui commence presque à pourrir. « L’odeur ne laisse aucun doute », décrit Marik.
Il a reçu un schrapnell deux jours plus tôt, mais a continué à se battre comme si de rien n’était. Il a gardé son pantalon, ses bottes et son bonnet vissé sur le crâne. « On te le laisse, dit Micha, le chirurgien, puisque tu n’es blessé qu’au dos, mais enlève au moins ton pantalon. » Vassil s’exécute sans zèle. Les médecins tiennent à tout vérifier, car parfois les gars cachent des blessures, les croyant bénignes.
Une pause, les derniers blessés sont emmenés en ambulance dans la nuit. Le silence retombe sur la cour, où la plupart des médecins fument. « On fait ça depuis trois ans. C’est la routine, le boulot, c’est comme boire un café », explique Sergey, médecin-chef, responsable des évacuations et des points de stabilisation de la 59e brigade. L’aide-infirmier lui rétorque : « Oui, mais le café, ça prend plus de temps. » (…)
L’équipe manque bien souvent de médicaments appropriés et d’oxygène, elle doit parfois se tourner vers les associations de volontaires qui leur donnent gracieusement ce dont les soignants ont besoin. À cause de la bureaucratie, de la corruption aussi, les services officiels n’arrivent pas à satisfaire les demandes. « La guerre aggrave les défauts d’un système qui en comptait déjà beaucoup, la corruption notamment. »
Mais le pire pour les médecins et le reste de l’équipe, c’est la fatigue qui les mine. Mobilisés ou volontaires de la première heure, ils n’ont d’autre choix que d’attendre la fin de la guerre, car il n’y aura pas de relève. « On a une semaine ou deux de vacances tous les six mois. C’est dur de rentrer et de se retrouver avec des gens qui ne connaissent pas la guerre, et c’est encore plus dur de repartir pour revenir ici. » Marik n’a plus fêté l’anniversaire de sa fille depuis le début de la guerre, Sergey non plus, et l’aide-soignant regrette le temps où il pratiquait l’apiculture : « Depuis que j’ai entendu le bruit des drones kamikazes, je n’arrive plus à m’occuper de mes abeilles. » (…)
De nouveaux blessés débarquent, branle-bas de combat : il faut réveiller Micha et Marik. Allongé sur le lit médicalisé, celui dont ses frères d’armes disent qu’il s’appelle Gennady, un bandage autour de la tête, dit avoir mal à la tête. « C’est que tu es vivant », lui lance Micha, tout en le prenant en charge. « Un cas léger, une commotion probablement », explique Marik. « Comment t’appelles-tu ? » questionne Micha pour remplir la fiche de prise en charge. « Je ne sais pas », répond l’autre.
Micha lui demande de bouger les jambes pendant qu’on lui découpe ses vêtements : tout fonctionne. Mais lorsque Marik ôte le bandage de fortune, un flot de sang s’échappe de son oreille. Personne n’a besoin d’un signe : c’est grave, un éclat d’obus a pénétré son oreille et s’est probablement niché dans son cerveau. « Quel âge as-tu ? » demande l’infirmière. « Ta date de naissance ? » Micha décoche sa vanne : « Tu lui demandes sa date de naissance alors qu’il ne sait même pas son nom… » Elle revient à la charge et insiste pour savoir quand il est né. « Je sais pas ; peut-être aujourd’hui. » C’était le treizième blessé grave de la nuit, il y en aura encore un dernier. « Je vais mourir ? » L’infirmière sourit. « Oui, mais pas aujourd’hui. »
The Guardian, February 1, free accès
‘Everybody is tired. The mood has changed’: the Ukrainian army’s desertion crisis
Some of those abandoning the frontline say the longer the war goes on, ‘the more people like me there will be’
Extraits:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine three years ago, Viktor* was ready to die for his country. He volunteered to defend Kyiv as enemy tanks appeared and joined Ukraine’s armed forces. In the spring of 2023 he was fighting in the village of Tonenke, near the eastern city of Avdiivka. “When I arrived I was super-motivated. If necessary I would give my life,” he recalled.
Gradually, however, he became disillusioned. The battle was furious. “The Russians would smash our positions to the ground,” he said. Senior Ukrainian commanders gave unrealistic orders. Then, while he was defending a ruined building, a panel fell on his shoulder. After receiving injections to reduce the pain, he was told to return to the front. “I realised I’m nobody. Just a number,” he said.
In May that same year, Viktor left his position to seek further medical treatment. He did not come back. His commander marked him down as awol. Viktor is one of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers who have abandoned their units. The exact figure is a military secret, but officials concede the number is large. They say it is understandable, when tired troops have served for months without a proper break.
The issue of desertion has made headlines in Ukraine. Last week the government launched an investigation into the 155th Mechanised Brigade. Fifty-six soldiers disappeared while training in France. Hundreds of others are said to be missing. The unit’s commander, Dmytro Riumshyn, was arrested. He faces 10 years in jail for failing to carry out his official duties and to report unauthorised absences.
After three years of war, Ukraine is desperately short of soldiers, especially infantry. This has made it easier for Russia’s army to advance in the east. There are structural issues too. New brigades have been built from scratch. They performed poorly. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, recently ordered a change in policy, with inexperienced recruits integrated into existing battalions.
Some who desert keep a low profile. Others live and work openly. Viktor said he went back to his brigade in August 2023 but was told he was not wanted. Once a trained sniper, he now runs a garage in western Ukraine, where he repairs military vehicles for free. Had he killed Russians? “Many,” he replied. “Everybody is tired. The mood has changed. People used to hug soldiers in the streets. Now they worry about being conscripted.”
Viktor added there was a severe lack of frontline manpower. In February 2023 he was given a 10-day break – only to be recalled a day after he got home, as Avdiivka came under attack. Two people from his company had been killed, he said. The others were wounded. “One guy lost an arm. Another a leg. Some had bullet wounds. Nobody is completely OK. Even so, we managed to achieve some tasks,” he said.
Another deserter, Oleksii*, said he took part in Ukrainian offensives in the southern Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. He described one battle as chaotic, with bullets flying, mortars landing in a forest clearing, and insufficient artillery support. During the winter of 2022 he had a row with a new commander, applied unsuccessfully for a transfer, and got hurt. “I reached boiling point. So I decided to go where nobody can find me,” he said. (…)
Andrii Hrebeniuk, the sergeant major of an infantry battalion, fighting in the Donetsk oblast town of Velyka Novosilka, said soldiers went awol “pretty frequently”. “Some return. Some don’t,” he said. “It’s about morale more than injury. They need a psychological reset. They go and see their families and reappear after a couple of months.” Did he understand them? “I don’t sympathise and I don’t condemn,” he replied.
Hrebeniuk’s mechanised brigade, the 110th, last week took the unusual step of saying it was critically short of personnel. It had enough drones and artillery, but no infantry, at a time of constant Russian attacks. “We need to break the stereotype that if you join up you will be dead in five minutes,” Hrebeniuk said. He added: “Simple things keep you alive, like digging in, cleaning your weapons, and paying attention during first aid training.”
Reshetylova said there were hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers staying in their positions and “not going anywhere”. The recruitment crisis could be solved, she added, if Ukraine’s allies sent their own troops. If they did not, and Kyiv fell, Vladimir Putin would keep going. She said: “As I see it, it is Europe’s armies that are absent without leave. They don’t understand – or don’t want to understand – that this is their war too.”
*Names have been changed
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/31/tired-mood-changed-ukrainian-army-desertion-crisis
Trump’s Ukraine Moment
A U.S. president saying that he wants the war over is a big change.
Article intégral : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/29-janvier-2.pdf
The Economist, January 28, pay wall
Danger in the Donbas : Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling
An ominous defeat in the eastern town of Velyka Novosilka
Extraits:
THE FINAL battle for the small Donbas town of Velyka Novosilka dragged on for six days, though the outcome was obvious long before. Things became critical early in the new year, when Russian troops took over villages immediately to its north-east and west, pinching the Ukrainian defenders on three sides. By Thursday 23rd, the narrow corridor to what had become a nearly-isolated pocket had become impassable. The order to retreat came as soon as a mist descended. It was a nightmareish task that had to be completed on foot, under drone-filled skies, and across a river. The evidence of triumphant Russian propaganda channels suggests that many failed to make it.
Russia’s small victory in Velyka Novosilka (population just 5,000 before the war) followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses, and their eventual retreat. The immediate focus for the units that had been fighting there will now probably shift back to Pokrovsk to the north, a much-bigger logistical hub that Russia has been attacking at various intensities for the past six months. The fighting there has already prompted the Ukrainians to shut a crucial coking-coal mine—one that previously provided half the needs of the domestic metallurgy industry. Russian forces are also advancing nearby towards the site of useful lithium ore deposits.
The Kremlin’s plan probably depends on where it can make quick progress. The minimum requirement of its “special military operation” appears still to be occupying the entirety of the Donbas region (comprising the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk), regaining control of Russia’s own Kursk region, which Ukraine has partly occupied, and holding on to the “land bridge” it seized in the early stages of the war connecting Crimea to Russia. (…)
The modern battlefield—dominated by drones that spy, stalk and strike—is rapidly changing the nature of the fighting. In Velyka Novosilka, for example, armoured vehicles played a minimal role. “One of our tanks crept out near the frontlines,” says Captain Ivan Sekach, an officer with Ukraine’s 110th brigade defending the town. “Ten drones attacked, setting it alight almost immediately.” The fighting instead was done by infantry—small Russian groups of three, four, five, sent forward in waves. Most met a swift and bloody end. But some managed to establish new positions and move the fight closer, forcing the Ukrainians to retreat.
The Russian tactics are not dynamic, but are causing Ukraine no end of bother. Put simply, Russia has the infantry and Ukraine does not. Issues with mobilisation and desertion have hit Ukraine’s reserves hard. “We struggle to replace our battlefield losses,” says Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, the commander of a Ukrainian tactical grouping in the Donbas. “They might throw a battalion’s worth of soldiers at a position we’ve manned with four or five soldiers.” The brigades that make up the Donbas frontline are consistently understaffed, under pressure, and cracking. The front line keeps creeping back. (…)
The world’s focus has shifted to negotiations that have yet to happen; on the contradictory signals from the Trump administration that one day look positive for Ukraine, and the next less so. For those doing the fighting, the agenda is less abstract. As long as the front line keeps moving, Mr Putin appears to have little reason to compromise. The Russians will not run out of weapons any time soon, says the intelligence officer Cherniak. “They have at least a year, possibly two, to continue fighting as they have been.” (…)
Three years into its grinding attritional fight, it is still unclear if Russia can turn its many tactical gains into something bigger—enough to press deeper behind Ukraine’s weakening lines and to cause real worry. Mr Cherniak says the evidence so far suggests that this is unlikely. “We see their reserves, their missiles, their armour—and it’s not enough. Not yet.” Captain Sekach thinks luck may also have played a role. In Velyka Novosilka, he says, Russian armoured columns on more than one occasion broke through and got behind Ukrainian defences, but without realising it. Lost and disoriented, they turned back. “The Russian army doesn’t reward smart people, that’s my only explanation,” he says. “But we can’t count on it staying that way.”■
The Wall Street Journal, January 22, pay wall
Peace in Ukraine Needn’t Mean Russian Victory
It serves U.S. interests to keep backing Kyiv so that it can negotiate from a position of strength.
Extraits:
As President Trump seeks to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to support the Ukrainian military. Ukraine can reach a just and lasting outcome to this war, but only with our help.
Since Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, the topic of Ukraine funding has become increasingly politicized and detached from the facts on the ground. I worked on Russia and Ukraine policy at the White House over the past four years, and there are clear, straightforward, nonpartisan reasons why the U.S. should keep up its military aid for Ukraine.
First, Ukraine is an effective partner that is degrading the Russian military and, in the process, strengthening its position for a future negotiation. Press coverage of this war is frequently lopsided in portraying Russia as on the march and Ukraine on its back foot. The reality is more complex. (…) But it’s also true that Ukraine is imposing extraordinary costs on Russia, which is suffering an average of 1,500 casualties a day. It’s an open question whether Moscow can continue to recruit enough soldiers to replace its staggering losses, estimated at more than 700,000 casualties overall since 2022. (…)
Second, with U.S. help, Ukraine can push Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations. Russia wants the world to believe it can sustain its military campaign indefinitely, but the current landscape tells a different story. The Russian military is struggling, and the Russian economy is deteriorating. Thanks in part to U.S. and allied sanctions, inflation in Russia is above 9%, and its benchmark interest rate is at 21%. (…)
Maintaining military aid for Ukraine while simultaneously applying economic pressure on Russia would increase the likelihood of a durable peace. The Trump administration has made clear that its objective is to end the fighting. But to secure a just and lasting resolution, Ukraine requires leverage for talks. Cutting off aid would rob Ukraine of leverage, shift battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor and undermine Ukraine’s negotiating position at a critical moment.
Third, helping Ukraine succeed remains fundamentally in America’s national-security interest. Russia is seeking to legitimize territorial conquest by force. If Russian aggression isn’t halted in Ukraine, then Moscow could become emboldened to threaten the eastern-flank members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and aggressors around the world would become more likely to imitate Russia’s behavior. It is no coincidence that Iran, China and North Korea have all been deepening their support for Russia. (…)
Congress should make it a priority to appropriate additional security assistance funding for Ukraine. Only the U.S. has the capacity to provide Ukraine with the equipment it needs to prevail. (…)
As this war persists, it can be tempting for nonparticipating countries to lose interest. Curtailing security assistance to Ukraine now, however, would be a historic mistake that would play to Russia’s advantage.
The U.S. has led a historic, yearslong effort to help Ukraine protect its sovereignty, defend against Russian aggression and generate the leverage needed to secure a just and lasting peace. In the past few months, the U.S. has expanded sanctions on Russia, provided Ukraine with nonpersistent antipersonnel landmines, permitted the cross-border use of American-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems and supplied Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets and hundreds of air-defense missiles. Ukraine has a healthy stockpile of key munitions, while the pressures on Russia’s economy and military are growing.
Ukraine can enter a future negotiation with strength and reach an acceptable outcome to this war, but only if the U.S. continues to support the Ukrainian military and apply economic pressure on Russia. Now is the time to finish the job.
Mr. Shimer served on the National Security Council staff, 2021-25, most recently as the director for Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and previously as director for Russian affairs.
The Economist, January 22, pay wall
Death from above : Russian pilots appear to be hunting Ukrainian civilians
Residents of Kherson are dodging murderous drones
Extraits:
KHERSON, A REGIONAL capital in southern Ukraine, endured eight months of Russian occupation before Ukrainian forces liberated it in November 2022. The Russians retreated to the other side of the Dnieper river, but have indiscriminately shelled the city ever since. In June 2023 they blew up the nearby Kakhovka dam, flooding low-lying areas of Kherson. Now the city’s 80,000 inhabitants, down from a prewar population of 280,000, face a new sort of misery. For six months Russian drones have been attacking civilians daily, chasing cars and pedestrians through the streets in what locals call a “safari”.
There have been more than 1,000 drone strikes since last summer, injuring over 500 people and killing 36, according to municipal authorities. Surveillance drones patrol high up; smaller attack drones (known as FPVs, or first-person-view drones), with a flying time of 20-40 minutes, sit on rooftops to conserve battery power. The munitions dropped are often makeshift: mortar shells, grenades, canisters containing shrapnel or darts, or bottles of petrol that ignite.
Shops, schools, clinics, private houses, delivery vans, buses, firetrucks and other first responders are routinely targeted. Several administrative officials have been wounded. In one case, says Roman Mrochko, the head of the military authority in Kherson, a minibus “was almost completely destroyed, but the driver heroically saved the injured people by driving, you could say on scrap metal, to the hospital.” In the riverside neighbourhoods where the attacks are concentrated, designated “red zones” by Russians on Telegram channels, life has been throttled. There is no gas, water, electricity or municipal heat. Public transport is suspended. Ambulances wait outside the area for police in armoured cars to ferry the wounded to them.
The very few people still living in these areas, mostly pensioners, hardly dare to go out. (…)
The purpose of the Russian campaign is not clear. Mr Mrochko suggests the Russians are training drone pilots on Kherson’s civilians. Or it may be a tactic to establish a buffer zone, or to prepare for an offensive to retake part of the west bank of the river. The incidence of artillery strikes in Kherson has also been rising. (…)
Belkis Wille of Human Rights Watch, a rights watchdog, is compiling a report on the Kherson attacks. She says they are “deliberate” and may be calculated “to force civilians to leave the area”. Civilian casualties often result from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, Ms Wille notes, but the drones target civilians precisely.
Reports of Russian drone attacks on civilians elsewhere near Ukraine’s front lines are increasing. On the battlefield, some lethal drones already have a degree of autonomy, with artificial intelligence and object-recognition software to keep homing in on their targets even in the face of electronic jamming. Lethal drones with human pilots seem brutal enough, but the step to fully autonomous ones seems inevitable. Intentionally targeting civilians with drones is a war crime, but it is effective at depopulating areas. “I think what’s happening in Kherson is a harbinger,” says Ms Wille. ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/01/18/russian-pilots-appear-to-be-hunting-ukrainian-civilians
The Wall Street Journal, 17 janvier, article payant
Trump Can Make Russia Pay to Rebuild Ukraine
The West has frozen $300 billion of Moscow’s assets, but Europe has stood in the way of using them.
Extraits :
The key to securing Europe at less cost to U.S. taxpayers may be sitting in European bank accounts. The West has frozen around $300 billion of Russian foreign-exchange assets, but European obstinacy has prevented these funds from being used to compensate Ukraine for war damages. President-elect Trump should insist that the Kremlin’s reserves be mobilized to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and future arms purchases.
Russia has caused more than $150 billion in direct damage to Ukraine and nearly $500 billion in economic losses, according to the World Bank. Ukraine will need external funds of this magnitude to rebuild, and more in the meantime to rearm itself with continued purchases of Western weapons.
Mr. Trump doesn’t want the U.S. to foot this bill, especially with America’s military already spread thin in the Middle East and Asia. European budgeters are planning to increase their own defense spending, as Mr. Trump demands, so they’ll be stretched thin as well. The obvious solution is to use the frozen Russian assets.
The Group of Seven has already agreed to tap the profits from interest produced by the frozen assets. But because of European opposition, aided and abetted by the inept diplomacy of the Biden administration, tapping these profits unlocked only a $50 billion loan for Ukraine and left the underlying assets untouched. This isn’t enough.
Five factors make now the ideal time to use these funds to compensate Russia’s victims.
The first is Mr. Trump’s return to the White House. (…)
Second, the assets have changed. When the war started, most Russian reserves were in the form of foreign-government securities held by European custodians. Now, according to the Hoover Institution’s Philip Zelikow, the securities have largely matured into cash. (…)
Third, it’s clear that the reserves can be mobilized in ways consistent with international law. Ukraine is owed reparations from Russia. (…)
Fourth, Russia has less ability to retaliate economically. Any assets that Western firms still own in Russia are increasingly beyond their control. (…)
Fifth, many European governments are finally warming to the idea. Europeans realize that Ukraine needs a long-term source of funds, and change is coming in the most important country, Germany. Mr. Scholz will likely be replaced in February by Friedrich Merz, who has rightly criticized Mr. Scholz’s bare-minimum support for Ukraine. Mr. Merz has yet to take a stand on the foreign-assets question, but mobilizing Russia’s reserves would fit with his vision—and his need to address Mr. Trump’s insistence that Europe contribute more to its own security.
The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to strike a better deal. Both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from transferring Mr. Putin’s cash to the victims of his aggression—the sooner, the better.
Mr. Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of “Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe.” Mr. Miller is a professor of international history at Tufts University and nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
New York Times, 15 janvier, article payant
Guest Essay : Putin’s Plan for Peace Is No Peace at All
By Lloyd J. Austin III and Antony J. Blinken
Extraits :
President Vladimir Putin of Russia appalled the world with his full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago. He planned to topple Ukraine’s democratically elected government, install a Kremlin puppet regime and expose the West as weak, divided and diminished.
After more than 1,000 days of Mr. Putin’s reckless war of choice, he has failed to achieve a single one of his strategic goals. Russia’s power and influence are greatly diminished; it couldn’t even prop up a valued client like the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Meanwhile, Ukraine stands strong and defiant as a free and sovereign democracy, with an economy rooted in the West.
All this is a testament to the resilience of Ukraine’s troops and the strength of Ukraine’s people. It is also the product of steadfast American leadership, which has rallied allies and partners worldwide to help Ukraine survive the Kremlin’s imperial onslaught. The United States should build on this historic success, not squander it.
Mr. Putin assumed that the world would stand by when he sent his troops across the Ukrainian border. He was wrong. The United States has rallied some 50 countries from around the planet to help Ukraine defend itself — and to uphold the bedrock principle that borders may not be redrawn by force. (…)
As a percentage of G.D.P., more than a dozen contact group members now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the United States does. And these investments in Ukraine are delivering returns here at home, boosting our defense industrial base and creating good jobs. Mr. Putin’s aggression even spurred the very outcome he had sought to prevent: NATO is now bigger, stronger and more united than ever.
As a result, Ukraine has held off the second-largest military in the world — despite Mr. Putin’s reckless escalations and irresponsible nuclear saber rattling. (…)
Ukraine’s success to date is a huge strategic achievement, but its troops still face profound challenges on the battlefield. Russian forces have recently clawed back some of the territory that Ukraine liberated earlier in the war, and Mr. Putin’s bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants and other critical infrastructure is taking a harrowing toll. (…)
Still, Ukraine’s vulnerabilities should not mask Mr. Putin’s own growing dilemmas.
(…) Russia is suffering huge losses — an average of 1,500 casualties a day — to seize small slivers of territory. Russia has suffered more than 700,000 dead and injured since Mr. Putin began his war. Now he increasingly faces a painful dilemma: either endure high casualties for minimal gains, perhaps order a mobilization that triggers domestic instability, or negotiate seriously with Ukraine to end his war. (…)
All of this has given leverage to Ukraine — and to the next U.S. administration. This leverage should be used to end Mr. Putin’s war and usher in a durable peace that ensures Ukrainians can deter further Russian aggression, defend their territory and thrive as a sovereign democracy. That is what peace through strength would look like. But because Mr. Putin retains his imperial ambitions, giving up our leverage now by cutting aid and forcing a premature cease-fire would simply allow Mr. Putin to rest, refit and eventually reattack. This would be peace through surrender, which would be no peace at all.
Not for Ukraine, which would be crushed under Mr. Putin’s boot.
Not for Europe, which would fall under the shadow of a tyrant determined to reconstitute Moscow’s fallen empire.
Not for America’s friends elsewhere, who could face new risks of aggression from other autocrats who would likely see a victory for Mr. Putin as a hunting license of their own.
And not for the United States, which would have to spend more resources and shoulder greater risks to defend not only against an emboldened Russian leader but also against other autocrats and agents of chaos bent on tearing down the system of rules, rights and responsibilities that has made generations of Americans more secure and more prosperous.
Pursuing a policy of peace through strength is vital to Ukraine’s survival and America’s security. The United States and its allies and partners must continue to stand by Ukraine and strengthen its hand for the negotiations that will someday bring Mr. Putin’s war of aggression to an end.
Lloyd J. Austin III is the secretary of defense. Antony J. Blinken is the secretary of state.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/14/opinion/us-ukraine-defense-austin-blinken-russia.html
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14 janvier, article payant
Aufmarsch der Roboter – neue Technologien machen den Krieg in der Ukraine noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser
Immer mehr teure und schwere Grosskampfsysteme erweisen sich auf den Schlachtfeldern der Ukraine als untauglich. Sie lassen sich mit billiger und flexibler Drohnentechnologie aushebeln. Sichtbar wird der Krieg der Zukunft, der nicht weniger grausam ist.
Sergei Gerasimow ist Schriftsteller und lebt in der Grossstadt Charkiw, die nach wie vor von den Russen mit Raketen beschossen wird. – Aus dem Englischen von A. Bn.
Extraits :
25. Dezember, früher Weihnachtsmorgen. Die Strassenlampen sind gerade angegangen. Hier und da schleichen die ersten Autos durch die leeren Strassen, aber die meisten Menschen schlafen noch an diesem festlichen Morgen. Nur ein paar Fenster leuchten in einem gemütlichen gedämpften Licht, das an eine Kerzenflamme erinnert. Es sind die letzten Sekunden vor einem Raketenangriff.
Als unglaublich schnell Feuertropfen vom Himmel herab zu regnen beginnen, treten eine Mutter und ihr Kind an das Fenster. Nicht weit entfernt davon, hinter dem schwarzen Umriss einer Kirche, trifft eine der Raketen ein Wärmekraftwerk: Es besitzt vier hohe Schornsteine, darunter einen, der die anderen überragt und der trotz wiederholten russischen Versuchen, ihn zu zerstören, nach wie vor raucht.
Die Explosion ist so gewaltig, dass der Himmel über halb Charkiw für einen Moment in orangefarbenes Feuer eintaucht, da die Wolken die höllischen Flammen am Boden reflektieren. Dann steigt ein kochender, flackernder Feuerpilz über dem Kraftwerk auf, verschmilzt mit den tief hängenden Wolken und verwandelt sich in etwas, das wie der dicke Wirbel eines Tornados aussieht.
Die Mutter, die das Geschehen vom Fenster aus beobachtet, spricht einen seltsamen Satz, um ihr Kind zu beruhigen: «Hab keine Angst, es wird noch schlimmer werden.» In Momenten wie diesen ist es oft schwer, die richtigen Worte zu finden.
Oreschnik, die Schreckliche
Als ich zehn Tage später am Ort vorbeifahre, sehe ich jedoch, dass das Kraftwerk noch immer in Betrieb ist: Einer der Schornsteine, der höchste, stösst noch immer Rauch aus. Die Fenster des Wohnhauses auf der anderen Strassenseite sind zerborsten, und das ist auch schon alles, was die Russen mit ihrem Angriff am Weihnachtstag erreicht haben.
Jede dieser Raketen kostet etwa so viel wie ein Kampfpanzer, aber im Moment funktionieren die grossen, teuren Raketen nicht. Sie jagen den Menschen nicht einmal mehr wirklich Angst ein. Oreschnik, die Schreckliche, mit der Putin der Welt immer wieder droht, lässt die meisten von uns nur mit den Schultern zucken. Fast täglich werden wir vor einem möglichen erneuten Abschuss dieser Mittelstreckenrakete mit sechs Sprengköpfen gewarnt, aber nur einer meiner Freunde gerät in Panik, wenn ihm eine weitere Warnung unterkommt. Für ihn ist das eine Nervensache: Zu viele russische Raketen sind schon zu nahe an seinem Haus eingeschlagen.
Auch zahlreiche andere Dinosaurier der Militärtechnik haben sich in diesem Krieg als nahezu nutzlos erwiesen. Sie erzeugen nicht mehr dieselbe Wirkung wie früher. So zum Beispiel schwere Panzer, die Millionen von Dollar kosten. Während ein solches Ungetüm Kilometer zurücklegt, um sich einer feindlichen Stellung zu nähern, hat eine leichte und billige FPV-Drohne ausreichend Zeit, ihn zu zerstören. Unscheinbare Marinedrohnen versenken grosse, unhandliche Kriegsschiffe und schiessen Kampfhelikopter über dem Meer ab. Die berühmten intelligenten Excalibur-Artillerie-Granaten mit GPS-Lenkung, die früher eine Treffsicherheit von bis zu 70 Prozent hatten, finden heute nur noch in 6 Prozent der Fälle ihr Ziel. Die elektronischen Abwehrsysteme haben gelernt, mit ihnen umzugehen.
Im Dorf Lipzi, neunzehn Kilometer nördlich von Charkiw, führte die ukrainische Armee die erste vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht ohne Infanterie durch. Zumindest war es das, was in den Medien darüber zu lesen war: eine vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht. Die Ukraine hat gewonnen und den Feind zurückgedrängt. Es wurden keine Einzelheiten über diese Konfrontation bekannt, und sie hat die militärische Landkarte nicht verändert, so dass der Sieg wahrscheinlich nicht wirklich bedeutend war. Russische Telegram-Kanäle spotteten über die Schlacht und veröffentlichten Fotos von beschädigten ukrainischen Bodendrohnen, die wie Spielzeugautos mit grossen Rädern aussahen.
Als ich mich mit einem Mann, der Drohnen herstellt, über den Schlagabtausch von Lipzi unterhielt, äusserte ich die Ansicht, dass die Schlacht ja eigentlich nicht als Roboterschlacht bezeichnet werden könne, da dort keine Roboter, sondern von Operateuren gesteuerte Drohnen gekämpft hätten. Daraufhin antwortete er mir, dass dort auch robotische Geschütze eingesetzt worden seien, die in der Lage seien, ein Ziel selbständig zu finden und auszuwählen. Aus einer Entfernung von fünfzig Metern treffe ein solches Geschütz mit Sicherheit den Kopf des Gegners, selbst wenn dieser gerade einen doppelten Salto mache, und aus einer Entfernung von zweihundert Metern treffe es mit Sicherheit den Rumpf.
Ausserdem seien in der Schlacht bei Lipzi auch die berühmten Roboterhunde eingesetzt worden. Sie schossen nicht, aber sie machten anhand von dessen Wärmeprofil den Gegner aus. Diese Schlacht war also tatsächlich robotisch, wenn auch nicht vollständig. Auf jeden Fall war es der erste Angriff dieser Art in der Geschichte, ohne Beteiligung der Infanterie. Als solcher dürfte er in die Militärgeschichte eingehen.
Die Schlappe bei Lipzi hat die Russen nicht sonderlich beunruhigt, denn sie haben nur eine weitere Portion Kanonenfutter verloren, und davon haben sie immer reichlich: 2024 hat die russische Armee ohne Wimpernzucken 420 000 Mann verloren, also fast eine halbe Million, aber doch rund 4200 Kilometer ukrainisches Territorium erobert, das heisst, grob gesagt, ein Rechteck aus Feldern, Schluchten, verbrannten Wäldern und rauchenden Ruinen von vierzig mal hundert Kilometern. Solches ist natürlich eine grandiose strategische Leistung, die sämtliche Verluste rechtfertigt.
Paradoxerweise ist dieser Krieg einerseits der modernste und am meisten technisierte aller Kriege der Geschichte, andererseits zieht er sich genauso endlos in die Länge und vernichtet genauso sinnlos Menschenmassen wie der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Da ist dasselbe monatelange und jahrelange Sitzen in den Schützengräben. Dieselben täglichen Abertausende von Artilleriegranaten pflügen das Land immer neu um und verwandeln die Wälder in eine Art riesige Haarbürste. Sogar das nach Senf riechende Giftgas Chlorpikrin, auf das Deutschland damals zurückgriff, ist jetzt wieder im Einsatz: Es wird von Russland gegen die Ukraine verwendet. Manchmal, wenn ich auf Videos sehe, wie Schweine aus zerstörten Schweineställen noch lebende Verwundete auffressen, und zwar beginnend mit dem weichen Unterleib, denke ich, dass dieser Krieg noch schlimmer ist als der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Die Grausamkeit und Ausweglosigkeit des Ersten Weltkriegs war das Ergebnis von damals entwickelten neuen Militärtechnologien: Maschinengewehre, Panzer, Stacheldrahtzäune, massive Artillerie. Das Gleiche geschieht jetzt: Neue Technologien machen den Krieg immer noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser. (…)
Aus strategischer Sicht ist nichts Gutes an unbemannten Schlachten – wenn der menschliche Faktor ausgeschaltet wird, werden wirtschaftlich starke Länder wirtschaftlich schwache Länder militärisch dominieren, und dagegen kann nichts getan werden. (…)
Die Zukunft der Kriegsführung liegt indes zweifellos in der künstlichen Intelligenz. Es ist interessant, dass KI während dieses Krieges für eine breite Öffentlichkeit verfügbar geworden ist. Während die Kämpfe tobten, haben die Menschen gelernt, Aids sowie einige Formen von Krebs wirksam zu behandeln, Neuralink-Chips in ein menschliches Gehirn zu implantieren, das Herz eines Schweins in einen Menschen zu verpflanzen und auch die Flugbahn eines Asteroiden zu verändern. (…)
Da wir stark damit beschäftigt waren, uns gegenseitig umzubringen, haben wir all dies kaum bemerkt, aber es scheint, dass der technologische Fortschritt nicht an uns vorbeigeht. Die Ukraine hat bereits Millionen, vielleicht sogar Dutzende von Millionen Stunden an Drohnenaufnahmen gesammelt, die zweifellos dazu dienen werden, KI-Modelle zu trainieren, die in der Lage sein werden, Entscheidungen auf dem Schlachtfeld zu treffen und Menschen mit übermenschlicher Genauigkeit zu töten. (…)
The Economist, 11 janvier, article payant
Russia and the West : Time is not on Russia’s side, argues Finland’s foreign minister
By Invitation: Elina Valtonen calls for a lower oil-price cap and tougher measures against Russia’s shadow fleet
Elina Valtonen is Finland’s foreign minister.
Extraits :
RUSSIA IS FAR from an unstoppable force of nature. The autocrats who run it rely on a war economy that is unsustainable and shows serious cracks. Democracies should take advantage by increasing the economic pressure. It is we who have the momentum.
Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s narrative, and some people’s belief, sanctions do work. Even when they do not prevent certain goods and technologies from entering or—in the case of oil and gas—leaving Russia, they certainly make logistics more cumbersome. That increases costs.
Witness the rise in Russian consumer prices, which are up by more than a third since the end of 2021. This is due mostly to the rise in import costs and the country’s labour shortage translating into high nominal wage inflation.
Owing to a low birth rate, high mortality and an exodus of Russians who oppose Mr Putin or just want a better life elsewhere, Russia’s population is shrinking, ageing and losing its best talent. The senseless war in Ukraine, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is not helping.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
In 2024 Russia’s GDP grew by around 3.5%. This relatively strong performance came almost exclusively from sectors directly related to the war. Most forecasters expect barely any growth in 2025 as Russia runs out of labour and other resources. Despite all this, Russia can maintain the current level of military production, even if it means cutting back on everything else.
Military spending is eating up the budget and Russia has to fund its deficit through borrowing. With little to no access to international capital markets, Russia borrows domestically. New debt is absorbed by domestic banks, which place the government bonds at the central bank for cash. Essentially, the central bank is printing money to finance the government’s spending on the war.
The rouble has weakened significantly and would be on the floor were it not for central-bank support through emergency buying and capital-control mechanisms. (…)
With the economic outlook so bleak, time is not on Russia’s side. So far Mr Putin has prioritised his war against Ukraine over the welfare of his own people. To achieve just and lasting peace in Ukraine, he must be made to understand that the cost of his illegal campaign is getting too high, even for his tolerance.
To this end, we need to increase the economic pressure on Russia and reduce the possibilities for dodging sanctions, including the use of a shadow fleet. Russia uses rusting, non-insured tankers to covertly carry Russian oil around the world, undermining the EU and G7 oil-price cap on Russian crude and petroleum products. (…)
Several measures for limiting the use of the hazardous fleet are in the works. In December, 12 European countries, including my own, announced that their maritime authorities will start requesting proof of insurance from suspected shadow vessels as they pass through the English Channel, the Danish Straits of the Great Belt, the Sound between Denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of Finland. Non-compliant vessels will be placed under sanctions, which, in the EU’s case, would ban them from the bloc’s ports and maritime services.
Across Europe, decoupling from Russian energy is well under way. Direct and indirect gas and oil imports need to be further constrained. The oil-price cap, currently at $60 per barrel, should be lowered further and enforcement of the cap strengthened in conjunction with international partners.
In parallel with increasing economic pressure on Russia, Europe, America and their partners must continue supporting Ukraine militarily and economically. As Donald Trump prepares to take office for a second time, Europeans must stand ready to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security, and make the required financial investments.
Under President Joe Biden, America has been a strong backer of Ukraine’s fight for independence and democracy—underlined by Mr Biden’s recent announcement of an additional $2.5bn in security assistance. Early indications from the incoming American administration are encouraging. Although Mr Trump and his team have made it abundantly clear that they expect Europeans to do more for the continent’s security, I do not expect America to walk away from helping Ukraine, or from Europe as a whole. Such a move would diminish America’s global influence and undermine its ability to compete strategically with China and others.
The war is far from lost. With determined support from its partners, Ukraine will get through this winter in a position to enter peace talks on its own terms and timeline. Ukraine’s international partners need to keep up their joint measures until Russia starts to engage with the world in a peaceful manner, respecting the UN Charter and international law.■.
The Guardian, 27 décembre, libre accès
Can Europe switch to a ‘wartime mindset’? Take it from us in Ukraine: here is what that means
Nato’s warning reached me as I braced for a missile attack in Kyiv – where we’ve learned how to survive in the era of Russian hybrid warfare
Extraits:
Day 1,024 of the invasion. Kyiv, 7am. Friday the 13th. In a former life, someone would have observed that this is a day that portends bad luck. But in a country where shelling is a daily occurrence, it has become irrelevant. I wake up to the sound of an app on my phone warning me of an increased missile threat. While my partner and I are hiding in the corridor, I read the news that the Nato chief, Mark Rutte, has called on members of the US-led transatlantic alliance to “shift to a wartime mindset”.
With the first bang of the air defence system, a thought strikes me: for those who have not already been living with it for nearly three years, how would you explain this mindset? What is this wartime thinking?
Let’s start with the basics. Try to accept the thesis that Russia is your enemy. Everything Russian is your enemy. I know this is complicated. But Russia has been using literally everything as an instrument of hybrid warfare: sports, ballet, classical music, literature, art – these are all platforms for promoting its narratives. Evenyour neatest Russian Orthodox church could conceal Russian intelligence officers, just waiting for the command to put down their incense burners and take up arms. Don’t forget that for advocates of the political doctrine known as “the Russian world”, this world is potentially limitless; it exists wherever the Russian language is spoken and monuments to Pushkin have been plonked down. (…)
It’s hard to believe, but it won’t be Vladimir Putin himself invading your country. It will be hundreds of thousands of ordinary Russians who have been told for decades that your values are evil. No one will care about the nuances and subtleties of your specific leftism, libertarianism or liberalism. What Putin calls the “collective west”, he regards as uniform, and evil. (…)
Wartime mindset means having a “bug-out bag” packed and ready to go, to fit your whole life into one backpack. Copies of documents. A few family photos. A first aid kit. A power bank. A spare pair of underwear and socks. Something you can leave home with.
The most difficult thing to believe is that war could be on your doorstep. And this doorstep is not symbolic, but very real: the doorstep of your own home. The loss of your favourite porcelain, your parents’ books, childhood photos of your grownup children, the inability to take your beloved cat, dog or hamster while being evacuated – all of this is real.
It always seems that war is something that happens to someone else, in some poorer part of the world. They can’t just start dropping bombs on the capital of a European country in the 21st century! Wartime mindset is the realisation that they can.
And no matter how hard you try to prepare, one day you will wake up to an enemy missile attack. You will think that it will be over in two or three weeks, another month at most. Soon you will lose track of the days. But you will love your country with all your heart. You will fall in love with the national humour and character again, and rediscover your national cuisine. In fact, you will come to regard every national dish cooked in the dark (as there will be no electricity) as an element of national resilience and resistance.
While waiting for a miracle, I really want to believe that none of this will happen to you, as it has happened to us.
Kyiv, 10am. End of the air-raid alert. The Russians have launched 90 missiles and 200 killer drones targeting civilian infrastructure. The goal remains the same: to force Ukrainians to live without electricity, heat and gas. Terrorising civilians is a method typical of a terrorist country. An ordinary morning of abnormal reality, and yet the world’s common will is not forceful enough to stop it.
I realise that I have run out of time to tell you the most important things of all: give your partner a kiss right now; take a course in tactical medicine, and another in firearms training; buy a power bank; write a will; and find out where the nearest bomb shelter is. For no reason. Just in case miracles don’t happen, and you find yourself called upon to shift to a wartime mindset.
Oleksandr Mykhed is a writer and member of PEN Ukraine. His book The Language of War was published by Allen Lane in June 2024
Le Monde, 27 décembre, article payant
« La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen »
Dans une tribune au « Monde », un collectif de personnalités et de citoyens parmi lesquels Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Ariane Mnouchkine, le général Vincent Desportes et Adam Michnik, appelle à la mise en place d’une coalition entre Etats européens accordés sur quelques mesures vitales pour un pays qui défend sa liberté et protège les nôtres.
Extraits:
L’Ukraine vit des heures angoissantes. L’armée russe, forte d’un budget militaire de 106 milliards d’euros, qu’elle veut porter à 135 milliards en 2025, poursuit son invasion au prix de dizaines de milliers de morts et de la destruction systématique des infrastructures vitales de l’Ukraine : ses centrales énergétiques, ses hôpitaux, ses usines.
Malgré la résistance héroïque des Ukrainiens, elle gagne du terrain grâce aux demi-mesures et aux retards de l’aide apportée par leurs alliés, qui se gardent bien de désigner la seule issue admissible de cette guerre : le retrait de la Russie dans ses frontières.
Paralysés par le « chantage au nucléaire » de Vladimir Poutine, Joe Biden et les dirigeants occidentaux ont livré à contretemps des armements en quantité et de portée limitées, sans procurer à l’Ukraine les moyens de la victoire. Préoccupés avant tout par le souci de ne pas concourir à une « escalade », ils ont laissé le Kremlin franchir successivement toutes les étapes de la surenchère militaire, jusqu’à l’arrivée ces derniers jours de 10 000 soldats nord-coréens, couronnée par l’emploi de charges chimiques et d’un missile balistique hypersonique.
Tétanisés par les rodomontades de Donald Trump, les gouvernements européens se préparent-ils mezza voce à accepter, avec un lâche soulagement, que la nouvelle administration américaine négocie un accord de cessez-le-feu au détriment de la volonté ukrainienne ?
La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen : triomphant aujourd’hui, Poutine reprendrait dans deux, cinq ou sept ans ses guerres de conquête contre l’Ukraine, mais aussi contre la Géorgie, la Moldavie ou les pays baltes. L’ensemble du continent glisserait vers l’abîme. Notre sécurité, nos libertés et nos valeurs sont directement menacées. Il faut donc agir, vite. (…)
The Economist, 27 décembre, article payant
Ink and blood : Ukrainian troops celebrate a grim Christmas in Kursk
A local paper braves Russian bombs to deliver news on the front line
Extraits:
THE NEWSPAPER round in Velyka Pysarivka can be sketchy. Barely 3km from the Russian border, the village is stalked by death. Oleksiy and Natalia Pasyuga, the husband-and-wife duo behind the Vorskla (the weekly takes its name from the local river) have a survival algorithm. Oleksiy, 56, drives. Natalia, 53, listens out of the passenger window for the drones that grow stealthier with every day. They say they are careful, though they know they are kidding themselves. Delivering the paper to the last remaining residents of the village is not a rational exercise, but a love affair. The tears of subscribers make it worth it, Ms Pasyuga says: “They grab the paper and hold it to their nose to smell the fresh newsprint.”
For its 2,500 readers, the Vorskla is more than a news source; it is a connection to the outside world. Most of Ukraine’s border villages now have no electricity or mobile connection. When televisions work, they pick up Russian channels. The Pasyugas say they feel obliged to stay to debunk the propaganda, though they evacuated their offices from Velyka Pysarivka in March after a glide bomb smashed their car and half the building. Six months later the Russians destroyed the other half, during attacks that coincided with Ukraine’s advance into Russia’s Kursk province just to the north. Now the Vorskla is put together in a library in the nearby town of Okhtyrka. It is printed and hand delivered to front-line villages in a car the couple borrow from their son.
When your correspondent calls, the Pasyugas are preparing a special Christmas issue. They already know what they want: uplifting stories to raise the morale of their weary readers. For once, there will be no obituaries of the local boys lost in battle. The Kursk offensive will be left out too, though that is less unusual. The Pasyugas say they know “too much” to accept the official celebration of the offensive as “Ukraine’s great and only triumph of 2024”. They choose silence instead. (…)
The urgency of Russia’s counter-attack appears tied to Donald Trump’s impending inauguration. Mr Putin wants Kursk to be a done deal by January 20th, rather than an embarrassing topic for discussion. Volodymyr Zelensky seems equally determined to retain the pocket as a bargaining chip. The Ukrainians are holding on, though the conditions on (and under) ground are getting grimmer. “Rain, slush, snow, cold, mud, beetles, worms, rats and glide bombs,” says Ruslan Mokritsky, a 33-year-old non-commissioned officer in the 95th Air Assault Brigade. The Russians can drop as many as 40 glide bombs on one position in the space of a few hours, he says. “In Kursk, death is always close; it practically holds your hand.” (…)
Back in Okhtyrka, Oleksiy Pasyuga says that the soldiers’ struggle puts his own worries into perspective. His five hryvnia ($0.12) margin on the 15 hryvnia cover price is enough to keep his team in business, he says. He is determined not to be the man who ends the Vorskla’s 95-year history. There is not much of a cushion, no adverts, no excess, so the paper’s Christmas edition will be the same lean eight pages as usual. They have decided to lead with a feature on the soldiers’ New Year: how they will mark it, what they might eat. For Major Bakrev, the answer is simple enough. On New Year’s Eve he will be at work; he will not be celebrating while his men freeze in the trenches. “Maybe I’ll mark it with a couple of volleys of our guns,” he quips. Officer Mokritsky, who is likely to spend the night underground, shrugs. The soldiers on the front line will celebrate as best they can. “Maybe we’ll have Coca-Cola.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/16/ukrainian-troops-celebrate-a-grim-christmas-in-kursk
Kiev Post, 26 décembre, libre accès
OPINION: Christmas Thoughts Inspired by John Lennon, and the Enemy of Peace
So, this is Christmas, and what have we done, another year over and the war goes on and on.
Extraits:
Greetings friends. It’s Dec. 25 and I’ve got John Lennon’s “So this is Christmas” song playing over and over in my head. Especially his idealistic refrain: “War is over.” I wish it were, but it’s not.
Christmas is supposed to be a joyous celebration that evokes peace, joy and optimism. But for embattled Ukraine and its supporters, this year it’s unfortunately another bleak one.
In the last 24 hours, the barbaric Russian monster has dropped more missiles and drones over Ukraine, bringing even more death and destruction at this particular time.
While most of you were celebrating with your loved ones, Ukrainians were once again subjected to the latest merciless aerial bombardment, and their brave soldiers were attacked all along the front line.
By whom? From a country whose regime has no respect for human life and hates everything the democratic world stands for. By a cynical imperialist despotism that is prepared to kill and lie to get its way and is prepared to ally itself with other outcast tyrannical regimes.
The heavy missile attack today in Ukraine shows that Russia is livid and desperate.
After waging a cruel war against Ukraine for almost three years, it failed to crush the Ukrainians and assert its control over them and the immediate neighbourhood. Apart from the embarrassment, it has had to pay the price, not only in the form of international isolation and sanctions but also through the heavy losses in human resources, which in practice it regards as mere cannon fodder.
But there is an additional new element that has irked Russia even more. Remember that this is the first Christmas that Ukraine has celebrated jointly with the rest of most of the Christian world on Dec. 25. This occurred after Ukraine’s parliament and churches decided they would extricate the country from the vestiges of Russian imperialistic tutelage which used to dominate over the political and economic spheres, but until recently still extended to the cultural and religious ones.
So, finally, Ukraine is celebrating Christmas on Dec.25 in a move tantamount to spiritual decolonization but is still having to fight to secure this freedom.
Just imagine the fury in the Kremlin or its vicarious agent – the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church – for whom Christmas continues to be celebrated on January 6 and 7 according to the “old” calendar.
So, with all due respect, John, I would like to end on a lyrical note. Allow me to add three stanzas to update your classic song, in the hope that you would endorse them if you were still with us.
Yes, another year over, John,
And peace is not being given a chance.
Unless we unite against the monsters,
On our graves, the Putins will dance.
So, let’s come together right now,
And imagine there’s no haven
For despots and war criminals,
Bullies expecting us to be craven.
All you need is love, John, you once said.
But warned us against minds that hate.
We all want to change the world, you added,
So, this Christmas, let’s think about our fate.
Bohdan Nahaylo, Chief Editor of Kyiv Post, is a British-Ukrainian journalist and veteran Ukraine watcher based between Kyiv and Barcelona. He was formerly a senior United Nations official and policy adviser, and director of Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian Service.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/44469
The Guardian, 24 décembre, libre accès
With Assad’s fall, Putin’s dream of world domination is turning into a nightmare
Complaints about the president are growing among Russian military and business leaders. Now is the time for the west to turn up the heat
Extraits:
As Bashar al-Assad fell, Russian nationalist military bloggers turned on the Kremlin. “Ten years of our presence,” fumed the “Two Majors” Telegram channel to its more than one million subscribers, “dead Russian soldiers, billions of spent roubles and thousands of tonnes of ammunition, they must be compensated somehow.” Some didn’t shy away from lambasting Vladimir Putin. “The adventure in Syria, initiated by Putin personally, seems to be coming to an end. And it ends ignominiously, like all other ‘geopolitical’ endeavours of the Kremlin strategist.” These weren’t isolated incidents. Filter Labs, a data analytics company I collaborate with, saw social media sentiment on Syria dip steeply as Assad fell.
It was in stark contrast to Putin’s silly claim at his annual news conference last week that Russia had suffered no defeat in Syria. Unlike social media, legacy media tried to walk the Kremlin line, but even here there were splits. “You can bluff on the international arena for a while – but make sure you don’t fall for your own deceptions”, ran an op-ed in the broadsheet Kommersant, penned by a retired colonel close to the military leadership. (…)
Assad’s fall is not just a blow to Russia’s interests in the Middle East but to the essence of Putin’s power, which has always been about perception management. (…)
And though the Kremlin maintains Russia and China are an alliance made in economic heaven, the reality is more tenuous. Russian businesses are saying that Chinese banks will no longer work with them now that Russian institutions have been blacklisted by the US. Instead, they worry that the Chinese are offering them “deeply suspicious” ways to move money – yet they have no choice but to play along.
Wall Street Journal, 23 décembre, article payant
Putin Sends Trump a Ukraine Message
The Russian suggests his price for peace is Kyiv’s defeat and U.S. humiliation.
Extraits:
Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine, and who doesn’t? Apparently Vladimir Putin, who used his annual end-of-year news conference last week to send the President-elect a message about his peace terms.
“Now, regarding the conditions for starting negotiations: We have no preconditions,” Mr. Putin said before outlining sweeping preconditions. Talks would be “based on” 2022 negotiations in Istanbul and “proceeding from the current realities on the ground,” he said.
Russia’s 2022 Istanbul proposal called for Ukraine to abandon aspirations to join NATO, become a permanently neutral state, and drastically shrink its armed forces. This would ratify Russia’s territorial gains and render Ukraine defenseless against inevitable future Russian aggression. (…)
Mr. Putin said he’s “ready to talk any time” with Mr. Trump, and some will dismiss his tough talk as merely the opening bid in what will be an inevitable deal. But it’s a mistake to think the Kremlin boss has given up his designs to turn Ukraine into a vassal state like Belarus. Letting Russia prevail in Ukraine on anything close to Mr. Putin’s terms would send a message of appeasement that would surely mean a larger war in the future. Mr. Trump can’t let Ukraine become his Afghanistan.
Kiev Post, 23 décembre, libre accès
Export Season 2024/25: How Much Grain, Oilseed Crops Ukraine Plans to Sell
Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, it remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products.
Extraits:
(…) As emphasized by the ministry, despite Russian armed aggression, Ukraine remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products, such as grain, oilseeds, vegetables and fruit. The agricultural sector not only ensures domestic food security but provides raw materials for processing enterprises.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/44341
The Economist, 21 décembre, article payant
Staying power : Ukraine is winning the economic war against Russia
Whether that lasts depends on its ability to overcome acute shortages of power, men and money
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s economy at large has reinvented itself to navigate wartime realities. It remains one-quarter smaller than in 2021. Yet for the first time since 2022, the start of the all-out invasion, it is healthier than its enemy’s in some key respects. Ukraine’s central bank forecasts GDP to grow by 4% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025. The currency is stable and interest rates, at 13.5%, remain near their lowest in 30 months. Contrast that with Russia, where rates should soon hit 23% to arrest the rouble’s fall, banks look fragile and GDP is set to grow by just 0.5-1.5% in 2025. But Ukraine faces strong headwinds: the uptick of war, the downtick of domestic resources, and Donald Trump. How long can its economy hold out?
Ukraine’s economic history since 2022 has had three phases. In the first, amid heavy fighting, the country scrambled to put out fires. Martial law was introduced and 14m people fled their homes. Russia blockaded Black Sea ports, choking off Ukraine’s exports. The central bank’s actions were subordinated to military objectives. In the first half of 2022 it financed half of the public deficit. It imposed strict capital controls and flooded banks with liquidity. Inflation soared and GDP shrank by a third (see chart 1).
The second phase began after Ukraine repelled Russia’s advances in the country’s south, in mid-2022. As confidence improved, GDP stabilised. (…)
The return of macroeconomic stability allowed the government and firms to war-proof their operations. One priority was to protect productive assets against Russian missiles. Industrial parks were built in safer western regions. Businesses invested abroad to war-proof their income. Expatriates have generated income from abroad, too: last year one in ten new firms in Poland was set up by a Ukrainian. (…)
Private firms have pivoted, too. After Mariupol, a key port on the Sea of Azov, was obliterated in the spring of 2022, Vitalii Lopushanskyi, an entrepreneur, created UADamage, an AI outfit that parses satellite images to build interactive maps featuring every building, road or bridge that has been destroyed. He has since mapped more than 200 cities. He also teaches drones to spot mines and guide robots on the ground to disable the devices.
The last piece was to keep hard currency flowing in. In July 2023 Russia refused to renew the grain deal. Ukraine responded by opening its own maritime corridor, securing it through a remarkable campaign of sea deterrence by drones and missiles. That allowed it to resume shipments of not just grain but also metals and minerals, its second-biggest export.
These measures, together with Western aid, have prevented Russia from robbing Ukraine of the resources and morale it needs to keep fighting. Now a third phase is beginning, during which the country’s economy faces its biggest threats yet: acute shortages of power, men and money.
Take power first. In 2022 and again this spring and summer, Russia relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s grid. Despite continuous repairs, the country can count on less than half of the 36 gigawatts (GW) in generation capacity it could tap before the war. And lately Russia’s campaign has resumed. (…) On a more positive note, the country has become better equipped to absorb such shocks. (…)
The second problem—and the thorniest—is the lack of labour. Since 2022 mobilisation, migration and war have caused the workforce to shrink by over a fifth, to 13m people. Demand is strong: the number of job openings has reached 65,000 a week, up from 7,000 during the first weeks of the war—but the average opening attracts only 1.3 applications, compared with two in 2021. Wages are rising. The economy and defence ministries are locked in a tug of war over mobilisation: where to strike the right balance for the country’s future. Ukraine’s civilian leadership has so far declined the maximalist demands of military leaders, to the detriment of the front line.
There are no easy fixes. (…)
The government, too, is spending much more money than it pockets. In 2025 its budget deficit is projected to near 20% of GDP. In principle nearly all of it—$38bn—will be financed from external sources. In June the G7 agreed to a $50bn debt package for Ukraine, to be repaid from interest generated by Russia’s €260bn-worth ($273bn) of sovereign assets frozen in the West. In early December America transferred its $20bn share to a World Bank fund that Ukraine can use for non-military purposes, though Mr Trump could try to make it harder for Ukraine to access the money.
Ukraine can probably survive without American funds in 2025 anyway. Together with an €18bn tranche the EU agreed to provide under a previous programme, contributions from other G7 members would plug the gap left by Uncle Sam, says Dimitar Bogov of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Ukraine also has healthy foreign-exchange reserves. (…)
Military developments could cause a crunch before 2026. Yet businesses are cautiously optimistic. Mr Travetsky says he turned a small profit this year, the first since taking on the farm. He is thinking about starting a new line in parmesan cheese. “I’ve done the training, and I know the recipe,” he says. But the obstacles remain daunting: “Try making it when you don’t have electricity 12 hours a day.” ■
Le Figaro, 18 décembre, libre accès
Guerre en Ukraine : des «centaines» de soldats nord-coréens morts ou blessés en Russie
Les soldats nord-coréens «n’avaient jamais combattu auparavant», a estimé un responsable américain, jugeant que cela pouvait expliquer «pourquoi ils ont subi de telles pertes face aux Ukrainiens.»https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-des-centaines-de-soldats-nord-coreens-morts-ou-blesses-en-russie-20241218
The Economist, 14 décembre, article payant
Charlemagne : Europeans are hoping they can buy more guns but keep their butter
Reports of a “war economy” are much exaggerated
Extraits:
Russia produces enough military kit to build an army the size of Germany’s every six to 12 months. Under its revanchist president, Vladimir Putin, it is busy invading one European country while meddling in the affairs of several others. Western intelligence officers seem to think a Ukraine-style attack on a NATO ally by 2030 is a distinct possibility. Faced with this sobering analysis, Europeans might have been forgiven for panicking into splurging on all things military, and doing real harm to the continent’s economy in the process. But worry not. With politicians bickering about pensions and social spending, and loth to raise taxes, the reality is of a continent unwilling to inconvenience itself for something so trifling as fending off a potential invader. Europeans want more military spending, sure; some churn out ludicrous soundbites about building a “war economy”. But God forbid that anyone make voters endure the cost of it.
Scrimping on defence is nothing new for Europeans. After the cold war ended, cutting military budgets became the norm, like taking August off or retiring in one’s prime. By 2014 today’s 27 European Union members were spending under 1.4% of their collective GDP on defence—less than on alcohol and tobacco. The military figure has since increased at a steady, if unspectacular, pace (just as booze and fags have gone out of fashion). This year the EU’s members will together finally meet the 2% target set by NATO, to which most belong, after Mr Putin first had a crack at Ukraine a decade ago. A few big countries, notably Italy and Spain, are still far below that level. (…)
Donald Trump, as he prepares to return to the White House, has made clear he will no longer tolerate Europe spending roughly a third of what America does on defence. On December 8th he reiterated that he was willing to stay in NATO only as long as Europeans “pay their bills”. To appease the incoming blusterer-in-chief and dissuade Mr Putin, Europe knows it must find more money. The trouble is, many national exchequers are bare and politics across the continent is messier than ever. Chaos reigns in France; Germany is in the early throes of an electoral campaign that will probably result in a new chancellor only after months of coalition-building. Collective action at EU level is impeded by the fact that certain prime ministers, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, respect the Kremlin more than they do fellow European leaders.
Everyone knows their armies need more cash, not least to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine. So how might it be done? The simplest way is for national governments, who after all oversee their armed forces and spend most of the tax levied in Europe, to cut larger cheques. A few already do. Poland says it will spend 4.7% of its GDP on defence next year, the most of any NATO member. But others are constrained by having maxed out their national credit card: France, Italy and Spain all have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 100%, and are under pressure from both markets and EU wallahs to improve their public finances. Apart from countries bordering Russia, voters clobbered by covid and then by soaring energy prices are in no mood for less social spending or higher taxes. Do not deprive us of butter, is the gist of Europe’s current politics.
Another way to boost defence expenditure is to do it at EU level. (…) Perhaps the money could be borrowed by EU members collectively instead, as it was to fund a €750bn pandemic-recovery fund in 2021? France has mooted such a joint bond, which would help skirt the issue of fiscal constraints. But more EU-level debt is unacceptable to “prudent” countries like the Netherlands that see common borrowing as a scheme to make frugal northerners pay for spendthrift southerners. (…)
Europe thus needs clever tricks to fund military stuff without crossing various red lines. One idea is for a “coalition of the willing” in Europe to raise €500bn by creating a fund essentially backed by promises of higher future defence spending. (…)
Details of the plan are vague. Its main selling point is that it has not been shot down since the Financial Times reported iton December 5th. A big figure would help send Mr Trump the message that Europe is doing something. In practice an extra €500bn would push outlays to just 2.4% of EU GDP (meanwhile a new NATO target of 3% is being floated). And a squabble would ensue over spending. Who decides whether to buy Europe-made kit (as France prefers, to ensure the long-term “strategic autonomy” of the EU) or off-the-shelf weaponry from America (as many others would like, to ensure the stuff is delivered soon), say? Raising money for defence is hard, paying it out may be even harder. ■
Wall Street Journal, 11 décembre, article payant
Stopping ‘Endless Wars’ Is Easier Said Than Done
Trump will need to overcome four foreign-policy fallacies to resolve entrenched conflicts.
Extraits:
Donald Trump’s promise to “put an end to endless wars” resonates with an American public fatigued by decades of military entanglements. His calls for efficient, clear objectives and reduced U.S. involvement abroad reflect a pragmatic approach to the nation’s challenges.
But Mr. Trump’s ambitions also underscore the enduring complexity of war. Wars are rarely resolved on convenient timelines or with numerical or technological superiority alone. As 19th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously warned, the first act of a statesman is to recognize the type of war he is in. Clausewitz described war as a contest of wills in which human determination outweighs material advantages. Misunderstanding the character of a conflict can lead to unintended consequences.
To reach his goals, Mr. Trump must heed Clausewitz’s advice. Achieving global success requires understanding the human and ideological dimensions of war and seeing past at least four common foreign-policy fallacies.
The first is the “abacus fallacy,” the belief that wars are won by tallying resources. Analysts often reduce military conflict to a numbers game, focusing on troop counts, tanks or artillery rounds. (…)
This fallacy persists today. In February 2022, many commentators predicted a Ukrainian defeat based on Russia’s numerical military advantages. But Ukraine’s innovative use of resources—information warfare, decentralized command structures, and asymmetric tactics such as using swarms of cheap, expendable drones to complement limited advanced-fire capabilities—highlight the qualitative dimensions of war. Numbers alone fail to account for human ingenuity, resilience and the will to fight.
The second is the “vampire fallacy.” First referenced in 2014 by Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, who later served as Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, the vampire fallacy promises that technological superiority will deliver swift victories. This too led observers to predict that Kyiv would fall within days of Russia’s invasion. Ukraine’s resilience shattered this illusion, proving that like numerical advantage, technological advantage can’t always replace determination. (…)
Gen. McMaster has warned of a third narrative, the “Zero Dark Thirty fallacy,” which elevates precision strikes and special operations to the level of grand strategy. After Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, some analysts initially suggested Israel could achieve its objectives through targeted raids and bombings alone. These recommendations ignored Gaza’s hostile environment, radicalized population and war-adapted terrain. (…)
This leads to the fourth error, the “peace table fallacy”—the belief that all wars end in negotiations. This approach isn’t always feasible. Simple calls for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia or for Israel to seek peace with Hamas ignore ideological and political stakes. Wars don’t end simply because one side desires peace; they end when one side achieves its objectives or both reach a stalemate.
The U.S. has fallen victim to these fallacies throughout history. (…)
Mr. Trump’s desire to simplify U.S. foreign policy and focus on achieving clear goals is admirable. But the complexity of war demands a careful and nuanced approach. Clausewitz’s reminder to recognize the type of war being waged remains vital. Wars are not contests of spreadsheets but struggles of will, shaped by leadership, morale and adaptability. To be successful, Mr. Trump must resist the allure of quick fixes and instead embrace strategies that reflect the unique nature of each conflict.
Mr. Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute.
Le Figaro, 11 décembre, libre accès
Pour Donald Trump, la «priorité» est de résoudre la guerre en Ukraine
Dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi, le président élu estime que «le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais (…) c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie».
Extraits:
Le président américain élu Donald Trump a estimé que sa priorité serait de «résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie», parmi les multiples crises en cours dans le monde, dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi. «La priorité, c’est de résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie. Ces deux pays subissent des pertes humaines incroyables. Des centaines de milliers de soldats sont tués», a affirmé samedi Donald Trump à l’hebdomadaire lors de son passage à Paris pour la réouverture de la cathédrale Notre-Dame.
«Il y a énormément de crises dans le monde. Depuis quelques jours, on en a une nouvelle en Syrie. Ils devront se débrouiller tout seul car nous ne sommes pas impliqués là-bas, et la France non plus», a-t-il ajouté. «Le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais je pense que c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie», a-t-il précisé.
(…) Samedi, pour la première fois depuis son élection, Trump a rencontré à Paris le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky, sous les auspices du président français Emmanuel Macron.
Le lendemain, il a appelé à un «cessez-le-feu immédiat» et à des négociations, écrivant sur sa plateforme Truth Social que Zelensky était prêt à «conclure un accord et mettre fin à cette folie». Le président ukrainien a exprimé de son côté mardi sa «profonde reconnaissance» envers le président républicain pour «sa forte détermination» à mettre fin à la guerre avec la Russie. (…)
Ukrainska Pravda, 9 décembre, libre accès
After Syria, world must realise that Russia can be defeated – Polish PM
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has linked the fall of the Syrian regime to the possibility of defeating Russia and its allies.
Extraits:
Quote: “The events in Syria have made the world realise once again, or at least they should, that even the most cruel regime may fall and that Russia and its allies can be defeated.”
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/12/8/7488259/
Wall Street Journal, Opinion, 6 décembre, article payant
Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
The Russian ruler wants to scare the West. But he has problems that escalation in Ukraine wouldn’t solve.
Extraits:
When Vladimir Putin announced in a Nov. 21 video address that Russia had launched a new high-speed ballistic missile with nuclear capacity against Ukraine, he didn’t move his hands or fingers for nearly eight minutes. Observers concluded that the video had been doctored to hide that Mr. Putin suffers from hand tremors. Before the announcement, he had been absent from public view for 13 days. According to reliable Kremlin watchers, Mr. Putin’s appearances as shown on his website during that period were “canned goods,” or prerecorded.
Whatever the reason for the president’s prolonged absence, the Kremlin is going all out to show the world that its leader is indomitable, an important message as the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and Mr. Putin raises the specter of nuclear conflict. (…)
The Kremlin clearly aims to instill fear of nuclear escalation in Ukraine and NATO countries. According to political commentator Abbas Gallyamov, “in recent weeks, the number of mentions of nuclear weapons by the authorities has skyrocketed. . . . Even the Russian patriarch has joined in: he says that nuclear war is OK.” Western arms analysts have also raised the alarm, portraying Russia’s new system as a devastating threat to Europe. Tucker Carlson warned in a video from Moscow this week that “we are far closer to nuclear war than at any time in history.”
The key question is whether Mr. Putin would follow through on his threats. (…) Russian political analyst Maksim Katz observed recently: “Everything we know about Vladimir Putin tells us that such a decision is unlikely.” “For his entire quarter of a century in power,” Mr. Katz writes, “he has clearly demonstrated that he is not going to risk his life. The use of nuclear weapons in any form is a big step toward the grave.” (…)
By all accounts, Mr. Putin is unusually fearful of death. Covid caused him to retreat into paranoid isolation in his residence outside Moscow. Visitors had to quarantine for as much as two weeks and pass through a disinfectant tunnel before meeting with him at the end of a 20-foot-long table. Mr. Putin often brings his own white thermos mug to conferences and dinners with foreign leaders and uses a special, heavily armored train for travel in Russia. To keep safe in the event of a nuclear attack, Mr. Putin reportedly has several lavish underground bunkers, including at least one in the Ural Mountains and another under his palace at Gelendzhik on the Black Sea.
According to Russian military expert Ian Matveev, Mr. Putin is making nuclear threats because he is desperate. (…)
Mr. Matveev states that Mr. Putin “doesn’t understand what to do and how to respond, because he doesn’t want to drop a nuclear bomb. He doesn’t want to start a war with NATO, as he promised after [Ukraine’s] long-range strikes. So, he has to make such a showy action in the spirit of—‘look, I have a ballistic missile.’ ”
Time isn’t on Mr. Putin’s side. Thanks to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the ruble’s value has plummeted, inflation is rising, and declining economic growth is causing dissention among the country’s elite. The military is so desperate for manpower that it is using North Korean troops to regain territory in Kursk. (…)
As Mr. Katz observed, the Russian president is “trying to impress everyone with some kind of wonder weapon, while people do nothing but look at the dollar exchange rate.” For ordinary Russians, Mr. Putin’s nuclear swagger might not be enough to compensate for the exorbitant price of butter.
Ms. Knight is author, most recently, of “The Kremlin’s Noose: Putin’s Bitter Feud With the Oligarch Who Made Him Ruler of Russia.”
L’Express, 6 décembre, libre accès
La Russie prête à se défendre par “tous les moyens” : la dernière menace du Kremlin
Guerre en Ukraine. Le chef de la diplomatie russe dit avoir envoyé “un signal” aux alliés de Kiev après le tir d’un puissant missile à moyenne portée sur l’Ukraine, fin novembre.
The Economist, 6 décembre, article payant
Death from above : How Ukraine uses cheap AI-guided drones to deadly effect against Russia
Ukraine is making tens of thousands of them
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s drone war is evolving rapidly. Once a cheap answer to Russia’s artillery dominance, Ukrainian small and inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drones are now a force in their own right. They are used on a huge scale, with Ukraine projected to produce 2m this year. Ukraine now observes 1,000 Russian drones in every 24-hour period, says an insider. That has made some sections of the front lines, for example around Siversk in Luhansk province, practically no-go areas for humans. Drones are now responsible for a majority of battlefield losses, overtaking artillery, according to Ukrainian sources. (…)
The biggest change of all is that electronic warfare—essentially jamming—has consumed the battlefield. (…)
Data from the battlefield suggest that the hit rate for these AI-guided drones is currently above 80%. That is higher than the rate of manually piloted drones. (…)
The result is that Ukraine has become the furnace of a new kind of software-defined warfare which combines precision with mass. (…)
In both cases the drones themselves are made in Ukraine, by Ukrainians. One advantage of that is scale. Auterion’s largest partner in Ukraine, one of many, churns out 300,000 drones per year. Although recent Chinese sanctions have threatened to disrupt Ukraine’s drone supply chain, Mr Meier says that alternatives from Taiwan are now available. (…)
The tech entrepreneur rejects talk of military automation as some kind of dystopian future. “Using AI to accurately target is far more ethical than lobbing missiles and artillery,” he says. Ultimately, a human still has to make the final call on any engagement, says Mr Scherf. But Western and Ukrainian companies are busy working on deep-strike drones whose AI systems will be able to hunt for a wide range of potential targets far from the human operator. Mr Azhnyuk of The Fourth Law sees current technology as just the start. He hopes to have a prototype of a fully automated system, from launch to strike, built by early next year.■
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
NATO Chief Urges More Weapons for Ukraine Ahead of Any Peace Talks
Mark Rutte said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia — and that the West should help strengthen Kyiv’s position beforehand.
Extraits:
NATO’s new top diplomat suggested on Tuesday that Ukraine should put off any peace talks with Russia until Western allies can send enough military aid to help Kyiv push ahead on the battlefield and garner a stronger negotiating position.
Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia in a war that has dragged on for nearly three years.
But with U.S. President-elect Donald J. Trump vowing to secure a quick cease-fire that officials in Kyiv fear would be favorable to Russia — and despite war fatigue hanging over parts of Europe — Mr. Rutte urged the military alliance’s members to step up shipments of weapons, ammunition and air defenses before they try working toward a truce.
“Let’s not have all these discussions, step by step, on what a peace process might look like,” Mr. Rutte said ahead of two days of meetings of foreign ministers, including Ukraine’s, at NATO headquarters in Brussels. “Make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to get to a position of strength when those peace talks start.”
“So I would say more military aid, and less discussions on what the peace process could look like,” Mr. Rutte added.
His comments came even as President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has recently shifted his public stance on a potential peace deal. After years of insisting that Ukraine would cede no territory to Russia in a deal, he has recently signaled that Ukraine would be willing to do so — for now, at least — in return for NATO membership.
While NATO membership remains unlikely while the war is ongoing, Mr. Zelensky’s rhetoric is a marked change. Officials in Kyiv have even provided a rationale that could potentially allow them to temporarily cede territory, asserting that Russian-controlled land in Ukraine would not be internationally recognized as part of Russia. (…)
Mr. Trump has been vague about how he would bring peace to Ukraine in as little as 24 hours, as he has pledged. But senior officials in his administration, including Vice President-elect JD Vance, have proposed such ideas as allowing Russia to keep the territory it has captured and guaranteeing that Ukraine will not join NATO, or withholding military aid to Ukraine until it agrees to negotiate. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/nato-ukraine-trump-peace-talks.html
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
Investigation Into Forced Adoptions From Ukraine Points Finger at Putin
Yale researchers traced hundreds of children taken to Russia in the war, finding what they described as “a higher level of crime than first understood.”
Extraits:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and senior Kremlin officials “intentionally and directly” authorized a program of coerced fostering and adoption of Ukrainian children during the war in Ukraine, according to a Yale University report that was released on Tuesday.
The report provides strong new evidence for a war crimes case against Putin and other officials, the researchers said.
An investigation by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified 314 children from Ukraine who have been placed in a “systematic program of coerced adoption and fostering” since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to the report. It details evidence of direct orders from senior Russian officials, including Mr. Putin, to carry out the adoption program.
“It reveals a higher level of crime than first understood,” the Research Lab, which is part of the Conflict Observatory, a program supported by the U.S. Department of State, said in a statement.
Yale’s investigation could bolster the case against Mr. Putin and his commissioner for children, Maria Lvova-Belova, who were named in an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in March last year for their roles in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. (…)
The report says the Russian president’s office provided direct financial support and other assets for the program.
The treatment of the Ukrainian children may constitute a war crime or crimes against humanity, and could even support a case of genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Research Lab said. (…)
The Kremlin has denied committing war crimes, and maintains that the adoptions are a patriotic and humanitarian effort to help abandoned children. (…) The report also accused the Russian authorities of working to conceal the origin and whereabouts of the Ukrainian children. After the international court issued its arrest warrants, Russia removed much of the evidence from relevant websites, the report said.
“Russia engaged in acts of deception to conceal the full scope of this program and related activities,” the report said. “Most critically, children taken from Ukraine are fundamentally presented in Russia’s databases as if they were from Russia.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-children-deportation-adoption.html
😮 Le Figaro, 3 décembre, article payant
Sergueï Karaganov, architecte de la politique étrangère russe: « La dissuasion ne fonctionne plus, il faut réinstaurer la peur»
ENTRETIEN – Écouté au Kremlin, président d’honneur du très influent Conseil de politique étrangère et de défense (SVOP) qu’il a cofondé en 1992, Sergueï Karaganov est une figure clé de la pensée stratégique russe.
Extraits:
LE FIGARO. – Que pensez-vous des changements apportés récemment par Vladimir Poutine à la doctrine nucléaire russe ?
Sergueï KARAGANOV. – L’objectif de la politique de la Russie est d’abaisser le seuil d’utilisation des armes nucléaires et de barrer la route à une guerre nucléaire majeure. Poutine a précisé que la Russie a le droit d’utiliser des armes nucléaires, y compris contre des puissances non-nucléaires qui mènent la guerre contre nous avec le soutien de puissances nucléaires. Il s’agit d’une innovation importante, mais il existe également d’autres changements. Je m’en félicite car cela fait plusieurs années que je plaide pour de tels changements et je suis heureux d’avoir contribué à lancer une discussion sur ces sujets. Nous proposons d’ailleurs d’autres évolutions dans notre dernier livre. (1)
Depuis de nombreuses années, je suis extrêmement troublé par le fait qu’une grande partie de la population, en particulier des élites – en Occident mais pas seulement – ont été gagnées par une sorte de parasitisme stratégique : les gens se sont habitués à la paix ; ils n’ont plus peur de la guerre. Je considère que c’est très dangereux. Depuis une quinzaine d’années, le monde est entré dans une période de bouleversements tectoniques qui conduiront inévitablement à des crises. La menace qu’un grand nombre de ces crises dégénèrent en une guerre mondiale et nucléaire générale augmente rapidement. Nous devons tout faire pour empêcher le monde de glisser vers la troisième guerre mondiale.
Comment faire, selon vous ?
Pendant soixante-dix ans, les armes nucléaires nous ont sauvés de la guerre. Mais la peur de ces armes s’est apaisée et il est nécessaire de la réinstaurer car des crises et des conflits surgiront inexorablement compte tenu des changements tectoniques que j’évoquais. Je me suis aperçu que nous étions tous intellectuellement bloqués aux années 1970-1980, alors que le monde a changé de façon spectaculaire, y compris sur le plan nucléaire. La dissuasion nucléaire ne fonctionne plus. Il faut réintroduire un fusible nucléaire dans l’ensemble du système international et cela ne s’applique pas seulement aux relations entre la Russie et l’Occident.
Vos propositions risquent de mener à une escalade…
Oui, il est nécessaire de conduire à l’escalade. J’encourage la Russie à progresser sur l’échelle de l’escalade vers la dissuasion et l’intimidation. Des pas ont déjà été faits en ce sens mais il faut aller plus loin pour dégriser tout d’abord nos voisins européens qui, de mon point de vue, ont perdu la raison. Comme il y a cent ans, ils sont en train de pousser le monde vers une guerre mondiale tandis que les Américains misent cyniquement sur une guerre entre la Russie et l’Europe en espérant qu’un tel conflit épuise la Russie et dépouille en même temps l’Europe. (…)
(1) « De la dissuasion à l’intimidation » (2024, non traduit en français)
The Economist, 2 décembre, article payant
Rouble worries : Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort
Supplies from China are about to become more expensive
Extraits:
AT FIRST GLANCE, it did not look that different from other sanctions. On November 21st America’s Treasury Department imposed new restrictions on more than four dozen Russian banks, including Gazprombank, the financial arm of the giant state gas firm. The bank, the largest in Russia not already subject to American sanctions, had been excluded from previous packages in order to allow some central and eastern European countries, including Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, to continue paying for imports of Russian gas. After December 20th, when the measures take full effect, European buyers of Russian gas will be forced to find workarounds involving either third-party banks or currencies other than the dollar, which will take time.
America’s announcement came at a bad moment for the Russian economy, meaning that foreign-exchange markets were quick to respond. The prospect of new restrictions on access to hard currency sent the rouble down by 10% against the dollar to a low of 115 on November 27th, before the central bank inspired a modest rally by using its reserves to buy roubles. Even after this rally, the rouble is still down by 8% against the dollar over the past month and by more than 15% in the year so far. Russia’s currency is at its weakest since immediately after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The government is putting a brave face on the news. Speaking in Kazakhstan on November 28th, Vladimir Putin told reporters that “there are certainly no grounds for panic.”
wrong. Indeed, the latest fall in the rouble’s value makes the job of Russia’s central bank much more difficult. Wartime spending has used up spare capacity in the economy, driving down unemployment to just 2.4%. The government’s latest budget, unveiled in September, will raise defence and security spending by another 25% next year, to around 8% of Russia’s GDP, a post-cold-war high. Annual inflation is running at more than 8%.
In this context, a weaker rouble is a doubled-edged sword. A lower level against the dollar increases the rouble value of oil exports, helping plug the government’s widening deficit. Yet it also pushes up the price of imported goods—something that matters for both consumers and the government’s war effort. (…)
Against a backdrop of high inflation and fears over the value of the currency, Russia’s central bank has already lifted interest rates to 21% this year. Traders now expect rates to end the year at 25%, up from expectations of 23% before the recent slide in the rouble’s value. So far, the Russian government has shielded both consumers and firms from the effects of higher rates via a variety of subsidised-borrowing schemes. But with public finances under pressure, support has recently been scaled back. (…)
The combination of a declining currency and a ballooning budget deficit has led to talk of a hard landing for the Russian economy in 2025. After two years of strong growth, which has confounded many analysts’ gloomy predictions, the pace of expansion will slow sharply. The economic bill for the war is at last coming due. It could be a big one. ■
Articles du 29 novembre au 12 juin 2024