Le Point, 18 janvier, article payant
Peggy Sastre : Comment les « idiots utiles » de la gauche radicale ont permis l’ascension du Hamas
Michaël Prazan dévoile l’envers du mouvement terroriste islamiste, soutenu par les « idiots utiles » d’une certaine gauche occidentale.
Extraits :
Il y a les essais qui documentent et il y a ceux qui marquent. La Vérité sur le Hamas et ses « idiots utiles », que l’historien, documentariste et journaliste Michaël Prazan fait paraître ce 15 janvier aux Éditions de l’Observatoire, est de cette trempe. Un ouvrage incisif qui ne se contente pas d’exposer les mécanismes d’une idéologie destructrice, mais dévoile et dénonce les complicités et aveuglements qui lui permettent de prospérer.
Pas des dérapages, pas le fruit chaotique et spontané d’une barbarie opportuniste, mais bien la traduction d’une stratégie pensée, calculée et exécutée dans un cadre dépassant de loin le théâtre de la guerre. La conséquence directe d’une idéologie structurée, ancienne et méthodique dont les racines plongent, certes, dans une histoire complexe, mais aussi et surtout dans une partition historique et sociale adroitement orchestrée.
Michaël Prazan connaît Gaza. Il y était voilà près de quinze ans, et son séjour a été essentiel pour appréhender l’organisation et la domination du Hamas. « Les lieux sont toujours une source précieuse d’information et de compréhension », nous explique-t-il. Prazan sait comment cette enclave, exiguë et surpeuplée, est devenue au fil des années le reflet d’une organisation politique ayant réussi à imposer son pouvoir par la force, la terreur et l’endoctrinement. Il y a rencontré des figures majeures du Hamas, notamment l’un de ses fondateurs, ainsi que le futur chef du Jihad islamique. Il nous révèle des individus tout à fait conscients de leurs agissements et les raisons qui les animent : « Ce sont des stratèges qui savent très bien ce qu’ils font, de même que les conséquences de leurs actes », confirme-t-il. (…)
Stricto sensu, le Hamas n’est d’ailleurs même pas un mouvement nationaliste palestinien. Il est avant tout l’expression d’une théologie politique voyant dans la Palestine un waqf, une terre sacrée appartenant à l’ensemble des musulmans, pas à un peuple spécifique. Cette dimension religieuse rend toute concession impossible. Pour le Hamas, négocier ou céder un morceau de terre n’est pas seulement une trahison, c’est une hérésie. Avec son cocktail de termes religieux et d’exhortations belliqueuses, difficile de faire plus éloquent que la rhétorique des leaders du Hamas que Prazan expose et décortique. On y entend, sans la moindre ambiguïté, que le Hamas ne mène pas une guerre pour un territoire mais une lutte existentielle pour une vision du monde.
C’est à ce titre qu’il n’y aura jamais de paix, que des « trêves ». Comme le précisait à Prazan son ami Hassan Balawi, cadre de second rang du Fatah et ancien chef de la communication du ministère des Affaires étrangères de l’Autorité palestinienne, devenu l’un de ses ambassadeurs à l’Unesco et au Parlement européen : « Pour les islamistes, Israël représente une nouvelle croisade. Les croisades ont duré deux cents ans, et, pendant ces deux siècles, des dirigeants islamistes tels que Saladin faisaient, de temps à autre, des “trêves” avec les rois chrétiens. Après un certain temps,les dirigeants musulmans repartaient au combat. » Et Prazan de commenter : « Les croisades sont la principale référence historique des Frères musulmans. Peu importe le temps qu’il faut : seul compte, en bout de course, le fait de parvenir à ses fins. »
Parmi les autres passages fondamentaux du livre, l’analyse de l’endoctrinement, en particulier chez les plus jeunes. Gaza, où près de la moitié de la population a moins de 18 ans, est un terrain fertile pour la propagande du Hamas, que Prazan restitue avec une force tragique. Comme ces programmes télévisés diffusés par Al-Aqsa TV avec leurs personnages costumés appelant au meurtre des Juifs comme d’autres récitent une comptine.
« Il est presque impossible de rencontrer quelqu’un qui conteste le pouvoir du Hamas », constate aujourd’hui Prazan. L’absence quasi totale d’opposition à Gaza s’explique non seulement par la répression brutale exercée par le mouvement, mais aussi par des décennies de lavage de cerveau.
À Gaza, une génération entière a grandi sous le joug du Hamas, sans connaître d’autre réalité politique ou idéologique. (…)
Mais l’emprise du Hamas ne se limite pas au Proche-Orient, et les islamistes peuvent compter sur un réseau de soutien propageant leurs idées bien au-delà de ses frontières. « L’entrisme des organisations fréristes diffuse un discours de victimisation à même de convaincre les nouvelles formes prises par l’antiracisme, déplore Prazan. Il y a un aveuglement volontaire, notamment d’extrême gauche, qui semble obstruer ou évacuer la réalité pour des motifs idéologiques et électoralistes. »
Le tout s’enracine dans un phénomène historique : depuis les années 1980, la cause palestinienne est devenue un marqueur essentiel du militantisme étudiant à gauche. Avec l’effondrement du communisme, le pro-palestinisme a pris le relais comme dernier grand identifiant idéologique : un mouvement que galvanisent une méconnaissance des réalités et une opposition systématique à Israël, érigé en symbole d’oppression.
Comme le résume Prazan : « Ajoutons à cela l’ignorance – qui renvoie à la baisse du niveau scolaire qui affecte les lycéens ou les étudiants, mais aussi un certain nombre d’enseignants –, l’hystérie et la violence des réseaux sociaux, le développement des théories complotistes, l’explosion de l’antisémitisme qui, depuis le 7 Octobre, s’exprime désormais sans aucun garde-fou, la disparition des communautés juives de banlieue, depuis, en gros, les années 2000-2005, qui a renvoyé les Juifs à toutes sortes de fantasmagories, et la perte de repères qui touche les nouvelles générations sur ce qui fonde le pacte républicain, la pulsion ou la séduction révolutionnaire qui identifie la violence islamiste à un adjuvant capable de renverser le capitalisme, le dévoiement du mot “résistance” ou le romantisme supposé de la violence révolutionnaire en général, palestinienne en particulier, et vous aurez là les éléments du combo explosif qui a façonné ce à quoi nous avons assisté au cours de l’année écoulée. » Sans compter que « certains acteurs sont motivés par un antisémitisme de moins en moins masqué, ou par intérêt, sachant que certains d’entre eux sont en lien avec des pays, notamment des émirats perméables à l’idéologie des Frères musulmans. »
À ce titre, le livre de Michaël Prazan n’est pas qu’une dissection du Hamas. Il interroge aussi les failles des démocraties occidentales, gangrenées par la peur, l’autocensure et les compromissions. Une dérive que l’assassinat de Samuel Paty aura tragiquement illustrée, avec l’intimidation islamiste parvenant à imposer le silence dans des sphères pourtant censées incarner la liberté d’expression. Une complaisance qui, pour Prazan, équivaut à une trahison morale. Comme si, en relativisant certains actes, en refusant de nommer clairement le mal et en faisant petit à petit de la barbarie un « moyen de lutte » acceptable, nos sociétés consentaient à leur autodestruction.
The Economist, 17 janvier, article payant
The Arabs, Iran and Israel : First, the ceasefire. Next the Trump effect could upend the Middle East
Will Israel and Donald Trump use the threat of annexation to secure a new grand bargain?
Extraits :
Even before the ceasefire in Gaza Donald Trump had begun to reshape the Middle East. He was influential in pushing Israel to a truce with Lebanon in November. The fragile deal struck between Israel and Hamas on January 15th further reduces the intensity of the fighting in the region and resets Israel’s domestic politics. It will also reinforce the president-elect’s power over the Arab states that helped broker the deal, and over Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister.
He will need all the leverage he can get. As Mr Trump enters the White House, he and his advisers face huge decisions about what policies to pursue in a region that has been transformed since his first term.
One dilemma is how much effort Mr Trump should expend on the region. (…) The other dilemma is choosing between competing visions of the region’s future: whether to enable Israel’s hard right, or constrain it in pursuit of a grand bargain with Saudi Arabia.
Such a bargain would potentially have a knock-on benefit, of creating a stronger grouping of Middle East countries opposed to Iran, making it easier for America and its allies to contain the Islamic Republic or weaken it further and force it to the bargaining table. Mike Waltz, the incoming national security adviser, calls it a “huge priority”. Mr Trump sees it as his ticket to a Nobel peace prize.
The agenda of right-wing Israelis remains ambitious. They dream of rebuilding settlements in Gaza and of annexing the occupied West Bank (see map), and are bullish about Israel’s recent incursions into Lebanon and Syria. One of the most extreme individuals in Mr Netanyahu’s coalition is Bezalel Smotrich, the hard-right finance minister. He has already spent the past two years trying to bring about a de facto annexation of the West Bank, pushing through bureaucratic changes that make it easier to expand Jewish settlements there. (…)
Mr Netanyahu had not sworn off annexation for ever. “The word ‘suspend’ was chosen carefully by all parties,” said David Friedman, then America’s ambassador to Israel. “It’s off the table now, but it’s not off the table permanently.” In private, American and Arab diplomats said Israel had promised not to pursue annexation until the end of 2024.
The project of an expansive Israel also has sympathisers within Mr Trump’s swirling group of advisers, among them Mike Huckabee, tipped to be the next ambassador to Israel, an evangelical Christian who believes there is “no such thing as a settlement”. Yet for all that, the Gaza ceasefire points in a different direction. Many of Mr Trump’s close advisers—including his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff—have ambitious plans for regional diplomacy. Allowing Israel to annex the West Bank would scuttle those and lay the groundwork for renewed conflict with the Palestinians.
A major consideration is Saudi Arabia. Muhammad bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler, is eager for a deal that normalises relations with Israel. He sees it as the gateway to better relations with America, which has offered a formal defence treaty, nuclear co-operation and other sweeteners. The plight of the Palestinians does not move him as it does older Saudi royals. (…)
A deal establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia will have to go far beyond ruling out annexation. The Saudis will want a credible Israeli commitment to Palestinian statehood. That, in turn, requires a reset of Israeli politics, with Mr Netanyahu facing down the hard-right parties that he has come to rely on in order to build a viable coalition.
The Gaza ceasefire showed a new dynamic in play, with Mr Trump putting pressure on Mr Netanyahu, who then overruled the extremists in his cabinet. But Mr Netanyahu has yet to fully cross the rubicon: he continues to maintain that the war has not ended and that Israel seeks a total victory over Hamas. (…)
Mr Netanyahu (…), or a future Israeli leader, could pursue a grand bargain backed by Mr Trump. But a huge outstanding question would still remain: the status of Gaza. Hamas has lost its top leadership and thousands of fighters during the war, but it has had no trouble finding more amid the strip’s teeming misery. “We assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, said in a speech on January 14th. (…)
The group’s past wars with Israel followed a familiar pattern. Gaza endured days or weeks of bombardment. Once a ceasefire took hold, donor countries stepped in to fix the damage. Hamas retained its grip on power. It hopes to do the same this time. If it does, though, it is unlikely Gaza will be rebuilt soon. (…)
Hamas will not find it easy to wield power in post-war Gaza—but there are also no easy alternatives to its rule. Mr Biden had been keen for the PA to take control of the territory. Mr Netanyahu refused even to discuss the idea, let alone pursue it; he hoped to dump the job on Arab states. Mr Trump’s views are a mystery. If he does not pursue a viable plan for governing the strip, the ceasefire will remain fragile: reconstruction is meant to be part of the deal. Israel will remain isolated. Ending the war will not buy it much goodwill if Gaza still resembles an enormous refugee camp.
Much has changed in the Middle East. That does not mean anything is possible, though. A Saudi-Israeli deal is a realistic goal in the next four years, but it may not be possible to strong-arm the Saudis.
Nor will Mr Trump negotiate that deal in isolation. He has also promised another round of “maximum pressure” aimed at forcing Iran into a diplomatic agreement that restrains its nuclear programme and, perhaps, its support for regional militias as well. The events of the past year have left those militias deeply weakened. Hizbullah, the Iranian-backed Shia group in Lebanon, is no longer in a position to menace Israel. The Assad regime in Syria has collapsed, yielding to an interim government that seeks accommodation with Israel.
Empowering Israel’s far right would jeopardise these gains: the Palestinian cause can still mobilise violence and unrest across the region. On the other hand, a durable peace in Gaza and a fair settlement for the Palestinians would get Mr Trump the deal he covets—and probably the peace prize, too. ■
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 janvier, article payant
Die Waffenruhe im Gazastreifen ist eine gute Nachricht – doch die Hamas bleibt ein Problem
Israel muss in dem Abkommen schmerzhafte Zugeständnisse machen und den «totalen Sieg» über die Terrororganisation aufschieben. Die Hoffnungen auf ein Ende des Krieges sind verfrüht. Dennoch bietet die Feuerpause Chancen, die nun genutzt werden sollten.
Extraits :
(…) Sosehr nun Erleichterung herrscht – dieses Abkommen ist alles andere als perfekt. Es sichert das Überleben der Hamas und zwingt Israel zu schmerzhaften Zugeständnissen, wie etwa zur Freilassung von Hunderten verurteilten Terroristen aus israelischen Gefängnissen. Die Zerschlagung der Terrororganisation aus Gaza ist und bleibt ein legitimes Ziel der Israeli – zumal diese nicht von ihrem Anspruch, den jüdischen Staat zu zerstören, ablassen wird.
Deshalb ist die Hoffnung, dass die Einigung in Doha zu einem definitiven Ende des Krieges führen wird, völlig verfrüht. Die Hamas wird alles unternehmen, um ihre Machtposition im Gazastreifen nicht zu verlieren. Gelingt ihr dies, hat Israel jedes Recht, den Krieg wieder aufzunehmen und sich gegen die mörderischen Terroristen zu verteidigen.
Warum der Sinneswandel Netanyahus? Hat er eingesehen, dass sich die Hamas mit militärischem Druck allein nicht zerschlagen lässt? Nach Einschätzung der Amerikaner haben die Terroristen jüngst mehr neue Kämpfer rekrutiert, als sie verloren haben. Fest steht: Solange dieser Konflikt andauert, wird es immer junge Palästinenser geben, die sich von islamistischen Predigern dazu verführen lassen, mit einem Sturmgewehr in der Hand «Widerstand» zu leisten.
Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass Netanyahu darauf spekuliert, nun einige Geiseln freizubekommen, nur um dann mit Unterstützung von Präsident Trump den Krieg mit neuer Härte fortzusetzen und auch die israelische Kontrolle über das besetzte Westjordanland zu zementieren. Doch Trump, der selbsternannte «Dealmaker», könnte andere Ziele vor Augen haben: ein Normalisierungsabkommen mit Saudiarabien, einen Friedensplan für den Nahen Osten, einen Friedensnobelpreis. Dies wäre jedenfalls ein hoffnungsvolleres Szenario als ein fortgesetzter Krieg.
All dies wird jedoch davon abhängen, ob es gelingt, die Macht der Hamas zu brechen – und das ist mehr als fraglich. (…) Doch wer sollte an ihrer Stelle die Kontrolle übernehmen? Die korrupte Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde – der Wunschkandidat der Biden-Regierung –, die es bis heute nicht geschafft hat, das Massaker vom 7. Oktober 2023 unmissverständlich zu verurteilen? Die Golfmonarchien, die nur dann helfen wollen, wenn gleichzeitig ein palästinensischer Staat entsteht? So oder so wird die Hamas keine Gelegenheit auslassen, eine alternative Nachkriegsordnung zu sabotieren. Die Vorzeichen stehen schlecht.
(…) Donald Trump scheint für diese Aufgabe besser gerüstet als sein zaudernder Vorgänger Joe Biden. Nach der Einigung vom Mittwochabend schimmert ein kleines bisschen Hoffnung über dem Nahen Osten. Doch Optimisten haben es bekanntlich schwer in dieser krisengeplagten Region.
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/israel-trotz-waffenruhe-bleibt-die-hamas-ein-problem-ld.1866500
The Wall Street Journal, 16 janvier, article payant
Trump Forced Netanyahu to Make a Deal With the Devil
Some hostages will come home but Hamas survives, which means more Israelis and Americans will die.
Extraits :
The cease-fire and hostage agreement announced by Israel and Hamas Wednesday is a bad deal. Worse, it comes at the wrong time and under unfavorable conditions. The deal stipulates that roughly three dozen hostages kidnapped from Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, will be returned to their families. While that’s good news, the price—the survival of Hamas—is too steep.
A better deal was available and could have been reached had Jerusalem and Mar-a-Lago waited a few days. President-elect Trump’s demand for a final agreement before his Jan. 20 inauguration pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the current framework. (…)
Under the agreement, Hamas will be able to replenish its depleted ranks. Seven hundred or more terrorists will go straight from Israeli prisons to the streets of Gaza. Many are sadistic killers who have spent their years behind bars dreaming of a return to the battlefield.
By releasing these hardened killers, Israel is repeating a mistake it has learned 100 times the hard way: Releasing large numbers of terrorists ignites waves of terror. This happened after the May 1985 Jibril Agreement, which led to the first intifada. In 2011, Israel exchanged 1,027 Hamas prisoners for one kidnapped hostage—soldier Gilad Shalit. Among those released in exchange for Mr. Shalit was Yahya Sinwar, who later became the leader of Hamas in Gaza and masterminded the Oct. 7 massacre.
Hamas terrorists freed by the current deal will soon rejoin the organization’s network, which spans Judea, Samaria, Gaza, Qatar and Turkey. Once reunited with their colleagues, they will launch new attacks. It’s as if the U.S. sent captured al-Qaeda fighters back to Afghanistan in 2002. Crazy.
Goods and fuel will also flood into Gaza as a result of Wednesday’s agreement, helping Hamas to rebuild itself militarily and financially. Hamas will use the fuel for tunnel digging and operations against Israel Defense Forces soldiers. (…)
Hamas has a long history of stealing foreign aid, selling what it steals to Gazans at inflated prices, and using the proceeds to recruit young fighters. When the cease-fire takes effect and the IDF withdraws, the organization will quickly rebuild itself and resume its cross-border activities.
It’s reasonable to ask why the IDF hasn’t been able to destroy Hamas completely in 15 months. The main reason is that President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken repeatedly intervened in ways that helped Hamas survive. Israel’s acceptance of the American demand that it fight with one hand tied behind its back was a strategic failure. One strategic failure doesn’t justify another.
Many Israelis hoped that Mr. Trump would stop the madness and give Mr. Netanyahu the green light to crush Hamas once and for all. Instead Mr. Trump pushed Mr. Netanyahu to accept a deal with the devil. The Israeli prime minister should never have done it.
Mr. Kahana is diplomatic and White House correspondent for Israel Hayom, a daily newspaper.
The Economist, 16 janvier, article payant
A ceasefire in Gaza at last : After 15 months of hell, Israel and Hamas sign a ceasefire deal
Donald Trump provided the X factor by putting heat on Binyamin Netanyahu, who insists the war isn’t over yet
Extraits :
AFTER MORE than 15 months of war, and just five days before Donald Trump is inaugurated as America’s 47th president on January 20th, a ceasefire in Gaza has at last been agreed. The deal, struck on January 15th, is essentially the same proposal that the outgoing American president, Joe Biden, extracted from Israel in May. It took eight months of tortuous mediation and the joint efforts of both old and new American administrations, alongside those of Egypt and Qatar, to get Israel and Hamas, Gaza’s Islamists, to commit.
Mr Trump seems to have been the X factor. He made it clear to the Israelis he has no desire to enter the White House having to manage yet more war in the Middle East. That bellicosity seems to have helped secure a ceasefire in Lebanon, and now one in Gaza.
During the first phase of the accord, meant to last six weeks, Hamas will free 33 of the 98 Israeli hostages still held in Gaza, in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. During this initial period, further talks will be held to finalise the next stage of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the release of the remaining hostages.
It is too soon to say the war is over. (…)
Meanwhile Hamas is divided between its leaders outside Gaza, who have proved more flexible in the talks, and its surviving commanders in the enclave, led by Muhammad Sinwar, a younger brother of Yahya, the mastermind of the October 7th attack who was killed by Israel last October. The younger Mr Sinwar now controls the fate of the Israeli hostages. He is eager to prove to Palestinians and the rest of Hamas that he can drive a tougher bargain in return for freeing the captives. He insisted on being the last to give his assent to the ceasefire and may yet scupper it.
In Israel, too, Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, still has to bring the accord to his cabinet, where his more radical ministers remain opposed to ending the war. He will almost certainly win that vote, but his government may collapse as a result. Still, now that he has promised Mr Trump a deal, it will be difficult for him to wriggle out of it, as he has done so often in the past.
The new administration’s approach is yielding results in part because the Trump team has little truck with the diplomatic niceties of the outgoing bunch. When Mr Trump’s new envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, a New York real-estate mogul, arrived in Israel for talks on January 11th, he brusquely informed the Israelis he would not wait for the Sabbath to end to meet Mr Netanyahu.
But it is not just manners. Despite five decades of steadfast support for the Jewish state, Mr Biden is less popular in Israel than Mr Trump. Mr Netanyahu could at least tell his supporters that by refusing Mr Biden’s demands he was standing up for Israel’s interests. That argument is much less convincing when the Israeli right sees the incoming president as much friendlier than his predecessor. (…)
In the past year Israel has gone to war with Hizbullah, the Iranian-backed Shia movement in Lebanon, destroying much of its military capabilities and eliminating its senior leadership. It has done the same to Hamas in Gaza as well. Mr Netanyahu claims to have “changed the face of the Middle East”. He has even taken credit for the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Now he may be ready to secure what he believes would be his legacy as Israel’s long-serving leader: a deal with the Saudis which he hopes would weaken Iran and curb its regional ambitions.
To do so would probably mean losing his current majority in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. (…) Mr Netanyahu is trying to keep his radical partners on side by promising them that the war is not yet over. But those close to the prime minister acknowledge that unless Hamas throws a spanner in the works, he is now prepared to go the full course, even if it means losing his majority.
Israel’s successes, against Hizbullah in particular, have revived Mr Netanyahu’s flagging popularity, at least somewhat. And a clear majority of Israelis now support a deal to end the war. In talks with the far right the prime minister has emphasised that the second stage of the deal leading to a full Israeli withdrawal and permanent ceasefire is far from inevitable. This is true, but Mr Netanyahu knows that a return to full warfare in Gaza would incur the wrath of Mr Trump, a president whom, unlike the outgoing one, the prime minister fears crossing. ■
The Wall Street Journal, 16 janvier, article payant
Which President Will Get Credit for a Gaza Cease-Fire?
The Biden administration has spent months on negotiations, but Trump might have pushed it over the line
Extraits :
WASHINGTON—The finalizing of the cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas owes much to the impending transfer of power from President Biden to President-elect Donald Trump, sparking a pointed debate over who deserves the credit.
Though the deal is the product of months of on-and-off talks, the approaching change of U.S. administration has served as an unofficial deadline for cementing the accord, current and former U.S. officials say.
“WE HAVE A DEAL FOR THE HOSTAGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WILL BE RELEASED SHORTLY. THANK YOU!” Trump announced Wednesday on Truth Social, his social-media platform. “This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November.”
Biden also took credit for the deal in a statement confirming the deal. “My diplomacy never ceased in their efforts to get this done,” he said, expressing a theme he emphasized in remarks Wednesday afternoon at the White House.
While walking away from the podium, a reporter asked Biden if he or Trump ultimately deserved credit for the deal.
Biden turned around, smiled and said: “Is that a joke?” (…)
Regional dynamics played an important role. Israel is increasingly focused on reining in Iran’s nuclear program and well aware that both Biden and Trump support sealing the Gaza deal over the next week. Hamas, meanwhile, has been gravely weakened by the Israeli military, which also decimated Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The scramble over which American president deserves the plaudits has begun in Washington and will only intensify as the initial release of nearly three dozen hostages and a 42-day cease-fire takes place. (…)
Middle East analysts and even some Biden administration officials argue the combination of Democratic and Republican efforts appears to have brought the talks to the finish line. (…)
Netanyahu, Ross added, doesn’t feel he can go against Trump, giving the incoming president leverage in the relationship at the start of his second term. “But the Biden team deserves credit for basically helping to craft the deal,” he said. (…)
“There was tremendous cooperation here between Trump and Biden,” said Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. Middle East negotiator who is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But this is not a resolution of the issue. There’s no Hollywood ending here.” (…)
Incoming Trump national security adviser Mike Waltz, previewing how the next administration sees the problem, said it was imperative to get a resolution of the Gaza conflict and encourage a “finally reformed” Palestinian Authority.
But he expressed skepticism about the ability to moderate extremist movements in the region. “Hopefully you can reform the next generation,” he said, “but sometimes you just have to put bombs on foreheads.”
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/which-president-will-get-credit-for-a-gaza-cease-fire-736fef87
Le Point, 16 janvier, article payant
À Gaza, une trêve trumpienne
ÉDITO. L’accord entre Israël et le Hamas est un soulagement bienvenu car il met un terme au moins provisoire aux hostilités, mais il laisse entière la question de l’avenir de la bande de Gaza.
Extraits :
C’est une trêve bienvenue car elle n’a que trop tardé. Une trêve qui devrait conduire en principe, si tout se passe bien, à la libération des 98 otages israéliens qui restent détenus à Gaza, ainsi qu’une accélération de l’aide humanitaire à la population palestinienne qui a tant souffert des 15 mois de guerre. Mais c’est aussi une trêve fragile, qui peut se rompre à tout moment, et surtout qui laisse entière la question de l’avenir de la bande de Gaza et de sa gouvernance. Sur le plan politique, tout reste à faire.
Pour l’instant, le Hamas reste au pouvoir à Gaza. C’est un échec patent pour le Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou qui s’était fixé comme but « d’éradiquer » le mouvement terroriste après le méga pogrome dont il s’est rendu coupable le 7 octobre 2023 (1 200 Israéliens tués, 250 autres pris en otages).
Si Israël a pris le risque de valider l’accord du 15 janvier – dont les dispositions sont grosso modo sur la table depuis mai 2024 –c’est d’abord parce que l’armée israélienne a porté des coups tels au Hamas que la dangerosité du mouvement est émoussée (…).
C’est aussi parce que l’équilibre des forces a radicalement changé depuis un an au Proche-Orient, au profit d’Israël (…).
Cependant, le facteur décisif semble bien avoir été le retour imminent de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche. Le président élu avait menacé l’an dernier de « déchaîner l’enfer » au Proche-Orient si la question des otages n’était pas réglée avant son investiture, lundi 20 janvier. L’accord est programmé pour entrer en vigueur la veille, dimanche 19 janvier. L’émissaire personnel de Trump au Proche-Orient, Steve Witkoff, a participé aux dernières tractations au Qatar, comme si le dirigeant républicain était déjà le vrai chef de l’exécutif américain. « Ces derniers jours, nous avons travaillé comme une seule équipe », a d’ailleurs reconnu Joe Biden depuis la Maison-Blanche, notant que « les termes de l’accord seront, pour l’essentiel, mis en place par la prochaine administration ». (…)
Donald Trump, lui, a déjà annoncé qu’il entendait relancer dès que possible la dynamique des accords d’Abraham, qu’il avait parrainés pendant son premier mandat. Ces accords avaient conduit les Émirats arabes unis, le Bahrein puis le Maroc à développer leurs relations avec Israël. La prochaine étape que le nouveau président américain est désireux d’aider Israël à franchir concerne l’établissement de relations avec l’Arabie saoudite. Mais celle-ci a déjà averti qu’elle ne s’engagerait pas sans que l’État hébreu accepte un processus crédible conduisant à l’émergence d’un État palestinien. Une perspective que le gouvernement Netanyahou exclut catégoriquement. Même si la trêve devait finir par tenir à Gaza, la paix au Proche-Orient reste une perspective hors d’atteinte pour le moment.
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/a-gaza-une-treve-trumpienne-15-01-2025-2580073_24.php
The Jerusalem Post, 14 janvier, article payant
What will Turkey do with Syria’s Kurdish population? – opinion
Although Erdogan might deplore the effect on Turkey’s domestic political scene, he may yet see an autonomous Kurdish region recognized within a new Syrian constitution.
Extraits :
What is to become of the Kurds, by far Syria’s largest minority, with some two million people? (…)
TURKEY, A long-time supporter of the rebel movement that overthrew the dictatorial regime of Bashar al-Assad – the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham – now has strong political influence with its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Julani. Erdogan no doubt hopes to use it to control his perennial Kurdish problem by continuing to occupy the swaths of Syria that he has overrun. But despite his dominant political position in post-Assad Syria, it is far from certain that he will be able to do so.
Julani’s intentions regarding minorities in general, and the Kurds in particular, are still very unclear. Ever since the fall of the Assad regime Julani has presented a moderate face to the world, consistently declaring that he intends to be as inclusive as possible in establishing Syria’s new governance.
In short, he may not endorse the continued occupation by Turkey of large areas of sovereign Syria. Moreover, he has said several times that Kurds are “part of the Syrian homeland” while assuring the nation that “there will be no injustice.”
THOUSANDS of years ago, a proud and independent nation lived and thrived in its own land in the heart of the Middle East. Subject to many foreign invasions, this ethnically-distinct people refused to be integrated with their various conquerors and retained their own culture.
At the start of World War I, their country was a small part of the Ottoman Empire. In shaping the future Middle East after the war, the Allied powers, especially Britain, promised to act as guarantors of this people’s freedom. That promise was subsequently broken.
Although this sounds similar to the story of the Jewish people, it is in fact the broad outline of the long, convoluted, and unresolved history of the Kurds.
The nearly 35 million Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world. Historically, they inhabited a distinct geographical area flanked by mountain ranges, once referred to as Kurdistan. No such location is depicted on current maps, for the old Kurdistan now falls within the sovereign space of four separate states: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
Most Kurds – some 25 million – live within Turkey’s borders. There are 2 million in Syria, while within Iraq the 5 million Kurds have developed a near autonomous state. Nearly 7 million Kurds are trapped inside Iran’s extremist Shi’ite regime.
The Treaty of Sevres, marking the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, stipulated a referendum would decide the issue of the Kurdistan homeland. That referendum never took place, and the Sevres treaty itself was rendered null and void in 1922 by the establishment of the Turkish Republic under Kemal Ataturk.
The Treaty of Lausanne followed, giving control of the then-Kurdistan homeland to the new republic. With a stroke of the colonial pen, over 20 million Kurds were declared Turkish.
Kurdish autonomy achieved its greatest recognition in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, which established the Kurdistan region as a federal entity within Iraq, with its own local government and legal framework.
The Kurds in Syria will be well aware of that. (…)
In September 2017, Syria’s then-foreign minister stated that Damascus would consider granting Kurds greater autonomy once ISIS was defeated. Events overtook these aspirations, and nothing of the sort materialized. But they might provide Julani with a template for a future accommodation with the Kurds within the constitution of a unified and restored Syrian state.
Although Erdogan might deplore the effect on Turkey’s domestic political scene, he may yet see an autonomous Kurdish region recognized within a new Syrian constitution – and even, eventually, some form of alliance between that and the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-837218
The Jerusalem Post, 14 janvier, article payant
Sudan: The real genocide
Whether you call it an obsession or antisemitism, social convenience or just ignorance, the international silence on the Arab genocide in Sudan adds up to the same thing: an egregious moral outrage.
The writer is founding director of The David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies and author of more than 20 books about Jewish history and the Holocaust.
Full article here: https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/14-anvier.pdf
Link: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-837219
The Wall Street Journal, 13 janvier, article payant
Hamas Has Another Sinwar. And He’s Rebuilding.
Under Yahya Sinwar’s younger brother, Hamas is recruiting new fighters in Gaza, drawing Israel into a war of attrition
Extraits :
Hamas suffered a severe blow last fall when Israel killed Yahya Sinwar, the group’s leader and strategist behind the Oct. 7 attacks.
But now the U.S.-designated terrorist group has another Sinwar in charge, Yahya’s younger brother Mohammed, and he is working to build the militant group back up.
Israel’s 15-month campaign has reduced Hamas’s Gaza Strip redoubt to rubble, killed thousands of its fighters and much of its leadership, and cut off the border crossings it might use to rearm. The well-trained and well-armed cadres who surged into southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, are badly weakened.
But the violence has also created a new generation of willing recruits and littered Gaza with unexploded ordnance that Hamas fighters can refashion into improvised bombs. The militant group is using those tools to continue to inflict pain. The Israeli military in the past week has reported 10 deaths among soldiers in the area of Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza. Hamas also has fired some 20 rockets at Israel in the past two weeks.
The recruitment drive and persistent fighting under Sinwar pose a fresh challenge for Israel. (…)
“We are in a situation where the pace at which Hamas is rebuilding itself is higher than the pace that the IDF is eradicating them,” said Amir Avivi, a retired Israeli brigadier general, referring to the Israel Defense Forces. “Mohammed Sinwar is managing everything.” (…)
Mohammed Sinwar is believed to be about 50 and has long been considered close to his older brother, who was more than 10 years his senior. Like Yahya Sinwar, he joined Hamas at an early age and was considered close to the head of the movement’s armed wing, Mohammed Deif.
Unlike his brother, who spent more than two decades in an Israeli prison, Mohammed hasn’t spent a significant amount of time in Israeli jail and is less understood by Israel’s security establishment. He has operated largely behind the scenes, according to Arab officials, earning him the nickname “Shadow.”
“We are working hard to find him,” said a senior Israeli official from the Southern Command, which runs the battle in Gaza. (…)
Before the war, Israel believed that Hamas had up to 30,000 fighters arranged into 24 battalions in a structure that loosely resembled a state military. The Israeli military now says it has destroyed that organized structure and has killed about 17,000 fighters, and detained thousands of others.
Hamas, which Israeli and Arab officials say still controls large areas of the Gaza Strip, hasn’t said how many fighters it has lost. The number of new Hamas recruits also remains unclear. (…)
The new fighters, while inexperienced, are launching hit-and-run attacks in small cells of just a few fighters. They are using guns and antitank weapons that require little military training.
Hamas is recruiting the new fighters with promises of more food, aid and medical care for young men and their families, according to Arab officials, who say the militants sometimes steal humanitarian aid or co-opt civilians to work with the militant group. (…)
Hamas militants are also targeting funerals and prayer gatherings to find aggrieved young Palestinians inclined to sign up, these officials said.
The recruiting drive is extending a war that was triggered by the Hamas-led attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, which left around 1,200 people dead and about 250 taken hostage. About 400 Israeli soldiers have died fighting in Gaza. More than 46,000 people have been killed in Gaza during the war, according to Palestinian health authorities, who don’t say how many were combatants. (…)
The Jerusalem Post, 12 janvier, article payant
Blinken’s parting words: No hostage deal? Blame Hamas, not Netanyahu – analysis
Blinken’s comments in the interview Saturday were not all that predictable when nearly 20 minutes of the 50-minute conversation turned toward Israel, Hamas, and Gaza.
Extraits :
The way US Secretary of State Antony Blinken began his swan-song interview with The New York Times some three weeks before leaving office was predictable: The Biden administration he served left America better placed around the world than when it came into office. (…)
But his comments in the interview Saturday were not all that predictable when nearly 20 minutes of the 50-minute conversation turned toward Israel, Hamas, and Gaza.
Here are some key takeaways: (…)
Blinken, who has been closely involved in the negotiations, probably has a pretty good idea. And here is what he said when asked by the interviewer whether Netanyahu blocked a ceasefire deal in July that would have led to the hostages’ release.
“No, that’s not accurate,” he said. “What we’ve seen time and again is Hamas not concluding a deal that it should have concluded.”
Blinken said there have been times, such as when Israel killed Hamas head Yahya Sinwar, that Israeli actions have made getting to a conclusion of a deal more difficult, but unlike Golan, he clearly placed the onus not on Netanyahu but on Hamas. (…)
Blinken said there were two main impediments to Hamas reaching an agreement to free the hostages. One impediment, he said, was when there was public daylight between the United States and Israel and the perception that pressure on Israel was growing: “We’ve seen it: Hamas has pulled back from agreeing to a ceasefire and the release of hostages.” (…)
The other main impediment to Hamas making a deal, Blinken said, was their belief and hope that there would be a much wider conflict: “that Hezbollah would attack Israel, that Iran would attack Israel, that other actors would attack Israel, and that Israel would have its hands full, and Hamas could continue what it was doing.” (…)
Blinken, again to his credit, flagged this, though not specifically referring to her.
“Look, one of the things that I found a little astounding throughout is that for all of the understandable criticism of the way Israel has conducted itself in Gaza, you hear virtually nothing from anyone since October 7 about Hamas,” he said. “Why there hasn’t been a unanimous chorus around the world for Hamas to put down its weapons, to give up the hostages, to surrender – I don’t know what the answer is to that.
“Israel, on various occasions, has offered safe passage to Hamas’s leadership and fighters out of Gaza. Where is the world? Where is the world saying, Yeah, do that! End this! Stop the suffering of people that you brought on!
“Now, again, that doesn’t absolve Israel of its actions in conducting the war. But I do have to question how it is that we haven’t seen a greater sustained condemnation and pressure on Hamas to stop what it started and to end the suffering of people that it initiated.” (…)
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-836195
The Economist, 12 janvier, article payant
All talk and no truce : From inside an obliterated Gaza, gunfire not a ceasefire
In north Gaza the IDF is now facing “a bitter guerrilla war”
Extraits :
Once home to nearly 200,000 residents, Jabalia, the main town in northern Gaza, is a deserted wasteland of destroyed buildings and churned-up mud. But the soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces (idf), now on their third offensive there since the war in Gaza began in October 2023, have no idea when they are leaving.
“We still have a mission here,” insists Major Omer, commander of an infantry company, who accompanied The Economist on a brief visit to Jabalia. “There are still Hamas snipers hiding, carrying out ambushes. It is now the most basic and bitter guerrilla war.” The young soldiers and officers may still believe in the mission, but their former commander, Yoav Gallant, the defence minister who was fired in November, has admitted in private that the idf no longer has a military purpose in Gaza. Occasionally, the major’s men encounter civilians, whom they force towards the seething mass of misery of around 1.5m displaced Gazans huddled in southern Gaza. The operation in Jabalia, which is in its fourth month, could drag on indefinitely. Or it could end in days, if a ceasefire being negotiated in Cairo and Doha is agreed.
Only a few thousand civilians remain in Gaza’s northern quarter. Some right-wing Israeli politicians and generals want to prevent those who lived there ever returning. Others insist that Israel’s military presence is temporary, until a deal is reached with Hamas, the Islamists behind the October 7th attacks. But that remains elusive.
The odds of a ceasefire have little to do with the situation in Gaza, where at least 45,000 people, well over half of them civilians, have been killed in the war. Policy is driven neither by Israel’s military objectives—or lack thereof—nor the immense suffering of most Gazans, now entering a second winter in a cramped “humanitarian zone” where several babies have died of hypothermia. The main considerations of both sides are political.
The basics of the notional deal supposedly on the table have not changed since May, when they were first laid out: Israel would withdraw fully from Gaza, in stages, in return for the release of 98 Israeli hostages, around half of whom are assumed to be alive. But in public Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, insists Israel will fight on until it achieves “total victory” over Hamas, whatever that means. Hamas, despite its shattered state, is showing little flexibility, refusing to release hostages before Israel guarantees a withdrawal.
Mr Netanyahu is under pressure from his far-right allies, who talk of building settlements in Gaza. Ending the war could bring down his government and bring on the public reckoning he has been evading. Hamas leaders are anxious to retain some control over the rubble of Gaza and keep some hostages as bargaining chips.
America’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, insisted on January 8th that “we’re very close to a ceasefire and hostage agreement.” But those close to the talks believe a deal to end the war and free all the hostages is extremely unlikely before Donald Trump takes power. It is more likely that a smaller number of hostages will be released in return for a truce of a few weeks. For now, even a short respite for Gaza seems too much to hope for. ■
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 janvier, article payant
Syrien: Die Finanzquellen der neuen Machthaber
Die Rebellen haben ihre Arme wie eine Krake über ihre Gebiete ausgestreckt. Ein verzweigtes Netzwerk verschaffte ihnen das Geld, das sie brauchten. Ein Modell für ein neues Syrien ist dies nicht, erklärt die Konfliktforscherin.
Extraits :
Anfang Dezember eroberten syrische Rebellengruppen unter Führung der islamistischen Hai’at Tahrir al-Scham (HTS), was so viel wie Befreiungsfront für die Levante oder Syrien bedeutet, in weniger als zwei Wochen Damaskus. Sie beendeten damit einen fast vierzehnjährigen Bürgerkrieg. Seitdem regiert in Syrien eine von der HTS dominierte Übergangsregierung. HTS wurde 2011 als syrischer Ableger des „Islamischen Staats“ (IS) im Irak gegründet, damals noch unter dem Namen Dschabhat al-Nusra (Unterstützungsfront). In den ersten Jahren zählte die Gruppe einige Tausend Kämpfer, heute sind es Zehntausende. Wie kam es zu diesem rasanten Aufstieg? Eine zentrale Rolle spielte das komplexe Finanzierungsmodell der Gruppe.
Um zu verstehen, wie die Finanzierung und damit die Macht von HTS funktioniert, muss man an den Anfang zurückgehen. Zunächst wurde HTS vom IS im Irak und von Al-Qaida finanziert, als die beiden dschihadistischen Netzwerke noch zusammengehörten. Doch schon bald eignete sich die Gruppe lokale Ressourcen an, indem sie Waffen, Munition und Treibstoffvorräte des Regimes erbeutete. Schon 2013 kontrollierte die HTS zusammen mit anderen Oppositionsgruppen weite Teile Nordsyriens. Die Gruppe konzentrierte sich auf die Kontrolle lebenswichtiger und gewinnbringender Ressourcen wie Getreidesilos, Wasserkraftwerke und Elektrizitätswerke. Sie eroberte auch Ölquellen in Deir ez-Zor im Osten des Landes, bevor diese im Sommer 2014 vom IS eingenommen wurden. Auch Entführungen zur Erpressung von Lösegeld gehörten zu ihrem Portfolio. Die Gruppe legte daher großen Wert auf Eigenfinanzierung und Diversifizierung der Einnahmequellen. Dazu zählten auch ausländische Quellen.
Hier sind vor allem wohlhabende Salafisten aus den Golfstaaten zu nennen, die in den Jahren 2012 und 2013 radikal-islamistische Gruppen in Syrien regelrecht mit Geld überschwemmten. Vor allem in Kuwait ansässige religiös-politische Organisationen und Netzwerke wie die Umma-Partei spielten eine wichtige Rolle bei der Finanzierung salafistischer Gruppen wie Ahrar al-Scham. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass auch Gelder an HTS und IS geflossen sind. (…)
Seit 2017 hat sich die finanzielle Lage der Gruppe grundlegend verändert. Bis Mitte 2017 war Ahrar al-Scham – Hauptpartner und Rivale von HTS – die zentrale Macht im Nordwesten Syriens und kontrollierte die wichtigsten wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen wie den Grenzübergang Bab al-Hawa zur Türkei. Dieser erwirtschaftete durch den Import von Waren schätzungsweise bis zu 4 Millionen US-Dollar pro Monat. Mitte 2017 eroberte HTS Bab al-Hawa und übernahm sukzessive die Kontrolle über Idlib und die umliegenden Gebiete. Darüber hinaus kontrollierte HTS weitere Grenzübergänge im Landesinneren, auch zwischen Rebellengebieten und vom Regime kontrollierten Gebieten, die ebenfalls Millionenbeträge durch Gebühren und Zölle einbrachten.
Die Gruppe monopolisierte auch die Verwaltung, die zuvor in den Händen verschiedener Rebellengruppen lag. Zu diesem Zweck gründete HTS Ende 2017 die Syrische Rettungsregierung. Diese war nominell unabhängig, doch hinter den Kulissen zog HTS weiterhin die Fäden.
Durch die enge Verflechtung mit dieser Regierung erschloss sich die Gruppe neue Finanzierungsquellen: Sie erhob Steuern und Abgaben auf alle Dinge des Lebens und monopolisierte die Wirtschaft. So kontrollierte HTS über mit ihr verbundene Unternehmen und Händler die Verteilung von Lebensmitteln und anderen Gütern wie Gas und Treibstoff. Auch Internet- und Kommunikationsdienste wurden von einer Behörde monopolisiert, die durch ungünstige Konditionen für Internetanbieter hohe Gewinne machte. Der Stromsektor wurde von einem mit HTS verbundenen Unternehmen kontrolliert. Die gesamte Finanzierung lief über die Cham-Bank in der Stadt Idlib, die aus der HTS eigenen Hawala-Gesellschaft hervorgegangen ist.
Seit 2018 dominierte Watad Petroleum, ein eng mit HTS verbundenes Unternehmen, den Treibstoffmarkt in Idlib. Dieses Unternehmen war lange das einzige, das eine Lizenz für den Import und Vertrieb von Öl und Gas nach und in Idlib besaß und damit auch die Treibstoffpreise kontrollierte. Zivilisten, aber auch Krankenhäuser und Bäckereien litten unter den oft hohen Preisen. Im Jahr 2022 löste sich das Unternehmen aufgrund von Vorwürfen und Krisen auf und übertrug die Verantwortung für die Treibstoffversorgung der Generaldirektion für Erdölderivate, die ihrerseits die Importlizenz an Unternehmen vergab, die sich im Besitz von HTS nahestehenden Personen befanden.
Die Zivilbevölkerung wurde auch selbst zur Kasse gebeten, zum Beispiel durch eine Straßengebühr, die von Menschen entrichtet werden musste, die durch von der HTS kontrollierte Gebiete fuhren. Gebühren wurden auch für Autos, Motorräder, Straßenreinigung, Müllabfuhr, Strom und Wasser erhoben. Außerdem konfiszierte die Gruppe landwirtschaftliche Flächen und Immobilien, die zuvor in staatlichem oder privatem Besitz waren und nun an Flüchtlinge und Bauern vermietet oder verpachtet wurden. (…)
Kurzum: Alles, was in der Provinz Idlib geht, steht und fährt, wurde besteuert, aus allen Notwendigkeiten des Lebens hat die Gruppe Profit geschlagen. Ein Großteil der Gelder floss in militärische Ausrüstung und Ausbildung, aber auch in den Bau von Straßen und die Versorgung der Zivilbevölkerung mit Gütern und Dienstleistungen. Die Diversifizierung der Einnahmequellen stärkte die Resilienz der Gruppe und trug schließlich dazu bei, dass sie zu der wichtigen Rebellengruppe wurde, die die entscheidende Militäroperation Ende November 2024 anführte.
Es ist zu erwarten, dass viele dieser Unternehmen und Geschäftsleute nun in ganz Syrien aktiv werden und sich weiter bereichern. Obwohl der Wirtschaftsminister der Übergangsregierung eine Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft anstrebt, ist dies angesichts der Geschichte von HTS schwer vorstellbar. Ihr komplexes Finanzierungsmodell hat sich für die Gruppe bewährt, es kann aber kein Wirtschaftsmodell für das neue Syrien werden.
Dr. Regine Schwab ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Leibniz-Institut für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung und Lehrbeauftragte an der Goethe Universität Frankfurt. Sie forscht zu bewaffneten Konflikten und nichtstaatlichen bewaffneten Gruppen mit einem Fokus auf den Nahen Osten, vor allem Syrien.
https://www.faz.net/pro/weltwirtschaft/weltwissen/syrien-wie-sich-hts-finanziert-110215906.html
The Economist, 12 janvier, article payant
No easy fix : The West is making a muddle of its Syria sanctions
Outsiders should be much clearer about how and when they will be lifted
Extraits :
FOR many Syrians, the past month has been bewildering. They have watched one Western envoy after another rush to Damascus to celebrate the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the longtime dictator deposed in December. Yet as they depart, those same envoys insist it is far too early to ease the web of sanctions on Syria’s economy. America and Europe seem eager to meet Syria’s new rulers, but not to help them. (…) if Syria is to recover from a decade of civil war, it will need more than piecemeal exemptions. So far, though, that is all that many Western policymakers seem prepared to offer. (…)
Proponents of a take-it-slow approach believe that America and Europe should use sanctions as leverage to push for an inclusive government in Syria. Lifting them would not forfeit that leverage, though: they can always be reimposed. And while inclusion is a laudable goal, it is a squishy one. Mr Assad often appointed women and religious minorities to his cabinet. He also gassed his own people. If Western policymakers want the new government to be inclusive, they will need to spell out exactly what that means. (…)
Europe may move faster. On January 3rd the French and German foreign ministers met Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto ruler, in Damascus. Annalena Baerbock, the German foreign minister, said it was premature to lift sanctions. In private, though, German diplomats are circulating a proposal which would do just that.
The eu would probably start by dismantling sanctions on a few key sectors, such as Syrian banks and the national airline. Reconnecting banks could make it easier for Syrians in Europe to send remittances, a lifeline for many inside the country. The bloc is expected to discuss the German proposal at a meeting of foreign ministers later this month.
There will be a separate debate around Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist rebel group which led the offensive that toppled Mr Assad. America, Britain and the eu all label it a terrorist organisation, as does the United Nations. Some of these prohibitions date back more than a decade, to a time when hts was still known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. It has since ditched the jihadists and moderated its views.
But unwinding the sanctions will be tricky. The secretary of state could revoke America’s designation, but that is politically fraught. The EU’s 27 members would all have to agree. Delisting the group at the UN could take more than a year. Even if HTS dissolves itself, as Mr Sharaa has promised to do, lifting sanctions on it will not be straightforward.
Western governments should make all this a priority. A six-month exemption might allow donors to send power barges, but investors will need stronger assurances before they promise to build new power plants. If sanctions remain in place, Syria could remain a charity case. ■
The Wall Street Journal, 11 janvier, article payant
Annexing Parts of Gaza Is the Way to Unleash ‘Hell’ on Hamas
The terror group doesn’t care about Palestinian lives. Losing territory would be a humiliation.
Extraits :
President-elect Trump delivered an unequivocal message to Hamas in a Dec. 2 Truth Social post: “If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume Office as President of the United States, there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity. Those responsible will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”
With only a week and a half until Mr. Trump’s inauguration, the question arises: How can hell be unleashed on hell?
I recently visited Jabalia, north of Gaza City, which before the current war was one of the Middle East’s most densely populated areas and a source of great pride for Hamas. Today, Jabalia is in ruin. Most residents heeded the Israeli military’s repeated orders to evacuate. Packs of starving dogs roam the desolate streets.
The Israel Defense Forces unleashed hell on Gaza. Most of the strip has been decimated by Israeli bombs. But the population still isn’t rising up against Hamas, the regime that brought this catastrophe upon them. What good would another barrage of explosives do? There’s no benefit to turning tens of thousands more Gazans into refugees. Gaza’s refugee population is already bloated, as refugee status extends not only to those who lost their homes in Israel’s 1948 War of Independence, but also to their descendants.
Hamas sees the suffering of the Gazan people as a benefit, not a cost. Terrorists who locate their headquarters in hospitals, schools and kindergartens do so not only to protect themselves from possible attacks but also to exploit the inevitable killing of civilians for propaganda: More killing equals more world empathy. Hamas also steals humanitarian aid from its own citizens and then sells food at exorbitantly high prices to a starving population. Further civilian suffering won’t change Hamas’s lack of care for Gazans’ welfare.
Mr. Trump should take two steps. The more urgent is to stop Hamas’s systemic seizure of the humanitarian aid that Israel sends to Gaza. (…) Mr. Trump should honor Mr. Blinken’s promise and call for the transfer of aid only by IDF soldiers or private entities with the ability to ward off Hamas terrorists. Without the ability to steal aid and exploit its starving population, Hamas would be at great risk of collapsing within weeks.
Another strategic move would be to allow Israel to annex parts of the Gaza Strip. In the Middle East, nothing hurts more than loss of territory. In the Palestinian dialect of Arabic, sumud, or “steadfastness,” is closely associated with the concept of attachment to the land. Territory is the most precious and stable currency in the region. The worst outcome of a war meant to conquer Israel would be Israel’s ending with more territory than when it began. (…)
Today, the world demands that Israel withdraw to its original borders after every conflict it wins. Is it surprising that aggressors repeatedly try to destroy the Jewish state, knowing that they face little to no threat of loss of territory? This status quo must change.
There is nothing sacred about Gaza’s borders, which were created in 1949 to mark the line of separation between Egypt and Israel. Gaza was under Egypt’s control until 1967, and it was controlled by Israel until 2005, when the Jewish state unilaterally withdrew.
There is a clear security justification for shrinking Gaza’s borders: Annexing a 1-mile perimeter around Gaza would create a buffer zone between Hamas-governed territory and the Israeli communities that Hamas brutally attacked on Oct. 7. The zone should also include a 3-mile stretch along the northern border of Gaza, which was the site of Israeli settlements before Israel withdrew and Hamas converted them into terrorist bases.
The borders of the Middle East were drawn arbitrarily in the 20th century by European diplomats representing colonial powers. This contributed to nearly a century of bloody violence, as artificial borders can’t protect nations from conflicting tribes. Bashar al-Assad’s fall in Syria is only the most recent example of tribal turmoil in a Middle Eastern country.
During Mr. Trump’s first term, he signaled his openness to rethinking the Middle East by recognizing both Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and some form of Israeli sovereignty over Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria. Mr. Biden, for his part, tacitly permitted the IDF to create a buffer zone in portions of southern Syria. Mr. Trump can extend this approach to Gaza to signal that terrorism doesn’t pay. This map change could represent a significant advancement toward peace in the Middle East.
Mr. Segal is chief political commentator on Israel’s Channel 12 News and author of “The Story of Israeli Politics.”
Le Figaro, 11 janvier, article payant
«Un intrus dans la vie politique», Joseph Aoun, le président qui incarne une nouvelle donne géopolitique au Liban
PORTRAIT – Ce chrétien maronite originaire du sud du pays, favori des États-Unis et de la France, prend la tête d’un pays meurtri par la guerre avec Israël et la crise économique.
Extraits :
Joseph Aoun est le cinquième commandant en chef de l’armée à accéder à la présidence du Liban. Il aura besoin de ses épaules solides et de sa carrure de combattant, pour exercer ses nouvelles fonctions dans un pays en lambeaux, épuisé par une guerre meurtrière avec Israël et ruiné par plus de cinq ans de crise économique et financière. Après plus de deux ans de vacance à la tête de l’État, il succède à un homonyme, un autre général Aoun, Michel (sans lien de parenté), qui l’avait nommé commandant en chef en 2017. Ce n’est pas seulement parce qu’elle met fin à une longue crise institutionnelle que l’élection de ce militaire de carrière a réveillé parmi les Libanais l’envie de renouer avec l’espoir. Son discours d’investiture suggère une volonté de rupture avec « les guerres, les attentats, les ingérences, les attaques, les convoitises et la mauvaise gestion de nos crises ».
Le sexagénaire, dont les orientations politiques sont peu connues jusqu’ici, a inscrit son mandat de six ans dans une perspective de renouveau en se présentant comme le « premier président élu après le centenaire de la création de l’État du Grand Liban, en plein bouleversement du Moyen-Orient ».
L’élection par le Parlement de ce chrétien maronite – une communauté à laquelle est réservée la fonction – est le résultat d’un forcing diplomatique américano-franco-saoudien. (…)
Sa première mission est de mettre en œuvre l’accord decessez-le-feu conclu le 27 novembre dernier. Le texte prévoit le retrait israélien du sud du Liban et le déploiement de l’armée libanaise en lieu et place des combattants du Hezbollah qui doivent livrer leurs armes dans la zone située au sud du fleuve Litani.(…)
S’ils n’ont pas applaudi comme leurs pairs à ce discours, les députés du Hezbollah et leurs alliés ont voté en connaissance de cause pour le nouveau président qui marque le passage du Liban à une sphère d’influence pro-occidentale.
« L’équation a changé. La fonction militaire du Hezbollah au service de l’Iran est terminée. Cela qui ne signifie pas que son rôle politique au Liban l’est aussi. Bien qu’il entretienne de très bonnes relations avec les Occidentaux, Joseph Aoun a toujours pris soin de ne pas susciter l’adversité du Hezbollah », explique Johny Mounayer, un analyste politique réputé proche de l’ancien commandant en chef. (…)
Est-ce que cette réputation de « propreté » suffira à impulser un changement dans la pratique du pouvoir à Beyrouth ? La question est d’autant plus ouverte que le régime politique libanais n’est plus le système présidentiel qui avait permis au général Fouad Chehab de moderniser l’État dans les années 1960. (…)
« Joseph Aoun est un intrus dans la vie politique », explique Fadi Assaf, fondateur du cabinet Middle-East Strategic Perspective. « Même si ses années à la tête de l’armée l’ont préparé à affronter les intrigues, il est loin d’être immunisé face à une classe politique aguerrie dont il a eu un avant-goût le jour même de son élection : la séance électorale a été pratiquement interrompue entre les deux tours de scrutin pour tenter d’engager avec lui des négociations sur une série de dossiers clés. » (…)
Face à des défis gigantesques, c’est la personnalité du chef militaire originaire du sud du Liban qui est mise en avant par certains de ceux qui l’ont côtoyé. « C’est un homme humble, à l’écoute, avec la volonté de servir plutôt que de se mettre en avant. Il sait s’entourer et inspirer confiance », témoigne le président de l’Ordre de Malte au Liban, Marwan Sehnaoui, qui collabore avec l’armée depuis des années sur de nombreux projets humanitaires.
Face à l’effondrement du pouvoir d’achat de la solde des militaires après la crise de 2019, la façon dont le commandant en chef de l’armée a maintenu la cohésion de la troupe, notamment grâce à des aides financières étrangères, montre « sa capacité à apporter des solutions concrètes, à anticiper, et préserver la confiance dans l’institution », estime Lamia Moubayed Bissat, présidente de l’Institut des Finances Basil Fleihan, en charge de plusieurs programmes de formation des officiers. Et d’ajouter : « Joseph Aoun est un véritable leader. Il incarne la réussite des institutions là où les politiques ont échoué de manière désastreuse. »
Le Monde, 9 janvier, article payant
Syrie : « On est face à un mouvement qui s’est déradicalisé par le haut »
Grand spécialiste de la Syrie, le chercheur Patrick Haenni analyse la nature du nouveau pouvoir issu du groupe Hayat Tahrir Al-Cham et les défis stratégiques et sécuritaires auxquels vont être confrontées les nouvelles autorités de Damas.
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Chercheur associé à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence, Patrick Haenni étudie le groupe Hayat Tahrir Al-Cham (HTC) et parcourt l’ensemble des territoires des oppositions syriennes depuis une décennie. Il s’est régulièrement entretenu avec la direction du mouvement, dont son chef, Ahmed Al-Charaa, dans son ancien fief d’Idlib, puis à Damas après la chute du dictateur Bachar Al-Assad, le 8 décembre 2024. Il livre ici son analyse de la stratégie actuelle du mouvement.
Comment Ahmed Al-Charaa capitalise-t-il sur sa victoire face au régime d’Al-Assad ?
Cette victoire a impliqué de nombreuses factions et près de 30 000 hommes. C’est le fruit d’un effort collectif mais, in fine, le résultat du coup de poker calculé du nouvel homme fort de Damas. Elle s’est faite en dépit de tous : de ceux qui, à Idlib, auraient préféré s’appuyer sur l’expérience de la gouvernance locale pour négocier une lente normalisation avec la communauté internationale ; de l’Occident et de l’ONU, qui maintenaient HTC sur la liste des organisations terroristes et prêchaient le cessez-le-feu ; des Etats de la région, qui normalisaient leurs relations avec Al-Assad et redoutaient un nouvel aventurisme militaire dans une région en pleine ébullition depuis la guerre à Gaza.
Cette victoire, le mouvement ne la doit donc qu’à lui-même. Maître de cette dernière séquence de la révolution, le nouveau pouvoir en placeà Damas entend bien rester aux commandes de la transition qui s’amorce. D’où ce chassé-croisé entre pressions extérieures pour la placer sous le parapluie onusien d’un côté, et renforcement d’un nationalisme sourcilleux de l’autre. (…)
La prise de pouvoir du 8 décembre 2024 n’est en effet pas le simple prolongement du mouvement contestataire de 2011. Il y a d’abordune mutation sociologique en profondeur. En 2011, la révolution ratissait large et la participation des élites urbaines était significative. Aujourd’hui, l’équipe dirigeante est une force militaire profondément brassée par douze années de guerre, par de nouveaux recrutements, et elle se caractérise, en partie au moins, par un certain provincialisme. C’est une révolution qui s’appuie sur les petites classes moyennes, comme on le voit au regard des profils de certains nouveaux gouverneurs : ni idéologues radicaux ni représentants des élites urbaines cosmopolites, mais technocrates islamistes conservateurs.
Deuxièmement, la prise de pouvoir change de modalités. En 2011-2012, les « printemps arabes » ont été le fait de mobilisations de masse dans une situation de passivité des appareils militaires. Ici, c’est un blitzkrieg qui a réussi pour des raisons liées à la tactique militaire, à une diplomatie de guerre efficace et à la destruction continue de la bureaucratie étatique et militaire opérée par un régime ayant souvent fait le pari des milices et de la privatisation sauvage.
Troisièmement, l’idéologie portée par l’équipe dirigeante actuelle est plus conservatrice et islamique que ne pouvait l’être la révolution en 2011-2012. Héritage de la radicalité des débuts autant que produit d’un lobbyisme conservateur, un populisme islamiste travaille au corps les élites intermédiaireset la base sociale du mouvement. Cela a parfois contraint la direction de HTC à recentrer le curseur idéologique et à tempérer les velléités conservatrices de la base de son gouvernement sur des enjeux comme les manuels scolaires à Damas ou la moralité publique à Idlib.
On est donc face à un mouvement qui s’est déradicalisé par le haut, ce qui crée un constant rapport de force entre ladirectionet une partie de ses cadres. Cette déradicalisation n’est pas adossée à un quelconque aggiornamento idéologique modéré ; elle est plutôt le fruit d’un pari thermidorien des chefs ayant fait, à Idlib, le choix de s’appuyer sur les majorités silencieuses contre les minorités radicales agissantes. Le mouvement s’aligne sur un mainstream sunnite conservateur et révolutionnaire dominant son environnement à Idlib mais encore bien éloigné du centrisme dans lequel se reconnaissent les élites urbaines, à Damas ou Alep, et plus encore les « minorités ».
En raison de son rôle dans la prise du pouvoir et de la satisfaction populaire provoquée par la chute de Bachar Al-Assad, il se voit comme détenteur d’une légitimité révolutionnaire à remettre aux autorités qui émaneront du processus de transition. Lequel devra redéfinir la nature de l’Etat, la Constitution et se conclure par une échéance électorale.
Les modalités de la transition ne sont pas, à ce jour, clairement définies. (…)
The Jerusalem Post, 27 décembre, article payant
Selective moral outrage causes double standard across Middle East
If social justice warriors truly care about justice, they must broaden their focus beyond selective targets and confront the realities of regimes like Assad’s. Anything less is moral bankruptcy.
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Let’s talk about selective moral outrage – that peculiar phenomenon where the world’s loudest advocates for justice are suddenly silent when confronted with atrocities that don’t fit their preferred narrative.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the global response to the horrors of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. As the details of Assad’s atrocities come to light, it becomes painfully clear how indifferent the so-called social justice warriors on American college campuses are to the mass killings of innocent people – so long as those atrocities cannot be blamed on Jews.
While the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza is a legitimate concern, anyone with a moral compass can discern the difference between a war initiated by a terror organization and crimes against humanity like those we are now uncovering in Syria.
Yet, there are zero college protests, zero arrest warrants for Assad, and zero street campaigns against him. The absence of outrage over the industrialized violence and mass killings perpetrated by Assad is striking. The question is: Why?
We have long known that Assad used chemical weapons on his own people, but now that his regime has been toppled, we are learning even more about the horrors of Sednaya Prison. (…)
Beyond Sednaya, a vast network of mass graves, torture sites, and execution chambers dots Syria’s landscape, each telling its own story of systematic violence. Near Damascus alone, mass graves like Al-Qutayfah and Najha reveal the scale of the slaughter – tens of thousands of bodies buried in attempts to erase evidence of genocide. Over 150,000 Syrians remain missing, with 66 unverified mass graves suspected across the country.
This isn’t random violence; it’s a calculated, industrialized apparatus of repression and extermination. (…)
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, over 500,000 people have been killed, the overwhelming majority of whom were civilians targeted by the Syrian regime.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights reports that, as of July 2020, at least 3,196 Palestinian refugees were killed by regime forces. Other estimates place the number of Palestinian refugees who have died due to war-related incidents in Syria at over 4,022. A UNRWA spokesperson highlighted the dire situation, stating, “Palestinians are among those worst affected by the Syrian conflict.”
Yet, the pro-Hamas rallies and encampments express no outrage on behalf of Syrian Palestinians. (…)
Jewish communities worldwide have become all too accustomed to the double standards and antisemitism driving many “social justice movements.” But the selective moral outrage and indifference to the atrocities in Syria reveal a new level of hypocrisy. The disproportionate focus on criticizing Israel, while ignoring Assad’s crimes – even when his regime murdered Palestinians – lays bare the antisemitism at the core of these movements. (…)
If social justice warriors truly care about justice, they must broaden their focus beyond selective targets and confront the brutal realities of regimes like Assad’s. Anything less is moral bankruptcy.
The writer is the co-founder and CEO of Social Lite Creative, a digital marketing firm that specializes in geopolitics.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-834884
The Wall Street Journal, 26 décembre, article payant
The Obama Era Is Finally History in the Middle East
The threat from Iran is greatly diminished, but Turkey poses new challenges.
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The consequences of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in Syria will reverberate for years across the Middle East, but one great fact is already clear. The Obama era in Middle Eastern history has, thankfully, come to an end.
Barack Obama’s misguided diplomacy made Iran the de facto master of Syria and Lebanon and massively reinforced Russian power and prestige. Almost every significant authority in the region loathed Mr. Obama’s Middle East order. Israelis detested what they saw as appeasement of a genocidal regime in Tehran. Sunni Arabs abhorred the “Shia Crescent” from Iran to Lebanon that Mr. Obama’s vision was ready to accept. The Gulf Arabs feared Mr. Obama’s Middle East so much that they brushed Palestinian objections aside to form strategic partnerships with Israel. Turkey, which saw the American president deliver Syria and Lebanon on a silver platter to Iran even as he supported Kurdish groups aligned with domestic terrorists, was equally horrified by the world Mr. Obama tried to make.
Turkey and Israel, with a boost from Ukraine, succeeded in killing Mr. Obama’s dream. Benjamin Netanyahu, using American weapons but wisely ignoring Team Biden’s muddled strategic advice, broke Iran’s military power through a succession of attacks on Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan steadily helped anti-Assad forces with roots in extremist Sunni Arab organizations like al Qaeda survive and thrive until the Assad regime was vulnerable. With Iranian power tamed and Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, Assad was exposed, and the Turkish-backed Arab forces moved in for the kill. (…)
What’s dawning in Syria today is a new era of regional and religious competition. Already many Arabs, remembering the centuries of Turkish hegemony under the Ottoman Empire, fear that Turkey will replace Iran as the chief threat to the independence of the Arab world. That’s good news for the strategic partnerships between Israel and some of the Gulf states. Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey is if anything an even greater potential threat to the security of the Gulf states than Iran managed to become. By linking himself to the cause of Sunni Islamist “democracy,” Mr. Erdogan can hope to develop a more potent ideological threat to the Gulf monarchies than Iran’s Shia model ever became.
Both Israel and the Gulf Arabs have reason to worry about Mr. Erdogan’s Palestinian policy. Turkey’s alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood is a powerful political weapon for Ankara in any competition with the Gulf states for the position as the leaders of the Sunni world. Supporting the Palestinians can help Turkey polish its political image on the Arab street.
Syria’s future is up for grabs. (…)
History, however, isn’t ending in the Middle East just yet. With Iran sinking and Turkey rising, our ability to manage an increasingly complex relationship with Ankara will become more difficult and more important in the years ahead. Keeping Turkey on side while promoting deepening cooperation between Israel and its Arab associates will be the keys to successful American policy in the new Middle East. Let’s hope the new administration can get the job done.
The Wall Street Journal, 26 décembre, article payant
Israelis See Chance to Remake Middle East in War’s Wake
Despite criticism over conduct of Gaza war, some see new diplomatic opportunities
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TEL AVIV—Since the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has dealt a series of damaging setbacks to its most dangerous regional adversaries. It has hobbled Hamas in Gaza, severely damaged Shiite militia Hezbollah in Lebanon and fended off missile salvos from Tehran while landing its own blows in Iran.
Israel’s military operations—especially its conduct of the war in Gaza, where local authorities say more than 40,000 Palestinians have died—have hurt the country’s international standing. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for its prime minister and former defense minister.
But Israel’s leaders say the military gains are worth the trade-off in reputational damage and argue that the country’s stronger strategic position opens the door for diplomatic gains in the future as Arab countries look for partners to keep Iranian power at bay.
“For the first time in the history of Zionism, there is an opportunity for Israel to be a regional power,” said Avner Golov, a former senior director at Israel’s National Security Council, who is now a vice president at MIND Israel, which advises governments on national security. (…)
Current and former Israeli officials are pushing for aggressive steps to build an Israeli, American and moderate Arab alliance that includes Saudi Arabia and is aimed at checking Iran’s influence. The re-election of Donald Trump, who confronted Iran in his first term and is returning to the presidency next month, has raised hopes for such an alliance, said Golov. (…)
The Gaza war set in motion a sequence of events that has helped lay the groundwork, said Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations. Israel has weakened Iran by largely incapacitating its military allies Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Those successes triggered the recent fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a key Tehran ally. Israel has also decimated Iran’s air defenses in two rounds of tit-for-tat airstrikes, leaving Tehran vulnerable in any future confrontation.
“We expect our determination and strength shown over the past year will lead to more regional stability,” said Danon. (…)
Israelis overwhelmingly oppose a Palestinian state now, but Israel could give Palestinians a clear road map to self-governance in Gaza and the West Bank, Golov said. It is unclear whether Saudi Arabia would accept such a compromise.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would struggle to pass such measures with his current coalition, analysts say, because it relies on far-right parties who want to tighten rather than loosen Israeli control over the Palestinian territories. Netanyahu himself has stressed since the current war began that he would oppose a Palestinian state. (…)
Not everyone agrees Israel’s military achievements have made itself or the region safer, and there are risks that the war’s trade-off could still prove costly to Israel.
The widely televised devastation in the Gaza Strip and the rising death toll there have sowed the seeds for future conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, said Hussein Ibish, senior resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, a think tank in Washington. (…)
“It is really surrounded by bitter enemies who have much more reason to be bitter enemies today than they did on Oct. 7,” he said.
Across the Middle East and in many developing countries, meeting with Israeli leaders has become taboo, stifling future cooperation, said William Wechsler, senior director of Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, a think tank in Washington. (…)
From the start of the war, one of the key questions for Israel in weighing the war’s trade-offs was whether it would have a free hand to pursue its military goals before the diplomatic consequences became overwhelming, said Micah Goodman, an Israeli author and philosopher.
“We needed to restore deterrence—and in order to restore deterrence, we needed to do things that reduce our legitimacy,” Goodman said. But on balance, he added, “I think Israel managed to pull it off.”
Le Point, 25 décembre, article payant
Non, Jésus n’était pas palestinien
L’histoire, la culture et le lien des Palestiniens avec le Proche-Orient se suffisent à eux-mêmes. Il n’est ni nécessaire ni juste de s’approprier ou de falsifier l’histoire juive.
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Dans l’histoire du Proche-Orient ou même du monde, peu de figures suscitent autant de débats que Jésus de Nazareth. Pour les chrétiens, il est tout à la fois le Messie, le Fils de Dieu et Dieu incarné, la pierre angulaire de leur religion, aujourd’hui la première au monde en nombre de fidèles. Le vrai Jésus était un rabbin juif vivant en Judée romaine au premier siècle.
Aux yeux de ses contemporains, qu’il puisse fonder une nouvelle religion tenait sans doute de l’extravagance – mais c’est littéralement ce qui est advenu. Plusieurs facteurs expliquent la fulgurance du développement du christianisme : le rejet de Jésus comme Messie par les courants dominants du judaïsme, le puissant attrait de son message universaliste promettant le salut à tous les croyants, quelles que soient leurs origines, et le zèle missionnaire de ses disciples, à l’instar de saint Paul, après sa crucifixion.
Aujourd’hui, dans le monde, les chrétiens sont bien plus nombreux que les juifs. Si l’on peut comptabiliser dans les 15 millions de juifs, les chrétiens sont plus de 2 milliards, auxquels on peut ajouter les 2 milliards de musulmans qui reconnaissent eux aussi Jésus comme prophète de leur foi. Un déséquilibre numérique à l’origine de tensions interreligieuses spécifiques, notamment dans le contexte explosif du conflit israélo-palestinien, où l’histoire elle-même est devenue un champ de bataille. Ces dernières années, et surtout depuis l’escalade du conflit à Gaza, il est de plus en plus fréquent d’entendre que Jésus et Marie, sa mère, étaient palestiniens. Que Noël est une « histoire palestinienne ».
Pour voir si une telle affirmation tient debout, il est essentiel de commencer par définir ce que signifie véritablement être un Palestinien. Si les traces du terme « Palestine » remontent à l’Antiquité, la notion de nationalité palestinienne moderne date de l’effondrement de l’Empire ottoman. Sous le règne ottoman (1517-1917), la région qui, plus tard, deviendra la Palestine sous mandat britannique n’était ni officiellement désignée sous ce nom ni administrée comme une unité politique unique. (…)
À l’époque, la majorité des habitants de la région étaient des musulmans sunnites, descendants de populations converties à l’islam lors des conquêtes islamiques survenues un millénaire plus tôt. Des conquêtes qui avaient instauré la domination islamique et transformé le paysage religieux local. Dans le même temps, divers groupes chrétiens – orthodoxes syriaques, catholiques et chrétiens arméniens – y coexistaient. La communauté juive, bien que plus restreinte, était solidement implantée dans des villes comme Jérusalem, Hébron, Safed et Tibériade. Et sa population allait se renforcer au XIXᵉ siècle par la naissance du mouvement sioniste, mais également avant, avec des arrivées motivées par le désir ancestral de nombreux Juifs de la diaspora de retourner sur la terre de leurs ancêtres. Un désir qui s’enracinait dans une histoire marquée par l’esclavage, les exodes forcés sous l’Empire romain et autres déplacements successifs sous les divers empires ayant régné sur la région. (…)
Après l’effondrement de l’Empire ottoman à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale, la Palestine est devenue un mandat britannique. Dès 1920, la domination britannique va entraîner une augmentation significative de l’immigration juive en Palestine. Les décideurs britanniques, séduits par les idéaux du mouvement sioniste, percevaient dans l’établissement d’une patrie juive en Palestine une réponse aux problèmes historiques de la dispersion des Juifs et de l’antisémitisme à l’échelle mondiale.
Sauf que la population non juive de Palestine s’opposait fermement au sionisme. (…)
Dans ce contexte, de violentes tensions intercommunautaires allaient éclater, avec leur lot de tragédies, comme les pogroms survenus à Hébron et à Safed dans les années 1920 et 1930. Un conflit qui s’est d’autant plus intensifié avec l’affrontement entre des groupes musulmans antisionistes, menés par des figures telles que Hadj Amin Al-Husseini et Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam, et des milices sionistes, au premier rang desquelles le Lehi et l’Irgoun.
Jésus occupe une place centrale dans la conscience palestinienne. Les chrétiens palestiniens, dont les origines remontent aux premiers disciples de Jésus, se perçoivent comme les gardiens des traditions et des sites sacrés de la région, de Bethléem à Nazareth en passant par Jérusalem. Pour eux, Jésus n’est pas seulement une figure théologique, mais aussi un lien vivant avec leur héritage et leur histoire sur cette terre.
Dans l’islam, Jésus occupe une place spirituelle majeure, ce qui lui confère une grande importance pour les Palestiniens musulmans. Il est vénéré comme une figure miraculeuse, né de la Vierge Marie, et sa stature de prophète crée un lien spirituel entre les Palestiniens musulmans et leurs homologues chrétiens. Pour ces derniers, Jésus incarne la justice, l’histoire et l’autorité morale. Les musulmans, quant à eux, voient en lui non seulement un prophète ayant précédé l’islam, mais également un véritable musulman, bien que la religion islamique soit apparue plusieurs siècles après sa mort.
(…) Dans une région où l’identité est profondément liée à la lutte pour la terre et les droits, l’idée d’un Jésus palestinien s’est imposée comme une revendication spirituelle et culturelle affirmant une continuité historique. Cependant, bien que les Palestiniens entretiennent des liens géographiques et religieux avec Jésus, elle n’est pas historiquement exacte. Et elle constitue également une tentative d’appropriation d’un chapitre majeur de l’histoire juive.
À l’époque de Jésus, sa région faisait partie de l’Empire romain et portait le nom de Judée. (…)
Affirmer que Jésus était palestinien est non seulement anachronique, mais, également, aussi inexact que de le dire israélien, ottoman, byzantin ou croisé chrétien… vu qu’aucune de ces identités n’existait à son époque. Chacune de ces désignations appartient à une période historique différente, marquée par des réalités sociopolitiques spécifiques. Imputer l’une ou l’autre de ces identités à Jésus ne reflète pas la réalité du premier siècle, et ne colle ni à son ministère ni à ses disciples. (…)
L’identité de Jésus était profondément juive. Ses enseignements, tels qu’ils sont rapportés dans les Évangiles, s’enracinent profondément dans les écritures et les traditions juives. Ses disputes avec les chefs religieux des différentes factions juives de l’époque – Pharisiens, Sadducéens, Zélotes et autres – étaient avant tout des discussions internes au judaïsme. Jésus a vécu dans une société juive, s’est adressé aux préoccupations de ses compatriotes juifs et a finalement été exécuté par les Romains en tant que « roi des Juifs », un titre reflétant autant la perception de ses partisans que de ses ennemis.
Un poids historique qu’on ne peut pas simplement ignorer. L’idée, contemporaine, selon laquelle Jésus était palestinien sert souvent d’outil rhétorique pour minimiser et délégitimer le lien historique des Juifs avec le Proche-Orient. D’aucuns pourraient dire que l’exactitude historique importe moins que le pouvoir du symbole, et que Jésus constitue une figure emblématique pour les Palestiniens en raison de son importance universelle. Cependant, tenter de réinterpréter sa vie à travers le prisme d’une identité nationale moderne revient à occulter la réalité historique de la Judée du premier siècle, au profit de l’invention de nouvelles mythologies.
En tant qu’Arabe palestinien, je ne ressens pas le besoin d’enrichir notre identité par des mensonges ou des exagérations. Notre histoire, notre culture et notre lien avec la terre se suffisent à eux-mêmes, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’usurper ou de déformer les récits des autres, ni de chercher à remplacer Israël par la Palestine. Chaque peuple a le droit d’être libre et de déterminer son propre destin, qu’il puisse ou non compter Jésus de Nazareth parmi ses membres. Affirmer que Jésus était palestinien repose sur des anachronismes qui ne résistent pas à un examen sérieux et n’a aucun lien avec la question fondamentale du droit des Palestiniens à disposer de leur propre gouvernement. Il est temps de laisser ce mythe derrière nous et de se concentrer sur l’essentiel.
*John Aziz est un musicien de père palestinien et de mère britannique. Il est aussi militant pour la paix et analyste de la politique et de l’histoire du Proche-Orient.
https://www.lepoint.fr/debats/non-jesus-n-etait-pas-palestinien-24-12-2024-2578632_2.php
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 décembre, article payant
Judenhass, Schwurbler und Esoteriker: Evangelische Gemeinden auf Abwegen
Eine Kirche im Bundesland Hessen hat einen antisemitischen Weihnachtsmarkt veranstaltet. Unsere Recherche zeigt, wie katastrophal die Zustände wirklich sind. Der Fall sagt einiges über die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland aus.
Extraits:
Statt Besinnlichkeit und Glühweinschwips gibt es nach einem Weihnachtsmarkt in Darmstadt ordentlich Zoff. Die Jüdische Gemeinde Darmstadt hat Strafanzeige gegen die lokale Michaelisgemeinde gestellt, und die Evangelische Kirche in Hessen und Nassau hat sich der Anzeige in einer bemerkenswerten Form von Krisenmanagement angeschlossen. Die Staatsanwaltschaft ermittelt.
Die Gemeinde nämlich hatte den Weihnachtsmarkt am 14. und 15. Dezember veranstaltet, und zwar mit einer Gruppe namens «Darmstadt 4 Palestine». Der Markt geriet zum Hamas-Propaganda-Fest. Das Zeichen der Terrororganisation Hamas, ein rotes Dreieck, und der Slogan «From the river to the sea», der die Vernichtung Israels einfordert, wurden als Plätzchen und Mitbringsel angeboten.
Ein Weihnachtsmarkt ist ein Symbol deutsch-christlicher Freundlich- und Gemütlichkeit, ein Ort der Nächstenliebe und eine winterliche Oase in den Städten mit Nussknackern, Nikolaus, Plätzchen, Glühwein und mit Namen beschrifteten Tassen. Wie kann es sein, dass eine solche Veranstaltung zu einem Ort des Hasses gegen Juden wird?
Damit Terrorsymbolik auf einem Weihnachtsmarkt landen kann, müssen Dinge über einen langen Zeitraum schiefgelaufen sein, Entscheidungsträger blind oder mit völlig falschen Werten ausgestattet sein. Ein Milieu muss sich ausgebreitet haben, das die Rahmenbedingungen für den Tiefpunkt schafft und ihn so ermöglicht.
Deshalb ist diese Recherche nicht nur eine über die Michaelisgemeinde in Darmstadt, sondern auch eine, bei der man Pars pro Toto vieles über die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland lernt wie auch über ein Milieu, das in der Kirche dominant ist, das die Gottesdienste gestaltet und die Gemeinden prägt. Der Zustand der Gemeinde lässt Rückschlüsse auf das System zu, in dem er geschehen konnte. (…)
Besonders sticht ein Satz in der Einladung hervor: «Palästina ist ein multireligiöses Land, in dem nicht nur muslimische, sondern eben auch jüdische und christliche Menschen zu Hause sind.» Er lässt sich nur so interpretieren, dass Israel eigentlich Palästina ist, denn nur dort leben jüdische und christliche Menschen. In dem Fall wäre Israel hier – auf der Website einer deutschen Kirchengemeinde – das Existenzrecht abgesprochen; Israel wird zu «Palästina» gemacht. Eine andere Auslegung, nämlich dass die palästinensischen Gebiete als Heimat der Juden gemeint sind, ist so unsinnig, dass sie auszuschliessen ist.
Der Weihnachtsmarkt wurde an unterschiedlichen Stellen als «antikolonialistischer Weihnachtsmarkt» angekündigt, Israel kommt demnach die Rolle einer Kolonialmacht zu; das ist politisch und historisch inkorrekt und entspricht dem Narrativ radikaler Israel- und Judenhasser. (…)
Dafür, dass der Pfarrer und sein Team die Hamas-Abzeichen in Wahrheit nicht weiter schlimm fanden, spricht einiges. Kurz bevor der Weihnachtsmarkt stattfand, war Ende November Johannes Zang in der Gemeinde zu Gast. Er ist der Autor des Buchs «Kein Land in Sicht? Gaza zwischen Besatzung, Blockade und Krieg».
Das Buch ist in weiten Teilen eine Rechtfertigung des Hamas-Massakers vom 7. Oktober an Israeli; es stellt das Ausmass und teilweise die sexualisierte Gewalt an dem Tag gegen die Opfer weitgehend infrage und insinuiert bereits durch seine Aufteilung, aber vor allem durch seinen Inhalt, dass das Massaker nicht so schlimm wie in den Medien dargestellt und vor allem zu rechtfertigen sei. 160 Seiten befassen sich mit Gaza, unter anderem ausführlich selbst mit kleinsten Themen, wie dem, dass israelische Behördenformulare für die Bewohner Gazas schwer auszufüllen seien. Dann folgen lediglich zehn Seiten über das Massaker am 7. Oktober, dann wiederum 75 über «Israels Krieg». (…)
Den Christen in Darmstadt wird mehr geboten als Politik. Im kommenden Jahr kommt noch ein oder eine «Dr. Kia» vorbei, um vor «elektropathologischen Frequenzen» zu warnen. Und mehrmals die Woche finden Yogakurse statt; Yoga ist deutscher Alltag, aber genau genommen eine indische, hinduistisch geprägte Philosophie, die mit der evangelischen Kirche so viel zu tun hat wie Fridays for Future mit dem Porsche 993.
Natürlich erlaubt die Michaeliskirche allein kein Urteil über den Zustand der ganzen protestantischen Kirche zu fällen. Aber Äusserungen der Mitglieder des Kirchenvorstands zeigen die Sympathie für bekannte Köpfe der Institution wie Margot Kässmann. Die prominente Protestantin legt das christliche Streben nach Frieden so aus, dass Israel keine Waffen mehr geliefert werden sollen. Für das ständig attackierte Land wäre das schnell das Ende seiner Existenz. Die «friedensbewegte» Kässmann ist fest verankert in dem Milieu, das in Darmstadt auftritt und Weihnachtsmärkte organisiert.
Die sogenannten Friedensbewegungen – die mit ihrer Argumentation in Wahrheit den Kriegstreibern dieser Welt einen Gefallen tun – zeigen sich auch auf den Kirchentagen; ebenso der Hang zur Esoterik, zur altlinken Israel- und USA-Feindlichkeit und die naive Zuneigung – die häufig als Toleranz getarnt ist – zu muslimischen und selbst islamistischen Bewegungen.
Dergestalt alt-links und grün grundiert hat sich die evangelische Kirche auch einem jüngeren Zeitgeist geöffnet: zum Beispiel in der St.-Johannes-Kirche in Köln, in der nachts queere Partys stattfinden, also primär Partys für Menschen, die nicht heterosexuell sind und sich nicht als Mann oder als Frau definieren. Der Pfarrer präsentiert seine Arbeit als «Kirche with a twerk», also Kirche mit sexuell provozierendem Wackeln des Pos. Passt das zur Botschaft Gottes?
Was man allgemein weniger findet – und hier zählt auch die anekdotische Evidenz privater Gottesdienstbesuche: Feier der Sakramente, Verkündung des Wortes Gottes, Gebet und Anbetung, Verkündigung von Segen, Bekenntnis und Vergebung, Liturgie, Feierlichkeit, Ritual und Ästhetik.
Im vergangenen Jahr schrieben die evangelischen Landeskirchen einen negativen Rekord. Nur noch 22 Prozent der deutschen Bevölkerung gehören ihnen an. Pro Jahr treten mittlerweile regelmässig über eine halbe Million Menschen aus.
Yoga gibt es eben auch woanders, Powackeln auf Instagram, Queer-Partys in jedem x-beliebigen Klub, Friedensbewegungen à la Croissier und Zang bei Sahra Wagenknecht und der AfD – und Hass auf Juden und Israel ist ohnehin Alltag in Deutschland. Für all das braucht kein Mensch die Kirche.
Wall Street Journal, 24 décembre, article payant
Syria’s Rebel Leaders Have Control of the Country. Now What?
The new Islamist-led government promises moderation, but officials aren’t committing to such issues as women’s rights or free elections
Extraits:
DAMASCUS, Syria—Victorious Islamist rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa spends his days conferring with advisers and meeting a stream of visitors—U.S. diplomats and leaders from Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and Syria’s religious sects.
They all want to know the same thing: How does Sharaa plan to govern the war-battered nation of 23 million people?
Sharaa, a guerrilla fighter who led the campaign that toppled the regime of Bashar al-Assad, is seeking an answer. So far, the U.S.-designated terrorist has shed the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, which drew the world’s attention, and swapped combat fatigues for a suit.
Sharaa fought with al Qaeda in Iraq as an anti-U.S. jihadist and, in recent years, has sought to recast himself as a more moderate figure, promoting a pragmatic brand of Islamist politics. He now counsels patience.
“People have big ambitions, but today we must think realistically,” he told reporters after the rebels’ swift victory. “Syria has many problems, and they won’t be solved with a magic wand.”
Sharaa’s rebel group, which had for years been running a tiny swath of northwest Syria, now controls cosmopolitan Damascus and rules over millions of Syrians including Alawites, Christians and Kurds. In Aleppo, the first city claimed in the recent offensive, the group left churches untouched and promised to govern inclusively.
Sharaa, leaders of his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, as well as allied resistance groups, face decisions that open the door to peaceful rebuilding after more than a decade of civil war or new rounds of sectarian fighting fueled by the meddling of outside powers. (…)
HTS political affairs bureau member Mohamed Khaled described in a briefing with reporters the group’s to-do list: Merge rebel groups into a national army, bring back Syrian refugees, write a constitution and staff government ministries.
Khaled said he and Sharaa envision a yearlong transition to lay the framework for a new government. Such hot-button social issues as women’s dress codes, the treatment of LGBT people and alcohol consumption will be discussed, they said, and elections will have to wait. (…)
Barbara Leaf, an assistant U.S. Secretary of State who met Sharaa on Friday, said she heard “some very pragmatic and moderate statements on various issues from women’s rights to protection of equal rights for all communities.”
“It was a good first meeting,” Leaf said. “We will judge by deeds, not just by words. “
“At the end of the day they’re pragmatic, they’re utilitarian, they’re politicians, they’re incomparable to the regime in terms of their policies,” said Dareen Khalifa, a senior adviser at International Crisis Group who has interviewed Sharaa many times. “But they are conservative Islamists.”
Some Western officials and analysts argue for removal of the group’s U.S. designation as a terrorist organization. (…) “I don’t think they have a detailed plan yet,” said Ford, the former U.S. ambassador to Syria. “I think, in part, they’re making it up as they go.” (…)
In a meeting with foreign journalists, Khaled was asked how his government would approach social issues such as LGBT rights and the sale of alcohol at bars.
“It’s open for discussion,” Khaled said. “There will be committees, there will be a constitution, and this is all going to be decided by the laws.”
That transition will take time as laws and a constitution are written, he said. Until, he added, there will be no elections.
The Guardian, Opinion, 24 décembre, libre accès
Assad’s demise has been widely celebrated – but it spells an uncertain future for Syria’s Kurds
The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham regime, which has friendly relations with Turkey, is unlikely to tolerate Kurdish autonomy
Extraits:
The fall of Bashar al-Assad after the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) takeover in Syria is bad news for the country’s Kurds. It is worth charting how things got here from the start of the war in Syria in 2012. During the conflict, the Democratic Union party (PYD) emerged as the biggest and most influential Kurdish political actor in Syria, taking territorial control in the north and maintaining an autonomous administration, albeit a fragile one.
The PYD’s position is even more precarious after the HTS takeover. Turkey, emerging as the most influential foreign actor in Syria, is laser-focused on limiting any Kurdish push for autonomy domestically and regionally. Another challenge the PYD faces is that the HTS-led regime is very unlikely to tolerate existing Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
The emergence of an autonomous region run by the Kurds in northern Syria was unexpected. Syrian Kurds, who make up about 10% of the population, had been more suppressed and less visible than Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. However, very quickly after the war started, this hitherto quiet Kurdish presence evolved into a highly active political and military movement that garnered significant regional and international attention.
From the beginning of the Syrian war, the PYD chose to side with neither Assad nor the anti-regime rebel groups, and instead sought to secure its position in the north. In 2012 it unilaterally declared the establishment of an autonomous region called Rojava (Western Kurdistan), formed of three territorially separate cantons: Afrin, Kobane and Cizre.
All this has been difficult to digest for Turkey. Its concerns run deep because the PYD has links with the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), an armed group that has been fighting Turkish forces for four decades and is designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkey and its allies. The PYD follows the ideology of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, even if it maintains that it is a separate entity. Turkey, however, sees them as one and the same and refuses to accept any form of Kurdish political entity connected to the PKK on its borders. It did all in its power to oppose Rojava diplomatically and by supporting Islamist forces. (…)
That is not to say everything has been a model of ideal democracy. The PYD has been criticised for its treatment of political rivals and attempts to indoctrinate the population with its ideology. But this is a new project, with a lot of appeal to many communities in north Syria and to the west – and it seemed to promise a different future to a historically suppressed group.
Now, with the collapse of the Assad regime, the position of the PYD has become even more precarious. The new emerging regime is unlikely to maintain the tacit agreement between Damascus and the PYD that allowed Kurdish control of the north while Damascus continued to supply, albeit poorly, the population there with resources, services and salaries.
The HTS has a hostile relationship with the PYD and friendly relations with Turkey. Turkey may now escalate its military intervention in Kurdish-controlled areas with more freedom and ease. Its recent push into the north-east and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army’s takeover of Manbij signals that.
However, Turkey is also exploring talks with its own Kurds in the hope of winning their support to change the constitution in a way that could possibly allow the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to hold office for another term. Turkey will want to enter any negotiations with the Kurds from a position of as much power as possible in Syria, where the PYD would ideally have as little strength and influence as possible.
The Syrian war has been a process of change and flux. Indeed, war and regime change can create opportunities for non-state political groups, but they also pose significant risks for such groups. The Kurds are all too familiar with these ebbs and flows of history, whether thinking of the short-lived Sulaymaniyah administration in Iraq in the early 1920s, the Republic of Mahabad in Iran in 1946, the Kurdistan region in Iraq since 1991 or Rojava in Syria since 2012.
Whether any outcome in the post-Assad period will be a positive one for stability, peace and democracy for the Kurds – and for all Syrians in the region – remains to be seen.
Dr Zeynep Kaya is a lecturer in international relations at the University of Sheffield. She is the author of Mapping Kurdistan: Territory, Self-Determination and Nationalism
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/dec/23/assad-syria-kurds-future-hayat-tahrir-al-sham
New York Times, 23 décembre, article payant
Organized Looting Throws Gaza Deeper Into Chaos
Gangs are filling a power vacuum left by Israel in some parts of southern Gaza, hijacking desperately needed aid for Palestinian residents.
Extraits:
Hazem Isleem, a Palestinian truck driver, was passing through the ruins of southern Gaza last month with a truckload of aid when armed looters ambushed his convoy.
One of the gunmen broke into his truck, forcing him to drive to a nearby field and unload thousands of pounds of flour intended for hungry Palestinians, he said by phone from Gaza. By the next morning, the gang had stripped virtually all of the supplies from the convoy of about 100 trucks of United Nations aid, enough to feed tens of thousands of people, in what the United Nations described as one of the worst such episodes of the war.
“It was terrifying,” said Mr. Isleem, 47, whom the looters held for 13 hours while they pillaged the flour. “But the worst part was we weren’t able to deliver the food to the people.”
Israel’s bombardment and invasion of Gaza in response to the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack last year has unleashed a humanitarian crisis in the enclave, with more than 45,000 people dead, according to local health officials, who do not distinguish between civilians and combatants. Hunger is widespread, and Israel has placed restrictions on the entry of aid into Gaza and blocked movement of aid trucks between the north and south.
Though Hamas has been routed in much of the territory, Israel has not put an alternative government in place. In parts of southern Gaza, armed gangs have filled the resulting power vacuum, leaving aid groups unwilling to risk delivering supplies. (…)
Hundreds of truckloads of relief are piling up at the crossing in part because aid groups fear they will be looted.
What began as smaller-scale attempts to seize aid early in the year — often by hungry Gazans — has now become “systematic, tactical, armed, crime-syndicate looting” by organized groups, said Georgios Petropoulos, a senior U.N. official based in the southern city of Rafah. “This is just larceny writ large,” he said. (…)
International aid workers have accused Israel of ignoring the problem and allowing looters to act with impunity. The United Nations does not allow Israeli soldiers to protect aid convoys, fearing that would compromise its neutrality, and its officials have called on Israel to allow the Gaza police, which are under Hamas’s authority, to secure their convoys.
Israel, which seeks to uproot Hamas, accuses the group of stealing international aid and says that the police are just another arm of the militant group. They have repeatedly targeted Hamas’s police force, severely weakening it, and police officers are rarely seen in much of Gaza, residents say. (…)
“Today, the ordinary Gazan’s dream, his aspiration, is to obtain a piece of bread,” Mr. Awad said. “I can’t say anything sadder than that.”
Gazan transportation company owners, truck drivers and aid groups say multiple gangs have participated in looting recently. But many people involved in aid delivery named Yasser Abu Shabab, 35, as the man who runs the most sophisticated operation.
They say Mr. Abu Shabab’s gang dominates much of the Nasr neighborhood in eastern Rafah, which the war has transformed into a wasteland. Mr. Petropoulos, the U.N. official, called him “the self-styled power broker of east Rafah.” (…)
Mr. Isleem, the truck driver who was ambushed in Rafah, said the looters who captured him told him that Mr. Abu Shabab was their boss. Awad Abid, a displaced Gazan who said he had tried to buy flour from Mr. Abu Shabab’s gang in Rafah, said he had seen gunmen guarding warehouses containing stolen cartons of U.N.-marked aid.
“I asked one of them for a sack of flour to feed my children,” Mr. Abid said, “and he raised a pistol at me.” (…)
Mr. Abu Shabab denied looting aid trucks on a large scale, although he conceded that his men — armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles — had raided half a dozen or so since the start of the war.
“We are taking trucks so we can eat, not so we can sell,” he said in a phone interview, claiming he was feeding his family and neighbors. “Every hungry person is taking aid.” He accused Hamas of being primarily responsible for stealing the aid, a claim that Hamas has denied. (…)
The looters’ chokehold on supplies and soaring prices are undermining Hamas in the areas that it still controls. On Nov. 25, Hamas’s security forces raided Mr. Abu Shabab’s neighborhood, killing more than 20 people, including his brother, Mr. Abu Shabab said.
Official Hamas media reported at the time that its forces had killed 20 members of “gangs of thieves who were stealing aid.” (…)
In late November, Israeli forces opened fire on looters waiting to waylay trucks in Rafah, forcing them to retreat, according to an internal U.N. memo. With the path cleared, U.N. aid trucks rushed toward central Gaza.
But the gangs were far from deterred.
The looters soon regrouped and hijacked them on the road, the U.N. memo said. The trucks were stripped bare.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/23/world/middleeast/gaza-looting.html
Wall Street Journal, 23 décembre, article payant
End the Houthis’ Threat to Global Trade
The Trump administration will be well-positioned to stop Iran’s proxy attacks on international shipping.
Extraits:
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militia last week fired two ballistic missiles at Israel. One hit an empty school; the other wounded more than a dozen people in Tel Aviv. But the Houthis haven’t been focused on Israel: Earlier this month, they launched a drone attack on three commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen. The Houthis pose a greater threat to international shipping than to the Jewish state—a problem the Biden administration has allowed to fester.
The group has raised prices on goods by disrupting international trade. The cost to ship a container from China to the West Coast has more than doubled over the past year, partially because of the Houthis’ attacks.
With Iran’s axis of resistance reeling from defeats in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, the Trump administration will be well positioned to deal forcefully with the Houthis—putting pressure on Tehran, restoring American credibility, and lowering prices on imported goods. (…)
The Houthis claim their attacks are part of the Oct. 7 war against Israel. Most of the ships they’ve attacked have no direct link to Israel. It’s more likely that their goal is to assert Iranian control over world trade.
The economic effects have been significant. Red Sea shipping has declined by more than 50% over the past year. Major shipping companies including Maersk have opted to sail around Africa rather than risk Houthi fire. War risk insurance costs have more than doubled. All this translates into higher costs for American consumers. JPMorgan predicted that the attacks could “add 0.7 percentage points to global core goods inflation.”
The world confronted a similar problem during the surge in Somali pirates’ attacks on vessels in the Gulf of Aden beginning in 2007. The international community rallied with a unified response. (…)
The Houthi threat to global trade is greater but has been met with a weaker response. While the Somali pirates were armed with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, the Houthis have missiles and drones. Somali pirates generally sought to hijack a vessel to ransom its crew; the Houthis seek to damage or sink the vessel.
The U.S. has tried to organize an international flotilla to deter Houthi attacks—but other than the U.S., only the U.K., Sri Lanka, Greece, Denmark and the Netherlands contributed vessels. The European Union put together a Red Sea force but with a narrow defensive mandate and only four ships. (…)
As the world’s largest importer, only the U.S. has sufficient interest and ability to deter threats to shipping. But aside from a few limited airstrikes, which don’t seem to have altered Houthi behavior—including one over the weekend—the Biden administration has done little.
Ending the Houthis’ attacks should unite U.S. officials across foreign-policy camps. (…)
The Trump administration should begin by redesignating the Houthis as a terror group. The U.S. should seek a significant expansion of attacks against Houthi targets. In this, America need not put more of its service members in harm’s way. It can rely on its ally Israel, which this month executed extensive airstrikes on Houthi ports. Israel could do more with sufficient munitions. But only the U.S. can provide the naval assets, and the pressure on Iran, needed to remove the Houthi threat.
Mr. Kontorovich is a professor at George Mason University Scalia Law School and a scholar at the Kohelet Policy Forum, a Jerusalem think tank.
The Economist, 22 décembre, article payant
Syria’s horrors : One of Assad’s mass graves is found, with as many as 100,000 bodies
But justice for the victims of the Assad regime will be slow
Extraits:
AMOUND OF dirt blocks the road to a walled compound on the outskirts of al-Qutayfa, a town around 30km north of Damascus, the Syrian capital. It is silent, save for the occasional bark of two stray dogs and the faint buzz of power lines running over the compound. Breeze-block walls enclose an area roughly the size of two football fields. For more than a decade, Bashar al-Assad’s army turned this wasteland into a mass grave—believed by Syria’s new rulers to be one of his largest.
For years, earthmovers would arrive late at night, followed by refrigerated trucks packed with bodies, locals said. Initially the graves were not deep enough; stray dogs would burrow into the dirt and pull up corpses. So Mr Assad’s soldiers were ordered to dig deeper.
Until a week ago, this was one of the most sensitive areas in Syria—a garrison town where stopping your car in the wrong place could mean being arrested. Locals kept silent, paralysed by fear. “Whatever they sent me, I was supposed to bury,” says Haj Ali Saleh, a former mayor of the town who still lives there. He resigned in 2012 and was then briefly detained by the authorities after refusing to follow orders to construct a mass grave.
But the regime found others who were more willing. It was the early years of Syria’s civil war, and Mr Assad’s grip was tightening. Prisons were overflowing and the regime turned to increasingly brutal methods to suppress dissent. Torture and execution became commonplace. (…)
In recent years human-rights organisations have used satellite imagery to determine that there was a mass grave on the outskirts of al-Qutayfa. They could not say anything definitive about the number of bodies it contained. In the years that followed, the regime attempted to cover its tracks. Residents describe trucks that would arrive to exhume bodies, moving perhaps thousands elsewhere. A foul stench would engulf the town as the trucks unearthed the graves. “Everyone in the town knew what they were doing,” says a farmer who lived nearby. (…)
Everyone in al-Qutayfa seemed to have known that something horrifying was going on. But to say anything was to risk ending up in the grave. So far there has been no talk from those now in charge of Syria of exhumation and forensic testing to confirm the scale of the atrocity. The residents of al-Qutayfa are outraged. They are desperate for the world to know what happened in their town.
After more than a decade of war, millions of Syrians have missing relatives. A handful of survivors have limped out of the regime’s prisons in recent weeks, but for many, the only hope for answers lies in the mass graves being discovered across the country. Ali Schwaat is a farmer in al-Qutayfa who worked just a few hundred meters from the grave site for over a decade. “The mother of a dead person can sleep,” he says, “but the mother of a missing son never will.” ■
The Economist, 22 décembre, article payant
The other war’s winners and losers : Conflict is remaking the Middle East’s economic order
Iran is boxed in as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey look to capitalize
Extraits:
THE LIQUIDITY crunch could not have come at a worse time. Usually, most of Hizbullah’s budget arrives on a plane in Damascus, the Syrian capital, with the country’s Iranian ambassador. The cash is then transported across the Lebanese border to the Shia militia. But on December 8th, just weeks after Hizbullah stopped fighting with Israel in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president and Iran’s ally, was overthrown. Iran evacuated officials and soldiers in Syria. Already financially emaciated, Hizbullah faces rebuilding deprived of its surest cash flow.
Iran has long vied with Gulf states for influence over the Middle East, despite being under American sanctions. Its financiers and traders have outfoxed Western officials with a labyrinthine economic system, built primarily across friendly countries, which funded proxies, traded arms with Russia and took oil payments from India and China. That was, at least, until October 7th 2023, when Hamas’s attack on Israel plunged the region into chaos and started to blow holes in Iran’s networks. A year on, the Islamic Republic looks like the war’s big economic loser. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey, all jostling to pick up lost trade and influence, are its likely winners. (…)
The loss of financiers in Damascus and Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, is also a headache. As much as half of Iran’s revenues come from oil exports in a typical year, despite the American sanctions. Payments flow through a series of correspondent banks and small exchanges, registered to international aliases and allies. One of many such arrangements made use of Hizbullah’s supporters in Lebanon’s diaspora, who, through companies affiliated with the militia, took payments for Iranian oil from countries ranging from Turkey to Senegal, and kept some profit for themselves. But Muhammed Qasir, the man who ran the network, died in October in an Israeli air strike. According to Israeli officials, Iran has had a hard time getting things going again in his absence. (…)
Such losses could be disastrous for Iran’s remaining supporters in the Middle East. With Hamas and Hizbullah greatly weakened, and Mr Assad in exile, only the Houthis, the proxy over which Iran has the least influence, fighting for control over Yemen, are not in disarray.
Iran is now struggling to get weapons or cash to Beirut and the Palestinian territories to replenish forces, as much materiel arrived through Syria. The alternative is moving supplies covertly, but that limits the size of shipments to what can be hidden and takes longer. Extra cash is desperately needed. (…)
It does not help that Iran’s finances have also been hit by debts that must now be written off. Its government has lost billions of dollars in loans to Mr Assad, which propped him up while Syria was shut out of global markets. Officials suggest a combination of personal loans to Mr Assad and credit lines for oil came to $5bn a year.
Meanwhile, the Gulf and Turkey are hoping to scoop up lost influence. As America has grown less willing to spend in the Middle East, Gulf states have become the biggest external financiers to its poorer countries. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lent $34bn across the Middle East and North Africa in 2021-22, compared to $17bn in 2019-20. Their loans are also lubricating economies that Iran previously helped finance, including Kuwait. Long friendly with Iran, even as it enjoyed good relations with the West, Kuwait has recently become less willing to trade with the Islamic Republic, Iranian officials complain.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are negotiating with America to pick up some of the reconstruction bill in Gaza in return for a Palestinian state. In Syria, Turkey hopes to profit from its support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the biggest presence in the new government. Some Western officials worry that Syria under the thumb of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, would be little better than it was under a leader loyal to Iran and Russia. But on December 18th the Iranian rial plunged to its lowest ever level against the dollar. The Syrian pound, meanwhile, has soared by 25% in two weeks. The market, at least, disagrees. ■
Le Figaro, 21 décembre, libre accès
Rima Hassan appelle «les Franco-Palestiniens» à rejoindre «la résistance palestinienne armée»
«La seule chose qui vous empêche de l’envisager, c’est la colonialité du monde», a-t-elle publié sur X.
Extraits:
Rima Hassan, eurodéputée de La France Insoumise, créé à nouveau la polémique. «Si les Franco-Israéliens sont autorisés à servir dans l’armée israélienne tout en jouissant des acquis de la double nationalité», a-t-elle publié sur X ce mercredi, «tout Franco-Palestinien doit pouvoir rejoindre la résistance armée palestinienne dont la légitimité est reconnue par les résolutions des Nations unies relatives au droit à l’autodétermination des peuples». «La seule chose qui vous empêche de l’envisager, c’est la colonialité du monde», ajoute-t-elle.
L’eurodéputée se réfère à la résolution du 30 novembre 1973 de l’ONU qui «réaffirme la légitimité de la lutte des peuples pour leur indépendance, leur intégrité territoriale et leur unité nationale et pour se libérer de la domination coloniale et étrangère et de l’occupation étrangère par tous les moyens à leur disposition, y compris la lutte armée».
Mais la «résistance armée palestinienne», comme le Hamas, est qualifiée de terroriste par la France, comme l’a rappelé le ministère des Affaires étrangères. De plus, la France ne reconnaît pas l’État de Palestine et donc, de facto, la nationalité palestinienne. (…)
En revanche, le service militaire est possible pour un Franco-Israélien. Une convention bilatérale signée entre la France et Israël prévoit que les binationaux peuvent être appelés sous les drapeaux en cas de conflit. 4815 soldats de nationalité française, la deuxième la plus représentée après les États-Unis, ont été mobilisés par Tsahal, l’armée israélienne, révélait Europe 1 en octobre dernier. L’eurodéputée est connue pour sa virulence envers Israël et un soutien affichée à la cause palestinienne. Elle avait été convoquée par la justice pour «apologie du terrorisme» le 30 avril pour avoir affirmé que le Hamas menait «une action légitime».
The Economist, 19 décembre, article payant
Meet the boss : Everyone wants to meet Syria’s new rulers
But a flurry of diplomatic meetings in Damascus points to the obstacles ahead
Extraits:
IT WAS a very social week for a man with a $10m bounty on his head. Foreign diplomats rushed to Damascus to talk with Ahmad al-Sharaa (pictured), the rebel commander who led the offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad. His Islamist faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is blacklisted as a terrorist group by America, Britain, the European Union and the United Nations. That did not prevent him from meeting Geir Pedersen, the UN special envoy for Syria, or delegations from Britain, France, Qatar, Turkey and other countries.
After more than a decade of civil war, Syria is emerging from isolation. But Mr Sharaa’s meetings this week point to the challenges ahead: sceptical foreign powers, uncertain politics and a worsening conflict in the country’s north-east.
An interim government, dominated by hts, is meant to rule until March. One of its priorities is to persuade Western governments to lift the sanctions imposed during Mr Assad’s reign. (…)
In a letter to Joe Biden, the lawmakers who wrote one of America’s sanctions bills urged the president to move quickly in removing the restrictions. “The fall of the Assad regime presents a pivotal opportunity,” they argued. But other members of Congress seem inclined to wait. So do European governments. Kaja Kallas, the eu’s foreign-policy chief, said the bloc would only start lifting sanctions once HTS has taken “positive steps” towards creating an inclusive government.
Early signs of that are mixed. In recent days Mr Sharaa has met representatives of minority groups, including the Druze, and rival rebel groups, like the faction that led the uprising in southern Syria earlier this month. Meeting them is one thing, though; giving them a role in a post-Assad government is another. (…)
Syria will soon have a pressing need for basic commodities. Iran had been shipping as much as 80,000 barrels of free oil per day. Those deliveries have been halted. Syria could buy oil on the spot market, but that requires hard currency, which is scarce. Foreign reserves are believed to have fallen as low as $200m, down from $17bn before the war. Mr Assad and his cronies are thought to have stolen billions.
After more than a week of silence, on December 16th a statement attributed to Mr Assad appeared on a social-media account he previously used. He claimed he never wanted to flee Syria—“the only course of action was to continue fighting”—but that his Russian backers forced him to evacuate. Though it could not be authenticated, the missive sounded like Mr Assad. It was widely mocked by Syrians, and then forgotten: another sign of how quickly the former president, who loomed so large over Syrian life for decades, has faded into irrelevance. ■
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/19/everyone-wants-to-meet-syrias-new-rulers
The Economist, 19 décembre, article payant
Prospects of a ceasefire in Gaza : Israel and Hamas look close to some kind of deal
Lebanon, Syria and Donald Trump have all been important
Full text;
A series of meetings in Cairo and Doha have led to renewed optimism about the prospect of a deal between Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamists in Gaza, ending the war there after over 14 months. A number of factors, including a ceasefire in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which have isolated Hamas, and pressure on Israel from Donald Trump, who would like to take credit for a deal, have brought new flexibility on both sides. But Israel’s military presence in Gaza and the question of the release of 100 Israeli hostages remain obstacles. A truce of some weeks will probably precede a longer-term ceasefire.■
Wall Street Journal, 17 décembre, article payant
Assad’s Fall Upends the Middle East’s Largest Drug Empire
Captagon helped sustain the Syrian regime, and fueled war and addiction across the region
Extraits:
The fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad overturned the most profitable drug-smuggling network in the Middle East, exposing the former regime’s role in manufacturing and trafficking pills that fueled war and social crises across the region.
Captagon, a methamphetamine-like drug that has been produced for years in Syrian labs, helped the Assad regime amass huge wealth and offset the impact of punishing international sanctions, while also allowing allies such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia to profit from its trade.
Days after they ousted Assad in a lightning offensive last week, rebels circulated videos from industrial-scale manufacturing and trafficking facilities inside government air bases and other sites affiliated with former top regime officials. (…)
Used by everyone from taxi drivers and students working late hours to militia fighters seeking courage, Syrian-produced captagon helped drive a demand for drugs across the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, and became a source of international tension between Syria and its neighbors.
The disclosures provide evidence of what had long been alleged: that the Assad regime was the driving force behind an estimated $10 billion annual global trade in captagon, which in recent years has become the drug of choice across the Middle East. Assad used the funds to sustain its rule and reward loyalists.
“This absolutely proves that the regime was systematically involved in captagon production and trafficking,” said Caroline Rose, an expert on the captagon trade at the New Lines Institute, a Washington think tank. “They were able to make these facilities as large as they wanted to, and plug and play.”
While captagon has long been known to have been produced in smaller labs across Syria—despite Syrian denials—the size and scale of the newly disclosed facilities show the staggering extent of the trade at every level of the regime.
“You can imagine the manpower, the resources that were required. It shows such investment into this illicit trade,” Rose said. “It penetrated so many elements of the regime: its political apparatus, patronage networks, the security apparatus.”
Captagon was the brand name of a drug originally manufactured in Germany in the 1960s to treat conditions such as narcolepsy and attention-deficit disorder. After it was banned in most countries for being too addictive, criminal groups moved production of the drug to Lebanon and then to Syria after its civil war broke out in 2011. Most of the world’s captagon has been produced there in recent years. (…)
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist rebel group leading the blitz offensive that toppled Assad, has attacked the captagon trade as an example of the former regime’s moral and financial corruption. In a victory speech at Damascus’s Umayyad Mosque on Friday, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani said Assad had turned Syria into “the largest captagon factory in the world. Today, Syria is being cleansed, thanks to the grace of Almighty God.”
The dismantling of the Assad captagon empire will also strain the resources of Hezbollah, which according to U.S. and Arab security officials facilitated trafficking in areas under their control and secured the houses of drug dealers in southern Syria.
Economic activities in Syria such as taxation and smuggling, including of captagon, helped Hezbollah deflect the damage of international sanctions—which also affect its sponsor, Iran—and become more financially self-sustaining.
“Captagon allowed Hezbollah to diversify its source of revenue,” said Joseph Daher, visiting professor at the University of Lausanne and author of a book on the political economy of Hezbollah.
Uprooting the captagon trade is unlikely to dent the growing appetite for drugs in the Middle East, experts say. The industrial-scale production in Syria amplified a demand for captagon since the late 2010s, which will remain high, Rose said.
If the blow to Syria’s captagon production leads to a permanent supply shortage, drug users will likely either pay more for captagon or turn to other and more dangerous stimulants that are surging in the region, such as crystal meth, she said. (…)
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syria-assad-captagon-drug-trade-a8b30615?mod=hp_lead_pos7
The Jerusalem Post, 14 décembre, article payant
What the new Middle East chessboard means for Israel – opinion
The collapse of Assad’s regime marks the start of a new and volatile chapter.
Extraits:
(…) With Assad gone, Iran’s influence has suffered a decisive blow. The offensive that toppled his regime also weakened Hezbollah and isolated Iranian forces, removing a linchpin of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Yet this strategic gain for Iran’s opponents does not guarantee stability. Rival factions are competing to fill the vacuum, leaving Israel confronted with new and unpredictable threats.
Israel faces a profoundly altered security environment. While the demise of a longstanding adversary offers a brief reprieve, the ascent of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham near its northern frontier is alarming. HTS, rooted in al-Qaeda, has seized major territories and proclaims ambitions extending beyond Syria’s borders. (…)
Lacking prospects for Western reconstruction aid due to its extremist credentials, the rebel group may consolidate power through radicalism, openly threatening Jerusalem and Mecca. This places Israel and Saudi Arabia in the crosshairs of a group adept at exploiting chaos. For the next US president, Donald Trump, who vowed to end foreign entanglements, the rise of HTS complicates any aspirations for disengagement.
Russia’s position in Syria is also uncertain. The hasty withdrawal from several bases amid HTS’s advance raises the question: Will Moscow abandon its prized naval facility at Tartus? (…) Having pounded anti-Assad factions for years, Russia cannot expect accommodation from HTS. (…)
Israel, aware of these shifting dynamics, is already moving to secure its northern border. Recent operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in southern Syria reflect a strategic priority: pre-empting extremist advances and deterring Iranian proxies. This approach underscores a broader effort to recalibrate security postures across the region. (…)
Syria’s collapse also reverberates through neighboring states. Lebanon, economically fragile and politically beholden to Hezbollah, faces further destabilization as Tehran’s influence wanes. Without reliable Syrian support, Hezbollah may intensify its grip on Lebanon’s politics, worsening an already dire crisis. (…)
For Israel, the priority is to leverage the strategic openings created by Assad’s fall while mitigating the risks of emboldened extremists. It must reinforce intelligence capabilities, neutralize remaining Iranian proxies, and deepen diplomatic engagement with partners like Jordan and the Gulf states. Such efforts are essential in a region now defined by shifting alliances, fragmented authority, and the uncertain role of global powers.
The collapse of Assad’s regime marks the start of a new and volatile chapter. Whether this upheaval leads to a more stable order or plunges the Middle East into further discord depends on the strategic choices that regional and international actors make now. For Israel and its neighbors, the challenge is to navigate an environment reshaped by the simultaneous weakening of Iran, the unsettling rise of jihadist actors, and the uncertain recalculations of global powers.
Catherine Perez-Shakdam is executive director of We Believe In Israel and the Forum for Foreign Relations. Dr. Stepan Stepanenko is director of research and strategy at the Forum for Foreign Relations.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-833035
Le Point, 13 décembre, article payant
Hugo Micheron : « Il n’y a pas de djihadistes modérés »
Chercheur à Sciences Po, le spécialiste du djihadisme analyse les forces et les dynamiques à l’œuvre enSyrie après la chute d’Assad.
Extraits:
(…) Quelques semaines plus tard, la riposte israélienne avait lieu au Liban ; la Russie, l’Iran et le Hezbollah devaient repositionner certaines troupes hors de Syrie, permettant ainsi au groupe djihadiste HTC de mener une incroyable offensive et de renverser le régime de Bachar el-Assad.
Enseignant-chercheur à Sciences Po, Hugo Micheron connaît bien cette milice et son leader, Abou Mohammed al-Joulani. Il nous invite à nous méfier de sa prétendue conversion en guerrier libérateur de la Syrie.
Le Point : Après avoir survécu à de nombreuses crises et tragédies, le régime Assad s’est effondré. Que vous inspirent ces jours historiques ?
Hugo Micheron : C’est la fin d’un régime haï en Syrie, qui est responsable d’une guerre civile ayant fait 400 000 morts et 11 millions de déplacés en interne et en externe. Un régime qui aurait probablement perdu la guerre civile sans l’intervention de l’Iran et de la Russie. La Syrie était de facto un condominium russo-iranien, c’est-à-dire un régime ayant perdu sa souveraineté. Il s’est effondré en quelques jours, mais il était en sursis depuis dix ans. Cela rappelle le scénario afghan. À Kaboul, le régime était soutenu par une puissance extérieure, en l’occurrence les États-Unis, et semblait solide. Il a été renversé sous les coups de boutoir des talibans, un groupe qui, par certains aspects, rappelle la coalition menée par HTC.
Comment qualifier Abou Mohammed al-Joulani, le nouvel homme fort de la Syrie ?
Il est trop tôt pour dire ce qu’il est devenu. Il suffit de regarder son « pedigree ». C’est un Syrien, né dans une famille plutôt aisée. Il rejoint le djihad en Irak en 2003 et se retrouve dans une prison tenue par les Américains, où il est en contact avec tous ceux qui deviendront l’état-major de Daech.
Entre 2011 et 2012, il est envoyé en Syrie par le chef de l’État islamique d’Irak et futur chef de Daech, Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, avec qui il se brouille, avant de monter son propre groupe autonome, le front Al-Nosra, rien de moins que la filiale d’Al-Qaïda en Syrie.
Il mène alors une politique de syrianisation du djihad, très différente des pratiques de Daech. Il est plus politique que l’État islamique et ne recourt pas à l’ultra-violence. Il s’est d’abord cassé les dents contre le régime soutenu par l’Iran et la Russie. Mais quand il a vu le soutien au régime diminuer, il a repris la route, avec de l’équipement fourni par la Turquie et son soutien direct ou indirect, et il a rempli son premier objectif : faire tomber Bachar et s’emparer de Damas. (…)
Al-Joulani s’est un peu taillé la barbe et il a troqué l’habit du cheikh pour celui du chef militaire. Mais il faut se méfier, il est très doué pour la politique et a bien compris les signaux qu’il fallait envoyer sur la scène internationale, notamment aux Occidentaux. Un peu comme les talibans qui avaient promis aux Américains et aux médias occidentaux qu’ils avaient changé. On voit aujourd’hui qu’il n’en est rien. (…)
Je vois deux grands scénarios se dessiner : soit la Syrie devient comme la Libye – l’opposition se fragmente en plusieurs fiefs et le pays connaît une sorte de guerre civile prolongée –, soit elle suit l’exemple irakien après la chute de Saddam Hussein : le pouvoir est stabilisé par une puissance étrangère. En Irak, c’est l’Iran qui était à la manœuvre. En Syrie, c’est la Turquie qui pourrait structurer le nouveau régime. (…)
Faut-il prendre Al-Joulani au sérieux quand il dit avoir renoncé au djihad global et au terrorisme ?
Il a peut-être renoncé à la dimension globalisante du djihad d’Al-Qaïda à des fins tactiques. Ça ne veut pas dire qu’il a renoncé à l’intégralité du corpus idéologique djihadiste. (…)
Quand il dit avoir renoncé au djihad global, Al-Joulani nous dit : « Ne vous en faites pas, laissez-moi faire, je vais stabiliser la région. » Le problème, c’est qu’il n’y a pas de djihadistes modérés. Cela n’existe pas. (…)
Son groupe administrait déjà la région d’Idlib, où il appliquait la charia. Va-t-il étendre la loi islamique à l’ensemble du pays ?
Al-Joulani est un tacticien qui pense sur le court, le moyen et le long terme. À Idlib, le régime repose sur une interprétation extrêmement rigoriste de la charia, comme le font les salafo-djihadistes. L’espace public est régi par la morale religieuse, même si, contrairement à Daech, il existe une forme de tolérance envers les chrétiens et les minorités religieuses.
HTC n’a pas mis en place d’exécutions publiques filmées, mais c’est un régime extrêmement brutal et qui n’a aucune considération pour un gouvernement non religieux. L’idée qu’il puisse y avoir des lois qui émanent d’une justice humaine est pour lui une hérésie. Le paysage d’Idlib sous le régime de HTC montre un rigorisme qui n’avait jamais existé auparavant dans la région.
On est sur des bases qui ne sont pas celles de l’islam traditionnel syrien. Il ne faut pas être naïf. Al-Joulani est un très bon politique, mais son projet est religieux, il n’y a aucun doute. (…)
Le Figaro, 13 décembre, article payant
À Idlib, vitrine du nouveau pouvoir syrien, «on vit proche du Coran»
REPORTAGE – La ville est administrée par le groupe rebelle islamiste HTC depuis 2017. Elle offre un aperçu de son projet de société, qui pourrait être répliqué au niveau national.
Extraits:
Au North Café, situé à la bordure d’Idlib, deux femmes discutent à mi-voix autour d’un smoothie. De leurs visages, on ne distingue que des yeux rieurs. Comme de nombreuses habitantes de la ville située à l’extrême nord-ouest de la Syrie, elles portent le niqab. Dans ce café, une palissade coupe la terrasse en deux. À gauche, les hommes. À droite, l’espace réservé à la gent féminine. Ici, pas d’alcool, ni de cigarette pour les femmes. Chem, qui habite la ville depuis 2017 et est combattant indépendant rallié à HTC, désigne les clientes du café. « Un conseil, si tu peux t’habiller avec des vêtements amples pour que les gens ne te distinguent pas, c’est mieux pour ta sécurité. Par exemple comme les sœurs assises là-bas », lance le rebelle de 38 ans armé d’une kalachnikov.
Depuis 2017, l’enclave d’Idlib est sous la coupe de Hayat Tahrir al-Cham (HTC), groupe rebelle ayant mené l’offensive éclair qui a fait tomber le régime demi-centenaire de la famille el-Assad le 8 décembre. Ils administrent une zone d’une superficie d’environ 6500 kilomètres carrés grâce à un « gouvernement de salut syrien », qui rejetait jusqu’à sa chute la légitimité du gouvernement de Bachar el-Assad.
Le territoire n’utilise pas la livre syrienne. Ici, on ne paie jusqu’à présent qu’en livres turques, en dollars ou éventuellement en euros. De nombreuses incertitudes demeurent sur la nature du régime que l’organisation HTC souhaite mettre en place en Syrie. Dans ce contexte, Idlib est un proto-État qui peut être considéré comme une vitrine du fonctionnement et de l’idéologie du groupe. (…)
Sur la place adjacente au lycée pour filles Hussam-Hijazi, les habitants se retrouvent à grands coups de frappes dans le dos et de sourires. « Ici nous vivons une vie normale. Vous pensez que la Syrie, c’est Hiroshima… Oui il y a eu la guerre mais il y a une vie, les gens ont besoin de manger, les enfants d’aller à l’école comme tout le monde », commente Chem, le combattant rattaché aux rangs de HTC. Il porte un treillis et un foulard noir sur la tête, dont seule dépasse une longue barbe brune. Au niveau de son abdomen, trois réserves de cartouches. Il s’interrompt pour montrer le stade de football à la pelouse flambant neuve que l’on aperçoit depuis le café. « J’espère que d’ici à quelques années, le Barça, Ronaldo et Messi viendront jouer ici », lance-t-il.
À l’instar d’un État régulier, le « gouvernement de salut syrien » dispose de ministères allant de la Sécurité à la Santé, de forces de l’ordre, d’une université et d’hôpitaux. Ici comme à Damas, les rebelles de HTC se veulent rassurants, soulignant la mue qu’ils ont effectuée depuis 2012. D’abord rattachée à al-Qaida sous le nom de « Front al-Nosra », l’organisation a pris ses distances avec le djihad global et a coupé tout lien avec l’organisation terroriste en 2016.
Son idéologie demeure néanmoins particulièrement rigoriste. À Idlib, les porteuses de niqab représentent environ un tiers des femmes présentes dans l’espace public, alors qu’elles sont rares dans le centre de Damas. « Je suis allé à Damas pour la première fois la semaine dernière lors de l’offensive. Je remercie Allah de vivre ici, lâche Chem. Ici, on vit proche du Coran, on respecte les règles de l’islam. »
Il réfléchit, avant de trancher : « Notre exemple, ce sont les talibans d’Afghanistan (qui interdisent notamment aux filles et aux femmes d’étudier, imposent un code vestimentaire strict et des lois basées sur une lecture ultrarigoriste du Coran, NDLR). Ils se sont battus pendant 42 ans, et maintenant ils vivent chez eux selon leurs propres règles. Quelle fierté ! » Le combattant ne porte pas la parole officielle du groupe. Mais ses mots reflètent des idées partagées par d’autres rebelles de HTC que nous avons rencontrés à Damas et Idlib. (…)
« On verra ce que l’avenir nous réserve. En tout cas tout le monde a sa place ici, il n’y a pas de divisions dans notre pays », élude Adel Badaoui sous le regard avisé de son père. Le HTC, en passe de diriger le pays, multiplie les déclarations publiques et les initiatives selon lesquelles les minorités, notamment les chrétiens, ne seront pas discriminées. (…)
Malgré les inquiétudes, l’optimisme demeure. « J’ai rencontré Abou Mohammed al-Joulani (le nom de guerre du chef du HTC, NDLR), je lui fais confiance », avance au téléphone Mgr Hanna Jallouf, évêque des catholiques de rite latin en Syrie basé à Alep. En 2014, le franciscain a été enlevé par le Front al-Nosra.
Libéré, il se bat plus que jamais pour maintenir le dialogue entre les communautés, persuadé qu’un avenir commun peut exister en Syrie entre chrétiens et musulmans. « Maintenant, si Dieu le veut, la guerre est finie, et on va ouvrir un nouveau chapitre », espère Adel Badaoui, à l’instar de tous les autres habitants que nous avons rencontrés. Un message lancé depuis le bastion de la résistance islamiste au régime de Bachar el-Assad, devenu laboratoire d’un gouvernement de transition que le monde entier regarde avec appréhension.
Le Monde, 11 décembre, article payant
En Syrie, les premiers témoignages accablants des prisonniers sortis des geôles du régime d’Al-Assad
Reportage : L’hôpital Al-Nafis, dans le nord de Damas, a la lourde tâche de recueillir des hommes brisés, libérés de l’enfer carcéral du clan Al-Assad. Les médecins n’avaient jamais vu une telle détresse psychologique. Les familles, elles, tentent désespérément de retrouver les leurs dans les couloirs des urgences ou à la morgue.
Extraits:
L’homme est comme suspendu entre le monde des morts et celui des vivants, allongé sur une civière en cuir noir à l’hôpital Al-Nafis, dans le quartier de Barzeh, dans le nord de Damas, mardi 10 décembre. La tête posée sur la paume de sa main, son regard est perdu dans le vide et sa bouche reste bée. Son œil gauche est tuméfié, son nez épaté par une vieille fracture. D’autres fractures à la colonne vertébrale et au crâne ont brisé son corps fragile, dénutri. Une maladie de peau lui ronge les jambes.
Une quinzaine de personnes l’entourent, certaines, un téléphone à la main avec la photo d’un proche qui, comme lui, a disparu, un jour, dans l’enfer carcéral du clan Al-Assad. Ils n’en sont pas encore revenus. « Tu as vu mes fils ? Bassem et Ahmed Alala », lui crie un Syrien d’une cinquantaine d’années, brandissant un portrait de ses deux enfants âgés d’une vingtaine d’années, avant leur disparition, il y a dix ans.
« Il ne se souvient même pas de son propre nom… », souffle un médecin qui n’arrive pas à retenir la foule autour de l’homme. Quand il reprend parfois ses esprits, le trentenaire tient des propos décousus. « Il s’appelle Khaled Badawi. Il était soldat et a déserté. Il a été arrêté, il y a deux ans, à Alep et transféré à [la prison de] Saydnaya. Nous n’avions plus de nouvelles de lui depuis », dit son frère Tarek, posté au pied du lit.
Lorsqu’il l’a reconnu, la veille (lundi ?), sur une vidéo circulant sur Facebook, Tarek s’est mis immédiatement en route, avec toute la famille, depuis Alep, à 350 kilomètres plus au nord. Seuls les deux enfants de Khaled Badawi, âgés de 3 et 5 ans, et leur mère, de qui il est séparé, sont restés à Alep. « On est contents de le retrouver. Il va un peu mieux qu’hier », poursuit Tarek. Deux de leurs cousins, 24 et 34 ans, sont encore portés disparus, dix ans après leur arrestation à un barrage de sécurité.
Khaled Badawi a été le premier prisonnier à être arrivé, dimanche, à 7 heures du matin, à l’hôpital Al-Nafis. Il a été libéré de Saydnaya, la sinistre prison située à 20 kilomètres au nord de Damas, décrite par l’ONG Amnesty International comme un « abattoir humain », au moment où les rebelles syriens emmenés par Hayat Tahrir Al-Cham (HTC, Organisation de libération du Levant, ancienne branche d’Al-Qaida en Syrie) se sont emparés de Damas. (…)
Pour les familles dont les proches ont disparu dans les geôles syriennes, la libération des griffes du clan Al-Assad s’est transformée en une éprouvante quête. De la prison de Saydnaya aux mosquées et aux hôpitaux de Damas, où ont été transférés les prisonniers, morts ou vifs, après que les portes des prisons se sont ouvertes. A l’hôpital de Damas, près de la vieille ville, des Syriens s’engouffrent par dizaines dans les couloirs qui mènent à la morgue. Trente-cinq corps ont été amenés dans la nuit. (…)
Des corps sont disposés sur les tables, dans des sacs mortuaires bleus. Certains sont morts, il y a longtemps. Leur peau est noircie, tannée comme le cuir. D’autres semblent avoir péri ces derniers jours. Les médecins légistes les examinent pour déterminer la date et la cause de leur décès. « La plupart sont morts depuis longtemps. Certains ont été tués par balles. Ils ont des traces de coups sur le corps. Il est possible qu’ils aient été torturés », affirme un médecin légiste, qui préfère ne pas se prononcer avant la fin des examens. (…)
« On était traités comme des insectes. Les gardiens n’étaient pas humains, c’étaient des démons. Nous n’étions même pas autorisés à les regarder dans les yeux, sinon ils nous frappaient ou nous exécutaient », raconte Aouni Said Khalaf, un masque noir lui couvrant la bouche. (…)
The Economist, 11 décembre, article payant
Who are the main rebel groups in Syria?
They were united against the country’s dictator. Now they have little in common
Extraits:
WHEN REBELS reached Syria’s capital, Damascus, on December 8th, they did so from two directions. Fighters from the south were the first to arrive. From the north came members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of al-Qaeda that had led the push against the country’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, over the preceding fortnight. The Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), two other important groups, were also involved in the fight to topple Mr Assad. This was the culmination of 13 years of bloody civil war. Soon after rebels reached the city, the president fled, ending more than 50 years of his family’s rule.
Mr Assad is a member of Syria’s Alawite minority: he terrorised both the Sunni majority and other minorities, including Kurds, Christians and Druze. Over the course of the civil war, hundreds of militias sprang up. Rebel groups with disparate aims were united in their opposition to him. Now that he is gone, those militias may find that they lack a common purpose. Who are Syria’s main players and what do they want?
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
This group, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), is believed to have 10,000-30,000 fighters. It is an Islamist movement rooted in Salafism, an ultra-conservative branch of Islam. HTS was founded in 2011, under the name Jabhat al-Nusra, as an affiliate of al-Qaeda. It broke with the group in 2017 and has sought to distance itself from jihadism, purging al-Qaeda loyalists from its ranks. Since that year HTS has ruled a slice of Idlib governorate, in Syria’s north-west, pushing the bulk of Islamic State (IS) fighters out of the area. It established the Syrian Salvation Government there, which taxes residents, provides social services and issues identity cards. Syria’s new prime minister, Muhammad al-Bashir, previously served as the head of that administration. Mr Sharaa has sought to present HTS as a religious nationalist group tolerant of minorities: it does not impose dress codes on women and permits church services. But America, Britain, Europe and the United Nations still classify HTS as a terrorist group (though they are pondering whether to change that). (…)
Syrian Democratic Forces
East of Idlib governorate, in the north of the country, the SDF runs a fief that encompasses roughly a quarter of Syria. The SDF is Kurdish-led, though it also has Arab and Christian fighters. Its military wing is led by the People’s Protection Units, many of whom are veterans of the Kurdistan Workers Party, a militant group that fought for years inside Turkey for an independent Kurdish state. Turkey considers the SDF a terrorist group, and the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sees the presence of a Kurdish force on his doorstep as a threat. But the SDF is backed by America, which has spent hundreds of millions of dollars training and arming the group to help it fight IS. (…)
Syrian National Army
HTS may have led the offensive, but the SNA’s role has also been decisive. It too is influential in the north. Mr Erdogan established the group in 2017, bringing together a network of anti-Islamist militias who opposed Mr Assad. Many SNA fighters were once members of the Free Syrian Army, a collection of opposition groups made up of defectors from Syria’s armed forces, and the group remains fairly decentralised. Turkey, which funds, trains and arms it, uses the SNA as a proxy to fight the SDF. (…)
Islamic State
IS is a diminished force in Syria—but the uncertainty created by the overthrow of Mr Assad could provide it with an opportunity. The jihadist group originated in Iraq, where its members fought alongside al-Qaeda as part of the Iraqi insurgency that sprang up after America and Britain deposed Saddam Hussein. In 2014 IS seized a large chunk of north-eastern Syria, as well as territory in Iraq, where it imposed an extremist interpretation of Islamic law. By 2019 its caliphate had been dismembered: the land it had held was divided between rebel groups and its fighters retreated to small pockets of rural Syria. Some 10,000 of its fighters are imprisoned by the SDF. If fighting in Kurdish areas intensifies, and leads to their escape or release, IS could pose a renewed threat to Syria and the West. ■
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/12/10/who-are-the-main-rebel-groups-in-syria
New York Times, 10 décembre, article payant
Hanna Notte: Putin Just Suffered a Huge Defeat
Hanna Notte is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.
Extraits:
This time, when Bashar al-Assad started to fall, Russia was not there to catch him.
Russia largely watched from the sidelines as Syrian rebels swept through the country in less than 10 days, overtaking Aleppo, Hama and Homs before entering Damascus, the capital, on Sunday. Mr. al-Assad is now gone, his departure celebrated by crowds of ecstatic Syrians. In Russia, where Mr. al-Assad has fled, the fall of his government amounts to a devastating loss. Decades of Russian military and political investment to carve out a foothold in the Mediterranean are now at risk. Vladimir Putin may yet manage to retain some stakes in a post-Assad Syria, but there’s no way around it: He just suffered a significant defeat. (…)
Besides seeing its partner Iran weakened, Russia will lose leverage to other regional heavyweights, especially Israel and Turkey. Russia’s partnership with Mr. al-Assad and Hezbollah made it an Israeli “neighbor to the north,” which meant that Israel had to inform Russia when it was conducting strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria. Israel also had to navigate with caution on Ukraine, even as Russia moved closer to Iran and adopted a pro-Palestinian position on the Gaza war. With Mr. al-Assad gone and the Iranians sidelined in Syria, Israel has more room to maneuver.
With Turkey, with which Russia has a longstanding rivalry, the loss is arguably greater. Having already accumulated leverage over Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey could have formidable bargaining power in any negotiations over Russia’s future influence in Syria thanks to its patronage of Syria’s armed opposition.
Mr. al-Assad’s ouster could also lead to the more tangible loss of the bases, Hmeimim and Tartus. Russia will do all it can to retain the bases, of course. The shift in its language when talking about its new Syrian interlocutors — from “terrorists” to “armed opposition” — suggests diplomatic efforts are already underway.
In that, Russia may succeed. But its influence in Syria — and the regional clout that came with it — will never be quite the same.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/10/opinion/syria-assad-russia-putin.html
The Jerusalem Post, 10 décembre, article payant
Operation ‘Bashan Arrow’: IDF destroys over 350 Syrian Military targets
IDF says most of Syria’s military capabilities were destroyed within 48 hours.
Extraits:
(…) The aim of the operation was to prevent them from falling within reach of terrorist groups in Syria.
The Israeli navy struck both the Al-Bayda and Latakia ports, in which were some 15 Syrian naval vessels, the military added.
The military struck anti-aircraft batteries, air force fields belonging to the Syrian military, and weapons production facilities in Damascus, Homs, Latakia, Palmyra, and Tartus. The IDF also degraded cruise missiles, surface-to-sea missiles, UAVs, fighter jets, radars, tanks, and attack helicopters, among other things.
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-832749
The Economist, 10 décembre, article payant
Pass the port : Syrian rebels have dealt a blow to Vladimir Putin’s naval ambitions
The loss of a key Mediterranean port could hobble the Russian navy
Extraits:
FOR 50 YEARS Russia’s foothold in the Mediterranean has been bound up with the Assad dynasty in Syria. It was in 1971 that Hafez al-Assad—father of Bashar, Syria’s dictator until last week—became president of the country. And it was the same year that the Soviet Union signed a deal with Syria to lease a port at Tartus on Syria’s coast. That enduring Russian military presence now hangs by a thread, following the swift collapse of the Assad regime. The Kremlin appears to have avoided a panicked and disorderly departure, but its influence on NATO’s southern flank is likely to wane. (…)
A spokesman for the Kremlin said that Russia had taken “necessary steps to establish contact in Syria with those capable of ensuring the security of military bases”. One of those steps appeared to be a more emollient tone to the people that Russia once bombed: Russian media have hurriedly switched from describing rebels as “terrorists” to the “armed opposition”. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the most powerful rebel group, “has been pragmatic in its tone and seems to be keeping its engagement options open,” says Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank. It is possible that the group would allow Russia to keep the base in exchange for arms, diplomatic support or some other quid pro quo. What is more likely is that any deal will be a temporary arrangement. Russia is “negotiating the terms”, says Mr Kofman, but is on the way out. “One way or another, Moscow will likely have to abandon its bases in Syria.” (…)
Nine years ago, Russia’s intervention in Syria marked its resurgence as a major military power beyond Europe. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, fresh from invading eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea the previous year, swooped in to save his ally with a decisive show of air power thousands of miles from home. The events of the past week mark a sharp reversal in fortunes. Mr Assad’s fall “is a major blow to Putin’s dream of Russia as a global player in a multipolar, post-Western world,” writes Sabine Fischer of the SWP think-tank in Berlin.
Many influential Russians appear to have reached much the same conclusion. The new rulers of Syria “create the impression of being rational and civilised”, wrote Fyodor Lukyanov, an analyst close to the Kremlin, adding that Russia’s “absolute priority” was Ukraine. Russia, he concluded, was better off being a regional power, focused on Europe. “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union,” agreed Ruslan Pukhov, an expert at the CAST think-tank in Moscow with close ties to the defence establishment. Russia had won fast, but failed to consolidate their victory politically. “The Americans have been through this before in Iraq and Afghanistan,” wrote Mr Pukhov, “but the Russians, by our national tradition, must necessarily step on the same rake themselves.”■
Le Figaro, 10 décembre, article payant
Renaud Girard: «Le grand gagnant de la chute de Damas, c’est Erdogan»
CHRONIQUE. – Erdogan a pris pas surprise la totalité des observateurs du Proche-Orient. Il va désormais s’adonner sans entraves à son sport favori : la répression des Kurdes.
Extraits:
La prise de Damas, le 8 décembre 2024, par les rebelles du HTC (Hayat Tahrir al-Cham, organisation de libération du Levant), après une folle course de douze jours, les ayant amenés, de la poche d’Idlib contrôlée par la Turquie, à Alep, puis Hama, puis Homs, puis la capitale syrienne, est un événement, au Moyen-Orient, comparable en importance géopolitique à ce que fut la chute du mur de Berlin de 1989 en Europe.
Le grand gagnant de cette affaire, ayant pris par surprise la totalité des observateurs du Proche-Orient, est le Frère musulman qui préside aux destinées de la Turquie depuis le début du XXIe siècle. Non seulement ses proxies (supplétifs étrangers) ont chassé ceux de l’Iran dans le contrôle de la Syrie voisine, mais il va pouvoir désormais s’adonner sans entraves à son sport favori : la répression des Kurdes, ce peuple musulman mais non arabe, qui aspire à la liberté, à l’indépendance et à la laïcité. (…)
Lors des printemps arabes de 2011, le président Erdogan, dans une forte pulsion néoottomane, a essayé de mettre la main sur l’Égypte, la Libye, la Tunisie, en y encourageant les Frères musulmans. Sauf en Tripolitaine, cette stratégie a lamentablement échoué. Voilà qu’il a maintenant la chance inouïe d’offrir une troisième manche à sa stratégie néoottomane – la deuxième ayant été le succès de ses alliés azerbaïdjanais dans leur guerre d’agression de septembre 2020 contre les Arméniens.
Joulani, le nouveau patron de la Syrie, se présente comme un nationaliste, respectueux des droits des minorités. Les naïfs ont le droit de le croire. Personnellement, j’ai du mal à croire qu’un homme qui a fait des allers et retours entre al-Qaida et l’État islamique soit vraiment un militant de la tolérance religieuse. Il a peut-être changé, mais pas au-delà de l’idéologie des Frères musulmans, qui est aussi celle, depuis sa jeunesse, du président turc. Napoléon exigeait de ses généraux qu’ils aient de la chance. Incontestablement, Erdogan en a.
Le Point, 9 décembre, article payant
Kamel Daoud : ce que révèle la révolution syrienne
CHRONIQUE. La chute de Bachar el-Assad, provoquée par des islamistes rêvant de restaurer le califat, illustre l’échec des élites progressistes du monde arabe.
Extraits:
« Irhal ! » (« Pars ! ») rugit la foule sur la place Tahrir. Le dictateur s’appelait Moubarak, c’était en Égypte, le 25 janvier 2011. On connaît la suite. Idem pour la Libye, la Tunisie ou l’Algérie. L’opportunisme islamiste (mieux armé, mieux financé), puis le retour à l’autoritarisme sous prétexte de « stabilité » face au « chaos » de la « démocratie » déjà maudite, car trop occidentale…
Faut-il donc toujours croire à une « révolution » dans le monde dit « arabe » ? Peu probable, si l’on considère les échecs répétés depuis un siècle dans cette région engluée dans la sacralité de Dieu ou de l’autoritarisme. Mille raisons de rester en mode observateur sceptique, entre le califat à venir et la dictature en ruine. L’empathie ne change pas la réalité.
D’abord, l’équation du changement est toujours verrouillée entre une dictature, qui prétend offrir « la stabilité » au prix des libertés, et un islamisme, qui demeure la seule force politique organisée depuis la fin des colonisations ou des protectorats. Au milieu de ce piège, les progressistes, laïcs ou « gauche arabe », souvent engoncés dans des attitudes ambiguës face à l’Occident ou rentiers des décolonisations et du sentiment anti-occidental. Des minorités spéculatives qui ne pèsent plus dans le rapport de force, comme les baathistes panarabes au Proche-Orient ou les mouvements décolonialistes au Maghreb. Ces castes idéologiques ne contrôlent ni les institutions, ni les médias, ni la ténacité du travail de proximité des foules, ni la production du leadership.
Il y a deux décennies, les printemps « arabes » avaient démontré la réalité arabe, aussi cruelle soit-elle : un échec dans les deux sens de la rupture politique. Celui de la démocratie impossible, car non préparée, et celui des dictatures invivables, parce qu’elles sont violentes et prédatrices. Aujourd’hui, la Syrie, grand pays exemplaire de la douleur d’être « arabe » au présent, confirme encore une fois cette équation.
Trois jours à regarder, de loin, le scénario de la « libération », érodé, voire refroidi, par les décevantes années précédentes : prisonniers libérés, statues déboulonnées, dictateur en fuite, cris des foules et des pleurs de joie. On ne peut rester insensible à cette émotion, car elle réactive ce rêve millénaire politique dans le monde arabe : un jour, nous serons libres, un jour, nous serons heureux.
Mais, au cœur de cet enthousiasme, il y a désormais une fêlure : le soulèvement est encore une fois « islamiste », la dictature est tombée, mais « sur la tête du peuple » encore une fois. (…)
La Syrie continue d’offrir le même message inquiétant et discret : dans le monde dit « arabe », ce qui devait changer, c’est l’idée de… changement. Aujourd’hui, si l’on n’est pas islamiste, on ne rêve plus que de fuir vers l’Allemagne et l’Occident. Cette force politique, ventriloque des prédations internationales, dangereuse et barbare, est l’unique dynamique du changement. C’est aussi un échec. C’est l’échec des élites progressistes à accepter l’idée de sacrifice et de mort, de « travailler » l’éducation, les syndicats, la « culture » et les propagandes, de reproduire les idéaux par les écoles et les livres. (…)
La Syrie, c’est un peu le monde dit « arabe », entre le califat à venir et la dictature qui ne veut pas renoncer. On lui souhaite de meilleurs jours.
Wall Street Journal, 9 décembre, article payant
After the Fall of Syria’s Assad
It’s a defeat for Russia and Iran, and it offers openings for Trump.
Extraits:
The weekend collapse at long last of the Assad family regime in Syria is no cause for mourning unless you are the leaders of Russia and Iran. The fall creates risks but also opportunity for a better Syria and a more stable Middle East.
The Kremlin said Sunday that Bashar al-Assad had fled Damascus, and Russian state media reported that he had been granted asylum in Russia. It speaks volumes about Russia that it has become the ultimate protector of the man who murdered more of his own people than even his father, Hafez al-Assad. (…)
It’s worth recalling Barack Obama’s role in keeping Mr. Assad in power. Mr. Obama declined to support the opposition in any important way and then refused to enforce his “red line” against Mr. Assad’s use of sarin and chlorine gas to kill his own people.
Incredibly, Mr. Obama invited Russia to help end the civil war. Vladimir Putin obliged by joining with Iran to prop up Mr. Assad, elbowing the U.S. out, and establishing an air base and a long-desired naval base on the Mediterranean. This misjudgment helped Iran expand its Axis of Resistance from Tehran to Beirut. It also reversed the strategic triumph achieved by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1970s in minimizing the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East.
The fall of the Assad government is a defeat for Russia and Iran. (…)
None of this is the result of President Biden’s foreign policy. Like Mr. Obama, his Middle East priority has been appeasing Iran. (…)
But Israel turned the tables, first by diminishing Hamas in Gaza, then by eliminating Hezbollah’s leadership, and demonstrating it can strike even heavily defended targets in Iran. Tehran’s mullahs couldn’t protect Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar, and now Mr. Assad in Syria. All of this is the result of Israel’s daring and fortitude in self-defense, even in the face of Mr. Biden’s opposition. (…)
Then there is Iran, which may respond to its new weakness by accelerating its nuclear program. The Institute for Science and International Security, run by close Iran-watcher David Albright, said Friday: “From today’s IAEA [U.N nuclear watchdog] update on Iran, it is clear that Iran is instituting a capacity to make weapon grade uranium, under the guise of making 60 percent, at the Fordow underground enrichment plant.”
Mr. Trump will face an early decision on whether to destroy this capacity before Iran gets a nuclear weapon.
Optimism is rarely warranted in the Middle East, but realism and strength can increase deterrence. The Oct. 7 Hamas massacre is turning out to be a miscalculation for the ages, leading to defeats for the forces of Mideast mayhem. Mr. Trump can exploit the opportunities.
Le Figaro, 9 décembre, article payant
Gilles Kepel : « La chute de Bachar el-Assad est la manifestation cruciale d’un bouleversement du monde »
GRAND ENTRETIEN – Des rebelles, menés par des islamistes radicaux, ont annoncé la chute du président syrien et la «libération» de la capitale Damas. Pour le spécialiste de l’islam et du monde arabe contemporain*, cette déroute signe l’effondrement de l’« axe de la résistance antisioniste » dirigé par Téhéran.
*Professeur émérite des universités, Gilles Kepel a récemment publié « Le Bouleversement du monde : l’après-7 Octobre » (Plon, 2024).
Voir « Article du Jour » !
The Jerusalem Post, Opinion, 9 décembre, article payant
The fall of Assad: A message to those who rely on Iran and Russia – opinion
The future of Syria is at a foundational moment. What comes next can always be worse.
Extraits:
(…) The immediate question is – what does this mean for Russia and Iran’s abilities to pursue foreign assets? I previously believed the duo would swoop in to save Assad as they had before, but this time they did very little to save him. While Israel reportedly prevented Iranian aid and troops from reaching Damascus, it is unlikely it was enough to prevent the siege of the capital. Will Western powers move to capitalize on a sense that Iran and Russia are spread too thin?
Iran and Russia spent decades propping up proxy powers across the region, including Assad in Syria. Historically, Iran would deploy Hezbollah from Lebanon to assist the Assad regime, but they were largely dismantled fighting Israel.
Iran also relies on Syria to get arms to Hezbollah. The collapse of Syria cuts Iran off from Hezbollah, unless they travel through northern paths that require passing US military installations or Israeli surveilled zones. Iran is not positioned to take Israel on directly, which is clear based on their inability to reach Syria. Israel should capitalize on this.
Israel can seize the moment by reinforcing the Golan Heights and ensuring all northern passages to Lebanon are severed. Israel must also make clear to the rebel factions controlling the northern border that challenging Israel comes with grave peril. Strategic aerial strikes and military operations can prevent Iran from rearming Hezbollah. (…)
Regarding Russia, it is known that the war in Ukraine has drained its resources. Some estimates suggest Russia has lost over 600,000 men in Ukraine and countless amounts of treasure. If Russia cannot defend its operations in the Middle East, its investments in Libya and across central Africa could become targets. (…)
The argument that Russia being spread thin allowed for the collapse of Syria will be a boost to all who advocate for funding the Ukrainian defense effort. Funding Ukraine against Russia is undeniably better than the US directly combating it, but this shows quantitative results for the investment outside Ukrainian territory. It is in the US’s interest for Russian allies to fail globally from a strategic standpoint. If we can cut Iran off from its proxies in the process, that is an incredible bonus. (…)
The future of Syria is at a foundational moment. What comes next can always be worse. The international community cannot allow Syria to fall into control of Islamic fundamentalists. The easiest way to counter this is to demand Turkey cease its support of the HTS and potentially support the Kurdish forces in the north who have been allies to Israel and the US for decades. Kurdish communities lost tens of thousands fighting ISIS on behalf of Western coalitions; we can support them against attacks from Turkey and remnants of the Assad regime.
I admit I thought Assad’s regime would last longer than a couple of days once the war kicked off again. But what this shows is that Russia and Iran are not positioned to protect one of their longest-standing allies.
Israel and the US can send a message to all who stand under the Iranian-Russian umbrella: They are not your friends and will not save you if you challenge our countries. If done properly, we can reshape global dynamics for decades, but we must be methodical and precise to capitalize on an overexposed enemy.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-832577
The Economist, 9 décembre, article payant
After Assad: Who will rule Syria now the Assad regime has been toppled?
Syrians are hoping for a peaceful transition of power. They may not get it
Extraits:
ON THE ROAD to Damascus from Syria’s border with Lebanon on December 8th, Syrian army posts lay deserted. The asphalt was littered with uniforms left behind by Bashar al-Assad’s forces, who had swiftly changed into civilian clothes and fled from advancing rebels. Posters with the former dictator’s face had been torn and defaced. Less than two weeks after rebels began their advance, the regime had fallen and Mr Assad had fled to Moscow. In Damascus and across the country, Syrians were cheering a fresh start and a reboot of their relations with the world.
What kind of fresh start will they get? Much depends on whether Syria’s multi-pronged opposition, suddenly bereft of its common enemy, will band together to form a pluralist, federal civilian government over all of Syria, or descend into infighting that plunges the country into a new civil war.
The early signs have been encouraging, though it is far too soon to be sure of anything. The rebels, foremost among them Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate that has ruled a slice of north-western Syria for the past few years, say they have learnt the lessons of past regime changes in the Arab world. Unlike in Iraq and Libya, the transition is being managed locally, rather than by foreign powers and returning exiles. Russia and Iran, previously Mr Assad’s main backers, have retreated into the shadows.
The rebels have appealed to the police and civilian authorities to remain in their posts pending the announcement of a unity government. They have imposed a curfew, which by the evening of December 8th appeared mostly to have stopped looting in the capital (the pilfering of crockery from the presidential palace aside). And though most of the rebels are from the Sunni majority that was particularly terrorised by the Alawite Assads, they have toned down their sectarian triumphalism and have promised to protect Syria’s many minorities.
But things in Syria have a habit of getting complicated. The de facto partitioning of Syria that took place under Mr Assad has intensified since his fall. Rebels from the north, east and south of the country co-ordinated their takeover with remarkable discipline in recent days. Yet because Mr Assad’s regime collapsed far faster than they expected, they have not had time to plan for the day after. Each of the four main factions—Turkish-backed Sunni rebels in the north-west, Kurds in the north and east, Jordanian-backed rebels in the south, and the remaining loyalists from Mr Assad’s Alawite sect in the west—has its own army. All of them have been bolstered by the weapons, land and economic holdings seized from the Assads in recent days. Each group will want its share of the spoils and a slice of whatever package is arranged to reconstruct the devastated country, with needs estimated to cost some $200bn.
Within hours of Mr Assad’s fall, the fragile truce between the different groups had begun to break down as fighting flared at Manbij, on the line dividing Turkish-backed Arabs in the north-west from the Kurds in the north-east. (…)
The strongest contender to rule Syria is Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the 42-year-old head of HTS, which launched the rebel offensive from its seat in Idlib in north-western Syria only 11 days ago, on November 27th. Mr Jolani (pictured) has ditched his Islamic nom de guerre (his Telegram channels now refer to him as “President Ahmed al-Shara”), and assured Christians and women that he has no plans to impose strict Islamic codes. On the evening of December 8th he delivered a sermon in the Umayad mosque in Damascus; Syrian state television broadcast a statement in which he claimed that “the future is ours”. He is said to like comparisons to Saudi Arabia’s Muhammad bin Salman, another young Sunni strongman.
But Mr Jolani’s past as al-Qaeda’s leader in Syria and his brutal suppression of rivals makes others wary. (…)
That America, Russia and the UN all regard Mr Jolani as a terrorist and HTS as a terrorist organisation could also complicate things if he does indeed take charge. His close ties with Turkey and Qatar irk Arab powers who want to limit their zone of influence. Some opposition figures talk ominously about how convenient his assassination would be. (…)
Whoever takes charge in Damascus will have trouble controlling all of Syria. (…)
Some hope foreign powers could help the rebels cobble together political and military councils or even a unity government and pave the way for a power-sharing transition. America, though, will probably do little to help. “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT,” Donald Trump wrote in capitals on his social-media account. “LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” After 13 years of civil war and penury, an exhausted population is praying for a peaceful handover that has proved vanishingly rare in the Arab world. With so much division inside and outside Syria, consensus will be hard to find.■
Le Figaro, 9 décembre, article payant
Tahar Ben Jelloun : « Aujourd’hui, Bachar est en fuite comme un pauvre type »
CHRONIQUE. Pour l’écrivain franco-marocain, la chute du régime de Bachar el-Assad, renversé par des rebelles islamistes, constitue une bonne et une mauvaise nouvelle.
Extraits:
Comme au moment de la fuite de Saddam Hussein, le palais de Bachar el-Assad est envahi par les « rebelles libérateurs » d’un pays sous la dictature des el-Assad depuis un demi-siècle. Des images pathétiques.
La fuite ! C’est ce que Bachar a trouvé de mieux pour échapper à un procès qui l’aurait condamné, vu que cet homme a massacré délibérément son peuple qui, au moment du « Printemps arabe », en mars 2011, a manifesté pacifiquement, réclamant la démocratie et la liberté. Bachar a donné l’ordre à son armée de tirer sur les manifestants.
À partir de là, Bachar n’a rien voulu entendre. Une élimination de son peuple a été programmée et mise à exécution. Ce qui s’est traduit par des centaines de milliers de morts et par six millions de réfugiés dans le monde. (…)
Aujourd’hui, ce qui arrive est assez surprenant : une bonne et une mauvaise nouvelle. Bonne, parce que Damas est tombée et que Bachar est en fuite comme un pauvre type, un lâche, un criminel de la pire espèce. Mauvaise, parce que le mouvement « Hayat Tahrir al-Sham » (HTS) agit au nom d’une idéologie islamiste intégriste. Il est composé d’anciens membres d’Al-Qaïda.
Pour le moment, les habitants sortent crier leur joie et leur soulagement, disant : « Ça ne peut pas être pire ! » Ensuite, on ne sait pas ce qui va se passer et surtout comment ce groupe va gouverner un pays blessé, dépeuplé et martyrisé.
The Economist, 8 décembre, article payant
The road to Damascus : The fall of Syria’s dictator
After the rebels’ astonishingly swift advance, Bashar al-Assad has fled
Extraits:
SYRIANS HAVE seen these scenes before: their countrymen tearing down posters of Bashar al-Assad, overrunning his army bases, storming the jails where he keeps political prisoners. But that was ten years ago and more. They had not expected to see them again. And they certainly had not expected what came next: abandoned by his army and his foreign allies, Mr Assad has fled the country. The Syrian dictator’s brutal 24-year reign has come to a sudden end.
His defeat took less than two weeks. (…)
The regime’s ever-shrinking rump state, consisting of Damascus and the coast, was almost totally encircled by the evening of December 7th. Nobody had seen Mr Assad in days. His office claimed that he was still in Damascus, working as usual, but there were no images to confirm it. Many Syrians thought he was long gone. His family was already thought to be in Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). (…)
In a video message hours later Muhammad al-Jalali, the Syrian prime minister, said the regime was prepared to hand control to a transitional government. The army chief told officers that Mr Assad’s reign had ended. There is still no official word on the president’s whereabouts.
Syrians are in shock at the regime’s swift collapse—even though it had looked inevitable for days. (…)
A desperate Mr Assad then tried courting Arab states. Multiple sources say he made a personal appeal to Muhammad bin Zayed, the president of the UAE, who has a well-known hatred of Islamist groups like HTS. He has also begged for help from Egypt, Jordan and other countries. But nobody was willing to help a regime that seemed like a lost cause. “He’s telling everyone he wants to fight,” one well-connected Syrian said of Mr Assad before his fall. “The problem is that no one else wants to fight for him.”
What happens next is impossible to predict. (…) But HTS probably lacks the resources to govern a big, diverse country. (…)
As the rebels advanced on Damascus, officials from Iran, Russia and Turkey met on the sidelines of a conference in Qatar to discuss Syria’s future. They did not agree on much. (…)
Turkey, which has backed the rebels in northern Syria, will have the most influence over how they act. Donald Trump, America’s president-elect, seems content to let others sort out the mess: “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT,” he wrote on social media.
For many Syrians, though, such questions can wait. There is great unease about the future—but greater relief that the end of the Assad regime, which brought so much death and destruction, has finally come. ■
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/07/the-fall-of-syrias-dictator
Le Point, 8 décembre, article payant
« Les Occidentaux doivent tendre la main au nouveau pouvoir en Syrie»
INTERVIEW. Après la chute d’Assad et la prise de Damas par les rebelles islamistes, l’ex-ambassadeur Michel Duclos souligne les risques de la transition dans un pays épuisé par la guerre civile.
Conseiller spécial géopolitique à l’Institut Montaigne, Michel Duclos a été ambassadeur de France à Damas de 2006 à 2009. Il est l’auteur du livre La longue nuit syrienne, 10 années de diplomatie impuissante paru aux Editions de l’Observatoire.
Extraits:
Le Point : Après la « Longue nuit syrienne », pour citer le titre de votre livre, l’aube se lève-t-elle sur la Syrie ?
Michel Duclos : Il y a une chance, mais les choses peuvent encore tourner mal. On ne peut pas exclure un scénario à la libyenne, où les groupes rebelles se divisent. Ou un scénario à l’afghane, où un groupe écrase les autres, là-bas c’était les talibans. Il y a quand même, dans le peuple syrien, un certain degré de maturité politique. Et peut-être aussi que les hommes comptent, et que nous avons dans Ahmed al-Chareh, le chef du groupe Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), un vrai politique. Il a montré qu’il avait su tempérer son islamisme par une ouverture aux minorités et par un gouvernement relativement responsable à Idlib. Il y a des éléments d’espoir d’une reconstitution d’un contrat national syrien. (…)
Qui sont ces rebelles du HTS, qui ont mené l’essentiel de l’offensive sur Damas ces derniers jours ?
Il s’agit d’une filiale d’Al-Qaïda, reconvertie dans un agenda national syrien. Beaucoup de gens s’interrogent sur la sincérité de cette conversion. Pour moi, la rupture avec Al-Qaïda a bien eu lieu et la question serait plutôt de savoir si leur chef a l’étoffe d’un grand homme politique, quelqu’un qui comprend qu’il faut transcender son ADN pour réunir un pays. En outre, bien que l’attention soit focalisée sur lui et son groupe, il faut se souvenir qu’ il y a beaucoup d’autres groupes rebelles, soit directement soutenus par la Turquie, réunis dans ce qu’on appelle l’Armée nationale syrienne, soit au sud, soutenus par les Jordaniens, les Américains…. Ces différentes sensibilités sont-elles capables de s’entendre ? La Syrie est un pays qui n’a pas connu la démocratie ; l’idée de compromis n’est pas évidente. (…)
Comment doivent réagir les Occidentaux ?
Ils doivent sortir de leur incompréhension radicale. Le 1er décembre, la déclaration quadripartite [Etats-Unis, France, Royaume-Uni et Allemagne, ndlr] appelaient à « une désescalade »… Il est nécessaire aujourd’hui que les Occidentaux, et en particulier les Français, qui ont une responsabilité historique vis-à-vis de la Syrie, tendent la main au nouveau pouvoir. Il faut envoyer des signaux, montrer que la France partage la joie des Syriens, la joie de la libération de la Syrie. Même les soutiens d’Assad sont soulagés aujourd’hui ! Il faut saluer les sacrifices de tous les Syriens morts pour la libération de leur pays, la souffrance de toutes les victimes d’un régime criminel entre tous, la foi de tous ceux qui croit encore dans la capacité à revivre de ce pays.
Mais passer d’un dictateur sanguinaire à un pouvoir islamiste, n’est-ce pas troquer un mal contre un autre mal ?
Cela va être le sentiment général. Mais il faut se souvenir que si les rebelles sont devenus islamistes, c’est parce qu’on les a lâchés en 2013. Il ne faut pas renouveler cette erreur ! Au départ, le centre de gravité de la rébellion n’était pas islamiste ; c’est à partir du moment où on les a lâchés que les Syriens se sont tournés vers ceux qui leur apparaissaient comme les plus résistants, les plus hostiles au régime.
Le grand vainqueur régional est-il la Turquie ? Quel est le plan du président Erdogan derrière toute cette opération ?
Je pense que son idée initiale consistait plutôt à infliger une leçon à Assad, et donc de donner un feu vert à Ahmed al-Chareh et à son groupe HTS pour faire le coup de feu à Alep. La prise d’Alep a surpris la Turquie ; j’en veux pour preuve le fait que les groupes qui sont plus directement affiliés à la Turquie, regroupés dans ce qu’on appelle l’Armée nationale syrienne (ANS), au nord-est d’Alep, ne sont intervenus que quelques jours plus tard. Cela laisse penser que les Turcs n’avaient pas planifié tout ce qui s’est passé. (…)
Dans quel état est la Syrie après 13 années de guerre civile ?
Un état épouvantable, où 80 % des habitants vivent dans la pauvreté, souvent dans une pauvreté abjecte. Il y a encore un peu de pétrole, mais il n’y a plus vraiment d’industrie. Les gens survivent grâce à l’argent envoyé de l’étranger par les Syriens exilés. La grande ressource du régime Assad, c’était la drogue captagon. L’une des immenses difficultés à relever pour le nouveau pouvoir, quel qu’il soit, sera de rétablir une économie. Mais il sera peut-être aidé par le fait que beaucoup de Syriens exilés manifestent une grande envie de revenir au pays. https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/les-occidentaux-doivent-tendre-la-main-au-nouveau-pouvoir-en-syrie-08-12-2024-2577441_24.php
The Guardian, 8 décembre, libre accès
Fall of Damascus sidelines Russia and brings Turkey to the fore
As Moscow’s top diplomat reeled in Doha, his Turkish counterpart appeared to know he had the upper hand
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 décembre, article payant
Damaskus ist gefallen: Der Sturz von Bashar al-Asad verändert Syrien und den gesamten Nahen Osten
In atemberaubender Geschwindigkeit haben die islamistischen Rebellen die syrische Hauptstadt erobert. Asad ist offenbar geflohen – auf den Strassen Syriens herrschen Freude und Ungewissheit. Für die Region bedeutet das eine Zeitenwende.
Extraits:
(…) Der Vormarsch markiert eine neue Ära: In atemberaubender Geschwindigkeit haben die Rebellen die Herrschaft der Familie Asad gestürzt, die das Land seit 54 Jahren unterdrückt hat. Bashars Vater Hafiz al-Asad hatte sich im Jahr 1970 in Damaskus an die Macht geputscht und Syrien ebenfalls jahrzehntelang mit eiserner Faust regiert.
Nun haben die Rebellen geschafft, was ihnen im Jahr 2011 nicht gelungen ist. Als damals der Arabische Frühling Syrien erreichte, antwortete Asad auf die Forderungen nach Reformen mit unfassbarer Gewalt und setzte in den Jahren darauf auch Giftgas gegen seine eigene Bevölkerung ein. Das Resultat war ein blutiger Bürgerkrieg, in dessen Folge Hunderttausende Menschen vertrieben wurden und unter anderem der Islamische Staat die Macht in einigen Teilen des Landes übernahm.
Mit ausländischer Hilfe konnte sich Asad allerdings wieder fangen: Russland, Iran und der libanesische Hizbullah gaben Asad Schützenhilfe im Krieg gegen das eigene Volk. Doch die Schutzmächte des Autokraten haben nicht mehr die Kraft, die Schreckensherrschaft Asads zu stützen. Russland hielt sich bis auf wenige Luftangriffe im Nordwesten Syriens aus den Kämpfen heraus. Iran hatte jüngst einige Militärberater geschickt, die aber laut der «New York Times» schon am Freitag wieder abgezogen wurden. Für beide Mächte ist der Verlust Syriens ein schwerer Schlag. (…)
Im Rest der arabischen Welt hat der rasante Fall Asads vor allem Besorgnis ausgelöst. Man wolle bloss kein weiteres Chaos, wiederholen etwa Vertreter vom Golf in privaten Gesprächen. Auch deshalb hatten sich die Golfstaaten dem einst verhassten Asad in letzter Zeit wieder angenähert und versucht, ihn mit Versprechen und Hilfen gefügig zu machen. (…)
Jetzt blicken sie skeptisch in die Zukunft. Gerade in Abu Dhabi oder Riad gelten die protürkischen Islamisten der HTS als alles andere denn als vertrauenswürdige Partner. (…)
In Syrien herrscht derweil Ekstase, gemischt mit Ungewissheit. (…)
Die Rebellen der HTS hatten sich in den letzten Jahren einen moderateren Anstrich verliehen. Ihr Anführer, Mohammed al-Julani, hat seinen Bart gestutzt und zeichnet seine Dekrete nun mit seinem zivilen Namen Ahmed al-Sharaa. Am Sonntagmorgen verbot er seinen Kämpfern, die Institutionen des Staates in Damaskus gewaltsam einzunehmen. Diese sollten vom bisherigen Ministerpräsidenten in einem geordneten Prozess übergeben werden. Auch Freudenschüsse in die Luft sind offenbar verboten. (…)
In Syrien hat am Sonntagmorgen die Stunde null geschlagen: Es ist völlig offen, wer auf Asad folgt und ob das Land nicht von neuem in blutigen Kämpfen versinkt, die entlang konfessionellen Grenzen ausgetragen werden. Klar ist beispielsweise, dass die kleine Minderheit der Alawiten, aus der Asad stammt, über ein Ende der Herrschaft ihres Schutzherrn nicht glücklich sein wird.
Doch auch im alawitischen Kernland, etwa in der Hafenstadt Latakia, brach am Sonntag vereinzelt Jubel auf den Strassen aus. Dass Damaskus ohne Blutvergiessen fiel, ist ebenfalls ein Hoffnungsschimmer: Ein langer Kampf um die Hauptstadt hätte den Bürgerkrieg neu entfachen können. «Ich hoffe auf eine neue Verfassung und freie Wahlen», sagt Anas al-Rawi. Noch fühle sich das allerdings sehr weit entfernt an, und die Begeisterung überschatte alles. «Ich hätte nie gedacht, dass ich die Stunde null noch erleben darf.»
New York Times, 8 décembre, article payant
Syrians Mourn All They Have Lost, Even as They Celebrate
Thoughts of loved ones dead or missing complicate joyous relief at the prospect of an end to the rule of Bashar al-Assad.
Extraits:
Even as many Syrians celebrated the rebels’ advance into Damascus on Sunday morning, they were reminded of all they had lost over 13 years of civil war.
The loved ones who were killed, tortured or disappeared into the regime’s labyrinthine prison system. The homes they lost to airstrikes and shelling. The lives they had to abandon.
“Thank God, thank God,” said Eman Ouad, whose husband was killed in the civil war. Her voice was close to breaking.
“Our freedom has returned,” said Ms. Ouad, 44, who was displaced from her home in Damascus and now lives in Syria’s northwest. “Thirteen years of subjugation. Thirteen years of displacement.” (…)
hmed al-Misilmani, a journalist, said he ran onto his balcony yelling for joy when he saw reports that President Bashar al-Assad was fleeing the country. At the same time, he was thinking of friends who had been imprisoned at Sednaya, a prison notorious for torture and mass executions.
“We hope to God they are still alive,” said Mr. al-Misilmani, who was displaced from his home near the city of Homs six years ago. (…)
Anas Khoury, 24, an opposition activist who fled his Damascus suburb with his wife after a 2013 chemical attack, said he was scanning lists of prisoners freed from Sednaya. His brother was detained there in 2011, and the family does not know if he is still alive.
Mr. Khoury said he was struggling to express his sense of shock at the latest twists in a conflict that has created so much upheaval for his family. His children were born in Idlib and don’t know their grandparents.
“They were born in displacement,” he said. “They were born among the tents.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-eyewitness-assad.html
The Economist, 7 décembre, article payant
Closing in: Syria’s Bashar al-Assad is in mortal danger
Whether he survives may depend not on his allies but on his one-time foes
Extraits:
NOT EVEN the Syrian rebels themselves thought they would be so successful. When they began a surprise offensive in northern Syria on November 27th, they found Bashar al-Assad’s regime in disarray. His troops fled. Within days the insurgents had captured Aleppo, Syria’s second city. The advance slowed around Hama, 120km to the south—but did not stop. On December 5th the rebels reportedly took the city (see map). For the first time in a decade, Mr Assad’s rule looks vulnerable. (…)
After Hama, HTS’s next goal will be Homs, 50km farther south. A victory there would sever the main road linking Damascus to the coast, the heartland of Mr Assad’s Alawite sect. That would make it extremely difficult for the regime to defend and resupply the capital.
At the same time, rebels are also consolidating their control around Aleppo. (…)
All this is a reminder of just how maddeningly complex the Syrian conflict has become—and that is before you get to foreign powers. Mr Assad was thought to be in Moscow when the rebel offensive began, returning to Damascus over the weekend. On December 1st Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, paid him a visit. The Syrian president is pleading with Russia and Iran, his two closest allies, to help him push back the rebel offensive.
Over the past week Russian jets have bombed Idlib and Aleppo. But Russia’s ability to help is limited. (…) But Russia’s presence in Syria has shrunk since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Even at its peak, its role was that of a force multiplier: helping the regime plan military operations and offering air support, surveillance, logistics and intelligence. It preferred to leave most of the ground fighting to others. (…)
Iran supplied much of the cannon fodder, but it too has been diminished. Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shia militia it supports, has been battered by a year of war with Israel. It cannot deploy thousands of fighters to help Mr Assad as it did a decade ago. Iran itself has endured a year of Israeli strikes on its military infrastructure in Syria. (…)
A few weeks ago, Mr Assad might have felt confident. Most Arab states had restored diplomatic ties with him; some were even lobbying America to lift sanctions on his regime. Russia thought it could convince Donald Trump to withdraw American troops from eastern Syria.
The precipitous reversal was predictable. Mr Assad’s regime has been hollowed out by years of war and corruption. Syria’s economy has collapsed: unemployment is high, inflation higher. The army is full of young men press-ganged into long service for low pay. Mr Assad might find loyalists willing to fight for their own villages, especially in Alawite areas. But his army is too demoralised to do much more than that.
He may hope that a deal will save him. (…) Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, instead seeks a deal with the Syrian dictator to send back millions of Syrian refugees and establish a buffer zone that will push the SDF away from the border.
For months Mr Erdogan has tried to negotiate such an agreement, only to be rebuffed: Mr Assad does not make concessions to anyone. (Indeed, his stubbornness has even irritated Vladimir Putin.) Now, though, his position is far weaker. The fall of Aleppo gives Turkey a larger buffer zone than it could have imagined. Mr Erdogan may hope this will let him dictate terms—and that Mr Assad, desperate to save what remains of his rump state, will have no choice but to accept them. ■
Wall Street Journal, Editorial, 6 décembre, article payant
The Propaganda War on Israel Never Stops
Amnesty International lends its once-good name to the genocide lie.
Extraits:
From the people who brought you “Israeli apartheid” comes another trendy smear: “Israeli genocide.” With a new report Wednesday night, Amnesty International assures its good standing in the anti-Israel herd. The price is to swallow an inversion of reality.
Amnesty poses as a fair-minded critic of Israeli policies, but it tipped its hand in its 2022 report that tried to claim “this system of apartheid originated with the creation of Israel in May 1948.” That’s well before any “occupation,” but it reflects the ideological obsession that treats the Jewish state’s existence, in any borders, as a crime.
Amnesty’s headline-grabbing apartheid report quietly conceded it wasn’t arguing Israel’s laws are analogous to South Africa’s. This new report uses a similar sleight of hand by redefining genocide. The case law at the International Court of Justice requires a finding that “intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, must be the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the pattern of conduct.” Amnesty says that’s too high a bar and looks at the “broader picture” and “context.”
By context it means apartheid and all its previous slanders of Israel. What about Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, which was genocidal in character? Here’s the report’s opening line: “On 7 October 2023, Israel embarked on a military offensive on the occupied Gaza Strip (Gaza) of unprecedented magnitude, scale and duration.”
Gaza wasn’t occupied, and Hamas, not Israel, embarked on a military offensive. But Amnesty says it will get to the Hamas mass murder later. Here it uses the Oct. 7 massacre to pathologize the Israeli “state of mind resulting from the attacks.”
While Amnesty uses the casualty figures of the “Gaza-based Ministry of Health,” aka Hamas, it never mentions that Israel says 17,000 dead Hamas fighters are among them. It omits the crucial civilian-to-combatant ratio, which would suggest Israel has done better than most in urban warfare.
The report essentially blesses Hamas’s strategy of using human shields. It suggests Israel has no right to attack in civilian areas even if Hamas is using them, just as it wouldn’t if some enemy soldiers had gone home on leave. As if that’s equivalent to terrorist headquarters in hospitals and a 400-mile, terrorist-only tunnel system beneath cities.
Amnesty even criticizes Israel for evacuating civilians from active war zones. This, too, becomes evidence of “genocidal intent” because it displaces the civilians. (…)
Not one of the groups yelling genocide calls on Egypt to let women and children escape to safety by opening its border with Gaza. Uniquely in this conflict, they insist that civilians be penned in the war zone. They do so because they know there isn’t an Israeli genocide but rather unintended civilian casualties, which can be used against Israel.
New York Times, 6 décembre, article payant
Trump Could Take Us to War With Iran. But He Could Also Broker Peace, by John Ghazvinian
Dr. Ghazvinian is executive director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania.
Article intégral: https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/6-decembre.pdf
Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/opinion/trump-iran-war-peace.html
Wall Street Journal, 4 décembre, article payant
Trump, Biden and Hamas’s Hostages
The President-elect threatens those holding Americans in Gaza.
Extraits:
One of President Biden’s failures has been his reluctance to speak up about the Americans held hostage by Hamas since Oct. 7, 2023. He rarely mentions them, and when he does it’s usually to criticize Israel’s government for not agreeing to a cease-fire with Hamas that would cause the terrorists to release them.
On Monday Donald Trump signaled he’ll pursue a different strategy. “Everybody is talking about the hostages who are being held so violently, inhumanely, and against the will of the entire World, in the Middle East – But it’s all talk, and no action!” Mr. Trump said on Truth Social.
“Please let this TRUTH serve to represent that if the hostages are not released prior to” when he returns to the White House, “there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity,” he added. “Those responsible will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America. RELEASE THE HOSTAGES NOW!”
Call that bombastic if you want, and Mr. Trump would have to follow through on his threat if Hamas doesn’t act by Jan. 20. But at least he’s demanding that Hamas release the hostages it kidnapped, rather than leaning on Israel, which has agreed to cease-fire terms Hamas has refused. (…)
The terror group on Saturday released a propaganda video of 20-year-old Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander. The Israel Defense Forces said Monday it has confirmed that another Israeli-American, 21-year-old Cpt. Omer Neutra, was killed in the Oct. 7 massacre; his body remains in Gaza. Three Americans are still believed to be alive in Gaza’s dungeons: Mr. Alexander, Sagui Dekel-Chen and Keith Siegel. Hamas is the source of their suffering.
The Guardian, 3 décembre, libre accès
Israel responds to Hezbollah rocket attack with airstrikes on south Lebanon
Bombing comes an hour after Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed a ‘strong’ response to Hezbollah’s action
The Economist, 2 décembre, article payant
Frozen no more : Syrian rebels sweep into Aleppo in an embarrassing rout for Bashar al-Assad
The Syrian dictator will not be able to count on help from Russia and Iran, his closest allies
Extraits:
FOUR YEARS is how long it took Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator, to retake Aleppo after part of the city fell to insurgents in 2012. Less than four days is how long it took him to lose it. On November 27th rebels launched a surprise offensive in north-west Syria. By the night of November 29th they were posting photos of themselves at the ancient citadel in the heart of Aleppo. Most of Syria’s second city is now under their control. It was a rout: Mr Assad’s army seems to have simply turned tail.
The front lines in Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011 with Mr Assad’s brutal suppression of protests against his regime and has since killed more than half a million people and displaced some 13m, had been largely frozen since 2020. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a mainly Kurdish militia backed by America, ran the north-east, while factions aligned with Turkey governed a slice of the north-west. The rest of the country was Mr Assad’s rump state, which he controlled with help from Russia and Iran. A fragile agreement between Russia and Turkey kept those lines fixed.
No longer. (…)
Though the start of the offensive was a surprise, HTS has spent years preparing for it. (…)
The timing was no coincidence. When Mr Assad retook Aleppo in 2016, he needed lots of help. Russia provided air power. Thousands of ground troops came from Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shia militia, and a constellation of other groups backed by Iran. He cannot count on such help this time. Hizbullah has been mauled by a year of war with Israel: it has lost most of its leadership and an estimated 4,000 fighters. Iran has lost many of its top commanders in Syria to Israeli air strikes. (…)
As for Russia, it withdrew thousands of troops from Syria after it invaded Ukraine in 2022. It is also frustrated with Mr Assad’s refusal to reconcile with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president. Its official statements sounded almost nonchalant as rebels closed in on Aleppo. (…)
The Syrian army has been hollowed out by years of war, corruption and economic collapse. Many of its conscripts have little motivation to defend the regime—hence the swift collapse in Aleppo. (…)
What will happen next? One question is what other powers in the north will do. Turkey seems to have encouraged its Syrian partners to launch this offensive. Will it go further, and offer to help them hold the areas they have seized? Meanwhile, there have already been reports of clashes between the Turkish-backed rebel groups and the SDF, which Turkey regards as a terrorist organisation.
Another is how HTS will behave in the areas it now controls. (…)
That points to a third question: whether other parts of Syria will now revolt. (…)
Whatever comes next, the fall of Aleppo is a humiliation for Mr Assad and his allies. It is also a remarkable example of the law of unintended consequences. When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th 2023, it hoped to have the support of Iran and its allied militias. Instead it started a sequence of events that left those militias too battered to defend Mr Assad, who now finds himself at his most vulnerable for many years.■
Wall Street Journal, 2 décembre, Guest Essay, article payant
Benny Gantz : Why the Hezbollah Cease-Fire Falls Short
Without effective and reliable international involvement, the Israel Defense Forces will end up back in Lebanon.
Extraits:
The lesson of Oct. 7, 2023, is that Israel must be uncompromising and proactive when it comes to protecting itself. Underpinning the current, temporary cease-fire arrangement with Hezbollah is the strong likelihood that Israel will be forced to return to another painful and costly round of fighting in Lebanon. A sustainable agreement must not only address the threat from Hezbollah and promise effective and reliable international involvement, but it must be clear about the source of regional instability: the Iranian regime. (…)
Hamas launched the most lethal attack on Jews since the Holocaust on Oct. 7. The next day, Hezbollah, backed by its Iranian patrons, decided to join the war. Since Oct. 8, Israel and its people have endured nearly 20,000 rockets and hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles launched from Lebanon. Nearly 70,000 of Israel’s citizens have been displaced. Dozens have been murdered, among them 12 Druze children. As a result, the IDF had to return to Southern Lebanon to neutralize the same threat behind which I had personally shut the gates nearly a quarter of a century earlier.
What Israel uncovered this time was another Oct. 7-like attack poised for launch: terror tunnels within sight of Israeli towns ready to unleash hundreds of Radwan terrorists as well as missile silos and weapon caches embedded in Lebanese homes close to the border. All of it set for deployment on command.
Hezbollah has been holding the state and people of Lebanon hostage for decades. (…)
Unlike the Iranian regime, which seeks to subjugate Lebanon and exploit its people, Israel seeks to coexist with its neighbor to the north. Israel’s wars have always been waged against Hezbollah and other terror organizations—never against the people of Lebanon.
History ultimately remembers those brave enough to capitalize on opportunities—Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, King Hussein of Jordan, Emirati President Mohammed Bin Zayed, Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI. A new, moderate Middle East is developing with U.S. leadership and Israeli economic and military strength. Lebanon can be a part of it.
Mr. Gantz, chairman of the National Unity party, was Israel’s minister of defense, 2020-22.
The Economist, 30 novembre, article payant
The Palestinian question : A broader peace is within Israel’s grasp, say Tamir Pardo and Nimrod Novik
A former Mossad director and former foreign-policy adviser on an offer not to be refused
Extraits:
THIS WEEK’S ceasefire in Lebanon is to be welcomed. But its resilience is to be questioned, because it changes nothing of the fundamentals of the conflict. What could change those fundamentals—what should—is a peaceful offer, made in September and so far ignored, from a coalition of 57 Arab and Muslim countries.
Israel’s political leadership is strategically paralysed, unable to translate military successes into transformative post-war realities. True, Israel’s armed forces have shown impressive intelligence and operational abilities against Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah. Yet even with a tentative ceasefire in Lebanon, Israel faces adversaries on six other fronts—Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran and the West Bank. For well over a decade Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s governments have addressed each of these challenges in isolation. Meanwhile they steadfastly ignore the thread that connects many of them: the Palestinian issue. (…)
Similar analysis regarding Israel’s other potential peace partners leads to the same conclusion: Israel’s conduct on the Palestinian issue—before the Hamas atrocities of a year ago but certainly more so with the massive casualties and destruction of the ensuing war—strains relations with Egypt and with the signatories of the Abraham accords. None has yet cut diplomatic relations, but several have withdrawn ambassadors, suspended business ventures or curtailed bilateral communications. The only beneficiaries of Israel’s hostilities towards Palestinians are its enemies, principally Iran.
Ultimately Israel’s leadership needs a broad strategy that accounts for both regional security challenges and the Palestinian question. Despite its military capabilities, Israel is a small country that needs alliances, especially given that tensions with Iran could escalate, in particular should Israel feel forced to neutralise an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear programme. (…)
That is why ignoring the offer by a powerful camp—a Muslim-Arab coalition stretching from Malaysia and Indonesia through Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to Tunisia and Morocco—is astonishing. It promises full relations with Israel in the wake of a Palestinian-Israeli accord. As Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, put it in September, “All of us are willing to guarantee the security of Israel in the context of Israel ending the occupation and allowing for the emergence of a Palestinian state. We want a peace in which Israel lives in peace and security, accepted, normalised with all Arab countries.” The group includes rich countries and military powers that jointly offer Israel a partnership in three missions.
The first is to end the war in Gaza and bring Israeli hostages home. Then, a regional-international coalition hostile to Hamas stands ready to assist the PA in governing Gaza. The second is to support the reform of the PA, ushering in a path to dignity and self-determination for young Palestinians as an alternative to the terrorist ideology of Hamas. The third is to integrate Israel into a regional coalition that contributes to the prosperity of all its partners and builds a regional security framework that checks Iran’s violent ambitions.
None of these missions can be realised without a sea change in Israel’s Palestinian policy. And key players among those 57 states will not wait idly for Israel to get its act together. Should Israel continue on its current trajectory—towards an open-ended occupation of Gaza, further entrenchment of West Bank annexation and offending the world’s 2bn Muslims by continued Judaisation of Islam’s third-holiest shrine—these countries will form alliances without it.
One can only hope that soon the severity of the current multi-front crisis and the government’s failure to address it will force a national moment of clarity about the offer on the table. Israel’s security requires an alternative leadership that will develop a sober strategy and a bold, peace-oriented national agenda. ■
Tamir Pardo is a former director of Mossad. He is a member of the leadership of Commanders for Israel’s Security, a movement of former Israeli security officials.
Nimrod Novik was a senior adviser to Prime Minister Shimon Peres and a special ambassador. He is a member of the leadership of Commanders for Israel’s Security and a fellow at the Israel Policy Forum, a think-tank.
The Jerusalem Post, Opinion, 28 novembre, article payant
Most Mideast autocrats welcome President-elect Trump – opinion
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the first leaders to congratulate Trump.
Extraits:
Throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Iran and its proxies, there was a collective sigh of relief at the reelection of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Given the choice between a Democratic administration led by Kamala Harris and a second Trump term, many in the region favored the latter, based on prior experience with Trump and his statements since leaving office.
For the region’s autocratic regimes – again, with the exception of Iran and its proxies – a Trump administration is preferable because, unlike the Democrats, he does not view human rights as an obstacle to maintaining relations. Leaders such as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden, at various points, balanced their policies not only with national interests but also with liberal values.
While they did not expect these regimes to transform into democracies overnight, especially after the results of the Arab Spring, they promoted a spectrum of more liberal approaches toward minorities and opposition groups, as seen, for example, in Jordan.
Currently, no fewer than 10 Middle Eastern states rank in the bottom 20 of the 2024 Global Index of Freedom and Democracy, with another seven in the next two deciles. The trend is unmistakable.
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the first leaders to congratulate Trump. (…)
Morocco has similarly extended its congratulations to Trump, who became the first US president to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara – an acknowledgment exchanged for Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel.
In the Gulf, Arab states are also pleased by Trump’s return. His first foreign trip in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, where he signed over $100 billion in deals, though it remains unclear how fully these were realized.
More significantly, Trump’s past firm stance on Iran aligns well with Saudi interests. Although Riyadh struggled with the administration’s lack of response to the 2019 Houthi drone attack on the Aramco oil fields, Trump’s position is still viewed as more assertive than that of the Democrats.
The Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel. Trump, along with his son-in-law Jared Kushner, laid much of the groundwork for the 2020 Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, leading many to believe his administration could further this process. Netanyahu has also expressed enthusiastic support for Trump’s return, calling it “the greatest comeback in history.” Israel, often regarded as the region’s only democracy, echoes the reaction of its autocratic neighbors, perhaps for similar reasons.
However, the cost of normalization for Saudi Arabia has risen since the Israel-Hamas War began: they now seek the establishment of a viable Palestinian entity, if not an outright state – something Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to offer. The UAE and Bahrain would also welcome such steps, and both, along with Egypt, remain supportive of Trump.
CONVERSELY, IRAN and its allies are apprehensive about Trump’s return. (…)
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-831049
The Economist, 28 novembre, article payant
Ceasefire at last : Peace in Lebanon is just a start
Donald Trump must build on Joe Biden’s belated success
Extraits :
AT LAST, A flicker of hope. The ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah, which took effect on November 27th, brings respite to millions of Lebanese and Israelis. It ends a war of nearly 14 months that Hizbullah, a Shia militia, no doubt regrets having started. It gives Israel much of what it sought, including a right to strike if Hizbullah re-arms. America, meanwhile, has a responsibility for monitoring compliance.
But this agreement is just a start. It offers only a promise that Hizbullah will be disarmed, and such pledges have often been broken. The reason to hope that this time will be different is that Hizbullah has been much diminished and will struggle to regain its former strength.
It was a rare success for America’s diplomats, who have often looked feeble since October 7th 2023. (…)
Donald Trump was an encouragement, too. Iran may be keen to negotiate with him, which would have been impossible while Hizbullah was shooting at Israel. Iran now has an incentive to restrain its militia, at least for a while. As for Mr Netanyahu, he is also eager to stay in the president-elect’s good graces. Ending the war in Lebanon is a welcome gesture towards Mr Trump, who campaigned on doing just that. (…)
more. It may seem that the region’s two wars have been separated and, with Lebanon becalmed, Gaza is now just an isolated conflict. That is an illusion. Any path to a grand bargain of the sort Mr Trump’s aides are keen to pursue must begin in the ruins of Gaza.
Far-right Israeli lawmakers see Mr Trump’s second term as a golden opportunity to rebuild Jewish settlements in the narrow Gaza Strip that were dismantled in 2005. They are also keen to annex parts of the West Bank, thus precluding a future Palestinian state. Allowing this would be a disaster, not only for Palestinians but also for Mr Trump’s regional agenda. (…)
Mr Trump will need to dampen the impulses of Israel’s coalition (and of his own Republican Party). At the same time, he can help strengthen the ceasefire in Lebanon. He should offer to negotiate with Iran but make clear that shipping arms to Hizbullah would instantly end such talks.
Joe Biden has dismally failed to use American leverage in the Middle East. He promised there would be no daylight between America and Israel, even as Mr Netanyahu defied him time after time. He kept Iran under sanctions that he failed to enforce. No side took him seriously, since there seemed to be no consequences for resisting America. Mr Trump will need to be tougher—and remember to use his leverage on America’s regional allies, not only its foes. ■
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/11/27/peace-in-lebanon-is-just-a-start
New York Times, 28 novembre, article payant
A Battered and Diminished Hezbollah Accepts a Cease-Fire
Thirteen months of war left Hezbollah weakened, isolated and desperate for a way to stop the fighting.
Extraits :
For years, Hezbollah told the Lebanese that it alone could defend them from Israel. It boasted of powerful weapons and hardened commandos who would unleash deadly “surprises” if war broke out. And it assured its followers that a regional alliance of militias supported by Iran would jump in to support it in battle.
Those myths have now been shattered.
After 13 months of war, Hezbollah entered a cease-fire with Israel on Wednesday that it will struggle to convince anyone, other than its most fervent loyalists, is not in fact a defeat.
The 60-day truce, which is supposed to lay the groundwork for a more lasting cease-fire, comes after three months of withering Israeli attacks that have thrown the organization into disarray.
Deep intelligence infiltration enabled Israel to assassinate many senior leaders, including Hezbollah’s secretary general of 32 years, Hassan Nasrallah. Israel bombarded the group’s most loyal communities, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee and blowing up dozens of villages, ensuring that many people have no homes to immediately return to.
And Hezbollah’s fateful decision to consult no one before firing rockets at Israel, setting off a conflict that grew into Lebanon’s most deadly war in decades, has left it isolated in the country and in the wider Middle East, with Lebanon facing an exorbitant bill for reconstruction.
Many of Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon and elsewhere hope that the war has weakened it enough that it will no longer be able to impose its will on the country’s political system. But it remains unclear whether Lebanon’s other parties will now feel empowered to stand against it.
Hezbollah still has many thousands of fighters in Lebanon and commands the loyalty of a large share of the country’s Shiite Muslims.
After the cease-fire took hold on Wednesday, thousands of them poured back into Beirut’s southern suburbs to inspect the damage. Many honked their horns, waved yellow Hezbollah flags and said the fact that Hezbollah survived amounted to a win.
“Morale is high and there is victory,” said Osama Hamdan, who was cleaning out the shop where he sells water pumps. His family’s apartment had been damaged and would cost more than $5,000 to fix so they could move back in, he said. (…)
At the height of its power before the war, it was perceived to be such a military threat that Israel and the United States feared that a war with the group could set the region ablaze and devastate Israel.
But as the war escalated, Hezbollah’s allies failed to come to its aid in any effective way, undermining the credibility of Iran’s network. And Israel stepped up its attacks so fast — incapacitating thousands of Hezbollah members by detonating wireless devices and heavily bombing their communities — that Hezbollah found itself unable to mount a response close to what it had threatened for years. (…)
Hezbollah began firing on Israel in solidarity with Hamas after that group’s deadly attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. For months, as Israel and Hezbollah exchanged fire across the Israel-Lebanon border, Hezbollah’s leaders swore that the battle would end only when Israel stopped attacking Gaza.
That demand is nowhere to be found in the new cease-fire, leaving Israel free to continue its quest to destroy Hamas. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/27/world/middleeast/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire.html
Wall Street Journal, 27 novembre, article payant
Hezbollah’s Cease-Fire Is a Victory for Israel
Iran’s Lebanese proxy staggers out of the fight, leaving Hamas alone in Gaza.
Extraits :
Israeli hard power has secured what 11 months of soft words from Biden envoys could not: Hezbollah’s agreement to abandon Hamas. Iran’s terrorist proxy in Lebanon resumed firing rockets at Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, and it had pledged to continue until Israel conceded to Hamas’s demands. Tuesday’s cease-fire deal marks Hezbollah and Iran’s retreat under fire from that pledge.
The deal is no panacea, and it may prove fragile. Some fighting could restart as Hezbollah tries to rearm in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces have agreed to prevent that, with a U.S.-led committee adjudicating compliance. But behind these polite fictions and paper commitments lies the real achievement of the war: a change in the balance of power.
Hezbollah had been deterring Israel. Even as the terrorists expanded their arsenal, fired on northern Israeli towns and ultimately forced more than 60,000 Israelis from their homes, Israel feared escalation. (…)
But once Israel took the initiative with air strikes and daring sabotage, Hezbollah couldn’t deliver on its threats. Israel suffered little damage after it killed Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and tore through its chain of command. Israel lost 80 soldiers, but the ground invasion cleared weapons stores and tunnels in the border villages.
“Only three months ago, this all would have sounded like science fiction.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday. His former defense minister, Israel’s military leadership and the Biden Administration had all pushed for a deal before the escalation, with Hezbollah at the height of its power. “This is no longer the same Hezbollah,” Mr. Netanyahu said. “We set it back decades.” (…)
The agreement is unpopular among the Israeli government’s supporters and is a political gamble for Mr. Netanyahu. Yet he brought along his right-wing partners, in defiance of their base. Meanwhile, the moderate opposition leaders preferred by President Biden now call the cease-fire a sellout.
If the deal survives the 60-day transition period, Israel will be able to greet the second Trump Presidency with Iran newly vulnerable, Hamas isolated in Gaza, and a major diplomatic opportunity for a deal with Saudi Arabia. Second-guessed at every point, Israel has fought through to its strongest strategic position in at least a decade.
The Economist, 27 novembre, article payant
A ceasefire in the Middle East : Israel and Hizbullah strike a fragile deal to end their war
Joe Biden’s last roll of the dice on peace in the Middle East
Extraits :
IT HARDLY LOOKED as if a truce was imminent. The afternoon of November 26th saw Israel launch dozens of air strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, some of the heaviest bombardment this year. Then the Israeli army told people to evacuate the heart of the Lebanese capital, an area where Hizbullah, a Shia militia, has no armed presence. Traffic jams stretched for kilometres as panicked residents fled.
Even as bombs fell on Beirut, though, the Israeli cabinet met to approve a ceasefire that would end its 14-month war against Hizbullah. The next few hours were tightly choreographed. Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, told Israelis about the deal in a televised speech. Then came an announcement from Joe Biden, the American president. The Lebanese cabinet was not expected to meet until the next morning, but its vote will be little more than a formality.
IT HARDLY LOOKED as if a truce was imminent. The afternoon of November 26th saw Israel launch dozens of air strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, some of the heaviest bombardment this year. Then the Israeli army told people to evacuate the heart of the Lebanese capital, an area where Hizbullah, a Shia militia, has no armed presence. Traffic jams stretched for kilometres as panicked residents fled.
Even as bombs fell on Beirut, though, the Israeli cabinet met to approve a ceasefire that would end its 14-month war against Hizbullah. The next few hours were tightly choreographed. Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, told Israelis about the deal in a televised speech. Then came an announcement from Joe Biden, the American president. The Lebanese cabinet was not expected to meet until the next morning, but its vote will be little more than a formality.
The deal, which took effect at 4am local time on November 27th, calls for a 60-day halt to the fighting. During that period Hizbullah will move its fighters north of the Litani river, about 30km from the border with Israel, which will gradually withdraw its own forces from south Lebanon. The Lebanese army will deploy around 5,000 soldiers to the region. All of this will be monitored by a panel of five countries, led by America. Israel will retain the right to strike at “immediate threats” in Lebanon.
Both sides have good reason to end the war. (…)
A year of combat, both in Lebanon and in Gaza, has placed enormous strain on the Israeli army. (…)
As for Hizbullah, its leadership has been largely wiped out this year, including Hassan Nasrallah, its charismatic boss for more than three decades. It has lost much of its advanced missile arsenal and its military infrastructure in south Lebanon. Those losses will only mount if the war drags on. Most Lebanese did not want it to begin in the first place and are desperate for it to end.
But both sides also have concerns about the deal. The fear in Israel is a repeat of 2006: its previous war against Hizbullah ended with UN Resolution 1701, which called for the militia to disarm. Hizbullah ignored that edict and the Lebanese army, which was meant to patrol the region south of the Litani, was too weak to enforce it. Some Israeli politicians fear that this agreement will prove equally hollow. (…)
The Lebanese army is still weak. Five years into an economic crisis that bankrupted the Lebanese state, many soldiers moonlight as taxi drivers to supplement monthly salaries that are worth as little as $100. The army will need donations from Western and Arab backers to recruit and equip more troops. Even with financial help, it is unclear if Lebanese troops will be willing and able to confront Hizbullah. (…)
The five-country monitoring panel is meant to review alleged violations of the agreement. If the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers fail to act, Israel says it will. “The length of the ceasefire depends on what happens in Lebanon,” said Mr Netanyahu.
Many Lebanese will be unable to return home. The World Bank estimates the war has caused $8.5bn in damage and economic losses, more than one-third of Lebanon’s GDP. Close to 1m people have been displaced and around 100,000 homes have been damaged. Entire villages in the south have been razed. The state cannot afford to do much reconstruction.
Yet for all the caveats, the ceasefire is a rare bit of good news. (…)
Mr Netanyahu has very different incentives in Gaza. His far-right allies dream of rebuilding the settlements that were evacuated in 2005 and have vowed to bring down the coalition if Israel withdraws. (…)
For more than a year, Hizbullah insisted it would not stop fighting Israel until Israel stopped fighting in Gaza. Israel has now broken the link between the two fronts. That will take some of the pressure off its overstretched army. By ending one war, Mr Netanyahu may make it easier to continue the other. ■
Haaretz, 27 novembre, article payant
Merkel Slams Netanyahu in Memoir for ‘Completely Undermining’ Two-state Solution
Ex-German Chancellor Angela Merkel has harsh words for Benjamin Netanyahu in her new book, but is complimentary toward another Israeli premier, Ehud Olmert
Extraits :
(…) In her account of foreign policy, Merkel focuses primarily on Russia and the United States, offering brief mentions of countries like France and China while largely overlooking the Middle East – except for Israel.
In a chapter dedicated to the Jewish state, Merkel writes about her first visit as a minister in 1991 through to her last as chancellor in 2021.
She reflects on her relations with Israel and the political figures she interacted with, mostly Shimon Peres, Ehud Olmert, Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett.
She writes that she “liked” Olmert, describing him as “direct and to the point,” and that he was “genuinely” committed to a two-state solution and that he had convinced her for the German army to participate in UNIFIL peacekeeping missions after the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
Merkel emphasizes her support for such a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, noting that it required Israel to have the strength to make painful concessions, such as halting settlement expansion.
From 2009 onward, however, she writes that the differences with Netanyahu became insurmountable. “We could only agree on the formula ‘We agree to disagree,'” she writes. Merkel further criticizes him, noting that although he “sometimes mentioned the words two-state solution,” in practice “he did nothing for it.” Through settlement construction in the West Bank, she argues, Netanyahu “actually undermined it completely.”
Merkel was chancellor for 16 year from 2005 and her legacy with Israel is particularly significant, embodying Germany’s unwavering commitment to its right to exist – an approach that has become increasingly contentious following Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s subsequent offensive in Gaza.
In her 2008 address to the Knesset, Merkel reiterated the “special historical responsibility” that every German government bears for Israel’s security, describing it as a core element of her country’s Staatsräson (raison d’état).
The former chancellor writes that the term Staatsräson has stayed with her, especially after the “horrific” terror attacks by Hamas last year. On Israel, she notes that it is “the only democratic state in the Middle East,” constantly exposed to threats, but supported not least by a strong civil society. She writes that she expected Israel would receive worldwide solidarity afterward, as she denounces “antisemitism manifesting in unchecked incitement” in Germany.
Commenting on the protests in Germany against Israel’s war in Gaza, Merkel says that”while the desire for a viable Palestinian state and the legitimacy of criticism toward Germany or Israel’s actions remain valid,” some have used these demonstrations “as a cover to express their hatred of the State of Israel and Jews.”
She condemns this as a misuse of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and assembly. (…)
“Freedom” is available in English and is out now, published by Pan Macmillan.
👎 Le Monde, 27 novembre, article payant
Daniel Cohn-Bendit et Raphaël Glucksmann : « Comment ne pas voir que la riposte israélienne viole les lois de la guerre et piétine le droit international ? »
Alors que l’élection de Donald Trump pourrait conforter Benyamin Nétanyahou dans sa stratégie meurtrière, les ancien et actuel députés européens affirment, dans une tribune au « Monde », que le mandat d’arrêt de la CPI contre le premier ministre israélien n’est pas antisémite et appellent la France à reconnaître l’Etat palestinien.
Extraits :
Nous ne pouvons supporter l’insupportable. La destruction totale de Gaza, c’est insupportable. Les bombardements quotidiens du Liban, c’est insupportable. L’extension permanente de la colonisation en Cisjordanie, c’est insupportable. Les plans à demi cachés, à demi publics, d’expulsion en masse des Palestiniens, c’est insupportable. Voilà ce que vient rappeler le mandat d’arrêt de la Cour pénale internationale émis le 21 novembre contre Benyamin Nétanyahou et son ex-ministre de la défense Yoav Gallant ; ce mandat qui n’a rien « d’antisémite », contrairement à ce que prétend le premier ministre israélien, et qu’Israël aurait pu éviter en lançant une enquête sérieuse sur les crimes commis à Gaza.
Nous avons pleuré avec les Israéliens le 7 octobre 2023, le plus abominable pogrom depuis la Shoah. Nous avons toujours pensé et dit que le Hamas était une organisation terroriste et qu’Israël avait le droit de se défendre, de le combattre et d’éliminer ses chefs. Nous sommes profondément attachés à l’existence d’Israël et nous voyons bien à quel point le Hamas, le Hezbollah et la théocratie iranienne qui les pilotent visent sa destruction.
Comment ne pas voir pourtant que la riposte israélienne viole les lois de la guerre et piétine le droit international ? Comment ne pas voir que Benyamin Nétanyahou a fait de la continuation sans limite ni fin de cette guerre l’horizon de sa survie politique ? Comment ne pas voir l’empilement des cadavres à Gaza et l’annihilation méthodique de toute possibilité d’un Etat palestinien avec la colonisation en Cisjordanie ?
Comment ne pas voir que, après avoir soutenu en sous-main le Hamas pendant des années – en facilitant son financement par le Qatar et en favorisant sa mainmise sur Gaza par hostilité à l’égard de l’Autorité palestinienne et par rejet de toute solution à deux Etats –, Benyamin Nétanyahou épouse aujourd’hui les vues des pires extrémistes de son gouvernement, qui rêvent d’un Israël allant de la mer au fleuve ? Comment ne pas voir que ces extrémistes sont des colons fanatiques qui sont en train de coloniser l’Etat israélien de l’intérieur et sapent les fondements mêmes de la démocratie israélienne ? (…)
Le seul cap digne et viable, c’est l’émergence d’un Etat palestinien conjointement au démantèlement du Hamas, sous l’égide d’une Autorité palestinienne réformée, reconnaissant pleinement l’existence de l’Etat d’Israël jusque dans ses manuels scolaires et bénéficiant d’un soutien international massif. Voilà la seule perspective qui permettrait un chemin vers la paix, l’espoir d’une vie libre pour les Palestiniens et d’une vie sûre pour les Israéliens.
Wall Street Journal, 26 novembre, article payant
The U.N’s Anti-Israel ‘Genocide’ Purge
Alice Nderitu said Israel’s campaign in Gaza doesn’t meet the definition of genocide. She was fired.
Extraits :
The United Nations long ago lost credibility as a moral arbiter, but its assault on Israel is hitting a new low. On Wednesday the U.N. will refuse to renew the contract of Alice Wairimu Nderitu, the Kenyan who is the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide.
Ms. Nderitu is an accomplished mediator, whose U.N. bio describes her as a “recognized voice in the field of peacebuilding and violence prevention.” She has served in that role since 2020 and her tenure has been marked by careful study of humanity’s worst crime. She is being dismissed because she has stood firm in her belief that Israel’s war with Hamas isn’t genocide.
In 2022 her office issued a guidance paper on “when to refer to a situation as ‘genocide.’” The paper noted U.N. officials should “adhere to the correct usage” of the term because of the political and legal sensitivities that surround it and “its frequent misuse in referring to large scale, grave crimes committed against particular populations.”
Her paper explains that the term “genocide” was coined in 1944 by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to describe massacres of entire ethnic groups with the intention of eliminating them. That definition, Ms. Nderitu has said, includes the Holocaust, the Hutus’ genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Serbian slaughter of Bosnian Muslims, and may include the ethnic killings now unfolding in Sudan.
As a legal matter, establishing a pattern of violence as a genocide requires demonstrating intent. Israel’s campaign of self-defense doesn’t qualify. The war against Hamas has had many deaths, but Israel’s strategy is intended to dismantle a terrorist regime, not eliminate an ethnic group. The Jewish state has gone to great lengths to minimize Palestinian civilian casualties, even as Hamas uses civilians as shields so their deaths can be used as propaganda.
That’s not what the anti-Israel cabal at the U.N. want to hear. On Nov. 14 the U.N. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices issued a report supporting accusations of genocide. The report announced it had found “serious concerns of breaches of international humanitarian and human rights laws” and “the possibility of genocide in Gaza and an apartheid system in the West Bank.”
The committee is taking its cues from Austrian Volker Turk, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, who has spent the past year assailing Israel. His claims are often echoed by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Israel’s critics. The committee is comprised of member states Malaysia, Senegal and Sri Lanka. Senegal and Malaysia are majority Muslim nations with a history of hostility to Israel.
Ms. Nderitu serves at the pleasure of Mr. Gutterres, and Mr. Turk and the anti-Israel faction want her out. (…)
Beyond Ms. Nderitu’s fate, the damage here includes defining genocide down. The word has become a weapon of political propaganda that will erode’s its moral authority when it’s needed to describe genuine horrors.
Ms. Nderitu may be out, but her refusal to endorse a lie in service of a political agenda has been a profile in courage. Can anyone with integrity survive at the U.N.?
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-ns-anti-israel-genocide-purge-c8feef1a?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s
The Jerusalem Post, Opinion, 26 novembre, article payant
Why Erdogan’s Turkey undermines US and NATO security interests
Is Turkey still a reliable NATO ally under Erdogan’s Islamist and authoritarian rule?
Extraits :
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’s (FDD) Turkish expert Sinan Ciddi writes that under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “Ankara is not only distancing itself from the West, but consciously working to undermine its core security interests.”
Most Americans are unaware that NATO’s second-largest military is led by an authoritarian leader who follows the Muslim Brotherhood’s anti-American Islamist ideology. Turkey (Turkiye) became the home of the Muslim Brotherhood after they were thrown out of Egypt in 2013.
The US State Department says, “Turkey is an important US security partner.” Yet, that same State Department is also highly critical of its human rights practices, “including arbitrary killings, torture, deaths in custody, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and continued detention of tens of thousands of persons.”
Erdogan has eliminated from his military, media, judiciary, and government the pro-American and secular voices and, for good measure, imprisoned more journalists than any other country in the world. (…)
The incoming Trump team should remember, “Turkey provided aid, weapons shipments, and fighter transits to Al Qaeda-affiliated extremist organizations… and helped facilitate its bloody rampage… Erdogan’s patronage of Hamas has been instrumental in the organization’s international efforts to fundraise, recruit, and likely execute terror attacks inside of Israel – possibly even those that took place on October 7.”
President-elect Trump may be tempted to make a deal with Erdogan, who will try to charm the former and future president. Erdogan wants to replace Qatar as an intermediary with Hamas. The correct choice for our new president is to list both Qatar and Turkey as state sponsors of terror for their support of Hamas and Iran. (…)
Erdogan sees Israel as an enemy and has been supporting, defending, and giving sanctuary to Hamas, which has planned its terrorism from Turkish soil.
“No one can make us qualify Hamas as a terrorist organization. Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them. Netanyahu and his administration, with their crimes against humanity in Gaza, are writing their names next to Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, like today’s Nazis,” Erdogan said. (…)
Both sides of the aisle see Turkey as a problem. During his confirmation hearings for secretary of state in 2021, Antony Blinken said, “Turkey is not acting like an ally. The idea that a so-called strategic partner of ours would actually be in line with one of our biggest strategic competitors in Russia is unacceptable.” (…)
So, what should the Trump administration demand of Turkey?
- End financing and giving sanctuary to Hamas.
- End the ethnic cleansing of the Syrian Kurds. If we abandon the Kurdish Syria Democratic Forces, which are indispensable in preventing the reemergence of ISIS, it could force US boots back on the ground. It will also signal to our allies worldwide that we are a fair-weather friend.
- Hand over the Russian S-400 system so we can learn how to make our F-35 fleet invulnerable to the “axis of aggressors” communications jams.
- Stop helping the Iranian economy as the Trump administration prepares to restart maximum pressure sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
- Revisit the Biden administration’s sale of F-16 fighters until Turkey aligns with our interests and acts like an ally and a member of NATO.
- For leverage, threaten the removal of the US Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, which is important but not indispensable.
Mr. Trump, keep your friends close and your enemies closer. But remember, no matter how much Erdogan flatters you, he remains an American adversary trying to take advantage of you and our national security interests.
The writer is the senior security editor for The Jerusalem Report, the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and regularly briefs members of the US Congress and their foreign policy aides on the Middle East.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-830560
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 novembre, article payant
Abgrenzung zum Antisemitismus: Darf man Israel hassen?
Antisemitismus tritt seit dem 7. Oktober immer mehr in Gestalt von Hass auf Israel auf. Aber gibt es diese Haltung auch ohne Judenhass? Eine Abgrenzung ist schwierig.
Extraits :
Die Zweite Intifada hatte gerade begonnen, da stürmte in Ägypten ein Lied des Volkssängers Schaaban Abdel Rahim die Charts. „Ich hasse Israel“, bekundete er – und galt sogleich als Stimme des Volkes. Ende des Jahres 2000 gab es noch keinen Streit über Antisemitismusdefinitionen, keine Bundestagsresolutionen zu dem Thema, keinen 7. Oktober und keinen Gazakrieg.
Der Hass auf Israel auf der Welt ist seither, wenn nicht größer, so doch offener geworden. Zugleich versuchen Länder wie Deutschland verstärkt, seine Verbreitung einzuhegen, auch mithilfe von Recht und Verwaltung. Dabei wird darauf verwiesen, dass Israelhass eine Verkörperung von Antisemitismus sei, ein Deckmantel für Judenhass.
Der Staat kann den Gefühlshaushalt seiner Bürger zwar kaum regeln. Hass zu äußern kann aber verboten sein, wenn etwa der öffentliche Frieden gestört wird. Die Grenzen sind nicht einfach zu bestimmen. Grundsätzlich, beteuert die Bundesregierung, würden „antisemitische Anfeindungen“ angeprangert und verurteilt.
Im öffentlichen Diskurs geht es dabei immer stärker um Anfeindungen gegen Israel. Aber auch die Debatte darüber, was Antisemitismus ausmacht und wo seine Grenzen verlaufen, kreist inzwischen maßgeblich um die Frage, ob „antiisraelisch“ immer eine Variante von „antisemitisch“ ist. Viele sind damit nicht einverstanden – nicht zuletzt manche liberal gesinnten Juden.
Dass Hass auf Israel stets mit einem antisemitischen Weltbild gleichzusetzen sei, ist zweifelhaft. So ist ohne Weiteres vorstellbar, dass eine 1948 vertriebene palästinensische Familie den dort gegründeten Staat ablehnt und hasst – ohne Antisemitismus. Und angesichts des israelischen Vorgehens im Gazastreifen wäre es nahezu überraschend, wenn dort (und anderswo) nicht allein deswegen Wut und Hass um sich griffen.
Auch die Gegnerschaft zum Zionismus ist nicht per se antisemitisch, sie war in den Anfängen dieser Bewegung vor allem unter Juden verbreitet. Es geht nicht darum, solche Einstellungen gutzuheißen. Hass macht blind, er führt in der Regel nur zu noch mehr Hass und kann in Gewalt umschlagen oder zu ihrer Rechtfertigung genutzt werden. Dennoch ist es wichtig, Abgrenzungen zu treffen, damit Antisemitismus als Kategorie nicht beliebig wird.
Das wird allerdings dadurch erschwert, dass Israelhass im wahren Leben eben doch oft mit antisemitischen Vorstellungen einhergeht. (…)
Gegen die Stimmung auf den Straßen wird sie wenig ausrichten. Dort wird sich weiter Hass auf Israel artikulieren, schwer erträglicher und unerträglicher. Das zu ändern liegt nur teilweise in der Macht des Staates. Die Verhältnisse im Nahen Osten sind ein verlässlicher Produzent von negativen Gefühlen aller Art.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/krieg-in-nahost/abgrenzung-zum-a
L’Opinion, 26 novembre, article payant
Nucléaire : « Les Européens mettent l’Iran au pied du mur »
« Si Téhéran ne reprend pas sa coopération avec l’AIEA, cela offrira un prétexte à Israël pour lancer des frappes sur ses infrastructures nucléaires », estime le consultant Michel Makinsky
Extraits :
Quelle est la portée de la résolution du conseil des gouverneurs de l’AIEA ? Depuis des mois, le directeur général de l’AIEA, Rafael Grossi, tentait de trouver des solutions pour le plein respect des engagements iraniens sur le dossier nucléaire. Son objectif est d’obtenir la restauration de l’arrangement technique du 4 mars 2023 qui permettait à l’agence de réaliser plus d’inspections et de disposer de plus de caméras de surveillance.
En vain. La résolution pose un ultimatum pour mettre un coup d’arrêt aux écarts de Téhéran. Principale innovation, ce texte demande au directeur général de présenter un rapport complet sur les stocks et l’utilisation éventuelle de matières nucléaires non déclarées, même pour les activités passées, qui sera débattu au plus tard à la fin du printemps 2025.
L’adjectif « passées » contrarie l’Iran qui pensait le dossier clos par le rapport de l’AIEA du 2 décembre 2015. Vu de Téhéran, cette remise en question est-elle acceptable ? Non. In fine, le trio européen met, à travers cette résolution, l’Iran au pied du mur… (…)
Quelles leçons en tirer ? C’est un camouflet pour les dirigeants iraniens qui n’avaient pas prévu un tel ultimatum. Leurs gestes de dernière minute ont été surestimés. Cette résolution contrarie l’ouverture diplomatique du président Massoud Pezeshkian, de son vice-président pour les Affaires stratégiques, Javad Zarif, ainsi que des ministres et diplomates de la république islamique. Le vote de la résolution par 19 des 35 membres du Conseil de l’AIEA est un signe d’isolement malgré l’offensive diplomatique iranienne lors de la dernière assemblée générale des Nations-Unies. Cet isolement a été confirmé par l’adoption d’une résolution onusienne approuvée par toute l’Union européenne dénonçant les violations des droits de l’homme par le régime iranien. (…)
Cet isolement a été confirmé par l’adoption d’une résolution onusienne approuvée par toute l’Union européenne dénonçant les violations des droits de l’homme par le régime iranien. (…)
Comment peut réagir Israël ? Cette résolution conforte Benjamin Netanyahu, le premier ministre israélien, et les faucons du cabinet de guerre dans leur ligne dure contre l’Iran. Si Téhéran ne reprend pas sa coopération, ce sera un prétexte pour lancer des frappes sur des sites nucléaires et des infrastructures critiques comme les raffineries… (…)
Donald Trump favorisera-t-il ce « coup fatal » contre l’Iran ou tentera-t-il un grand marchandage avec le régime ? On sait qu’il ne souhaite pas la dangereuse et coûteuse prolongation des affrontements armés tout en n’excluant pas de « montrer ses muscles ». Elon Musk a eu des contacts avec des diplomates iraniens… Donald Trump devra aussi tenir compte d’un autre acteur important dans cette période de tensions. L’Arabie saoudite vient de conduire un exercice militaire conjoint avec l’Iran. Le 11 novembre, une délégation militaire saoudienne s’est aussi rendue à Téhéran pour discuter de coopération. Les lignes bougent.
https://www.lopinion.fr/international/nucleaire-les-europeens-mettent-liran-au-pied-du-mur
Le Figaro, 26 novembre, libre accès
Le pape François dénonce «l’arrogance de l’envahisseur» israélien et russe
François a prononcé une rare prise de position contre la politique israélienne. Une déclaration prononcée une semaine après avoir évoqué pour la première fois les accusations de «génocides» à Gaza.
Extraits :
(…) «Je mentionne simplement deux échecs de l’humanité aujourd’hui: l’Ukraine et la Palestine, où les gens souffrent, où l’arrogance de l’envahisseur l’emporte sur le dialogue», a-t-il déclaré, une phrase improvisée qui ne figurait pas dans son discours initial. Fustigeant une nouvelle fois le commerce des armes, Jorge Bergoglio a critiqué «l’hypocrisie de parler de la paix tout en jouant à la guerre». «Le dialogue doit être l’âme de la communauté internationale», a-t-il plaidé devant des diplomates et des représentants religieux. (…)
Fin septembre, le jésuite argentin avait déjà dénoncé un usage «immoral» de la force au Liban et à Gaza, semblant appeler Israël à la retenue. Mais c’est la première fois que le chef de l’Eglise catholique dénonce publiquement en ces termes la politique israélienne vis-à-vis des territoires palestiniens. (…)
Le Saint-Siège reconnaît depuis 2013 l’État de Palestine, avec lequel il entretient des relations diplomatiques, et soutient la solution à deux États.
Haaretz, 25 novembre, article payant
Israeli Government Imposes Sanctions on Haaretz, Cuts All Ties and Pulls Advertising
The resolution approved on Sunday did not appear on the government’s agenda published ahead of the weekly cabinet meeting, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved it without it undergoing the customary legal review
Extraits :
Israel’s government approved on Sunday a proposal by Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi that mandates any government-funded body refrain from communicating with Haaretz or placing advertisements in the paper. The proposal was approved by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The decision, according to the government’s explanation, is a reaction to “many editorials that have hurt the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its right to self defense, and particularly the remarks made in London by Haaretz publisher, Amos Schocken, that support terrorism and call for imposing sanctions on the government.” (…)
In a speech at the Haaretz conference in London last month, Schocken said “the Netanyahu government doesn’t care about imposing a cruel apartheid regime on the Palestinian population. It dismisses the costs of both sides for defending the settlements while fighting the Palestinian freedom fighters, that Israel calls terrorists.” (…)
Schocken’s comments prompted Karhi to launch a renewed campaign urging a government boycott of the newspaper. A year ago, he approached the cabinet secretary, Yossi Fuchs, with a draft resolution to cease the Government Advertising Bureau’s publications in Haaretz and to halt all subscriptions to the newspaper by state employees — including in the IDF, the police, the Israel Prison Service, government ministries, and state-owned companies.
Haaretz reacted to the government decision with the following statement: “The opportunist resolution to boycott Haaretz, which passed in today’s government meeting without any legal review, is another step in Netanyahu’s journey to dismantle Israeli democracy. Like his friends Putin, Erdoğan, and Orbán, Netanyahu is trying to silence a critical, independent newspaper. Haaretz will not balk and will not morph into a government pamphlet that publishes messages approved by the government and its leader.”
The Jerusalem Post, 25 novembre, article payant
Gov’t says it is cutting all ties with the ‘Haaretz’ newspaper
This decision came “in light of the recent statements by the publisher of ‘Haaretz’, Amos Schocken, who expressed support for terrorism and called for sanctions against the government”.
Extraits :
The exact quotes from Schocken’s speech were, “The Netanyahu government wants to continue and intensify illegal settlement in the territories that were meant for a Palestinian state. It doesn’t care about imposing a cruel apartheid regime on the Palestinian population. It dismisses the costs of both sides for defending the settlements while fighting the Palestinian freedom fighters that Israel calls terrorists.” (…)
“Not only did they continue building settlements, but the present government also supports the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from parts of the occupied territories. In a sense, what is taking place now in the occupied territories and in part of Gaza is a second Nakba of sending, creating refugees, even people who lived in the occupied territories in Area C and the people who live in the northern part of Gaza,” Schocken said.
He added that “a Palestinian state must be established, and the only way to achieve this, I think, is to apply sanctions against Israel’s leader, against the leaders who oppose it, and against the settlers who are in the occupied territories in contravention of international law.”
“Zionism is still a justified idea for the Jewish people, but the conduct of successive Israeli governments has distorted its meaning beyond recognition. Israel needs to be put back on the right path, and unfortunately, the main way to do it, I think now, is by international pressure,” Schocken concluded.
According to Karhi, “It is unacceptable for the publisher of an official newspaper in the State of Israel to call for sanctions against it and support the state’s enemies in the midst of a war, while international bodies harm the legitimacy of the State of Israel, its right to self-defense, and actually impose sanctions, including criminal sanctions, against it and against its leaders.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-830510
Wall Street Journal, 24 novembre, article payant
War Between Hezbollah and Israel Drags Beirut Back Into Despair
Lebanon’s embattled capital returns to cycle of destruction as Israeli airstrikes target Hezbollah neighborhoods
Extraits :
BEIRUT—From his tiled terrace in the foothills overlooking Beirut, Mohammed Dayekh is watching a place he once loved go up in flames.
A 34-year-old director and screenwriter with jet black hair and tattooed forearms, Dayekh grew up in southern Beirut. Four years ago, he moved to the hills above the city after Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia group, tightened its grip on his old neighborhood and made it more conservative. More women started wearing the Iranian-style chador instead of Lebanese-style headscarves, and men talked up Tehran’s influence.
Now, Dayekh feels a flood of complicated emotions as he watches Israeli airstrikes hit the neighborhood. He had yearned for change in Lebanon, he said—but not like this.
“This place that I destroyed in my own mind is being destroyed by someone else,” he said, as fires from the strikes rose above the Mediterranean.
Beirut has staggered through war, economic collapse and a port explosion in 2020 that leveled much of the city center. Now, the latest conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, is dragging Beirut back into a cycle of violence, just as it was beginning to stabilize after years of chaos. (…)
Overall, some 3,600 people have been killed in Lebanon over the past year, according to the Lebanese health ministry. The conflict began when Hezbollah started firing missiles daily at Israel after Oct. 7, 2023, to show solidarity for Palestinians in Gaza, it said. Israel retaliated in an effort to stop the attacks.
The conflict also has caused $8.5 billion in damage, according to the World Bank, nearly half of Lebanon’s annual economic output, which had already cratered after a financial crisis that started in 2019. (…)
In the 1950s and ’60s, Beirut attracted Hollywood stars and European jet-setters. But it never fully recovered from a 15-year civil war that began in 1975, pitting Muslims against Christians and the Israeli army against the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was temporarily based in Lebanon in the early 1980s.
When the war ended, Lebanon’s government rebuilt the devastated capital. And for a while, the city boomed, drawing cash from the Persian Gulf and Lebanese expats who returned each summer from the U.S. and elsewhere to eat mezze with family and enjoy Beirut’s beaches and bars.
A parallel boom took place in southern Beirut’s Dahiyeh neighborhood, as Hezbollah—bankrolled by Iran—evolved into a political party that elected candidates to parliament, launched its own satellite channel and expanded its military forces. It also smuggled new missiles and drones into the country from Iran and widened its network of tunnels in southern Lebanon. (…)
In 2019, a banking crisis caused Lebanon’s economy to implode, and massive protests called for a transformation of Lebanon’s political system. Then, in 2020, a warehouse full of hazardously stored ammonium nitrate exploded, destroying a swath of the capital. (…)
By 2023, Lebanon was learning to live with what felt like a permanent state of crisis. But Beirut residents watched warily as tensions in the region escalated after the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas.
The Israeli airstrikes and invasion of Lebanon have driven more than a million people from their homes, with most converging on Beirut and its immediate surroundings, according to the Lebanese government. (…)
The Jerusalem Post, Opinion, 24 novembre, article payant
The violence in Israel’s Arab society is a result of neglect and systemic failures
Since the beginning of this year, there have been thousands of shooting incidents and over 220 murders in Arab society – shocking figures that should have shaken the foundations of the entire state.
Extraits :
Every day, we wake up to another headline about yet another murder, another act of violence in Arab society. Just last week, the car of Rahat Mayor Talal Al-Karnawi was set on fire following a weekend of eight murders in less than 48 hours. These incidents come against the backdrop of a statement by Police Commissioner Dani Levy, claiming we should be proud of the decrease in crime rates due to the efforts of the Israel Police.
We are in the midst of a crime epidemic, with an average of one murder every 1.68 days in Israel – an unimaginable statistic. However, neither the numbers nor the most recent events have prompted the police or the National Security Ministry to take responsibility for the safety of Arab society, which comprises one-fifth of the country’s population.
Since the beginning of this year, there have been thousands of shooting incidents and over 220 murders in Arab society – shocking figures that should have shaken the foundations of the entire state. (…)
In the past year, we have been preoccupied with external threats, but it seems we can no longer ignore the internal threats that exact such a heavy toll. We cannot remain silent any longer. (…)
We have learned through painful experience that too many innocent people from all segments of Israeli society are drawn into these scenes of crime and murder. This is a protest for all of us.
The police report “efforts” and “investigations,” but in reality, a large number of these cases remain unresolved. The clearance rate for murders in Arab society is shockingly low compared to that in Jewish society. Criminals continue to roam free, unafraid of consequences. The message is clear: Arab lives are worth less.
This violence does not only harm Arab society; it creates a deep rift that prevents us from building a shared society where everyone feels secure. Jews and Arabs living side by side must feel safe in both Arab and Jewish towns. But how can integration happen when we, Arab citizens, are afraid to leave our homes? How can we live normal lives when mothers fear sending their children to school and fathers worry about their children going to work?
This is not fate. The violence in Arab society is not a result of “culture” or “tradition,” as some claim, but of years of neglect, discrimination, and disregard by the authorities. Resources are not allocated; education, welfare, and infrastructure are inadequately addressed; and the police are absent where they are most needed – to prevent crime, not just react to it after the fact.
This violence is not just a problem for Arab society – it is a problem for Israeli society as a whole. (…)
This week, we will march to show that our lives matter, to cry out that we are not alone, and to demand security and justice. It is time for the State of Israel to understand – it is its fundamental duty to ensure the safety of all its citizens, including Arabs.
Join the march. Together, we can change this reality.
The writer is a co-CEO of the Arab-Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment, and Cooperation at the Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development (AJEEC– NISPED).
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-830395
The Jerusalem Post, Opinion, 24 novembre, article payant
Trump and Biden can forge peace in Israel – and earn Trump the Nobel Prize – comment
Trump has a chance to transcend these odds of winning the Nobel Peace Prize by joining forces with President Joe Biden to end the war in Israel.
Extraits :
Donald Trump, the former and now president-elect, has never been shy about his desire to be recognized on the world stage.
A Nobel Peace Prize, he once hinted, would be the pinnacle of that recognition. But let’s face it: the skewed global narrative often pits America—and especially its more conservative leaders—against the odds of such accolades. Trump, however, has a chance to transcend these odds.
How? By joining forces with President Joe Biden to end the war in Israel, forcing Hamas to release the hostages, holding Hezbollah to terms that preserve Israel’s future, dismantling the Houthis in Yemen, and demonstrating a united Western front.
This idea isn’t far-fetched. It’s bold, yes, but not impossible. (…)
Trump has already laid the groundwork for peace in the Middle East through the Abraham Accords, a historic agreement normalizing ties between Israel and several Arab states. (…)
The accords marked a seismic shift in regional dynamics, demonstrating that peace could be achieved through economic and diplomatic engagement rather than prolonged conflict. Yet, Trump received little recognition for this monumental achievement. (…)
Building on this legacy by partnering with Biden to resolve the current crisis would not only bring justice to those achievements but also cement Trump’s status as a peacemaker.
The Abraham Accords showed the world that nations once considered adversaries could become allies. Now, Trump has the chance to extend that vision to a new chapter in Middle East diplomacy.
The war in Gaza has already claimed countless lives and destabilized the region. The hostages held by Hamas are a painful symbol of the ongoing strife. Forcing their release would be a victory for humanity and America’s moral authority. But it won’t be easy. It requires more than military might; it demands diplomatic finesse, economic leverage, and, most critically, a united front. (…)
Let’s not underestimate the ripple effects of such a partnership. Securing peace in Israel could lead to broader stability in the Middle East. Forcing Hezbollah into terms that safeguard Israel’s borders would weaken Iran’s regional influence. Dismantling the Houthi threat in Yemen would disrupt a key Iranian proxy and secure vital maritime routes.
And for Trump, these achievements wouldn’t just be political victories; they’d be personal triumphs. They’d be the foundation for his place in history, not just as a divisive figure but as a unifier, a peacemaker. (…)
I’ll admit: this vision might seem utopian. (…)
History is watching. The world is waiting. And Trump has the chance to show that, even in the most polarized of times, unity is still possible.
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-830439
The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 23 novembre, article payant
Gazans deserve the right to freedom of movement
Civilian populations are allowed and even encouraged to flee combat zones to avoid danger. Why can’t Gazans?
Extraits :
In many ways, the world treats the Arabs of Gaza differently than other people – and often to the Gazans’ detriment. This is true with regard to the violation of their basic right to freedom of movement. Over the years, the international community has agreed upon certain fundamental rights that all inhabitants of planet Earth should be entitled to, yet these same nations are now denying one of those rights to a particular group. (…)
DO THE nations of the world actually care about the welfare of the Gazans or are the Gazans mere pawns being used to harm Israel? Gaza is unquestionably a mess. After Israel pulled out in 2005, Hamas took control and spent the massive foreign donations digging tunnels and accruing weapons, and now the full-scale war they started has left the coastal enclave devastated. It would make sense for the world to support, even encourage, the suffering Gazans to leave, a desire of many people in war zones.
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) just before the Simchat Torah massacre of October 7, 2023, found that nearly a third of Gazans were interested in emigrating – and for those between 18-29, it approached half, with the overwhelming motivations being economic and educational. One can assume that due to the war, those numbers are even higher. Similarly, according to a January 15 article in this newspaper, over three-quarters of Israelis favor voluntary emigration of Gazans.
The global community welcomed the Ukrainian and Afghan refugees without any hint that they should stay and watch their countries burn. Why is choosing to flee a combat zone or an economically challenged region deemed logical and acceptable for all except the Gazans? Politicians from around the world complain about the supposed civilian death toll in Gaza, yet one concrete step available to them is to provide them with a safe haven. Yet when Israel suggested voluntary Gazan emigration, the EU and UK slammed it.
o complain about the Gazan suffering and to also bar them from leaving is the height of hypocrisy. Nobody, not the neighboring Arab states, not the wealthy Gulf sheikhdoms, not the enlightened West, not even the litigious South Africa are offering refuge to Gazans. And not only are they not offering refuge, they are insisting that they stay put and be barred from leaving.
Prior to the current war, emigrating Gazans left via Egypt. At present, neither Israel (for obvious reasons) nor Egypt permits them to transit. However, I would like to believe that if the world showed real willingness to take in Gazans, Israel would work with the international community to facilitate their exit. Only America has started toying with the idea recently. (…)
There is no moral or legal justification to deny Gazans the right and ability to flee what has now become an inhospitable locale. And yet the Biden administration and other Western leaders have been preventing Gazan emigration. Their freedom of movement should be respected, and they should be given a chance to build new lives in another land – and thereby also contribute to stability in the Middle East.
The writer is a professor of neuroscience at Bar-Ilan University.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-830134
Le Point, 23 novembre, tribune, article payant
Bernard-Henri Lévy: « Il n’y a pas de génocide à Gaza »
LE BLOC-NOTES DE BHL. Le philosophe rappelle pourquoi l’accusation de « génocide » visant la guerre que mène Israël à Gaza n’a aucune pertinence, n’en déplaise au pape François.
Extraits :
(…) On peut pleurer – c’est mon cas – les victimes civiles de Gaza : on ne peut pas dire d’une armée qui prévient avant de tirer, qui inonde les quartiers qu’elle s’apprête à bombarder de messages adjurant les habitants de ne pas rester, qu’elle est une armée génocidaire.
On peut trouver – c’est aussi mon cas – que ce n’est pas une vie d’être, au gré des combats, ballotté du nord au sud, puis du sud au nord, et de vivre dans des logements de fortune, parfois des tentes : une tente n’est pas une chambre à gaz ; les corridors d’évacuation, ouverts quotidiennement pour pouvoir se mettre à l’abri, ne sont pas des chemins de la mort ; et, si les civils ne sont pas plus nombreux à les emprunter, c’est parce que le Hamas les tient en otage et s’en fait des boucliers.
On peut estimer – c’est déjà moins certain, mais enfin… – que le Cogat, la Coordination israélienne des activités gouvernementales dans les Territoires, n’achemine pas assez d’aide humanitaire à Gaza : des centaines de convois passent tous les jours ; s’il n’en passe pas davantage, c’est, de nouveau, la responsabilité du Hamas, qui soit les bloque de l’autre côté de la frontière, soit en confisque la cargaison pour la revendre ; et il n’y a, côté israélien, aucune limite à ces mouvements. Et je ne parle même pas de cette sœur cadette de feu Ismaïl Haniyeh, le chef du Hamas, soignée dans un hôpital du sud d’Israël… ou de cette campagne de vaccination organisée en pleine guerre et qui a touché 90 % des enfants gazaouis… ou, il y a dix jours, de ces 231 petits atteints de maladies rares et transportés vers des hôpitaux émiratis qui étaient seuls en mesure de les traiter…
A-t-on jamais vu pareils « génocidaires » ?
Imagine-t-on la Wehrmacht prévenir : « Mesdames et messieurs les Juifs… nous nous apprêtons à attaquer… ou à vacciner… prière d’évacuer sans délai vos ghettos et vos shtetls… merci d’emprunter les corridors prévus à cet effet… » ?
La vérité est que j’ai un peu « étudié » ces sujets.
J’ai vu des génocides (Srebrenica, Darfour).
J’ai filmé les torturés d’Al-Qaïda en Afghanistan et les corps brûlés vifs, jetés du haut des toits, décapités, de Daech à Mossoul.
J’ai documenté sur le terrain, les tueries, pour le coup indiscriminées, de la Russie en Ukraine.
J’ai couvert, bien avant cela, les carnages du FIS en Algérie, auxquels a échappé Kamel Daoud.
Bref, je sais ce que sont des êtres promis à la mort.
Et je vois bien que l’on oublie, dans cette guerre d’Israël contre l’Iran et ses marionnettes, que Tsahal est la première armée au monde à prendre autant de mesures pour qu’il y ait le moins possible d’innocents pris dans la fournaise des batailles.
Ainsi se forgent les mythes.
Ainsi passe-t-on du complot judéo-maçonnique, ou judéo-bolchévique, ou judéo-capitaliste, à la conspiration judéo-génocidaire dont tous les Juifs du monde seraient plus ou moins complices.
Et ainsi outrage-t-on, non seulement la vérité des faits et des noms, mais la sainte mémoire des morts des génocides du dernier siècle.
https://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/il-n-y-a-pas-de-genocide-a-gaza-22-11-2024-2576000_32.php
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 novembre, article payant
Haftbefehl aus Den Haag: Würde Deutschland Benjamin Netanjahu festnehmen?
Das Völkerrecht ist klar: Die Bundesregierung muss Haftbefehle des Internationalen Gerichtshofs vollstrecken. Berlin will aber an Israels Seite stehen. Und jetzt?
Extraits :
(…) Seit Donnerstagnachmittag war auf die Reaktion der Bundesregierung gewartet worden. Am Freitagvormittag teilte Hebestreit schließlich mit, man habe die Entscheidung „zur Kenntnis genommen“. Deutschland sei an der Ausarbeitung des IStGH-Statuts beteiligt gewesen und einer seiner größten Unterstützer, so der Regierungssprecher. Diese Haltung sei auch „Ergebnis der deutschen Geschichte“. Gleichzeitig sei „Konsequenz der deutschen Geschichte, dass uns einzigartige Beziehungen und eine große Verantwortung mit Israel verbinden“. (…)
Mit Blick auf die Haftbefehle äußerte Hebestreit, die Bundesregierung werde die „innerstaatlichen Schritte“ nun „gewissenhaft prüfen“. Weiteres „stünde erst dann an, wenn ein Aufenthalt von Premierminister Benjamin Netanjahu und dem ehemaligen Verteidigungsminister Joav Gallant in Deutschland absehbar ist“. Als Hebestreit anschließend von Journalisten gefragt wurde, was die Mitteilung konkret bedeutete, verwies er auf die Mitteilung. Etwas deutlicher wurde der Sprecher, als er schließlich äußerte, es falle ihm schwer, sich vorzustellen, „dass wir einen israelischen Ministerpräsidenten hier festnehmen“.
Die Haftbefehle gegen Netanjahu und Gallant stellen die Bundesregierung vor erhebliche Herausforderungen. Sie möchte keinen Zweifel an ihrer Unterstützung Israels aufkommen lassen. Zugleich ist sie an das Völkerrecht gebunden. Und das verpflichtet Deutschland dazu, Haftbefehle des IStGH zu vollstrecken. (…)
Auf die Frage, ob man Netanjahu nun raten werde, nicht nach Deutschland zu reisen, antwortete sie: „Es gilt die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz.“ Zugleich nannte Baerbock eine mögliche Verhaftung in Deutschland „eher theoretisch“.
Libération, édito, 23 novembre, article payant
Face au mandat d’arrêt de la CPI visant Nétanyahou, l’Occident divisé
Tandis que les bombes continuent de tomber à Gaza, les pays occidentaux clamaient leurs divisions face à la décision de la Cour pénale internationale d’émettre des mandats d’arrêt contre le Premier ministre israélien et son ancien ministre de la Défense.
Extraits :
(…) Si certains des pays ayant signé le traité de Rome de la CPI ont accueilli la nouvelle avec enthousiasme – le Premier ministre irlandais Simon Harris la qualifiant de «mesure extrêmement significative» –, d’autres se sont montrés bien plus prudents.
Jamais à court de formules énigmatiques, le Quai d’Orsay a ainsi déclaré que la France a «toujours soutenu les actions de la Cour» mais que les mandats d’arrêt constituaient «une question juridique complexe»et que la situation nécessitait donc «beaucoup de précautions juridiques». Il faut bien sûr comprendre exactement le contraire : la question juridique est simple, mais nécessite des précautions politiques complexes. Les Etats-Unis ayant rejeté la légitimité des mandats en des termes très vifs avant même que le futur président américain Donald Trump n’entre en fonction, on voit mal le Royaume-Uni – ou même la France – arrêtant Nétanyahou au risque de sacrifier l’armement de l’Ukraine ou celui de l’Otan. Loin de saisir l’opportunité d’imposer dans le pays une prise de conscience, l’opposition israélienne a par ailleurs unanimement condamné la décision, redoutant qu’elle repousse les procès pour corruption contre Netanyahou, dont la première apparition au tribunal devait avoir lieu le 2 décembre. Loin de toutes ces considérations, le nombre de morts à Gaza sous les bombes israéliennes continue de monter en flèche, mettant en doute la conscience morale du monde et sa capacité à reconnaître le mal.
DOUZE COMMENTAIRES SUR LA DECISION DE LA CCI A L’ENCONTRE DE NETANYAHU:
1) Haaretz, Editorial, 22 novembre, article payant
Starvation, Murder, Persecution: ICC Warrants Are an Unprecedented Moral Nadir for Israel
Extraits :
The arrest warrants that the International Criminal Court issued against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant position Israel at an unprecedented moral nadir, as a country whose leaders are accused of grave crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip. (…)
Netanyahu predictably responded by accusing the court of antisemitism and presenting himself as a modern-day Dreyfus, just as he has during his criminal trial in Israel. And as usual, senior opposition leaders fell in line with the government, as did both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. (…)
But Israel’s problem, and that of every Israeli, isn’t whether the prime minister and his ousted rival have the ability to travel freely. Rather, it’s the horrific actions of its government and its army, as described by this international legal institution. These are actions to which most of the Israeli public is indifferent and hardhearted. At most, Israelis blame them on Hamas, which perpetrated the massacre in southern Israel on October 7, 2023 and has refused to surrender, even in the face of the mass killing, expulsion and destruction Israel has wreaked in Gaza. The fact that Hamas itself has committed horrific war crimes against Israelis and refuses to surrender and release the hostages, does not justify the mass killing, deportation and destruction that Israel has inflicted on the Gaza Strip. (…)
One might have hoped the ICC’s announcement would raise pointed questions in Israel about the morality of the ongoing war in Gaza. Unfortunately, both the government and public opinion, with the support of most of the media, are refusing to listen. Instead, they are all hoping that Trump will enable Israel to continue, if not intensify, the actions that the International Criminal Court defines as crimes against humanity.
2) The Jerusalem Post, Editorial, 22 novembre, article payant
ICC risks its credible reputation with warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant – editorial
Some will see the ICC’s decision as reasonable, and that is exactly what will ultimately strip the court of its legitimacy.
Extraits :
November 21, 2024 – the day the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for alleged war crimes against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant – will go down as the day that led to the demise of the ICC itself.
Not the demise of Israel – as some of the enemies of the Jewish state fantasize the decision will expedite – but rather of the ICC itself.
Why? Because this decision will be seen by reasonable people around the world – and there are reasonable people around the world – as a farce, a joke, a miscarriage of justice. The authority of courts, all courts, rests in the degree of credibility it has in the eyes of those it is meant to serve.
The decision to issue an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Gallant for fighting a terrorist army that openly states it wants to destroy the Jewish state and which started this war with a brutal orgy of violence worthy of the Middle Ages and Nazi Germany is something that will ultimately strip the court of any shred of legitimacy. (…)
The kind of war Israel is fighting in Gaza – against a terrorist organization for which the norms of civilization have no meaning – is not covered in international law. The laws of nations are those that deal with war between states who act in accordance with the same law. It is not the same as the situation Israel is in, where one side is a state bound by international law and the other side is a terrorist army hiding behind civilians and intentionally drawing fire toward civilians as a tactic of war. (…)
Israel will survive this scandalous decision; the ICC may not.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-830235
3) New York Times, Opinion, 22 novembre, article payant
Nicholas Kristof : The Warrant for Netanyahu’s Arrest Also Implicates the United States
The arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on Thursday for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel will reverberate through that country, but it also raises questions for the United States.
If the international court believes that Israel may have committed war crimes in Gaza and engaged in a policy of deliberate starvation of civilians, then whose weapons were used? Which country protected Israel in the United Nations and blocked more robust efforts to channel food to starving Gazans? The answer, of course, is the United States.
President Biden in May denounced the I.C.C. prosecutor’s request for warrants and said that “there is no equivalence — none — between Israel and Hamas.” But there is a moral equivalence between an American child and an Israeli child and a Palestinian child. They all deserve to be protected. We should not operate as if there is a hierarchy in the value of children’s lives, with some invaluable and others expendable.
Aid workers I’ve interviewed overwhelmingly agree that Israel has used starvation as a tool of war. The impulse of Americans who are skeptical of the warrants will be to respond by noting the brutality of the Oct. 7 atrocities by Hamas that preceded Israel’s assault on Gaza. Fair enough: The I.C.C. also issued an arrest warrant for a Hamas leader for crimes against humanity.
The point is that war crimes by one side do not justify additional war crimes by the other. We should unite in condemning the savagery of attacks by Hamas, but that savagery does not excuse Israel’s use of American weapons to level entire neighborhoods in Gaza.
Biden has spoken a good deal about the challenge Russia creates for the “rules-based international order,” and it’s because of Russian brutality in Ukraine that an arrest warrant was issued for Vladimir Putin. But if we decry Putin’s violations of international law in Ukraine, how can we simultaneously supply weapons that an international tribunal suggests are used for breaches of humanitarian law in Gaza?
Israel is now more isolated than ever, and it will be more difficult for Netanyahu to travel. Americans should also reflect on how we have become more isolated, as reflected in the U.N. resolution this week calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza. Our allies supported it, but the United States vetoed it.
When our weapons are implicated in war crimes, maybe it’s past time for a policy rethink.
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/11/19/opinion/thepoint#icc-netanyahu-warrant
4) Wall Street Journal, 22 novembre, article payant
The ICC’s Assault on Israel—and the U.S.
With its arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the International Criminal Court sacrifices its standards and future to join the war on Israel.
Extraits :
The International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants Thursday for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defense chief, and this legal assault isn’t only against Israel. The precedent will harm the ability of all democracies to defend themselves against terror groups or states.
On Israel, the ICC has twisted the law and the facts. (…)
First, the law: The ICC only has jurisdiction over its member states, but Israel isn’t a member and Gaza isn’t a state. The court nonetheless conjures a State of Palestine. It then deems the state’s borders to include Gaza and lets the Palestinian Authority sign for the territory Hamas has controlled since 2007. International “law” is malleable when it targets Israel.
Second, the facts: Hamas started the war on Oct. 7 by sending death squads into Israel, then pledged to use its Gaza fief to repeat the massacre “again and again.” Israel went to war in self-defense with the legitimate objective of destroying Hamas.
This is about more than Israel, whose military may have achieved the lowest ratio of civilian-to-combatant deaths in the history of urban warfare. The effect of the ICC warrants is to disarm any Western democracy that is responding to atrocities from terrorists and rogue states. This precedent will be used against the U.S., which, like Israel, never joined the ICC.
The ICC indicts Mr. Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for allegedly using starvation as a method of warfare and several other crimes against humanity. (…)
The charge of deliberate starvation is absurd. Israel has facilitated the transfer of more than 57,000 aid trucks and 1.1 million tons of aid, even though Hamas’s rampant theft means Israel is provisioning its battlefield enemy, something the law can’t require.
This is why President Biden said on Oct. 18, 2023, that if Hamas steals the aid, “it will end.” The President broke that promise, and Israel has exceeded its aid obligations.
The international Famine Review Committee found on June 30 that famine isn’t occurring in Gaza—Hamas attributes 41 deaths in the entire war to malnutrition—but that elevated risk of famine will persist as long as the war goes on. Especially when the world backs Egypt’s decision not to allow refugees out of Gaza, trapping civilians in the war zone.
Using Palestinian civilians as political weapons is the essence of Hamas’s strategy, which the ICC now vindicates. Hamas cheered the ICC warrants on Thursday in a statement that “international justice is with us and against the Zionist entity.” (…)
The court’s self-immolation is one more consequence of a Biden foreign policy that has too often put the authority of international institutions above the U.S. national interest. It’s also a reason he soon won’t be President.
5) The Economist, 22 novembre, article payant
Israel’s most wanted : The arrest warrant for Netanyahu will have big consequences
Both the prime minister and the International Criminal Court will suffer
Extraits :
FOR MONTHS the decision seemed both inevitable and improbable. On November 21st it finally came. The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and Yoav Gallant, until recently the defence minister (pictured right). They are accused of overseeing war crimes during Israel’s year-long war in Gaza against Hamas, a Palestinian militant group. The court also indicted the top commander of Hamas, which carried out a massacre of Israelis that triggered Israel’s assault on Gaza. But it is the charges against the two Israeli politicians that are the real earthquake: a diplomatic disaster for Mr Netanyahu, and perhaps also for the court itself.
Karim Khan, the ICC’s prosecutor, requested the warrants in May. The case he brought is separate from allegations of Israeli acts of genocide against Palestinians pending before the International Court of Justice, which hears disputes between states (the ICC prosecutes individuals). The type of charges brought against Messrs Netanyahu and Gallant are easier to prove than a charge of genocide against Israel would be: they are accused of using starvation as a weapon of war in Gaza, and of directing attacks against civilians in the territory. (…)
The ICC is meant to be a court of last resort that steps in when a country’s own courts fail to prosecute abuses. Israel’s attorney-general told Mr Netanyahu this year that forming a state commission of inquiry might stall the ICC’s probe. But he has yet to appoint one, and the judges noted Israel’s failure to do so in their decision.
The ruling drew near-universal condemnation from Israeli politicians. (…)
There is no risk that Israel will extradite Messrs Netanyahu or Gallant to The Hague, since the country is not a member of the ICC. But 124 other countries are, including many of Israel’s closest friends. The most immediate consequence of the judgment is that both men will be unable to travel to those countries for fear of arrest. Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, said the court’s decision was binding on all EU members. (…)
The main exception, of course, is America, which is not a member of the court. The decision has thrown a bombshell into America’s presidential transition. It will embarrass Joe Biden’s outgoing administration, divide Democrats and outrage Republicans as they prepare to take control of the White House and both houses of Congress in January.
Leading Republicans have warned that America will impose sanctions on the ICC—with support from Democrats if possible or without it if necessary. Mike Waltz, whom Donald Trump has chosen to be his national security adviser, promised a “strong response” to the court’s “antisemitic bias”. (…)
Democrats, for their part, are increasingly split over the war in the Middle East. (…)
Ironically, it may be the court that suffers the most immediate consequences in the form of sanctions imposed by America. Mr Netanyahu is not about to end up in the dock, nor is Israel about to end its war in Gaza. But the judgment will have long-term consequences: both Mr Netanyahu and the country he leads will be more isolated and more dependent on the United States.■
6) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22 novembre, article payant
Die Haftbefehle gegen Netanyahu und Gallant sind eine sinnlose Anmassung
Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof setzt den israelischen Ministerpräsidenten auf die Anklagebank der Weltöffentlichkeit. Damit wird der Ruf Israels befleckt, aber im Nahen Osten nichts verbessert.
Extraits :
(…) Was das Gericht völlig ignoriert, ist allerdings der juristische, militärische und politische Kontext der untersuchten Fälle. Da ist erstens die Tatsache, dass Israel als einziger demokratischer Staat im Nahen Osten selbst über einen Rechtsstaat und eine unabhängige Justiz verfügt. Diese muss gemäss dem Römer Statut Priorität haben, um solche Vorwürfe zu untersuchen und vor Gericht zu bringen. Doch der ICC greift mit seinem forschen Vorgehen der örtlichen Justiz vor – und das in einem Land, dessen Bevölkerung breit und demokratisch abgestützt die Jurisdiktion des ICC nicht anerkennt. Das ist eine unerklärliche Respektlosigkeit gegenüber Israel.
Zweitens masst sich das Gericht im fernen Den Haag an, die militärische Lage im Gaza-Krieg so klar beurteilen zu können, dass es zwischen zulässigen und unzulässigen Opfern in der Zivilbevölkerung unterscheiden kann. Und das in einem Krieg, den die Aggressoren Hamas und Islamistischer Jihad mit einem hinterhältigen Überraschungsangriff auf die israelische Zivilbevölkerung, mit Mord, Geiselnahmen und sexueller Gewalt begonnen haben. In diesem Krieg versteckt sich die Hamas systematisch inmitten der Bevölkerung Gazas und nutzt menschliche Schutzschilde und zivile Einrichtungen, um aus dieser Deckung heraus zu operieren. (…)
Drittens ist nicht ersichtlich, wie das Vorgehen des ICC irgendeinen positiven Beitrag zur humanitären Lage oder zum Frieden im Nahen Osten leisten könnte. Israel ist ein entscheidender Machtfaktor in der Region, gegen dessen Willen nichts geschieht. Ähnlich ist es mit den USA, die den ICC ebenfalls nicht anerkannt haben und fest hinter Israel stehen. Das Gericht bringt beide Staaten gegen sich auf und bewirkt mit seinen Haftbefehlen nichts. Ausser dass der Ruf Israels weiter beschädigt wird – als ob es nicht genug Hass auf den israelischen Staat und die Juden in der Welt gäbe. Der Vorstoss wird in Israel deshalb zu Recht empört abgelehnt. (…)
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/israel-der-haftbefehl-des-icc-gegen-netanyahu-ist-anmassend-ld.1858763
Eurotopics, 23 novembre, libre accès
7) Le Soir sees a step in the right direction:
“One can assume that the Palestinian victims of Israel’s terrifying methods in the Gaza Strip will greet the announcement of the arrest warrants with satisfaction tinged with disbelief. … The victims suspect that there is a long way to go yet and that the spectacle of an Israeli prime minister appearing before his judges in The Hague will probably never happen. … Nonetheless, these arrest warrants, which have been a long time coming due to heavy pressure on the ICC, represent a very welcome debut in international justice. Something that goes (slightly) beyond symbolism. Moreover, this is a first, given that never before have the leaders of a state considered to be part of the ‘West’ been subjected to such humiliation.”
8) De Telegraaf is outraged:
“The court seems to ignore the fact that Israel is fighting a barbaric terrorist group that has vowed to murder, rape and take hostages until Israel is wiped off the map. … In the legitimate exercise of its right to self-defence, Israel is confronted with an enemy that is blatantly using citizens as human shields. … Clearly, none of this interests the ICC. The fact that the Hamas gang of murderers reacted jubilantly to the issuing of the arrest warrants speaks volumes.”
9) By equating Israel with Hamas the ICC is putting its authority at risk, criticises the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:
“No public mention of the genocidal terrorist attack that Israel is defending itself against. Arrest warrants against mass murderers and members of the government of a democratic constitutional state announced in the same breath. The Criminal Court should not be surprised if previously loyal Western states refuse to follow it – and the enemies of law and freedom cheer it on. A further rift is looming – and this from a court whose statute invokes the common bonds of all peoples and expresses concern ‘that this fragile mosaic could be destroyed at any time’. And so it is.”
10) Europe won’t go against the United States on this issue, Libération’s chief editor Dov Alfon predicts:
“Never short of enigmatic ways of expressing himself, the French Foreign Ministry explained that France has ‘always supported’ the Court’s actions, but that the arrest warrants represent ‘a complex legal issue’ and therefore the situation requires ‘many legal precautions’. Of course, the exact opposite is meant: the legal question is simple but requires complex political precautions. Since the United States has rejected the legitimacy of the warrants in the strongest terms, even before the future US president Donald Trump takes office, it is hard to imagine that Britain – or even France – would arrest Netanyahu at the risk of sacrificing the military support for Ukraine or Nato.”
11) The Times says the arrest warrants are counterproductive:
“Israelis are still traumatised by October 7 and the instinct of many will be to circle the wagons and defend their prime minister against what they regard as a remote and hostile institution bent on smearing their embattled nation. That innocent inhabitants of Gaza, thousands of children among them, have suffered grievously in the last year is beyond doubt. But the forum for examining Israeli policy and those directing it is the province of the Israeli legal system. The ICC’s grandstanding exercise in lawfare will simply create more heat, not light.”
12) Le Monde, 22 novembre, libre accès
Éditorial : Israël : des mandats d’arrêt contre l’impunité
La décision de la Cour pénale internationale de poursuivre Benyamin Nétanyahou et son ancien ministre de la défense Yoav Gallant pour crimes de guerre et crimes contre l’humanité rappelle une fonction essentielle de la justice, celle qui oblige à rendre des comptes.
The Economist, 22 novembre, article payant
More chaos in Gaza : Israel’s hardliners want no one else to control Gaza
Only 11 out of a recent convoy of 109 aid trucks managed to get in
Extraits :
Amid the catastrophic destruction of Gaza, new buildings are rising. Not shelters for Palestinians left homeless by the war, or hospitals for the sick and injured, but bigger outposts for the Israel Defence Forces (idf) along the new roads it has paved in key spots, bisecting the coastal strip and cutting it off from Egypt.
On November 12th the army opened another new road, at the Kissufim crossing on the border with Israel. For the moment this one is not meant for Israeli troops but to let aid into central and southern Gaza. Israel is eager to rebuff accusations that it is starving Gaza’s people. But on the first day the crossing was operating an aid lorry was stolen after entering the strip. The next day 14 out of 20 lorries trying to get in were stolen, some by Palestinian gunmen who shot and wounded the drivers.
One of the few things Israel and aid groups agree on is that Gaza’s growing chaos makes it ever harder to distribute aid to the 2.2m people there, most of them displaced by the war. Little is getting in. Nearly a third of the lorries entering Gaza are hijacked, reckons an Israeli officer. On November 18th, only 11 lorries in a convoy of 109 trucks made it into southern Gaza, says unrwa, the un’s agency for Palestinians.
Some looters run their own fiefs. Some are stronger than Hamas which, despite being battered by Israel, still controls parts of Gaza. One Israeli general admitted that idf units do not always try to stop looters because commanders are loth to risk their soldiers’ lives in the crossfire.
The situation in northern Gaza is dire. The un says that virtually no aid has reached parts of the area for 40 days, repeating its warnings that famine is imminent. Fishermen heading out to sea have been shot by Israeli troops. Prices of basics have soared. Onions cost 400 times as much as they did before the war, eggs 16 times and sugar over 25 times. Few people have cash to pay for food anyway: banks no longer function.
Israel has no clear plan for delivering aid to Gaza. Currently the lorries are brought in by international aid organisations or paid for by foreign governments. But once through Israeli checkpoints the convoys may come under fire from looters, the idf and Hamas.
Israel and the international groups blame each other. (…)
Israel’s security establishment wants to set up an alternative Palestinian force, aligned with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, to replace Hamas and take over running the strip. But Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, is against this. Rather than present a day-after strategy for Gaza, he sacked its main proponent, the then defence minister, Yoav Gallant. (…)
Mr Netanyahu is under pressure from his far-right allies to reject a ceasefire. They make no secret of their desire to build settlements in Gaza. (…) Concern is growing that the far right will exploit this lack of strategy to secure Israeli control of Gaza. (…)
With northern Gaza almost empty of civilians and most of its buildings destroyed, it looks ever likelier that Israel will insist on maintaining control to pave the way there for new Jewish settlements. ■
The Jerusalem Post, 22 novembre, article payant
UNRWA officials tell Hamas, PIJ ‘we are one’ in secret Lebanon meeting – report
The meeting held in 2017 showed UNRWA’s Pierre Krahenbuhl cordially meeting up with leaders in different Palestinian terror organizations, asking them to keep the meeting secret.
Extraits :
Former UNRWA commissioner general Pierre Krahenbuhl met with leaders of designated Palestinian terrorist organizations during his term, assuring them that “we are one” and “no one can separate us,” as published on a UN Watch expose. (…)
Strikingly, Krahenbuhl appeared to have been completely aware that such meetings were problematic, as according to UN Watch’s expose, he warned those present to maintain their discussions out of the public sphere, so as to avoid a “challenge” to their “credibility”, as well as “lead to a loss between donor countries and UNRWA, which might result in reduced or even halted funding.”
During these clandestine discussions, Krahenbuhl explicitly emphasized a “spirit of partnership” with those present in the room, and encouraged them to challenge UNRWA’s decisions privately, promising potential modifications or complete reversals of decisions. In his own words, Krahenbuhl advocated for a mutual partnership, inviting terrorist representatives to critique UNRWA’s decisions freely. He suggested they could meet “a thousand times” to discuss concerns, with the potential to alter or completely rescind existing policies.
“Your cooperation with us in security matters and your commitment to not closing UNRWA institutions, facilities, schools, or offices also completes this partnership,” said the UNRWA official to the leaders of Palestinian terrorist organizations, concluding by saying “If we can achieve this, it means we are united, and no one can separate us.”
These documents provide a stark insight into the complex and controversial interactions between UNRWA leadership and organizations designated as terrorist groups by multiple international entities.
UN Watch Executive Director, Hillel Neuer, reminded that Hamas official in Lebanon Ali Baraka, who was present at the meeting with Krahnbuhl, regularly met with UNRWA regional directors, some of which saluted him for Hamas’s anniversary. (…)
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-830147
Haaretz, 21 novembre, article payant
Israel’s War on Hezbollah’s Economic Empire: From Human Trafficking to Drug-running Captagon
The Lebanese terror group owns a construction company, produces drugs and smuggles oil from Iran. Israeli jets have attacked Hezbollah financial institutions in Lebanon, but the group’s economic network still spans the globe
Extraits :
Israel’s extensive attack on the Hezbollah-linked al-Qard al-Hasan financial institution last month served several purposes. Not only did the airstrikes across Lebanon destroy buildings and offices hoarding gold and cash, they sent a message to the country’s 1.5 million Shi’ites: Your economic, welfare and security network is being dismantled.
Israel was adhering to that famous old saying: “Follow the money.”
For many years, the Israeli intelligence community knew how crucial it was to track terrorist groups’ funds, but unfortunately this awareness wasn’t always prioritized in the battle against Hamas and Hezbollah.
The turning point came after October 7, when the public was outraged at the Netanyahu government for having allowed and even encouraged Qatar to send funds to Gaza. A sizable chunk went toward arming Hamas.
Now, with the war against Hezbollah in full swing, Israel is making a great effort to block the funding sources and money-smuggling routes of the Lebanese Shi’ite terrorist organization. (…)
According to Israeli and U.S. intelligence estimates, Hezbollah’s annual budget ranges from $700 million to $1 billion. A full 70 to 80 percent is funded directly by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. The rest comes from donations and illegal businesses.
This partly covers salaries to the 40,000 or so members of Hezbollah’s regular and reserve forces, and helps maintain the organization’s welfare system. The average salary of a Hezbollah operative ranges between $200 and $400 a month. Commanders receive more, depending on rank and position.
This budget doesn’t include the weapons transferred from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, says Matthew Levitt, an ex-counterterrorism intelligence analyst at the FBI and a former deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Treasury, where he handled terrorist-financing issues. Levitt, who is considered one of the world’s leading experts in this field, is currently a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (…)
Hezbollah has ventured to supplement its income in very creative ways, among them drug trafficking. Israeli intelligence knew about these efforts for decades but turned a blind eye because some dealers were recruited by Israeli intelligence, and some were double agents who worked with both Israel and Hezbollah.
The bulk of Hezbollah’s drug income comes from Colombian, Brazilian and Ecuadorian cartels. According to Levitt, Hezbollah doesn’t produce the drugs itself but its people launder money and move the proceeds.
The best-known drug lords are the Amin Baz and Taj al-Din families, which operate in Africa. Meanwhile, in 2016 the United States imposed sanctions on Shi’ite politician Amin Sherri for allegedly financing terrorism. In 2005 Sherri had been elected to the Lebanese parliament for Hezbollah, and last month Israeli planes bombed his offices.
Hezbollah takes part in production and trade of the drug Captagon (Fenethylline) – the “cocaine of the poor” – in southern Syria, where the Assad regime is also an active partner. Israel didn’t target the laboratories, even though Israeli intelligence knows their location.
“I don’t understand why we didn’t bomb them,” says Udi Levy, the former head of Harpoon, a secret Mossad unit that did battle in the financial wars against Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran. “The people especially suffering from the epidemic of the Captagon trade are Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and I suppose they’d be very grateful to us if the labs were destroyed.” (…)
Hezbollah also engaged in human trafficking; young women were smuggled from Eastern Europe and Africa to the Middle East. The key figure here was Mustafa Badreddine, notorious for the sexual abuse of women. Wanted for many years by Israeli intelligence, he was gunned down mafia-style at the Damascus airport. (…)
Levitt says that oil smuggling from Iran is an even greater source of income. To circumvent the sanctions, Iran transports oil to Syrian ports through a “shadow fleet” whose ships use fake documentation, register under the names of shell companies and fly foreign flags. (…)
Financial routes are harder to block than arms smuggling, Doron argues. “The first thing Iran and Hezbollah did after the [2006] Second Lebanon War was to resume the fund transfers to rehabilitate the organization and wounded people in the Shi’ite community. I find it hard to believe that this time it will be possible to dry up Hezbollah’s terrorist funds.”
New York Times, 21 novembre, libre accès
Israel and Iran Seemed on the Brink of a Bigger War. What’s Holding Them Back?
So far, direct attacks between the two adversaries have been precise and calculated. Whether that lasts is another question.
Extraits :
It has been nearly a month since Israel sent more than 100 jets and drones to strike Iranian military bases, and the world is still waiting to see how Iran will respond.
It is a loaded pause in the high-risk conflict this year between the two Middle East powers. Israel’s counterattack came more than three weeks after Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles — most of which were shot down — on Oct. 1 to avenge the killings of two top Hezbollah and Hamas leaders.
The first volley of strikes came in April, when Iran decided to avenge an attack on one of its diplomatic compounds by directly bombarding Israel with at least 300 missiles and drones. Even then, Israel waited days, not hours, to respond.
Not long ago, analysts might have predicted that any direct strike by Iran on Israel, or by Israel on Iran, would have prompted an immediate conflagration. But it has not played out that way.
Partly that is the result of frantic diplomacy behind the scenes by allies including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. But the calculated, limited strikes also reflect the fact that the alternative — a war of “shock and awe” between Israel and Iran — could lead to dire consequences not just for the region but also much of the world.
“The nature of the attacks seem to speak to a shared acknowledgment of the acute risk of an even deeper regional war that both sides still probably want to avoid,” said Julien Barnes-Dacey, the Middle East director at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
That does not mean there are not dangers to the current approach, he noted. “It’s an extremely precarious and likely unsustainable pathway that could quickly spin out of control,” he said. “There is also a possibility that Israel may be more deliberately working its way up the escalatory ladder with the intention of eventually doing something wider and more decisive.” (…)
One of Mr. Trump’s close advisers, the tech billionaire Elon Musk, met last week with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations in what was described as an opening attempt to diffuse tensions between Tehran and the incoming American president.
But Mr. Trump is widely expected to make U.S. foreign policy more favorable to Israel, and is stacking his cabinet with Iran hawks. That could very well bring the war between Iran and Israel into new terrain.
Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/world/middleeast/israel-iran-brink-bigger-war.html
Haaretz, opinion, 20 novembre, article payant
Israel Must Take Control of Gaza Aid if It Wants to Bring Hamas Down
Extraits
(…) Similarly, the “Generals’ Plan” proposed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland – to remove the inhabitants of northern Gaza, isolate the terrorists there and starve them along with whatever civilians decide to remain there – may seem rational on the planning table, but in reality it is deeply flawed and highly damaging because it has no political, legal or moral feasibility. Worse, its partial execution could cause Israel to pay a high price without reaping any of its promised gains.
From a purely military standpoint, Eiland’s proposal makes a lot of sense. Israel is grappling with a manpower shortage and from burnout among the reserves while the public is losing patience for continued combat and sacrifice in Gaza. This patience is a limited resource, and the repeated incursions into places that were previously “cleaned out” is eroding it. Evacuating civilians from hostile territory would enable Israel to isolate Hamas fighters. This would allow the army to control key points without incurring the high cost, in money and in human lives, of numerous entries into the same area, and also hit Hamas in a way that would hurt it most – with a permanent loss of territory.
Eiland is mainly correct in his assertion that Israel, under pressure from the international community, is sustaining Hamas. The terror group seizes the humanitarian aid that Israel brings into Gaza and uses it to maintain its hold on power. Instead of shortening the war, Israel is prolonging it by providing the enemy with food and fuel, and thereby also prolonging the suffering on all sides. (…)
However, (…) not everything that makes sense militarily also makes sense morally, legally and politically. Israel cannot starve thousands of civilians who may not be able to leave the dangerous area even if warned, especially if they haven’t been provided with a safe alternative. International law does permit the temporary evacuation of civilians from areas of conflict, but only for as long as the danger exists, and not permanently. And it certainly does not permit the deliberate targeting of civilians who have remained in the danger zone. (…)
I have frequently urged that Israel stretch the limits of the international community’s patience in order to achieve the main war goal: destroying Hamas. But totally blocking humanitarian aid would make the international community completely lose its patience, and consequently hurt the supply of arms to Israel. Partial implementation of Eiland’s plan would be the worst option of all: The international fallout would be severe, Israel would ultimately surrender to the pressure and let in the aid without achieving its goals.
Still, the problem that Eiland highlights cannot be ignored: Israel is sustaining the enemy, and thereby preserving Hamas’ gang-like and anarchic rule in Gaza. This reality obliges the Israel Defense Forces to carry out repeat raids of territory that it previously cleared, and this costs money, arms, and, most importantly, lives. The only solution is to direct the humanitarian aid into areas that are under total Israeli control and to distribute it there under Israeli supervision.
Israel should create “safe zones” in northern, central and southern Gaza. Tent camps would be erected in these zones, and supplied with water, food and medicines. They would be run by international organizations under Israeli oversight. Israel would invite Gazan civilians to these camps and they would be screened by the Shin Bet security service, which would identify and arrest Hamas militants. The IDF would gradually channel the humanitarian aid that comes into Gaza to these areas rather than to any of the areas under Hamas control.
In this way, Israel would fulfill its duty as an occupying force to provide humanitarian aid to the population, and prevent Hamas from controlling Gazan society by means of aid distribution. Israel could also lay the basis for a temporary military administration. In time, this administration would be replaced by local Palestinian rule that would be subject to Israeli oversight or credible international oversight and begin the long process of de-Hamasification and de-radicalization of the population in Gaza. Such de-radicalization is necessary as a basis for Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in the future.
The basic prerequisite for this to happen is for Hamas to be deprived of control over humanitarian aid, without Israeli planners getting carried away by false visions of what mass expulsion and starvation could achieve.
Prof. Orbach is a military historian at the Hebrew University and a co-author of the plan for the postwar rehabilitation of Gaza, “From a Murderous Regime to a Moderate Socie
The Economist, 20 novembre, article payant
America and the Middle East : Get ready for “Maximum Pressure 2.0” on Iran
The Trump White House may bomb and sanction the regime into a deal
Extraits:
OCCASIONALLY, THERE are second acts in American diplomacy. During his first term as president, Donald Trump abandoned the nuclear deal agreed on in 2015 by Iran and world powers. He went on to pursue “maximum pressure”, a policy of crippling sanctions meant to compel Iran into a stricter agreement. It was only half successful: though the sanctions battered Iran’s economy, Mr Trump left office without a deal.
Now he may get another chance. Many of the sanctions have remained in effect during Joe Biden’s presidency, but American enforcement has flagged: Iran’s oil exports climbed from less than 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2019 to a high of 1.8m bpd earlier this year, almost all of them sold to China. People close to the president-elect are keen to resume the pressure when they take power in January—but such talk has prompted unease in the Middle East, and not only in Iran.
OCCASIONALLY, THERE are second acts in American diplomacy. During his first term as president, Donald Trump abandoned the nuclear deal agreed on in 2015 by Iran and world powers. He went on to pursue “maximum pressure”, a policy of crippling sanctions meant to compel Iran into a stricter agreement. It was only half successful: though the sanctions battered Iran’s economy, Mr Trump left office without a deal.
Now he may get another chance. Many of the sanctions have remained in effect during Joe Biden’s presidency, but American enforcement has flagged: Iran’s oil exports climbed from less than 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2019 to a high of 1.8m bpd earlier this year, almost all of them sold to China. People close to the president-elect are keen to resume the pressure when they take power in January—but such talk has prompted unease in the Middle East, and not only in Iran.
Though Mr Trump has been vague about his plans, many of his cabinet nominees support tougher sanctions. Marco Rubio, his pick for secretary of state, opposed the original nuclear deal and criticised Mr Biden for his failure to enforce an oil embargo. Mike Waltz, the incoming national security adviser, wants to “reinstate a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign” against Iran.
There may be dissenting voices. (…)
Analysts think that tougher American enforcement could block up to 1m bpd of Iranian exports. That could halve Iran’s oil revenue at a time when its budget deficits are already soaring. What is more, Mr Trump might be able to avoid a big spike in American petrol prices: the International Energy Agency, a global forecaster, predicts an oil-supply glut of more than 1m bpd in 2025. The market could probably absorb the loss of some Iranian crude. (…)
Iran has blown past those limits. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog, estimated in August that Iran had more than 5,750kg of uranium enriched to various levels. That included 165kg at 60% purity, a hair’s breadth from weapons-grade. It has also resumed production of uranium metal, which can be used to make the core of a nuclear bomb. Iran could probably produce a bomb’s worth of enriched uranium in less than two weeks. Reviving the JCPOA would lengthen that timeframe—but it would still be far less than a year. (…)
America could ask for many things in a new agreement. (…)
The problem, of course, is that diplomats have tried to negotiate some of these provisions in the past. Iran refused. This is where advocates of maximum pressure think Mr Trump is their secret weapon: he could threaten to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities if diplomacy fails, and he might seem crazy enough that Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, would take him seriously.
Mr Khamenei may not, though. (…)
Instead he could try to call Mr Trump’s bluff. He knows that the incoming president does not want a war with Iran and that some of his allies are keen to disengage from the Middle East in order to focus on China. Rather than a comprehensive agreement, Iran could propose a limited one that simply pulls its nuclear programme back from the threshold. It could offer to get rid of its stockpile of 60% uranium, either by blending it down or shipping it outside the country, and to cap enrichment once again.
This would be hard for Mr Trump to defend, a far weaker agreement than the one he abrogated in 2018. But inconsistency never troubles him. He could argue that his predecessor left him a mess. (…)
The Jerusalem Post, 20 novembre, article payant
Italy admits rockets that hit UN forces were from Hezbollah, not Israel
Last week Italy had said an unexploded artillery shell hit the base of UNIFIL base, putting the blame on the IDF.
Extraits
Last week, Italy said an unexploded artillery shell hit the base of UNIFIL base, putting the blame on the IDF.
According to Barron’s, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto had initially said in Brussels that the IDF had staged the attack on the UN base in Lebanon.
Israel’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar had promised Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani an ‘immediate investigation’ into the shell incident.
However, an IDF review determined that Hezbollah was responsible for firing the rocket hit the UNIFIL post, the military said. (…)
UNIFIL agreed with the IDF report that these strikes were from Hezbollah, saying the rocket was “fired most likely by non-state actors within Lebanon.”
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-829916
Wall Street Journal, Editorial, 20 novembre, article payant
Pope Francis Turns on Israel
With his call for a genocide investigation in Gaza, the pope has taken a side.
Extraits
Pope Francis has written a new book to mark the 2025 jubilee. In an excerpt from “Hope Never Disappoints” that has generated headlines, he proposes a “careful investigation” by international experts into whether Israel’s actions in Gaza meet “the technical definition” of genocide.
But don’t kid yourself. What matters here is not the prospect of some authoritative finding by a respected international body. With this call, the pope has taken a side in the Hamas-Israel war. The headlines all have “pope,” “Israel,” and “genocide” in them—a great victory for anti-Israel forces. (…)
There is something disturbing about a pope accusing Jews—the victims of genocide themselves—of genocide while they are fighting for survival on several fronts against enemies aiming to destroy them. Especially after the barbarous Oct. 7 massacre of unarmed Israeli civilians that started the war, and the follow-up Hamas strategy of using innocent Palestinian civilians as human shields.
The complicated papal history with the Nazis during World War II should give the Vatican reason to be careful making anti-Israel pronouncements. The resistance and moral example of John Paul II against Communism that helped to topple the Soviet Union was authentic humanism. But under Pope Francis that moral witness has attenuated.
By his use of the word “genocide,” Pope Francis has not moved Gaza any closer to peace. All he has done is give aid and comfort to the enemies of the Jewish people and all civilized society.
Wall Street Journal, 19 novembre, article payant
Now That Harris Has Lost, Let Israel Win
Biden’s decision to block weapons shipments to the Jewish state was a military and political failure.
Extraits :
For months the Biden-Harris administration has sought to restrain Israeli military operations by blocking or delaying the delivery of weapons—far more weapons than has been reported. This policy has failed, and with the election over, it’s time to reverse it. (…)
Some of these delays may be for legitimate reasons—such as U.S. shortages—but others are intentional. (…)
Although President Biden has helped Israel defend itself—deploying U.S. military assets, which have helped shoot down Iranian projectiles—he has held back from helping Israel win. Israel seeks to dismantle Hamas, degrade Hezbollah and defang Tehran’s nuclear program. The Biden administration by contrast has sought to end the war immediately, for political expedience and out of strategic shortsightedness.
The politics of withholding weapons has failed. Mr. Biden and Kamala Harris seemed to think they could win Michigan, with its ample Arab-American population, by being tough on Israel. Ms. Harris lost Michigan to Donald Trump and did especially badly in the Arab-majority city of Dearborn, a hotbed of anti-Israel sentiment. The administration’s policy toward Israel may have contributed to Ms. Harris’s loss in Pennsylvania, where far more Jews voted for Mr. Trump than in 2020.
The policy also backfired on the war front. Delaying weapons to Israel has dragged out the war, worsening humanitarian conditions and undercutting U.S. interests. (…)
A well-armed Israel could press Hezbollah to agree to proper cease-fire terms. And even though major operations have mostly ended in Gaza, Israel still needs American weapons in case that theater reignites.
Israel also needs to be fully armed to take the fight to Iran—to retaliate if the regime strikes again, or to attack its increasingly dangerous nuclear program. If Israel crushes the Iranian axis, it would be a boon for U.S. interests. Iran and its proxies kill America’s troops, plot to assassinate its politicians and civilians, and meddle in its elections. Tehran’s nuclear program remains one of America’s greatest strategic threats.
Mr. Trump seems to understand this. (…)
Perhaps the expiration date of Mr. Biden’s policy is already dawning on the president. The State Department last week determined that it won’t carry out its threat made in a letter to Jerusalem last month to improve humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip or else be subject to an arms embargo. The administration should now go a step further: providing Israel with the weapons it needs to defeat the Iranian axis that threatens the free world.
Messrs. Makovsky and Misztal are, respectively, president and vice president of policy for the Jewish Institute for National Security of America.
Haaretz, 16 novembre, interview, article payant
‘By Allowing Suitcases of Cash Into Gaza, Israel Seriously Harmed the Global Fight Against Hamas’
How does Hamas’ shadow economy operate? How did the terror group’s leaders get so rich? And will become of the funds intended for Gaza’s post-war rehabilitation? Dr. Shlomit Wagman-Ratner, an expert on terrorism financing, has followed the money
Extraits :
(…) After we learned, on October 7, just how far a well-financed terrorist organization can get, maybe you can help us understand how it happened. How did Hamas morph from a small organization established in a refugee camp into an international organization whose annual turnover is estimated in the billions?
Hamas’ channels of finance are diverse. First of all, there’s state financing. Hamas received $300 to $400 million a year from Qatar and another $100 million from Iran. In addition, Hamas relies on a system of companies and investments that it has throughout the world. That activity, also estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year, is important not only because it opens channels of finance but also channels for various kinds of connections.
In other words, such a system serves Hamas’ weapons procurement.
Terrorist organizations, not only Hamas, have a serious problem with procurement. After all, they can’t just go and buy parts for a missile, say, under the name Hamas Inc. They need a framework for purchasing matériel. Hamas’ economic activity encompasses many Middle Eastern countries. Among others there are ties with mining companies in Sudan and Algeria, real estate firms in the United Arab Emirates, and an array of firms based in Turkey, some of which are actually public companies.
Turkey is essentially a center of gravity for Hamas’ economic activity, thanks to Mr. Erdogan.
There is one notable case – perhaps the only one I know at the global level – in which a commercial real estate investment company that’s traded on the Turkish stock exchange was declared by the United States to be a Hamas-owned entity. I do not recall another case in which a company listed on a stock exchange was declared to be linked to terrorist activity. After a declaration like that, a company is supposed to forfeit its assets, cease its activity and be shut down. This specific company is actually continuing to grow, not least because it won government tenders to build residential neighborhoods. (…)
In principle, is it even possible to eliminate a terrorist organization on the scale of Hamas or Hezbollah through economic warfare? Don’t all the means, all the systems, all the international cooperation – doesn’t all that simply add up, in the end, to just damage control?
The answer is complicated. A terrorist organization needs money, and plenty of it. If significant economic damage is inflicted on such an organization, its ability to act is obviously curtailed.
Curtailed, but not eliminated.
There is never total victory in the world of [fighting] terrorism financing. There are many small victories, but also serious damage can be inflicted. In the years in which the American sanctions against Iran were implemented with full force, Iran was shattered. The new Iranian president is now globe-trotting and begging for the sanctions to be lifted. Can terrorist groups be eliminated by this method? Apparently not. But there is simply no other way.
Le Figaro, 16 novembre, article payant
«Vous détruisez tout»: à Gaza, des réservistes israéliens mettent en cause la légalité des ordres appliqués
RÉCIT – Selon le quotidien « Haaretz », l’armée a ouvert seize enquêtes sur des suspicions de crimes commis par ses soldats dans l’enclave palestinienne.
Extraits :
(…) Plus discret, mais aussi plus massif, le phénomène dénommé en Israël « refus gris », prend de l’ampleur. Il s’agit de ces réservistes qui ne répondent plus à l’appel. D’après l’armée israélienne, 85 % des réservistes se plient désormais aux ordres de mobilisation, alors qu’au début de la guerre c’était 100 %. Après bientôt 14 mois de combats, ces hommes et ces femmes qui ont un travail, une famille, sont fatigués par de longues périodes sous le drapeau. Le modèle de l’armée israélienne, qui repose d’abord sur leur engagement mais pour des périodes en principe courtes, trouve là une limite. Le manque de bras pourrait devenir préoccupant.
Jeudi, le journal Haaretz a annoncé que l’armée israélienne enquêtait sur 16 dossiers qui pourraient constituer des crimes de guerre. Elle assure qu’elle agit dans le respect du droit international. De nombreux témoignages de soldats indiquent que le Hamas utilise la population et les infrastructures civiles pour cacher des armes, dissimuler ses combattants qui peuvent surgir, à n’importe quel moment, parmi un groupe de Gazaouis, d’un immeuble banal ou d’un tunnel, pour attaquer des militaires israéliens. Au brouillard de la guerre s’ajoute, chez ceux-ci, un sentiment du devoir et, parfois, un désir de revanche. Cela fait que peu de soldats osent dénoncer ce qui se passe dans le territoire palestinien. (…)
The Jerusalem Post, 14 novembre, article payant
EU’s Borrell proposes suspending Israel dialog over Gaza war concerns
Borrell cited “serious concerns about possible breaches of international humanitarian law in Gaza” in a Wednesday letter.
Extraits :
European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has proposed that the bloc suspend a political dialog with Israel, citing possible human rights violations in the war in Gaza, according to four diplomats and a letter seen by Reuters.
In the letter sent on Wednesday to EU foreign ministers ahead of their meeting this coming Monday, Borrell cited “serious concerns about possible breaches of international humanitarian law in Gaza” and said “thus far, these concerns have not been sufficiently addressed by Israel.”
The political dialog is enshrined in a broader agreement on relations between the EU and Israel, including extensive trade ties, that entered into force in June 2000.
“In light of the above considerations, I will be tabling a proposal that the EU should invoke the human rights clause to suspend the political dialog with Israel,” Borrell wrote.
A suspension would need approval from all 27 EU countries, which the diplomats said was very unlikely. Multiple countries objected when a senior EU official briefed ambassadors in Brussels on the proposal on Wednesday, said three of the diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity. (…)
The EU has struggled to find a strong, united position on the Gaza war, which was triggered by attacks by Hamas Palestinian militants on Israel on Oct. 7 last year. The bloc has called on Hamas to release all Israeli hostages and on both sides to respect international law.
Some EU countries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, are staunch backers of Israel, while others, such as Spain and Ireland, stress their support for Palestinians.
One of the diplomats said there was “astonishment” among ambassadors about “the lack of process and preparation” around the proposal.
His actions left the EU “more divided than ever,” said the diplomat.
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-829047
Wall Street Journal, editorial, 13 novembre, article payant
Gaza’s Forgotten Palestinian Victims
Who will protest on behalf of the dissidents tortured by Hamas?
Extraits :
You won’t see any street protests over it. No encampments on campus. Video evidence of the torture of Palestinians in Gaza elicits little reaction in the West—perhaps because the torture was carried out by Hamas.
On Sunday the Israel Defense Forces released a 47-minute montage of Hamas interrogations from CCTV footage that its troops discovered in Gaza. Israel says it found thousands of hours of footage, which are from 2018-20 and show “Hamas’s brutal methods for interrogating civilians, violating human rights and systematically oppressing residents suspected of opposing the organization’s rule.”
The scenes are repulsive, and they match accounts from victims of Hamas such as gay men, political dissidents and those accused of “collaborating” with Israel. Prisoners are seen in the video with sacks over their heads, chained to floors and ceilings in unnatural positions while they are beaten with canes on the soles of their feet. They writhe in agony while their torturers chat casually and recline—one with his hands folded behind his head.
This is how Hamas acts in peacetime against its own people. Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, got his nickname as “butcher of Khan Younis” for killing Palestinians accused of collaboration. When Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, it threw rivals off roofs. This war has also seen Hamas executing or torturing Palestinians who in some way are alleged to aid Israel or dare voice dissent.
Hamas’s brutality has never seemed to trouble the conscience of the student or activist left in the West. In the same way Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Syria, many of them starved and bombed indiscriminately in Damascus’s Yarmouk district, made no impression. No one gets worked up when Israel can’t be blamed.
That’s one reason the movement that calls itself “pro-Palestine” is better termed “anti-Israel.” Another is its demand that Israel leave Gaza to Hamas rule. When you hear the shout “Free Palestine,” understand what’s left implicit: “for a larger Hamas dictatorship.”
The Jerusalem Post, 13 novembre, article payant
Annexation vs. security: Israel’s strategic choice in a tense moment – editorial
Israel faces a choice: Pursue diplomatically fradulent West Bank annexation or focus on Iran and regional security threats.
Extraits :
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s recent call for West Bank annexation has put Israel at a decisive crossroads, one that invites scrutiny for the timing of his statements.
Smotrich envisions a bold step toward Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, eyeing the incoming Trump administration as a potential ally. But amid rising regional threats – from Iran’s relentless drive for influence to the ongoing conflicts with Hezbollah and Hamas – Israel faces far more urgent priorities that demand focus. (…)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long used annexation as a political lever, and Smotrich’s remarks may very well serve as a trial balloon to gauge Washington’s stance under President-elect Donald Trump. But Israel’s national security interests would be far better served by focusing on de-escalating regional conflicts and working closely with the US on countering Iran.
The man reportedly tapped by Trump to be his secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, is known for his assertive stance on Iran and aligns with Israel’s position on containing Iranian influence. With Rubio as a diplomatic ally, Israel could rally significant support from the US to counteract Iranian ambitions rather than risking a new front by pursuing annexation. (…)
Israel’s push for sovereignty in Judea and Samaria is not a new idea; Smotrich’s faction has long advocated for annexation, claiming historical and security justifications. However, extending sovereignty over the West Bank – a region Palestinians envision as part of a future state – is fraught with risks, especially in the context of international law and global perception.
Most world powers view the West Bank settlements as illegal, and a unilateral move to apply sovereignty could lead to severe diplomatic isolation for Israel.
It could also threaten to isolate Israel from its Arab allies – including signatories of the previous Trump administration’s Abraham Accords – and Saudi Arabia, whose consideration of warmer ties with Israel appears to be doubtful after recent contact between the Saudis and Iranians and comments by Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza.
Beyond the diplomatic consequences, annexation could lead to increased violence and unrest in the West Bank, triggering a potentially incomprehensible Third Intifada that Israel is ill-prepared to handle while already facing threats on multiple fronts.
Israel’s immediate focus should be on securing itself against the existential threat posed against it by Iran. An annexation move could further embolden Iran to destabilize the region by arming its proxies, potentially drawing more factions into open conflict with Israel. This is a risk Israel cannot afford, especially when there is an opportunity to strengthen the anti-Iran alliance with the US under Trump. (…)
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-828828
Wall Street Journal, 12 novembre, article payant
Why Iran May Dash for the Bomb
Regime voices are pushing for it, and panic over Trump may offer a new impetus for action.
Extraits :
Among the many challenges facing the incoming Trump administration is an Iran on the edge of nuclear arms. The mullahs have used the Biden years well, filling their coffers and advancing their atomic project. Much has changed in the Middle East since Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel has been more daring in taking on its enemies. But a middling power can do only so much, particularly when constantly badgered by a procession of Democratic Party luminaries.
Among the regional changes is how the mullahs conceive of their war against Israel. The Iranian theocracy now knows that its proxy strategy is flawed, that its conventional ballistic missiles lack accuracy and punch, and that the Jewish state can bomb anything inside Iran, with the possible exception of the clerical regime’s deeply buried uranium-enrichment plants.
At least one aspect, however, has remained constant. In its raid on Iran last month, Israel didn’t attack the greatest threat: Iran’s nuclear-weapons sites. Nor did it strike what would cause the most immediate, regime-shaking pain, the Kharg Island oil facility, through which about 90% of the Islamic Republic’s oil exports are shipped. Israel again showed its discomfort with escalating against Iran. That is likely owing in part to the Biden administration’s prodding for restraint, but also to Israeli fear that their fighter-bombers could fail against the Fordow uranium-enrichment site, which is buried beneath a mountain.
The Israeli government hopes the air force’s strikes inside Iran will induce more nuclear hesitation—that the regime won’t enrich uranium to bomb grade and assemble an atomic trigger. Israelis may be praying that Mr. Trump will relieve Jerusalem of the task of bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities or at least support Israel if it tried to do so. Given the nature of the threat, and how close the regime is to the bomb, time may no longer be on Israel’s side.
For the first time, important Iranian constituencies are publicly calling for the state to build nuclear weapons. (…)
Jerusalem’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear threat, and of whatever military actions need to be taken against it, is increasingly intelligence-based. Israeli leaders posit that the air force doesn’t need to act until the Iranians are enriching uranium to 90% and are assembling a nuclear initiator. (…)
In practice, however, Washington has never known when its enemies were dashing to the bomb, let alone initiated a military plan to stop them. Perhaps the Israelis will do better. (…)
As always, America remains the wild card in Mr. Khamenei’s calculations. The American political class doesn’t seem keen on patrolling or disciplining an unruly Mideast—but the U.S. remains a superpower capable of damaging if not derailing the bomb project if it chose to. Mr. Trump’s most consequential accomplishment was killing Iran’s dark lord, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, which spooked the regime. The new president’s unpredictability could slow down the regime’s nuclear aspirations. But the fear of the impending Trump administration could cause the mullahs to dash to the bomb, hoping that American and Israeli intelligence will fail to detect their move.
Mr. Gerecht, a former CIA Iran-targets officer, is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Wall Street Journal, 12 novembre, article payant
After War in Gaza, Rivals Hamas and Fatah Don’t Plan to Be in Charge
Palestinian factions aim to create an apolitical committee acceptable to Israel to oversee aid distribution and rebuilding
Extraits :
The two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, are coalescing around a plan for Gaza’s reconstruction when major fighting stops. Its main selling point: Neither will be in charge.
Palestinian officials from both factions, long bitter rivals, have reached a consensus to create an apolitical committee of Palestinian technocrats not affiliated with either of them to manage the sensitive and massive jobs of aid distribution and rebuilding, Palestinian and other Arab officials said. Their acquiescence clears one potential obstacle to a postwar plan discussed by the U.S. and Israel, which would put a temporary technocratic government in place in Gaza until it is stable enough for elections.
“They have a lot more room and urgency for common ground now and to avoid being sidelined,” said Tariq Kenney-Shawa, a policy fellow at the Palestinian Policy Network, a think tank.
Hamas is open to a committee not aligned with Palestinian factions to oversee aid and reconstruction, Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’s Doha-based political bureau, said in an interview. Fatah is also warming to the idea of an apolitical Gaza committee, said officials in the Palestine Liberation Organization political body and the Palestinian Authority, both controlled by Fatah. “An agreement [on such a formula] is likely,” said a senior official from the Palestinian Authority.
The initiative is fraught with uncertainty and dependent on a cease-fire deal that Hamas and Israel haven’t been able to agree on for more than a year. Even if the two Palestinian sides work out differences that have separated them for decades, it is unclear whether Israel would accept such a committee. The Israeli government is determined to stamp out what remains of Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and opposed to the Palestinian Authority’s involvement in running Gaza after the war. (…)
X, 8 novembre, article payant
Angeblich 70% der Getöteten in Gaza Frauen und Kinder. Wirklich?
Selon Jean Quatremer, journaliste à Libération, « un magnifique debunkage d’une étude du Haut commissariat aux droits de l’Homme de l’ONU affirmant que « 70% des morts » à Gaza sont des femmes et des enfants et qui est maintenant reprise partout comme vérité. C’est en allemand, mais le bouton traduire fonctionne très bien. En deux mots: problèmes d’échantillonnage et de sources ».
Extraits :
Die Medien titeln heute, 70% der im Gazastreifen Getöteten seien Kinder und Frauen. Das habe der Report des Büros des Hochkommissariats für Menschenrechte (OHCHR) ergeben. Die haben das sehr sicher als Pressemitteilung herausgegeben, die Medien prüfen das dann nicht mehr. Das macht absolut keinen Sinn. Und widerspricht sogar einigen Zahlen der Hamas selber. Denn der Anteil von Frauen und Kindern erreicht nach den Zahlen von 2016 etwa 71,5% der Bevölkerung im Gazastreifen. Dass hauptsächlich Männer in Kampfhandlungen verwickelt werden, wird hier nicht abgebildet. Wie kann das also sein?
Der eigentliche Report ist nicht einfach zu finden. Er wird weder in den Medien, noch in den Social Media Accounts der UN direkt verlinkt. Man muss sich auf die Suche begeben, in den hunderten UN Seiten suchen, um dann in einer Zusammenfassung einen Link zum PDF-Original zu finden. Das hat bereits einen Geschmack, ist bei der UN aber normal. Ich hätte ihn gerne auf dem U.M. Server bereitgestellt, der ist aber nach wie vor wegen einem Hacker-Angriff down. Hier der Direktlink: https://ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/20241106-Gaza-Update-Report-OPT.pdf…
In dem Report wird als Quelle u.a. auch der Lancet Artikel angegeben, der im Juli von 186.000 Toten im Gazastreifen ausging. Den ich und andere längst zerlegt haben. Geschrieben von einem Palästinenser, der Schätzungen abgibt. Und der auch keine Studie war, wie oft behauptet, sondern schlicht ein Leserbrief. https://x.com/ungemeve/status/1815000407401201815… (…)
Die Schlagzeile müsste also nicht lauten „70% der Getöteten in Gaza Frauen und Kinder“. Sondern entweder „13,6% der nachgewiesenen Getöteten im Gazastreifen Frauen und Kinder“ oder „70% der im Gazastreifen in Wohnhäusern getöteten sind Frauen und Kinder, im Gefecht Getötete wurden nicht erfasst“. Aber das verkauft sich nicht.
https://x.com/quatremer/status/1855177887147557068
The Economist, 9 novembre, article payant
Direction unknown : Will Donald Trump “stop the wars” in the Middle East?
What he does may depend on which son-in-law spoke to him last
Extraits :
ON HIS first day as president-elect, Donald Trump united the Middle East. Everyone agrees his second term in office will transform American policy in the region. But no one agrees on what that policy will be. Though his election probably heralds a dramatic shift, the direction he will take depends on who has his ear.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, was quick to curry favour. He was among the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect on what he called “history’s greatest comeback”.
He reckons that a Trump administration would give him free rein to continue Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon: there would be no more nettlesome American calls for a ceasefire (not that Joe Biden’s cajoling amounted to much). He has good reason to believe that. In his first term, Mr Trump showed little concern for the plight of the Palestinians. He supported the growth of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, drafted a peace plan that was deeply skewed in Israel’s favour.
But Mr Trump ran for office on a pledge to calm the region. “I’m going to stop the wars,” he said in his election-night victory speech. America has sent Israel $18bn in military aid since October 2023, and at least four American soldiers have died in connection with the fighting. Some in Israel wonder if Mr Trump will balk at the cost and demand that Mr Netanyahu end the war before he takes office. “Do you really think Trump wants this hanging over the first year of his presidency?” a Western diplomat in the region asks rhetorically. (…)
He has promised not to allow Iran to build a bomb. At the same time, he seems unenthusiastic about a conflict. “I don’t want to do damage to Iran,” he said on November 5th, adding that he wanted it to be a “successful country”. Some Iranians joke that the regime should offer him a property deal: the best way to clinch a new nuclear accord would be to throw in a contract for a Trump Tower in Tehran.
The people around him have mixed opinions. His first cabinet had close ties to the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, a bellicose Washington think-tank that advocates regime change in Iran. Some of its members may find roles in a second Trump administration.
At the other end of the spectrum is J.D. Vance, the vice-president-elect, who does not seem keen on a new war in the Middle East. In an interview last month he said that America and Israel would sometimes have diverging interests, “and our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran”. (…)
No one is sure how Mr Trump will govern this time. Last month he promised to bring peace to Lebanon. He did not say how. Will he demand that Israel withdraw its troops and agree to a ceasefire? Or will he back a wider ground invasion in the hope of uprooting Hizbullah for good? (…)
The Economist, 9 novembre, article payant
The war in Lebanon : Israel’s war aims in Lebanon are expanding
It is hoping for political change as well as the destruction of Hizbullah
Extraits :
(…) Lebanese worry that Israel’s war aims in their country now go far beyond the immediate destruction of Hizbullah’s fighting capabilities near the border. Israel has begun targeting important parts of the group’s non-military leadership. It tried to kill Wafiq Safa, the enforcer through whom Hizbullah imposed its will on the Lebanese state. Israel has also declassified intelligence it claims shows the location of the group’s vast financial reserves.
Across Lebanon’s various religious sects people speak of a creeping “Gazafication” of the war. They say that Israel’s campaign, which had been more targeted than in Gaza, is widening. They fear that the killing of civilians as “collateral damage” is becoming widespread and accepted. According to Lebanon’s health ministry, almost 3,000 people have died since October 2023 (it does not specify how many were civilians). Satellite imagery and video footage from the south show whole villages being destroyed by Israel’s forces.
American and Israeli officials see an opportunity to take advantage of Hizbullah’s relative weakness to get a new president in place, who might push back against the Shia group and be more friendly to the West. Last month, Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, called on the Lebanese to take action against Hizbullah to avoid “the abyss of a long war”.
Previous efforts to interfere in Lebanon’s politics have ended badly. An Israeli-backed Christian president was elected in 1982, only to be killed by an assassin with links to Syria before he took office. With the backing of the Syrian regime, Hizbullah is believed to have been responsible for the murder in 2005 of the prime minister, Rafik Hariri, which ultimately led to an uprising that forced the Syrians out of the country after decades of occupation.
Meanwhile, the outsiders who are officially meant to help maintain Lebanon’s stability have little power to do so. Neither Israel nor Hizbullah has any respect for unifil, a peacekeeping force. It has been ineffective in enforcing un Resolution 1701, which prohibits the militia from keeping an armed presence south of the Litani River, around 30km from the Israeli border.
And Israel has called on the un to withdraw from the south. Its troops have fired on unifil at least 15 times in the past two months. Israeli tanks rammed through the gates of a un base near the border. The un says that some of these incidents appear to have been deliberate; Israel claims un troops serve as human shields for Hizbullah. “They want us out,” says a former senior unifil officer. ■
Wall Street Journal, 8 novembre, article payant
Trump to Renew ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign Against Iran
Relations with Tehran, which sought to assassinate the president-elect and other former American officials, are likely to be even worse this time around
Extraits :
President-elect Donald Trump plans to drastically increase sanctions on Iran and throttle its oil sales as part of an aggressive strategy to undercut Tehran’s support of violent Mideast proxies and its nuclear program, according to people briefed on his early plans.
Trump took a dim view of Iran during his first term, aborting a six-nation agreement with Tehran—known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—that sought to curb Iran’s nuclear weapons work. He also imposed what was described as a “maximum pressure” strategy in hopes Iran would abandon ambitions for a nuclear weapon, stop funding and training what the U.S. considers terrorist groups and improve its human-rights record.
But when he takes office on Jan. 20, Trump’s approach to Iran is likely to be colored by the knowledge that its agents tried to assassinate him and former top national security aides after they left office, former Trump officials said. Iran is believed to be seeking revenge for a 2020 U.S. drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s covert paramilitary operations. (…)
The people briefed on Trump’s plans and in touch with his top advisers said the new team would move rapidly to try to choke off Iran’s oil income, including going after foreign ports and traders who handle Iranian oil. That would re-create the strategy that the former president adopted in his first term, with mixed results. (…)
Once back in the White House, Trump could face the same dilemma that Biden did in curbing oil sales by Iran and other adversaries such as Venezuela—the risk that oil prices could rise and spark inflation. (…)
“It’s going to be maximum pressure 2.0,” said McNally, who now heads Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm Rapidan Energy Group. (…)
Despite the mutual hostility, some who worked for Trump don’t rule out an eventual U.S.-Iran diplomatic deal in his second term. Trump likes to make deals, Mulroy said, but only “if it’s his deal.”
Le Point, édito, 8 novembre, article payant
Donald Trump, artisan de paix ?
L’ÉDITO DE LUC DE BAROCHEZ. Sur fond de guerre au Proche-Orient, le président élu entend renouer avec son projet de faciliter une alliance entre Israël et l’Arabie saoudite.
Extraits :
i l’Ukraine peut être considérée comme la perdante de l’élection présidentielle américaine sur la scène internationale, Israël en est le gagnant. La perspective d’un retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche donne des ailes à Benyamin Netanyahou. Toujours plongé dans la guerre contre les auteurs des massacres du 7 octobre 2023 et leurs soutiens, le Premier ministre israélien peut compter sur le 47e président des États-Unis pour lui apporter un appui politique et militaire encore plus solide que celui dont il a bénéficié en quatre ans de mandat de Joe Biden.
Au Proche-Orient, beaucoup retiennent du premier mandat de Trump (2017-2021) l’aval que son gouvernement donna à une série de décisions favorables à la droite israélienne : reconnaissance de l’annexion par Israël des hauteurs du Golan, conquises en 1967 sur la Syrie ; déménagement de l’ambassade américaine de Tel-Aviv à Jérusalem ; refus, contrairement aux administrations précédentes, de juger les implantations israéliennes en Cisjordanie illégales au regard du droit international.
Donald Trump, cependant, ne s’arrêta pas là. Lui qui aime conclure des « deals » se mua en artisan de paix dans les derniers mois de son mandat, en 2020. Il parraina les accords d’Abraham, premiers traités conclus par Israël avec des États arabes en un quart de siècle. Les Émirats arabes unis, Bahreïn et le Maroc rejoignirent l’État juif dans une coalition vouée au développement des échanges économiques et humains, une nouveauté au Proche-Orient puisque les arrangements précédents conclus par Israël avec l’Égypte (1979), l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (1993 et 1995) et la Jordanie (1994) ne débouchèrent, dans le meilleur des cas, que sur une paix froide.
Le grand œuvre trumpien s’arrêta à la frontière de l’Arabie saoudite, qui s’abstint à l’époque de s’y joindre. (…)
Trump a dit à Netanyahou qu’il entendait que les guerres en cours cessent sans tarder. Mais il lui a laissé la bride sur le cou, en l’autorisant à « faire ce qu’il a à faire » pour écraser le Hamas et le Hezbollah. Une fois installé à la Maison-Blanche, le 47e président des États-Unis sera tenté de renouer avec sa politique de « pression maximale » contre Téhéran, lui qui avait dénoncé pendant son premier mandat, à la demande de Netanyahou, l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien. Joe Biden a remis l’Amérique sur un cours plus conciliant avec Téhéran, mais son successeur sera d’autant moins enclin à le suivre dans cette voie que les services iraniens, selon le renseignement américain, ont cherché à le faire assassiner pendant la campagne électorale. (…)
L’Iran enrichit de l’uranium à tour de bras et s’approche chaque jour un peu plus du moment où il pourra fabriquer sa propre bombe nucléaire. S’il y parvient, les équilibres régionaux en seront bouleversés, au profit de Téhéran. L’État juif a averti qu’une telle situation serait inacceptable pour lui ; il fera tout ce qu’il peut pour l’en empêcher. Le retour de Donald Trump va-t-il encourager Netanyahou à s’embarquer dans des actions encore plus agressives contre la République islamique et ses installations nucléaires ? Le danger d’une conflagration régionale va accompagner l’installation du nouveau président à la Maison-Blanche. Le projet d’extension des accords d’Abraham pourrait alors en souffrir. Le talent de Donald Trump pour conclure des « deals » pacifiques risque d’être très vite mis à l’épreuve.
https://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/donald-trump-artisan-de-paix-08-11-2024-2574719_32.php
Le Point, 7 novembre, article payant
Donald Trump réélu, l’Iran retrouve son « pire cauchemar »
Le retour à la Maison-Blanche du milliardaire républicain, résolument pro-israélien et anti-République islamique, ouvre la voie à une escalade militaire dans la région.
Extraits :
(…) Les efforts déployés par la République islamique pour se débarrasser de Donald Trump sont à la hauteur du contentieux qu’elle a avec lui. Au-delà du cas de Qassem Soleimani, l’ancien pensionnaire de la Maison-Blanche est l’homme qui a torpillé le rapprochement entre Téhéran et le reste du monde au milieu des années 2010.
Son principal fait d’armes est d’avoir, en mai 2018, retiré les États-Unis de l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien (JCPOA), que respectait pourtant l’Iran, selon l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique, avant de prononcer contre Téhéran plus de 1 500 sanctions dans le but de le contraindre à accepter un texte à ses conditions.
Cette politique de « pression maximale » contre la République islamique n’a pas eu l’effet escompté. Loin de ramener Téhéran à la table des négociations, elle l’a, au contraire, encouragé à relancer tambour battant son programme atomique controversé. En parallèle, l’Iran a aiguisé le glaive de l’« axe de la résistance », l’alliance anti-israélienne et anti-américaine qu’il parraine, en accentuant son soutien militaire et économique aux milices chiites d’Irak et de Syrie, au Hezbollah au Liban, au Hamas et au Jihad islamique dans les territoires palestiniens et aux rebelles houthis au Yémen.
Autrefois secrète et indirecte, la guerre à laquelle se livrent l’Iran et Israël a éclaté au grand jour. Depuis le mois d’avril, les gardiens de la Révolution islamique frappent directement le territoire israélien avec leurs missiles et leurs drones, entraînant des représailles de Tsahal sur le sol iranien. Et seules les pressions exercées par Joe Biden sur Benyamin Netanyahou ont, pour l’heure, permis d’éviter un embrasement régional. Dans ce contexte explosif, le retour à la Maison-Blanche de Donald Trump pourrait mettre le feu aux poudres.
« Il faut attendre de voir si Donald Trump changera ou pas ses politiques hostiles à l’égard de l’Iran », tempère depuis Téhéran une source diplomatique iranienne. « Du point de vue de l’Iran, il n’existe, de toute façon, pas de réelle différence entre les démocrates et les républicains dans le sens où le président des États-Unis suit la même politique étrangère à notre égard, quelle que soit la couleur de son parti. » Officiellement, les Iraniens se veulent plutôt rassurants. Mais ces réactions de circonstance peinent à masquer une réelle inquiétude.
« L’élection de Donald Trump n’est pas une bonne nouvelle en Iran, car celui-ci est perçu comme étant très proche du Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou et développant à l’égard d’Israël un soutien sans faille ni limite », souligne Hamidreza Azizi, chercheur au German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), à Berlin. (…)
Pendant ce temps, les centrifugeuses iraniennes continuent de tourner à plein régime, si bien que la République islamique n’a jamais été aussi près de l’obtention de la bombe atomique (…).
La dernière attaque israélienne a laissé des traces en Iran en détruisant au moins trois batteries antimissiles de fabrication russe S-300 ainsi que deux systèmes de radar longue distance Ghadir, garantissant à l’aviation de Tsahal une plus grande liberté d’action sur le territoire iranien en cas de futures opérations. Considérant la perspective d’une bombe iranienne comme une « menace existentielle », le Premier ministre israélien, qui n’a jamais caché son souhait de frapper à terme les installations nucléaires iraniennes, s’était toujours heurté au veto de l’administration Biden, déterminée à laisser une chance à la diplomatie avec Téhéran. Avec le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche, le verrou américain vient de sauter.
The Jerusalem Post, 6 novembre, article payant
Why do IDF numbers of Hamas dead keep going down?
The IDF has dismantled Hamas’s 24 battalions.
Extraits :
In July, the IDF said that it had killed 17,000 Hamas terrorists.
Since then, if one adds up the number of times that the IDF said it killed dozens of terrorists in one day or more, the number of Hamas dead would need to have climbed to at least 18,000 and maybe even 19,000.
And yet recently, IDF sources said that the number of killed Hamas forces is at around 15,000.
How did 3,000-4,000 Hamas operatives come back to life in the last four months?
Moreover, this is not the first time that the IDF or the government has had to walk back statistics. (…)
There was a point in the war where maybe an argument could be made for greasing the statistics a bit as part of the psychological warfare which Hamas and Hezbollah were also playing aggressively.
However, that time period passed a long time ago and if there were any doubts, they should have revised downward for the highest level of accuracy long before the IDF’s July announcement. (…)
One hopes that this will be the last sudden revision downward by the IDF of its statistics on how many Hamas fighters have been killed.
Continued significant revisions of the numbers not only raises doubts about the IDF’s credibility of reporting on basic war statistics, it also harms Israel’s public relations war to reduce the quantity of Palestinian civilians its critics can say have been killed.
If 43,000 Palestinians have been killed, it makes a difference whether 25,000 were civilians or 30,000 were civilians, and it makes a difference whether Israel’s arguments on the issue remain consistent and based on evidence or whether they are viewed as politicized.
The IDF has dismantled Hamas’s 24 battalions. It is a fact that can be seen in the field. No one needs to exaggerate numbers to prove this more.
At the same time, Hamas has thousands or more fighters who have faded in with the civilian population and will be waiting to return when they think the moment is right.
Saying more of them are dead than really are and not taking this threat fully seriously will not help Israel in the future.
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-827562
The Free Press, 5 novembre, libre accès
Abigail Shrier: The Kindergarten Intifada
There is a well-coordinated, national effort between teachers, activist organizations, and administrators to indoctrinate American children against Israel. A Free Press investigation.
Extraits :
In August, the second largest teachers union chapter in the country—there are more than 35,000 members of United Teachers Los Angeles—met at the Bonaventure Hotel in L.A. to discuss, among other things, how to turn their K-12 students against Israel. In front of a PowerPoint that read, “How to be a teacher & an organizer. . . and NOT get fired,” history teacher Ron Gochez elaborated on stealth methods for indoctrinating students.
But how to transport busloads of kids to an anti-Israel rally, during the school day, without arousing suspicion?
“A lot of us that have been to those [protest] actions have brought our students. Now I don’t take the students in my personal car,” Gochez told the crowd. Then, referring to the Los Angeles Unified School District, he explained: “I have members of our organization who are not LAUSD employees. They take those students and I just happen to be at the same place and the same time with them.”
Gochez was just getting warmed up. “It’s like tomorrow I go to church and some of my students are at the church. ‘Oh, wow! Hey, how you doing?’ We just happen to be at the same place at the same time, and look! We just happen to be at a pro-Palestine action, same place, same time.”
The crowd burst into approving laughter.
Seated at a keffiyeh-draped table, Gochez said, “Some of the things that we can do as teachers is to organize. We just have to be really intelligent on how we do that. We have to know that we’re under the microscope. We have to know that Zionists and others are going to try to catch us in any way that they can to get us into trouble.”
He continued: “If you organize students, it’s at your own risk, but I think it’s something that’s necessary we have to do.” (…)
It’s tempting to dismiss this as one more bull session among radical teachers leading a far-left public-sector union. If only.
Four years ago, I was among the first journalists to expose the widespread incursion of gender ideology into our schools. Once-fringe beliefs about gender swiftly took over large swaths of society partly thanks to their inclusion in school curricula and lessons.
Today, extensive interviews with parents, teachers, and non-profit organizations that monitor the radicalism and indoctrination in schools convinced me that demonization of Israel in American primary and secondary schools is no passing fad. Nor is it confined to elite private schools serving hyper-progressive families. As one Catholic parent who exposes radicalism in schools nationwide on the Substack Undercover Mother said to me: “They’ve moved on from BLM to gender unicorn to the new thing: anti-Israel activism. Anti-Israel activism is the new gender ideology in the schools.”
Parents who watched in alarm as gender theory swept through schools will recognize the sudden, almost religious conversion to this newest ideology. And very few educators are standing against it. (…)
Especially in the year since the Hamas massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023, the anti-Israel materials have become pervasive. It’s not surprising that they are found in world history and current events lessons. But demonization of Israel is now taught in art, English, math, physics, and social-emotional learning classes.
“So how do we do all this without getting fired?” Gochez asked his assembled audience of public school teachers. “That’s the million-dollar question. And I don’t know how in the hell we have not been fired yet because I know for sure they have tried, but we have to organize. That’s the bottom line. If they come after one of us, the district has to know that it will be a bigger headache for them to try to touch one of us than it would be to just leave us alone.”
All for the sake of indoctrinating other people’s children.
https://www.thefp.com/p/abigail-shrier-the-kinderfada-revolution
The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 4 novembre, article payant
Israeli economic and social resilience shines amid war challenges
The resilience of the Israeli economy, the extraordinary strength of the Israeli people, and their genuine desire to continue this amazing project known as the State of Israel are sources of optimism
Extraits :
(…) What is remarkable, however, is that while Israeli investors continue to shift their funds and investments from Israel to overseas during times of war and significant uncertainty, foreign investors have accelerated their investments in Israel, demonstrating their appreciation for the state and the potential returns its investments can yield. (…)
According to the Balance of Payments report from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), foreign investments in Israel increased by $5.9 billion in the second quarter of 2024.
This represents the largest financial increase since early 2023 – a year in which foreign investors distanced themselves from Israel due to concerns over judicial reform. (…)
These positive and significant figures come despite and alongside Israel’s credit rating downgrades by all international rating agencies and the expansion of fighting against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
From a medium- to long-term perspective, foreign investors show that investments in Israel should be a part of every portfolio. Their “FOMO” (fear of missing out), reinforced by notable increases on the local stock exchange in the past year and peaks in leading indices, fortifies the investment establishment. (…)
How can we explain the significant gap between foreign and Israeli investors?
To put it succinctly: We perceive things differently from our perspective. Foreign investors have the ability to view Israel through a cold, calculated lens.
They don’t live here and don’t understand the anxieties that come with the war – existential fear, rocket alarms and alerts, managing a household when one partner is called to duty for extended periods, and the daily uncertainty stemming from threats and different fighting zones.
In addition to all of this, we also have to contend with the government’s steadfast opposition to a state investigative committee, the widespread belief that there are no real lessons to be learned, and contentious issues such as judicial reform, the promotion of settlements at all costs, and exemptions from military service for the ultra-Orthodox sector – all of which will persist for a considerable amount of time.
However, the resilience of the Israeli economy, the extraordinary strength of the Israeli people, and their genuine desire to continue this amazing project known as the State of Israel are sources of optimism and hope that things will improve in the near future.
Let’s hope those in power don’t sabotage it.
The writer is a media consultant who specializes in large-scale, multi-national companies and advises both listed and private companies in strategic planning, branding, IPO, and crisis management.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-827396
The Economist, 1 novembre, article payant
Diminished defences : Israel is keeping open the nuclear option
It has prepared a path to hit Iran’s nuclear sites after America’s election
Extraits :
WHEN IRAN fired 181 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1st, Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and at least some of his generals, spied an opportunity to do what the country’s air force had practised for decades—bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. The armada of more than 100 Israeli planes that flew east on October 26th instead hit only military facilities. But in doing so they may have disarmed Iran and paved the way for deeper and more ambitious attacks in the future.
Iran has long operated four batteries of the Russian-made S-300 air-defence system. In April, after another Iranian missile barrage, Israel neutralised one by destroying its target-engagement radar. Israeli sources suggest that the three remaining systems were taken out on October 26th. Satellite images seen by The Economist and analysed by Chris Biggers, an imagery expert who used to work for America’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, show evidence of a destroyed radar at Eslamshahr to the south-west of Tehran. Israel also hit a variant of the long-range Iranian-made “Ghadir” radar at Ilam on the country’s western border, says Mr Biggers.
The strike on October 26th used some stealthy F-35 jets to penetrate Iranian airspace. A larger number of non-stealthy F-15 and F-16 jets fired long-range ballistic missiles from Iraqi airspace. A strike on Iran’s deeply buried nuclear sites would require much more ordnance dropped from closer to the target.
That is now easier to achieve. Iran does have other air-defence systems. But these are less capable and have shorter ranges: an indigenous “Talaash” battery was present at an oil refinery in Abadan; the refinery was hit anyway. Russia, which faces a growing barrage of Ukrainian drones and missiles, is unlikely to be in a position to supply new radars. (…)
The strike at Parchin was notable for another reason. Israel promised the Biden administration—which supplied a THAAD air-defence system to protect Israel from any Iranian reprisals—that it would not mount a major attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, an act that could trigger a full-scale war days before America’s presidential election. But Israel could not resist making a small symbolic flourish.
Israel would probably need America’s assistance in a full-fledged assault on Iranian nuclear sites, not least given the number of munitions involved, which would tax even Israel’s large and capable air force. It may yet get it. America’s Central Command worked exceptionally closely with Israel in planning the latest strikes, according to Israeli security officials. On October 4th Donald Trump encouraged Israel to go after nuclear facilities: “That’s the thing you want to hit, right?” Should Mr Trump be re-elected on November 5th, Mr Netanyahu might decide that the moment is ripe for such an attack. Iran would now find it much harder to parry it. ■
The Economist, 1 novembre, article payant
The aftermath of the Israeli strikes : Iran needs a new national-security strategy
Will it choose a nuclear bomb or detente with America?
Extraits :
IT WAS TYPICAL Ali Khamenei: the man who makes the final decisions in Iran did not want to make one. On October 27th the supreme leader gave a speech about Israel’s air strikes on Iranian military facilities the previous day. It was a weighty moment: never before had the Jewish state overtly bombed the Islamic Republic, despite their decades-long shadow conflict. Yet Mr Khamenei’s words were muted. The Israelis, he vowed, would be made to understand the power of Iran. What that meant was up to others to decide: “Our officials should be the ones to assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done,” he said. It was not a call for calm, but nor was it a declaration of war.
Such indecisiveness is no longer sustainable. The Israeli air strikes on October 26th, retaliation for an Iranian ballistic-missile barrage on October 1st, had significance far beyond their military impact. They signalled the failure of Iran’s national-security doctrine. The strategy that Mr Khamenei pursued for decades has fallen apart—and Iran’s 85-year-old leader seems incapable of charting a new course.
The old course involved avoiding the choice between ideology and pragmatism that all ideological regimes tend sooner or later to face. Though Iran was not at peace with its neighbours, until recently it was not quite at war with them either. It spurned the West—“Death to America” was a core tenet of its ideology—even as it pursued the West, desperate for relief from economic sanctions. It could not decide whether its rogue nuclear programme was a path to a bomb or a bargaining chip.
A revolutionary who was jailed and tortured by the shah’s secret police, Mr Khamenei was, and still is, a zealous ideologue. He sees the West as decadent and insists that Iran should try to become self-sufficient. (…) Thus he tempered his ideology with pragmatism. The economy needed to be rebuilt, so he allowed Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who served as president from 1989 to 1997, to pursue better relations with Arab states and the West. But such overtures were never permanent. For Mr Khamenei, compromise was a tactical move: the destination remained the same, even if the path zigged and zagged.
Hostility towards America and Israel has remained a constant. Mr Khamenei sees the former as an implacable foe, and he believes not only that the latter must be destroyed but that it will be; he claims Israel will not survive past 2040. Under his leadership, Iran spent decades arming Arab militias, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon. They were to serve both as Iran’s forward defence—to keep conflicts away from its borders—and the vanguard of a future battle with Israel. But Mr Khamenei realised that battle lay in the future: he spoke of “strategic patience”, a multi-generational struggle to achieve his goals. (…)
When Hamas militants crossed into Israel and massacred almost 1,200 people, they demonstrated the flaw in using proxies: foreign groups can have divergent interests. No doubt Mr Khamenei supported the idea of a decisive war against Israel. Not the timing, though. But the late Yahya Sinwar, then the leader of Hamas in Gaza, had no time for “strategic patience”.
A strategy that was built over decades collapsed within a year. Hizbullah had looked formidable when it fought in Syria and skirmished on the border with a reluctant Israeli army. But it buckled in the face of a full Israeli assault. The brutality of Hamas’s attack on October 7th convinced Mr Netanyahu to drop his former caution, and Joe Biden, the American president, did surprisingly little to restrain him. Instead of a shield, Iran’s proxies became a liability.
Now Iran needs a new security doctrine. (…) One option would be to try to rebuild its militias. But that would mean doubling down on a failed strategy. Israel will probably never again be so tolerant of Iranian-backed militias on its borders, and those armed groups may struggle to regain their former support. Gazans are furious with Hamas for dragging them into a war, and many Lebanese feel the same about Hizbullah. Even if they could be rebuilt, it would take many years.
A second option would be for Iran to boost its own capabilities. It could try to strengthen a regular army hollowed out by decades of sanctions and under-investment. (…)
That leaves a third option, which is fast gaining support in Iran: a nuclear deterrent. Iran needs just days to enrich enough uranium for a bomb (though it would need much longer to build a warhead and fit it onto a missile). But a race for a bomb would invite further attacks by Israel and, perhaps, America—and with several of its S-300 air-defence batteries damaged by Israel’s strikes in October, Iran is in no position to defend against them. (…)
All of these options assume that Iran will need to deter America and Israel because it will continue to be hostile towards them. But it does have another choice: to pursue a less ideological foreign policy.
That would be a dizzying about-face. But Iran has made those before. (…)
A more pragmatic foreign policy would not upset Iranians, who are broadly dissatisfied with Mr Khamenei’s approach. For years, a popular protest slogan in Iran has been “not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran”. One recent poll found that 78% think Iran’s foreign policy is a cause of its economic problems, while 43% think it contributes to tensions in the region (just 18% think it eases them). Two-thirds of Iranians want to normalise ties with America.
There is far less support for recognising Israel, with just 25% in favour and 67% against (though, in a police state, people may not feel comfortable answering this question truthfully over the phone). But Iran would not have to establish ties with the Jewish state, merely stop fighting it, as most Arab states did decades ago.
It is hard to imagine Mr Khamenei talking about detente, a repudiation of his life’s work. His successor will decide whether to continue a war of choice that has impoverished Iran for decades and now brought it under attack by an enemy state for the first time since the 1980s. That decision has never been more urgent. ■
The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 1 novembre, article payant
When everything is genocide, nothing is
The genocide campaign aims to invert the most sacred element of post-Holocaust Jewish identity, using “never again” against the Jewish state itself.
Extraits :
“We need to start using the word genocide to make the world listen.” This was the first time I heard someone publicly accuse Israel of genocide at a Harvard Divinity School event, and no one even blinked.
It was just three weeks before Hamas’s October 7 massacre, during a screening of Israelism, a film that its creators claim is “redefining Judaism’s relationship with Israel” but perpetuates distorted narratives about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The audience member’s strategic logic was chilling in its simplicity: “We shouldn’t call Israel an apartheid anymore because the world doesn’t care. It’s not strong enough.”
What I witnessed was not just a semantic shift but the template for a calculated political strategy. Now, more than a year later, this cynical escalation of rhetoric has moved from the old Harvard auditorium to the mainstream of American political discourse. The repercussions go well beyond Israel’s image; they threaten to undermine the very framework we use to confront actual genocide worldwide.
While accusations of Israeli genocide were once confined to fringe social media accounts run by practical proxies of Iran or the Muslim Brotherhood, October 7th provided these claims unprecedented traction.
The genocide campaign was prepared in advance; Google Trends data shows that “genocide” searches started to climb one day after Hamas’s brutal attack. What began as a premeditated campaign has infiltrated student and academic circles, human rights organizations, leftist movements worldwide, and now, mainstream American political discourse. (…)
Why has the genocide claim against Israel gained such traction when similar claims regarding historical atrocities against African-Americans and Native Americans – involving millions of deaths – received far less international attention? Why do the deaths of 40,000 Palestinians – possibly half of them Hamas members – cause more moral outrage around the world than documented cases of mass murder throughout history?
The genocide campaign, despite being unfounded and easily refutable, remains profoundly dangerous for Israel and the American Jewish community because it doesn’t attack Israel on rational grounds but rather on an emotional level, targeting not Israel’s strategic assets but its spiritual and ideological foundations.
As Yossi Klein Halevi explains in “The War Against the Jewish Story,” anti-Zionist forces use the genocide claim to attack Israel’s fundamental right to exist. He argues that “the ease with which anti-Zionists have managed to portray the Jewish state as genocidal, a successor to Nazi Germany, marks a historic failure of Holocaust education in the West.” (…)
The weaponization of “genocide” requires more than just denials and social media posts by pro-Israel influencers that preach to the choir; it demands concrete action from both Israel and the global Jewish community. (…)
The solution lies in embracing a universalist approach while maintaining historical specificity. As Holocaust scholar Yehuda Bauer, who recently passed away, taught us, “The horror of the Holocaust is not that it deviated from human norms; the horror is that it didn’t.”
This means teaching the Holocaust alongside other genocides – not to diminish its uniqueness but to illuminate the patterns that make genocide possible. It means helping students distinguish between the tragic civilian casualties of war and the systematic attempt to eliminate a people.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. Failing to counter this campaign risks a future where “genocide” loses all meaning, becoming just another weapon in political warfare. Don’t be surprised if future generations will be mandated to visit museums commemorating a fabricated “Palestinian genocide in Gaza.” These institutions would serve not to educate about universal human rights but to delegitimize Israel’s very existence, recasting the entire Zionist project as a colonial enterprise of conquest.
The genocide campaign aims to invert the most sacred element of post-Holocaust Jewish identity, using “never again” against the Jewish state itself. We risk a world where real genocides go unchallenged because we’ve exhausted our moral vocabulary on false accusations. And we risk allowing the memory of the Holocaust – meant to serve as humanity’s eternal warning – to be turned against the very people it nearly destroyed.
The writer is a fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center researching how to combat extremism through people-to-people initiatives in the Middle East, and an expert on US-Israel relations, Jewish Diaspora affairs and antisemitism.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-826873
The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 1 novembre, article payant
Egyptian hatred amid peace: A machinery for producing hatred against Israeli Jews
Is there any hope left for completely changing these conditions to achieve popular peace?
Extraits :
Egypt’s machinery for producing hatred against “Israeli Jews” operates tirelessly, around the clock, and in an extreme and furious manner, despite more than 45 years have passed since the peace treaty between the two countries signed in Washington on March 26, 1979.
I will provide four examples to prove my point with verified evidence. All the following excerpts are part of extended statements. (…)
Al-Azhar Religious Institution
Al-Azhar is Egypt’s official religious institution and is also described as the “citadel of moderate Islam worldwide.” Its influence extends beyond Arab nations to many Muslim countries, which consider its views to be a binding reference. Although Al-Azhar is an institution of Sunni Islam, its statements regarding hostility toward Israel are nearly identical to the rhetoric of the Shi’ite clerics in Iran.
This is an excerpt from Al-Azhar’s statement commemorating the anniversary of the terrorist attack by Hamas militias against unarmed Israeli civilians in the Gaza border region on October 7, 2023:
“Al-Azhar deeply regrets the continued violence and destruction in Gaza for an entire year. It strongly condemns the ongoing terrorist aggression that continues to commit the worst forms of genocide and massacres, leaving thousands of martyrs and wounded, while the world watches in shameful silence and fails to take responsibility for this ongoing tragedy.” (…)
After the successful Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operation that resulted in the death of terrorist leader Yahya Sinwar and two of his colleagues, Al-Azhar issued this statement: “Al-Azhar mourns the ‘martyrs of Palestinian resistance’ who fell at the hands of a criminal Zionist force, which has caused havoc, killing and destruction, and occupied our Arab land, all while an international community remains impotent [and as] silent as death, and international law is worth less than the ink used to write it.”
Al-Azhar’s issues such official statements regularly throughout the year. Furthermore, its newspaper, Sawt Al-Azhar, directly supervised by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, doesn’t stop at incendiary statements. It continues to publish caricatures mocking Jews, celebrating terrorist incidents from October 7, and portraying the terrorists as heroic resistance fighters. (…)
Ministry of Education and Technical Education
In a disastrous media appearance that went unnoticed amid a flood of events, Mohamed Abdel Latif became Egypt’s Minister of Education and Technical Education on July 3, 2024. By virtue of his position, he directly oversees more than 25,657,000 students, according to the latest statistics from December 31, 2023 – a staggering number.
In that interview, he openly and proudly acknowledged the authoritarian military regime’s permanent approach and explained how “hatred is institutionalized and enmity is ingrained” in the minds and consciousness of millions of Egyptian students, directing these sentiments specifically against the State of Israel. (…)
When consider the role of state-owned media, officially controlled by Egyptian intelligence, and its significant contribution to the “hate and hostility toward Israel campaign,” which has been ongoing since the time of Abdel Nasser, we gain insight into the mindset we are entrenched in and what actions need to be taken (see the Magazine, “My longest 10 minutes” by Rami Mangoubi, June 1, 2007).
Is there any hope left for completely changing these conditions to achieve popular peace?
Yes – as Nelson Mandela said: “It always seems impossible until it’s done.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-827000
The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 30 octobre, article payant
For 75 years, UNRWA has sought to undermine Israel, perpetuate conflict – analysis
What did UNRWA accomplish in seventy-five years? Most of its camps played a key role in wars against Israel, and its mandate perpetuates the conflict.
Extraits :
n the wake of Israel passing two bills that essentially block the activity of the UN Relief and Works Agency in areas under Israeli control, UNRWA’s work is under scrutiny.
Many circles worldwide have condemned Israel’s actions. UNRWA is a “lifeline,” the UK says. UNRWA has claimed Israel’s vote is against the UN “charter.” The organization is “irreplaceable,” the head of the World Health Organization said on Monday.
What is most interesting about UNRWA is that the organization exists at all. Established by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1949, it began its work in 1950 toward providing direct relief and work programs for “Palestine refugees” – meaning, at the time, the hundreds of thousands of Arabs who had fled the fighting in British Mandate Palestine and, later, areas that became part of the State of Israel in 1948. (…)
What has UNRWA done since its founding? The organization has 58 recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza. Since UNRWA’s establishment, the number of “refugees” has increased. Today, for example, there are some 900,000 registered “refugees” in the 19 UNRWA camps in the West Bank.
The UN estimates that around one-third of the overall number of people considered “refugees” live in the 58 camps, meaning that many of them have moved to towns and other areas. In some cases, such as in Lebanon, they are often restricted to the camps.
UNRWA maintains not only the camps but also a large number of facilities linked to the camps and refugees. For instance, UNRWA says it has 155 facilities in Gaza, where it enabled 1.5 million internally displaced people to shelter in January 2024. There are eight refugee camps in Gaza; the Khan Yunis camp, for example, has almost 100,000 people registered in it. (…)
An organization that manages almost 60 camps and hundreds of facilities and serves a growing population that numbers some six million registered refugees is more like a country than an organization.
This is a crucial point; UNRWA, as an organization, including the refugees it deals with, is larger than approximately 80 of the countries that are members of the UN.Despite the good intentions that may have been behind its creation in 1950, UNRWA has transformed into something entirely different. The only reason to maintain an organization like UNRWA, which keeps millions of people dependent, is to use them as a proxy against Israel. (…)
What that means is that the UNRWA state or empire was organized to destroy Israel and use the refugees as the main engine of this destruction. For decades, the number of refugees has grown, and their political aspirations have shifted from supporting two states to supporting one state. October 7 was an outgrowth of this shift.
The concept of UNRWA is to keep Palestinians dependent, living in refugee camps generation after generation, while using its young men as foot soldiers to fight Israel.Winding down the camps and having the people live normal lives and believe in two states and peace could have potentially resulted in peace. However, the UNRWA mandate was never to embrace peace, two states, and coexistence. (…)
Since the 1990s, the UNRWA camps have not embraced two states or peace but have instead continued to embrace extremism, thereby becoming a hotbed for radicalism. The road to October 7 was paved from there. In Gaza, when Hamas took over, UNRWA didn’t oppose Hamas but was available to partner with it.
Now, Gaza has been destroyed in another war because of UNRWA’s unwillingness to end this conflict and stop using refugees as a tool against Israel.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-826651
Netanyahou, le fin stratège militaire
L’ŒIL DU GÉNÉRAL TRINQUAND. Le Premier ministre israélien a rétabli la crédibilité de son armée.Il lui faut maintenant établir une stratégie politique. (Le Point, 30 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Depuis plus d’un an, la guerre fait rage au Proche-Orient. Progressivement, Israël s’est attaqué à tous ses ennemis pilotés par l’Iran. Tout d’abord le Hamas à Gaza au lendemain des massacres du 7 octobre 2023. Puis le Hezbollah au Liban, via l’incroyable opération sur les bipeurs, les frappes ciblées dans le sud du pays et à Beyrouth, et enfin l’attaque au sol le long de la frontière. En même temps, des cibles sont atteintes en Syrie contre les milices et la présence iranienne. (…)
Ainsi, « l’arc de feu » établi par l’Iran autour d’Israël s’est embrasé. Le monde retient son souffle dans l’attente d’une déflagration régionale. Les pays sunnites du Moyen-Orient assistent à cette montée des tensions et, objectivement, laissent faire, voire soutiennent en coulisses Israël. Les États-Unis, après avoir réaffirmé leur soutien indéfectible à la défense d’Israël, ont annoncé leur volonté de se coordonner pour répliquer contre l’Iran.
Les succès tactiques d’Israël à Gaza, au Liban, en Syrie ou au Yémen laissent un goût d’inachevé. Une attaque décisive contre l’Iran commanditaire de ces mouvements est toujours redoutée. Au-delà de la réduction de la menace directe à l’encontre d’Israël, la possibilité d’empêcher l’Iran de disposer de l’arme nucléaire est dans toutes les têtes. Par ailleurs, un affaiblissement de Téhéran aurait un effet certain sur la solidité de l’axe constitué avec Moscou. Si une attaque importante directe devait effectivement survenir et provoquer un affaiblissement du régime des mollahs et de ses séides, la paix aurait-elle une meilleure chance ? (…)
« La guerre est la continuation de la politique par d’autres moyens », disait Carl von Clausewitz. Sachant que, depuis 1947, la question clé dans la région est celle palestinienne, quelle peut être la politique d’Israël dans ce domaine ? Actuellement, le seul horizon visible est la réduction des menaces, à défaut de leur éradication. (…)
Il faudra bien, toutefois, envisager une solution politique pour ne pas laisser une paix armée s’installer et attendre la prochaine explosion. Monsieur Netanyahou est en train de rétablir la crédibilité militaire d’Israël, mais il lui faut maintenant établir une crédibilité politique. C’est là la marque d’un véritable stratège. Yitzhak Rabin disait : « Seul un peuple fort peut faire la paix avec ses ennemis. » Après l’épreuve de force, il est temps de passer de la tactique à la stratégie qui permettrait de conduire à la paix.
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/netanyahou-le-fin-stratege-militaire-30-10-2024-2574049_24.php
Bruno Karsenti : “Cessons de considérer le conflit israélo-palestinien comme colonial ou civilisationnel”
Idées. Pour le philosophe, en dépit des victoires militaires d’Israël, le piège tendu par le Hamas le 7 octobre se referme sur l’Etat hébreu. “Netanyahou est en train d’unifier l’ensemble du Moyen-Orient contre Israël”, déplore-t-il. (L’Express, 30 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Comment pourrait-on se sortir de ces clivages identitaires, désormais exacerbés même en France?
La première condition, c’est de revenir à la véritable nature de ce conflit israélo-palestinien qui dure depuis près de quatre-vingts ans. Les politiques dans la région, tout comme ceux dans les pays occidentaux, doivent avoir conscience que ce qui s’oppose ici, ce sont deux prétentions nationales concurrentes. Cessons de considérer qu’il s’agit d’un conflit colonial, ou d’une opposition entre l’Occident et le Sud. On ne pourra s’en sortir que si l’on remet au premier plan une juste définition de ce conflit, qui reprend la manière dont le sionisme s’est formulé et réalisé et, en confrontation avec lui, la façon dont la cause palestinienne s’est forgée et autonomisée. Le problème, c’est qu’en Israël même, le gouvernement met en avant cette grille de lecture civilisationnelle d’un supposé conflit entre l’Occident et le “Sud global”. Il suffit de rappeler qu’une figure de l’extrême droite comme Ben-Gvir est originaire d’Irak, et donc de l’une de ces communautés juives qui ont subi l’expulsion des pays arabes, pour se rendre compte de combien la lecture raciale, civilisationnelle et coloniale est désajustée. Pourtant, parallèlement, dans les pays occidentaux, l’idée que l’Etat d’Israël aurait un caractère colonial gagne sans cesse plus de terrain, mettant en cause de cette manière sa légitimité. Cette déformation idéologique a des effets catastrophiques, pour les juifs comme pour les Palestiniens.
Après le 7 octobre, une partie des élites savantes l’a pourtant endossée sans la moindre hésitation. Alors que l’opinion générale majoritaire, dans les démocraties libérales, reconnaissait globalement le caractère antisémite du massacre, on a vu les intellectuels et les universitaires se cliver. Cela s’est manifesté essentiellement sur la gauche du spectre politique. De ce côté, reconnaître qu’il y avait bel et bien, centralement et pas marginalement, de l’antisémitisme à dimension exterministe dans les actes du 7 octobre, a paru souvent hors de portée. Certains, comme chez LFI, ont poussé la dénégation jusqu’à retourner la description et faire de ces actes des faits de résistance. Mais sans aller jusque-là, même la gauche sociale-démocrate, à laquelle j’appartiens, s’est montrée hésitante, rechignant à exprimer ce que pourtant, tacitement, elle devait bien reconnaître comme une évidence. Dans la revue K, nous avons au contraire choisi de souligner le caractère antisémite du 7 octobre en parlant à ce sujet de pogrom. On l’a fait avec la conscience que la catégorie n’était pas en toute rigueur applicable, puisqu’un pogrom concerne une population minoritaire visée par la population majoritaire, ce qui n’est pas le cas en Israël. Mais s’il fallait bien user du mot, c’était pour mettre les points sur les i. Le type de violence, le modus operandi du 7 octobre, tel qu’il était perçu par les juifs, mais aussi par tous ceux qui voyaient bien qu’il s’agissait de tuer, violer, brûler le plus de juifs possible dans le laps de temps où ils étaient à portée de main, n’était correctement décrit que par la référence au pogrom.
Appréhender correctement ce conflit, c’est d’abord prendre conscience que, dans sa dernière période, tandis qu’un sionisme religieux anti-arabe montait en Israël, le nationalisme palestinien a perdu de sa force et a été largement remplacé par un islamisme profondément antijuif incarné par le Hamas. Face à cela, c’est la solution à deux Etats qui doit être reprise. Mais pour arriver à un Etat palestinien, il s’agit d’abord de construire une nation palestinienne au sens moderne du terme, c’est-à-dire pluraliste, capable d’accepter des minorités, de prendre en charge le bien-être de sa population et d’entretenir des relations pacifiques avec ses voisins. Depuis les accords d’Oslo [NDLR : signés en 1993], les responsabilités dans l’éloignement de ce processus sont partagées, et Israël en détient à coup sûr une grosse part. Mais quand on mesure ce qu’est réellement le Hamas, et qu’on constate le délitement de l’Autorité palestinienne incapable de renouveler ses cadres, on ne peut pas nier non plus les problèmes qui existent du côté palestinien.
L’historien Yuval Noah Harari, auteur de Sapiens, nous exprimait récemmentle sentiment de solitude des progressistes israéliens qui doivent à la fois se battre contre le Hamas et le Hezbollah, contre leur Premier ministre Netanyahou qui menace la démocratie israélienne, et contre une partie des progressistes occidentaux qui appellent au boycott de tout ce qui vient d’Israël. De même, se sent-on aujourd’hui isolé quand on est un juif progressiste européen?
Pour un public assez disparate, et évidemment pour ses rédacteurs, la revue K a été une bouée de sauvetage, une sorte d’arche de l’après-7 octobre. Bien entendu, à la rédaction, nous avons d’abord été sidérés par l’acte lui-même. Mais la suite ne nous a pas surpris. Nous avions anticipé les réactions et les clivages profonds qui se sont produits immédiatement dans les opinions occidentales. Il était évident que l’antisémitisme avait déjà le vent en poupe en Europe. La revue est née justement il y a trois ans afin de documenter et d’expliquer ce qui n’arrive pas à être posé clairement comme un problème public. Nous n’avons pas été surpris non plus de voir une partie hégémonique, intimidatrice et péremptoire, de l’opinion savante se jeter sur l’occasion pour faire affirmer que tout type de projet national fort, comme l’est celui de la fondation d’Israël, ne peut jamais être au fond que de nature coloniale. C’est ce qui se produit aux Etats-Unis, mais aussi en Europe Ici, c’est le prix que l’on paie en l’occurrence du fait que l’Europe des nations n’arrive plus à se penser elle-même, et développe de plus en plus une forme d’autocritique sortie de ses rails. Or cela a pour conséquence de faire d’Israël, cet Etat-nation situé hors d’Europe, mais lié à l’histoire de l’Europe et à son identité reconstruite après 1945, le problème majeur du présent. Le fait qu’en Europe les juifs vivent dans une polarité entre une intégration forte dans leur Etat d’accueil, et un attachement à l’existence d’Israël en tant qu’Etat où leur sécurité en tant que juifs est potentiellement et par principe assurée, est de moins en moins compris aujourd’hui.
Je pense d’ailleurs que les Etats-Unis ont été plus surpris par les réactions antisémites de l’après-7 octobre que nous ne l’avons ne l’a été. La réussite de l’intégration des juifs dans une société multiculturelle y a longtemps paru quelque chose d’acquis. De plus, étant donné la quasi-parité numérique entre les juifs américains et les juifs israéliens – 5 millions contre 7 millions -, les Etats-Unis ont toujours considéré Israël pratiquement d’égal à égal. L’idée d’Etat-refuge a du coup beaucoup moins d’impact que dans l’esprit des juifs européens. Israël est plutôt vu comme un autre centre juif auquel on tient, mais qui est en somme presque de même nature que soi. C’est ce qui fait que les Américains ont été bien plus étonnés que nous de constater que la haine d’Israël était l’axe principal de la mouvance postcoloniale. En Europe, au contraire, la concurrence grandissante entre la mémoire post-Shoah et la mémoire postcoloniale est un fait reconnu depuis le début des années 2000. L’articulation entre deux figures du “plus jamais ça”, l’une accompagnant la colonisation et ses crimes, l’autre renvoyant à la destruction des juifs, ne s’est pas toujours vécue dans la tension et la contradiction. Mais c’est le cas depuis maintenant plus de vingt ans. Ce qui s’avère après le 7 octobre, pour les Européens, c’est l’accélération de cette tendance préparée d’assez longue main. (…)
The aftermath of the Israeli strikes : Will a humiliated Iran choose a nuclear bomb or a love bomb?
How 30 years of strategy blew up in the regime’s face (The Economist, 29 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
IT WAS TYPICAL Ali Khamenei: the man who makes the final decisions in Iran did not want to make one. On October 27th the supreme leader gave a speech to address Israel’s air strikes on Iranian military facilities the previous day. It was a weighty moment: never before had the Jewish state overtly bombed the Islamic republic, despite their decades-long shadow conflict. Yet Mr Khamenei’s words were muted. The Israelis, he vowed, would be made to understand the power of Iran. What that meant was up to others to decide: “Our officials should be the ones to assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done,” he said. It was not a call for calm, but nor was it a declaration of war.
Such indecisiveness is no longer sustainable. The Israeli air strikes on October 26th, retaliation for an Iranian ballistic-missile barrage on October 1st, had significance far beyond their military impact. They signalled the failure of Iran’s national-security doctrine. The strategy that Mr Khamenei pursued for decades has fallen apart—and Iran’s 85-year-old leader seems incapable of charting a new course.
The old course involved avoiding the choice between ideology and pragmatism that all ideological regimes tend to face sooner or later. Though Iran was not at peace with its neighbours, until recently it was not quite at war with them either. It spurned the West—“death to America” was a core tenet of its ideology—even as it pursued the West, desperate for relief from economic sanctions. It could not decide whether its rogue nuclear programme was a path to a bomb or a bargaining chip. (…)
Hostility toward America and Israel has remained a constant. Mr Khamenei sees the former as an implacable foe, and he believes not only that the latter must be destroyed but that it will be (he claims Israel will not survive past 2040). Under his leadership, Iran spent decades arming Arab militias, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon. They were to serve both as Iran’s forward defence—to keep conflicts away from its borders—and the vanguard of a future battle with Israel. But Mr Khamenei realised that battle lay in the future: he spoke of “strategic patience”, a multi-generational battle to achieve his goals. (…)
For Mr Khamenei, this may have seemed like validation. He wanted to pursue his ideological goals without embroiling Iran in a war. Regional chaos and hesitant foes allowed him to do that: Iran built a formidable proxy force and walked right up to the nuclear threshold without being attacked; it negotiated with America even as its militias struck America and its allies. The supreme leader’s balancing act worked—until October 7th.
When Hamas militants crossed into Israel and massacred almost 1,200 people, they demonstrated the flaw in using proxies for forward defence: foreign groups can have divergent interests. No doubt Mr Khamenei supported the idea of a decisive war against Israel. Not the timing, though. But Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, had no time for “strategic patience”. (…)
A strategy that was built over decades collapsed within a year. Hizbullah had looked formidable when it fought in Syria and skirmished on the border with a reluctant Israeli army. But it buckled in the face of a full Israeli assault. The brutality of Hamas’s attack on October 7th convinced Mr Netanyahu to drop his former caution, and Joe Biden, the American president, did surprisingly little to restrain him. Instead of a shield, Iran’s proxies became a liability.
Now Iran needs a new security doctrine. The immediate question is how it might regain some measure of deterrence. One option would be to try to rebuild its militias. (…) Gazans are furious with Hamas for dragging them into a war, and many Lebanese feel the same about Hizbullah. Even if they could be rebuilt, it would take many years. (…)
A more pragmatic foreign policy would not upset Iranians, who are broadly dissatisfied with Mr Khamenei’s approach. For years, a popular protest slogan in Iran has been “not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran”. One recent poll found that 78% think Iran’s foreign policy is a cause of its economic problems, while 43% think it contributes to tensions in the region (just 18% think it eases them). Two-thirds of Iranians want to normalise ties with America.
There is far less support for recognition of Israel, with just 25% in favour compared with 67% against (though, in a police state, perhaps not everyone feels comfortable answering such a question truthfully over the phone). But Iran would not have to establish ties with the Jewish state—merely stop fighting it, as most Arab states did decades ago.
It is hard to imagine Mr Khamenei talking about detente, a repudiation of his life’s work. His successor will decide whether to continue a war of choice that has impoverished Iran for decades and now brought it under attack by an enemy state for the first time since the 1980s. That decision has never been more urgent. ■
Mideast by Midwest : War is not the only reason some Muslims are ditching the Democrats
In Michigan, where Kamala Harris leads by less than a percentage point, it could be the difference (The Economist, 29 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
AS PRESS conferences go, the one held at the Arab American Chamber of Commerce building in Dearborn, a suburb of Detroit, on October 27th, was uncomfortable. On one side of a boardroom table, opposite a crowd of cameras and microphones, sat around a dozen men and women who are influential in Arab-American circles. Taking turns to speak, each of them explained how they were directly affected by war in the Middle East; how they felt disappointed and betrayed by President Joe Biden; and how despite it all, they would still be voting for Kamala Harris.
“I’ve heard people in my community say they want to punish Democrats for this war,” said James Zogby, the second speaker and the founder of the Arab American Institute. “They’re not going to punish Democrats. They’re going to punish immigrants. They’re going to punish innocent people.” He finished with a plea: “Don’t punish the country, the world, your children, your grandchildren, because you’re angry.”
As they spoke, a small crowd holding up Palestinian flags was gathering outside, suggesting that they would be doing exactly that: “There are traitors inside,” went the chant. “Endorsing our genocide.” Later they called the attendees “Zionist collaborators”. According to Jenin Yaseen, one of the protesters, the only difference between Ms Harris and Donald Trump is the speed at which each would accept the murder of all Palestinians. Both are appalling, she said, but she thought Mr Trump was at least honest in his contempt for the Palestinian cause.
Michigan is among the closest of swing states, with polls suggesting Ms Harris has the slenderest of leads: our model puts her just 0.4 percentage points ahead. And according to the census bureau, 310,000 people claim Middle Eastern or North African origins in the state, or about 3% of the total. Winning over Arab voters could deliver Mr Trump the election. (…)
There is some reason to think that a few Muslims would be drifting to Mr Trump even without the war, and that the bloodshed in Gaza and Lebanon simply provides an excuse. On a call organised by the Trump campaign on October 21st, Amer Ghalib, the mayor of Hamtramck, barely mentioned the war in Gaza at all. An imam present suggested that if Ms Harris wins, “the boys will turn to girls, and the girls will turn to a boy (…)
« En réalité, Israël a dénudé l’Iran »
INTERVIEW. L’historien militaire Pierre Razoux explique pourquoi les frappes israéliennes sont beaucoup plus handicapantes pour Téhéran que ce que l’on croit. (Le Point, 29 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
C’est une première dans l’histoire. L’État d’Israël a revendiqué, samedi 26 octobre, avoir réalisé des raids aériens de « précision » contre des sites militaires en Iran, en représailles de l’attaque iranienne au missile sans précédent menée le 1er octobre dernier contre le territoire israélien. (…) Si la riposte israélienne était attendue depuis trois semaines, son ampleur limitée a quelque peu surpris alors que le ministre israélien de la Défense avait promis une réponse « mortelle, précise et particulièrement surprenante ». Directeur académique de la Fondation méditerranéenne d’études stratégiques (Fmes), l’historien militaire Pierre Razoux est un des meilleurs analystes stratégiques couvrant le Moyen-Orient. Dans un entretien au Point, l’auteur de Tsahal. Nouvelle Histoire de l’armée israélienne et La Guerre Iran-Irak (Perrin) explique pourquoi les frappes israéliennes sont beaucoup plus handicapantes pour l’Iran que ce que l’on croit.
Le Point : Beaucoup d’observateurs ont été surpris par la modération de la riposte israélienne à l’Iran. Est-ce aussi votre cas ?
Pierre Razoux : Pas du tout. Je trouve cette riposte extrêmement calibrée et intelligente dans le cadre de la partie de ping-pong engagée entre Israël et l’Iran. Contrairement à ce que je pensais moi-même, cette attaque ne s’est pas révélée spectaculaire et a fait un nombre réduit de victimes : quatre soldats de l’armée iranienne qui opéraient sur des sites de défense antiaérienne. La volonté manifeste d’Israël de ne pas humilier l’Iran permet à ce pays de décrire le narratif qu’il souhaite en interne.
En réalité, Israël a signifié, à mon sens, à l’Iran, qu’il l’avait dénudé en frappant son système antiaérien dans ce qu’il a de plus performant, c’est-à-dire les batteries S 300 livrées par la Russie. C’est la même logique de signalement stratégique qui s’était déjà produite lors de la riposte israélienne du 19 avril dernier, lorsque Tsahal avait déjà détruit une batterie antimissile S 300 à Ispahan, près du site nucléaire de Natanz.
Mais cette fois, l’ampleur est bien plus importante. Le message est qu’Israël a détruit les meilleures batteries antimissiles sol-air iraniennes, qui plus est à côté d’objectifs stratégiques : le nucléaire, la balistique, la recherche et le pétrolier. La prochaine fois, les avions israéliens pourront par conséquent se balader comme ils le souhaitent au-dessus de l’Iran et bombarder ce que bon leur semble. À ce titre, je pense que c’est un signal très fort qui confère un avantage important à Israël.
Avec ce nouveau cycle d’attaques iraniennes et de représailles israéliennes, la boîte de Pandore de la guerre est-elle ouverte entre les deux pays ?
Si elle l’est davantage que la première fois, la boîte de Pandore n’est pas complètement ouverte. C’est-à-dire que les Israéliens disent aux Iraniens que s’ils sont raisonnables et qu’ils cessent leurs frappes directes contre Israël, alors ils peuvent en rester là. En revanche, s’ils continuent, la prochaine riposte sera bien pire, car l’Iran n’aura plus rien pour intercepter les frappes israéliennes, et sera humilié avec une attaque spectaculaire.
Donc, la balle est dans le camp des Iraniens qui doivent digérer tout cela. (…)
Dans la situation actuelle, les Iraniens peuvent-ils être encouragés à se doter au plus vite de la bombe atomique pour sanctuariser leur territoire ?
La question du nucléaire est le dossier le plus brûlant qui dépendra du nouveau président américain. Si Kamala Harris était élue, je pense que les Iraniens continueront à discuter avec les Américains et leur faire miroiter le fait qu’ils ne franchiront pas le seuil nucléaire. Mais si c’est Donald Trump, dont ils savent qu’ils n’ont rien à attendre sinon des problèmes, alors ils pourraient être tentés de gagner du temps jusqu’en juillet 2025, date à laquelle l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien (JCPOA) cessera officiellement d’exister.
Téhéran pourrait alors en profiter pour sortir du Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire (TNP) et se lancer dans l’obtention de bombes atomiques et se déclarer puissance nucléaire, comme l’Inde et le Pakistan. C’est probablement le calcul qui est déjà fait en Iran, même s’il n’est pas encore officialisé pour le moment, les Iraniens attendant le bon prétexte pour le faire.
En résumé, la réponse de l’Iran à Israël pourrait ne pas être des frappes massives contre l’État hébreu mais la fabrication de la bombe atomique, car à ce moment-là, tout le monde ira discuter avec Téhéran. Les Iraniens ont compris aujourd’hui qu’ils ne gagneront pas la bataille technologique contre Israël.
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/en-realite-israel-a-denude-l-iran-28-10-2024-2573875_24.php
Israel bombs Iran : Israel’s limited missile strike on Iran may be the start of a wider assault
Whatever Iran’s response to the attack, it carries risks for the regime (The Economist, 28 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
AFTER DECADES of shadow war between the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic, in the early hours of October 26th Israel carried out its first officially acknowledged attack on Iran. Dozens of warplanes flying at least 1,300km from their bases in Israel launched missiles against air-defence facilities and missile factories in three Iranian provinces, including on the outskirts of the capital, Tehran.
It is a measure of the sky-high levels of tension in the Middle East that the targets chosen by Israel, which were purely military, were perceived to be among the more limited of its options. Since Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1st, officials close to Binyamin Netanyahu had been talking up the Israeli prime minister’s view that a “historic opportunity” had opened up for landing a strategic blow on Iran.
Instead Israel mainly hit Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air-defence radars and missile launchers, avoiding its nuclear sites. Nor did the Israelis destroy vital economic targets such as oil-export terminals. This suggests that Israel is, for once, taking into consideration the pressure from its American ally. It may also suggest Israel is preparing the ground for a subsequent, much more devastating, strike.
The key to understanding Israel’s decision is the American political calendar. With America’s presidential election just ten days away, Israel had the choice of retaliating against military targets, with America’s tacit blessing, or defying President Joe Biden’s explicit warnings not to attack nuclear or energy-related facilities on the eve of the vote. The latter would have jeopardised future co-operation with a Democratic administration, should Kamala Harris win on November 5th. In the event of victory for Donald Trump, who has already expressed his support for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear programme, then there is always an opportunity for future strikes. (…)
This time Mr Netanyahu has chosen to exercise strategic patience, at least for now. But if he is prepared to pay a political price for choosing a more measured course of action against Iran, it almost certainly means that on the other fronts Israel is waging war–Gaza and Lebanon–he will be less receptive to pressure for ceasefires. Add to that the pressure from his far-right allies, who have the power to topple his government during the next session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which begins on October 27th, and any kind of cessation of Israel’s other wars looks less likely.
The nature of this strike on Iran appears to show that when America cares to apply serious pressure, it can still shape Israeli policy. Israel has repeatedly escalated the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon this year, in defiance of the Biden administration’s urgings. This time it acted in full co-ordination, so far avoiding a move that could have caused both regional conflagration and a global energy price spike. However the risk is that this attack was only a prelude to a more serious assault to follow. ■
Who are Gaza’s ‘civilians’? Inside Gazan identity, Hamas ties – opinion
Not everyone in Gaza should be declassified as a “civilian,” but I do think that another review of the identity of Gaza’s “civilian” population is required. (Le Jerusalem Post, 28 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
A year has passed since an estimated 2,500 Gaza civilians followed in the footsteps of the Hamas Nukhba units that broke through the Gaza security barrier, and ransacked and decimated a dozen Jewish border communities.
Some assisted the Hamas terrorists by pointing out specific homes, while others looted.
Several dozen had themselves photographed joyfully celebrating the day’s victory by standing on burning tanks and at ripped open fences, smiling with their fingers in the V-sign held high.
Multiple video clips display their actions, including one old Arab limping on his cane as he enters the back gate of the kibbutz.
Many hundreds more joyfully greeted the returning Hamas terrorists with live or dead hostages on their trucks, cars and motorbikes.
They shouted and cheered and several are pictured stomping on dead Israelis as well as hitting and spitting at the hostages.
Ironically, despite the expulsion of all Israelis from Gaza in 2005, tens of thousands of Gaza civilians had been in contact with Israelis, mainly due to the effort Israel made to provide employment in Israel so as to wean Gazans from terror.
Some 50,000 others, according to a CNN report, had benefited from the Israeli Road to Recovery NGO whose volunteers, many from the Gaza border communities, transported sick Gazans into Israel for medical treatment.
(…) A complex relationship
JEWS AND Arabs have had a complex relationship over the past century and a half. (…)
THE FIELD of biopolitics investigates how political power shapes the behaviors of whole populations through diverse strategies and controls. Gaza, however, acts in the reverse: The politics of the location is influenced by the demographic makeup of the Gaza Strip.
The current population of Gaza is estimated at two million. More importantly, more than 70% of that population is defined as refugees of Palestine. In other words, the “native” Gaza population is a small minority. The refugees cared for by UNRWA make up almost three-fourths (74%) of the current population of Gaza.
A 1988 study found that in 1948 Arabs, from some 144 cities, towns, and villages came to Gaza. The area’s population tripled by 1950 with 42% originating from the Lydda District and more than 50% from areas surrounding what became the Gaza Strip.
These now “refugees,” their identity maintained through food handouts, schools and summer camps, all overseen by Hamas, were indoctrinated that they are “foreign” to where they live.
Add to this the high rate of under-18 year olds, who are most prone to be attracted to violent behavior patterns, and the result is a constant wave of Hamas reinforcements.
To that reality, and taking into consideration the history outlined above regarding Gaza’s violent reactions to the Jewish resettlement enterprise of the last 120 years, the mantra of “Gaza’s civilians” and “Gaza’s non-combatants” must be reappraised. (…)
This analysis is not suggesting that everyone in Gaza should be declassified as a “civilian,” but I do think that another review of the identity of Gaza’s “civilian” population is required.
The writer is a researcher, analyst, and opinion commentator on political, cultural, and media issues.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-826338
The Dilemma Iran’s Leader Faces (NYT, Guest Essay, 25 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
If a person is fortunate enough to live into his ninth decade, life often turns toward quiet reflection, relaxation and the comforts of family and community. Not for the 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The sunset years of Iran’s supreme leader have been defined by a series of daunting challenges: regional humiliations, domestic uprisings, the looming threat of war with Israel and a pivotal decision on whether to pursue nuclear weapons — a choice with profound implications for his political legacy and the country he has ruled for 35 years.
In the past 100 days, Mr. Khamenei has endured devastating losses. Israel struck decisive blows against Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, including the assassination of the Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Yahya Sinwar in Gaza and the elimination of Mr. Khamenei’s most important ally, the Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Additionally, on Oct. 16, the United States sent B-2 stealth bombers — $2-billion-dollar aircraft capable of delivering 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs — to destroy weapons depots in Yemen linked to Iran’s Houthi allies. It was another blow to Iran’s proxy armies, and a clear signal to Tehran that its underground nuclear sites are within reach. (…)
In short, Mr. Khamenei has spent the autumn of his life violently repressing a population that wants to unseat him while simultaneously engaging in a sophisticated military and financial conflict with Israel and the United States. Now, on the cusp of a major military attack by Israel, a nuclear power, the supreme leader faces a critical choice: whether to pursue nuclear weapons. (…)
Until now, Iran has maintained a strategy of nuclear ambiguity, attempting to deter its adversaries by staying just short of developing a nuclear weapon without the severe economic and diplomatic penalties associated with one. Although Iranian officials long emphasized that Mr. Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding nuclear weapons under Islamic law, they now openly acknowledge their capacity to build such weapons if they choose, echoing U.S. intelligence assessments. Iran’s domestic media estimates the total cost of the country’s nuclear program — including sunk expenditures, lost energy revenue and foreign investment due to sanctions — can be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, yet it contributes a mere 1 percent to Iran’s energy needs.
Perhaps the most important role that Iran’s nuclear program has served for the last two decades is diverting attention away from its cultivation of missiles, drones and potent regional proxies. As a senior Gulf official once told me about the U.S.-led strategy toward Iran: “We spend all of our time trying to prevent them from acquiring a weapon they will never use, while neglecting the weapons they and their proxies use against us every single day.” (…)
Until now, Iran has maintained a strategy of nuclear ambiguity, attempting to deter its adversaries by staying just short of developing a nuclear weapon without the severe economic and diplomatic penalties associated with one. Although Iranian officials long emphasized that Mr. Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding nuclear weapons under Islamic law, they now openly acknowledge their capacity to build such weapons if they choose, echoing U.S. intelligence assessments. Iran’s domestic media estimates the total cost of the country’s nuclear program — including sunk expenditures, lost energy revenue and foreign investment due to sanctions — can be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, yet it contributes a mere 1 percent to Iran’s energy needs.
Perhaps the most important role that Iran’s nuclear program has served for the last two decades is diverting attention away from its cultivation of missiles, drones and potent regional proxies. As a senior Gulf official once told me about the U.S.-led strategy toward Iran: “We spend all of our time trying to prevent them from acquiring a weapon they will never use, while neglecting the weapons they and their proxies use against us every single day.”
Mr. Khamenei now faces a dilemma of his own making. Having ruled since 1989 — the last time he left Iran — he is caught in a high-stakes military, financial and psychological battle against America and Israel at a time when his own mental faculty and energy are undoubtedly fading. Hesitating to respond to adversaries’ provocations risks further diminishing his authority, yet a strong response could jeopardize his survival.
As he navigates these challenges, the growing pressure for succession discussions in Tehran will only intensify, raising critical questions about Iran’s future direction and stability. In this last chapter of his life, Mr. Khamenei must grapple not only with his legacy but also with the existential fate of the regime he has led for decades.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/opinion/iran-israel-america.html
Russia Provided Targeting Data for Houthi Assault on Global Shipping
Moscow’s assistance in attacks that are disrupting trade shows how the Kremlin is seeking to tie up the U.S. in the Middle East (WSJ, 25 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Russia provided targeting data for Yemen’s Houthi rebels as they attacked Western ships in the Red Sea with missiles and drones earlier this year, helping the Iranian-backed group assault a major artery for global trade and further destabilizing the region.
The Houthis, which began their attacks late last year over the Gaza war, eventually began using Russian satellite data as they expanded their strikes, said a person familiar with the matter and two European defense officials. The data was passed through members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who were embedded with the Houthis in Yemen, one of the people said.
The assistance, which hasn’t been previously reported, shows how far Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to go to undermine the U.S.-led Western economic and political order. Russia, in this case, supported the Iran-backed Houthis, which the U.S. designates as a terrorist group, as they carried out a series of attacks in one of the world’s most heavily traveled shipping routes.
More broadly, Russia has sought to stoke instability from the Middle East to Asia to create problems for the U.S., analysts say. The widening conflict in the Middle East, triggered by last year’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, has absorbed resources and attention at a time when Washington has sought to focus on the threats from Russia and China.
“For Russia, any flare up anywhere is good news, because it takes the world’s attention further away from Ukraine and the U.S. needs to commit resources—Patriot systems or artillery shells—and with the Middle East in play, it’s clear where the U.S. will choose,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, a think tank based in Berlin. (…)
Yahya Sinwar’s death : Yahya Sinwar made Hamas his own fief
Will his successor embrace more violence or compromise? (The Economist, 25 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
After the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in 2021 Yahya Sinwar appeared sitting in an armchair in the open air, surrounded by rubble and smiling. It became a defining image of defiance for many Hamas supporters. This time the story ended differently. Mr Sinwar died in the ruins of Gaza, like tens of thousands of victims of the war he unleashed a year ago. In a firefight with an Israeli patrol in southern Gaza, the leader of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group, was killed on October 16th. His death leaves Hamas shattered and divided.
To his supporters, the architect of the October 7th atrocities punctured Israel’s sense of invincibility and catapulted a waning cause into the world’s headlines. To his opponents, he brought hellfire down on Gaza. His rise was the culmination of decades of planning and outmanoeuvring of opponents, turning a movement into the Sinwar show. In prison the man became systematic in his thinking. “He had this military mindset,” said Khaled Zawawi, who was incarcerated with Mr Sinwar. According to Yuval Bitton, an Israeli intelligence agent, “He studied us through enemy eyes…he looked for weakness, for a point at which he could say, this is the time to attack.” (…)
One potential successor is Khalil al-Haya, who was closest to Mr Sinwar and supports close relations with Iran. Another is Mr Meshal, who might want Hamas to come under the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in effect accepting a two-state solution. In 2012 he cut the group’s ties with Syria in response to the Hizbullah-backed regime’s fierce suppression of the uprising there.
If Hamas survives Israel’s onslaught, whoever wins may determine where the group goes next. It may embrace more violence and extremism. Another path leads to moderation and compromise. Power politics at the top of Hamas will decide which route is taken.■
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/10/24/yahya-sinwar-made-hamas-his-own-fief
Israel must not end war yet despite Sinwar success
We, who want this war to end yesterday, must keep fighting tomorrow and tomorrow, until the aggressors – Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran – cave in. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 24 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
When Israel’s soldier-heroes killed Yahya Sinwar, President Joe Biden declared: “This is a good day for Israel, for the United States, and for the world.” Vice President Kamala Harris agreed, echoing Biden that “Israel has a right to defend itself, and the threat Hamas poses to Israel must be eliminated.”
Even Thomas Friedman, who has spearheaded The New York Times’ condemnation of Israel’s war and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for supposedly prolonging the campaign for political reasons, acknowledged: “it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the death of the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.”
Yet somehow, these military geniuses – like most others – failed to add four words: “and I was wrong.”
But they were – and still are.
They were wrong by constantly pressuring Netanyahu and Israel to end the war – months ago. They were wrong by opposing Israel’s entry into Rafah, where Israeli soldiers caught Sinwar in the broad net Israel needed to cast so wide and for so long after Hamas’s bloodbath.
They were wrong by unfairly politicizing Netanyahu’s stubborn determination to crush Hamas. And they were – and are – wrong, to treat this war as some video game that only kills really, really bad guys, with no innocents getting caught in the crossfire as the fight ends quickly and painlessly.
Urban warfare is grueling – especially with Hamas terrorists cowering behind Palestinians who also hate Israel. Don’t forget: “There has rarely been a military campaign like this, with Hamas leaders living and moving through hundreds of miles of tunnels, organized in multiple stories underground, determined to protect themselves with no care for the civilians suffering above ground.” Guess who said that? Biden last week.
Israelis appreciate the munitions America has supplied, and Biden’s tremendous moral support. Still, the obsessive attempts to restrain Israel terrify me as an American historian. (…)
Alas, refusing to incorporate new, inconvenient, politically incorrect facts into their worldviews, Biden, Harris, and Friedman instantly returned to the same stale rhetoric they used to try to restrain Israel for months.
Harris, whose words most count now, insisted: “This moment gives us an opportunity to finally end the war in Gaza, and it must end such that Israel is secure, the hostages are released, the suffering in Gaza ends, and the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination.” (…)
Indeed, we cannot “end the war in Gaza” until “Israel is secure.” And if the Gazans are truly innocent, they should turn on Hamas and force it to surrender, while freeing the hostages. (…)
The Wall Street Journal reports that Sinwar kept “urging” Hamas officials “to refuse a hostage deal. Hamas had the upper hand in negotiations, Sinwar said, citing internal political divisions within Israel, cracks in Netanyahu’s wartime coalition and mounting US pressure to alleviate the suffering in Gaza.”
A more unified global front against Hamas might have freed the hostages sooner; it remains the only way to end their suffering, which weighs on all people of conscience.
In short, we, who want this war to end yesterday, must keep fighting tomorrow and tomorrow, until the aggressors – Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran – cave in.
Only then, once Israel is secured, will those Palestinians who actually want “dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination” – rather than Israel’s destruction – have a shot at making progress, too.
The writer, a senior fellow in Zionist thought at the Jewish People Policy Institute, is an American presidential historian. His latest book, To Resist the Academic Intifada: Letters to My Students on Defending the Zionist Dream was just published.
Yahya Sinwar’s death is not enough to end the Israel-Hamas war – The Jerusalem Post
Au Liban, la double peine des chiites opposés au Hezbollah qui fuient les bombardements
RÉCIT – Dans la plaine de la Bekaa et au sud du pays, les chiites opposés au «parti de Dieu» subissent la répression des leurs en plus des conséquences de la guerre. (Le Figaro, 24 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) [Hussein] affirme aussi que le groupe islamiste est populaire essentiellement chez les plus démunis, et que, d’ailleurs, chaque nouvelle guerre, en créant du besoin, le renforce. Dans quelle proportion ? Une étude parue dans la revue Foreign Affairs en juillet a rapporté que 85% des chiites auraient « confiance » dans le Hezbollah. Mais les opposants chiites affirment généralement qu’au moins un bon tiers de la communauté serait en réalité piégé dans une relation de dépendance.
Inaudibles car systématiquement bâillonnés par le Hezbollah, les opposants n’en sont pas moins déterminés, comme Mahmoud Cheaib, 44 ans, qui s’est engagé dans le mouvement réformiste né des grandes manifestations de 2019 et qui réclame la fin du système confessionnel. Habitant à Nabatiyeh, ville du sud du pays, le chiite s’y est même présenté aux élections législatives.
Il raconte les intimidations, les agressions physiques, et la triche à peine dissimulée du « parti de Dieu » aux élections. « Le Hezbollah avait déployé des immenses photos de moi avec marqué : “espion américain”. » Aujourd’hui, il montre surtout les images de dévastations de la ville, bombardée encore jeudi par l’armée israélienne, et qui circulent sur les groupes WhatsApp des habitants.
(…) il n’y a, selon lui, qu’un seul responsable. « C’est l’Iran, peste-t-il. D’ailleurs, le Hezbollah a très peur que sa base militante se rende compte qu’elle a tout donné à l’Iran qui, à son tour, n’a rien fait pour la protéger, et que tout cela est un vaste mensonge. » Mahmoud évoque notamment la grande « tromperie » du « velayet-e faqih ». Cette doctrine religieuse iranienne justifie l’autorité sur les croyants de l’ayatollah Khamenei, censé être le représentant sur terre de « l’imam caché », le 12e successeur du prophète Mahomet mort en 939 selon la tradition chiite. « Cette doctrine a assujetti une partie de la population aux intérêts iraniens », juge-t-il. (…)
« La communauté chiite est dans les ténèbres, prisonnière de cette mythologie de l’imam qui va réapparaître, un mythe médiéval doublé du programme nucléaire de l’Iran », alerte de son côté Rasha al-Ameer, sœur de l’intellectuel libanais Lokman Slim, opposant de renom au Hezbollah, assassiné en 2021 de quatre balles dans la tête. « Mon frère avait prévu beaucoup de choses, dont cette guerre », dit-elle aussi.
Rasha al-Ameer a quitté sa maison au cœur du quartier de Dahié, à Beyrouth, pour se réfugier dans la montagne. « Je lutterai de toutes mes forces pour construire un nouveau Liban, loin de celui, piégé dans ce système confessionnel, légué par la France », explique-t-elle, en référence au compromis communautaire élaboré à l’indépendance du pays à la fin du mandat français dans la région. La plupart des chiites opposés au Hezbollah veulent y mettre un terme, même s’ils butent toujours sur la puissance du mouvement chiite, qui a phagocyté au fil des années le non-État libanais
Au Liban, la double peine des chiites opposés au Hezbollah qui fuient les bombardements
Will Israel assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei? – opinion
The idea of assassinating the supreme leader may recede slightly in favor of more vital targets. These could include Iran’s nuclear and missile program facilities. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 23 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The image of Israeli assassination targets recently shown on Israel’s Channel 14 and picked up by the BBC featured several figures allegedly wanted by Israel but did not include the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Those listed included Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Ali Al Sistani, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar (killed by the IDF last week), Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, Yemeni Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Al Houthi, and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani.
However, recent strikes and intelligence breaches targeting Iranian security institutions and their affiliated proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, make the scenario of assassinating Khamenei highly plausible. (…)
Several factors place Khamenei within the scope of potential Israeli targets, even if his name was absent from the publicized “assassination list.”
Indeed, this very omission could be considered an indicator of purposeful misdirection and deception. Such tactics are highly likely in these circumstances. (…)
THIRD, THERE are strategic assessments that view the scenario of targeting Khamenei as potentially the least costly and most impactful.
This scenario would have implications for disrupting the calculations of Iranian regime leaders and igniting conflict within the narrow circle of power. It could also create the conditions to spark popular unrest among those already primed to challenge the regime.
This is being fueled by deteriorating economic and security conditions and the country’s preoccupation with ongoing external confrontations and conflicts. (…)
The decisive factor in all of the above hinges on the assessment by Israeli decision-makers of the cost-benefit analysis being conducted during this period, which aims to maximize Israel’s strategic gains from the turbulent regional scene.
In my opinion, the idea of assassinating the supreme leader may recede slightly in favor of more vital targets. These could include Iran’s nuclear and missile program facilities.
This depends on Israel’s operational capability to carry out an effective strike against these facilities without the risk of facing a second strike. It also depends on the IRGC’s capability to retaliate against the potential Israeli attack. In this case, the scenario seems open to all possibilities, including all-out war.
Subjecting Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities to a failed or limited-impact strike could compel the IRGC to use all available offensive capabilities against Israel. They might do so without restraint or political calculations.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.
Is it in Israel’s interest to assassinate Iran’s Ali Khamenei? – The Jerusalem Post
Les 7 fronts de la guerre menée par Israël expliqués par les cartes
CARTE – Si la mort du chef du Hamas, Yahya Sinwar, signe «le début de la fin» de la guerre à Gaza, selon Benyamin Netanyahou, l’État hébreu continue de se battre sur plusieurs autres fronts, du Liban au Yémen en passant par la Cisjordanie et la Syrie (Le Figaro, 22 octobre 2024, accès libre)
How Hezbollah Is Destroying Lebanon
In the last year, we’ve witnessed a disturbing trend among some on the fringe left, who cheer those they think are resisting Western imperialism. (The Free Press, Bari Weiss, 23 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Podcast : 53 min.
How Hezbollah Is Destroying Lebanon | The Free Press
«Cette guerre est la leur, pas la nôtre» : dans le quartier chrétien d’Achrafié, à Beyrouth, le rejet du conflit mené par le Hezbollah
REPORTAGE – Beaucoup espèrent que l’affaiblissement de la milice chiite au Liban sera l’opportunité de reconstruire un État fort. (Le Figaro, 23 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Depuis un mois, le drapeau blanc habillé d’un cèdre entouré d’un cercle rouge a fleuri dans les rues d’Achrafié, quartier chrétien de l’est de Beyrouth. Comme chaque année, le principal parti politique chrétien, les Forces libanaises, y déploie son emblème pour commémorer l’assassinat, le 14 septembre 1982, pendant la guerre civile, de son fondateur, Bachir Gemayel.
« Cette fois, avec la guerre, cela permet de délimiter notre territoire », explique Charbel, le gérant d’une galerie d’art du quartier. « Cette guerre est la leur, pas la nôtre ». Il pointe du doigt la place des Martyrs, sur laquelle des réfugiés du sud du Liban se sont installés sommairement. « Nous ne voulons pas de réfugiés, ils peuvent être infiltrés par des combattants du Hezbollah », explique à son tour un client de la galerie, riche habitant du quartier.
Depuis le début de l’offensive israélienne dans le sud du pays, un quart du territoire libanais a été évacué par sa population qui cherche à échapper aux bombardements, selon l’agence de l’ONU pour les réfugiés. Les déplacés sont nombreux à avoir trouvé refuge dans les quartiers de l’ouest du centre-ville, installés à même les trottoirs et parfois dans leurs voitures qui encombrent les rues, garées en double file. Achrafié, en revanche, a fermé ses portes. Les écoles n’accueillent pas de réfugiés. De nombreux restaurants ont clos leurs portes. Et les rues sont inhabituellement calmes. (…)
« Achrafié a une symbolique très forte au Liban, explique Pascal Monin, politologue à l’université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth. Pendant la guerre civile, c’était al-Qalaa, “la forteresse”, le lieu de la résistance chrétienne le long de la ligne de démarcation qui séparait Beyrouth en deux. » (…)
L’actuel chef des « FL », Samir Geagea, est sorti d’un rare silence adopté depuis l’attaque des bipeurs contre le Hezbollah le 17 septembre. Il a d’abord appelé 12 octobre à l’élection d’un président de la République dont le siège est vacant depuis 2022, « seule option » selon lui pour parvenir à un cessez-le-feu entre le Hezbollah et Israël. Fidèle à sa ligne, il a ensuite haussé le ton face au Hezbollah, appelant à mettre fin à son « hégémonie » sans pour autant l’éliminer.
Député d’une circonscription d’Achrafié et membre du parti Kataëb allié des Forces libanaises, Nadim Gemayel s’emporte : « on n’a pas été capable de se libérer du Hezbollah. Si les Israéliens s’en chargent, tant mieux ! » Le fils de Bachir Gemayel précise néanmoins ne pas vouloir faire connaître à la communauté chiite l’humiliation connue par les chrétiens après avoir perdu la guerre civile. (…)
Non, M. Kouchner, ce qui se passe à Gaza ne justifie pas l’antisémitisme
TRIBUNE. « Comment faire pour ne pas être antisémite quand on voit les dégâts de l’armée israélienne à Gaza ? » demande Bernard Kouchner. Rien ne saurait justifier l’antisémitisme, répond l’historien Marc Knobel. (Le Point, 23 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Affirmer, comme le fait Bernard Kouchner, que, en raison de cette guerre, l’on pourrait devenir antisémite est très grave. En s’avançant sur un terrain miné, il semble minimiser la portée de l’antisémitisme en le liant à des événements tragiques. Une telle justification pourrait alimenter les stéréotypes millénaires dont les Juifs ont été victimes et encourager ceux qui cherchent à s’en prendre aux Juifs pour diverses raisons. Cela donnerait l’impression qu’il suffirait de trouver un prétexte pour justifier une montée de l’antisémitisme, légitimant ainsi cette haine tenace et déculpabilisant ceux qui y cèdent facilement.
Il est crucial de rappeler que nos compatriotes juifs vivent dans un climat de peur et d’insécurité. Les statistiques révèlent que les actes antisémites ont considérablement augmenté, atteignant des niveaux sans précédent. Depuis 2000, les Français juifs ont été confrontés à des vagues de violence, avec 13 091 actes recensés entre octobre 2000 et fin 2022. En intégrant les chiffres de 2023 (1 676 actes) et du premier trimestre 2024 (366 actes), ce total atteint désormais 15 133 actes, illustrant une réalité alarmante qui perdure dans notre société depuis plus de deux décennies. Cette situation met en lumière l’ampleur croissante de l’antisémitisme en France, qui n’est pas un phénomène récent mais une problématique profondément ancrée. Cette tendance inquiétante souligne la nécessité d’une vigilance accrue et d’actions concrètes pour protéger les victimes et combattre plus efficacement l’antisémitisme.
L’antisémitisme ne peut trouver aucune justification ; il ne peut être légitimé sous aucun prétexte. Dans ce contexte, entendre Bernard Kouchner me cause une profonde consternation. Chaque jour, mes collègues et moi-même luttons contre cette haine et en mesurons la dangerosité. Il est crucial de maintenir notre engagement à dénoncer l’antisémitisme sous toutes ses formes, car il constitue une menace non seulement pour les victimes mais également pour l’ensemble de notre société.
* Marc Knobel est historien, ancien membre du conseil scientifique de la Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la haine anti-LGBT (Dilcrah). Il est notamment l’auteur de Cyberhaine. Propagande, antisémitisme sur Internet (Hermann, 238 p., 24 €).
Non, M. Kouchner, ce qui se passe à Gaza ne justifie pas l’antisémitisme
Economic war : Hizbullah’s sprawling financial empire looks newly vulnerable
Why Israel is now bombing Lebanese banks (The Economist, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Residents of Beirut are, by now, used to warnings from the Israel Defence Forces ahead of bombing runs. Typically, these instruct locals to stay away from a tower block suspected of harbouring fighters, or perhaps a school said to double as a weapons cache. The warning on October 20th was a little different. It told people to steer clear of branches of al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH), a bank.
Israel targeted the bank because it is linked to Hizbullah. Once a mere militia, the group has enormous sway in Lebanon, where it runs a sprawling welfare system, in part funded via business interests at home and abroad. It draws power from a reputation as the Middle East’s most professional non-state outfit and from the popularity of its services, which it provides to Lebanon’s Shia sect even as it wages war against its neighbour. Israel hopes, therefore, that destroying AQAH branches will help undermine this strength and disrupt the financial flows which keep Hizbullah’s soldiers armed, fed and paid.
Lebanon’s economy has been a disaster since 2019, when a shortage of dollars precipitated a financial crisis. A huge explosion at Beirut’s port in 2020, in which more than 200 people died, made things worse. The government resigned; no subsequent caretaker one has lasted much longer than a year. At official exchange rates, the Lebanese pound has lost 98% of its value against the dollar since the financial crisis; last year inflation reached a high of 221% and debt hit 285% of GDP. IMF officials say that there is no one with whom to even begin discussing a bail-out. (…)
Where does the money Hizbullah holds in AQAH accounts come from? Getting cash into Lebanon is a labyrinthine operation, designed to dodge Western sanctions, and often involves Iran. According to several Western officials, Iran’s ambassador brings cash on a private jet each time he arrives in Beirut. Funds dribble in through a network of small currency exchanges that Iran uses to take payments for oil. Hizbullah officials are also employed as middle-men for Iran’s oil trade. According to America’s Treasury, Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal, one of the group’s financiers, each year trades Iranian oil worth hundreds of million dollars.
Iran provides $700m a year in direct support. Less than $200m of this makes it to Hizbullah’s civilian administration—far from enough to fund its varied social programmes. The rest is siloed in the budget of the military wing, which is kept away from the organisation’s bureaucrats, so as to prevent them from being subject to the extremely strict American sanctions, including secondary penalties, that the military wing already faces. (…)
Other sources of finance are unambiguously illicit. The Treasury reckons that Nazem Ahmad, just one dubious financier, has overseen at least $1bn in sales of goods, including art and diamonds, in the past decade. According to American officials, many of the most dodgy flows arrive from West Africa and Latin America. The Ivory Coast is a hotspot for the gem trade; Colombia plays a similar role for drugs. Different regions send cash in different ways. West Africa favours jets laden with cash, whereas South-East Asia tends to opt for disguised remittance payments. (…)
Iran is unlikely to come to the rescue. Despite its military support for Hizbullah, the country is itself mired in economic difficulties and will not have an appetite to bail out its ally’s welfarism. America is seeking support for a plan to force Hizbullah out of Lebanon’s government, which would only add to the group’s problems. Its soldiers are now said to be complaining of not being paid on time. And Israel’s targeting of AQAH could throw everything from hand-outs to Lebanon’s financial plumbing into disarray. As a Western sanctions official puts it: “Job done, for us.” ■
Hizbullah’s sprawling financial empire looks newly vulnerable
Iran, le début de la fin ?
L’ÉDITO DE LUC DE BAROCHEZ. La théocratie qui entend rayer Israël de la carte du monde est fragilisée et sa stratégie est dans une impasse. (Le Point, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israël a décapité le Hamas, après le Hezbollah. Et pourtant la guerre au Proche-Orient, qui vient d’entrer dans sa deuxième année, ne semble pas près de s’arrêter. La tentation est forte pour l’État hébreu de pousser son avantage afin d’affaiblir la République islamique d’Iran, en laquelle il voit, avec raison, une menace mortelle. L’affrontement peut-il conduire à la fin de la théocratie qui a identifié Israël comme l’État à rayer de la carte du monde ?
Le régime de Téhéran a enduré cette année les pires revers depuis que son fondateur, l’imam Khomeyni, avait dû accepter un armistice avec l’Irak de Saddam Hussein en 1988 – après huit ans de guerre, il avait eu l’impression de « boire une coupe de poison ». (…)
Développée depuis plusieurs décennies, la stratégie de Téhéran consiste à assiéger Israël par procuration, en finançant et en armant un réseau de milices anti-israéliennes à travers la région. L’onde de choc du méga-pogrom islamiste du 7 octobre 2023 a fait dérailler ce plan. L’acte barbare, conçu par Sinouar comme l’étincelle d’une apocalypse censée engloutir l’État juif, a tourné un an plus tard à la déroute du Hamas, à la dégradation du Hezbollah et à l’affaiblissement de l’Iran. La conflagration est bien là, mais pas dans les termes que le « boucher de Khan Younès » imaginait.
Les revers subis par ses affidés ont poussé l’Iran à descendre lui-même dans l’arène. À deux occasions, il a frappé directement Israël, les 13 avril et 1er octobre. Les salves de missiles furent puissantes et pourtant, chaque fois, les dégâts causés furent négligeables, grâce à l’efficacité de la défense antimissiles de Tsahal, renforcée par l’appui américain.
En s’exposant ainsi, la République islamique n’a fait qu’afficher sa faiblesse militaire, et donc sa vulnérabilité. La riposte annoncée par Israël, le jour où elle adviendra, va de nouveau la plonger dans un dilemme. (…)
L’affrontement, désormais direct, entre Israël et la République islamique devrait dessiller les yeux de ceux qui voient la question palestinienne comme la clé unique d’une solution de paix au Proche-Orient. Depuis un an, ce sont l’Iran et son hydre terroriste qui attisent les hostilités. Or, Téhéran se moque de l’avenir des Palestiniens ; il ne fait qu’instrumentaliser leur malheur pour se poser en leader du monde musulman. Le Hezbollah, de même, n’est en rien partisan d’une solution à deux États ; son objectif est l’éradication d’Israël. Idem pour le Hamas, qui n’a de cesse d’utiliser la population de Gaza comme bouclier humain. (…)
Netanyahou lui-même, dans un message vidéo adressé directement au peuple iranien, vient d’exposer sa vision à demi-mot. « Lorsque l’Iran sera libre, et ce moment adviendra bien plus vite qu’on ne le pense, tout sera différent, a-t-il dit. Nos deux anciens peuples, juif et perse, seront finalement en paix. » La face du monde en serait assurément changée. Cependant, l’histoire récente du Proche-Orient – qu’on se souvienne de l’Irak et de la Libye – invite à la circonspection quant aux effets d’un changement de régime imposé de l’extérieur. Ce n’est que si le peuple iranien parvient à secouer lui-même le joug qu’il retrouvera vraiment la liberté.
Military Gains Strengthen Netanyahu’s Hand, but Israelis Remain Divided
Hamas chief’s killing extends a run of tactical wins for Israeli leader (WSJ, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
A month of Israeli military successes, capped by the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, is boosting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s popularity and strengthening his political hand.
Netanyahu, who turned 75 on Monday, has once again shown incredible staying power as a politician, after his popularity suffered in the wake of last year’s Oct. 7 attacks. More Israeli voters would choose Netanyahu to be prime minister over the main leaders of the centrist opposition, according to the results of recent polls, which were conducted before Sinwar’s killing.
His rising support among right-wing voters could improve his position as the U.S. makes a diplomatic push for a cease-fire deal and Israel weighs a response to Iran’s missile strikes on the country earlier this month.
After the Oct. 7 Hamas-led attacks on Israel, the “assumption in the political system and in his own party was that he is finished,” said Yaakov Katz, senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, a think tank in Jerusalem. “The fact that he has gone from overseeing Israel’s biggest security failure to being the preferred leader is a remarkable testament to his political survival skills.”
The rising poll numbers don’t mean Netanyahu’s political troubles are over. Far from it. Deep divisions in Israel, including over how to win the release of hostages still held in Gaza, would likely make it difficult for him to forge a governing coalition if there were to be new elections, polls show.
New elections aren’t due for another two years unless the government falls earlier and no alternative majority can be found. (…)
“The Israeli system makes it very difficult for any opposition to bring down the government. For that to happen, the reigning coalition has to crack from within,” said Nimrod Novik, a fellow at the Israel Policy Forum, a New York-based think tank.
The premier’s biggest asset is the lack of a convincing opposition leader, say many analysts.
“There is no real opposition offering an alternative path in the current war, even though people have doubts that Israel can achieve its goals, let alone articulate an alternative future for Israel,” said Scheindlin.
She said the centrist former general Benny Gantz, whose once-strong popularity has faded in recent months, “never developed a political personality, a vision for the country.”
The months ahead will test Netanyahu’s ability to manage Israel’s multi-front war beyond vowing to carry on fighting.
Israel’s military leaders have warned that achieving lasting security benefits will require finding political arrangements in Gaza and Lebanon that prevent the re-emergence of hostile militant armies.
“Netanyahu has yet to leverage the military achievements into a political success,” said Katz. “He is afraid to outline a political resolution in either Gaza or southern Lebanon, because whatever the answer, there will be a political price,” he said.
Military Gains Strengthen Benjamin Netanyahu’s Hand, but Israelis Remain Divided – WSJ
Triple trouble : America’s election and Israel’s wars reach a crescendo—together
An Israeli aerial strike on Iran remains likely in the coming days (The Economist, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
WHEN MIGHT the fighting in the Middle East stop? The region is in the grip of a trio of wars that are connected yet also partly independent and dangerously unpredictable. Israel will probably attack Iran in the coming days in retaliation for its missile salvo of October 1st. Violence in Gaza continues to flare up despite the death of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas mastermind behind the October 7th attacks. And Israel’s war in Lebanon rages on: on October 21st America’s envoy said it had “escalated out of control”.
These three theatres are playing out against a fourth factor: the American election. Some in the Biden administration may hope that a last-minute push to achieve ceasefire deals before the polls open could stop the death toll in the Middle East from mounting any further—and as a result help Kamala Harris’s election prospects. Yet Israel may also have some incentive to keep fighting: a Trump victory would probably change the strategic backdrop by giving it even more latitude. (…)
One firm conclusion is that Israel is unlikely to accept ceasefires in Gaza or Lebanon until its strikes on Iran, and any Iranian counter-strike, are finished. But even then a decisive end to the mayhem is influenced by a final factor, the American election. Both candidates are already involved. Kamala Harris, as vice-president, has been on Mr Biden’s recent calls with Mr Netanyahu. Donald Trump has spoken with Mr Netanyahu as well. (…)
Ms Harris has promised to continue Mr Biden’s unstinting support of Israel. But she has been more forceful in calling for an end to the fighting, and in acknowledging the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. Yet it is far from clear that her victory would shorten the timeline of the Middle East’s wars. For one thing, Mr Biden would remain president until the end of January. It is conceivable that, with a Democratic victory secure, he might allow Israel even more leeway to hit Iran and its proxies; or, alternatively, that Israel might feel able to disregard the waning authority of his administration.
And what if Mr Trump wins? In the presidential debate in July, he said Israel should be allowed “to finish the job” in Gaza; on October 4th he said that Israel should strike Iran’s nuclear sites. The Middle East’s wars are hardly likely to be resolved by the time the next president is inaugurated. Instead there is a fair chance they will be the hardest problem on his or her desk. ■
America’s election and Israel’s wars reach a crescendo—together
Yahya Sinwar’s death shakes Iran, echoing the collapse of tyranny – opinion
Hamas leader Sinwar’s death marks the beginning of the end of Iran’s ‘unity of fronts’ strategy against Israel. (The Jersusalem Post, opinion, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Sinwar also brought ruin and destruction upon Gaza. His leadership deepened poverty and inflicted significant pain on the Palestinian people. It is no surprise that his demise brought a sense of relief to parts of the population in the Gaza Strip, already exhausted by the prolonged violence and destructive war. Those familiar with the fall of Nazi Germany may find eerie similarities to the corpses of leading Nazis, strewn among the devastation of Berlin, the capital of the Nazi empire, and the corpse of Sinwar in the ruins of the Gaza Strip. The Iranian backers of Hamas, who often evoke genocidal Nazi tropes echoed by Sinwar, may need a crash course on how the Third Reich ended in the greatest catastrophe in German history.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death shakes Iran – The Jerusalem Post
Bibi was right: How Israel’s recent military successes boost his leadership – editorial
Israel’s recent military successes have boosted Netanyahu’s popularity, allowing him to continue to play the political game. (The Jersusalem Post, édito, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) It is only natural that the popularity of the leader of a nation at war falls and rises with the fortunes of that war, and right now, Netanyahu’s numbers are on the rise as the war is going better than it was a few months ago. He still has a large percentage of the population angry with him; angry at the lack of a hostage deal; angry that responsibility for October 7 has not yet been taken; angry that thousands of citizens still cannot return to their homes, but Netanyahu has been around the block before and knows how to play the political game.
What Bibi has done is buy time, both hoping and gambling that his political fortunes will change as the tide of the war turns – from the very outset, he said this would be a long war. It seems the tide may have turned for the prime minister.
How Israel’s recent military successes boost Bibi – The Jerusalem Post
In Death, Hamas Leader May Have Won Wider Support Than When He Was Alive
Across the Arab world, U.S.-aligned governments find themselves in difficult positions as clerics and citizens praise Yahya Sinwar (WSJ, 21 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
For more than a year, Mustafa Muhammed, a displaced Palestinian, had sensed other Gazans living in tents there turning against Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Some people sleeping on the street or among the debris of their homes after waves of Israeli bombardments were growing openly scornful, he said.
That is, until Sinwar was killed—not deep in a tunnel, or fleeing Gaza, as many people suspected would be the case, but dying in an encounter with Israeli soldiers in the south of the strip.
Sinwar’s final moments were on display in a video released by Israel that apparently showed the Hamas chief critically injured, throwing an object at a surveillance drone shortly before his death. When Gazans saw the footage, many changed their minds, Muhammed said.
“It showed he was fighting until the very end,” he said. (…)
Sinwar’s actions as one of Hamas’s top operatives, and especially last year’s attack on Israel, divided opinion across the Palestinian territories and wider region. (…)
Only 29% of Palestinians in Gaza were satisfied with Sinwar, according to September polling from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. But the way he died has prompted a reappraisal among many Palestinians and Arabs, and it is putting some governments in a bind as they measure their own responses to his death.
Key U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt are in a particularly delicate position, analysts say. Swaths of their populations are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause if not Hamas itself, while their governments have either at points designated Hamas a terrorist group or are wary of its influence and connections to Iran. (…)
Officials from Egypt and Jordan—both having diplomatic relations with Israel and the latter having a significant Palestinian population—have mostly stayed quiet publicly. “They are going out of their way to not issue a direct response to this topic,” Rabbani said. (…)
The drone footage released by Israel appears central in this shift in sentiment toward Sinwar, said Gershon Baskin, a former Israeli hostage negotiator who is now Middle East director of the diplomacy advocacy group, International Communities Organization. (…)
Even one of Hamas’s most bitter rivals in the Palestinian movement, the Fatah party that governs the West Bank, on Friday said it mourned Sinwar. It called him a “martyr” and said his death wouldn’t dissuade the Palestinian people from pursuing freedom.
In Death, Hamas Leader May Have Won Wider Support Than When He Was Alive – WSJ
Why Israel ignores international advice and focuses on its survival – opinion
Despite well-meaning Western advice, Israel remains focused on battling Iranain-backed threats to preserve the Jewish state. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 21 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Bombarded by missiles from its foes and advice from its friends, Israel has learned to stand firm against both. Well-meaning advice is easy to promulgate from the safety of the US, the UK, and the capitals of Europe and is the more insidious of the two.
After all, Israel’s anti-ballistic missile systems, though not 100% effective, do offer the nation a fair degree of protection. But apparently, humane and virtuous calls to “react proportionately,” “negotiate a ceasefire,” and “stop firing in civilian areas” put Israel in the dock in the eyes of the world, charging the Jewish state with overstepping the mark.
The elimination of Yahya Sinwar on October 17 has, if anything, accelerated the process. Already President Joe Biden, presidential candidate Kamala Harris, and figures like UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer are calling for what amounts to a unilateral Israeli ceasefire, together with an unenforceable demand that Hamas release the remaining hostages. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reaction to Sinwar’s death was: “The war is not over.”
Purveyors of well-intentioned advice to Israel seem to ignore the oft-stated intention of Iran and its satellites in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq to eliminate the Jewish state and its people. Israel’s friends often appear to discount the fact that the nation has been fighting for its very existence from the moment it was established and that the fight is far from won.
They either fail to appreciate or simply do not believe that Iran has the West and its democratic way of life in its sights just as much as Israel and that by battling the Iranian octopus, Israel is fighting for the West as much as for its own continued existence. (…)
The prestigious British journal The Spectator carried an article by Douglas Murray on October 4 headlined: “Why Israel was right to ignore international advice.” It begins by setting down the picture of recent events in the Middle East as purveyed to the UK public.
“If you follow most of the British media,” wrote Murray, “you may well think that the past year involves the following events: Israel attacked Hamas, Israel invaded Lebanon, Israel bombed Yemen. Oh, and someone left a bomb in a room in Tehran that killed the peaceful Palestinian leader Ismail Haniyeh. (…)
As Murray observes: “All this time the governments in Britain and America have given the Israelis advice which mercifully they did not listen to. Earlier this year, Kamala Harris warned that the IDF shouldn’t go into Hamas’s Gaza stronghold in Rafah.
“Fortunately the Israelis did not listen to Kamala’s beginners’ guide to Rafah. They went into the Hamas stronghold, continued to search for the hostages, continued to kill Hamas’s leadership, and continued to destroy the rocket and other ammunition stores that Hamas has built up for 18 years.”
The nub of Murray’s argument is: “The wisdom of the international community is that ceasefires are always desirable, that negotiated settlements are always to be desired, and that violence is never the answer. As so often, these wise international voices have no idea what they are talking about. (…)
Why Israel ignores international advice – The Jerusalem Post
Michael Wolffsohn: Erfühlte Meinungen und historische Fakten – über ein paar verbreitete Legenden in Sachen «Palästina»
Die Haltung der Weltöffentlichkeit zum Gaza-Krieg ist gespalten wie kaum je zuvor. Wer sich ein schlüssiges Bild des scheinbar unlösbaren Konfliktes machen will, sollte die lange Geschichte gut kennen und genau analysieren – wider die Vorspiegelung falscher Tatsachen. (NZZ, Guest Essay, 21 octobre, article payant)
Michael Wolffsohn ist Historiker und Publizist. Aus seiner Feder liegen vor: «Wem gehört das Heilige Land?» (2002) und «Eine andere Jüdische Weltgeschichte» (2022).
Hier ist der komplette Text als PDF:
https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/21-octobre-deutsch.pdf
Peut-on frapper le nucléaire iranien ?
DÉCRYPTAGE – L’accélération des changements au Proche-Orient a remis la question nucléaire iranienne sur le devant de la scène. Mais Joe Biden pousse Israël à y renoncer. (Le Figaro, 19 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Depuis les massacres du 7 Octobre, c’est l’éléphant dans la pièce, le sujet tabou qui recouvre d’un brouillard menaçant le conflit au Proche-Orient, l’arrière-pensée des diplomates. Mise entre parenthèses par l’invasion de l’Ukraine en février 2022, la question du nucléaire iranien est brusquement revenue sur le devant de la scène. Israël peut-il, et va-t-il, dans sa réplique annoncée aux tirs de missiles iraniens, pousser les représailles jusqu’aux installations nucléaires iraniennes ?
Les forces de sécurité de l’État hébreu se préparent depuis longtemps à cette éventualité. L’accord sur le nucléaire iranien, scellé en 2015 entre la communauté internationale et l’Iran, qui visait à ralentir la marche de la République islamique vers la bombe, est mort, tué par le retrait unilatéral de l’Administration Trump en 2018 et par les violations de Téhéran. (…)
La fin de la coopération entre Israël et l’AIEA, le gendarme du nucléaire de l’ONU, a rendu aveugle la surveillance de la communauté internationale. Le renforcement des liens stratégiques entre l’Iran et la Russie, qui a fourni des missiles anti-aériens S300 à Téhéran pour protéger ses installations nucléaires, et le développement du programme balistique iranien jouent un rôle d’accélérateur dans le programme militaire iranien. En échange de l’aide militaire au Kremlin dans sa guerre contre l’Ukraine (drones et missiles), « la Russie partage avec l’Iran ses technologies, y compris sur la question nucléaire » a affirmé, en septembre, le secrétaire d’État américain Antony Blinken. Combien de temps faudrait-il alors à la République islamique pour devenir un État nucléaire à part entière, avec toutes ses conséquences, relance de la prolifération dans la région et parapluie formidable offert aux « proxies » pour se reconstituer ?
Les avis des experts divergent, mais la plupart évoquent quelques mois. Pour les autorités israéliennes, il s’agit donc d’une question existentielle. Depuis la révolution islamique, l’Iran se considère en guerre contre l’État juif, surnommé « le petit satan ». Le Hezbollah a fait de « l’anéantissement d’Israël » une de ses priorités. L’extension du conflit au Moyen-Orient, les attaques de l’Iran pourraient fournir à Israël, enhardi dans ses succès, une opportunité, dans le vide politique qui précède toujours les élections présidentielles américaines, de frapper les installations nucléaires iraniennes.
(…) Combien de temps faudrait-il alors à la République islamique pour devenir un État nucléaire à part entière, avec toutes ses conséquences, relance de la prolifération dans la région et parapluie formidable offert aux « proxies » pour se reconstituer ?
Les avis des experts divergent, mais la plupart évoquent quelques mois. Pour les autorités israéliennes, il s’agit donc d’une question existentielle. Depuis la révolution islamique, l’Iran se considère en guerre contre l’État juif, surnommé « le petit satan ». Le Hezbollah a fait de « l’anéantissement d’Israël » une de ses priorités. L’extension du conflit au Moyen-Orient, les attaques de l’Iran pourraient fournir à Israël, enhardi dans ses succès, une opportunité, dans le vide politique qui précède toujours les élections présidentielles américaines, de frapper les installations nucléaires iraniennes.
Mais cette option comporte des risques et des difficultés. (…)
Pour réaliser cette opération militaire de grande ampleur, Israël aurait en théorie besoin de bombes à perforation antibunker que les États-Unis ont pour l’instant refusé de lui fournir. Joe Biden a affirmé qu’il ne soutiendrait pas une attaque israélienne contre les installations nucléaires, qui pourrait selon lui entraîner une guerre régionale ou précipiter la décision iranienne de devenir un État nucléaire.
Au commencement était le Hamas. Mais à la fin sera l’Iran, la véritable cible, celle qui nourrit d’armes et d’idéologie ses affidés au Moyen-Orient. Comme l’affirmait récemment Joshua Zarka, l’ambassadeur israélien en France, dans une interview au Figaro : « Tant que l’Iran n’aura pas profondément changé, il n’y aura pas de paix dans la région. » Pour donner une chance à un changement de régime en Iran, Israël pourrait aussi décider de frapper les installations pétrolières, attaquant ainsi les rentrées financières du régime. Les États-Unis se sont également opposés à cette solution, qui déstabiliserait le marché des hydrocarbures.
Mais pourraient-ils, si Israël ignorait leurs pressions, rester à l’écart de ce nouveau front ? Ils ont frappé jeudi des dépôts souterrains de munitions des rebelles houthistes au Yémen, avec des bombes pénétrantes de dernière génération. Les mêmes qui pourraient frapper les sites iraniens. Un message direct à Téhéran.
Peut-on frapper le nucléaire iranien ? (lefigaro.fr)
Israel Kills Sinwar, and Biden Wants to ‘Move On’
The administration seems determined never to grasp the realities on the ground in Gaza and the region. (WSJ, opinion, 19 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
President Biden sees the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar as an opportunity to end the war in Gaza. “It’s time for this war to end and bring these hostages home,” Mr. Biden said to reporters Thursday in Berlin. He said he had spoken with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about how “we secure Gaza and move on.” Based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Middle East realities, this gambit is likely to fail.
The presidential election makes a peace initiative irresistible to Democratic Party leaders. If a cease-fire were achieved, Kamala Harris could celebrate it not only as a major foreign-policy achievement, but also one that benefits Israel. (…)
But Mr. Biden’s initiative is more than a play in domestic politics. Since the State of the Union address in March, he and his team appear to have seen the war in Gaza as the key to stabilizing the whole Middle East. Their approach clashes with the situation on the ground, and Sinwar’s death hasn’t changed that.
Team Biden’s diplomacy suffers from three major errors. First, it mistakenly assumed that Mr. Netanyahu could be forced into accepting a chastened Hamas as a major political actor in Gaza. “We have to be honest about the fact that Hamas will remain in Gaza in some form after the war is over,” a Biden official told the Times of Israel last May. “No amount of fighting is going to change that.” The White House masks its acceptance of Hamas by expressing its intention to “revitalize” the Palestinian Authority. But in 2007 Hamas expelled the Palestinian Authority by force from Gaza. When the Israelis have asked what would compel Hamas now to cede power, the White House has had no convincing answer. (…)
Second, the president and his team have misread the connection between Gaza and the Lebanon front. Biden officials seem to want a cease-fire in Gaza that will also lead to a cease-fire in Lebanon. They expect Hezbollah and Iran to stop attacking Israel once Hamas agrees to a cease-fire. (…)
Finally, the Biden team seems to be misreading the Iran-Israel dynamic. Sinwar’s death comes as Israel has been preparing to launch a reprisal against Iran for launching ballistic-missile attacks against it. For Israel, the reprisal is crucial to revitalizing its deterrence against Iran.
Mr. Biden’s cease-fire initiative will likely come with a demand for even more restraint by Israel against Iran. Mr. Netanyahu may or may not heed such counsel. If he does, he will then pursue “total victory” in Gaza and Lebanon even more urgently—if only to prove that Iran and its proxies can’t use America to restrain Israel so they can shoot at it with impunity.
Mr. Doran is director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.
Israel Kills Sinwar, and Biden Wants to ‘Move On’ – WSJ
L’ONU accuse la France d’avoir « durement » réprimé les manifestations propalestiniennes
Plusieurs démocraties occidentales ont été accusées, parmi lesquelles les Etats-Unis, le Canada, la France, l’Allemagne et la Belgique. (Le Point, 19 octobre, libre accès)
Why do citizens in authoritarian Arab countries hate Israeli Jews? – opinion
I will answer through my personal experience when I was in Egypt. This is the same experience of millions of others – yes, millions. (The Jersusalem Post, opinion, 19 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
A full year has passed since the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023, in the areas surrounding the Gaza Strip. These events have turned into a global moral issue, where the fall of some people into support for terrorism was resounding, as moral standards were disrupted and human values were absent.
A massive number of citizens from Arab countries, too large to count, came out in defense and celebration of Hamas’s actions against unarmed Israeli civilians. These actions, which included torture, rape, murder, burning and terror, are beyond what words in any language can describe, as if we are living through a catastrophic and dramatic act reminiscent of the works of Henrik Ibsen, the Norwegian playwright and pioneer of dramatic theatre. It’s as if they breathe and inhale hatred.
Why do citizens in authoritarian Arab countries hate Israeli Jews? I will answer through my personal experience when I was in Egypt. This is the same experience of millions of others – yes, millions. Although the level of institutionalizing and rooting hatred of Israelis varies from one country to another, the core is the same, like a theatrical script. (…)
La France a «immédiatement reconnu» Israël : la nouvelle erreur historique d’Emmanuel Macron
DÉCRYPTAGE – En conférence de presse jeudi, le président de la République a voulu mettre fin à la polémique sur la création d’Israël par l’ONU, en expliquant que la France avait reconnu l’État hébreu dès son indépendance. Ce qui est factuellement faux. (Le Figaro, 19 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Une conférence de presse pour clore la polémique. (…)
En guise de justification, Emmanuel Macron a tancé journalistes et ministres, évoquant leur «manque de professionnalisme» et «le délitement du débat public» face à la diffusion de cette phrase «sortie de son contexte». Il a donc tenu à rappeler l’attachement de la France à Israël : «Que ceux qui donnent des leçons d’histoire lisent cette proclamation (celle de l’indépendance par Ben Gourion le 14 mai 1948, NDLR), ils comprendront pourquoi la France a immédiatement reconnu l’État d’Israël», a-t-il lâché. Mais ici encore, Emmanuel Macron semble avoir pris des libertés avec l’histoire.
Car en réalité, la France est même… l’un des derniers pays occidentaux à avoir reconnu l’État d’Israël. Quand David Ben Gourion déclare l’indépendance en 1948, les États-Unis et l’URSS, dans une rare communion, le reconnaissent immédiatement, entraînant avec eux leurs alliés respectifs. Mais la France, elle, temporise. Elle n’accordera sa reconnaissance de facto que huit mois plus tard, en janvier 1949, et sa reconnaissance de jure, c’est-à-dire définitive et complète, qu’en mai suivant, juste après l’entrée de l’État hébreu à l’ONU. Elle entraînera avec elle les pays du Benelux et le Royaume-Uni, qui sera suivi par les pays du Commonwealth.
Déjà, lors du vote du plan de partage, la France avait voté «oui» à l’arraché, sous la pression des Américains, alors que sa politique était plutôt celle de l’abstention jusqu’ici. Dans les deux cas, la France a souhaité maintenir un équilibre. «À l’époque, la France avait la plus grande communauté juive d’Europe, mais aussi la plus large communauté musulmane, avec 25 millions de personnes dans les colonies», rappelle l’historienne Frédérique Schillo, spécialiste d’Israël et auteur de La Politique française à l’égard d’Israël. Elle était «soucieuse de limiter les dégâts dans sa relation de plus en plus délicate avec ses dépendances arabes, départements ou mandats», abonde l’historien Dominique Trimbur dans Les relations franco-israéliennes, 1948-2004. En Algérie, le mouvement vers l’indépendance qui mènera à la guerre quelques années plus tard est notamment en pleine expansion à cette époque.
De fait, la France, pourtant à la tête du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU à l’époque, ne condamnera pas l’attaque du Liban, de la Jordanie, de la Syrie, de l’Irak et de l’Égypte contre Israël, au lendemain de sa déclaration d’indépendance. Elle tentera également, sans succès, de négocier sa reconnaissance, notamment en «cherchant une indemnisation pour les Palestiniens d’origine maghrébine qui ont fui pendant la Nakba», et en «appelant au retrait de Tsahal du Sud-Liban», souligne Frédérique Schillo. Si la France reconnaît officiellement Israël par la suite, c’est dans une logique de blocs, à la veille d’élections capitales à la Knesset, où les travaillistes de Ben Gourion affrontent les communistes, soutenus par l’URSS, ajoute l’historienne. (…)La France a «immédiatement reconnu» Israël : la nouvelle erreur historique d’Emmanuel Macron (lefigaro.fr)
Yahya Sinwar Dies as He Lived
Had Israel listened to Biden, the terrorist would still be alive. (WSJ, 18 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on Thursday is a proper measure of justice for his lifetime of murder, and with any luck it will be a step toward a cease-fire in Gaza and an end to Hamas’s terrorist rule in the territory. (…)
Sinwar’s demise adds to the impressive Israeli record in killing the leaders of the jihadist radical groups bent on the destruction of the Jewish state. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed by 2,000-pound bombs in Lebanon last month, while Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in July. Most of Hamas’s military commanders and hundreds of its fighters have also been killed.
This is crucial as a deterrent against future attacks, signaling that the lifespan of future terrorist leaders will be short. It’s also crucial if Palestinians in Gaza are going to have a chance at better governance and reconstruction.
Sinwar was known for his brutal enforcement of Hamas rule in the territory, and for the torture and murder of anyone suspected of cooperating with Israel. His survival would have been a living rebuke to Israel and his victims and their families. It would also have made any non-Hamas Palestinian leadership in Gaza impossible.
(…) it’s worth recalling that Mr. Biden has pressured Mr. Netanyahu and his government for months to stop the war in Gaza. The U.S. counseled against a major military campaign against Hamas. Then, despite Israel’s clear early success, he tried to bully Israel against sending troops into the city of Rafah, where Sinwar was thought to be hiding.
Israel went ahead anyway, and Mr. Netanyahu has a right to claim vindication for doing so. It’s not too much to say that if Israel had taken Mr. Biden’s advice, Sinwar, Nasrallah, and the rest of the Hamas-Hezbollah leadership would still be alive.
Sinwar was the main opponent of a cease-fire in Gaza, and his death may cause Hamas’s next leader to agree to a deal that would release the remaining hostages. (…)
Israel has shown through its fortitude since Oct. 7 that the best way to deter an adversary is to demonstrate ferocious retribution for murdering its people. It deserves support as it continues to re-establish that deterrence.
Yahya Sinwar Dies as He Lived – WSJ
The beginning of the end? How Yahya Sinwar’s death will change the Middle East
Gaza’s mastermind of mayhem is dead. A ceasefire may be alive again (The Economist, 18 octobre, article payant)
Voir « Article du Jour »
How Yahya Sinwar’s death will change the Middle East (economist.com)
Mort de Yahya Sinouar, l’homme qui a ruiné la cause palestinienne
ANALYSE. Le leader djihadiste était l’instigateur des massacres barbares du 7 octobre 2023, l’acte déclencheur de la guerre qui ravage depuis un an la bande de Gaza. (Le Point, 18 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
La mort de Yahya Sinouar, le potentat du Hamas, tué jeudi par Tsahal selon le chef de la diplomatie israélienne, fait disparaître l’homme qui a déshonoré la cause palestinienne. Car le chef du mouvement islamiste était l’instigateur des massacres barbares du 7 octobre 2023, qui ont dissipé pour longtemps toute perspective d’une solution négociée du conflit séculaire entre Israéliens et Palestiniens. (…)
La disparition de Sinouar marque une étape essentielle dans la réalisation des buts de guerre israéliens à Gaza, qui sont au nombre de trois : destruction de l’appareil politico-militaire du Hamas afin qu’il ne soit plus en mesure de gouverner le territoire et de menacer Israël ; libération de tous les otages capturés par le Hamas ; sécurisation à long terme de la frontière sud d’Israël, passant par une démilitarisation et une déradicalisation de la bande de Gaza.
Elle valide aussi l’obstination du Premier ministre Benyamin Netanyahou, qui proclame depuis des mois sa volonté de « finir le travail » à Gaza, malgré les nombreux appels au cessez-le-feu et au compromis avec le Hamas, qui émanent de la communauté internationale, mais aussi d’une partie de la population et de la classe politique en Israël. (…)
Les critiques de la stratégie israélienne ont souvent mis en avant depuis un an l’idée qu’une idéologie comme celle du Hamas ne pouvait pas être défaite par les armes. Selon eux, les destructions d’infrastructures et d’habitations ne peuvent que renforcer le soutien populaire dont bénéficient les islamistes et créer de nouvelles générations de terroristes.
Et pourtant, les succès israéliens dans l’élimination des cadres dirigeants du mouvement terroriste démontrent que les capacités du Hamas peuvent être suffisamment dégradées pour lui interdire de reprendre le contrôle de la bande de Gaza et d’organiser des attaques significatives contre le territoire israélien. (…)
Il est encore trop tôt pour savoir quel impact aura la mort du chef du Hamas sur la question de la libération des otages. On peut cependant affirmer d’ores et déjà que son décès ne permettra pas, à lui seul, d’entrevoir un nouvel avenir pour la bande de Gaza. L’objectif que s’est fixé le mouvement – la destruction d’Israël – est désormais hors d’atteinte pour lui. Mais la perspective d’une solution politique au conflit, à savoir la création d’une entité étatique palestinienne à côté d’Israël, ne s’est pas rapprochée pour autant, bien au contraire.
Le profond traumatisme causé par les massacres du 7 Octobre a renforcé dans la population israélienne l’idée que la sécurité nationale ne pouvait pas supporter le voisinage à sa frontière d’un État palestinien, même officiellement désarmé. La perversité de Sinouar continuera à répandre ses méfaits bien au-delà de sa mort.
Mort du chef du Hamas Yahya Sinouar, l’homme qui a ruiné la cause palestinienne (lepoint.fr)
After Sinwar’s Death, Israel Has Stark Choice: Declare Victory or Keep Fighting
Netanyahu suggests the war will continue as the U.S. and Israel’s military argue for a cease-fire in Gaza (WSJ, 18 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar creates an opportunity for Israel to declare victory and wind down the war in the Gaza Strip.
For now, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is keeping his options open.
“The war isn’t over,” Netanyahu declared late Thursday in a televised address that suggested he might treat Sinwar’s scalp as vindication for his policy of relentless military pressure in Gaza, and carry on.
His speech, however, included hints that he might shift Israel’s focus from annihilating what’s left of Hamas to bringing home the 101 Israeli hostages still held in Gaza by the U.S.-designated terrorist group.
Netanyahu is already coming under pressure from the U.S. to treat Sinwar’s elimination as a pivotal moment and revive the stalled effort to reach a cease-fire that frees the hostages—a preference shared by Israel’s military and intelligence services.
Such a deal with Hamas wouldn’t go down well with the Israeli premier’s right-wing coalition and many of his voters.
How he decides could determine the fate of the wider war in the Middle East, the hostages in Gaza, Israel’s frayed global relations and Netanyahu himself.
Whatever comes next, Thursday’s confirmation that Sinwar had been killed by Israeli tank fire represents a moment of catharsis for many Israelis and a heavy blow to Hamas. (…)
Sinwar’s death is an important symbolic event, but it doesn’t mean Israel can end the war now, said Yaakov Amidror, a former national security adviser under Netanyahu and a fellow with the Jewish Institute for National Security of America in Washington. Rather, he said, it shows that Israel’s strategy of continuing to apply military pressure throughout the Gaza Strip is working.
Hamas remains strong enough to attack any alternative government in Gaza, Amidror said. “We have to continue to degrade its military capabilities, to make Hamas irrelevant, not just as a threat to Israel, but to everyone who might come in as a substitute,” he said.
Amidror said it took Israel four years to suppress the bloody uprising known as the second Intifada in Jenin, a city in the occupied West Bank. He predicted at least another year of fighting in Gaza.
The killing of so many Hamas leaders also could make it harder to find anyone with the authority to negotiate and uphold a deal, a problem Israel is also potentially facing with Hezbollah after assassinating most of its leading echelon.
With Israel’s military accumulating tactical wins against Hamas and Hezbollah and preparing to strike their backer Iran, the question is whether Netanyahu wants to stop. He and other Israeli leaders haven’t said how the war ends without a cease-fire-and-hostage deal.
After Sinwar’s Death, Israel Has Stark Choice: Declare Victory or Keep Fighting – WSJ
Biden’s Pre-Election Threat to Israel
He once pledged Gaza aid would stop if Hamas stole it. What happened? (WSJ, opinion, 17 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
On Oct. 18, 2023, President Biden announced that humanitarian aid would move from Egypt to Gaza with Israel’s consent “based on the understanding that there will be inspections and that the aid should go to civilians, not to Hamas.” A year later Mr. Biden has reneged on that pledge, and he’s blaming Israel in the bargain.
Mr. Biden’s words a year ago were definitive: “Let me be clear. If Hamas diverts or steals the assistance, they will have demonstrated once again that they have no concern for the welfare of the Palestinian people and it will end. As a practical matter, it will stop the international community from being able to provide this aid.” Note that “it will end.”
Instead the President has demanded that Israel transfer ever more aid, even as Hamas steals it to keep power over Gaza’s population. Israel’s Channel 12 News reported, with video evidence, that Hamas commandeered 47 of 100 aid trucks entering Gaza last Tuesday. This is Hamas’s lifeline. It keeps the war going.
srael lately had been squeezing Hamas in northern Gaza, trying to break its aid-grip on the people, but Vice President Kamala Harris came out against the effort on Sunday. She is grandstanding for anti-Israel voters in Michigan after Israel had privately agreed to relent. Earlier that day the Biden Administration had threatened Israel in a letter from senior U.S. officials Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin: Surge aid to Gaza within 30 days or risk a weapons embargo.
The timing couldn’t be worse. Israel may soon retaliate against Iran for its recent missile attack, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei needs to know that America has Israel’s back. Instead Mr. Biden sends a more equivocal message: The U.S. will aid Israel’s defense but do its best to weaken Israel’s response to attacks.
(…) The Biden team supports Israel, but not the moves that might deliver victory. The Administration suggests it could withhold offensive weapons from Israel—while maintaining missile defense. Under duress, Israel has signaled it will cooperate on the aid, so Mr. Biden may not make good on his threat. The question is why he so often threatens Israel, and never Hamas or Iran.
Mr. Biden’s threat letter also urges Israel to keep the status quo with Unrwa, the compromised United Nations refugee agency, and schedule Red Cross visits for Hamas prisoners in Israel, which isn’t required for unlawful combatants. Meanwhile, Hamas refuses Red Cross visits to the hostages it holds.
Hamas broke off hostage talks weeks ago. As White House spokesman John Kirby said Tuesday, “I wish I could tell you that there are fresh negotiations at hand. There aren’t, but that’s because Mr. [Yahya] Sinwar,” Hamas’s leader, “has shown absolutely zero interest in continuing that discussion.”
The Biden-Harris answer is to send him another aid bailout—and then wonder why the Gaza war continues. Israel’s military has resisted taking charge of aid distribution directly, but it may have no other choice.
Biden’s Pre-Election Threat to Israel – WSJ
The war in Lebanon : Just inside Lebanon, Israeli soldiers debate how far to go
They are 2km inside the country, but prepared to go farther (The Economist, 17 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
AS ISRAEL’S invasion of Lebanon rages, amid mounting casualties and fierce missile and rocket exchanges across the border, one issue is becoming clearer: the extent of Hizbullah’s fortifications near the border, and the potential threat that they pose to Israel in the form of an October 7th-style attack from the north. But another looming issue is fundamentally unclear: how deep into Lebanon Israel’s invasion will go, and the extent to which it will devastate and destabilise the country.
Your correspondent was embedded with an Israel Defence Forces (IDF) unit on October 13th. A winding path down the forested mountainside was hard to follow. Only the occasional shrub hacked away with a machete and circles of paint on tree trunks revealed it was manmade. A slit in the earth revealed a subterranean world, one of hundreds of similar hideaways the IDF says it has uncovered since it began operating inside Lebanon on October 1st.
Israel is keen to show that these underground positions are part of a Hizbullah plan to invade Israel. It says Hamas had hoped that Hizbullah would join the assault on October 7th 2023. Hizbullah instead made do with a barrage of rockets on Israeli bases and communities near the border, starting on October 8th. Yet the scale of the facilities is ominous. The underground spaces were intended for thousands of members of the elite Radwan force. In one there were combat fatigues, boots and weapons, presumably for fighters who arrived in civilian clothes. The positions near the border contained explosive devices to breach the border wall a few hundred metres away.
If the nature of the Hizbullah threat close to the border is now more visible, Israel’s strategy is not so clear. It has devastated Hizbullah’s leadership in a series of air strikes, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah. It has also destroyed much of the movement’s arsenal of long-range missiles that targeted central Israel. The IDF says its ground operations in Lebanon are limited to clearing the area immediately near the border of Hizbullah infrastructure, which may take only a few weeks.
Yet whether that diminishes Hizbullah’s capacity sufficiently is open to question. Israel’s goal is to re-establish deterrence and to allow the return of around 60,000 Israelis who had fled towns and kibbutzim just across the border following Hamas’s attack last year. But Iran’s most potent client militia still packs a punch. The bulk of Hizbullah’s force on the border, tens of thousands of men strong, remains just a few kilometres to the north. Every day small mobile launchers still fire hundreds of short-range rockets into Israel. On October 13th a Hizbullah drone hit an IDF training base 60km from the border, killing four soldiers and wounding dozens. (…)
America and France, along with the Lebanese caretaker government, have been trying to reach a ceasefire agreement. Air strikes and fighting have, in the space of a month, killed over 2,000 people in Lebanon and displaced over 1m, according to the UN. But Israel is unlikely to be satisfied with a ceasefire alone, even if it includes a further retreat of Hizbullah forces.
(…) Since the early 1970s Lebanon’s weak state has proved unable to prevent Palestinian and Shia militias from using its territory to launch attacks on Israel. Two wars in 1982 and 2006 and countless smaller operations in southern Lebanon over the years have proved that a military solution alone cannot ensure security on the border. This time, Israeli commanders claim they are not leaving unless and until a credible force is deployed in southern Lebanon to keep Hizbullah from coming back. Yet if that credible force never emerges, then the IDF faces the prospect of a partial occupation of Lebanon, far greater levels of civilian casualties and, possibly, another quagmire.■
Just inside Lebanon, Israeli soldiers debate how far to go (economist.com)
UNIFIL’s inaction and the West’s blind eye – editorial
Hezbollah has been hiding behind UNIFIL for far too long, but European leaders continue to blame Jerusalem. (The Jerusalem Post, 17 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
Even in an upside-down world where rape and kidnapping are excused as “resistance,” where protesters march in major Western cities hailing terrorists, and where self-defense is characterized as “genocide,” a statement on Monday by the foreign ministers of Italy, Germany, France, and Britain was still staggering.
The statement, made after five members of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force were wounded in separate incidents in southern Lebanon, called on Israel and all parties to ensure the safety of UNIFIL personnel and to allow it to fulfill its mandate.
The stabilizing role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon? Who are they kidding? The foreign ministers must be referring to another southern Lebanon – maybe Lebanon, Pennsylvania – not the 850 square kilometer area from the Blue Line to the Litani River because, in that area, “stability” does not exist. Terrorists don’t generally pound another country with scores of anti-tank missiles, rockets, and drones from an area where peacekeepers are deployed to fulfill a “stabilizing role.”
UNIFIL was established in 1978 after Israel’s Litani Operation expelled PLO terrorists from southern Lebanon in the wake of the Coastal Road massacre that year. Charged with confirming Israel’s withdrawal, UNIFIL was also tasked with helping the Lebanese government, mired in a civil war, to regain its authority in the area.
The force was significantly expanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006, which ended the Second Lebanon War. It was also charged with ensuring the demilitarization of southern Lebanon.
No one expected the 10,500-strong force to actively engage with Hezbollah, but Jerusalem did expect that the force would provide regular, honest accounts of efforts by Hezbollah and its sponsor, Iran, to turn the region into a forward base for an eventual attack on Israel.
UNIFIL failed miserably in even that simple task. (…)
What does Guterres think – that the Hezbollah attack tunnels full of equipment and weapons that the IDF is unearthing each day in southern Lebanon were formed as if by magic? That the rockets and missiles stored in scores of homes in the area materialized out of thin air?
Given that UNIFIL has done little to prevent Hezbollah from bombarding Israel from southern Lebanon since October 8, and given that it did nothing to report Hezbollah’s massive buildup in the region over the years, the claim by the European foreign ministers that the organization is a force for stability, is utterly baseless.
Furthermore, the accusation that Israel is deliberately targeting UNIFIL personnel is ridiculous. Israel cannot tolerate a situation where Hezbollah terrorists believe they can fire near UNIFIL positions and be immune from an Israeli response.
UNIFIL, to ensure that its personnel are not harmed, should withdraw from southern Lebanon. And top-tier European foreign ministers, to retain credibility with Jerusalem, should direct their condemnations at Hezbollah for brazenly violating the UNSC Resolution 1701 and for putting UNIFIL at risk rather than accusing Israel of defending itself against terrorists.
UNIFIL’s inaction and the West’s reaction – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Hell and horror, again : Does Israel’s new plan for Gaza include withholding food?
Israel’s government says no, but America is demanding the ramping up of supplies (The Economist, 17 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
HARROWING FOOTAGE of limbs attached to intravenous drips inside burning hospital tents in Deir al-Balah in Gaza on October 14th was a reminder that the war there—one of several fronts Israel has been fighting on since Hamas massacred 1,200 people a year ago—is far from over. Although the world’s focus is on Lebanon and a possible Israeli retaliation against Iran, the horror in Gaza continues.
Four people were killed and dozens wounded in Gaza after Israeli air attacks. More than 42,000 people have been killed in the strip since October 7th 2023, according to the Hamas-run authorities. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claimed they had conducted a “precise strike” on a “terrorist” headquarters adjacent to a hospital. On October 6th nearby Jabalia, a refugee camp, was surrounded by an armoured division. The idf says that it is attacking some 4,000 Hamas fighters who have been regrouping in northern Gaza. In response the idf has told civilians in the north to evacuate. It has halted convoys carrying food, leaving the area without vegetables, fruit, yogurt or even rice. “For a fortnight we’ve only eaten beans and bread,” says a former civil servant.
Israel’s own figures suggest the overall flow of aid to Gaza, measured by weight, has dropped by more than half during October so far compared with the rate in September. That has angered America. On October 14th Antony Blinken, the secretary of state, and Lloyd Austin, the defence secretary, threatened to cut military aid to Israel if it does not increase the flow of supplies. This was the most overt warning in this war from Israel’s main ally and it led to the IDF’s allowing the first humanitarian convoy into northern Gaza in two weeks.
Some speculate that the IDF will implement what the Israeli media is calling “the generals’ plan” to eliminate Hamas fighters and press their leader, Yahya Sinwar, to release the 101 Israeli hostages still being held. The plan—proposed by a group of retired generals—entails cutting off food supplies to northern Gaza where roughly 400,000 civilians are present (down from a pre-war population of about 1.1m), and demanding that they move elsewhere in Gaza where supplies would continue. Anyone who remains would be treated as a combatant. For now, despite going hungry, people are not leaving. Resistance, for most, is staying put. Leaving “is going from one hell to another”, says one resident. “We’d rather die in our homes.”
The IDF denies it is implementing any such plan, which would probably amount to starving out the population and be in breach of international law. (…)
Israel’s incoherent strategy in Gaza reflects the divisions within its government. (…)
“If we take responsibility for the distribution of food in Gaza, it means we have to establish a full administration there,” says a general opposed to the far-right’s plans. Mr Netanyahu, whose parliamentary majority needs the far-right parties, has not taken a clear position on the aid issue. He is in no rush to end the war in Gaza, since it would be followed by a national reckoning over his government’s failings in preventing the Hamas attack on October 7th.
“A year into this war and there still isn’t any clear strategy on how to deal with Gaza,” says an exasperated Israeli security official. “The government is focused on the war with Hizbullah and Iran, but Gaza is where it all started and they’re ignoring it now at Israel’s peril.” ■
Does Israel’s new plan for Gaza include withholding food? (economist.com)
Création d’Israël : le raccourci historique d’Emmanuel Macron
En affirmant que l’État hébreu a été « créé par une décision de l’ONU », le président a commis une confusion historique. Rappel des faits. (Le Point, 17 octobre, article payant)
Voir « Article du Jour »
Création d’Israël : le raccourci historique d’Emmanuel Macron (lepoint.fr)
In Lebanon, We Took Pride in Our Resilience. Not Anymore. (NYT, tribune, 17 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The windows of my apartment in Beirut rattled with the force of the blasts. I heard screams, I heard terror, I heard death. I haven’t properly slept for weeks now. How can anyone sleep, or even rest, with explosions around us and dread within?
For more than three weeks now, Israel has been bombing Beirut and has sent troops into the south in its pursuit of Hezbollah, the militant Lebanese political and paramilitary force that is Israel’s sworn enemy. More than 2,300 people have been killed and more than 10,000 wounded over the past year — most in the past few weeks — and some one million people displaced. The recent attacks have killed at least 127 children.
Nowhere is safe; no one is secure. This is not life. It is an excruciating wait for the possibility of death. But in truth, living in Lebanon for the past 50 years has been a lot like waiting for the next disaster. (…)
I’ve witnessed so many wars and tragedies here that I sometimes feel 100 years old.
My father, Atallah, was from a small village in southern Lebanon on the border with Israel — a beautiful place called Yaroun. We buried him there last year, granting his last wish before he died. This month his hometown was leveled. Do you know how many times Yaroun has been shattered and rebuilt from the ashes? It’s the phoenix metaphor that has been applied to the Lebanese people throughout recent history. We are told we are resilient. We are admired for bouncing back, for making do, for finding a way. Ah, those plucky Lebanese!
We, too, used to value this quality in ourselves, whether we bragged about it openly or secretly inside. “We snap right back to our feet,” we used to tell ourselves and others. “Look at us rebounding.” But more and more, I hear people speak of Lebanese resilience with disdain, even anger. We don’t want to be resilient; we just want to live, and to live with a sense of a future — not this “carpe diem” existence which fuels our tendency to ignore our problems and remain oblivious of the past.
It’s as if the Lebanese people are destined for eternal collateral damage. Pointing fingers at foreign powers is easy, and justified: Blame for Lebanon’s decades-long problems can be placed on Israel, Iran and Syria and the failure of France, Lebanon’s former colonial patron, in particular and Europe in general to intervene. Blame can also be placed on the political Machiavellianism of the United States and its blind support for Israel, including the Biden administration’s decision to step aside from meaningful efforts to stop Israel’s campaign. They have all contributed to this infernal vicious circle we’ve been trapped in for decades now.
The latest conflict is one of many tragedies brought on us by Israel, with its right-wing extremism, disproportionate violence, greedy expansionism and ruthless wars. Hezbollah has also brought devastation, with its ultrareligious vision, fealty to Iran and hostage-holding of the Lebanese state for many years now. As Israel and Iran threaten each other, we die.
But it is time to admit that we, the Lebanese people, share responsibility. We fail to learn our lessons time after time. A majority keeps supporting the corrupt warlords who control the people by appealing to sectarian instincts and by using the lure of clientelism, replacing the state institutions that they themselves have contributed to undermining. It is time we pull those heads of ours out of the sand of resilience and work together to build a real democratic, secular state. (…)
The world’s criminality and inhumanity as these concurrent tragedies unfold leave me deeply shocked. At the highest governing levels, there’s no urgency to remedy this situation — just empty promises and condemnations to appease guilty consciences. I don’t know if we can afford hope. The darkness feels endless. Where can hope come from? Cynicism prevails in global politics. Every moment here feels borrowed or reminds us of life’s fragility. Every breath feels like an act of defiance. Perhaps our only hope is us.
Ms. Haddad is an author and journalist and a former candidate for the Lebanese Parliament. She wrote from Beirut, Lebanon.
Vom Geburtshelfer zur «unerwünschten Person» – die schwierige Geschichte Israels und der Vereinten Nationen
Die zögerlichen und dann sogar ablehnenden Reaktionen von Uno-Offiziellen haben nach dem Trauma des 7. Oktober in Israel alle Hoffnungen zerstört, dass die Vereinten Nationen die Rolle eines ehrlichen Maklers spielen könnten. (NZZ, tribune, 17 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Dabei hat die gemeinsame Geschichte so gut angefangen: Man mag es kaum glauben, der epochale Teilungsbeschluss der Vereinten Nationen war – neben dem Drang der britischen Regierung, ihr gescheitertes koloniales Experiment im «Mandatsgebiet Palästina» zu beenden – einer der entscheidenden Geburtshelfer für «Eretz Zion».
Die Entscheidung, die am 29. November 1947 mit grosser Mehrheit getroffen wurde, machte aus der Frage, ob Israel entstehen wird, die Frage, wann Israel entstehen wird. Amos Oz hat in «Eine Geschichte von Liebe und Finsternis» die Freude beschrieben, die die Delegierten in Lake Success im fernen Jerusalem auslösten, und lässt dort seinen Vater zu ihm selbst sagen: «Diese Nacht, Kind, wirst du bis an dein Lebensende nicht vergessen, von dieser Nacht wirst du noch deinen Kindern, Enkeln und Urenkeln erzählen (. . .).»
Von diesem Höhepunkt an wurde die Beziehung beinahe augenblicklich kompliziert: Das liegt auch daran, dass der «Geburtshelfer» Uno wenigstens Mitverantwortung für einen folgenreichen «Geburtsfehler» im Verhältnis zwischen den Vereinten Nationen und dem Staat Israel trägt, dessen Wirkung sich bis heute entfaltet: Die Resolution 194 der Generalversammlung bestätigt im Dezember 1948 das Recht «friedliebender Araber» auf Rückkehr an ihre Wohnorte bzw. auf Entschädigung.
«Das Problem», so sagt der Historiker Benny Morris, «bestand darin, dass dieselben Araber, die geflüchtet waren, eben noch versucht hatten, den jüdischen Staat und/oder die jüdische Gemeinde zu vernichten – man kann den israelischen Politikern also nicht verübeln, dass sie sie nicht als ‹friedliebend› ansahen und ihre mögliche Rückkehr als das Eindringen einer grossen potenziellen Fünften Kolonne empfanden, die den neugeborenen jüdischen Staat zu destabilisieren und möglicherweise zu stürzen drohte.» Man muss diese pointierte Sicht nicht teilen, aber schon damals war zweifellos die Zahl der potenziellen Rückkehrer grösser als die Zahl der Juden im Staatsgebiet.
Bis heute würde die Umsetzung des Rückkehrrechtes die Existenz des Staates als «Heimstatt der Juden» gefährden. Die in der damaligen Situation durchaus nachvollziehbare Betonung und Politisierung des Flüchtlingsthemas durch die Uno trägt in letzter Konsequenz dazu bei, dass der Status der Flüchtlinge «ewig» wird. Eine Rolle dabei spielt auch die Uno-Agentur UNRWA, die Leid lindern und Hilfe bieten soll. (…)
Mit der «Vererbung» des Flüchtlingsstatus und der Idee, neben die globalen Uno-Strukturen eigene regionale «Uno-Werke» zu setzen, verschieben sich über die Jahrzehnte völlig die Dimensionen: Die Uno beschäftigt allein in Gaza heute mehr Menschen als an ihren beiden Hauptsitzen; die UNRWA zählt mehr Mitarbeiter als das allgemeine Flüchtlingshilfswerk (UNHCR) und wendet pro Flüchtling auch noch doppelt so viel Geld auf, wobei etwa die Hälfte des Budgets von den EU-Mitgliedstaaten aufgebracht wird. (…)
So undiplomatisch der Umgang Israels mit der Uno gelegentlich auch ist, so wenig lassen sich die puren Zahlen wegdiskutieren, die zeigen, wie wenig neutral die Uno agiert. Allein zwischen 2015 und 2022 hat die Generalversammlung rund 140 israelkritische Resolutionen verabschiedet. Lediglich 68 Resolutionen beschäftigten sich mit dem «Rest der Welt».
Dem wird gelegentlich der Einwand entgegengehalten, man könne doch nicht von den Mitgliedstaaten auf die Strukturen schliessen. Aber auch in den Strukturen ist die Parteilichkeit längst tief verankert, mit zum Teil glasklarem Antisemitismus. Die «Uno-Berichterstatterin zur Menschenrechtssituation in den palästinensischen Gebieten», Francesca Albanese aus Italien, setzt nicht nur explizit die Behandlung der Palästinenser mit dem Holocaust gleich, sondern wirft den USA und der Welt in eindeutig antisemitischer Manier vor, sie hätten sich der jüdischen Lobby unterworfen – als ob nicht bereits die Jahrzehnte antiisraelischer Tendenzen in den Vereinten Nationen dieses Argument widerlegten. (…)
Wenn die Vereinten Nationen nicht wollen, dass 2025 an ihrem 80. Geburtstag das Diktum von Jacques Schuster wahr wird, dass die Geschichte der Uno eine «Geschichte des Antizionismus» sei, müssten sie ihre Haltung gegenüber Israel fundamental revidieren und wenigstens den Anspruch einer neutralen und differenzierten Haltung an die eigene Arbeit stellen. Allein es fehlt der Glaube – und mutige Unterstützung für eine solche Umkehr, auch aus Deutschland.
Michael Borchard ist Leiter der Hauptabteilung Wissenschaftliche Dienste / Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; von 2014 bis 2017 hat er das Büro der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel geleitet.
UNIFIL – Israels Enttäuschung über die UNO (nzz.ch)
U.N. Peacekeepers Are Hezbollah’s Best Friend
Unifil let the terrorists roll in Lebanon but grandstands when Israel fights back. (WSJ , opinion, 16 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The United Nations peacekeeping force known as Unifil had one job: Keep armed terrorists out of southern Lebanon, where they could shoot at Israel. It failed so abysmally that Israel has had to go to war to clear out the terrorists. So what does Unifil do now? It refuses to fight, refuses to move, and blames Israel for putting its non-peacekeepers at risk.
Unifil was supposed to keep the north of Israel out of danger. Instead it has allowed Hezbollah to entrench itself in southern Lebanon over the years, storing arms in many of the homes and building a network of fully stocked attack tunnels and small outdoor weapons depots in preparation for an Oct. 7-style assault. Israeli troops have found a tunnel about 100 meters from a Unifil outpost.
For 11 months Hezbollah fired more than 8,500 rockets and missiles at Israel, mostly from southern Lebanon, under Unifil’s nose. The area, militia-free by order of the U.N. Security Council, was soon crawling with the world’s best-armed terrorists. But the peacekeepers said little and did less.
Israeli troops entered Lebanon on Oct. 1 and requested several times that Unifil move north, out of harm’s way. But the peacekeepers won’t budge, though there’s no peace to keep. “There was a unanimous decision to stay because it’s important for the U.N. flag to still fly high in this region,” said a Unifil spokesman.
Unifil finally seems to have found its calling: Getting in Israel’s way. (…)
Yet Unifil has become the toast of the diplomatic circuit for provoking condemnations of Israel. France, Spain and Italy express “outrage” at the “unjustifiable” injuring of two Unifil troops. The European Union’s foreign policy chief condemns “a grave violation of international law.” Reuters writes of Israel’s “targeting of the U.N. peacekeeping mission.”
Hezbollah couldn’t have scripted it better. And where was this diplomatic energy when Hezbollah dominated the area, and used it to force the depopulation of Israel’s north? It was missing in action, like Unifil. That’s why Unifil grandstands, and leaves its peacekeepers in harm’s way, while Israel fights and does their job for them.
U.N. Peacekeepers Are Hezbollah’s Best Friend – WSJ
Mayhem in the Middle East : America boosts Israel’s missile shield. What did it get in return?
The THAAD battery could indicate Israeli restraint on Iran (The Economist, 16 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
IN THE EARLY hours of October 15th two American cargo planes landed at an air-force base in the Negev Desert. Mobile surface-to-air missile launchers trundled off the ramp and were soon on their way to a launch site in southern Israel, along with some 100 American soldiers to operate them. America’s latest deployment to a war in the Middle East had begun, just two days after President Joe Biden gave the order.
The deployment of the battery of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) interceptors and its crew is a sign both of America’s continuing military support for Israel and of its hopes of stopping Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, from triggering a full-blown regional war. The deployment appears to come in the wake of an understanding that Israel will calibrate its retaliation against Iran for its missile attack on October 1st, by refraining from striking oil facilities or Iran’s nuclear sites. (…)
The immediate military purpose of the THAAD battery is to supplement Israel’s extensive missile-defence network in anticipation of another missile attack from Iran. “The THAAD isn’t a game changer,” says Brigadier General Ran Kochav, a former chief of Israel’s Air Defence Command. Israel’s existing missile-defence systems include the short-range Iron Dome, David’s Sling for intercepting mainly mid-range missiles and the Arrow interceptors designed for missiles launched from Iran, over 1,200km away. But it will provide another layer of defence by increasing the number of interceptors that can be used simultaneously to fend off another mass salvo of Iranian missiles.
That could alleviate growing Israeli concerns over a shortage of expensive interceptors. (…)
Yet the timing of the deployment is significant for political as well as military reasons. Since Iran’s latest salvo against Israel of 181 ballistic missiles on October 1st, there has been a tense exchange between Israel and America over the nature of Israel’s expected retaliation. Mr Netanyahu has sought what he sees as a historic opportunity to strike Iran’s nuclear programme and economic infrastructure, including its oil-export facilities, in the hope of toppling the Islamic Republic’s regime. Mr Biden, though prepared to support Israel in a retaliatory strike on military targets, has been less eager to sanction such a move, which could escalate Israel’s conflict with Iran and trigger a global energy crisis just before America’s presidential election in November. And as civilian casualties mount in Lebanon, and violence and misery intensify in north Gaza, Mr Biden is not keen to underwrite Israeli fantasies about remaking the Middle East.
Israeli officials say that the deployment of the THAAD battery to Israel is a sign that Mr Netanyahu has accepted the president’s concerns and agreed, for now, to limit the scope of Israel’s imminent attack. One official called the deployment “golden handcuffs”. Once again, America is showing its support for Israel, in the hope that it can rein in Mr Netanyahu’s more reckless tendencies. ■
America boosts Israel’s missile shield. What did it get in return? (economist.com)
Israel Assures U.S. It Will Not Strike Iran’s Oil and Nuclear Facilities, Officials Say
U.S. has sought to contain planned Israel counterattack on Tehran, hoping to head off wider Middle East war (WSJ, 15 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
WASHINGTON—Israel has assured the Biden administration that a planned retaliatory attack on Iran won’t target nuclear and oil facilities, according to U.S. officials, a promise sought by the White House to head off further Middle East escalation and to avoid a potential oil-price increase.
The pledges came in a call between President Biden and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week, as well as in conversations in recent days between Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant, the officials said.
Israel has suggested it would aim for military or intelligence targets, the officials said, but has stopped short of providing the U.S. a list of specific targets. The planned attack is a response to Iran firing 180 missiles at Israel on Oct. 1 after an Israeli airstrike that killed Lebanese militia Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
“We listen to the opinion of the U.S., but we will make our final decisions based on our national interests,” Netanyahu’s office said in a statement.
Israel’s response, which is likely to come before the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5, could resemble a previous attack in April that hit an Iranian military base shortly after Tehran launched 300 missiles and drones at Israeli territory. But Israeli officials have said that their operation could hit unexpected targets. It is also likely to be more severe, analysts said. (…)
Israel Assures U.S. It Will Not Strike Iran’s Oil and Nuclear Facilities, Officials Say – WSJ
Dans les taillis du Sud-Liban, l’armée israélienne découvre l’incroyable réseau militaire du
REPORTAGE – Un réseau de tunnels et de caches d’armes dense et bien fourni a été patiemment construit par la milice chiite. À quelques pas de la frontière, il permettait de harceler les villages israéliens. Il était aussi destiné à lancer une attaque terrestre de grande envergure, selon Tsahal. (Le Figaro, 15 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Pour arriver au sommet de la colline, l’armée israélienne a employé « beaucoup de force » mais n’a pas rencontré « beaucoup de résistance », explique le général Yiftah Norkin, de la 146e division. Le mur de béton qui sépare Israël du Liban a été éventré. Escortés par des chars Merkava, des bulldozers blindés ont tracé leur route à travers une végétation courte et épaisse : c’est un chemin terreux le long duquel des militaires patrouillent, arme à la main et masque sur les yeux. Les véhicules blindés et les chars soulèvent des nuages de poussière blanche.
À quelques mètres à l’intérieur du territoire libanais, les soldats ont trouvé deux tunnels dont les entrées étaient dissimulées sous des plaques de fer camouflées. Ici, la couche de terre est très fine et les tunnels, d’une dizaine de mètres de profondeur, ont été creusés dans la roche. Sous le sol, les militaires israéliens ont découvert du matériel de communication et des missiles antitanks. De là, on domine tout Israël : au sud-ouest, la baie d’Haïfa, Acre, Nahariya. Tous proches, des kibboutz et des moshav évacués depuis un an : Shelomi, Hanita. Il suffisait à un milicien du Hezbollah de sortir du tunnel pour leur tirer dessus, avant de disparaître.
En une poignée de secondes, le missile Kornet, une arme à visée laser de fabrication russe, atteignait sa cible. Dans ces communautés situées le long de la frontière libanaise, beaucoup de maisons ont été détruites de cette façon. L’armée israélienne a annoncé le début de ses incursions terrestres dans cette zone du Liban il y a une semaine.
En sept jours, les soldats israéliens opérant dans ce secteur estiment avoir trouvé 700 caches similaires, sur une surface d’environ un kilomètre carré. Pour l’instant, affirme un haut gradé israélien, il ne s’agit que de raids, avec des troupes menant des opérations ciblées avant de revenir en Israël. Pas question de renouveler l’erreur de 1982, quand l’opération « limitée » s’était transformée en une occupation de 18 ans. (…)
Israel must destroy the Iranian nuclear project – opinion
The bottom line is that even if the United States does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 15 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Anyone looking for an indication of Israel’s success against Hezbollah need not check the number of missiles the IDF destroyed or the number of those killed.
It is enough to look at a report that came out last week from Reuters, stating that Hezbollah is asking for a ceasefire now, regardless of the cessation of the fighting against Hamas.
Hezbollah’s announcement stands in stark contrast to the policy it has declared since October 8 of last year, and comes only against the backdrop of the organization’s military defeat.
Beyond the fact that Iran’s ring of fire around Israel was breached, Israel’s successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have dramatic implications on several levels.
First, they constitute a tremendous opportunity for the Lebanese state to create stability, after Hezbollah’s prolonged and longstanding occupation of the Lebanese people and all its sources of livelihood and subsistence.
Second, they provide a stabilizing factor in regimes such as Jordan and Egypt. Third, they “maintain the path of peace” for “threshold countries” with a tendency toward the axis of evil, such as Turkey.
But beyond the shift in the regional power structure, the most important implications concern the evil regime of the ayatollahs and the Iran-Russia-China axis. Israel’s success, thank God, creates new opportunities that until a few weeks ago were completely unthinkable.
An opportunity has arisen that no one had realistically considered before the war, to cut off the head of the octopus, to liberate the Iranian people from the murderous regime of the ayatollahs, and to destroy the evil nuclear enterprise that it is working on.
This is an opportunity that is not only rare but likely also the last before Iran breaks through with a nuclear bomb. (…)
The results of a successful attack will lead to the overthrow of the ayatollahs’ regime and the establishment of a benevolent regime in Iran, calm in the Middle East, and the breaking of the Russia-Iran-China axis of evil, which will help Ukraine and European countries.
Such an attack would bring calm and stability, and prevent an all-out global war.
The credit that Israel provided for the free world with the blood of its sons must be redeemed and realized now. (…)
Whether Biden, Harris, or the convergence of interests of both, the coming days and articulate Israeli spokesmen should be used to mobilize the Americans to head the coalition of blessed countries and free the world from the curse of the ayatollahs.
The bottom line is that even if the United States does not assume its historic role, Israel has the obligation, and the right, to destroy the Iranian nuclear project.
This last opportunity must be exercised!
👎👎👎Kenan Malik: Israel is not ‘saving western civilisation’. Nor is Hamas leading ‘the resistance’
Both sides believe they have right on their side and use it as an excuse to perpetuate bloodshed (The Guardian, opinion, 15 octobre, libre accès)
Extraits :
‘Israel is not invading Lebanon, it is liberating it.” So proclaimed France’s pre-eminent liberal philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy as Israeli tanks drove across the border and its war planes bombed villages in the south and residential districts in Beirut. “There are moments in history,” he exulted, when “ ‘escalation’ becomes a necessity and a virtue.” For Lévy, it is not just Lebanon that Israel is liberating, but much of the Middle East, too.
Lévy is not alone in rejoicing at Israel’s spreading military offensive. For many, Israel is waging war, not merely in “self-defence” but, in the words of president Isaac Herzog, “to save western civilisation, to save the values of western civilisation”, a claim echoed by many of its supporters. And the destruction of Gaza, of its hospitals and universities, and the killing of 40,000 people? And the 2,000 people killed in Lebanon in a fortnight, and the fifth of its population displaced? Collateral damage en route to saving civilisation. (…)
This Is the House That Hezbollah Built
The kitchen is filled with antitank missiles, the living room with grenades, mortars, guns and vests. (WSJ, opinion, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Imagine a generation of children who grow up believing that it is normal to live among weapons of war. This is the monster that Hezbollah built across dozens of villages in southern Lebanon. I saw it first-hand on Oct. 10, riding in a convoy of Israel Defense Forces humvees. The IDF asked me not to identify the village lest it endanger their operations.
Almost half the village was destroyed by a mix of room-to-room battles and the Israeli military’s exploding Hezbollah weapon stockpiles. IDF soldiers in tanks or bulldozers rumbled from house to house to catalogue weapons Hezbollah had buried, then demolished the homes. The terror group had hoped to tap its infrastructure in southern Lebanon to invade northern Israel in a replay of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack. (…)
As Israel tears apart Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon, it is also wiping out the West’s view that this is an Israeli problem that can be solved by diplomacy alone. Since the invasion of southern Lebanon began on Sept. 30, the IDF has showered the West with evidence of weapons and materiel hidden in every third or fifth house. In some villages, Hezbollah commandeers every house.
The West should be raining fire and brimstone down on Hezbollah and its sponsor, Iran, for making a farce of United Nations Resolution 1701. That resolution, adopted in 2006, said that Hezbollah couldn’t operate in southern Lebanon.
The West can no longer deny that Hezbollah is out of control and must be restrained, preferably by diplomacy but if necessary by force. Yet the West’s priority seems to be reaching a cease-fire so it can go on ignoring the dangers of these Middle Eastern actors.
In an ideal world, cease-fire and diplomacy are the way to prevent long wars. Diplomacy has worked wonders for Israel with six Arab and Muslim countries, most importantly Egypt. But until Hezbollah halts its rocket fire and accepts terms that let Israel and its allies expel the group from southern Lebanon, diplomacy is fruitless.
After Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre and Hezbollah’s unprovoked firing of rockets into Israel starting the next day, Israel gave Hezbollah 11 months to agree to a cease-fire that would have left its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in power and most of the group’s 150,000 rockets still able to threaten the Jewish state.
Nasrallah wasn’t interested. (…)
Israel’s decision to kill Nasrallah, as well as his top advisers and commanders, and to destroy most of Hezbollah’s rockets and dismantle its Radwan special forces unit made clear that Hezbollah can’t maintain its power. But if the West presses Israel into a cease-fire that merely reverts to Resolution 1701—which has been ignored for 17 years with no consequences—all of Israel’s successes will have been for nothing.
The West must realize that Hezbollah and Iran can’t be coaxed into joining the civilized world’s norms of nonviolence. But military force without diplomacy won’t end things either. Diplomacy backed by military force is the only way to achieve stability between Israel and Lebanon. This is even more true when it comes to the dangerous ayatollahs of the Islamic Republic. Tehran’s ballistic-missile attacks on Israel in April and October showed that Iran can kill thousands of people and destroy whole cities more than 1,000 miles away—a fate Israel averted only through excellent antimissile defense.
The U.S. and Europe must understand that Iran might someday turn these capabilities against them. And what if Tehran has a nuclear weapon? The West must shift its attitude toward the Middle East—to save the region from more wars and save itself from Iran and its proxies.
Mr. Bob is a co-author of “Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination—and Secret Diplomacy—to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East,” just out in paperback, and senior military analyst for the Jerusalem Post.
This Is the House That Hezbollah Built – WSJ
Keine Zivilisten, keine Nahrungsmittel, keine Gnade: Setzt Israel im äussersten Norden des Gazastreifens den «Plan der Generäle» um?
Im Schatten einer Eskalation mit Iran und der Offensive in Libanon will Israel in Nordgaza Fakten schaffen. Hinter den heftigen Angriffen der vergangenen Tage steckt wohl ein Vorschlag einflussreicher Ex-Offiziere. ? (NZZ, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Die israelische Armee ist in den nördlichen Gazastreifen zurückgekehrt – mit voller Kraft. Am 6. Oktober veröffentlichte sie zum ersten Mal seit Wochen neue Evakuierungsbefehle für den Norden Gazas. In den Tagen darauf wurden diese noch einmal ausgeweitet – das gesamte Gebiet nördlich von Gaza und Teile der Stadt sollen geräumt werden.
Kurz darauf begann die Offensive: Mit einer zusätzlichen Division, unterstützt von Artillerie und Luftwaffe, führt die Armee derzeit heftige Kämpfe in Jabalia. Dort tötete die israelische Armee laut eigenen Angaben Dutzende Terroristen der Hamas und des Palästinensischen Islamischen Jihad. Zudem soll sie 40 Stellungen der Terroristen zerstört haben, darunter eine Abschussrampe, von der am Samstag zwei Raketen auf die südisraelische Stadt Ashkelon abgefeuert worden waren. (…)
Israelische Sicherheitsexperten gehen davon aus, dass die Armee auf Geheiss der politischen Führung nun teilweise den sogenannten «Plan der Generäle» umsetzt. Bereits im April hatte eine Gruppe ehemaliger hochrangiger israelischer Offiziere unter Führung des früheren Vorsitzenden des Rates für die nationale Sicherheit Giora Eiland einen radikalen Plan veröffentlicht, um die Hamas zu besiegen.
Darin schlagen die Generäle die vollständige Evakuierung der schätzungsweise 300 000 Zivilisten aus der Stadt Gaza und allen Gebieten nördlich davon vor. Danach sollen humanitäre Hilfslieferungen komplett gestoppt werden. Die 5000 Hamas-Terroristen, die laut Giora Eiland im Norden verbleiben, hätten dann die Wahl, zu kapitulieren oder von israelischen Soldaten getötet zu werden. Die anschliessende Besetzung des nördlichen Gazastreifens soll den Druck auf die Hamas so weit erhöhen, dass sie sich auf eine Freilassung der Geiseln einlässt. (…)
Die Befürworter des «Plans der Generäle» argumentieren, dass der Hamas-Chef Yahya Sinwar vor allem zwei Dinge fürchte: eine unzufriedene Bevölkerung und einen Verlust von Territorium. Mit neuer Härte im Norden des Gazastreifens könnte er zu Konzessionen bereit sein, glauben sie. Michael Milshtein, ehemaliger Leiter der Palästinenserabteilung im israelischen Militärgeheimdienst, hält das allerdings für Wunschdenken. Seiner Ansicht nach ist der Plan, der derzeit teilweise umgesetzt werde, verfehlt.
«Ich verstehe wirklich nicht, wie dieser Plan zu einer Freilassung der Geiseln oder zu einer Kapitulation der Hamas führen soll», sagt er im Gespräch. Denn vielleicht befänden sich einige der verschleppten Israeli noch in Gaza-Stadt. Sollte die israelische Armee dann vorrücken, würde die Hamas sie voraussichtlich töten, so wie sie bereits Ende August sechs Geiseln ermordet habe, sagt Milshtein.
Zudem glaubt der Hamas-Experte nicht, dass eine Besetzung des nördlichen Gazastreifens den Druck auf Sinwar erhöht. (…)
So wie bereits zu Beginn des Kriegs habe Israel zwei Optionen. Entweder es besetze den gesamten Gazastreifen dauerhaft und töte Yahya Sinwar. «Dann ist allerdings klar, dass wir die Geiseln nicht wiedersehen», sagt Milshtein. Die andere Option: ein Abkommen mit der Hamas, das zwar einen hohen Preis habe, aber die verschleppten Staatsbürger rette.
Israel kämpft mit neuer Härte in Nordgaza. Was steckt dahinter? (nzz.ch)
👎👎👎Le lâche abandon du Liban
Dans leur guerre face au Hamas et au Hezbollah, les autorités israéliennes semblent moins intéressées par un cessez-le-feu, dont Washington parle peu, que par la tentation de remodeler la région par la force, et par elle seulement. (Le Monde, édito, 13 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Qui peut être surpris que des casques bleus puissent être pris pour cible par l’armée israélienne dans le sud du Liban ? Les tirs qui ont blessé deux soldats sri-lankais le 11 octobre sont intervenus après un premier incident, deux jours plus tôt, au cours duquel deux militaires indonésiens avaient déjà été blessés. L’armée israélienne nie toute intentionnalité, mais ces tirs interviennent en pleine offensive contre la milice chiite du Hezbollah pour laquelle l’armée de l’Etat hébreu ne semble se fixer aucune limite.
Comme à Gaza depuis un an, la présence d’un responsable militaire ou politique du Hezbollah est avancée à chaque fois pour justifier les bombardements les plus meurtriers, le prix versé par les civils également présents sur les lieux étant réduit à une simple contingence. Le droit humanitaire international s’effrite sous nos yeux sous ces coups de boutoir, assénés, qui plus est, par un gouvernement issu des urnes et soutenu militairement par les Etats-Unis.
Personne ne dénie à Israël le droit de se défendre. Le Hezbollah a exposé le Liban à un aventurisme que l’écrasante majorité de ses habitants n’a pas choisi au lendemain du 7 octobre 2023, lorsqu’il a tiré ses premières roquettes sur le territoire israélien en solidarité avec le Hamas, qui avait perpétré à l’occasion de cette attaque les pires massacres de civils de l’histoire de l’Etat hébreu. Ces tirs doivent cesser pour que des dizaines de milliers de déplacés israéliens puissent rentrer chez eux dans le nord d’Israël. Mais le million de déplacés libanais chassé du sud et qui campe dans des conditions épouvantables dans un pays qui était déjà sur le fil du rasoir, paralysé politiquement et épuisé économiquement, n’y a pas moins droit.
Les autorités israéliennes semblent cependant moins intéressées par un cessez-le-feu, dont Washington parle peu, que par l’opportunité de régler de vieux comptes, voire la tentation de remodeler la région par la force, et par elle seulement. (…) Cette hubris est inquiétante. (…)
De la colonisation sans entraves de la Cisjordanie occupée à la conduite des guerres en cours jusqu’au cœur de Beyrouth, en passant par l’embargo qui étrangla pendant dix-sept ans Gaza sans affaiblir le moins du monde le Hamas, l’Etat hébreu ne cesse d’agir en toute impunité au regard du droit. Le résultat devrait pourtant interroger.
Le lâche abandon du Liban (lemonde.fr)
Israelis don’t care what the world thinks about the war- opinion
Israel faces global criticism amid the war, but a poll reveals sharp divides between right-wing and center-left views on how much Israelis really care. (The Jerusalem Post, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) The conduct of the war brought criticism of Israel from both friendly and rival countries, fueled public protests in the United States and across the globe, led to accusations of genocide against Israel before the International Court of Justice, and resulted in charges of war crimes against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
How do Israelis view these pressures? Do they see them as real constraints on the goals or means of the war? To understand what the public thinks, the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University conducted a poll through the online survey company iPanel on September 19-23, covering a representative sample of 1,001 respondents.
We asked respondents about six types of international influences, which can be grouped into three categories. First, pressures from foreign governments – American or European demands; second, legal constraints – the international laws of war or the possible prosecution of Israeli officials before the International Criminal Court (ICC); and, third, the harm to Israel’s international standing – its global image or trade and investment ties.
Our findings show a clear divide between right-wing voters (supporters of the current coalition) and center-left voters (supporters of the opposition).
For right-wing voters, who are supporters of Netanyahu, international pressures matter little for the conduct of the war. Only 32% of rightists believe that American demands should affect how Israel manages the war, and a meager 12% think that European demands carry any weight. (…)
Overall, Israelis seem wholly or partly dismissive of international constraints on Israel’s war effort. This public attitude is consistent with Netanyahu’s bristling at international criticism. In the face of pressure from US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, the ICC prosecutor and others, the prime minister has rejected all demands and accusations and vowed to keep fighting with determination.
Such an attitude surely satisfies his political base and makes Netanyahu appear strong to his supporters. Yet, the long-term costs of ignoring the world will be high. With little international support, Israel will be unable to acquire the weapons it needs or to maintain the trade and investment flows its economy requires. The Israeli go-it-alone approach is a risky bet.
The writer is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility, Reichman University.
How do Israelis feel about international approval amid war – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Israel Says Documents Found in Gaza Show Hamas’s Attack Planning, Iran Ties
Letters and meeting minutes appear to show Hamas seeking funding from Tehran, trying to win support from Hezbollah (WSJ, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
DUBAI—Israel’s military shared with journalists documents that it said its soldiers found in Gaza and that appear to show financial and military support provided by Iran to Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas before the Oct. 7 attacks.
The Israeli armed forces gave The Wall Street Journal a series of what it described as letters and notes from meetings of the Hamas leadership as Israel weighs a retaliatory strike against Iran after Tehran fired a large salvo of missiles at Israel this month. (…)
The papers shown to the Journal suggest that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was negotiating with Iran over funding for a planned large-scale assault on Israel as far back as 2021.
In one of the letters, written in Arabic, Iran says it has allocated $10 million for Hamas’s armed wing. A few weeks later, Sinwar asks Iran for $500 million, divided into $20 million a month for about two years.
Other documents were shared with different media outlets. The officials who provided the documents declined to say why they were releasing them now.
The Wall Street Journal hasn’t independently verified the documents, most of which the Israeli military said it discovered on Jan. 31 in an underground bunker in the Gaza Strip city of Khan Younis, Sinwar’s hometown. (…)
Israel Says Documents Found in Gaza Show Hamas’s Attack Planning, Iran Ties – WSJ
Hizbullah’s role in Lebanon : Israel’s invasion of Lebanon may bolster support for Hizbullah
The group is deeply embedded in Lebanese politics and society (The Economist, 11 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
THE BRIGHT yellow flags of Hizbullah that line the highway leading south out of Saida, a port city in southern Lebanon, seem like the standards of a floundering kingdom. Head farther south, where Hizbullah, the Shia militia, holds sway, and the streets grow ever emptier. The only fighters visible are the dead ones staring down from posters. The decapitation, almost overnight, of the Hizbullah’s military leadership, and the assassination of its charismatic leader, Hassan Nassrallah, have shocked everyone, not least the Shia group’s own supporters.
Over a week after more than 80 Israeli bombs obliterated Nasrallah’s headquarters in southern Beirut, the group has yet to hold a funeral (reports suggest that he was secretly buried at a temporary site). Nor has it named a replacement; the surviving leadership is in disarray. The group’s military response to Israel’s aerial onslaught so far has been underwhelming.
As a fighting force Hizbullah has been bloodied. The obvious damage to its military strength is prompting questions about its ability to defend the Lebanese and its legitimacy as a political actor in Lebanon. But the group’s domination of Lebanon is based on far more than its military strength. It has spent decades embedding itself within Lebanon’s sectarian system, while simultaneously building a parallel state, neither of which will be destroyed by Israel’s current campaign. (…)
At the same time, it built a parallel social-welfare system, using money from Iran and from the group’s drug trade in Syria. A party membership card was more useful than a social-security number in gaining access to the best doctors. Scholarships sponsored by Hizbullah made education at Lebanon’s American universities affordable for bright children from impoverished Shia communities. Grants provided startup funds to Shia businesses.
Support for Hizbullah was based on more than the benefits it provided, however. The group’s armed resistance to Israel found particular salience among Lebanon’s Shias, long regarded as the country’s underclass. It claimed its first major victory in 2000 when Israel withdrew its troops after facing almost two decades of guerilla warfare. In the 34-day war in 2006 Hizbullah was battered but survived. That, said Nasrallah, was a victory in itself. Many saw in Hizbullah a force in Lebanon at last strong enough to stand up to Israel. (…)
And yet over the past month, Hizbullah has been unable to protect Lebanon or its Shia constituents. Of the 1.2m that have been displaced, many come from areas where sympathy for Hizbullah is strong. Lebanon’s weak government and its other political parties are taking care of those who have been affected by the war, not the Party of God.
But Israel’s ground invasion has offered the movement a lifeline. In fighting Israeli troops, it can reclaim the mantle of resistance. The need for post-war reconstruction will present new opportunities to regain its legitimacy. “Don’t underestimate Hizbullah’s ability to claim victory; if the war is over and they can lift the flag, that is enough,” says Ali al-Amine, a Lebanese journalist. The beginning of this was a disaster for Hizbullah. Its escalation may offer a reprieve. ■
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon may bolster support for Hizbullah (economist.com)
Waiting for war : The threat of an Israeli attack is reviving Iranian nationalism
Iranians fear their country is being dragged into war (The Economist, 11 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
In a teahouse in southern Tehran, the poorer half of Iran’s capital, a female storyteller regales a roomful of shisha-puffing men with tales from Persia’s ancient epic, Shahnameh. “He didn’t want war,” she tells them of its warrior hero, Rostam. “He did everything to avoid it, but they kept provoking, and then they forced him to fight.”
For years the ayatollahs’ critics in Iran called on America and Israel to rescue them from their oppressor, the Islamic Republic’s clerics and guards, only half in jest. Their anger has not subsided. But the looming threat from Israel has turned the mockery to foreboding. For the first time in over three decades, Iranians worry that their country, like Rostam, is being dragged into war.
The regime is trying to quell such fears. There has been no mass call-up or testing of air-raid sirens. But state radio and tv are playing martial music. Nationalist symbols are replacing religious ones. Iranian flags and the slogan “For Iran’s honour” are on the streets.
Many had recently hoped a shift in the regime’s tone might ease tension with the West and perhaps mollify Israel. But Israel’s attacks on Iran’s proxies have cast doubt on that. More Iranians seem convinced that war is inevitable. “Just a few months ago, we were worried about the economic crisis,” says a female university graduate in Khorasan, an eastern province. “Now we’re asking whether we’ll even survive tomorrow.” (…)
Many take pride in the regime’s riposte to Israel. And Iranian nationalism may revive in the face of foreign intervention. “There was an arrogance I didn’t like,” says a university lecturer and erstwhile critic of the regime, referring to Binyamin Netanyahu’s address to Iran. “I think he must learn a lesson so he won’t speak like that ever again.” Faced with the prospect of humiliation by the Jewish state, an Islamist tinge colours the nationalism of poor Iranians. Days after Iran’s attack on Israel, a vast crowd heard Mr Khamenei deliver his first public Friday sermon in four years. (…)
The threat of an Israeli attack is reviving Iranian nationalism (economist.com)
Trump may be good for Netanyahu, but not for Israel – opinion
The Democratic Party’s platform also makes it abundantly clear, emphasizing its commitment to Israel’s security. (The Jerusaem Post, 11 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Despite the extensive security assistance since Oct. 7, the cooperation in defending Israel from Iranian missiles, and the intense efforts to bring about the release of the hostages held by Hamas, Israelis are still captives of the perception that Israel-US relations are measured first and foremost by the relationships between the two countries’ leaders. They interpret US administration criticism of the Netanyahu government as lack of support for Israel, although quite the opposite is true.
As a longtime student and practitioner in the field of US-Israel relations, I find a direct contradiction between Israelis’ preference for Trump and their understanding that relations with the US are vital for their country, as is an accommodation with the Palestinians. In fact, the public clearly realizes Israel’s interest in supporting the Biden Doctrine and turning the tragedy of October 7 into an opportunity to boost Israel’s security through regional arrangements. This makes the fear of Harris and backing for Trump all the more troubling and in need of correction.
The confusion stems from ignorance regarding the two candidates and reflects the successful efforts by the Israeli and American political Right to portray Harris as ideologically or politically aligned with the most extreme progressives in the Democratic Party and among its voters. The reality couldn’t be more different. (…)
The Republican Party, meanwhile, consists in large part of Evangelicals (some 80% of them voted for Trump) and foreign policy isolationists whose support and commitment to Israel’s survival is questionable. Evangelicals believe that the second coming of Christ can only be achieved through a chaotic war in which most of us will die and the rest will convert to Christianity. For now, they want Israel to be a Jewish ethnocracy and the United States a white supremacist Christian one.
The isolationists, driven by the Trump mantra of Make America Great Again (MAGA Republicans), only support policies deemed immediately beneficial to the US itself, do not think America should be the leader of the free world, and are willing to abandon alliances with Ukraine, NATO, South Korea, Taiwan, and yes, even with Israel. (…) The liberal camp in Israel must make it clear to the public that a Harris presidency holds out great hope for their country, while Trump’s is a clear and present danger. Jewish American voters appear to be realizing this. The vast majority of the American Jewish community will undoubtedly support Harris and the implementation of the Biden Doctrine.
Opposition leaders must now help Israeli voters understand that Netanyahu and Trump will only distance us from a calm and safe life here, and that the time has come for us to support the Biden Doctrine for the sake of Israelis, Palestinians, the peoples of the region, the United States and the entire free world.
Trump not good for Israel – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Michael Walzer : «Israël mène une guerre juste, mais cela n’empêche pas de critiquer la conduite de la guerre»
GRAND ENTRETIEN – Dans Le Paradoxe des libérations nationales (PUF), le philosophe américain, professeur émérite à l’Institute for Advanced Study, à Princeton, et grand théoricien de la guerre juste, observe le retour du radicalisme religieux autour du globe, et la façon dont le sionisme messianique prend l’ascendant sur le sionisme laïque des pères fondateurs d’Israël. (Le Figaro, 11 octobre, article payant)
Voir « Article du Jour »
The Israel-Hizbullah war : Lebanon needs a new army in the south, says Yair Lapid
Israel’s opposition leader sees a way to turn war into a much-needed reset for the country (The Economist, tribune, 9 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du Jour”
Lebanon needs a new army in the south, says Yair Lapid (economist.com)
Israel’s Iron Prime Minister
(The Spectator, tribune de Niall Ferguson et Jay Mens, 9 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Israel’s Iron Prime Minister | The Spectator
Chez nous, la « cinquième colonne » de la République islamique d’Iran ne se cache même plus
L’ÉDITO DE FOG. Il en est jusque dans les rangs de l’Assemblée nationale pour oser soutenir la dictature des mollahs dans sa volonté de détruire Israël. (Le Point, opinion, 9 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Voilà que nous vivons, en plus, une crise de décivilisation : le conflit israélo-palestinien s’est invité en France dans les rues, les écoles, les universités, sous l’égide de LFI. (…)
Nos ennemis œuvrent désormais au grand jour,jusque dans l’hémicycle de l’Assemblée. Et ils sont français, de surcroît. La question n’est pas seulement politique, mais aussi métaphysique : par quelle aberration mentale leur haine de soi ou leur pulsion de mort les amènent-elles à appeler à l’intifada en plein Paris ou à se déguiser en fedayin, couverts de keffiehs, de voiles, de drapeaux palestiniens, pour soutenir la « résistance » emmenée par « le grand leader iranien », comme le dit sérieusement Villepin ?
C’est une pitié que la République islamique d’Iran ait tant de soutiens en France. Nous voilà tombés bien bas pour que la gauche islamo-gauchiste, tant d’intellectuels et une fraction de la jeunesse aient emboîté le pas des mollahs iraniens, à la tête d’un des régimes les plus abjects de la planète, contre la seule démocratie du Proche-Orient. L’État hébreu a certes commis des erreurs, et Benyamin Netanyahou n’est pas un saint, loin de là, mais on ne voit pas avec quel interlocuteur Israël pourrait mener la politique de paix que nous appelons de nos vœux quand les trois principaux ennemis d’Israël – l’Iran et ses deux bras armés, le Hamas et le Hezbollah – appellent à sa destruction.
L’extrême gauche n’a plus qu’une obsession, en dehors du riche : le Juif. D’où la diabolisation quasi paranoïaque d’Israël. Qu’importe si le pronostic vital de l’État hébreu est engagé, après deux attaques massives de missiles balistiques par l’Iran, il s’agit d’en finir avec cet indésirable pour mettre au jour, sur ses décombres, une grande Palestine, « de la mer au Jourdain ». Tel est l’objectif affiché des mollahs comme de leurs mercenaires. Sur la même ligne, les cavaliers de l’Apocalypse de notre « cinquième colonne » n’émettent jamais la moindre critique contre la République islamique d’Iran, sa meilleure alliée, voire son nouveau modèle. (…)
An introduction to Lebanon, perhaps the next front in a wider war
Four books and a film on a pivotal Middle Eastern country (The Economist, 8 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
LEBANESE BOAST that theirs is a country where you can ski in the mountains and swim in the ocean on the same day. Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, was once so urbane that it was known as the Paris of the Middle East. Lebanese have in common an irreverent sense of humour. They love their country for these and other reasons but they have often not loved each other. Lebanon’s various religious sects, 18 of which are officially recognised, have long fought one another. Outside powers, including Israel, Syria, Iran and America, have exacerbated their conflicts. Lebanon’s sect-based power-sharing system has led to corruption and political paralysis. Governments based on it have mismanaged the economy. GDP is less than half what it was in 2019. In 2023 the central bank devalued the Lebanese pound by 90% against the dollar. Inflation exceeded 200% that year. Many Lebanese have left in recent years, joining an already-vast diaspora. About 5.5m people, including hundreds of thousands of Syrian and Palestinian refugees, remain in a country that is being dragged once again into the seemingly endless war between Israel and its neighbours. That would escalate a regional crisis that Western powers are desperate to contain. We recommend four books and a film on a fascinating and pivotal country.
Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. By Robert Fisk. Oxford University Press; 752 pages; £20.99
Jokes for the Gunmen. By Mazen Maarouf. Granta; 176 pages; $13.99 and £10.99
Lebanon: A Country in Fragments. By Andrew Arsan. Hurst; 520 pages; $21.95 and £19.99
Caramel. By Nadine Labaki. (2007)
The Rock of Tanios. By Amin Maalouf. Abacus; 288 pages; £9.99
An introduction to Lebanon, perhaps the next front in a wider war (economist.com)
Le Hamas est sérieusement affaibli mais son chef, Yahya Sinwar, refuse de capituler
DÉCRYPTAGE – Malgré les lourdes pertes infligées par Israël, le groupe armé islamiste disposerait d’encore au moins 10.000 combattants. (Le Figaro, 7 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Du fond de sa tanière, il sait que le Hamas ne pourra plus régner en maître comme c’était le cas depuis qu’il avait chassé en 2007 l’Autorité palestinienne de Mahmoud Abbas, qui refusait de concéder sa défaite aux législatives de 2006. « Il ne pensait pas qu’Israël allait riposter aussi lourdement, poursuit cette source palestinienne en contact avec des messagers de Yahya Sinwar. Il avait imaginé que ce serait une sorte de 2014 plus », c’est-à-dire qu’Israël ferait la guerre plus longtemps qu’en 2014, mais que les combats ne dureraient pas un an. Si les victimes civiles palestiniennes n’ont jamais été sa préoccupation, Sinwar cherche à sauver ce qui resterait de ses hommes armés, dans l’espoir que le Hamas pèse encore une fois la guerre terminée. (…)
Avec la guerre lancée par l’État hébreu au Liban et les menaces d’extension régionale impliquant l’Iran, « Sinwar veut voir Israël embourbé dans une guerre régionale qui contraindrait l’État hébreu à lever le pied contre Gaza », estiment des responsables américains, cités par le New York Times.
Son attaque terroriste a relancé la cause palestinienne, mais à quel prix ? Les institutions du gouvernement du Hamas sont à genoux, la plupart des bâtiments officiels ont été endommagés ou détruits. De rares services subsistent : une quinzaine d’hôpitaux, des ambulances brinquebalantes, des tribunaux improvisés pour les actes officiels. Les écoles, la centrale électrique, les stations d’eau ou les commissariats ont cessé de fonctionner.
De nombreux Gazaouis, déjà pauvres dans une prison à ciel ouvert, sont mécontents de ce dramatique retour en arrière. La popularité du Hamas a baissé. Pour la première fois en un an, une majorité (57 %) des Palestiniens de Gaza estime que l’attaque du 7 octobre était une mauvaise décision (39 % pensent le contraire), selon un récent sondage du Centre palestinien de recherche.
Le Hamas est sérieusement affaibli mais son chef, Yahya Sinwar, refuse de capituler (lefigaro.fr)
The Middle East : Wrath and sorrow rule in Israel on the anniversary of October 7th
A divided country is at war with multiple enemies, and fighting itself (The Economist, 7 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du Jour!”
Wrath and sorrow rule in Israel on the anniversary of October 7th (economist.com)
The assault on Judaism: Will the US hold Macron accountable as France takes the lead
Until this weekend, France was hiding behind the posture that it is “just following orders” – just as it did in the 1940s. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 7 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Judaism is under a dual assault: A physical assault coming from Iran and its proxies and an ideological assault coming from the West.
Over the weekend, France’s President Emmanuel Macron linked the two when he announced that France has stopped providing arms to Israel that are used in its war against Hamas and encouraged others to do the same.
This is a stunning development with historical consequences. War is a zero-sum game. When one wants to support a party in war, it can either provide weapons to that party or try to prevent weapons from being used by the opposing party fighting it.
A year ago, the idea of Macron pleading with the world to effectively support Hamas in its war against the Jewish state would be unthinkable and dismissed as paranoia. But on October 5th, 2024, on the eve of one year anniversary of the October 7th attack, it really happened.
The Elyse Palace subsequently assured that France is still committed to the physical defense of Israel, pointing to its role in intercepting the Iranian missile attacks on October 1st and April 14.
Indeed, the bigger impact of Macron’s October 5th announcement may not be the potential loss of $33 million of French arms used to fend off the physical attack on the Jewish state, but the backwind Macron just provided for the ideological assault on Judaism, which is rapidly turning into an existential threat to the survival of Judaism. (…)
Until this weekend, France was hiding behind the posture that it is “just following orders” – just as it did in the 1940s. But with Macron’s call to embargo the Jewish state, France is no longer a passive follower. It just provided a powerful boost to the ICC efforts, certifying that, indeed, the actions of Israel in Gaza are so malignant that they warrant a global embargo on the Jewish state. (…)
As Macron made his new “outrageous” plea on October 5th, all eyes are now on President Biden. Will the US look the other way again? Or will it hold France accountable for its efforts to flip the Western world against the country that is defending it from the reign of terrorism? (…)
Nine months later, As the Jewish New Year began and as Israel was fighting a brutal physical war for its survival, Macron reminded us that the biggest threat to the survival of Judaism emanates from the ideological assault that is coming from the West and is accelerating at an alarming pace.
Gol Kalev is the author of the new book The Assault on Judaism: The Existential Threat is Coming from the West (www.TheAssaultonJudaism.com).
Guest Essay : Benny Gantz: What the World Needs to Understand About Iran Pictures (NYT, 7 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
Oct. 7, 2023, marked the worst tragedy for the state of Israel and the Jewish people since the Holocaust. Some 1,200 people were murdered in Israel, and approximately 250 people were taken hostage on a single day; 101 of those souls are still held captive in Gaza. Hezbollah in Lebanon began its attack on the north of Israel the very next day, forcing nearly 70,000 Israelis from their homes. Iran, launching attacks first on April 13 and again on Oct. 1, has sent millions of Israelis into the safety of their shelters.
A year later, one must ask: What were Hamas’s leaders hoping for, and what are Iran’s leaders seeking to achieve? (…)
So three rationales stood behind Hamas’s attack: jihadi fanaticism, an assessment that Israel was at a point of weakness and loyalty to Iran and its axis of evil. It is for these reasons that Oct. 7 and Iran’s subsequent attacks on Israel must serve as a stark warning to the region and the world regarding the Islamic republic’s uncompromising intentions and its outlook on the West.
Iran’s religious leadership is devoted to exporting its fundamentalist ideology, driven by the pursuit of hegemony and captivated by the thought of its opponents’ violent subjugation. I ask that other nations not make the same mistake we made and underestimate this component of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s calculus. (…)
Hamas’s leader and Ayatollah Khamenei share the same ambition: to annihilate Israel. But Ayatollah Khamenei only had greater strategic patience, leading him to a different conclusion on the right timeto launch a full-scale attack on my nation. Make no mistake: Iran is preparing, building and waiting for the right moment of weakness to pounce (…)
In a post-Oct. 7 reality, it is clear that Israel must — and the world should — be proactive and determined in the face of the threat the Iranian regime poses to Israel’s existence and the region’s future. The world cannot overlook Iran’s role in the strangling of freedom of navigation and the harming of global commerce in the Red Sea or its technological and military support for Russia in Ukraine. The regime and its axis must face a strong and united Middle East, led and supported by the United States, that is ready to take the initiative to prevent the realization of the Iranian vision of a regional Oct. 7. Now is the time to bolster regional cooperation and make a broad effort to confront Iran. (…)
Israel learned the lesson of Oct. 7; we now bear the responsibility of sharing the lesson with the world. The time to act against Iran is now. It’s not only a matter of necessity for Israel but also one of strategic imperative for the region and moral clarity for the world for the sake of peace and prosperity in the Middle East.
Benny Gantz is a former Israel minister of defense and is the chairman of the National Unity Party.
Pascal Bruckner : « Le moment est venu d’en finir avec les maîtres de Téhéran »
TRIBUNE. Pour le philosophe, Israël et ses alliés disposent d’une occasion unique de faire chuter le régime des mollahs. Et porter ainsi un coup fatal à l’islam politique. (Le Point, 7 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Le philosophe iranien Daryush Shayegan l’avait répété à plusieurs reprises : la chute de la République islamique portera un coup fatal à l’islam politique et contraindra les sociétés arabo-musulmanes à abandonner peu à peu l’obscurantisme religieux pour des accommodements plus raisonnables avec la modernité. Les despotes du monde entier observent l’attitude d’Israël, des États-Unis et de l’Europe : une seule hésitation, une suite d’atermoiements, une rétorsion trop douce seraient une bénédiction pour Poutine, Xi, Erdogan. Elles signifieraient que le monde occidental est faible et peut tomber comme un fruit mûr.
Quelle que soit la forme prise par les représailles américano-israéliennes – paralysie du système électrique, destruction des infrastructures militaires et nucléaires, élimination ciblée des chefs des Gardiens de la révolution –, le moment est venu d’en finir avec les maîtres de Téhéran qui assassinent leur peuple, pendent les femmes et torturent leurs opposants. La disparition de ce gouvernement constituerait une avancée importante pour travailler à une réconciliation entre Palestiniens et Israéliens.
Deux nations sauvent aujourd’hui l’honneur du monde libre : l’Ukraine et Israël, en proie aux mêmes ennemis puisque Poutine et Khamenei sont liés par un traité d’amitié et que le premier soutient le Hamas, le Hezbollah et les talibans. Il faut désormais frapper la pieuvre à la tête, et ce avant que l’Iran n’ait la bombe. Esquiver cette opportunité serait un crime contre la liberté et exposerait les dirigeants occidentaux à un déshonneur durable.
Pascal Bruckner : « Le moment est venu d’en finir avec les maîtres de Téhéran » (lepoint.fr)
One Year After Oct. 7, Israel Sees a Future at War
The Hamas-led attack has convinced the country that it must take the battle to its enemies (WSJ, 7 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) “Pre-emptive wars will be in the future part of the Israeli tool kit,” said Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser.
The impact of this new strategy is expected to touch nearly every part of Israeli society, reshape Middle East geopolitics and shake up relations with the U.S., which as Israel’s main diplomatic ally and supplier of weapons has watched its influence diminish.
It could come at the expense of Israel’s diplomatic goals, including building a regional alliance that can counter Iran. Saudi Arabia has said it won’t normalize relations with Israel unless there’s a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, an idea that remains unpopular in Israel and is a no-go for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current right-wing government. (…)
Without seeking political and diplomatic solutions, “it’s a matter of endless war,” said Tamir Hayman, a former head of Israeli military intelligence and executive director of the Tel Aviv-based think tank Institute for National Security Studies. “After Gaza, we will go to Lebanon. After Lebanon, go to the West Bank. After the West Bank, we go to Iran.”
For many Israelis, this has opened up a terrifying new reality. Will Israel become a Sparta of the Middle East, with national security and war its most defining characteristic? Israelis had become accustomed to the growing business opportunities that periods of calm made possible, with Tel Aviv becoming a global technology hub with high salaries, an internationally recognized restaurant scene and luxury high-rise apartments.
Israel has mandatory military service for most citizens, with an army that relies on both conscripts and hundreds of thousands of reservists who, in peacetime, live normal lives. Israelis are now contemplating a future where they could spend even more time at war. (…)
Israel’s security rethink is a testament to the success of Iran’s anti-Israel militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories. The Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack wasn’t limited to Israel’s southern border. It unleashed Iranian-backed militias like Hezbollah, which began firing rockets on northern Israel on Oct. 8, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have fired long-range ballistic missiles in Tel Aviv. At the same time, Tehran-backed Iraqi and Syrian militias have harassed Israel with rocket fire and drones.
What this year has shown is that Iran’s strategy has opened up more ways for Israel to be attacked and from more places—from sophisticated rockets to off-the-shelf drones and suicide bombings in Tel Aviv. (…)
“This is not a war against Hamas or Hezbollah,” said Ofer Shelah, director of national security policy research at the Institute for National Security Studies. “This is a war against the Iranian Axis of Resistance.” (…)
Critics of Israel’s strategic shift say it will bog the region down in endless conflict, and risks radicalizing the populations of stable Arab neighbors and pushing potential allies like Saudi Arabia away. Media across the Arab world continues to focus on the death toll in Gaza, where more than 40,000 Palestinians have been killed, according to local health authorities, who don’t distinguish between combatant deaths and civilians. (…)
Polls have consistently shown Israelis feel their sense of security was shattered on Oct. 7 and it still hasn’t recovered. People are grieving, depressed and “feel like the sky has fallen on their heads,” said Tamar Hermann, a pollster and senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute think tank in Jerusalem.
Ayala Metzger, 50, has become one of the leaders of the protest movement to free the hostages. Her father-in-law, Yoram Metzger, was 80 years old when he was kidnapped on Oct. 7 from his home in Kibbutz Nir Oz. His body was found by the Israeli military in August. Ayala said Israel is no longer a country she recognizes, and she and her husband talk about leaving.
“This is the only home I know, but it’s crazy now,” she said. “Where I live, I don’t feel like home.”
One Year After Oct. 7, Israel Sees a Future at War – WSJ
Hamas Leader Is Holding Out for a Bigger War, U.S. Officials Say
Yahya Sinwar is increasingly fatalistic, has blocked a cease-fire deal and, so far, been frustrated that Hezbollah and Iran have not come to his aid, officials said. (NYT, 5 octobre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
(…) Mr. Sinwar has long believed he will not survive the war, a view that has hindered negotiations to secure the release of hostages seized by his group in the Oct. 7 attacks in Israel, according to U.S. intelligence assessments.
His attitude has hardened in recent weeks, U.S. officials say, and American negotiators now believe that Hamas has no intention of reaching a deal with Israel. (…)
Hamas has shown no desire at all to engage in talks in recent weeks, U.S. officials say. They suspect that Mr. Sinwar has grown more resigned as Israeli forces pursue him and talk about closing in on him.
A larger war that puts pressure on Israel and its military would, in Mr. Sinwar’s assessment, force them to scale back operations in Gaza, the U.S. officials said. The war in the region has widened, but not in ways that have meaningfully benefited Hamas, at least not yet. (…)
Isolated and in hiding in Gaza, Mr. Sinwar’s communication with his organization has become strained. He stopped using electronic devices long ago and stays in touch with his organization through a network of human couriers, according to Israeli and American officials. (…)
Some Israeli officials have questioned whether Mr. Sinwar is still alive. U.S. and Israeli officials acknowledge there is no definitive proof of life. There have been no audio or video recordings from him for months.
On Sept. 13, Hezbollah released a letter that Mr. Sinwar sent in support of Mr. Nasrallah. Some Hamas officials, speaking elliptically, suggested that it was written outside Gaza by someone else, with Mr. Sinwar’s approval. It was not handwritten, unlike other communications that have been verified to come directly from him.
But American officials said they had no evidence he was dead, and in fact senior U.S. officials said they thought he was alive and making critical decisions for Hamas. Mr. Sinwar remains in hiding but appears to recognize that Israeli forces are closing in on him. (…)
While Mr. Sinwar’s strategy is not yet working, it could ultimately succeed. (…)
A senior U.S. official said Iran’s actions over the past few months had sent a clear message to Mr. Sinwar: “The cavalry is not coming.”
Hamas Leader Is Holding Out for a Bigger War, U.S. Officials Say – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
A Yazidi Woman Is Liberated From Slavery in Gaza
Fawzia Sido’s decadelong captivity illustrates the connections between ISIS, Hamas and other jihadists. (WSJ, 5 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du Jour”
A Yazidi Woman Is Liberated From Slavery in Gaza – WSJ
« Non, la question palestinienne n’est pas la clé des problèmes du Proche-Orient »
TRIBUNE. Un an après les massacres du 7 Octobre, Simone Rodan-Benzaquen, directrice Europe de l’American Jewish Committee (AJC), souligne le rôle déstabilisateur de la République islamique d’Iran. (Le Point, 5 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Pendant des années, de nombreux diplomates et experts ont considéré que la résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien était la clé de tous les problèmes du Proche et du Moyen-Orient. Cette idée, théorisée sous la présidence de Jimmy Carter aux États-Unis (1977-1981), a influencé les politiques internationales et la manière dont les crises dans la région sont interprétées.
Depuis le 7 Octobre, elle domine de nouveau les commentaires d’une grande partie des médias et des milieux politiques français, qui affirment que sans un État palestinien, la région ne connaîtra pas la paix et qu’il est impératif que la France reconnaisse un tel État.
Cette théorie est non seulement erronée, mais aussi dangereuse. Le dossier palestinien a, certes, été délaissé et devra être traité pour le bien des deux peuples. Mais qui peut croire sérieusement que la solution se trouve uniquement du côté israélien ? Et que la seule résolution de ce conflit dépendrait uniquement des deux acteurs et qu’elle améliorerait la situation au Liban, en Afghanistan, en Syrie, en Irak, au Yémen ou au Soudan ?
En continuant à défendre cette théorie, on alimente les thèses conspirationnistes qui font d’Israël ou du sionisme le principal danger pour la planète. Si le conflit israélo-palestinien est perçu comme étant au centre de tout, et qu’Israël est désigné comme fautif, alors Israël devient responsable des malheurs du monde entier.
Plus grave encore, cette théorie occulte l’une des clés des problèmes régionaux : la véritable force déstabilisatrice du Moyen-Orient est la République islamique d’Iran. Dès le 7 Octobre, des Israéliens mais aussi des opposants iraniens, libanais et émiratis avaient alerté sur le rôle central joué par la République islamique d’Iran dans ces attaques et au-delà. (…)
« Non, la question palestinienne n’est pas la clé des problèmes du Proche-Orient » (lepoint.fr)
Liban : les Français divisés sur la responsabilité du Hezbollah ou d’Israël dans le conflit
SONDAGE EXCLUSIF – Si quatre Français sur dix affirment ne pas vouloir prendre parti, le ressenti sur ce conflit est très marqué politiquement. Sans surprise, on voit comment la gauche, et plus précisément les sympathisants LFI, pense qu’Israël porte la responsabilité. (Le Figaro, 5 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Le conflit au Liban s’inscrit-il dans le continuum de ce qu’il se passe à Gaza depuis plus d’un an ? Dans l’opinion française, Israël est-elle perçue comme agresseur ou agressée ? Au regard des chiffres d’un sondage réalisé du 30 septembre au 1er 2024 par l’Ifop pour Le Figaro, une majorité relative des Français considère que le Hezbollah porte la responsabilité de l’exportation du conflit au Liban. La question avait déjà été posée lors de la précédente offensive israélienne au Liban contre le Hezbollah en 2006. Les chiffres s’inscrivent dans la continuité.
Pourtant, il aurait été possible d’imaginer, qu’à la différence de 2006, les images qui circulent sur les réseaux sociaux puissent faire pencher la balance. La plupart des vidéos sont celles de frappes israéliennes ou de destructions causées par l’armée israélienne sur des infrastructures civiles et militaires. Mais une majorité relative des Français «a une chronologie des événements en tête», commente Jérôme Fourquet, directeur du département Opinion de l’Ifop, auprès du Figaro. «Ils se souviennent que c’est le Hezbollah qui a attaqué et qu’il y a le match retour avec la réaction d’Israël», analyse-t-il. (…)
Même si quatre Français sur dix affirment ne pas vouloir prendre parti, le ressenti sur ce conflit est très marqué politiquement. Sans surprise, on voit comment la gauche et plus précisément les sympathisants de La France Insoumise (LFI), pense qu’Israël porte la responsabilité (un LFI sur deux).
On peut également remarquer que l’opinion penche aussi de ce côté chez les sympathisants du Parti socialiste. Inversement, dans l’électorat de droite, on incrimine très majoritairement le Hezbollah. Chez Renaissance, c’est plutôt partagé. «Il y a bien historiquement une lecture de droite et de gauche du conflit, avec sans doute aussi des phénomènes d’identifications qui se font. Il y a deux camps qui s’affrontent, quelque part c’est aussi un choc de civilisation», décrypte Jérôme Fourquet. (…)
Enfin, un seul groupe social culturel est homogène sur la question de responsabilité : ce sont les musulmans. 67 % d’entre eux incriminent Israël. Pourtant, «À Gaza, on est sur une population sunnite, comme l’écrasante communauté musulmane française. Or, au Liban le conflit oppose une organisation chiite, le Hezbollah. Cela n’empêche qu’il y a un continuum, car les deux conflits sont intriqués l’un l’autre. Il y a cette grille de lecture et cette empathie quasi-mécanique de soutien à la cause et une identification qui se fait beaucoup plus facilement.» Liban : les Français divisés sur la responsabilité du Hezbollah ou d’Israël dans le conflit (lefigaro.fr)
Zeruya Shalev : « Le pronostic vital d’Israël est engagé »
Un an après le 7 Octobre, l’écrivaine israélienne tremble pour l’avenir de son pays, entre la barbarie du Hamas et le dangereux « narcissisme » de Netanyahou. (Le Point, 5 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Durant l’année écoulée, j’ai maintes fois pensé à mes grands-parents. Quatre jeunes gens qui ont quitté famille et patrie au début du XXe siècle pour émigrer dans un pays de désolation, à faible densité de population, sous domination ottomane. Un pays d’où leurs ancêtres avaient été chassés deux mille ans auparavant et vers lequel convergeaient leurs prières de retour.
Leurs motivations n’étaient pourtant pas d’ordre religieux. Au contraire. Ces quatre-là, qui ne se connaissaient pas encore, s’étaient justement détournés de l’éducation passive qu’ils avaient reçue, pour choisir de fonder un foyer dans un endroit où le peuple juif serait en sécurité, à l’abri des persécutions antisémites subies en diaspora. Des dizaines d’années avant la Shoah, ayant compris l’ampleur du danger, ils ont décidé, ainsi que de nombreux autres jeunes, de prendre leur destin en main et sont partis de Pologne, de Russie, d’Ukraine et de Lituanie. Ensemble, ils ont travaillé comme des forcenés dans les champs, ont asséché les marais, ont fertilisé le désert au point que, à l’époque, un tel développement a aussi attiré une immigration arabe venue de Syrie, du Liban, de Jordanie et même du Soudan.
Ils ont affronté un climat hostile, la malaria, la violence des bandes armées locales et le harcèlement des autorités turques, mais n’ont pas renoncé. Ainsi, ils ont ouvert la voie, avant même la création de l’État, aux autres pionniers, aux réfugiés qui ont dû fuir l’Europe avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, aux survivants de la Shoah, puis, jusqu’aux années 1950, aux nombreux Juifs dont la vie était en péril dans les pays arabes.
La perception d’Israël comme lieu sûr pour le peuple juif, seul endroit où celui-ci pourra se défendre, a prouvé sa validité à de nombreuses reprises depuis 1948 et a perduré malgré le lourd tribut exigé par les guerres et les attentats. Mais le massacre du 7 octobre 2023 et l’assassinat en un seul jour du plus grand nombre de Juifs depuis la Shoah ont ébranlé chez de nombreux Israéliens jusqu’aux bases de ce sentiment de sécurité. Et ce n’est pas la seule chose qui a été ébranlée ce jour-là. A aussi vacillé, ce 7 octobre-là, la certitude que notre gouvernement agissait dans l’intérêt du peuple et veillait à son bien-être. Car c’est avec une brutalité sans nom qu’il a rompu ce contrat fondamental avec ses citoyens. (…)
Zeruya Shalev : « Le pronostic vital d’Israël est engagé » (lepoint.fr)
Gil Troy may be the smartest defender of Israel
As we mark the anniversary of October 7, I recommend that you read one of Prof. Gil Troy’s new publications, linked inside, to equip you with the intellectual arsenal necessary to advocate for Israel (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 5 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Prof. Gil Troy may just be the smartest defender of Israel on the planet. As we mark the anniversary of October 7, I recommend that you read one of Troy’s new publications to equip you with the intellectual arsenal necessary to advocate for Israel during these challenging times of rising antisemitism and anti-Zionism.
Troy is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem-based Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), distinguished scholar in North American history at McGill University, eloquent public speaker, prolific author, and popular newspaper columnist.
His latest effort is a 64-page guidebook he produced with JPPI titled “The Essential Guide to October 7th and Its Aftermath: Facts, Figures, History.” Thousands of copies have been printed by North American Jewish federations and synagogues, while the Jewish Community Centers Association emailed it to its more than 100,000 members ahead of the High Holy Days. Here is an excerpt and here is a PDF of the entire guidebook from JPPI. (…)
Among those praising the book is President Isaac Herzog: “Having spent my high school years in New York some decades ago, I enjoyed diving into Prof. Gil Troy’s inspiring, relevant, Zionist vision, rooted in American values and Jewish moral codes, Jewish history, and contemporary Israeli life. With these timely, must-read letters to his students – and to us all – Gil Troy confirms his stature as a revered teacher, a leading public intellectual, and one of today’s influential Zionist thinkers.”
Prominent Israeli activist Noa Tishby adds: “As Jews, we tell stories in ways that are personal, compelling, and inspiring. That is precisely what Prof. Gil Troy has done in these important and timely letters. If you want to know Why Israel, why Zionism, why Liberalism, why Americanism, why stand up for yourselves – and how to fight the jihadists and what he accurately calls the Academic Intifada – read this book… now!”
Shana tova from Jerusalem!
Gil Troy may be smartest defender of Israel Oct. 7 – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
The Palestinians’ future : Has the war in Gaza radicalised young Palestinians?
After Gaza, how will the Palestinians try to build their state? (The Economist, 4 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Among the banks, law firms and luxury hotels of central London, a piece of Palestine is rising. Born in an adjacent falafel joint, Palestine House has spread over five floors. Each depicts a different period of Palestinian history. The walls of one recreate the wooden latticework of a traditional inner courtyard; another, the smashed rubble of Gaza. Palestinian flags and banners protesting against genocide decorate the walls and pavement outside. By the end of the year Osama Qashoo, its founder, plans to open a journalists’ club, a radio station, a startup hub, an exhibition hall and a cultural salon in the building. “Each bomb Israel drops on Gaza is an amplifier,” says Mr Qashoo, an exile from the West Bank city of Nablus: “We are the carriers making sure Palestine’s story lives.”
Mr Qashoo is part of a new generation of activists among Palestinians whose sense of identity had been waning. They have been mobilised by the horrifying bloodshed and destruction in Gaza. They are dismissive of an ageing and discredited Palestinian leadership and seek new ways to pursue their century-long struggle. Mr Qashoo’s vision of the route to a Palestinian state is a peaceful one. Others sound more resigned to bloodshed. “Forget the dumb doves,” says Zeina Hashem Beck, a young poet at a recital in support of Gaza in New York. Will the war in Gaza galvanise young Palestinians to new forms of struggle, or prompt further violence in their quest for a state? (…)
Perhaps driven by the desire for a safe haven, the war has consolidated support for a Palestinian state. A Palestinian poll in September put support for a state based on the borders of 1967 at 60%, compared with 10% who backed a single state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians. Mr Dajani, who is the Palestinian representative abroad of A Land For All, which champions a confederation of a Jewish and Palestinian state with open borders, says Palestinian (but not Jewish) support for the movement has collapsed over the past year. He worries he will be ostracised as “a normaliser”. “It’s hard to imagine a rosy future with those who slaughtered your friends and family,” he concedes.
Palestinians seem even more divided about how to achieve statehood. For some, resistance can be peaceful. They see it in their determination to stay put. Palestinians have remained in their villages in northern Israel, even as Hizbullah has bombarded the area with rockets and Jewish Israelis have been evacuated. “There’s always this fear,” says Ghousoon Bisharat, the editor of +972, a joint Israeli-Palestinian magazine based in Haifa, “that if you leave, you don’t know if you’ll be allowed back.” Others see it in the celebration of merely being alive. “Drinking this beer is an act of resistance,” says a 29-year-old tattooed Palestinian bartender, who left Jaffa in Israel for Ramallah, the Palestinians’ seat of government in the West Bank.
But violence is also regaining its appeal. “This Israel understands nothing else,” says one Palestinian who founded a civil-disobedience movement two decades ago but has since lost faith in a peaceful approach. Contrary to Israeli claims that force will beat Palestinians into submission, survey after survey shows the reverse since Israel invaded Gaza. In a poll conducted in the West Bank by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, support for “military resistance” grew from 40% in May this year to 51% in September, whereas support for “peaceful political action” fell from 44% to 36% in the same period. A pollster in Ramallah has similar figures: support for violence in the West Bank grew from 35% in September 2022, when Yair Lapid was Israel’s prime minister, to 56% in September this year. The pollsters say that shift is most pronounced among Palestinians who are too young to remember the costs of the second intifada (uprising) and past Palestinian wars.
Hamas is the beneficiary. (…)
Many who back Hamas seem aware of the consequences. “Most of my friends will be killed,” says a young resident of Jenin camp in the northern West Bank, despairingly. In August Hamas in the West Bank conducted its first suicide-bombing inside Israel in years. “People want to be martyred not because they get a load of virgins in paradise, but because they want to make their families and parents proud,” says a student leader in Nablus.
How much of the professed support for Hamas remains lip-service and how much a true commitment to perpetrate attacks is hard to tell. (…)
Still, few Palestinians doubt that a violent backlash is coming. As Iran was bombarding Israel with missiles on October 1st, at least seven people were shot and killed in Tel Aviv. Hamas has claimed responsibility, saying that the attackers were from Hebron in the West Bank. The Palestinians have no effective government. Hamas’s days as an authority in Gaza seem over. A similar uncertainty hangs upon Mahmoud Abbas, the 88-year-old Palestinian president. And unlike their parents, most young Palestinians have no factional allegiance. In the coming months the pa could find it harder to control what little of the West Bank it still oversees, as settler and army attacks intensify and Palestinians retaliate. Without the political will to end it, few expect this cycle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be the most lethal—or the last. ■
Has the war in Gaza radicalised young Palestinians? (economist.com)
Why Israel Is Worried About Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (NYT, Guest essay, 4 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, learned the limits of his foreign policy strategy this week: Even well-armed and well-trained surrogate forces can prove unreliable if a determined modern army disables them.
After the death of Hassan Nasrallah and many of the other members of the upper echelons of the Lebanese Hezbollah, the clerical regime’s thwarted ballistic-missile attack on Israel on Tuesday was an attempt to diminish the humiliation that Tehran has felt after Israel rapidly deconstructed Iran’s most cherished protégé. With Hezbollah as a model and partner, Tehran had perfected Islamist imperialism on the cheap: Proxies spread the faith and mauled Iran’s enemies while shielding it from direct retaliation.
But as the Israeli offensives in Gaza and Lebanon have revealed, an aspiring regional hegemon with limited conventional capacity needs more firepower and deterrence than proxies alone can deliver. Israel may have already destroyed much of Hezbollah’s most dangerous missiles, launchers and missile crews. And given the two-time failure of Iran to overwhelm the Jewish state’s air defenses, the regime’s huge investment in ballistic and cruise missiles has also proved suddenly wanting.
Where, then, might Ayatollah Khamenei turn next? Despite the supreme leader’s stated religious objections to nuclear weapons, Iran has been steadily making progress on its nuclear weapons capabilities over the past year. It is now, according to the U.S. government, down to a one-to-two-week breakout time to produce enough uranium for one atomic bomb, though it could take it several months to field a nuclear weapon.
With its proxy fighters under siege and its conventional weapons proving insufficient, Tehran may be closer than ever to crossing the threshold and building a nuclear weapon. Iran’s missile barrages could provoke Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to risk a strike aimed at its nuclear facilities and deny Tehran the only weapon that could guarantee its freedom to maneuver. (…)
Opinion | Why Israel Is Worried About Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Only way for Israeli northerners to return home is boots on ground in south Lebanon – editorial
We at The Jerusalem Post wish the IDF success in its sacred mission to defeat the terror threat in Lebanon. (The Jerusalem Post, Editorial, 4 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) With the astonishing campaign to eliminate the upper echelon of Hezbollah’s leaders from Hassan Nasrallah on down and the unattributed exploding device attack that devastated an estimated 1,500 Hezbollah members, the terror group that has grown in size, confidence, and capability since the 2006 Second Lebanon War has been hit with a dizzying blow.
But, as we can see from the continued rocket fire, the only way to achieve a diplomatic solution that will enable the return of Israeli northerners to their homes is Israeli boots on the ground in southern Lebanon.
t’s an issue of national consensus, with both government and opposition leaders expressing support for the IDF incursion into Lebanon, which began on Tuesday night. (…)
And even the United States, which had cautioned against the invasion, seems to understand the necessity of the move.
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said after speaking to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant that “we agreed on the necessity of dismantling attack infrastructure along the border to ensure that Lebanese Hezbollah cannot conduct October 7-style attacks on Israel’s northern communities.” (…)
We at The Jerusalem Post wish the IDF success in its sacred mission to defeat the terror threat in Lebanon. And we wish our readers a year in which we see peace restored to the country, the homecoming of all of the hostages held in Gaza, the return of all residents of the North to their homes, and a plethora of unripe fruit purchases.
Biden Protects Iran’s Nuclear Program
After Tuesday’s missile attack, he is already telling Israel the targets it can’t hit in self-defense. (WSJ, 4 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du Jour”
Biden Protects Iran’s Nuclear Program – WSJ
On many fronts : The bloodshed in the Middle East is fast expanding
Israel seems certain to retaliate to Iran’s missile attack (The Economist, 4 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) What is more, there are limits to what a country of 10m, already straining from a year’s war on multiple fronts, can do. Two of the Israel Defence Forces’ six combat divisions are deployed in Gaza. They are skirmishing with Hamas fighters and destroying parts of the intricate tunnel network under Gaza. Two further divisions are already involved in the ground campaign in Lebanon, and more are poised to join. (…)
Mr Netanyahu has promised Israelis “complete victory”, but has not defined what that means with respect to Gaza, much less Lebanon or Iran. Just before the Iranian missiles hit on October 1st, two Palestinians from the West Bank city of Hebron killed seven people and injured 16 in a stabbing and shooting spree at a commuter-rail station in Jaffa, to the south of Tel Aviv. Mr Netanyahu may believe Israel’s future hinges on the defeat of distant foes like Iran, but however that conflict goes, Israelis and Palestinians will still be living cheek-by-jowl. Even this most tumultuous of years has not changed that. ■
The bloodshed in the Middle East is fast expanding (economist.com)
The great mistake : What Hamas misunderstood about the Middle East
A war meant to draw in the militant group’s allies has instead left them battered (The Economist, 3 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
PERHAPS IN HIS final days he reflected on the irony. Last year Hassan Nasrallah had not been eager to start a war with Israel. Hizbullah’s leader felt dragged into it by Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, who had declined to consult his allies before his men attacked Israel on October 7th. But Nasrallah joined the war anyway: his own rhetoric left him little choice. Almost a year later, that decision would cost him his life.
His assassination on September 27th was arguably the most momentous event in a momentous year. The worst massacre in Israel’s history led to the deadliest war in Palestinian history, Iran’s first direct attacks on Israel, even the first time in any war that missiles had been intercepted in space. None of this would have happened without Mr Sinwar’s fateful decision last October. That is not to say the region would have been at peace—but this particular sequence of events would have been unthinkable had Hamas not massacred 1,200 Israelis. Mr Sinwar wanted a cataclysmic war that would reshape the Middle East, and he got one
But in many ways it has not gone to plan. Gaza is in ruins. Hamas is battered. Hizbullah has lost its leader, its military command and its reputation for competence, while Iran feels vulnerable. There has been almost no sustained and spontaneous protest in the Arab world. No regimes fell, wobbled or cut ties with Israel. Even the economic consequences have been limited. The price of Brent crude is $10 lower than it was the day before Hamas attacked Israel, regional war be damned.
Mr Sinwar went to war with two assumptions: that he would enjoy the support of a strong and united “axis of resistance”, a constellation of pro-Iranian militias; and that Israel’s conduct would inflame and mobilise the region. Those beliefs were shared by many Arab, Israeli and Western officials. (…)
et when it came time to test the idea, Nasrallah was hesitant. An overwhelming majority of Lebanese, including around 50% of his Shia constituents, opposed going to war to support Gaza. Nor were his Iranian patrons enthusiastic. Hizbullah’s arsenal was supposed to be preserved as their shield against a possible Israeli attack; they did not want to jeopardise that arsenal in order to protect Hamas. (…)
Iran and its proxies were victims of their own hype. For all their talk of unity, the “axis of resistance” is a network of disparate militias that operate out of failed or failing states. (…)
All of this has made for an odd paradox: Arab states have been bystanders to an Arab-Israeli war. They denounced Israel’s war in Gaza but did not sever ties with the Jewish state, nor did they try to apply serious diplomatic or economic pressure on its Western backers. At the same time, they were desperate to avoid any confrontation with Iran, even when its proxies caused them real harm. So far this year Egypt has lost around $6bn in revenue from the Suez canal, more than half of what it expected to earn, because of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Its response has been to shrug. Jordan was almost apologetic when it shot down Iranian drones that violated its air space in April, lest anyone think it was siding with Israel. (…)
Policymakers in America and Israel are already crowing about the chance to craft a new Middle East. The region is hard to change, though—and it rarely changes for the better. Gulf states fear they will wind up being soft targets for a cornered Iran. And they see little upside in taking such risks. Lebanon’s ossified sectarian politics may prove hard to reform; Syria’s cynical dictator shows no sign of changing his ways. Meanwhile other countries in the region, such as Egypt and Jordan, are too weak to exert much influence. Even at such a dramatic moment, the Arab states may remain mere bystanders to history. ■
What Hamas misunderstood about the Middle East (economist.com)
Power outage : Who is really in charge of Lebanon?
A visual guide to the country’s tattered political system (The Economist, 3 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Lebanon’s political system is carved up along religious lines: the president should be a Maronite Christian, the job of prime minister is reserved for a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament must be a Shia Muslim. Seats in parliament are split equally between Christians and Muslims. The arrangement, designed to promote unity among religious factions, was drawn up after the country established its independence from France in 1943. In reality it has contributed to decades of division and deadlock. Squabbles often break out over power sharing, making it impossible to cope with the country’s crises.
Where does Hizbullah fit in? Its political wing and its allies across various religious groups hold 48% of seats in parliament (they lost their majority in 2022). But in much of the country Hizbullah functions as a parallel government, often with support from locals. Maps drawn up by Stratfor, a risk consultancy, show that its influence runs through the country’s Shia areas. These include the region south of the Litani river, some 30km from the border (the area from which Hizbullah fires rockets into Israel). The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a force created in 1978, is supposed to help keep the peace there.
Hizbullah is better equipped than Lebanon’s armed forces, thanks to supplies of weapons from Iran, and has been hardened by years of fighting in Syria’s civil war. Mr Nasrallah, while he lived, had more power in Lebanon than anyone in the government. His death, and Israel’s campaign against Hizbullah, could create a power vacuum.
The government is in no shape to fill it: the office of the president has been vacant since 2022. The prime minister, Najib Mikati, resigned that year and has since been merely a caretaker. Nabih Berri, the long-standing speaker of parliament, has become the main interlocutor with Israel and America, but Hizbullah—despite being decapitated and pummelled—remains the main Lebanese party in the conflict. As Israeli troops advance, Lebanon is facing what may be the largest displacement of people in its history. Its government is too weak to help them. ■
Who is really in charge of Lebanon? (economist.com)
Nasrallah et nous
L’ÉDITO D’ÉTIENNE GERNELLE. Si la réaction de M. Mélenchon à la mort du chef du Hezbollah ne surprend guère, on note une étrange indulgence d’une partie de la classe politique et des médias… (Le Point, 3 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Dans le genre décomplexé, notons aussi l’ahurissante nécrologie publiée par Le Monde du chef terroriste, dépeint en « chef charismatique », qui « a incarné la résistance à Israël au sein du monde arabe », où il était « adulé comme un nouveau Nasser ou un Che Guevara arabe ». Le tout flanqué d’un encadré (modifié par la suite) décrivant son fils comme « mort en martyr »… Un enthousiasme moins partagé dans ledit monde arabe, où beaucoup ont célébré la mort de Nasrallah…
Le problème, là encore, réside moins dans les indulgences constatables ici et là que dans l’apathie de ceux qui devraient se tenir debout. Qu’a dit l’Élysée à l’annonce de la mort de Nasrallah ? Presque rien, sinon un « il ne doit pas y avoir de guerre au Liban » que l’on ne peut qu’approuver, mais qui, s’agissant d’un terroriste ayant tué tant de Français, est plutôt léger. Faible, si on le place en regard du communiqué de Joe Biden, qui, insistant sur les victimes libanaises, syriennes et américaines, a vu dans la mort de Nasrallah « une mesure de justice ». Et un peu court, si l’on se réfère à ce qu’avait dit Nicolas Sarkozy après la mort d’Oussama ben Laden, en 2011, rappelant que ce dernier « était le promoteur d’une idéologie de haine et le chef d’une organisation terroriste qui a fait des milliers de victimes dans le monde entier, notamment dans les pays musulmans », puis ajoutant : « Pour ces victimes, justice est faite. Ce matin, la France pense à elles et à leurs familles. »
L’époque a un arrière-goût de défaite et de renoncement, particulièrement bien décrit par notre éditorialiste Peggy Sastre dans son dernier livre, aussi brillant que bouleversant, Ce que je veux sauver (Anne Carrière). Elle y raconte notamment « son » 7 octobre 2023 : « […] quand j’ai pris conscience que des pogroms étaient en train d’être tiktokisés, quand j’ai vu les foules se rassembler dans les rues de Londres, Paris, Sydney, Amsterdam, Chicago pour hurler leur joie, quand j’ai entendu telle ou telle figure politique ou médiatique leur exprimer soutien, fierté, fièvre “émancipatoire”, j’ai flanché. » Aujourd’hui, elle ne « flanche » plus, Peggy, comme vous pouvez le constater chaque semaine dans ces colonnes ! Et même si elle écrit avoir « le tournis » depuis un an, elle regarde, elle, les choses en face. Tout le monde ne peut en dire autant.
Nasrallah et nous (lepoint.fr)
A high-risk move : Iran bombards Israel as the war escalates further
Israel may take it as justification to attack Iran (The Economist, 2 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
After days of rocket and missile exchanges between Israel and Hizbullah, on October 1st the confrontation took an even more ominous turn, in two ways: Iran launched direct missile attacks on Israel, as Israel unleashed a ground invasion of Lebanon. The full-blown regional war that many have feared ever since the attacks of October 7th 2023 now looks closer than ever. One possibility is that Israel now responds with air strikes on Iran, perhaps targeting the facilities used for its nuclear programme, a highest-stakes mission that Israel has been planning for two decades. (…)
Still, the Iranian attack has a significance that goes far beyond potential Israeli casualties. Many within Israel’s political and security establishment believe there is a moment to transform the strategic picture in the region, given the weakness of Iran’s proxies. It is even possible that the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s leader, along with a senior Iranian general, in Beirut on September 27th, was designed to provoke Iran, luring it into a strategic trap. Either way the Iranian strike, they argue, gives Israel the justification to deal with Iran’s nuclear threat.
Key to this assessment is that the calculus has improved for Israel. One element of Iran’s failed attack in April is that it revealed its vulnerabilities. Israel chose to avoid a full-scale retaliation but three days later destroyed a key Iranian air-defence radar. That is now being taken as evidence that Iran’s defences are vulnerable to the Israeli air force. Meanwhile a long-standing argument against an attack was that Iran would respond by pushing Hizbullah to fire on Israel. Now with Hizbullah reeling and Israel already on a war footing, that seems less of a problem. (…)
Some Israelis are wary of the enthusiasm of Mr Netanyahu and his far-right coalition to take the fight to Hizbullah. “Lebanon is a vortex that has swept us in before,” warns Tamir Hayman, a former IDF general and the head of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “Israel needs to make its objectives clear in Lebanon and set out what kind of ceasefire it will be willing to accept with Hizbullah. Things have so far been going well against Hizbullah, but the potential for disaster in Lebanon is great.” A high-risk invasion is now taking place alongside an even higher-risk direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, raising the stakes for Israel—and the entire Middle East. ■
Iran bombards Israel as the war escalates further (economist.com)
Bret Stephens : Actually, We Absolutely Do Need to Escalate in Iran (NYT, opinion, 2 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du jour”
Opinion | Why We Need to Escalate in Iran – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Hezbollah and the Russia-Iran Link
The Biden administration prides itself on managing allies, but it is failing with Ukraine and Israel. (WSJ, opinion, 2 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The failed Iranian missile attack against Israel on Tuesday demands a powerful response. The Biden administration must support Israel’s effort to deter, or if necessary defeat, Iran and its proxies. The missile attack should convince the U.S. that it faces linked threats in Europe and the Middle East: Russia and Iran both aim to challenge American power. Washington unfortunately has ignored the link between these two adversaries and thus is also alienating two crucial U.S. partners, Ukraine and Israel, and disrupting their ability to strategize. For all its talk, the Biden administration is failing at alliance management. (…)
Israel and Ukraine are improbably but inexorably linked. Russia’s war against Ukraine is one front in a broader contest for Eurasian mastery. The Ukrainian military thus far has doggedly held off its larger, wealthier, more technologically capable foe with a combination of initiative, ingenuity and grit. But for Ukraine, defeat would mean obliteration.
Israel’s war against Hamas is also only the most visible portion of a wider war—in this case, with Iran. The Islamic Republic seeks to eliminate the Jewish state politically, forcing Israel to abandon its Jewish character and thereby compelling a mass exodus of Israeli Jews. Iran would kill whoever remained. (…)
One disturbing point of convergence is that both Jerusalem and Kyiv are navigating the crushing weight of American incompetence. The Biden administration insists that its crowning foreign-policy achievement has been maintaining alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is supposedly stronger and more united than at any point since the Cold War. But unity within NATO alone isn’t enough to secure American interests in Europe.
The key to European security is the relationship between the European powers and Russia. This makes Ukraine central. It’s the largest wholly European country by territory, has a population of about 38 million, is important to global production of food, oil and fertilizer, and dominates the Black Sea’s northern coastline. A Russia-controlled Ukraine would provide the Kremlin with crucial resources, population and territory. Combined with Russian dominance over Belarus, probable control over Moldova, and de facto control of Georgia, this political-economic unit would be strong enough to take on the U.S. and Europe in a protracted contest of wills. If Russia gains control of the Danube River’s mouth, it could isolate NATO’s vulnerable Black Sea members. The U.S. thus has a national interest in Ukrainian victory.
The Middle East is more complex. Iran seeks to dominate the region and lead a powerful Islamist coalition. The Gulf states have decided to sit on the sidelines, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ending direct competition for regional power with Iran last year. As a result, the Iran-Israel antagonism is central to the region’s destiny. Iranian domination of the Middle East would create a great U.S. power rival on the Eurasian landmass. The U.S. thus has a national interest in Israeli victory.
Yet America refuses to grasp what victory might mean for its allies, or to help create the conditions where victory can be achieved. (…)
The U.S. must also demonstrate its ability to endure and sustain a long war. Public condemnations of Russia, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah and insistence that the U.S. will support Ukraine “as long as it takes” are no substitute for tangible actions toward those ends. Iran and Russia are pursuing strategies of exhaustion because they believe the U.S. will eventually break.
Mr. Cropsey is president of the Yorktown Institute.
Hezbollah and the Russia-Iran Link – WSJ
Attaque contre Israël : l’incroyable risque pris par l’Iran
ANALYSE. En lançant une attaque massive contre l’État hébreu, avec un bilan humain limité, la République islamique espère avoir rétabli sa dissuasion face à Tsahal en évitant la guerre. (Le Point, 2 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Les frappes iraniennes ont en tout cas provoqué, d’après les images, des scènes de joie en Cisjordanie occupée, à Gaza, au Liban ou en Égypte, où règne une certaine frustration quant à l’inaction de la communauté internationale face aux agissements de l’armée israélienne dans l’enclave palestinienne ou au pays du Cèdre. Ainsi, l’ampleur de la riposte de Téhéran permet-elle de restaurer pour un temps l’image écornée de la République islamique auprès des opinions publiques arabes, farouchement propalestiniennes, au contraire de leurs gouvernants.
« Les dirigeants iraniens ont pris un très gros risque en lançant des frappes directes contre Israël plus importantes qu’au mois d’avril, qui reflète probablement la profondeur du dilemme dans lequel ils se trouvent pris, alors que leurs principaux partenaires sont gravement affaiblis, et que ne pas répondre aurait encore davantage miné leur crédibilité auprès de ces alliés », analyse Ali Vaez, directeur du projet Iran au centre de réflexion International Crisis Group à Washington. « S’ils semblent considérer l’affaire comme close, c’est n’est pas à Téhéran de décider mais à Israël et aux États-Unis, ajoute le chercheur. Et d’après toutes les opérations israéliennes que nous avons observées à Gaza, au Liban et même au Yémen, il apparaît que la situation est loin d’être terminée. » (…)
Bombe nucléaire
« L’Iran est prêt à la riposte israélienne et s’est préparé à une longue guerre d’ampleur avec ce pays », témoigne la source proche des milieux sécuritaires à Téhéran. « Après avoir longtemps fait preuve de retenue, il est arrivé à la conclusion que seule la force permettait de répondre à la force, même s’il doit payer un prix pour cela. Et de plus en plus de voix en Iran réfléchissent à se doter de la bombe atomique pour obtenir un rééquilibrage des forces face à Israël. » Pendant que le Moyen-Orient sombre, doucement mais sûrement, dans le chaos, les centrifugeuses iraniennes continuent de tourner à plein régime.
Attaque contre Israël : l’incroyable risque pris par l’Iran (lepoint.fr)
Joshua Zarka, ambassadeur d’Israël à Paris : «Tant que l’Iran n’aura pas fondamentalement changé, il n’y aura pas de paix au Moyen-Orient»
ENTRETIEN – Spécialiste du dossier iranien, l’ambassadeur d’Israël à Paris fut par le passé directeur adjoint des affaires stratégiques au ministère des Affaires étrangères. (Le Figaro, 1 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Nasrallah représentait le combat contre Israël. Pour tous ceux qui veulent la destruction de notre pays, il était un héros. En le perdant, l’Iran a perdu son principal moyen de dissuasion vis-à-vis d’Israël. Il faut bien comprendre que l’Iran est notre principal problème. Toutes les menaces contre Israël sont liées à lui : terroriste, conventionnelle, nucléaire. Le système de « proxis » de l’Iran dans la région lui permettait de nous faire la guerre de loin, sans s’engager directement. Aujourd’hui, il est tombé en morceaux. Ni le Hamas, ni les houthistes, ni le Hezbollah ne pourront plus nous dissuader.
Voulez-vous éradiquer le Hezbollah comme vous avez voulu éradiquer le Hamas ?
Le Hezbollah va perdre sa capacité de nous nuire au niveau militaire. Mais il ne va pas disparaître car c’est une idéologie. Tant que l’Iran n’aura pas fondamentalement changé, il n’y aura pas de paix au Moyen-Orient. Car son but est de remodeler la région par la force et le terrorisme. Les Iraniens reprendront, après la guerre, le financement et le réarmement du Hezbollah.
Y a-t-il de la place au Liban pour un scénario positif ? Celui qui permettrait au pays de se débarrasser de l’influence iranienne et de reprendre son destin en main ?
Oui, c’est faisable. Mais la communauté internationale devra vraiment s’y mettre, cesser de faire les choses à moitié et dire clairement que l’Iran est un ennemi du Liban et de la stabilité. Pour l’instant, je n’ai pas entendu les dirigeants internationaux reconnaître que l’Iran représente le cœur du problème.
Benyamin Netanyahou a-t-il une stratégie, une vision pour la région, ou sa seule préoccupation est-elle de se maintenir au pouvoir ?
Il a une stratégie, elle est très simple et elle n’a jamais changé. Il s’agit de bâtir les conditions qui mèneront à une paix stable entre nous et nos voisins. Mais depuis le 7 octobre, pour atteindre cet objectif, il nous faut passer par une période de guerre, car les « proxis » de l’Iran considèrent qu’Israël doit disparaître. Et nous, nous n’avons aucune intention de disparaître. Notre but est donc de les affaiblir suffisamment pour qu’ils soient incapables de menacer la paix. (…)
Qu’avez-vous pensé des appels au cessez-le-feu lancés, notamment par les États-Unis et la France, à la tribune de l’ONU ?
Aucun pays ne peut se permettre d’être attaqué sans répondre. Depuis que nous nous en sommes retirés, en 2005, plus de 200.000 missiles ont été tirés contre nous depuis Gaza. Depuis le 8 octobre, au moins 9000 tirs sont partis du sud du Liban contre nous. Imaginez la réaction de la France si des missiles étaient tirés contre elle depuis le Luxembourg… Nous ne faisons que nous défendre pour éviter une guerre future. La guerre est terrible, mais elle nous est imposée. Le peuple palestinien est celui qui souffre le plus, mais il est instrumentalisé par le Hamas, le Hezbollah, l’Iran et certains acteurs politiques dans les pays occidentaux. Il existe une façon très simple d’obtenir un cessez-le-feu avec le Hamas : la libération des otages. (…)
Fissile fallout : After the decapitation of Hizbullah, Iran could race for a nuclear bomb
The embattled clerical regime might feel the need for stronger deterrence (The Economist, 1 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
WHEN AN ISRAELI bomb killed Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, last week, it did not just decapitate a fearsome militia that has driven some 60,000 Israelis from their homes with frequent rocket attacks. It also dealt a hammer blow to Iran’s “axis of resistance”, a constellation of proxy forces that Iran has for decades used to attack both Israel and Western interests in the Middle East. In addition to its current assault on Hizbullah, Israel’s year-long dismemberment of Hamas in Gaza has vastly diminished Iran’s capacity to cause trouble if threatened. Those defeats, in turn, may be prompting Iran to fall back on its other main form of deterrence: its nuclear-weapons programme.
In recent days, amid Israeli strikes on Hamas, Hizbullah and militants backed by Iran in Yemen, Iranian officials have been insinuating that Israel’s belligerence may induce Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Others have suggested that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, might rescind an earlier fatwa, or religious edict, ruling out the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The regime has been expanding the number and sophistication of centrifuges it uses to purify uranium. It now has a big stockpile of near-weapons-grade material. It is plausible, though not yet likely, that Mr Khamenei might decide that the only way to protect his regime, which is despised by its own citizens and vulnerable to Israeli attack, would be to seek nuclear weapons.
America and Israel have long promised that Iran will not be allowed to build a bomb. Israel, in particular, appears to have detailed intelligence on the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme. If it were to pick up signs that Iran was crossing a threshold, it might well attack Iranian nuclear sites—something it came close to doing in 2011. But there is no guarantee that this would succeed. Israeli insiders, in their more candid moments, acknowledge that the chance to set Iran’s nuclear programme back significantly with air strikes may have passed: the relevant facilities are too deeply buried and nuclear know-how too widely dispersed. Bombing them would set the region ablaze while only delaying the programme by months, some argue. (…)
After the decapitation of Hizbullah, Iran could race for a nuclear bomb (economist.com)
Le nouveau Proche-Orient que crée Israël
L’ÉDITO DE LUC DE BAROCHEZ. Un an après la massacre du 7 Octobre, l’armée israélienne a éliminé le chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. Le début d’un nouvel ordre ? (Le Point, 1 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Le bombardement ciblé opéré par l’armée de l’air israélienne qui a tué le chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, le 27 septembre dans la banlieue de Beyrouth, portait le nom de code « Ordre nouveau ». Le terme révèle la volonté de Jérusalem de remodeler le Proche-Orient à sa main, un an après le pogrom du 7 Octobre. L’ambition est légitime, puisque l’enjeu est la survie à long terme de l’État juif. Est-elle, pour autant, réalisable ? Jusqu’où Israël peut-il transformer la région pour y garantir son insertion ? (…)
Nombreux sont ceux qui, dans la région, encouragent en sous-main Israël. Les dirigeants de l’Arabie saoudite, des Émirats arabes unis, de Bahreïn ou de l’Égypte savourent secrètement les humiliations infligées à l’Iran, que ce soit l’élimination du chef du Hamas, le 31 juillet à Téhéran, ou celle de Nasrallah. Et la destruction en cours de l’appareil militaire du Hamas par Tsahal satisfait tous ceux qui, à Amman, au Caire ou à Riyad, luttent contre leurs propres islamistes. La guerre est aussi une lutte pour conquérir les cœurs et les esprits au Levant. L’Iran a ses alliés, notamment la Russie, mais Israël aussi a les siens, même s’ils n’osent pas l’afficher ouvertement.
L’État hébreu, cependant, n’a pas les moyens de faire basculer à lui seul le sort de la région. L’Arabie saoudite peut l’aider mais elle a posé une condition claire : la restauration d’un chemin crédible vers la création d’un État palestinien. Après l’échec du processus de paix enclenché en 1993 à Oslo, Israël avait cru pouvoir ignorer la question palestinienne. La razzia du 7 Octobre dans les kibboutz du sud du pays est venu rappeler de manière dramatique à quel point cette omission était illusoire.
Le 7 Octobre a aussi montré le péril qu’il y avait à laisser des islamistes gouverner aux frontières d’Israël – puisque la bande de Gaza était aux mains du Hamas depuis 2007. Jamais l’opinion israélienne n’acceptera la moindre perspective que le Hamas ou un mouvement analogue puisse diriger un État palestinien. Les seuls qui semblent ne pas l’avoir compris, depuis un an, sont les dirigeants de l’Autorité palestinienne à Ramallah, qui refusent de s’engager sur la voie de la bonne gouvernance et de réformer leur administration corrompue. Tant que la guerre fait rage, leur immobilisme attire peu l’attention. Mais, quand elle s’apaisera, ils regretteront leur inaction.
Le nouveau Proche-Orient que crée Israël (lepoint.fr)
Israel Defends Itself—and May Save Western Civilization
The equivocation of Biden, Harris and other leaders should cause us all to feel a degree of shame. (WSJ, opinion, 1 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
How will we ever repay the debt we owe Israel?
What the Jewish state has done in the past year—for its own defense, but in the process and not coincidentally for the security of all of us—will rank among the most important contributions to the defense of Western civilization in the past three-quarters of a century.
It has eliminated thousands of the terrorists whose commitment to a savage theocratic ideology has claimed so many lives across the region and the world for decades. It has, with extraordinary tactical accuracy, dispatched some of the masterminds of the worst evil on the planet, including most recently Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader in Lebanon. It has repelled and then reversed the previously inexorably advancing power of one of the world’s most terrifying autocracies, the Islamic Republic of Iran. It has demonstrated to all the West’s foes, including Iran’s allies in Moscow and Beijing, that our system of free markets and free people, and the voluntary alliance network we have constructed to defend it, generates resources and capabilities of vast technical superiority. Above all, it has provided an unexpected but crucial reminder to our enemies that there are at least some willing and able to pursue and defeat them whatever the risk to our own lives and resources.
The only appropriate responses to Israel’s gallantry, fortitude and skill from us—its nominal allies, especially in the U.S.—are “thank you” and “how can we help?” (…)
Before Israel had even buried its dead last October and as Hamas was busy murdering its hostages, there were calls for Israel to cease fire. For a year we have heard our leaders’ “balanced” condemnations of Hamas and its terror masters on the one hand and the Jewish state on the other, a false equivalence that says more about the moral disorder in our own politics than about Israel’s motives and actions.
In Europe, they have gone even further, as usual, rewarding Hamas and Hezbollah by nominally recognizing a nonexistent Palestinian state and prosecuting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on bogus war-crimes charges.
Do they not get that in the end we have to make a choice: our ally, on the front lines of defense against barbarism or our enemies, those who literally want to see us all buried?
Fortunately for all of us, it seems Israel is prevailing despite the chorus of hecklers. (…)
As Israelis solemnly mark a year since Oct. 7, we should not only redouble our expressions of sympathy and solidarity. We should show them our gratitude, and if we are willing to be really honest, acknowledge a little of our own shame.
Israel Defends Itself—and May Save Western Civilization – WSJ
Does Netanyahu have what it takes to bring the new order? – opinion
Netanyahu’s recent UN speech and military actions suggest that achieving a ‘new order’ in the Middle East requires both combating threats and pursuing diplomatic normalization. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 1 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
September 27, 2024, will go down in history as one of the most impressive days in Israel’s military legacy, and perhaps even in the history of the entire Middle East. Shortly after the Israeli prime minister’s speech on the most important stage in the world, one of the greatest arch-terrorists of our time was assassinated in a spectacular operation by the IDF and Israeli security forces.
Years of showmanship speeches and threats of hitting targets “far beyond Haifa” went down in flames on Friday. This was all accomplished under the direction of Israel’s military chief of staff, defense minister, and yes – also the prime minister.
One can only imagine what went on behind the scenes of this decision, with the highest systems of risk management, and in the end one decision – courageous and bold. The IDF brought the opportunity, but it was the prime minister who had to “press the button,” and in contrast to past hesitations – he pressed it.
“A new order” – this is what the operation was called, and it’s hard not to connect it to the “Curse and Blessing” speech that Netanyahu gave immediately preceding it at the UN. The prime minister presented two maps: in one hand, he held the map of “Curse and Terror” which showed Iran and its proxies, its expansion in the Middle East, and the extent of its threat to regional stability.
In his other hand, he held the map of “Blessing and Peace” – the same map he presented exactly a year ago on the exact same stage, which shows how the Middle East will change after the normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. “Peace will make the Middle East a paradise,” he said. “The choice is between the curse of Iranian aggression and the blessing of reconciliation between Jews and Arabs.”
The two maps presented by the prime minister clearly demonstrate the combination of efforts required for the “new order”: eradicating the “curse,” alongside building the “blessing.” Each effort on its own will not yield results, only the powerful combination of them. (…)
The decision to launch Operation Northern Arrows was bold. The decision to assassinate Nasrallah was even bolder. This is the time for bold leadership – and only for that. This is the time to continue striking terrorism with military might. This is also the time to build the future with political might. The State of Israel has the historic opportunity to bring about a profound strategic change in the Middle East that will strengthen its security for years to come.
Netanyahu has the opportunity of his life to be remembered in the history books not only as the man who was at the helm of the terrible massacre of October 7, but as “Mr. New Order.” He was very bold in pressing the button on “removing the curse.” Does he have the courage to do what it takes to realize the “blessing” as well?
The writer is a strategy adviser and a member of Forum Dvorah. She is a former adviser at the National Security Council and the Prime Minister’s Office.
Netanyahu must act to secure order after Nasrallah assassination – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
From Nasser to Nasrallah
Hassan Nasrallah’s death will reshape Lebanon and the Middle East (The Economist, 30 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Whoever takes the reins will face the most precarious moment in Hizbullah’s four-decade history. It is not just that Israel has wiped out almost its entire military leadership, erasing centuries of experience in a matter of two months. It is also that the group stands humiliated in front of a Lebanese public that had already come to resent Hizbullah for its heavy-handed domination of politics.
The “Party of God” is the chief guardian of Lebanon’s grubby political order: its thugs helped to quash a popular pro-reform uprising in 2019, and two years later it strong-armed the state into halting an investigation of a massive explosion at Beirut’s port. Few will cheer Mr Nasrallah’s death when Israeli jets are killing scores of civilians across the country, but many will feel a touch of Schadenfreude. There may be an opportunity now to loosen Hizbullah’s stranglehold—although, as ever in Lebanon, that will raise fears of sectarian strife.
For years Hizbullah has been a loyal servant of Iran. The group played a crucial role in propping up Bashar al-Assad’s bloody regime in Syria, and it provides training and guidance to other Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen. No surprise, then, that some Arabs reacted with glee to Mr Nasrallah’s death. In Idlib, a rebel-held pocket of Syria, people handed out sweets to celebrate: Syrians will remember Mr Nasrallah as a butcher whose men starved and killed them. The Gulf states have kept mum, but it is a safe bet that champagne corks popped in palaces in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
That service gave Mr Nasrallah every reason to expect that Iran would come to his aid, especially after Israel carried out the astonishing assassination in Tehran of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas. That has not happened, in part because Iran’s leaders fear that they too have been infiltrated by Israel. They also worry about how a public show of support for groups like Hizbullah might affect their standing at home. Faced with growing discontent over a moribund economy, the regime does not want to be seen investing more resources in a proxy that seems to be losing its war against Israel. (…)
Whoever takes the reins will face the most precarious moment in Hizbullah’s four-decade history. It is not just that Israel has wiped out almost its entire military leadership, erasing centuries of experience in a matter of two months. It is also that the group stands humiliated in front of a Lebanese public that had already come to resent Hizbullah for its heavy-handed domination of politics.
The “Party of God” is the chief guardian of Lebanon’s grubby political order: its thugs helped to quash a popular pro-reform uprising in 2019, and two years later it strong-armed the state into halting an investigation of a massive explosion at Beirut’s port. Few will cheer Mr Nasrallah’s death when Israeli jets are killing scores of civilians across the country, but many will feel a touch of Schadenfreude. There may be an opportunity now to loosen Hizbullah’s stranglehold—although, as ever in Lebanon, that will raise fears of sectarian strife.
For years Hizbullah has been a loyal servant of Iran. The group played a crucial role in propping up Bashar al-Assad’s bloody regime in Syria, and it provides training and guidance to other Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen. No surprise, then, that some Arabs reacted with glee to Mr Nasrallah’s death. In Idlib, a rebel-held pocket of Syria, people handed out sweets to celebrate: Syrians will remember Mr Nasrallah as a butcher whose men starved and killed them. The Gulf states have kept mum, but it is a safe bet that champagne corks popped in palaces in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
That service gave Mr Nasrallah every reason to expect that Iran would come to his aid, especially after Israel carried out the astonishing assassination in Tehran of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas. That has not happened, in part because Iran’s leaders fear that they too have been infiltrated by Israel. They also worry about how a public show of support for groups like Hizbullah might affect their standing at home. Faced with growing discontent over a moribund economy, the regime does not want to be seen investing more resources in a proxy that seems to be losing its war against Israel.
On September 28th Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, announced that he would make an “important statement” on developments in Lebanon. When the statement came, it was hollow. Israel’s attacks would not hurt Hizbullah’s “solid structure”, Mr Khamenei opined, and the group would continue to lead the fight against Israel.
In the longer term, though, the events of the past two weeks could reshape Iran’s security policy. For decades it saw militias as its chief deterrent against Israeli or American attack; now it is watching its most powerful militia being eradicated. Some Iranians have already begun to argue that their country should build and test a nuclear bomb: if conventional deterrence has failed, only nuclear deterrence remains. (…)
Mr Khamenei has long preferred to stay just below the nuclear threshold. Recent events may change his mind. Even if they do not, he is 85; the decision will not always be his to make. Yet such a move would put Iran in something of a catch-22. It once relied on Hizbullah to shield its nuclear facilities from attack; if it dashes for a bomb because it can no longer rely on Hizbullah, those facilities will be exposed. (…)
Mr Nasrallah spent years talking up the “axis of resistance”, a constellation of Iran-backed militias committed to fighting Israel and America. He said they were strong and united. Then Israel decapitated the most powerful militia in a matter of weeks, while Iran sat idle. Hizbullah is not about to disappear: it has thousands of armed partisans, an arsenal of long-range missiles and a base of popular support. But the militia that emerges from this war will be very different from the one that entered it. ■
Hassan Nasrallah’s death will reshape Lebanon and the Middle East (economist.com)
Gilles Kepel: « Par-delà le Hezbollah, c’est la République islamique d’Iran qui est touchée de manière décisive »
GRAND ENTRETIEN – Selon le spécialiste de l’islam et du monde arabe contemporain, la tragédie du 7 octobre a précipité un basculement géopolitique sans précédent depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L’élimination par Tsahal du chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, s’inscrit dans ce grand chamboulement, explique-t-il. (Le Figaro, 30 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
LE FIGARO. – L’armée israélienne a annoncé, samedi, la mort d’Hassan Nasrallah, le chef du Hezbollah. Cette opération a lieu un an, presque jour pour jour, après le 7 octobre. Est-ce une revanche pour Israël ?
Gilles KEPEL. – Indéniablement. On peut même situer ce bouleversement dans une temporalité plus vaste. C’est actuellement le moment des fêtes juives de Kippour – qui, dans l’histoire contemporaine, restaient connotées avec la percée fulgurante des armées égyptienne et syrienne lors de la « guerre du Kippour » le 6 octobre 1973, qui avaient bousculé les défenses israéliennes, un souvenir traumatique pour l’État hébreu. Puis, le 7 octobre 2023, cinquante ans plus un jour après, la razzia pogromiste du Hamas avait pris en défaut, avec un effet de surprise identique, la frontière de Gaza, avec le massacre de plus de mille personnes dans les kibboutz et parmi les jeunes festivaliers de Nova, puis la prise massive d’otages entraînés dans les tunnels de l’enclave côtière.
Après une « riposte disproportionnée » – selon les préconisations de la doctrine de défense de Tsahal – qui s’est traduite par une hécatombe à Gaza qui dépasserait les 40.000 morts, 100.000 blessés, outre deux millions de déplacés, mais où Israël s’embourbait militairement et qui a eu des effets d’image et de réputation catastrophiques pour l’État juif, l’offensive contre le Hezbollah au Liban lui permet d’engranger un succès militaire et politique où Tsahal et le Mossad font une démonstration fulgurante de savoir-faire dans la belligérance électronique de demain. Cette nouvelle « guerre de Kippour » de 2024 a vocation à renverser le symbolisme de la faiblesse d’Israël en octobre 1973 puis 2023, et à retourner celle-ci en l’expression d’une force – à ce stade en tout cas, sans préjuger de la suite.
Mais sur le plan technique, de l’explosion des bipeurs, puis talkie-walkie, piégés préalablement par le Mossad, qui a neutralisé des milliers de cadres militaires du Parti de Dieu, et a semé la panique dans les rangs adverses, jusqu’aux frappes ciblées avec une précision inouïe qui ont liquidé l’essentiel de l’état-major et finalement occis Nasrallah – en principe l’un des hommes les mieux protégés du monde – la démonstration de virtuosité militaire est exceptionnelle, et en ce sens, c’est une revanche sur la prise en défaut du renseignement israélien le 7 octobre de l’an dernier.
Le Hezbollah est décapité, ses militants et sympathisants sonnés, mais cela se fait au prix de nombreuses victimes civiles au Sud Liban, dans la Bekaa et dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth, la dahié (« banlieue », en arabe dialectal), les zones d’habitat chiite et fief du parti. Pour les autres communautés libanaises, et les chiites hostiles au Hezbollah, qui ressentaient la domination militaro-policière du parti affidé à Téhéran, c’est un changement de paradigme, et chacun retient son souffle, dans l’attente des conséquences. (…)
Après l’attaque des bipeurs, est-ce un tournant géopolitique majeur ?
Oui, parce que, par-delà le Parti de Dieu lui-même, c’est la République islamique qui est touchée. Les morts en série de l’ancien président iranien Ebrahim Raïssi, de Haniyé et de Nasrallah s’inscrivent dans une même logique qui consiste à saper les fondements de « l’axe de la résistance » ; cela passe aussi par la Syrie d’Assad, qui ne tient que grâce à l’aide militaro-policière des Pasdaran et du Hezbollah, et qui se trouve soudain considérablement affaiblie. (…)
Je crois plutôt que le leadership à Téhéran est divisé comme jamais. La mort opportune dans un accident d’hélicoptère non élucidé de l’ancien président Raïssi est éminemment suspecte : ce fanatique sanguinaire, qui voulait succéder à l’octogénaire Khamenei, malade du cancer, a été remplacé par le médecin Massoud Pezeshkian, chargé par l’establishment du régime de ménager autant que possible l’Occident… jusqu’à ce qu’il se retrouve malgré lui chef d’un cabinet de guerre !
À mon sens, une partie de l’appareil dirigeant est dans une logique comparable à celle qui a prévalu en Russie à la fin de l’URSS : la République islamique est dans l’impasse, et c’est l’Iran tout entier qui risque de sombrer si le processus continue à se délabrer, après le coup terrible que représente la liquidation de Nasrallah et la décapitation du Hezbollah. N’oublions jamais que le facteur nationaliste perse reste dominant structurellement sous l’affichage conjoncturel du chiisme politique. (…)
La thèse centrale de mon livre tout juste paru, Le Bouleversement du monde, est que les fondements de l’ordre planétaire établis en 1945, après la défaite du nazisme, et la désignation du génocide des Juifs comme le Mal absolu, sont désormais complètement chamboulés – ainsi que l’antagonisme entre l’Ouest et l’Est, qui a perduré jusqu’à la chute du mur de Berlin le 9 novembre 1989 : aucun des deux camps antagoniques ne niait, ni même ne relativisait, la Shoah.
À ce clivage géopolitique qui fonctionnait selon une métaphore longitudinale, s’est substituée une mise en récit idéologique latitudinale dressant le «Sud global », incarnation du Bien et de la victimisation, contre un Nord maléfique, coupable d’un crime contre l’humanité qui éclipserait l’extermination des Juifs : la colonisation, accompagnée de l’esclavage et de la traite négrière (euro-américaine exclusivement : esclavage, traite, course maritime en monde islamique, et enlèvements d’enfants chrétiens pour les convertir de force et en faire des janissaires ne sont jamais mentionnés par les trissotins du Global South…).
Et Israël, dans cette narration qui est à la racine même du wokisme et du « décolonialisme », serait l’exacerbation de l’ignominie du Nord, en perpétrant à Gaza un « génocide ». Cela permet de récuser la légitimité même de la décision de l’ONU en 1947 de créer l’État hébreu – sur un territoire prélevé dans la Palestine mandataire sous contrôle britannique –, comme refuge pour protéger les Juifs survivants de l’Holocauste, puisqu’ils seraient à leur tour devenus génocidaires… Telle est l’incrimination contre Israël portée par l’Afrique du Sud et d’autres États comme l’Espagne devant la plus haute autorité juridique de l’ONU, la Cour internationale de justice de La Haye.
C’est le système onusien tout entier qui est devenu dysfonctionnel : la session pitoyable de la récente Assemblée générale à New York en a fourni l’illustration. Gilles Kepel: « Par-delà le Hezbollah, c’est la République islamique d’Iran qui est touchée de manière décisive » (lefigaro.fr)
Caught in the crossfire
Lebanon faces its worst crisis since the end of the civil war (The Economist, 30 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Israel’s assassination of the Hizbullah chief has shocked the country, just as the almost overnight devastation of the movement’s leadership has stunned its own followers. To many, Hizbullah’s dominance of the Lebanese state had seemed unalterable. It has drawn fierce criticism from across the political and sectarian spectrum in the past two decades, though such criticism could have deadly consequences. One retired army general, a Christian, said he was raising a glass of Laphroaig in happiness at Nasrallah’s death.
But he was an exception—and certainly he didn’t want to express his cheer publicly. Dima Sadek, a TV presenter who has faced death threats in recent years for her public criticism of Mr Nasrallah, was similarly loth to celebrate. “I dreamt that we would be victorious against you on the national front in the battle of freedom and the state,” she wrote to her 800,000 followers on X. “But not like this.” “We dreamt of the day of victory for freedom, not a moment of victory for the butcher,” she added. Many Lebanese are extremely critical of Hizbullah, but they are even more opposed to Israel, says Karim Bitar, a professor at St Joseph University in Beirut. “Don’t underestimate the shock of the Lebanese population. An entire generation is waking up to politics, and Israel is planting the seeds of future wars,” he adds.
Searching questions are being asked about Hizbullah’s strategy over the past year. Even among its devoutly loyal followers, some are wondering why they are now suffering on behalf of other people. “My heart is with Gaza, and the Palestinians, but I am Lebanese first,” said Fawaz Mohammed, who fled on the night of September 27th. “We will be stronger after the martyrdom of the Sayyid [Nasrallah] but I have to ask why me and my family are sleeping on the street,” he added. (…)
Lebanon is now in the throes of three days of national mourning; but the war goes on, and a traumatised country is more fearful than ever about what comes next. ■
Lebanon faces its worst crisis since the end of the civil war (economist.com)
Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden
By killing Hassan Nasrallah, Prime Minister Netanyahu weakens Hezbollah and Iran. (WSJ, édito, 30 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israel’s strike Friday against Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is a justified defensive act against an enemy backed by Iran and bent on the Jewish state’s destruction. It’s also a lesson for the Biden Administration in how to deter an enemy using military force instead of hopeless pleading for restraint and “de-escalation.”
Israel has exhibited remarkable restraint for nearly a year in response to Hezbollah’s thousands of rocket and missile attacks that have made the country’s north uninhabitable. (…)
Israel has changed its strategy from tit-for-tat responses to a pre-emptive campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s missile stores, launchers and military leadership. These are all justified targets in war. It’s tragic when civilians are also killed, but that is more Hezbollah’s fault. Nasrallah, who knew he was a marked man, located his hideout under residential buildings.
Israel’s campaign has been a remarkable display of intelligence, technological skill, and above all political will. The sabotage of Hezbollah’s pagers and walkie-talkies wounded or killed scores of fighters. Its targeted bombings against Hezbollah’s terror masters showed how much Israeli intelligence has penetrated its communications. It continued to bomb Hezbollah targets on Sunday, including military commanders.
Israel has done this despite the contrary advice of its allies in the U.S. and Europe. “West left powerless as Israel claims its biggest victory yet against Hezbollah,” declared the BBC in a news alert on Saturday. Isn’t Israel part of the West? It eliminated a terrorist whose killers are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans and Europeans. (…)
The U.S.-French statement mentioned Lebanon and Israel. Yet Lebanon has no functioning government to speak of, certainly not one that could give orders to Nasrallah. The statement didn’t mention Hezbollah or its minders in Tehran. Israel isn’t obliged to follow the dictates of Western politicians and pundits who counsel de-escalation from the safety of Bethesda.
Mr. Biden had the good political sense Saturday to call Nasrallah’s death a “measure of justice.” But he couldn’t resist another plea for his failing diplomacy, through the United Nations of all antisemitic places, to negotiate a cease-fire. A cease-fire is far more likely with Hezbollah and Iran on defense than it was before this month. (…)
Israel’s experience in the last year is a reminder to the West about the cost of failed deterrence and what is required to restore it. Israel let down its guard against Hamas a year ago and paid a terrible price. It seems determined not to repeat that mistake with Hezbollah.
Mr. Biden has undermined the U.S. ability to deter adversaries because he fears any escalation, ceding the advantage to Iran, Russia and China. Israel can’t afford such indulgence. Its survival is at stake.
Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden – WSJ
David French : Iran Is Losing. That May Matter More Than Israel’s Mistakes. (NYT, opinion, 30 septembre, article payant)
Voir “Article du jour »
Bombs in Beirut : Israel targets the head of Hizbullah in a deadly strike on Beirut
It may provoke the militia into a response that leads to all-out war (The Economist, 28 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
IN HIS SPEECH to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27th Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, put paid to the speculation that a truce might soon be declared between Israel and Hizbullah, the Iran-backed Shia movement that controls much of Lebanon. Or, as Mr Netanyahu described it, “the quintessential terror organisation in the world today”.
The American and French governments had been urging both sides to accept a 21-day truce that would provide a window for negotiations over a more lasting ceasefire, ending the year-long conflict that has depopulated both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border. “We won’t rest until our citizens can return safely to their homes. We will not accept a terror army perched on our northern border,” Mr Netanyahu said.
Minutes after he stepped down from the UN podium in New York, 9,000km away Israeli fighter-jets dropped several heavy “bunker-busting” bombs on the Dahiyeh neighbourhood of Beirut. The attack killed an estimated 300 people, destroyed a number of residential buildings and caused a series of intense underground explosions beneath them. Israel announced it had targeted Hizbullah’s “central headquarters”. The death toll is not yet confirmed but in private, Israeli officials were hopeful that they had killed Hassan Nasrallah, who has been Hizbullah’s secretary-general since 1992. In his long years as leader he had evaded previous assassination attempts by Israel. It is not yet clear whether he has survived the latest (sources close to Hizbullah claim that he is still alive, but the group has not produced a picture of him and Israeli sources say they think it is likely that he was killed). Either way, it is a devastating escalation by Israel that could lead Hizbullah to unleash its arsenal of long-range missiles in retaliation at Israel’s cities.
The previous morning, American and French diplomats had been talking about an imminent truce. (…)
Israel targets the head of Hizbullah in a deadly strike on Beirut (economist.com)
EXCLUSIF. « Le rôle du Liban n’est pas de libérer la Palestine »
ENTRETIEN. Principal allié chrétien du Hezbollah, Gebran Bassil estime que sa décision unilatérale d’attaquer Israël en soutien à Gaza va à l’encontre de l’intérêt national. (Le Point, 28 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Il est le principal allié chrétien du Hezbollah. À la faveur d’une alliance contre-nature conclue avec le mouvement islamiste chiite en 2006, le Courant patriotique libre (CPL) a pu faire accéder à la présidence du Liban son fondateur, le général Michel Aoun, de 2016 à 2022. En contrepartie, le Parti de Dieu a obtenu le soutien du CPL dans toutes les institutions du pays du Cèdre, dépassant son simple électorat musulman chiite, et devenant la milice reconvertie en parti politique la plus puissante du Liban. (…)
Dans une interview exclusive au Point, le président du CPL et ancien ministre libanais des Affaires étrangères Gebran Bassil appelle son allié chiite à cesser ses attaques contre Israël en soutien à Gaza et les Nations unies à exiger de l’État hébreu qu’il cesse ses bombardements du Liban. (…)
Il y a tout de même eu entre-temps les massacres du Hamas du 7 octobre, et le fait que dès le lendemain, le Hezbollah a revendiqué le lancement des hostilités contre le nord d’Israël en soutien à Gaza.
Laissez-moi vous dire deux choses. D’une part, Israël n’a jamais eu besoin d’excuses pour attaquer le Liban. Si ce pays avait l’intention de nous bombarder, il aurait pu le faire sans rien attendre du côté du Hezbollah. Maintenant, nous nous trouvons dans une situation de défense légitime face à toutes ces agressions israéliennes. D’autre part, notre position est claire sur le fait que nous sommes opposés à une offensive lancée par le Hezbollah contre Israël. Nous, Libanais, avons toujours cru à notre droit de nous défendre, mais nous n’avons pas comme rôle d’appuyer les Palestiniens en attaquant Israël. Il revient aux Palestiniens de libérer leur pays et leur terre, pas aux Libanais. Voilà pourquoi nous avons eu dès le début une position qui n’était pas celle du Hezbollah, à savoir l’unité des fronts et la guerre d’appui à Gaza. Cela donne aujourd’hui l’occasion aux Israéliens de dire que ce ne sont pas eux qui ont commencé. Nous sommes bien conscients qu’ils ont toujours été prêts à nous attaquer, mais il ne fallait pas leur donner cette excuse.
Vos propos sont d’autant plus étonnants que vous vous démarquez du Hezbollah, avec lequel vous êtes pourtant lié par une « entente » politique.
Dans notre feuille d’entente avec le Hezbollah, nous avons toujours parlé de stratégie de défense, jamais de stratégie d’attaque. On a toujours parlé de la protection et de la défense du Liban. Le rôle du Liban n’est pas de libérer la Palestine. Notre rôle est d’appuyer les Palestiniens dans leurs droits, et il y a plusieurs façons de le faire. En outre, cette stratégie d’unité des fronts n’a été appliquée qu’au Liban. Je m’explique : il y a un « Axe de la résistance » qui commence par l’Iran, puis passe par l’Irak, la Syrie et le Liban, auquel il faut ajouter les houthis au Yémen. Or, on ne voit ni l’Iran, ni l’Irak, ni la Syrie, impliqués dans cette guerre. On ne voit pas cet axe uni militairement dans la bataille. Pourquoi le Liban seul doit-il porter le fardeau de cette lutte ? Je ne parle même pas de l’Égypte et de la Jordanie, qui ont déjà un accord de paix avec Israël. (…)
Leash the dogs of war : An Israel-Hizbullah war would be a disaster for both
Both must find a way to step back (The Economist, 27 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Since Hizbullah started firing missiles at Israel on October 8th last year, Israelis, Lebanese and outsiders have dreaded escalation. Now it seems to be happening. The simmering conflict between Israel and Hizbullah, the Shia militia in Lebanon, is boiling over. More than 500 people were killed in a single day of air strikes as Israel targeted Hizbullah’s commanders and weapons. Tens of thousands of Lebanese have fled from the south. And Hizbullah is hitting back. On September 25th Israel intercepted a ballistic missile heading for Tel Aviv, the first time the militia has targeted Israel’s commercial capital.
As bad as things seem, they could get a lot worse. Israel has more troops in the north than it has had for the past nine months—though a ground invasion would demand still larger numbers, positioned in staging-areas on the border. Fears are growing that both sides are trapped on a path towards a terrifying conflagration. Yet both sides still have time, and good reason, to step back.
Both know that all-out war would be bloody and ruinous, and ultimately lead only to a return of the armed stand-off that prevailed before October 7th. Many would needlessly die, on both sides. Israel claims to have destroyed as much as 50% of Hizbullah’s arsenal, but it had more than 120,000 rockets and missiles. What is left could still do grave harm. Israel’s military muscle would not guarantee victory, as past wars in Lebanon have shown. A ground invasion would pit Israel’s troops, battle-weary after months of combat in Gaza, against a well-armed and hardened enemy on its own turf. A second big war would batter Israel’s economy. And Israeli attacks on infrastructure would aggravate Lebanon’s already dire economic collapse. Due to atrocious governance, its gdp is less than half what it was in 2019.
Even Iran, Hizbullah’s sponsor, seems wary of escalation. Masoud Pezeshkian, its new president, said at the un this week that it would not allow Israel to goad it into a regional conflict. The leaders of the Islamic Republic may well prefer their most powerful proxy to save its weapons as a deterrent against a direct Israeli attack on their own country.
Israel has further reasons to step back. It cannot destroy Hizbullah, only weaken it. (…)
The best way out of the conflict lies to the south. Mr Nasrallah has said he will stop firing on Israel when there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Such an agreement could then allow Hizbullah to pull back along the lines set out by un Resolution 1701, passed in 2006, which requires the militia to withdraw north of the Litani river, 30km from the border.
Alas, a truce in Gaza still seems out of reach because of the intransigence of both Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas. (…)
It would let Israelis return to their homes in the north and Lebanese to theirs in the south. Israel would still live under the shadow of a hostile and heavily armed opponent close to its border, so a truce today is no guarantee against conflict tomorrow. But one ceasefire would be better than none. ■
An Israel-Hizbullah war would be a disaster for both (economist.com)
Amin Maalouf : «Ce qui se passe au Liban est une immense tragédie»
VU D’AILLEURS – L’écrivain franco-libanais, secrétaire perpétuel de l’Académie française, déplore l’état d’une nation dans laquelle les appartenances ethniques et religieuses ne servent désormais qu’à attiser la violence. (Le Figaro, entretien, 27 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Vous aviez pressenti la dérive du pays du Cèdre. Son rêve de coexistence a été balayé par une oligarchie corrompue et les milices du Hezbollah…
Le Liban aspirait à devenir un modèle de coexistence. Malheureusement, aujourd’hui, le pays est devenu tout le contraire de cet idéal. Nous avons assisté à une évolution lente, mais inexorable. Une dérive folle que personne n’a voulu ou pu arrêter. Alors que le projet initial était de construire une nation capable de dépasser les différentes appartenances ethniques ou religieuses, aujourd’hui, ces identités ne font qu’attiser les tensions et la violence. Ce qui se passe au Liban est une immense tragédie. Les Libanais ne sont pas les seuls à en souffrir. Face à ce pays qui risque de ne pas réussir à se relever de la guerre, le monde entier aussi se sent impuissant. (…)
Il est clair que la classe dirigeante a sa part de responsabilité. Mais il serait réducteur de rejeter toute la faute sur les seuls dirigeants actuels. Ce à quoi nous assistons résulte malheureusement de l’abandon progressif d’une culture de la paix dans de nombreuses sociétés du Moyen-Orient. Les citoyens sont certes les victimes, mais c’est aussi sur eux que nous devrons nous appuyer si nous voulons un jour renouer le dialogue. À la fin de la guerre froide, nous sommes passés d’un monde divisé par des lignes idéologiques à un monde divisé par des lignes identitaires. Il s’agit pour moi d’un élément clé pour comprendre la situation actuelle. (…)
J’ai toujours cherché à comprendre les différents points de vue qui existent sur les événements historiques. Mon premier livre, Les Croisades vues par les Arabes, reflétait cette approche. Il est juste de critiquer et de combattre les idées que l’on ne partage pas, mais les Occidentaux ont tort de penser qu’il ne faut plus dialoguer avec les Chinois et les Russes, tout comme les Arabes ont tort de penser qu’il faut couper les ponts avec les Américains. Nous devons aussi entretenir des relations avec nos ennemis.Amin Maalouf : «Ce qui se passe au Liban est une immense tragédie» (lefigaro.fr)
History repeating : Hizbullah seems to have miscalculated in its fight with Israel
But neither side would gain from a ruinous and pointless war (The Economist, 26 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
WARLORDS are not known for their remorse, but Hassan Nasrallah offered some in 2006, weeks after a war that killed more than 1,100 Lebanese. The fighting began when Hizbullah, the Shia militia and political party he leads, abducted two Israeli soldiers in a raid. Mr Nasrallah said he was surprised by the ferocity of the response and called the raid a mistake. “If I had known…that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not,” he told an interviewer.
This time was meant to be different. Hizbullah started firing rockets at Israel on October 8th to support Gaza, which Israel had begun bombing after Hamas, a Palestinian militant group, massacred more than 1,100 Israelis one day earlier. It did not force Israel to end its war, but it tied up soldiers and missile-defence batteries and forced 60,000 Israeli civilians to flee their homes. Anxious to avoid a two-front battle, the Israeli army responded in kind with short-range artillery and air strikes. Both sides followed these unwritten rules for months, neither stopping nor escalating.
Yet it now appears that Mr Nasrallah has miscalculated again. What was meant to remain a limited conflict has become much bigger. In the past two weeks Israel has dealt Hizbullah the harshest blow in the group’s four-decade history. Mr Nasrallah seems at a loss for how to proceed. (…)
Unlike in Gaza, where they vow the total defeat of Hamas, Israeli generals acknowledge it is impossible to end Hizbullah’s dominance in Lebanon. Their goal is narrower: to force Hizbullah to halt its fire on northern Israel and withdraw its men from the border. Mr Nasrallah insists that will not happen. In a speech on September 19th he vowed to continue fighting Israel until the latter ends its war in Gaza, a promise he has made often over the past year. (…)
Mr Nasrallah has never been so isolated. He has lost many trusted lieutenants, some of whom had been members of Hizbullah since its founding in the 1980s. Those who remain are probably suspects : Israel could not have carried out extensive sabotage and assassinations without inside help. His communications are disrupted, and some of his missiles have been destroyed.
Hizbullah’s reputation is in tatters. Its Shia constituents long saw it as a mighty protector; now they have doubts. Among the wider population, many are furious with Mr Nasrallah for dragging the country into a fight he cannot win. Lebanon is still grappling with one of the worst economic crises in modern history. Since 2019 its currency has lost 98% of its value and GDP has dropped by half. It can ill afford a long war, let alone the reconstruction bill after one. (…)
All of this is important to Hizbullah—but arguably none of it matters so much as the opinion of Iran, its main sponsor. The Islamic Republic invested billions of dollars to build up Hizbullah’s missile stocks, including a concerted effort in recent years to upgrade their accuracy. They were meant to serve as an insurance policy against a direct Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Now Iran is watching in dismay as those same missiles are blown up.
It seems unwilling to help its proxy. (…)
If (Mr Nasrallah) digs in, the fighting could get much worse. Hizbullah has lost some of its arsenal to Israeli bombardment but still has tens of thousands of rockets and missiles. Israel could expand its strikes in Hizbullah’s stronghold in south Beirut, a neighbourhood it reduced to rubble in 2006. Neither side would achieve its goals: Israel would not end its war in Gaza, and residents of northern Israel would not feel safe to return home. A truce might be embarrassing for Mr Nasrallah—but the alternative is a ruinous and pointless war. ■
Hizbullah seems to have miscalculated in its fight with Israel (economist.com)
Gilles Kepel : « L’ordre du monde s’est retourné contre Israël »
Dans « Le Bouleversement du monde. L’après 7 Octobre » (Plon), le politologue Gilles Kepel décrypte le séisme provoqué par les massacres du Hamas. (Le Point, 26 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Il y a un an, les massacres perpétrés par le Hamas en Israël n’ont pas seulement ouvert un cycle de violences qui continue à faire rage au Proche-Orient, explique dans son nouveau livre le grand spécialiste de l’islam politique Gilles Kepel (Le Bouleversement du monde, l’après 7 Octobre, Plon, 176 p., 15 €). Ce pogrom, et les ondes de choc régionales qui ont suivi, ont aussi marqué une nouvelle étape dans le basculement de l’ordre moral du monde. Dans cette vision wokiste qui gagne du terrain dans nos universités comme dans une partie de l’électorat, le mal absolu n’est plus incarné par le génocide des juifs par les nazis, mais par la colonisation du « Sud » par les puissances du « Nord ». Israël, fondé comme un havre pour les survivants de la Shoah, se retrouve cloué au pilori dans la position du nouveau « génocidaire ». Cette subversion du socle moral de l’ordre international accentue les lignes de faille dans nos sociétés, travaillées par une polarisation inédite autour des deux pôles constitués par l’extrême droite et l’extrême gauche. Entretien. (…)
De quelle manière le 7 Octobre et ses suites ont-ils modifié les lignes géopolitiques mondiales ?
Le 7 Octobre bouleverse notre cadre de compréhension de l’univers géopolitique de l’après-Seconde Guerre mondiale, qui était fondé sur l’horreur du génocide nazi, sur le « plus jamais ça », et dont l’une des conséquences fut la création d’Israël par l’ONU pour fournir un havre aux survivants et aux rescapés. Même la guerre froide opposant les pays communistes au monde capitaliste n’avait pas remis en cause l’horreur du génocide comme fondement de l’altérité monstrueuse. Au contraire, Occidentaux et Soviétiques rivalisaient dans le fait que chacun d’eux avait été le pire ennemi du nazisme. Même avec la remontée en puissance d’une Russie poutinienne hostile à l’Occident, même après l’invasion de l’Ukraine, ce socle posé en 1945 n’était pas fondamentalement contesté. Mais, aujourd’hui, à la suite des bombardements israéliens sur Gaza, qui ont déjà fait plus de 40 000 morts, la notion même de génocide comme fondement moral de l’ordre du monde est retournée contre Israël par un groupe de pays et d’activistes qui se réclament du « Sud global ». Ces acteurs remplacent le génocide nazi, comme archétype de l’horreur absolue, par le « génocide » commis par Israël sur les Palestiniens, présenté comme l’aboutissement et l’exacerbation de l’histoire coloniale. Une opposition verticale Sud-Nord s’est substituée à l’opposition horizontale Est-Ouest ; le colonialisme du Nord est devenu le mal absolu ; les victimes en sont les pays du Sud, qui estiment leur demande de réparation fondée. (…)
Quelles sont les conséquences de ces évolutions pour les pays occidentaux ?
Stigmatisées moralement, nos sociétés occidentales sont renvoyées dans leurs cordes de pays du Nord colonialistes. Elles n’ont plus aucun fondement à se réclamer d’un quelconque magistère, alors qu’elles se percevaient comme porteuses du progrès de l’humanité. (…)
Pourquoi la Palestine est-elle devenue le cri de ralliement de ces activistes anticoloniaux ?
Parce qu’elle est au confluent de plusieurs forces idéologiques : l’extrême gauche d’abord, qui soutient depuis longtemps la résistance palestinienne, puis, à partir du milieu des années 1970, l’islamisme et son énorme capacité de mobilisation. Les gauchistes basculent alors dans la logique de soutien aux islamistes, vus comme porteurs de la lutte contre le capitalisme. Et le facteur nouveau, dans les pays européens, c’est l’irruption dans le champ politique institutionnel d’une forte population musulmane d’origine immigrée. La métamorphose démographique à l’œuvre dans nos sociétés est perçue, d’un côté, comme un « grand remplacement » par l’extrême droite, qui en tire un énorme capital électoral, et, de l’autre, comme une ressource clientéliste par l’extrême gauche. Jean-Luc Mélenchon a axé sa campagne pour les européennes et pour les législatives sur le thème de Gaza, avec Rima Hassan portant un keffieh. Les scores obtenus par les deux extrêmes identitaires témoignent de cette ligne. (…)
Peut-être aussi en Amérique, où Trump, s’il était réélu, le serait en partie grâce à Gaza ?
Aux États-Unis, le rôle ahurissant des grands électeurs fait que le choix que feront les 350 000 Arabes du Michigan, dont nombre d’entre eux sont des chiites d’origine libanaise influencés par le Hezbollah, pourrait être déterminant dans la présidentielle américaine. Il est hallucinant que le Parti de Dieu lié à l’Iran puisse peser, certes parmi d’autres facteurs, dans l’élection de la personnalité la plus puissante du monde. (…)
Gilles Kepel : « L’ordre du monde s’est retourné contre Israël » (lepoint.fr)
Iran’s Dilemma: How to Preserve Its Proxies and Avoid Full-Scale War
Iran says Israel wants to trap it into a direct conflict by bombing Hezbollah, even as a new Iranian president tries outreach to the West. (NYT, 26 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israel’s war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is another embarrassment for Iran and its new president, raising the pressure on him to strike back at Israel to defend an important ally.
Iran has so far refused to be goaded by Israel into a larger regional war that its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, clearly does not want, analysts say. Instead, President Masoud Pezeshkian is at the United Nations hoping to present a more moderate face to the world and meeting European diplomats in the hopes of restarting talks on Iran’s nuclear program that could lead to vital sanctions relief for its hobbled economy.
In New York this week, Mr. Pezeshkian was blunt. Israel was seeking to trap his country into a wider war, he said. “It is Israel that seeks to create this all-out conflict,” he said. “They are dragging us to a point where we do not wish to go.”
After a series of humiliations, heightened by Israel’s intensified attacks on Hezbollah, Iran faces clear dilemmas.
It wants to restore deterrence against Israel while avoiding a full-scale war between the two countries that could draw in the United States and, in combination, destroy the Islamic Republic at home.
It wants to preserve the proxies that provide what it calls forward defense against Israel — Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis in Yemen — without going into battle on their behalf.
And it wants to try to get some of the punishing economic sanctions against it lifted by renewing nuclear negotiations with the West while preserving its close military and trade relationships with Washington’s prime adversaries, Russia and China. (…)
Bret Stephens : Hezbollah Is Everyone’s Problem (NYT, 26 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
In 2006 Hezbollah launched a guerrilla raid into Israel. It led to a 34-day war that devastated Lebanon, traumatized Israel, and concluded with a U.N. resolution that was supposed to disarm the terrorist militia and keep its forces far from the border.
The resolution did neither.
Instead, a combination of international wishful thinking and the willfulness of Hezbollah’s patrons in Tehran have brought us to where we are now — the cusp of a conflict that could dwarf the scale of fighting in Gaza. Can a full-blown war be avoided? Hard to say. Can the lessons of 2006 lead to a better outcome this time? That’s the important question.
First lesson: Tactical brilliance is not a substitute for sound strategy. (…)
Second lesson: Hezbollah is not Israel’s main enemy. Iran is. Or, to borrow a metaphor from the former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett, Tehran is the head of the octopus and Hezbollah — like Hamas in Gaza or the Houthis in Yemen — is merely one of its tentacles. By going to war with Hezbollah, Israel risks exhausting itself in a secondary fight. (…)
Third lesson: Do not make an enemy of the Lebanese people. (…)
Fourth lesson: Keep the U.N. out of it. In theory, the Security Council’s Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war, empowered a U.N. peacekeeping force to prevent Hezbollah from placing its forces close to the Israeli border. In reality, the U.N. peacekeepers did nothing of the sort, at a cost of billions to U.S. taxpayers. (…)
Fifth lesson: The proper role for the United States in the crisis is not to seek a diplomatic solution. It’s to help Israel win. (…)
Which brings us to a sixth lesson: It’s tempting to view Israel’s various battles as regional affairs, distant from America’s central concerns. It’s also foolish. We are now in the opening stages of yet another contest between the free and unfree worlds. It’s a conflict that reaches from Norway’s border with Russia to the struggle of the Iranian people against their own government to the shoals of the South China Sea. It will probably last for decades.
In that fight, Israel is on our side and Hezbollah is on the other. Whatever happens in the days and weeks ahead, we can’t pretend to be neutral between them.Opinion | Hezbollah Is Everyone’s Problem – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Biden’s Diplomatic Magical Thinking
His attempts to soothe the Middle East have produced the opposite effect. (WSJ, 25 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
As tensions escalate and bombs fall across the Middle East, President Biden’s emissaries continue to urge all parties to calm down and dial back the violence. No one is listening, and this brings us to the central paradox of a troubled presidency stumbling toward an inglorious close. Mr. Biden may love diplomacy, but diplomacy doesn’t love him back.
No administration in American history has been as committed to Middle East diplomacy as this one. Yet have an administration’s diplomats ever had less success? Mr. Biden tried and failed to get Iran back into a nuclear agreement with the U.S. He tried and failed to get a new Israeli-Palestinian dialogue on track. He tried and failed to stop the civil war in Sudan. He tried and failed to get Saudi Arabia to open formal diplomatic relations with Israel. He tried to settle the war in Yemen through diplomacy, and when that failed and the Houthis began attacking shipping in the Red Sea, the ever-undaunted president sought a diplomatic solution to that problem too. He failed again.
For nearly a year Team Biden has given its all to the diplomatic effort to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. Repeatedly, administration officials have hailed progress toward an agreement that would pause the fighting and send the Israeli hostages home. But senior officials are conceding privately that the chances of a cease-fire deal during Mr. Biden’s remaining months in office are slim.
For the past few weeks Washington has been frantically trying to prevent the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah from escalating dramatically. Like Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Hamas and the Houthis, neither Israel nor Hezbollah thinks Washington is dispensing sound policy advice.
The Biden administration wants something it can’t have in the Middle East: continued influence with diminished presence. Its diplomacy is aimed at preserving a regional order that depends on the kind of American power projection the president desperately wants to avoid.
The metastasizing conflicts across the Middle East that Mr. Biden hates are the natural and inevitable consequence of his own policies. (…)
Biden’s Diplomatic Magical Thinking – WSJ
Israel haters have too much faith in humanity – opinion
In their worldview, it cannot be that human beings are capable of such atrocities on their own; it must be a reaction to even graver crimes committed by others. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 25 septembre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
Why do they oppose us with such intensity? Why does the hyper-liberal world react so viscerally to Israel? What stirs their agitation, driving them to fabricate wild claims and hurl accusations with unbridled fury? (…)
Of course, there are many answers to this question. Irrational and disproportionate hatred of Jews is nothing new. It is humanity’s oldest hatred, a vile stain on the moral conscience of mankind. Though ancient, antisemitism evolves with each generation, latching onto the shifting cultural narratives of the times.
In the current cultural milieu, the Jewish state presents a profound challenge to a core tenet of modern progressive ideology. It unsettles naive humanists on both a moral and an existential level. When individuals feel that their ideological foundations are threatened or discredited, they fiercely defend their worldview. In this current struggle, our enemies are willing to concoct far-fetched notions and propagate blatant falsehoods, desperately clinging to their old convictions.
This is part of what fuels the irrational and vehement opposition to Israel and the disturbing support for Hamas, despite its horrific acts of rape and barbaric murder. The events of Oct. 7 profoundly challenge core aspects of humanistic belief, and for some, the only solution is to find a way, any way, to blame Israel. This is their only strategy for preserving their ideological premises. (…)
Our belief in humanity is not naive; it is tempered by an awareness of the persistent evil in the world. We strive for a world where justice, peace, and understanding prevail, but we do so with the understanding that not everyone will choose the path of goodness. Man is free to choose – and often, he chooses the path of destruction and hatred. It is as simple as that.
This year, when we pray for God to remove the “kingdom of evil” from the Earth, we know precisely whom we are referring to. God creates good; man creates evil.
The writer is a rabbi at the hesder pre-military Yeshivat Har Etzion/Gush, with ordination from Yeshiva University
Israel-Hamas War challenges liberal understandings of human nature – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Michel Goya: «Si le Hezbollah ne cède pas, Israël ne pourra éviter une invasion terrestre au Liban»
ENTRETIEN – Entre la désescalade et la guerre totale, le docteur en histoire contemporaine juge plus que probable une invasion terrestre israélienne au Liban pour repousser le Hezbollah au-delà du fleuve Litani, après les intenses bombardements. (Le Figaro, 25 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Le scénario le plus problématique est évidemment celui d’une guerre, ou plus exactement d’une guerre de grande ampleur car la guerre a commencé de manière limitée depuis le 8 octobre. Aujourd’hui, Israël conduit cette guerre à une échelle supérieure. Ce peut être une escalade pour une désescalade : c’est-à-dire frapper un grand coup pour faire céder le Hezbollah. Ce qui est peu probable.
Le plus probable reste que l’on a actuellement la phase aérienne d’une offensive aéroterrestre israélienne qui était attendue car on savait que tous les moyens pour une telle opération étaient prêts. Concrètement, cette phase aérienne peut durer des jours, voire des semaines, avec des frappes des deux côtés.
Au bout de quelques semaines, les Israéliens verront ce qu’il en est: est-ce que le Hezbollah cède ? Est-ce qu’il se retire du sud-Liban et est-ce qu’il stoppe ses tirs de roquettes sur le nord d’Israël ? S’il ne cède pas, Israël ne pourra éviter invasion terrestre. (…)
Il est évidemment exclu pour elle d’aller au sol jusqu’à Beyrouth. Tsahal garde un très mauvais souvenir du bourbier libanais. Mais d’un point de vue stratégique, l’armée israélienne pourrait effectivement élargir sa campagne de frappes à l’ensemble du Liban pour faire pression sur le gouvernement libanais afin que lui-même fasse pression sur le Hezbollah. En 2006, les Israéliens avaient frappé tout le territoire libanais pour obliger le gouvernement à réagir, mais cela n’a pas marché. (…)
Le pire des scénarios serait que le gouvernement israélien soit saisi d’une sorte d’ubris et qu’il décide de détruire tous ses ennemis en même temps, galvanisé par sa guerre à Gaza où le Hamas a été détruit tactiquement et ne représente plus de menace. Les dirigeants seraient tentés dans ce cas d’éliminer la menace nucléaire iranienne dans la foulée pour être enfin en sécurité. (…)
La cessation des combats peut passer par Gaza, où le Hezbollah réclame un cessez-le-feu. Le mouvement chiite libanais attend un prétexte honorable pour cesser le combat : il ne veut pas céder sous la pression des bombes israéliennes. Il a été contraint d’entrer dans cette phase de la guerre. Il peut peut-être céder en considérant qu’un éventuel recul serait provisoire, mais ce serait une défaite et une humiliation.
Côté israélien, le minimum est de neutraliser cette menace au nord du pays, donc d’obtenir, après la destruction de l’arsenal de missiles du Hezbollah, son retrait jusqu’au nord du fleuve. Joe Biden a dit qu’il travaillait à «éviter une guerre plus large». Les États-Unis pourraient aussi faire pression en cessant la livraison d’armes et de munitions (la campagne israélienne est menée avec des bombes américaines). Mais pour le camp démocrate, en pleine campagne électorale, il est très délicat de s’opposer véritablement à Israël, sauf à se mettre une bonne partie de l’électorat très pro-israélien à dos.
Michel Goya est ancien colonel des troupes de marine et docteur en histoire contemporaine. Il a travaillé au Centre de doctrine d’emploi des forces à l’École militaire comme officier traitant à la division recherche du retour d’expérience (DREX).Michel Goya: «Si le Hezbollah ne cède pas, Israël ne pourra éviter une invasion terrestre au Liban» (lefigaro.fr)
Iran’s criminal exploitation of the Arabs: When will it stop?
For Iran, everything that followed the terrorism of October 7 is just another bargaining chip, as long as the blood being spilled isn’t Persian. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 25 septembre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
t’s as if there is an unnamed drug possessed by Iran and used in the Middle East, which helps to rob minds, twist facts, and distort collective awareness in many Arab countries. By this, I mean the complete disregard and blindness to Iranian crimes and destruction in several countries in the region, as if these places were lush oases instead of ruins haunted by owls, where Islamic terrorist groups from the “Axis of Resistance” — a coalition of armed militias that includes the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various armed groups in Iraq and Syria — are controlling decisions, resources, and the future. These groups serve as a frontline defense for Iran. (…)
For Iran, Sunni Arab states as a whole are merely fuel to stoke the poisonous plots in the region. The sole purpose of these plots is to serve the interests of the mullah regime, which considers Sunni Muslims to be the fiercest enemies of the Shiite Republic. Their only utility is their easy exploitation in achieving dreams and ambitions of reviving the bygone Persian Empire, but this time with an Islamic flavor based on a sectarian, divisive project.
To be specific, I will speak through facts, and I will limit myself to mentioning three examples that confirm what I am referring to. (…)
A simple, neutral overview of the primary enemy of the Arabs—if we compare Iran and Israel—will reveal that Iran is the sole and exclusive enemy of the Sunni Arabs. A quick glance at the countries whose destruction is their most prominent characteristic (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon), as well as Gaza before the current events and Jordan, which is highly likely to join at any moment, shows that the countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel have seen nothing but good from the Jewish state. I urge researchers to review the positive outcomes of Israel’s cooperation with “Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco” in various fields.
The reality we see in the aforementioned countries confirms that the adrenaline-fueled rhetoric of hatred toward Israel, directed at the masses and broadcast around the clock in all forms of media since the terrorism of October 7, has caused people’s glands to swell and blinded their minds and eyes to what is as clear as the sun. Therefore, the Arab collective enjoyment of Iran’s criminal exploitation requires the urgent summoning of sociologists—such as Ibn Khaldun, Auguste Comte, or Shmuel Eisenstadt—from their graves, in hopes that they might provide us with a satisfying answer!?
Iran is the sole and exclusive enemy of the Sunni Arabs – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Biden Works Against the Clock as Violence Escalates in the Middle East
President Biden is beginning to acknowledge that he is simply running out of time to help forge a cease-fire and hostage deal with Hamas, his aides say. And the risk of a wider war has never looked greater. (NYT, 24 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israel’s ferocious assault on Hezbollah, its most violent exchange with the Lebanese militant group since 2006, is not only a major widening of the war but also a significant widening of the breach between President Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (…)
Now, Mr. Biden’s aides say, the president is beginning to acknowledge that he is simply running out of time. With only four months left in office, the chances of a cease-fire and hostage deal with Hamas look dimmer than at any time since Mr. Biden laid out a plan at the beginning of the summer. And the risk of a wider war has never looked greater. (…)
“We could pick any moment, any set of rockets launched by Hezbollah, any set of strikes by Israel, and say, ‘Is this an escalation? Is that an escalation?’” Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, insisted over the weekend. He spoke just hours after Israel killed a Hezbollah leader wanted for his role in two 1983 bombings in Beirut that killed over 350 people, most of them U.S. service members.
“I think it’s not a particularly useful exercise,” Mr. Sullivan continued. “For us, the most useful exercise is to try to drive both parties to a place where we get an agreed and durable outcome that can end the cycle and keep us from ending up in the larger war.” (…)
Mr. Biden’s best hope now, in his final months in office, is that his successor will embrace a transformative deal in which Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel, and Israel agrees to the two-state solution that would give Palestinians a true home and a place in the international community.
In private, though, many members of Mr. Biden’s national security team make little effort these days to hide their exasperation with the prime minister. (…)
“Statecraft is all about aligning objectives and means,” said Mr. Ross, now a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute. “And I don’t see the objectives or the means to achieve them in what Israel is doing now.” Mr. Ross said that Israel’s calculation was that it could force Hezbollah’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and his Iranian backers to recognize they will pay a huge price for continuing to attack northern Israel until there is an accommodation with Hamas in Gaza.
Israeli officials counter that their objectives are straightforward: to mount a missile campaign that will wipe out Hezbollah’s command-and-control operations and its stores of weapons. And since last week, when Israel announced that the center of the conflict was moving north, to Lebanon, that process has been a methodical one. (…)
But it is hard to imagine that Mr. Netanyahu will be able to eliminate Hezbollah, just as he has been unable to eliminate Hamas. And it is harder still to imagine that Mr. Netanyahu will spend much time worrying about crossing Mr. Biden. He knows that if former President Donald J. Trump is elected, he will have a far freer hand to prosecute the war against Hamas and Hezbollah the way he sees fit. (…)
Mr. Biden, for his part, he noted, “never really used his leverage over Netanyahu,” a reference to the president’s power to cut off specific kinds of military aid if the prime minister ignored his counsel. “And you don’t have leverage unless you are willing to use it.”
Contre le Hezbollah, la légitime défense d’Israël
L’ÉDITO DE LUC DE BAROCHEZ. En tant qu’État souverain, l’État juif a le droit imprescriptible de se défendre s’il est agressé. Ce qui est le cas à sa frontière nord. (Le Point, 24 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israël n’a pas encore trouvé la voie pour sortir du brasier de Gaza, au sud du pays, que pointe déjà, côté nord, l’enfer dont le Hezbollah le menace depuis un an. Étant donné les capacités militaires colossales de l’organisation terroriste chiite, le conflit qui se prépare au Liban risque de faire apparaître comme une simple escarmouche les hostilités qui ont ravagé ces derniers mois le territoire palestinien.
Depuis un an, la milice libanaise a tiré plus de 8 500 missiles, roquettes et drones sur Israël. Ce n’est là qu’une infime fraction de l’arsenal que la république islamique d’Iran lui a fourni. Tsahal, occupée à Gaza contre le Hamas, avait choisi jusqu’à présent de faire le dos rond face au Liban, se contentant de riposter au coup par coup. Plus maintenant.
Les forces de sécurité israéliennes viennent de renverser la table, en menant une série d’opérations aussi audacieuses qu’inédites contre le Hezbollah. (…)
Les belles âmes admonestent déjà l’État juif. Elles font valoir qu’il n’existerait pas de solution militaire à ce conflit. Elles prétendent que les opérations de contre-terrorisme menées avec des engins piégés seraient illégales au regard du droit international humanitaire. Le débat mérite d’être ouvert, mais sur des bases factuelles correctes. Il convient d’abord de rappeler, inlassablement, qu’Israël est un État souverain et que, en tant que tel, il a le droit imprescriptible de se défendre lorsqu’il est agressé. (…)
Début 2023, l’armée israélienne mentionnait pour la première fois, dans sa revue annuelle des risques stratégiques, la possibilité qu’elle puisse être un jour contrainte de mener une guerre multifront contre l’Iran et ses milices supplétives dans la région, au Liban, en Irak, au Yémen, en Syrie… Il y a un an, les raids du Hamas ont fait passer ce scénario du statut d’hypothèse théorique à celui de possibilité tangible. Ces derniers jours, sa traduction concrète n’a jamais été si proche.
Contre le Hezbollah, la légitime défense d’Israël (lepoint.fr)
Die Pager-Operation war filmreif – doch eine Machtdemonstration ist kein Ersatz für eine israelische Strategie
Der Hizbullah ist gedemütigt und geschwächt – das macht die Lage noch unberechenbarer. Zu Recht will Israel der Bedrohung aus Libanon ein Ende setzen. Gute Optionen hat es dabei aber nicht. (NZZ, opinion 24 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Der Krieg im Nahen Osten ist seit dieser Woche um ein ebenso spektakuläres wie verwirrendes Kapitel reicher. In Libanon herrscht eine Mischung aus Fassungslosigkeit, Panik und Zorn, nachdem mit Sprengstoff präparierte Pager und Funkgeräte des Hizbullah am Dienstag und am Mittwoch plötzlich explodiert sind, Tausende von Menschen verletzt und Dutzende getötet haben. Die offensichtlich koordinierte Aktion richtete sich ganz gezielt gegen den von Iran gesponserten Hizbullah.
Die radikalislamische Miliz ist gedemütigt und geschwächt. Sie muss nun sowohl den Ausfall einer Vielzahl von Kämpfern und Kaderleuten verkraften wie auch ihr gesamtes Kommunikationskonzept überprüfen. In den Reihen des Hizbullah herrscht Angst vor weiteren israelischen Geheimoperationen, die Moral der Milizionäre liegt am Boden, in der Bevölkerung hat das Ansehen der Truppe gelitten. In seiner Rede vom Donnerstag referierte der Hizbullah-Chef Hassan Nasrallah zwar feurig von roten Linien und Vergeltung – doch auch er musste eingestehen, dass seine Truppe einen schweren Schlag erlitten hat. (…)
Es dauerte nicht lange, bis die obligate Empörungswelle über Israel hereinbrach. Von «Massenmord» und «Terror» war die Rede, Israel wurde als «Aggressor» und «Brandstifter» verschrien. Zweifellos markieren die Angriffe eine neue Dimension in diesem seit Monaten schwelenden Konflikt, in dem die vielbeschworene «Eskalation» längst Tatsache ist. Israel und der Hizbullah liefern sich einen gefährlichen Tanz, der die ganze Region in den Abgrund stürzen kann.
Doch die Kritiker haben offenbar bereits vergessen, dass es der Hizbullah war – der von den USA und der EU notabene als Terrororganisation eingestuft wird –, der diesen Krieg am 8. Oktober begonnen hat. Er demonstriert durch täglichen Raketenbeschuss Israels seine Solidarität mit der mörderischen Hamas im Gazastreifen. Zehntausende Israeli wurden aus dem Norden des Landes vertrieben und müssen seit Monaten in anderen Landesteilen ausharren. Für einen souveränen Staat ist diese dramatische Situation nicht hinnehmbar. (…)
Die Zeichen stehen auf Krieg. In der israelischen Regierung scheint die Überzeugung heranzuwachsen, dass die Bedrohung aus Libanon nur mit militärischer Gewalt entschärft werden kann. Der Druck, der unhaltbaren Situation im Norden ein Ende zu setzen, wächst. Nach langem Zögern hat das Sicherheitskabinett zu Wochenbeginn die Rückkehr der Bewohner des Nordens in ihre Häuser zu einem offiziellen Kriegsziel erklärt.
Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, bleiben eigentlich nur zwei Optionen: eine diplomatische Einigung mit dem Hizbullah, wie sie das Weisse Haus seit Monaten voranzutreiben versucht – oder ein umfassender Krieg. (…)
Selbst wenn ein Abkommen zustande käme, würde dies Israel keine nachhaltige Sicherheit bescheren. Der Hizbullah hat mehrfach bewiesen, dass seinen Versprechen nicht zu trauen ist. (…)
Doch auch ein offener Krieg gegen die schiitischen Islamisten birgt enorme Risiken. Ein solcher könnte sich rasch zu einem regionalen Flächenbrand entwickeln, in dem Iran seinem libanesischen Schützling zur Seite springt. Dann wären wohl auch die USA zum Eingreifen gezwungen, die internationale Krise wäre perfekt.
Die Geschichte hat gezeigt, dass es im südlichen Libanon wenig zu gewinnen und viel zu verlieren gibt – und heute ist der Hizbullah deutlich stärker als im Krieg von 2006, der keinen Sieger hervorbrachte. Heute könnte die Miliz während Wochen jeden Tag Tausende von Raketen auf Israel feuern, die Flugabwehr überlasten und für verheerende Schäden und Tausende zivile Opfer im jüdischen Staat sorgen. Auch für Libanon wäre ein solcher Krieg katastrophal.
Ein schneller und entscheidender Sieg gegen den Hizbullah ist eine Illusion. (…)
Darüber hinaus ist offen, ob Israel einen Doppelkrieg gegen die Hamas im Süden und den Hizbullah im Norden zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt überhaupt bewältigen könnte. (…)
Israels Dilemma wird zusätzlich dadurch verstärkt, dass es noch keinen Ausweg aus der Hölle von Gaza gefunden hat. Verlegt die Armee nun das Schwergewicht ihrer Kräfte in den Norden, rücken der Sieg über die Hamas und die Befreiung der Geiseln in noch weitere Ferne. Der lachende Dritte wäre der Hamas-Chef Yahya Sinwar – ein Jahr nach dem Massaker des 7. Oktobers könnte seine Vision eines Mehrfrontenkriegs gegen Israel doch noch in Erfüllung gehen.
Der Grat zwischen Krieg und Frieden ist in den vergangenen Tagen noch einmal schmaler geworden. Gute Optionen hat Israel nicht. Auch das filmreife Pager-Spektakel kann nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der jüdische Staat nun vor allem eine umfassende Strategie braucht, die nicht mitten ins Chaos führt, sondern eine neue regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur hervorbringt. Mit militärischer Gewalt allein lässt sich dies wohl nicht erreichen.
Israel greift Hizbullah-Pager an: Spektakel oder Strategie? (nzz.ch)
The truth doesn’t interest the UN, ICC, and ICJ when it comes to Israel – opinion
When it comes to Israel, neither the UN, the ICC, nor the ICJ are concerned with truth or justice. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 23 septembre, article payant)
(…) When it comes to Israel, neither the UN, the ICC, nor the ICJ are concerned with truth or justice.
EVEN STATEMENTS from friendly countries, such as Cyprus and Greece, asserting that “Israel has the right to self-defense,” do little to mitigate the Jewish state’s disappointment and frustration with those, now supporting the embargo, to which Israel has, for years, provided weapons and assistance for years. Israel must reassess its relations with those that – shamefully – voted against it.
As Israel does its best to heal from the horrific October 7 massacre, with the war far from over, Iran, the world’s largest terror state threatens the tiny state with annihilation.
Meanwhile, the Islamization of the West continues apace, with European leaders idle as their growing extremist Islamic communities – whose members arrived as guests – are spreading and beginning to act as if they are in charge.
Entire cities are being taken over by extremist, antisemitic Islamists. The percentage of Muslim citizens in urban populations, from which these antisemitic elements arise, is alarming.
In major cities, Muslims comprise significant portions of the population. In Paris, Muslims have already reached 10% of the total number of people living in the capital; in Marseilles, 25%; Brussels, 17%; Antwerp, 17%; Rotterdam, 13%; Amsterdam, 11%; London, 15%; Manchester, 16%; Frankfurt, 13%; Copenhagen, 10%; and Malmö, 20%.
By refusing to recognize that Iran, its proxies, and the Palestinians will not stop even if Israel ceases to exist, European governments are making a grave mistake. They will be next. The Muslim takeover of Europe is already on the agenda of Islamic clerics.
The Netherlands and Germany are waking up in light of the migrant crime waves. Both are tightening immigration laws, and the police have begun taking tougher measures against criminals. (…)
Nevertheless, Europe has already changed beyond recognition. Let’s hope that these countries are not closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.
The UN, ICC, and ICJ don’t care about truth when it comes to Israel – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Pascal Bruckner : «Israël, quand la ruse l’emporte sur la force»
TRIBUNE – La sophistication des assassinats ciblés du Hezbollah par les services israéliens, au moyen de bipeurs et de talkies-walkies, contraste avec la brutalité des bombardements à Gaza, dont les coûts humains sont trop importants, estime le philosophe. (Le Figaro, 23 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Comment ne pas être sidéré par l’intelligence des services israéliens capables d’installer dans les bipeurs et talkies-walkies du Hezbollah une armée de Gremlins qui ont explosé entre les mains de leurs usagers, causant au moins 20 morts et des milliers de blessés ? On ne peut que souhaiter aux Ukrainiens d’agir de même avec les apparatchiks et gradés russes. C’est une opération technique parfaitement réussie qui a redoré le blason du Mossad et du Shin Beth, puisque les bipeurs et les talkies étaient neufs et venaient d’une entreprise probablement piratée ou créé de toutes pièces en Hongrie par les services israéliens. Ironie tragique : les bipeurs ont été choisis par le guide suprême, Nasrallah, pour éviter l’usage des portables trop facilement repérables. Yaya Sinouar, paraît-il, ne possède ni portable ni bipeur et donne ses instructions sur de petits morceaux de papier. (…)
Reste que cet exploit pose deux problèmes distincts : comment les mêmes services de renseignements qui ont élaboré cet extraordinaire stratagème ont-ils pu ne pas voir ce qui se tramait depuis des mois à la frontière sud de Gaza avant le 7 octobre malgré les avertissements égyptiens et américains, les constatations de la police des frontières, les mouvements de populations au pied des fortifications qui séparent les deux entités ? (…)
Le maximalisme militaire est stérile sauf si l’on décide enfin d’attaquer la source du mal et de toutes les souffrances du Proche-Orient : le régime des mollahs, État terroriste s’il en est, membre de l’alliance totalitaire de la Russie, de la Chine et de la Corée du Nord. C’est à Téhéran que se trouve la solution au malheur proche-oriental, ce que savent tous les pays arabes de la région très hostiles à l’Iran, hormis le Qatar. Des plans dans l’état-major israélien existent pour frapper les installations militaires et nucléaires du pays chiite et le ramener vingt ans en arrière.
Mais pour cela, il faudrait l’accord et l’assistance de Washington : or ni Obama ni Trump ni Biden n’ont voulu d’un nouveau conflit malgré l’élimination du général Soleimani le 3 janvier 2020 à Bagdad par les drones américains. Tant qu’on laissera perdurer le régime islamiste installé en 1979, aucune solution durable ne pourra être envisagée. Tsahal en est réduit à couper les tentacules de la pieuvre au Yémen, en Syrie, en Irak, au Liban faute de pouvoir frapper la tête. Mais l’Oncle Sam ne veut plus être le shérif du monde et l’Europe n’a aucun pouvoir. La tragédie n’est pas près de s’arrêter.
Dernier ouvrage paru de Pascal Bruckner : « Je souffre donc je suis. Portrait de la victime en héros », Grasset, 2024.
Pascal Bruckner : «Israël, quand la ruse l’emporte sur la force» (lefigaro.fr)
Liban : Macron « hezbollhise » tout un pays par inadvertance
Ça partait sûrement d’une bonne intention, mais tous les Libanais ne s’identifient pas aux terroristes chiites auxquels l’Iran a offert le contrôle de leur pays. (Atlantico, 23 septembre, quelques articles gratuits / semaine)
Extraits :
Il y a une étrange petite vidéo postée par Macron sur les réseaux sociaux qui me laisse aussi perplexe que les « instas » gênants de l’avocate-influenceuse des violeurs de Mazan.
J’écoute une fois, je réécoute même une autre par acquit de conscience et souci d’éviter les malentendus —c’est de la diplomatie après tout, et on sait depuis le cardinal de Retz et François Mitterrand qu’on ne sort de l’ambiguïté qu’à ses dépens—, mais le malaise persiste…
Car il leur dit quoi, au juste, à ces Libanais plongés « dans la confusion, la peur et le chagrin » et auxquels il s’adresse sur un ton mielleux d’ecclésiastique ? Et quelle est donc la « nouvelle épreuve » que leur pays aurait subi et qui imposerait à la France de lui rappeler sa solidarité et son « amitié fraternelle » ?
La petite nation du Levant aurait-elle été frappée dans son cœur par une attaque aussi insensée qu’indiscriminée comme le suggère Mélenchon, par exemple ? Chaque Libanais se baladant, c’est notoire, un « bipeur » du hezbollah à la ceinture, la population tout entière aurait-elle couru le risque d’une explosion inopinée ? (…)
Pour son immense malheur, le Liban est devenu l’otage permanent d’une milice créée et financée par l’Iran des ayatollahs, dont les effectifs et les moyens rivalisent désormais avec ceux de l’armée régulière, et qui bombarde à feu continu un pays voisin avec lequel il n’existe aucun conflit territorial. Une milice qui, incidemment, lorsqu’elle n’est pas occupée à contraindre les 100 000 Israéliens de la zone frontalière à l’exode, fait sauter des boutiques à Paris et des soldats français à Beyrouth.
Au moins autant que Macron, on ne peut souhaiter que le meilleur à ce pays ami meurtri et déchiré. Mais s’inquiéter avec lui de l’escalade qui s’annonce (peut-être) n’impose pas de brouiller les pistes à ce point, domaine réservé ou pas.
Liban : Macron « hezbollhise » tout un pays par inadvertance | Atlantico.fr
Vincent Lemire, historien : « Il faut construire un “camp de l’apaisement” contre la complicité criminelle qui unit Yahya Sinouar et Benyamin Nétanyahou »
L’historien Vincent Lemire estime, dans une tribune au « Monde », que les intérêts vitaux des populations palestinienne et israélienne ne coïncident pas avec les calculs politiques de leurs dirigeants. (Le Monde, 23 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Un tel déferlement d’horreurs devrait imposer dignité et gravité aux responsables politiques français qui s’expriment sur le sujet – et le silence aux autres. Au lieu de cela, on assiste depuis un an à une constante dégradation du débat public : alors que, dans les semaines qui ont suivi le 7 octobre 2023, la sidération collectivement ressentie permettait l’écoute et l’échange des arguments les plus contradictoires, chacun s’est depuis enfermé à nouveau dans sa bulle cognitive et idéologique, sourd et aveugle à la souffrance de l’autre. Le climat politique français, autocentré sur les enjeux nationaux et l’inquiétante progression de l’antisémitisme, ne permet plus de poser sereinement les termes du débat. (…)
Qui pourrait affirmer que ces calculs sont erronés ? Du point de vue de leurs intérêts propres, Sinouar et Nétanyahou sont rationnels, complices et solidaires, ils ont tout intérêt à ce que cette guerre se poursuive, c’est pourquoi le cessez-le-feu est sans arrêt retardé. C’est aussi pourquoi le procureur de la Cour pénale internationale réclame un mandat d’arrêt contre chacun d’eux.
Mais on devrait pouvoir rappeler, posément, que cette guerre fait peser un risque existentiel sur les deux peuples, palestinien et israélien confondus. Ce risque existentiel est physique, vital et immédiat pour les Palestiniens ; il est juridique, géopolitique et différé pour les Israéliens. Les premiers sont menacés à Gaza par les bombardements, la famine, les épidémies, les expulsions répétées et l’anéantissement du système de soins, et en Cisjordanie par la violence meurtrière des colons, dont le président israélien lui-même considère qu’ils se sont livrés le 15 août à un « pogrom » contre le village palestinien de Jit.
Les seconds sont menacés par l’isolement d’Israël, toujours plus profond sur le plan régional, par l’effondrement d’une légitimité internationale pourtant indispensable à ce jeune Etat, issu d’un vote de l’ONU en 1947, et par le départ de ses habitants les plus diplômés : 38 % des jeunes médecins israéliens en formation ont annoncé vouloir quitter le pays à la fin de leurs études. Au même moment, on apprenait que l’armée israélienne recrutait des demandeurs d’asile pour combattre à Gaza en échange de titres de séjour. (…)
Au sein des opinions publiques occidentales, à l’abri des bombes et dans le confort d’une paix civile encore préservée, de nouvelles solidarités doivent également pouvoir se reconstruire en faveur d’un processus d’apaisement, contre la complicité criminelle qui réunit Yahya Sinouar et Benyamin Nétanyahou. Il ne s’agit pas deranimerun « camp de la paix », car ce n’est pas à l’ordre du jour, mais plutôt de bâtir un nouveau « camp de l’apaisement » et de la désescalade.
C’est possible, car nous ne sommes pas face à un dilemme moral, dans lequel il faudrait choisir entre deux voies contraires mais également légitimes. Il n’y a, en réalité, qu’une seule issue juste et raisonnable : un cessez-le-feu immédiat pour préserver les populations civiles de Gaza, sauver les otages encore en vie et prévenir un embrasement régional ; le recours à la justice internationale pour s’interposer entre les belligérants et briser ainsi le cycle de la vengeance. A ce prix, et à ce prix seulement, l’aube tragique du 7 octobre prochain pourrait se lever sur un fragile espoir.
Vincent Lemire est professeur d’histoire à l’université Gustave-Eiffel.
Another click of the dial : Israel and Hizbullah creep closer to all-out war
But Israel does not yet have the forces in place to invade (The Economist, 23 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
FOR NEARLY a year Israel has fought a defensive war on its border with Lebanon. Since October 8th the pattern has been familiar. Civilians on both sides of the border have fled. Hizbullah, the Shia militia in Lebanon, has fired missiles and launched explosive drones towards the towns and bases near Israel’s northern border. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has responded in kind with artillery and air strikes. That pattern has now been broken. (…)
Despite the escalation, this is not yet all-out war. Neither side has unleashed anything close to its full firepower. From Hizbullah, that would mean firing much larger salvoes, including long-range missiles towards key civilian and military locations in central Israel, and mounting multiple ground incursions into Israeli territory. For Israel it would include a much wider bombing campaign against Hizbullah’s missile network, including launch-sites within civilian areas, and as a final resort destroying civilian infrastructure in the hope of turning the Lebanese population against the organisation (many Lebanese already resent the group’s war with Israel). Military sources say that Israel is also planning a ground offensive that would include the capture of a buffer zone consisting of a few miles of territory north of the border. (…)
The timing of Israel’s latest steps masks the divisions within its upper military and political echelons. Some are urging a much speedier escalation, arguing that Israel should take advantage of the chaos within Hizbullah’s ranks to destroy a much larger proportion of its capabilities and capture territory. More cautious generals, including Yoav Gallant, the defence minister, favour the current, more gradual strategy, which they hope will give Hizbullah space to reconsider its position and back down.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, has promised to return the residents of the north safely to their homes. “Our goals are clear, and our actions speak for themselves,” he insists. (…)
On September 19th a visibly shaken Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-general, took to the airwaves to address his members. He insisted, as he has since October last year, that “We will not stop our attacks as long as the enemy does not halt its war in Gaza.” Unlike in Gaza, the framework for a ceasefire to the war in Lebanon already exists in the form of United Nations Resolution 1701. It mandates a withdrawal of Hizbullah forces to the Litani River, nearly 30km from the border. But Mr Nasrallah refuses to do so until Israel withdraws from Gaza.
For now it is far from certain that Mr Netanyahu can restore calm or enable Israeli citizens to return home to the north. Whatever the prime minister says, neither his goals nor his strategy are clear. And yet it is increasingly apparent that in its war with Hizbullah, Israel is not prepared to wait until they are.■
Israel and Hizbullah creep closer to all-out war (economist.com)
Israel’s New Hezbollah Strategy
Israel shows the damage the Iran-backed militia will suffer in a full-scale war. (WSJ, opinion, 21 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Israel appears to be pursuing a new strategy to deter a broader war with Hezbollah. Instead of tit-for-tat exchanges, it will make clear to the Iran-backed militia the damage it will suffer if it continues to fire missiles at Israel’s north.
That’s the conclusion we draw after a week of strikingly effective attacks on the Hezbollah war machine in Lebanon. The latest, on Friday, was a targeted strike on Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold of Dahiyeh. (…)
Iran’s terrorist axis has taken serious blows, and the region is on edge. On Friday Hezbollah fired 200 rockets at Israel, but it has to be considering its options. If its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, chooses to escalate, he now knows his Beirut bastion won’t be immune. His organization has been compromised, which means he may also be at risk.
A full-scale war could destroy Lebanon and carry risks for Israel too. It could also hurt Vice President Kamala Harris politically and help the Trump campaign. Mr. Nasrallah could end up facing Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu for several more years. That is a prospect neither he nor his Iranian bosses want. (…)
Even the Biden Administration has now recognized that Mr. Sinwar doesn’t want a deal, the Journal reports. Maybe Mr. Nasrallah would like to have a word with him? One way or another, Israel is going to return its 60,000 displaced northern citizens to their homes.
Israel’s New Hezbollah Strategy – WSJ
Bipeurs du Hezbollah : une opération sans précédent
Par son ampleur et ses dégâts, cette explosion simultanée menée par les services secrets israéliens restera dans l’histoire des guerres secrètes. (Le Point, 21 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Dans l’histoire des guerres secrètes que se livrent depuis des siècles les petites et les grandes puissances militaires, elle restera marquée d’une pierre blanche. Par l’ingéniosité de sa conception, par les moyens énormes qu’il a fallu mettre en œuvre dans le plus grand secret, par la sophistication extrême de la réalisation, par la démesure de l’humiliation qu’elle provoque chez l’ennemi et par la dévastation qu’il subit, tandis que l’assaillant demeure indemne. Le seul élément qui ne soit pas original dans cette incroyable opération qu’aucun romancier fécond n’avait envisagée – sous réserve d’inventaire – réside dans la prise de risque assumée de frapper des civils. (…)
Comment les Israéliens ont-ils procédé pour conduire cette attaque ? Les détails mettront quelque temps à émerger, mais il est clair qu’ils ont su profiter très vite de la décision du leader du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, d’exiger que les cadres de son mouvement se dessaisissent de leurs smartphones trop vulnérables, et les remplacent par des équipements nettement moins sophistiqués. Dans le New York Times, le journaliste Ronen Bergman, auteur de l’ouvrage Lève-toi et tue le premier sur les assassinats ciblés commandités par Israël, explique que les services israéliens ont créé de toutes pièces des entreprises de fabrications de pagers, qui se sont mises sur le marché. Dans le jargon des espions, on appelle ces sociétés des « berlues ». Un client croit s’adresser à un classique acteur industriel ou commercial, mais il s’adresse en fait à des agents de renseignements.
Dans ce cas précis, le Hezbollah ou ses intermédiaires prennent contact avec une anodine entreprise de Taïwan, Gold Appolo, qui sous-traite la fabrication des pagers à un sous-traitant hongrois, BAC. Bergman poursuit : « En fait, elle faisait partie d’un front israélien, selon trois officiers de renseignements informés de l’opération. Ils ont indiqué qu’au moins deux autres sociétés écrans avaient été créées pour masquer l’identité réelle des personnes qui créaient les bipeurs : des officiers des services de renseignements israéliens. BAC a accepté des clients ordinaires, pour lesquels elle a produit une gamme de bipeurs ordinaires. Mais le seul client qui comptait vraiment était le Hezbollah. » (…)
À la guerre, les blessés qu’il faut soigner mobilisent beaucoup plus d’énergies que les morts qui se contentent d’un enterrement et du chagrin des survivants. Cette opération israélienne n’a pour l’instant révélé que ses effets destructeurs. Ne doutons pas que la manière dont elle a été préparée, décidée et conduite va remplir bien des livres dans les années qui viennent.
Bipeurs du Hezbollah : une opération sans précédent (lepoint.fr)
Why Are Hezbollah’s Pagers Off-Limits?
Israel sabotaged the terror group’s secure military communications. (WSJ, 20 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
After Israel pulled off a covert operation against Hezbollah that ranks with the Trojan horse, the terrorist group’s apologists are crying foul. For too many in positions of influence, Israel simply isn’t allowed to fight back.
“I’m deeply alarmed by reports that a large number of communication devices exploded across Lebanon & Syria,” wrote United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres on Wednesday. He also said, “I think it’s very important that there is an effective control of civilian objects, not to weaponize civilian objects—that should be a rule.” Ken Roth, the long-time former head of Human Rights Watch, who turned his field into a blame-Israel-first chorus, seconded the point about objects “associated with normal civilian daily use.”
Do these people think the Lebanese communicate via pager and walkie-talkie? Israel didn’t tamper with civilian objects like smartphones or any device you might pick up at a Lebanese RadioShack. It sabotaged Hezbollah’s secure military communications.
The U.N.’s “alarm” is highly selective; Hezbollah’s takeover of southern Lebanon and daily attacks on Israel don’t trigger it. International bureaucrats reward the Iranian proxy group’s terrorism by creating new rules for Israel—and maybe next time for America.
Josep Borrell, the European Union’s top diplomat, said on Wednesday, “I firmly condemn today’s new attack via the explosion of a high number of electronic devices across Lebanon, which has caused several casualties and a high number of injuries. Once again, the indiscriminate method used is unacceptable.” He also said, “Even if the attacks seem to have been targeted,” the civilian harm was indiscriminate. Targeted is the opposite of indiscriminate.
The attacks blew up Hezbollah personal equipment directly, often in the hands of terrorists. The explosives were small enough in most cases to wound the fighter without harming people next to them, videos show. Hezbollah played up the tragic death of a child but acknowledged that nearly all other deaths were of its members. Hundreds of fighters were seriously injured. (…)
Israel-haters set an impossible standard in Gaza, where Hamas fights from schools and hospitals. But even when Israel meets that standard, as now in Lebanon, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez says, “This attack clearly and unequivocally violates international humanitarian law.” She cried when funding passed for Israel’s Iron Dome that shoots down Hezbollah’s indiscriminate rocket attacks.
On Thursday Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah framed the Israeli response as an act of terrorism against Lebanese civilians. Too many in the West win the dubious honor of having beaten him to the propaganda punch.
Why Are Hezbollah’s Pagers Off-Limits? – WSJ
Freud would have a field day with Nasrallah
Nasrallah’s speech, when viewed through this lens, reads less like a statement of facts and more like a diary of denials. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 20 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Imagine you’re sitting in a dimly lit room, eyes glued to the screen, as Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, appears on a grainy feed from his secret bunker. His tone is defiant, his gestures are grand, and his words drip with venomous certainty. As he speaks, Nasrallah’s voice rises and falls in a symphony of self-assured proclamations: “We are unafraid,” “We will never negotiate,” “Our forces are invincible.”
On the surface, it sounds like just another one of his classic monologues – a routine performance of bravado meant to rally his followers and rattle his enemies. But what if I told you that this tough-talking Nasrallah might actually be revealing the exact opposite of what he truly feels?
Welcome to the world of reaction formation, a psychological defense mechanism that could explain why Nasrallah seems to say one thing while unconsciously feeling the other. Think of it like the opposite way, but for your inner psyche: the more you declare you hate something, the more you might secretly love it – and the louder you shout about strength, the more vulnerable you actually feel.
Reaction formation was introduced by Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, as a defense mechanism where individuals respond to anxiety-provoking feelings by displaying behaviors or emotions that are the opposite of their true desires. Freud would have a field day with Nasrallah – if he wasn’t too busy analyzing his own dreams about cigars. (…)
Editor’s Notes: Freud would have a field day with Nasrallah – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Pager wars : Israel has bloodied Hizbullah but is stuck in a war of attrition
Two attacks on the Shia militia may not change Israel’s strategic dilemma in Lebanon (The Economist, 19 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
FIRST IT WAS pagers; then, walkie-talkies. On September 18th another wave of explosions rocked Lebanon: two-way radios detonated in homes and offices and even at a funeral, a day after some 3,000 pagers blew up across the country and in neighbouring Syria. In both cases the devices were used by members of Hizbullah, the Shia militia that has fired rockets at Israel for almost a year. (…)
All of this raises three questions: how these devices were made to explode; why Israel would have detonated them now; and what this means for its year-long conflict with Hizbullah. (…)
Despite the operational success, the timing underscores Israel’s strategic dilemma. Wounding lots of Hizbullah members and damaging the group’s communications would have been an ideal prelude to a major Israeli offensive. Since October 7th there have been voices calling for this, in order to reduce Hizbullah’s arsenal of long-range missiles and occupy a buffer zone inside Lebanon. But the government has not approved an incursion; instead, a low-level war of attrition has set in. (…)
That Israel activated the bombs without any further action indicates that, for now, it is not rushing to all-out war. It may also suggest that Israeli spies feared that Hizbullah would soon discover the vulnerability, and they decided to act before the militia swapped out the pagers.
Hizbullah may not rush for war either. People close to the group describe a state of shock after the blasts. It has been obvious for months that Israel had penetrated the militia: it has had no trouble assassinating a string of top commanders. But the back-to-back bombings are by far the biggest security breach in its history. “Hizbullah’s military arsenal is virtually paralysed,” says Lina Khatib of Chatham House, a think-tank. (…)
None of this, though, changes Israel’s dilemma. (…)
Since October 8th, when Hizbullah began firing rockets at Israel, the prevailing view has been that a ceasefire in Gaza is the only way to end those hostilities. But the prospects of such a deal look dim: Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, are both reluctant to accept one. Israel thus wants to decouple the two fronts. It no doubt hopes the exploding pagers and radios will remind Mr Nasrallah of the damage that Israel can do to his militia and its standing in Lebanon.
For Lebanese, the blasts reinforced a feeling of despair. Many drew comparisons to the massive explosion at Beirut’s port in 2020, another ordinary Tuesday on which death seemed to arrive from nowhere. Whatever their views on Hizbullah, they are nervous about what comes next and feel powerless to do anything about it. ■
Israel has bloodied Hizbullah but is stuck in a war of attrition (economist.com)
Enemy of my enemy : Why Israel has not yet lost Europe
Europeans are angry about Gaza, but they aren’t voting like it (The Economist, 19 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Condemnation of Israel has risen all across Europe since the war in Gaza began. The United Nations General Assembly is preparing to vote on September 18th on a demand for Israel to withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories, and one might think European voters’ anger at the war would persuade their governments to back it. This year pro-Palestinian demonstrators occupied universities in Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris; the Palestinian cause ranks with income inequality and climate change among the big issues of the European left. Polls show big drops in favourability towards Israel.
In fact, things are more complicated. Israel has so far suffered few consequences from its declining popularity. Most European governments do not want to stake their limited influence on gestures that will accomplish little. And anti-Zionism on the left is offset by the rising power of Europe’s hard right, which is anti-Muslim and largely pro-Israel. “Anti-Muslim feeling acts as a kind of buffer zone for Israel,” says Dominique Moïsi of the Institut Montaigne, a French think-tank.
European countries’ attitudes towards Israel break down roughly into three groups. Some Mediterranean and Nordic countries have long leaned towards the Palestinians, on human-rights grounds or out of sympathy with decolonisation movements. Israel’s biggest diplomatic setback of the Gaza war came when Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and Spain recognised Palestine as a state this spring; Sweden did so a decade earlier. Such countries’ citizens hold Israel in low regard, but that was true before the war too. In Spain, for instance, the favourable-unfavourable gap was at -53 in August, widening from -38 in May 2023, according to YouGov, a pollster.
Other western European countries are more equivocal, especially those affected by the Holocaust. Germany is a case apart: it believes it has a special responsibility for protecting Jewish life and sees defending Israeli security as a “reason of state”. Public opinion towards Israel (currently -34) is somewhat less negative than in Denmark or Sweden. The government has repressed pro-Palestinian demonstrations and hesitates to criticise Israeli abuses.
France has largely confined itself to calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and sending humanitarian aid. It faces a difficult balancing act, with both Europe’s largest population of Jews and the largest share of Muslims of any western European country. It is also facing the limits of its influence in the Middle East: an attempted mediation effort to prevent a war in Lebanon this summer came to nothing. Popular disapproval of Israel is at similar levels to that in Germany. But as in Germany, when the French are asked which side they sympathise with more, they divide about equally. (…)
Israel Planted Explosives in Pagers Sold to Hezbollah, Officials Say
Small amounts of explosive were implanted in beepers that Hezbollah had ordered from a Taiwanese company, according to American and other officials briefed on the operation. (NYT, 18 septembre, article payant)
Why the Hamas hostage deal won’t bring peace – opinion
A proposed hostage deal may offer temporary relief, but it fails to address Iran’s broader strategy of unifying its proxies against Israel. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 18 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) To understand the current dynamics, it’s essential to recognize that this is not just another chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran is spearheading a much broader regional campaign to encircle Israel with hostile forces. The ongoing efforts of terror organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza are part of a larger strategic framework aimed at weakening Israel’s defenses and expanding Iran’s influence.
This is why there is no urgency among these players to reach a ceasefire, and it looks like the whole campaign has shifted toward a war of attrition against Israel on various fronts.
Given this, the question arises: What could be done to secure a lasting solution? (…)
One of the key lessons from the current situation is the age-old adage, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” US President Joe Biden’s recent deployment of military assets to the Middle East serves as a clear signal to Iran. The US appears ready to deter Iranian aggression, but this show of force must extend to Iran’s proxies, who continue to test Israel’s defenses along its northern and southern borders.
Israel cannot afford to face Iran and its proxies alone. This is a battle that requires a broad international coalition, particularly with Western powers. While Israel is responsible for securing its borders and neutralizing immediate threats, dealing with Iran’s long-term ambitions demands coordination with the US and other allies. (…) The recent hostage deal – if it will be signed – offers only a temporary pause in the conflict at best, not a lasting solution. After the massacre of October 7, Israel cannot afford to live under the constant threat of terrorism on its borders. The international community, for its part, cannot afford to see the Iranian radical axis spread its dark and fanatical vision across the Middle East, and beyond.
The writer, a retired IDF lieutenant-colonel, is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in dealing with Israel’s security challenges on its northern borders.
Iran plans that Israel-Hamas hostage deal won’t maintain peace – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
How Hamas Uses Brutality to Maintain Power
The group has abused hostages and Palestinians in its efforts to maintain control of Gaza and wage an insurgent war. (NYT, 14 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Early this summer, Amin Abed, a Palestinian activist who has spoken out publicly about Hamas, twice found bullets on his doorstep in northern Gaza.
Then in July, he said he was attacked by Hamas security operatives, who covered his head and dragged him away before repeatedly striking him with hammers and metal bars.
“At any moment, I can be killed by the Israeli occupation, but I can face the same fate at the hands of those who’ve been ruling us for 17 years,” he said in a phone interview from his hospital bed, referring to Hamas. “They almost killed me, those killers and criminals.”
Mr. Abed, who remains hospitalized, was rescued by bystanders who witnessed the attack, but what happened to him has happened to others throughout Gaza.
The bodies of six Israeli hostages recovered last month provided a visceral reminder of Hamas’s brutality. Each had been shot in the head. Some had other bullet wounds, suggesting they were shot while trying to escape, according to Israeli officials who reviewed the autopsy results.
But Hamas also uses violence to maintain its control over Gaza’s population.
Some Palestinians have been injured or killed as Hamas wages an insurgent style of warfare that risks Palestinian lives to strike the Israeli military from densely populated areas. Others have been attacked or threatened for criticizing the group. Some Palestinians have been shot, accused of looting or hoarding aid. (…)
But Mr. Sinwar is the unchallenged leader of Gaza. While his day-to-day control of the government is attenuated, as he tries to avoid being captured or killed by Israel, he still sets the broad goals and policies for Gaza, according to officials briefed on the intelligence. (…)
Mr. Abed, 35, the Palestinian critic of Hamas who was beaten in July, was attacked after writing on social media and speaking to news media, including The New York Times, and believes that Hamas’s leaders want to make an example out of him.
On Wednesday, Mr. Abed left Gaza for the first time in more than two decades, one of dozens of wounded and ill people whom Israel permitted to travel to the United Arab Emirates for treatment.
“I feel terrible that I’ve left our family and people behind, but at the same time, I feel safe for the first time in 17 years,” he said in a voice message from his hospital bed in Abu Dhabi. “There’s no one that wants to kill, arrest or follow me.”
How Hamas Uses Brutality to Maintain Power – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
The Philadelphi story : A narrow corridor in Gaza has become an obstacle to a ceasefire
Binyamin Netanyahu says the presence of Israeli troops is crucial. His generals disagree (The Economist, 13 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) ON ISRAELI tactical maps the narrow corridor along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt is code-named “Philadelphi”. It is a rubble-strewn wasteland, just 14km long and around a kilometre wide. And yet it has become one of the main obstacles to a ceasefire agreement which could perhaps end the war in Gaza.
Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, claims the corridor is the main smuggling route through which Hamas’s Iranian benefactors supplied the weapons that enabled the group to launch the devastating attacks on Israel on October 7th 2023. He insists that it is critical for Israel to maintain a military presence there. If the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) withdrew from Philadelphi, Mr Netanyahu claims, Hamas would be able to secure the resources to carry out “another October 7th and another”. On August 29th the Israeli cabinet passed a decision to keep troops in the corridor indefinitely (only Yoav Gallant, the defence minister, voted against it). That may scupper any chance of reaching a deal to secure the release of 101 Israeli hostages still held in Gaza.
The generals and spy chiefs within Israel’s security establishment disagree with their prime minister. And it is puzzling that if holding the corridor is so central to Israel’s security, Mr Netanyahu waited seven months after the war began before giving the order to occupy the territory. (…)
The best way to prevent smuggling in the future, say Israeli defence experts, is to force Egypt to tighten its border controls. If Hamas were to start using the tunnels again, they concede, Israeli troops would have to return to Philadelphi to destroy them. But Egypt will not discuss any new arrangements for the Rafah crossing until Israel commits itself to withdrawing from Gaza entirely. (…)
The prime minister faces not only the generals’ dissent, but also growing public anger, with mass protests led by relatives of the hostages. Neither group can bring down his government. Nor can the Biden administration, which along with Egyptian and Qatari mediators have been scrabbling to come up with a formula that both sides can accept.
Even if they can find a solution that satisfies both Israel and Hamas, which insists on guarantees for a full Israeli withdrawal before releasing any hostages, six of whom it recently executed, a ceasefire is far from assured. Neither Hamas nor Israel’s hardliners seem capable now of reaching one. On September 4th Mr Netanyahu was asked whether Philadelphi was the only obstacle to a deal. He laughed: “No, it’s not.” In fact, he continued, everything can still be an obstacle. Philadelphi is just the latest excuse. ■A narrow corridor in Gaza has become an obstacle to a ceasefire (economist.com)
Israel must never abandon the Philadelphi Corridor – opinion
Insights from meetings with Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Rabin offer a deeper look into the strategic missteps and their impact on the current conflict with Hamas. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 12 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) [Sharon] noted that parts of Gaza might come under Arab control in the future, but the number of Israelis living there would ensure Israel’s long-term sovereignty over the area. He then ran his finger over the Philadelphi Corridor, emphasizing that this was the border between Gaza and Egypt. He asserted that Israel would never abandon this corridor, as doing so would result in Israel losing control over the weapons flow from Egypt into Gaza, transforming it into a militarized stronghold and posing a threat to the State of Israel.
I didn’t know much about the geography of Gaza at the time. I had never heard of the Philadelphi Corridor, but that finger drawn over that border and the words warning about what could happen if we ever gave up control of that border stuck in my mind forever.
Sharon ran for prime minister in 2000 with a campaign largely focused on protesting any withdrawal from Gaza. Winning by a landslide, he became the prime minister of Israel in March 2001. By June 2005, his government had approved a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
Since then, no one has been able to understand Sharon’s motives for reversing all of his prior declarations, beliefs, and principles, pulling out 9,000 Israelis living in Gaza, and abandoning all of it, including the Philadelphi Corridor.
WITH CLEAR hindsight, we now know that the abandonment of the Philadelphi Corridor is what directly led to the October 7 massacre. (…)
We can’t repeat the same mistake of abandoning the Philadelphi Corridor.
Another historic meeting I attended, together with Rabbi Marvin Hier, dean and founder of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Rabbi Abraham Cooper, the center’s associate dean and director of Global Social Action, was with then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in the boardroom off the Prime Minister’s Office, where the Sunday morning Cabinet meetings are held. The intimate meeting took place just a few weeks before the signing of the Oslo Accords.
As our half-hour meeting was coming to an end, Cooper asked one last question: “Aren’t you worried that perhaps this agreement is too big a risk to take? What if it doesn’t work out?”
To which Rabin gave two answers. “Yes, it’s a risk,” he said, “but we have to take risks for peace.”
He then added, “It’s not irreversible. It’s not forever. The first rocket they launch into Israel, the first violation of the peace agreement, we will go back in and take it over again.”
Did he realize that it would be impossible to reinvade Gaza and regain control because of world pressure, as we can see so clearly now? Was he sincere in his response? I don’t know.
Yet what I know now, without a doubt, is that stopping this war before its goals are achieved, based on the assumption that we can resume fighting later on if the agreement we sign now is violated, is perilously naive.
As Cooper asked then, we should be asking now: “Mr. Prime Minister, isn’t that too big a risk to take?”
The writer is the founder and chairman of OneFamily Fund, Israel’s largest organization caring for all of Israel’s victims of terror, without distinctions, since 2001, and doubling its operations since the October 7 massacre. This opinion piece was reviewed and approved by Rabbis Hier and Cooper.
Standstill in hostage talks, Israel should accept withdrawal from Philadelphi – editorial
The talks to release the remaining 101 hostages held by Hamas are stalled, primarily due to Israel’s insistence on retaining control of the Philadelphi corridor, seen as crucial for Israel’s security. (The Jerusalem Post, éditorial, 5 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
The talks to release the remaining 101 hostages held by Hamas in Gaza seem to be at a stalemate.
Although we are not privy to the details, Israel’s demand that it retain its presence in the Philadelphi corridor appears to be the main stumbling block.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a convincing argument for that need during his televised press conference Monday evening.
Utilizing a large map of Gaza and a pointer, Netanyahu explained the dangers of withdrawing from the strip of land bordering Egypt, citing it as a critical buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza under which Hamas smuggled weapons that allowed it to carry out the October 7 attack and launch rockets against Israel for years.
Unless Israel continues controlling the corridor, Hamas would not have any restraints from smuggling weapons in from Egypt and rearming, the prime minister asserted. (…)
The only vote against the decision came from Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, a former IDF southern commander, who reportedly called the decision “an unnecessary constraint that we’ve placed on ourselves.
“The decision made Thursday was reached under the assumption that there is time, but if we want the hostages alive, there’s no time,” Gallant reportedly told the ministers. “The fact that we prioritize the Philadelphi Corridor at the cost of the lives of the hostages is a moral disgrace.” (…)
Gantz presented a map of the entire Middle East and argued that Iran was the real strategic threat. He also argued that the Philadelphi Corridor was a tactical issue for which the IDF had sufficient answers, including an underground barrier to block all tunnels. He also rebuffed Netanyahu’s claim that international pressure would prevent Israel from recapturing the corridor if need be.
Israel is now facing two valid approaches to dealing with the current situation in Gaza. The first sees Israel sticking to its guns and not giving an inch to Hamas in the hopes that, in a weakened state, it will eventually concede on its demand of a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The second approach is agreeing to a phased pullout that would see the release of some of the hostages. (…)
Given those difficult choices, we believe the country must go with the latter and attempt to save as many of the hostages’ lives now as possible. Despite the potential dangers involved, it’s the right thing to do.
This is what makes us different from everyone else. If there are Israelis or Jews in distress in Gaza or anywhere in the world, Israel is supposed to be there to help them and bring them to safety.
Security is indeed sacrosanct. So is saving lives.
Standstill in hostage, ceasefire deal – Philadelphi main issue – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Real estate and religion : Israel’s settlers are winning unprecedented power from the war in Gaza
They are gaining land—and sway over the army, police and politics East (The Economist, leader, 4 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
DRIVE ALONG Highway 60, which traverses the West Bank from north to south, and it feels like a real-estate road trip. It is festooned with signs in Hebrew offering “Two Last Apartments in Mitzpe Levona” and promising that “Your Grass Can be Greener” seen from a villa in Tzofim. These are boom times for Israel’s settlers, who are gaining land, military influence and political power.
The war in Gaza has emboldened them. Binyamin Netanyahu’s government depends on settler-backed parties for its majority, giving them huge sway over the prosecution of the conflict and, some fear, a veto-power over any truce. Meanwhile the fighting has boosted the influence of settlers over the army, and provided a smokescreen for more land grabs in the West Bank. As a member of the government puts it: “With everyone distracted, last year by the protests over the legal reform and now by the war, we’ve done unprecedented things for the settlements.”
“It’s like a period of a miracle,” said Orit Strock, the minister in charge of settlements and a member of the hard-right Religious Zionism Party, talking to settlers. “I feel like someone who has been waiting at the traffic-lights and then the green light comes on.” In June the government authorised new settlements with 5,295 houses over 2,965 acres (1,200 hectares). Since 2022 it has also “legalised” planning for outposts that it had not previously recognised. Peace Now, an Israeli NGO which monitors settlement-building, said this was the largest appropriation of land in the West Bank since the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993.
The consensus among international-law experts is that all Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids countries to transfer population into occupied areas. The International Court of Justice underlined this view in July. Israel disagrees, claiming that the status of the land is contested and has Jewish associations going back millennia. Today around half a million settlers occupy parts of the West Bank. Another 200,000 live in neighbourhoods of Jerusalem east of the 1967 borders, which Israel has formally annexed.
Some of those settlements were built with the approval or encouragement of the government of the day. Others have sprung up in defiance of the country’s leaders. But there is no mistaking the current government’s stance. In addition to Ms Strock’s ministry, which funnels state funds to the settlements, her party’s leader, Bezalel Smotrich, a settler, is Israel’s finance minister and also has responsibility for much of the non-military administration of the West Bank within the ministry of defence. (…)
For most Israelis the war in Gaza is a tragedy. But many settlers see it differently. “For this movement, which historically saw secular Zionism as just a prelude to a much wider process of divine redemption, the war has come at a serendipitous moment, when they are at an unexpected peak of their political power,” says Tomer Persico, an expert on modern Jewish thought at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem. “For them it is a heavenly sign, a miracle.”
Mr Netanyahu insists that his government does not intend to rebuild the settlements in Gaza and that Israel’s presence is strictly for security purposes. But ministers in his government have been at rallies calling for Gaza’s Palestinian population to be deported and Jewish towns to be built instead. Daniella Weiss is a veteran settler who backs such policies. She recalls half a century ago in the West Bank: “First there were IDF bases. Then we came along and settled the land”. ■Israel’s settlers are winning unprecedented power from the war in Gaza (economist.com)
A Hostage Deal Is a Poison Pill for Israel (NYT, tribune de Bret Stephens, 4 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Huge demonstrations in Tel Aviv, coinciding with the heartbreaking funerals of six murdered hostages, have demanded that the prime minister agree to a cease-fire deal to obtain the release of additional hostages, at the cost of conceding one of Hamas’s core demands: an Israeli withdrawal from a strip of land known as the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates Gaza from Egypt. Netanyahu has refused, insisting in a news conference on Monday that Israeli forces will not leave.
Netanyahu is right, and it’s important for his usual critics, including me, to acknowledge it.
He’s right, first because the highest justification for fighting a war, besides survival, is to prevent its repetition. Israel has lost hundreds of soldiers to defeat Hamas. Thousands of innocent Palestinians have died and hundreds of thousands have suffered, because Hamas has held every Gazan hostage to its fanatical aims. Hamas was able to initiate and fight this war only because of a secure line of logistical supply under its border with Egypt.
Israel’s control of the Philadelphi Corridor largely stops this. To relinquish it now, for any reason, forsakes what Israel has been fighting for, consigns Palestinians to further misery under Hamas and all but guarantees that a similar war will eventually be fought again. Why do that? (…)
The more powerful case, especially emotionally, concerns the remaining 95 hostages, of whom 60 are believed to still be alive. Their agony is immense, as is that of their families. Any decent human being must feel acutely sympathetic to their plight.
But sympathy cannot be a replacement for judgment. (…)
A good society will be prepared to go to great lengths to rescue or redeem a captive, whether with risky military operations or exorbitant ransoms. Yet there must also be a limit to what any society can afford to pay. The price for one hostage’s life or freedom cannot be the life or freedom of another — even if we know the name of the first life but not yet the second. That ought to be morally elementary.
Also elementary: Whatever one thinks of Netanyahu, the weight of outrage should fall not on him but on Hamas. It released a video of a hostage it later murdered — 24-year-old Eden Yerushalmi, telling her family how much she loved them — on Monday, the day after her funeral. It’s another act of cynical, grotesque and unadulterated sadism by the group that pretends to speak in the name of all Palestinians. It does not deserve a cease-fire so that it can regain its strength. It deserves the same ash heap of history on which, in our better moments, we deposited the Nazis, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
There are bright people who say that what Israel ought to do now is cut a deal, recover its hostages, take a breather and start preparing for the next war, probably in Lebanon. Israelis should remember that wars will be worse, and come more often, to those who fail to win them.
Opinion | A Hostage Deal Is a Poison Pill for Israel – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Hamas Murders Six Hostages, Israel Is Blamed
They were killed in Rafah, where Biden and Harris delayed Israel’s entry with threats and by withholding weapons. (WSJ, opinion, 3 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
Hamas probably can’t believe its luck—or the lack of moral seriousness by its enemies. The terrorists murder six Israeli hostages, including one dual-citizen American, and Israel is suddenly under pressure to make concessions—to Hamas.
That’s the way it looked Monday, a day after Israel said it recovered the bodies of six hostages. They were executed in a Gaza tunnel only a day or two before Israel reached them, shot multiple times at close range. The hostages are Eden Yerushalmi, age 24; Ori Danino, 25; Alex Lobanov, 32; Carmel Gat, 40; Almog Sarusi, 27; and Hersh Goldberg-Polin, the U.S. citizen, 23. (…)
Yet the reaction from the White House, the British government, the Western press and some parts of Israel is to blame the Israeli government. On Monday, in a one-word answer to a press scrum, Mr. Biden accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of not doing enough to secure a hostage deal. (…)
Aid groups hyped worst-case scenarios for a Rafah invasion. Mr. Biden and Ms. Harris withheld weapons to stop Israel from fighting there. Ms. Harris wouldn’t rule out “consequences” if Israel went ahead. Egypt threatened to abrogate its peace treaty with Israel over it. Israel has since found over a dozen tunnels from Rafah into Egypt, which insists that Israel leave the border to let Hamas’s arms smuggling resume. It should be clear now why Israel couldn’t let Hamas rule Rafah.
Mr. Biden said Sunday that “Hamas leaders will pay for these crimes.” But his next sentence pushed for a cease-fire to end the war. Ms. Harris says, “Hamas cannot control Gaza,” an important line that has been missing from her speeches, but that also seems at odds with her insistence on an “immediate cease-fire.”
In executing hostages, Hamas must have figured it would increase pressure on Mr. Netanyahu. Many Israelis demand he make more concessions toward a deal because Hamas has rejected the past several, including the U.S. proposals, which Mr. Netanyahu accepted. Israel’s largest trade union held a brief strike on Monday to demand a deal. Others call that giving in to terrorism; the right-of-center group of hostage families is now demanding the end of negotiations and more military pressure on Hamas. (…)
The choices are heavy, and Israel’s leaders don’t need U.S. pressure driven by an American election calendar. Americans know right from wrong. When Mr. Polin and Ms. Goldberg spoke at the Democratic convention, the crowd chanted “bring them home.” That was also the chant at the Republican convention during the speech by the parents of Omer Neutra, a 22-year-old U.S. hostage still in Gaza.
Israel is offering unprecedented strategic concessions and risking its soldiers’ lives to free hostages. U.S. pressure should be on Hamas, which took the hostages and murders them.
Hamas Murders Six Hostages, Israel Is Blamed – WSJ
Only one moral end: Hamas surrenders, releases all hostages unconditionally – opinion
What does our enemy want? Nothing we can accept. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 2 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
We are facing a totalizing ideology, known as Palestinianism, executed by Hamas and its enablers, that seeks nothing less than ending the humiliating specter of sovereign Jews.
Our enemy is dedicated, by all means necessary, to teaching a final lesson to those Jews who dared imagine themselves equal, sovereign, and masters of their fate in their own state on their ancestral land—so that they never attempt to do so again.
We are up against an enemy that not only invaded our country and our homes to gleefully murder and mutilate the most peace-loving people in their beds but went on to kidnap hundreds of them to ensure they face no consequences for what they did on October 7.
The brutal executors of the ideology of Palestinianism, Hamas, did not kidnap people for the limited goal of releasing murderers from Israeli jails. Rather, they did so to ensure they pay no price for what they did, enabling them to do it again, and again, and again.
Make no mistake: as far as Hamas is concerned, it has paid no price and suffered no consequences for October 7. The devastation in Gaza and the people killed are all meaningless to Hamas. Buoyed by global pressure to provide it with ongoing supplies even as it conducts a total war, Hamas remains in firm control of Gaza and its people.
It has secured a position as a legitimate negotiating partner. At the same time, all the pressure is placed on Israel to yield to its demands to return to the status quo of October 6—with no consequences for its actions. Nothing is being done against the backers of Hamas—Qatar, Egypt, and Iran—with the first two being falsely portrayed as helpful (they’re not) and the latter as uninvolved. (…)
What the government should do
In the face of a totalizing ideology that plays a long game with an annihilationist goal, there is only one moral position for any government or international organization to pursue (and it should have been the policy from October 8):
1. Unconditional release of the hostages.
2. Unconditional surrender of Hamas.
That is the only way to end the immediate war.
(Ending Palestinianism as the ideology that negates a sovereign Jewish state in any borders is necessary to end the century-long war.)
And until then? It is war and should be waged as such, with no illusions about the enemy we face.
Einat Wilf is a former Israeli politician and author who served as a member of Knesset for Independence and the Labor Party.
Ending Hamas: The only moral path to true peace for Israel – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
The Wall Street Journal’s downfall: If you want the truth about Israel, look elsewhere – opinion
Once considered a pro-Israel breath of fresh air, the Journal’s news coverage of Israel and its current war has become increasingly problematic. (WSJ, opinion, 2 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
One of the questions I am asked most often at my lectures in America is “From which American media outlet should I get my news about Israel?”
My answer has always been “None of them.” Since the advent of the Internet, no one in America needs to get news about Israel from the local paper anymore.
That’s where people should get their sports news and maybe their weather reports. But when it comes to Israel, it’s just as easy to click Jpost.com as the website of any American media outlet.
In the past, the follow-up question had sometimes been “Not even The Wall Street Journal?” They asked that because the editorial line of the Journal is solidly pro-Israel, and its opinion pages are a breath of fresh air compared to other papers.
But that question has not been asked lately, as the Journal’s news coverage of Israel and its current war has become increasingly problematic. This is especially disappointing considering its positive reputation and its status as America’s top circulation newspaper, with more than three million digital subscribers and 649,000 print subscriptions. (…)
THE JOURNAL’S less sympathetic coverage of Israel has coincided with the arrival of a team of new editors led by Editor-in-Chief Emma Tucker, who arrived from The Sunday Times in what staffers called their “British invasion.”
The National Review reported that when Tucker fired dozens of workers, she “cut jobs from the team responsible for editing sensitive stories and weeding out any hints of bias.” One of the issues the new bosses decided to highlight, according to the report, was “Gaza.” (…)
BUT THE low point for the Journal’s Israel coverage came two weeks ago when the pro-Israel media watchdog HonestReporting exclusively reported how their Gazan reporter Abeer Ayyoub used her X (formerly Twitter) account to spread terrorist propaganda and fake news. (…)
Das Leben wählen, nicht den Tod – warum eine Auflösung der UNRWA der Schlüssel zum Frieden im Nahen Osten ist
Die UNWRA ist das strukturelle Rückgrat des illusionären palästinensischen Traums von einer Vernichtung Israels. Dabei sind die Palästinenser eigentlich längst zu Hause angekommen – doch ihre Hass-Ideologie und ihr Selbstopfer-Kult sperren sich der Einsicht. (NZZ, 26 août, tribune, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Die Ideologie, dass die Uno für ihr Flüchtlingsdasein verantwortlich ist, peinigt uns bis heute. Als Abu Marzook, ein hoher Hamas-Funktionär, vor ein paar Monaten gefragt wurde: «Warum lasst ihr die Menschen in Gaza zu ihrem Schutz nicht die Tunnel benutzen?», antwortete er: «Was? Die Tunnels sind für uns da. Für die Menschen in Gaza ist die Uno zuständig.» (…)
Die UNRWA ist zweifellos eine gescheiterte Organisation. Nicht nur finden die von ihr betreuten Flüchtlinge kein festes Unterkommen in Israels Nachbarstaaten, der Westen wird fortan von der arabischen Welt erpresst, die UNRWA nicht zu schliessen. Und da die UNRWA ihre Aufgabe ja noch nicht erfüllt hat, kann das auch nicht geschehen.
Was also soll die UNRWA tun? Sie fängt an, fleissig Aktivitäten zu entfalten. Zunächst in Sachen Berufsausbildung. Daraus wird bald das riesige Bildungsnetzwerk der UNRWA im Westjordanland, im Gazastreifen, in Libanon, Syrien und Jordanien.
In diesem Bildungssystem entsteht wesentlich ein palästinensischer Nationalismus, was an sich kein Problem ist. Nur dass der Nationalismus, der in den UNRWA-Schulen gedeiht, ein Nationalismus ist, der einzig und allein auf Rache und Rückkehr aus ist.
Unter dem Label der Uno und mit westlicher Finanzierung wird eine Generation nach der anderen erzogen im Schlupfloch-Glauben, dass man nach wie vor Flüchtling sei. Die gesamte Identität basiert nicht auf der positiven, konstruktiven Vision der Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates, sondern auf der destruktiven Idee der Vernichtung Israels. Die Rückkehr wird von Anfang an als brutaler Triumph gedacht, und es ist klar, was sie genau bedeutet: Rückkehr ist der «7. Oktober».
Seit 75 Jahren sind die Palästinenser in den UNRWA-Schulen auf diesen Moment des brutalen Triumphs über den jüdischen Staat vorbereitet worden. Das ist ihre Vision von Rückkehr, mit dem Segen der Uno und finanziert mit westlichem Geld.
Es spielt eigentlich keine Rolle, ob nun 5 oder 10 oder 15 UNRWA-Mitarbeiter am Massaker vom 7. Oktober beteiligt waren, denn die UNRWA ist das ideologische Rückgrat, welches Jahrzehnt für Jahrzehnt, Generation für Generation gewalttätige palästinensische Organisationen mit hervorbringt, welche sich der Idee der Befreiung Palästinas verschrieben haben: «vom Fluss bis zum Meer». (…)
Die UNWRA ist das Rückgrat des palästinensischen Traums der Vernichtung Israels. (nzz.ch)
The Middle East : Israel and Hizbullah play with fire
They both attempt escalating attacks that fall short of all-out war (The Economist, 26 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) For four weeks the entire region has awaited the revenge promised by Hizbullah and Iran for the assassinations of Shukr, and of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, in a government guest-house in Tehran. The delay in part reflects the difficulty of Iran’s position. It could retaliate directly, but a large missile and drone attack by it on Israel in April was largely intercepted by Israel and its allies. A repeat of this sort of spectacle could illustrate Iran’s ineffectiveness, not its wrath. Alternatively, were Iran to seek to launch an even bigger direct strike it could trigger an all-out war with devastating consequences. To deter Iran, America has now moved two aircraft-carrier strike-groups to the Middle East. (…)
Neither side wants to be blamed for scuppering the laborious talks over a ceasefire in Gaza, which trundle on. Shortly after the strikes in Lebanon were over, the Israeli government announced that its negotiating team would leave as scheduled for another round of talks in Cairo. Ending the war in Gaza, which, according to Hamas’s health ministry, has killed 40,000 people, including Hamas fighters, in the coastal strip, might help end the present cycle of escalation before it spirals out of control.
But whether a ceasefire in Gaza defuses the bigger conflict between Iran and its proxies and Israel seems far less certain. The optimistic view is that the entire region might step back from the brink, and that a ceasefire would open up a pathway to Saudi Arabia recognising Israel, and following that America, Israel and the Gulf Arab states co-operating more deeply on defence in order to contain Iran, their common adversary.
Yet there are many unknowns: who will occupy the White House; who will ultimately win the opaque struggle between reformers and hardliners within Iran; and whether Israel can tolerate daily rocket attacks on its northern communities, or will eventually mobilise to launch a bigger campaign against Hizbullah aimed at destroying its massive Iran-supplied missile arsenal. Even if the latest exchange of hostilities peters out it is unlikely the longer war will. ■
Israel and Hizbullah play with fire (economist.com)
Israels Geheimdienstchef warnt vor «jüdischem Terrorismus» – Ben-Gvir fordert seine Entlassung
Der Shin-Bet-Chef bezeichnet die Siedlergewalt und das Verhalten des Ministers für nationale Sicherheit als Bedrohung für den Staat. Sein Brief führt zu Chaos in Israels Regierung – und bestätigt, was viele internationale Partner hinter vorgehaltener Hand sagen. (NZZ, 24 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Sollten gewalttätige Siedlerbanden weiter das Gesetz in die eigene Hand nehmen, würde sich Israel in einen gescheiterten Staat entwickeln, so wie Libanon oder Syrien. «Israel schöpft seine Stärke daraus, dass es ein mehr oder weniger demokratischer, funktionierender, westlicher Staat ist», sagt der Professor an der Hebräischen Universität Jerusalem. «Wenn Israel das nicht mehr für sich behaupten kann, wird es äussert verwundbar gegenüber äusseren Gefahren.» (…)
In seinem Schreiben nannte Bar drei Gefahren für den israelischen Staat, falls dieser die Siedlergewalt nicht unter Kontrolle bringt: weltweite Verurteilung selbst durch Israels engste Partner, eine Überlastung der Armee sowie das Risiko einer weiteren Front in Israels Krieg. (…)
Der Tenor unter den Gesandten ist überall gleich: Durch die Tolerierung der Siedlergewalt legt Israel die Axt an seine eigene Sicherheit. Sollte sich nichts ändern, wären weitere Sanktionen gegen radikale Siedler und womöglich auch gegen Regierungsmitglieder wie Ben-Gvir programmiert.
In Israel scheint man begriffen zu haben, dass sich etwas ändern muss. Am Donnerstag wurden vier Personen festgenommen, die am Angriff auf Jit beteiligt gewesen sein sollen. In der Vergangenheit wurden nach ähnlichen Überfällen nur wenige Siedler verhaftet, Gerichtsverhandlungen sind noch seltener. Schon die schnelle verbale Verurteilung vieler israelischer Politiker nach dem Angriff auf das Dorf im Norden des Westjordanlandes zeigt: Viele Regierungsmitglieder sind sich des Problems bewusst.
Dass aber substanzielle Veränderungen folgen, ist unwahrscheinlich. Denn Netanyahu ist auf die Unterstützung seines rechtsextremen Koalitionspartners Ben-Gvir angewiesen. Und dieser sei nicht kompromissbereit, meint Gideon Rahat. «Ben-Gvir fürchtet sich nicht vor einem grossen Krieg – der zum Beispiel durch seine Besuche auf dem Tempelberg ausbrechen könnte», sagt der Politikwissenschafter. «Vielleicht wünscht er ihn sich sogar herbei, um dann mit aller Kraft gegen die Araber in Israel und den besetzten Gebieten vorgehen zu können.»
Israels Geheimdienstchef warnt vor «jüdischem Terrorismus» (nzz.ch)
Two Million Gazans Are Now Confined to 15 Square Miles
Israel’s widening hunt for Hamas is squeezing Palestinians into ever-smaller areas in the Gaza Strip (WSJ, 23 août, article payant)
Extraits:
Palestinians in Gaza have long lived in one of the most crowded places on the planet. Since the war broke out there over 10 months ago, the designated space in which they can hope to exist safely has dramatically diminished.
Israel has in recent weeks widened its offensive against Hamas in Gaza to areas its military previously marked as safe zones, but where it now says militants are hiding, hemming Palestinians into smaller and smaller portions of the strip.
So far this month, the Israeli military has issued at least nine evacuation orders covering areas it has designated as humanitarian zones, directives that the United Nations estimates have affected 213,000 people. It means Gaza’s 2.2 million people are now mainly confined to an area of roughly 15 square miles—smaller than the footprint of Manhattan.
Put another way, at the start of the year, evacuation orders pushed Palestinians fleeing the war to shelter in areas totaling around 33% of the strip, according to the U.N.; they are now reduced to just 11% of Gaza, an enclave roughly the size of Philadelphia. (…)
Forced to move at least two or three times already, some Palestinians are risking staying where they are, unable to find tents or shelter elsewhere and unconvinced that any part of Gaza is now safe.
“We know that we might be asked to leave soon,” said Fatma Khalaf, a 37-year-old mother of three children in the central Gazan city of Deir al-Balah. “But we really don’t know where we will go.”
Two Million Gazans Are Now Confined to 15 Square Miles – WSJ
Iran’s new government : The threat of war is empowering the Islamic republic’s hardliners
As a result, Iran’s new president is off to a disappointing start (The Economist, 23 août, article payant)
Extraits:
“I shouldn’t have voted,” says one unveiled Iranian woman. After a burst of enthusiastic voting in the second round of Iran’s recent presidential election, popular disillusionment has returned. Despondency is back at the top, too. Javad Zarif (pictured), Iran’s former foreign minister and its new vice-president, resigned on August 11th. He ran Masoud Pezeshkian’s campaign and helped revive hopes of a more representative government. The announcement of the new cabinet on August 21st showed how those hopes have been dashed.
Mr Pezeshkian has appointed Western-orientated and -educated men to negotiate with the West and try to ease sanctions, but he has retained hardliners to run internal affairs. His interior minister is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander who has suppressed protests against the regime. He has kept his hardline predecessor’s intelligence minister despite the numerous breaches under his watch, most recently the assassination of Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran. The vice-president and head of Iran’s atomic agency also keeps his job.
Mr Pezeshkian has abandoned promises to promote women and Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities whose votes helped him to victory. There is only one female minister, the second in the Islamic Republic’s history. She is in charge of roads. Again, there are no Sunnis or Kurds.
Apologists insist that without appeasing hardliners, who control parliament, mps would have blocked the appointments. Instead they approved them all. To make any progress Mr Pezeshkian also needs to keep Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on side. He said Mr Khamenei had signed off on the cabinet.
But Iranians expected better. (…)
For now, repression will keep the regime’s critics in check. But it still needs the West to solve its biggest problem—economic isolation. Mr Khamenei has tried looking to China and Russia, and failed. Under Mr Pezeshkian’s predecessor inflation was, on average, over 15 points higher than under any other Iranian president. A coffee in Tehran costs almost as much as in London. Mr Zarif has gone, but an ally, his British-educated former deputy, Abbas Araqchi, is slated to be foreign minister. And while Mr Khamenei damns Western perfidy, Mr Pezeshkian is the first president who has been permitted to take calls from Western leaders in three years. ■
The threat of war is empowering the Islamic republic’s hardliners (economist.com)
To keep football beautiful, give the Palestinian campaign of hate a ‘red card’
In order to indeed keep football as a force for good and politics out of sport, FIFA must once and for all give a ‘red card’ to Jibril Rajoub’s relentless campaign of hate against Israel. (The Jerusalem Post, opinion, 22 août, article payant)
Extraits:
Jibril Rajoub, a senior Palestinian Authority official and convicted terrorist, once declared, “If we had a nuke, we’d have used it [against Israel] this very morning.” Rajoub said this on Al-Mayadeen TV, a Hezbollah-affiliated television channel, the same Hezbollah which last month fired a rocket at Majdal Shams in northern Israel, murdering 12 young children playing football.
Rajoub, who also heads up the ‘Palestine Football Association,’ is now leading the Palestinian campaign to boot Israel from FIFA, the football world governing association, having failed to do so on previous occasions in 2015 and 2017.
A man with seemingly no shortage of titles, Rajoub also serves as President of the Palestinian Olympic Committee and tried – unsuccessfully – to boot Israel from the Paris Olympics. But the International Olympics Committee (IOC) would have none of that, with IOC President Thomas Bach saying: “We are not in the political business, we are there to accomplish our mission to get the athletes together.” (…)
FIFA’s current flagship campaign, “Football Unites the World,” promotes the sport as a “global movement to inspire, unite … and bring people together, all over the world, to celebrate the beautiful game.”
In Israel, football truly plays a unifying role and serves as a beacon of co-existence in the best spirit of FIFA and international football, with roughly a third of all football clubs and players being from the Arab-Israeli sector. Any penalties therefore imposed on the Israel Football Association would directly impact one of the most exemplary venues for Arab-Israeli coexistence.
In order to indeed keep football as a force for good and politics out of sport, FIFA must once and for all give a ‘red card’ to Jibril Rajoub’s relentless campaign of hate against Israel, and dismiss this baseless campaign to exclude the Jewish state from “the beautiful game”.
Arsen Ostrovsky is an Israeli human rights attorney who serves as CEO of The International Legal Forum and senior fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security. You can follow him on ‘X’ at: @Ostrov_A.FIFA must give ‘red card’ to Palestinian hate campaign – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
The Israel-Hamas war and Iran : The Middle East’s bizarre waiting game: ceasefire or Armageddon?
Israel accepts a proposal to pause fighting but Hamas’s hardliners may not (The Economist, 21 août, article payant)
Extraits:
IT WAS HARD not to detect a note of desperation from Antony Blinken. The American secretary of state is making his ninth visit to the Middle East since war in Gaza began over ten months ago. The latest round of indirect talks between Israel and Hamas is, he insisted, “a decisive moment” that is “probably the best, maybe the last opportunity” for reaching a ceasefire and a release of Israeli hostages. Yet no agreement has been struck yet. Amid his visit Iran issued another threat of a direct attack on Israel, which “must await calculated and precise strikes”. But the clerical regime appears uncertain of its timetable, too. It added that “time is on our side and it is possible that the waiting period for this response will be long”. (…)
On August 19th Mr Blinken met Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, for three hours. Afterwards the secretary of state told reporters that the Israeli prime minister had “confirmed” to him “that Israel accepts the bridging proposal”. Mr Netanyahu did not go as far, saying he “greatly” appreciated “the understanding that the US has shown for our vital security interests as part of our joint efforts to bring about the release of our hostages”. He did not mention a ceasefire of any kind. (…)
Even assuming Israel has indeed accepted America’s plan, Hamas still needs to be convinced. The group says it is “keen” on a deal but has so far rejected the American proposal, claiming it includes new conditions set by Israel and does not guarantee a full ceasefire or Israeli withdrawal after the initial truce. Without those guarantees, Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s hardline leader in Gaza, is reluctant to release hostages, who are dwindling in number. Just a few dozen are thought to still be alive. They are his last bargaining chips, and Israeli intelligence believes that some are being held close to him to protect him from assassination. (…)
While the talks drag on Iran has yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran, or of a senior Hizbullah commander in Lebanon, despite threatening bloody retaliation. Hizbullah, an Iran-linked militia, has continued its daily barrage of rockets and drones on Israel but avoided escalation. The three-week delay may reflect a lack of good options, as Iran tries to think up an attack that is more impressive than its missile and drone strike on Israel in April (which was largely intercepted) but does not trigger a full-blown war. The new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is anxious to avoid starting his term with an unpopular conflict. And his boss, the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, seems to be feeling the pressure, as shown by a string of social media posts inveighing against the “psychological warfare” that “the US, the UK and the Zionists” have waged against Iran and calling on his people to resist “the demands of the enemy”.
A ceasefire in Gaza might provide all parties with an excuse to avoid a regional war. Israel could claim that its main objectives have been met in Gaza, Hamas’s rump could boast of survival and Iran and its proxies could claim that their intimidatory tactics have forced Israel to compromise. But the final decision still rests with Messrs Netanyahu and Sinwar. And for both, their personal and political survival comes first. ■
The Middle East’s bizarre waiting game: ceasefire or Armageddon? (economist.com)
In Gaza, Israel’s Military Has Reached the End of the Line, U.S. Officials Say
Israel has severely set back Hamas but will never be able to completely eliminate the group, U.S. officials said. (NYT, 20 août, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in Gaza, according to senior American officials, who say continued bombings are only increasing risks to civilians while the possibility of further weakening Hamas has diminished.
With the Biden administration racing to get cease-fire negotiations back on track, a growing number of national security officials across the government said that the Israeli military had severely set back Hamas but would never be able to completely eliminate the group.
In many respects, Israel’s military operation has done far more damage against Hamas than U.S. officials had predicted when the war began in October.
Israeli forces can now move freely throughout Gaza, the officials said, and Hamas is bloodied and damaged. Israel has destroyed or seized crucial supply routes from Egypt into Gaza. About 14,000 combatants in Gaza have been killed or captured, the Israeli military said last month. (The U.S. intelligence agencies use different, more conservative methodologies to estimate Hamas casualties, though the precise number remains classified.)
The Israeli military also asserted that it had eliminated half the leadership of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, including the top leaders Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa.
But one of Israel’s biggest remaining goals — the return of the roughly 115 living and dead hostages still held in Gaza after being seized in the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks — cannot be achieved militarily, according to current and former American and Israeli officials. (…)
Israel’s most recent military operations have been something of a Whac-a-Mole strategy in the eyes of American analysts. As Israel develops intelligence about a potential regrouping of Hamas fighters, the Israel Defense Forces have moved to go in after them.
But U.S. officials are skeptical that approach will yield decisive results. To prevent its fighters from being targeted, Hamas has urged them to hide in its vast tunnel network under Gaza or among civilians. From the beginning of the war, Hamas’s basic strategy has been survival, and that has not changed, U.S. officials said.
(…) Yaakov Amidror, a retired major general who served as Mr. Netanyahu’s national security adviser, rejected the notion that Israel had nothing more to gain in Gaza through force.
“Israel’s achievements in Gaza are impressive, but they’re far from what should be achieved,” said General Amidror, who is now a fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. “If Israel evacuates its forces now, within a year, Hamas will be strong again.”
He emphasized that stopping the war now would be a “disaster” for Israel. (…)
The biggest unknown for both Israel and the Palestinians is who, or what, comes after Hamas, American and other Western officials say.
Time to face the truth: Hamas is a unified terrorist entity
The recent events exposing the false divide between Hamas’s political and military wings highlight the need for global recognition of Hamas as a unified terrorist entity. (The Jerusalem Post, 20 août, tribune, article payant)
Extraits:
It is time for the world to recognize the entirety of Hamas as a terror organization.
In the wake of the daring assassination of Hamas terrorist leader Ismail Haniyeh and the ascension of Yahya Sinwar to the top job of political chief of Hamas, the false division between the political wing of Hamas and the military wing of Hamas has been exposed.
Haniyeh, who started his terrorist career as aide-de-camp of Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin, held the position of political chief since 2017 and was seen as a moderate in the eyes of many around the world. Haniyeh left the Gaza Strip around the same time to help strengthen ties with Hamas’s strategic allies, and since then he has mainly led a life of luxury in Qatar and has traveled between Hamas’s allies, mainly Qatar, Iran, and Turkey with forays to Lebanon, Russia, and China. (…)
In the past, many countries have made an artificial divide between the military wing of Hamas, which is seen as hardline radicals and is sanctioned and outlawed in most Western countries, and the political wing of Hamas, which is seen as a more moderate and dovish faction of the group with which agreements could be reached. (…)
This is not by any means a unique position the West has taken against Hamas. Similar distinctions have been made with other malign actors such as Hezbollah, the Taliban, and different elements within the Iranian regime. Yet, in no other case, is the distinction so blatantly false as this one – as has been shown following Sinwar’s ascension to the job.
Sinwar, the terrorist who masterminded the October 7 massacre that saw some 1,200 Israelis murdered and some 250 abducted, has now taken the position of the head of the political wing of Hamas while simultaneously holding the position of top military leader of the group. This shows without a shadow of a doubt that the political and military leadership are complementary parts of this machine of destruction.
Based on this evidence, the State of Israel must take diplomatic action and demand that all parties, governmental or otherwise – including the UN – recognize the entirety of Hamas as a terrorist organization.
To paraphrase the words of Bill Roggio, editor of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’s Long War Journal: “There is no good Taliban and bad Taliban, there is The Taliban.”
The same must be said for Hamas: there is no moderate Hamas and no radical Hamas – there is only Hamas. It is not enough to theoretically declare Hamas as a terrorist organization. It must be fully treated as such.
The writer is an IDF combat veteran and analyst of current affairs, commencing a degree in history and political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
The case for recognizing Hamas as a whole terror organization – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Terror als Selbstzweck: Mit der Wahl von Yahya Sinwar setzt die Hamas ganz auf eine nihilistische Strategie der Gewalt
Nach der Tötung von Ismail Haniya in Teheran macht die Hamas ausgerechnet den Architekten des 7. Oktobers zu ihrem neuen Chef. Dies könnte für die Terrorgruppe in die Sackgasse führen. Doch auch Israel kann der Entscheid nicht freuen. (NZZ, 14 août, opinion, article payant)
Extraits:
Mit der Ernennung von Yahya Sinwar zu ihrem Chef schickt die Hamas ein klares Signal an Israel: Der bewaffnete Kampf wird fortgesetzt um jeden Preis, einen Kompromiss wird es nicht geben. Kein Hamas-Führer steht so sehr für die Strategie des blinden Terrors wie Sinwar. Der Chef der Hamas im Gazastreifen gilt als Architekt des Massakers vom 7. Oktober, mit dem die Terrorgruppe das Gebiet in einen verheerenden Krieg gestürzt hat, der nach Angaben der Gesundheitsdienste bis heute rund 40 000 Palästinenser das Leben gekostet hat.
Zusammen mit dem Militärchef Mohammed Deif, der im Juli vermutlich bei einem israelischen Luftangriff im Gazastreifen getötet wurde, hat Sinwar den Überfall auf die Städte und Kibbuzim in Israel geplant. Die Exilführung um Ismail Haniya und Khaled Mashal hat er vermutlich vorab nicht über die Pläne informiert. Der 61-Jährige wusste zweifellos, welche harte Reaktion er mit dem Massaker und der Geiselnahme provozieren würde. Doch den Preis war es ihm wert.
Mit dem Angriff hat Sinwar den Anspruch der Hamas bekräftigt, die Speerspitze des palästinensischen Widerstands zu sein. Er hat damit der Identität der Hamas als militärischer Akteur klar Vorrang gegeben gegenüber ihrer Rolle als politische Partei. Die Verwaltung des Gazastreifens und der Aufbau eines palästinensischen Staatswesens sind für ihn offensichtlich nachrangig. Der bewaffnete Kampf gegen den verhassten jüdischen Staat hat für ihn oberste Priorität.
Allerdings wird dieser Kampf zum Selbstzweck, wenn er kein realistisches Ziel verfolgt. (…)
Mit der Wahl von Yahya Sinwar setzt die Hamas auf Terror als Selbstzweck (nzz.ch)
Doubling down on extremism : Hamas’s pick of Yahya Sinwar as leader makes a ceasefire less likely
The appointment of the architect of October 7th ties the group closer to Iran (The Economist, 7 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) In messages passed via couriers from Gaza, Mr Sinwar had insisted that the new leader would need to be on good terms with both Iran and Syria—two of Hamas’s key backers. “Sinwar got much closer to Iran than anyone else in the movement in the past few years,” says Azzam Tamimi, a writer with close links to Hamas’s leadership. This essentially amounted to a veto on the appointment of Mr Meshaal. (…)
Mr Meshaal, who was the leader of Hamas at the time, closed the group’s headquarters in Damascus in 2012. He spent the next few years trying to cultivate ties with the Sunni Arab powers: in 2015, for example, he made a rare visit to Saudi Arabia to meet King Salman. Some Hamas leaders backed his effort, hoping the Gulf would provide them with investment and political legitimacy. Others preferred to patch up their relations with Iran. (…)
Had Mr Meshaal been named the group’s new leader—an appointment that Turkey and Qatar had been pushing for—it would have been a blow to the pro-Iranian faction within Hamas. The choice of Mr Sinwar means that Gulf states will keep their distance from the group: they view him as a dangerous ideologue aligned with their main regional foe. Moreover, Mr Sinwar’s appointment will further marginalise the group’s external political leaders, who are generally seen as more moderate and interested in diplomacy than Mr Sinwar is.
If there is indeed a part of Hamas that is interested in diplomacy, then it has been weakened by this move: whereas Mr Haniyeh had been pushing for a ceasefire with Israel, Mr Sinwar has instead tried to prolong the conflict. With Mr Sinwar cementing his control of both Gaza and Hamas’s political bureau, the chances of a ceasefire and the release of hostages look more remote. ■
Hamas’s pick of Yahya Sinwar as leader makes a ceasefire less likely (economist.com)
Yahya Sinouar, l’ennemi d’Israël qui se rêve en héros du peuple palestinien
Yahya Sinouar a été nommé chef du Hamas. Le cerveau des attaques du 7 octobre n’a qu’un objectif : éradiquer toute présence juive en terre d’Islam. Il se terre dans le gigantesque réseau de tunnels. (Le Point, 7 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Il n’est pas un jour sans que les médias s’interrogent sur ce que Sinouar a dans la tête. Quel est son mode de fonctionnement ? Par quoi est-il motivé ? Uniquement sa haine d’Israël ou son désir profond de devenir le héros du peuple palestinien, une sorte de nouveau Yasser Arafat ? Comme le dit Esmat Mansour, un de ses anciens compagnons de cellule, « pour comprendre Sinouar, il faut d’abord savoir d’où il vient. Quand il nous expliquait pourquoi il nous fallait lutter contre l’occupation, il revenait toujours à son histoire familiale vécue comme une tragédie sans fin dont il se souviendra toujours ». (…)
Dans une transcription d’une dizaine de pages de son interrogatoire publié par la presse israélienne, Sinouar décrit, sans état d’âme, la façon dont il a tué. Soit en étranglant la victime, soit en l’enterrant vivante ou en utilisant une machette. Il a fait vingt-deux ans de prison en Israël. Un peu plus de deux décennies qu’il mettra à profit pour apprendre parfaitement l’hébreu et connaître en profondeur son ennemi, étudiant avec acharnement l’histoire d’Israël et son fonctionnement politique et social. C’est en prison aussi qu’un chirurgien israélien lui a sauvé la vie en l’opérant d’une tumeur au cerveau. (…)
Il retrouve la liberté en 2011 dans le cadre de l’échange de 1 026 détenus palestiniens contre Gilad Shalit. De leader charismatique en prison – gare à celui qui ose le contester –, il prend, au fil des années, une place de plus en plus importante au sein de la direction du Hamas. La consécration arrive en 2017, lorsqu’à l’issue d’une consultation interne, il devient le chef, pour Gaza, du mouvement islamiste.
Une apothéose qui acte aussi la fin de la séparation entre branche militaire et branche politique du Hamas. À partir de là, et en dépit de déclarations lénifiantes comme celle faite au quotidien israélien Yediot Aharonot, en 2018 – « je ne veux plus d’autres guerres » –, il va concrétiser la vision théologique du fondamentalisme islamiste : éradiquer toute présence juive en terre d’Islam. Il le fera avec sa propre personnalité. (…)
Reste cette question : Yahya Sinouar avait-il prévu l’envergure de la réaction militaire israélienne ? En avait-il calculé les tenants et les aboutissants ? Et, autre interrogation : au-delà de la guerre qui bouleverse la région, a-t-il atteint un autre de ses objectifs, celui de devenir le leader de la cause palestinienne ?
Qui est Yahya Sinouar, le nouveau chef du Hamas ? (lepoint.fr)
Bundeswehr in den Nahen Osten? Was Merkel und Scholz hätten bedenken müssen
Deutschland hat die Sicherheit Israels zur Staatsräson erklärt. Doch wenn es zum Schwur kommt, entpuppt die moralische Supermacht sich als Maulheldin. (FAZ, 6 août, opinion, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Berlin kämpft für die Sicherheit Israels lieber weiter auf dem diplomatischen Parkett. Alles, was hilft,einen großen Krieg zu verhindern, muss versucht werden. Doch hören Israel und Iran auch auf Deutschland? Und was macht Berlin, wenn Israel von ihm verlangt, zu seinem Schwur zu stehen und mit militärischen Mitteln das Existenzrecht des jüdischen Staates zu verteidigen?
„Hypothetische Fragen“ heißt es dazu in Berlin. Merkel und Scholz hätten sich trotzdem mit ihnen beschäftigen sollen, bevor sie das große Wort von der Staatsräson in den Mund nahmen. Unbedingte Selbstverpflichtungen sollte nur eingehen, wer sicher ist, dass er sie unter allen Bedingungen erfüllen will und kann. Sonst gilt auch eine moralische Supermacht nur noch als große Maulheldin.
Deutschland hat die Sicherheit Israels zur Staatsräson erklärt (faz.net)
The Gaza Conflict Enters ‘Uncharted Territory’ (NYT, 5 août, opinion, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
“I don’t think war is inevitable,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Wednesday, after senior leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas were killed in pinpoint attacks in a suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, and Tehran. He was right; war is never inevitable until it breaks out. But suddenly the possibility of an all-in conflict of unpredictable breadth between Israel and its Iran-backed enemies, into which the United States would most likely be drawn, had become a dangerous possibility. (…)
In the optimistic telling, none of the actors wants an all-out war. Not Israel, which is already fighting in Gaza; not Hezbollah, whose Lebanese homeland is in wretched economic straits; not Iran, which just inaugurated a new president and prefers to let its “axis of resistance” — its proxy forces, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen — do the real fighting; not Hamas, which needs a cease-fire to stop the relentless Israeli pummeling and certainly not the United States, which is deeply divided over the Gaza war and in the heat of a fateful presidential race.
(…) But an equally compelling case can be made for an imminent war. Many Israeli generals have long wanted to launch a definitive strike against Hezbollah, which has accumulated a vast arsenal of missiles, rockets and drones, including precision-guided missiles far more sophisticated than anything Hamas has ever had. These could reach deep into Israel, threatening densely populated areas and critical infrastructure. (…)
If the cease-fire talks on Gaza are at a dead end — and both Israel and Hamas have been regularly putting new obstacles in its way — Mr. Netanyahu has a choice between continued instability and threat in the north or a decisive clash with Hezbollah and, if need be, with Iran and its proxies.
Israel, in that case, would pay a heavy price, but Lebanon and Iran a far heavier one. On his recent visit to Washington, Mr. Netanyahu repeatedly referred to the war in Gaza as really a war against Iran and its proxies, and spoke of continuing until full victory.
But what “full victory” means and the risks he is willing to take to achieve it remain unclear. All that is clear at this uncharted juncture is that neither all-out war nor an imminent peace is inevitable, and the suspense is tangible.
Opinion | The Gaza Conflict Enters ‘Uncharted Territory’ – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
The West’s criticism of Haniyeh’s assassination misses the anti-terror point
Western leaders’ condemnation of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination overlooks its critical role in the fight against terrorism. Rather than criticizing Israel, the West should support it. (The Jerusalem Post, 5 août, éditorial, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
(…) Haniyeh, for more than seven years the prominent leader of Hamas, a recognized terrorist organization, had a long history of orchestrating violence and terror against civilians.
Under his leadership, Hamas has carried out numerous attacks that have resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent people. His regime in Gaza was marked by aggressive militarization, the launching of rockets into Israeli territory, and the brutal suppression of political opponents within the Palestinian territories. Haniyeh’s alliance with Iran further exacerbated regional tensions, providing Hamas with the resources and support needed to sustain its terrorist activities. (…)
For instance, during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, over 4,500 rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel. Hamas also has a long history of using suicide bombers to attack Israeli civilians. One of the most notorious attacks occurred in March 2004, when a double suicide bombing at the port of Ashdod killed 10 Israelis and injured dozens. Haniyeh planned and endorsed these tactics. (…)
Several Western countries – including the US, Egypt, and Qatar – have expressed concerns that Haniyeh’s assassination undermines ongoing peace negotiations and escalates regional tensions. (…)
It is essential to recognize that Israel’s actions are not acts of aggression but of self-defense. Eliminating Haniyeh sends a solid message to terrorist organizations worldwide: Their leaders are not beyond reach. This act demonstrates Israel’s advanced intelligence capabilities and its unwavering commitment to neutralizing threats to its national security and the safety of its citizens.
The international community must consider who aligns themselves with individuals like Haniyeh. Those who see him as a friend or ally are, in effect, partners in terror. (…)
Haniyeh killed, West not understanding war on terror – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Lamps going out : The Middle East braces for war as Iran weighs its response to Israel
America is rushing troops to the region, while airlines are steering clear (The Economist, 5 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Iran and Hizbullah are not looking for all-out war. August 4th is the anniversary of the devastating explosion at Beirut’s port in 2020, which killed more than 200 people and wrecked much of the city centre. The blast was caused by a stockpile of ammonium nitrate at the port, and many Lebanese suspect Hizbullah had a hand in storing it there. The group is wary of inviting more destruction on the city.
There are voices calling for moderation in Tehran as well. Yousef Pezeshkian, son of the newly inaugurated president, wrote on his website that war with Israel is not a priority for Iran; rather, it should wage war on “poverty, corruption, discrimination, inequality and wasteful political factions”.
Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, and the hardline circle around him are unlikely to heed his call. But they will be aware that provoking further Israeli attacks, the next time perhaps on critical infrastructure, will not endear the regime to a population already suffering from frequent power cuts and water shortages. “The regime has to respond to a direct attack on Tehran,” says Raz Zimmt, an Iran watcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. “But they fear they can’t rely on domestic support for an all-out war with Israel.” (…)
Israel will rely on the American-led coalition to help it fend off any barrage. If missiles do get through this time and cause major damage, they would force Israel to launch its own retaliatory strikes. Many Western governments have already called for their nationals to leave Lebanon (which is hard to do, since many airlines are cancelling flights there too). But America’s willingness to stand beside Israel is fraying.
The key to ending the spiralling violence in the region remains a ceasefire in Gaza, where tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed since October. (…)
The assassination of Haniyeh will delay any ceasefire talks until Hamas can appoint a new interim leader. The obvious candidate is Khaled Meshaal, Haniyeh’s predecessor. But he is estranged from Hamas’s Iranian patrons; he is also an opponent of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, who will have the final say over any deal. With talks at an impasse until both Israel and Hamas can get their affairs in order, the chances of a much wider war continue to increase. ■The Middle East braces for war as Iran weighs its response to Israel (economist.com)
👎 Guerre Israël-Hamas : l’impasse des assassinats ciblés
La logique de liquidation de ses ennemis suivie de longue date par Israël n’a jamais empêché l’émergence d’une relève encore plus dangereuse. Et face à l’incapacité du gouvernement de Benyamin Nétanyahou de trouver une voie diplomatique, les éliminations ciblées incarnent désormais une fin plutôt qu’un moyen. (Le Monde, 3 août, édito, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Cette élimination s’inscrit dans une longue pratique dont l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine a tout d’abord été la principale cible, avant sa reconnaissance d’Israël lors des accords d’Oslo, en 1993, qui a coïncidé avec l’émergence du Hamas et son recours massif au terrorisme. Il serait fastidieux de dresser une liste exhaustive de ces assassinats. Leur récurrence fait surtout apparaître en creux leur principale limite : des frappes tactiques ne font pas une stratégie. (…)
Sur le fond, la conviction de l’establishment politico-militaire israélien demeure que ces assassinats ciblés permettent à la fois de protéger Israël et de gagner du temps. Les faits ne soutiennent pas cette analyse. Ils n’ont jamais empêché l’émergence d’une relève encore plus dangereuse : la barbarie déployée par la milice islamiste le 7 octobrele confirme. Ces éliminations sont devenues en fait une fin plutôt qu’un moyen, compte tenu de l’incapacité de Benyamin Nétanyahou à articuler la moindre solution au conflit israélo-palestinien qui ne parte pas de la négation des droits légitimes des Palestiniens à disposer de leur propre Etat. (…)
Guerre Israël-Hamas : l’impasse des assassinats ciblés (lemonde.fr)
After Ismail Haniyeh: Will Hamas turn from war to politics?
The assassination of its political leader poses a string of dilemmas (The Economist, 2 août, article payant)
Extraits:
On paper Ismail Haniyeh, assassinated in Tehran on July 31st, was Hamas’s supreme leader. When in 2022 he ran for a second term in that role, he was unopposed. But for the past ten months, since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7th, he has often looked more like a postman. The focus of leadership shifted to Gaza, while Mr Haniyeh ran the political wing from Qatar. The decision to continue war or seek a ceasefire has lain with the Qassam Brigades, the military wing led by Yahya Sinwar. Mr Haniyeh relayed messages.
In the short term the assassination tightens Mr Sinwar’s grip. But more pragmatic Hamas types think his decision to mount the attack in October squandered two decades of state-building. They want to reconstitute Hamas as a political movement and an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group that is its ideological parent, rather than remain a band of jihadist guerrillas. In any event, Mr Haniyeh’s death is likely to spark a struggle within Hamas that could determine its future—and that of Palestine itself. (…)
Now most Gazans, homeless and hungry, loathe Hamas. Their death toll is nearing 40,000, far greater than that of the nakba, or catastrophe of 1948. Gaza’s landmarks—its medieval hammams, mosques and handsome villas—are piles of rubble. “It’s the worst period in the history of Palestine,” says one Gazan in exile.
Hamas’s reputation for imposing law and order in Gaza has been shredded, too. Pillage is rife. Gunmen who may belong to Hamas have looted Gaza’s banks. Graffiti announce the verdicts of kangaroo courts, while thugs knee-cap the accused and toughs beat up critics. An opinion poll in June showed support for Hamas’s rule in Gaza had slumped to under 5%, compared with 39% in the West Bank. A day of reckoning may ensue when its fighters emerge from their tunnels: “He’ll be pummelled when he comes up,” says a writer in Gaza, referring to Mr Sinwar. And some fighters never will. Israel killed Muhammad Deif, the group’s military chief, in a strike in July. (…)
When the war stops, both Hamas and Gaza’s beleaguered people might want a new type of leader. Of the frontrunners to replace Mr Haniyeh, Khalil al-Haya is the closest to Mr Sinwar—and even he has suggested that Hamas could disarm. Another contender is Nizar Awadallah, a stalwart from Hamas’s inception who stood against Mr Sinwar for the group’s leadership.
The strongest candidate may be Khaled Meshaal, who headed the group until 2017, whereafter Mr Sinwar strove to marginalise him. A scholar raised in Kuwait with many diplomatic contacts, Mr Meshaal comes from the West Bank. He might want Hamas to come under the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the national umbrella, even if it had to accept its previous agreements recognising Israel. In the past he has also advocated breaking with Iran and Hizbullah, its Lebanese proxy, and turning to Sunni Arab states for support.
Whether the Qassam Brigades would agree is unclear. Anyone hoping to rule Gaza after the war would need their backing. But most Gazans yearn for respite and reconstruction. “Hamas’s leaders realise that October 7th was a miscalculation,” says Muhammad Daraghmeh, a Palestinian journalist with good sources among Hamas’s leaders. Will the group’s next boss agree?■
Will Hamas turn from war to politics? (economist.com)
La Turquie d’Erdogan de plus en plus agressive envers Israël
Les relations tumultueuses entre les deux pays ont atteint un paroxysme, au point que le président Recep Tayyip Erdogan a tenu des propos interprétés comme une menace à peine voilée d’invasion d’Israël. (Le Figaro,1er août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) en pleine guerre dans la bande de Gaza provoquée par des massacres le 7 octobre dans le sud d’Israël par le Hamas, que le président turc considère comme un « mouvement de libération nationale », l’heure est à une escalade verbale sans précédent. Pour la première fois, le président turc a lancé ce qui a été interprété en Israël comme une menace d’invasion : « De la même façon que nous sommes entrés au Karabakh et en Libye, nous pouvons faire de même avec eux (les Israéliens, NDLR). » Il faisait ainsi référence à l’aide militaire turque à l’Azerbaïdjan dans la guerre qui a opposé ce pays à l’Arménie, ainsi qu’au gouvernement, reconnu par l’ONU, de la Libye, en proie à une guerre civile.
La réponse ne s’est pas fait attendre. Sans prendre le moindre gant diplomatique, Israel Katz, le ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères, a affirmé qu’Erdogan « suit les traces de Saddam Hussein en menaçant d’attaquer Israël. Il devrait se souvenir de comment tout cela s’est terminé » pour l’ancien dirigeant irakien, qui a été pendu. Le président turc a « fait de son pays un membre de l’axe du mal dirigé par l’Iran », a ajouté le chef de la diplomatie, en appelant de façon pressante l’Otan à expulser la Turquie de ses rangs. (…)
En septembre 2023, peu avant les massacres du Hamas, Benyamin Netanyahou a rencontré en marge de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU le président turc, qui avait accepté une invitation à se rendre en Israël. Mais quelques semaines après, le 7 octobre a tout chamboulé.La Turquie d’Erdogan de plus en plus agressive envers Israël (lefigaro.fr)
Ever closer : The Middle East must step back from the brink
The path to doing that still starts with a ceasefire in Gaza (The Economist,1er août, article payant)
Extraits:
AWEEK can be a long time in war. Until July 27th there was growing optimism that Israel and Hamas were close to a ceasefire that would halt their ten-month conflict. Diplomats and spies from four countries planned to hash out the details at a meeting in Rome. Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, said the talks were “inside the ten-yard line”. Israelis and Palestinians might not have followed the American-football metaphor, but many shared his sentiment.
Then a rocket fired from Lebanon killed 12 children on a football pitch in the Golan Heights. Israel retaliated by bombing Beirut’s southern suburbs, hoping to assassinate a Hizbullah commander (his precise fate is still unclear). Hours later it killed Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in a surprise strike on Tehran. Hopes for a ceasefire then gave way to fears of a bigger regional war. (…)
Those fears may not yet be realised. (…)
A sort of deterrence is still holding—barely. But it is getting ever harder to maintain. (…)
The path to averting such a conflict starts with a ceasefire in Gaza. Mr Haniyeh’s assassination will no doubt temporarily halt the talks with Israel. But it will not change the reality in Gaza. Hamas’s fighters are exhausted and the public is desperate for relief from a war that has killed almost 40,000 people. That means whoever replaces Mr Haniyeh will face the same impetus to make a deal with the Israelis.
But it is still unclear whether Binyamin Netanyahu wants to make one. (…)
AWEEK can be a long time in war. Until July 27th there was growing optimism that Israel and Hamas were close to a ceasefire that would halt their ten-month conflict. Diplomats and spies from four countries planned to hash out the details at a meeting in Rome. Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, said the talks were “inside the ten-yard line”. Israelis and Palestinians might not have followed the American-football metaphor, but many shared his sentiment.
Then a rocket fired from Lebanon killed 12 children on a football pitch in the Golan Heights. Israel retaliated by bombing Beirut’s southern suburbs, hoping to assassinate a Hizbullah commander (his precise fate is still unclear). Hours later it killed Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in a surprise strike on Tehran. Hopes for a ceasefire then gave way to fears of a bigger regional war.
Those fears may not yet be realised. Iran has vowed a response for Mr Haniyeh’s killing, but it will probably be reluctant to go to war on behalf of Hamas. Israel and Hizbullah are likewise keen to avoid an all-out barrage of missiles, which would cause immense destruction on both sides of the border.
A sort of deterrence is still holding—barely. But it is getting ever harder to maintain. Combatants in the region are crossing lines that would have recently seemed uncrossable. Twice this year Israel has bombed Beirut, a city it had not officially targeted since 2006. In April Iran fired a volley of missiles and drones at Israel for the first time ever. The Middle East’s old rules of engagement have been erased. Because no one is sure about the new ones, each strike risks escalating to all-out war.
The path to averting such a conflict starts with a ceasefire in Gaza. Mr Haniyeh’s assassination will no doubt temporarily halt the talks with Israel. But it will not change the reality in Gaza. Hamas’s fighters are exhausted and the public is desperate for relief from a war that has killed almost 40,000 people. That means whoever replaces Mr Haniyeh will face the same impetus to make a deal with the Israelis.
But it is still unclear whether Binyamin Netanyahu wants to make one. The Israeli prime minister has prevaricated for months, fearful that agreeing to a ceasefire would switch Israel’s focus back to its internal ills, and his own trial for corruption. The hopeful view is that Mr Haniyeh’s death gives him an excuse to declare victory and to accept a deal. With the Knesset now in recess until October, he can do that without risking a no-confidence motion that brings down his government. There is also a cynical interpretation: if you want a truce, killing your main interlocutor is a curious way to show it. Perhaps Mr Haniyeh was too valuable a target to leave alive; or perhaps his killing was a way for Mr Netanyahu to sabotage the talks.
The assassinations may have been feats of intelligence and operations, but they do not change Israel’s bleak strategic position. Its war in Gaza has been drifting aimlessly for months; the loss of Mr Haniyeh, a politician who had little say over the fighting, will not weaken Hamas on the battlefield. Nor will assassinating Fuad Shukr, the Hizbullah commander, compel the group to halt its daily fire on northern Israel. A small country cannot keep battling on all fronts indefinitely.
Indeed, the choice for Israel has never been more stark. It can make a deal with Hamas in order to free the surviving hostages from Gaza, bring a measure of calm to its northern border and provide a chance for regional diplomacy. The public, senior army officers and even some right-wing lawmakers support such a step. Or it can spurn a deal in order to continue a war that could spiral out of control at any time—and probably doom the 115 hostages who remain in Gaza as well.
America has vowed to protect Israel. In recent days it quietly sent an aircraft-carrier strike group back to the Persian Gulf. Deterring Iran and its proxies is only part of the equation, though. President Joe Biden has spent months trying to cajole Mr Netanyahu into a ceasefire, and he has vowed to spend the final months of his presidency pursuing one. It is past time for Mr Biden to get tough and threaten real consequences if the Israeli prime minister continues to refuse. That may clash with his pro-Israel instincts. But if he does not press Israel, the consequence may be worse for the region, including Israel itself: a ruinous conflict that no one can control. ■
The Middle East must step back from the brink (economist.com)
Two knocks in the night : Israeli strikes in Beirut and Tehran could intensify a regional war
At the very least, they will delay talks over a ceasefire in Gaza (The Economist, 31 juillet, article payant)
Extrait:
SEVEN HOURS and 1,500 kilometres separated the air strikes in two Middle Eastern capitals. Both were part of an Israeli operation that could lead to a dramatic escalation in a regional war which has been raging for nearly ten months. (…)
Israel’s choice of targets was both tactical and symbolic. Mr Shukr was central to Hizbullah’s military operations since its founding in the early 1980s. He was thought to be involved in the attacks on American and French military barracks in Beirut in 1983. Israeli intelligence believes he was a critical link in shipments of Iranian guidance systems for Hizbullah’s long-range missiles.
As the head of Hamas’s politburo, Mr Haniyeh was less involved in military matters. He is believed to have been notified of the October 7th attack just minutes before it took place. Since 2017 he has been the group’s public face, based in Qatar and shuttling across the region. He led an effort to mend the group’s ties with Iran after their rift during the Syrian civil war, when Hamas spoke out against Bashar al-Assad (who was propped up by both Iran and Hizbullah). He was also an important interlocutor in ceasefire talks with Israel.
Details are still vague, but both assassinations seem to have been carried out by long-range missiles launched by Israeli fighter jets. Israel has only claimed responsibility for the Beirut strike, calling it retaliation for a rocket strike on Majdal Shams, in the Golan Heights three days earlier which killed 12 children. The rocket was almost certainly fired by Hizbullah as part of a larger barrage (though the group denies it was to blame). (…)
Neither Israel nor Hizbullah have an interest in a wider war—but they are preparing for one. There have been reports of Hizbullah positioning its long-range missiles on launchers and Israeli security officials have made it clear that, unlike on October 7th, their forces are poised and ready for a much wider campaign. (…)
Two men will ultimately decide whether those talks succeed. Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, is increasingly isolated. Israel has killed a number of senior Hamas commanders in Gaza. In recent weeks it has also rescued three hostages, and located the bodies of five dead ones. Gazans have endured immense suffering: almost 40,000 have been killed, and Israeli bombardment has damaged or destroyed most of Gaza’s buildings and infrastructure.
All of this has put Mr Sinwar under enormous pressure to make a deal: the Palestinian public is desperate for a ceasefire, and his leverage with Israel is dwindling as the number of living hostages continues to fall. Mr Haniyeh’s assassination will certainly delay the ceasefire talks, but it will not change the underlying situation in Gaza. (…)
The assassinations in Beirut and Tehran could give Mr Netanyahu the political tailwind he needs to make a deal—if indeed he wants to. He could claim to have responded to the October 7th attack and brought retribution on Israel’s enemies, the elusive “total victory” he has promised Israelis. But before he can decide, he will need to wait for Hizbullah and Iran to respond to the assassinations—and to see whether he has a much bigger war on his hands.■
Israeli strikes in Beirut and Tehran could intensify a regional war (economist.com)
Israel’s Five Wars (NYT, 31 juillet, opinion, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extrait:
The world will soon know the full shape and scale of Israel’s response to Hezbollah for Saturday’s rocket attack on a Druze town in the Golan Heights, which killed 12 children. But it’s not too soon to ask what purpose the expected retaliation will serve in the context of Israel’s five wars.
Five wars? Yes. And they are more about ideas than they are about geography.
The first war — the war Israel is now waging against Hamas and its allies in Gaza and the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran itself — is about security. (…)
Israel’s most strident critics insist that the current conflict is about Palestinian existence, about Israel’s alleged refusal to grant a Palestinian homeland. But that’s a historically ignorant claim — and a dishonest one. Israel agreed to a Palestinian Authority in 1993, offered a Palestinian state in 2000 and vacated the Gaza Strip in 2005. When campus protesters at Princeton chanted, “We don’t want no two states, we want ’48,” they weren’t asking for Israel to accept a Palestinian state. They’re demanding Israel’s abolition.
The third war is metaphorical. It’s also dangerous and corrosive. It’s Israel’s war for the legitimacy of its actions, a war against the “yes but” thinking that now describes the middle ground of Western opinion on the conflict. That’s not a demand that people turn off their brains when it comes to judging Israel’s behavior. On the contrary, it’s a request that they turn their brains on.
To wit: How exactly do the people who say Israel has “the right to defend itself” propose that it do so against an enemy that entrenches itself beneath civilians in hundreds of miles of tunnels? (…)
The fourth war is global, ideological — and fundamental. It’s the war against antisemitism. Among the many toxic and defamatory charges leveled against Israel since Oct. 7 is that the war in Gaza has caused a surge in antisemitism, a sly way of charging the Jewish state with being the agent of anti-Jewish hate. (…)
Finally, there’s the war within the state of Israel and among the Jewish people worldwide. It’s a war that has been one of the most enduring, and often fatal, features of Jewish history. Its contours were visible during the fight over Israeli judicial reform before Oct. 7, and now in the lawlessness of right-wing Israeli mobs charging into Israeli army bases. It’s also a war between diaspora Jews who recognize that the assault on Israel is ultimately an assault on them, and the “As a Jew” Jews who provide moral cover and comfort to Israel’s enemies. Addressing these divisions is as central to Israel’s long-term security as confronting any other threat. (…)
Opinion | Israel’s Five Wars – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Hate Ismail Haniyeh, but don’t celebrate his death – opinion
Haniyeh’s death is not a cause for celebration or parades but rather a time for thanks and gratitude to God that evil has been rooted out and that innocents have been protected. (The Jerusalem Post, 31 juillet, opinion, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extrait:
Arch demon, Hamas terrorist leader, and billionaire thief from the Palestinian people, Ismail Haniyeh, has been assassinated. The Bible says, “When your enemy falls, do not rejoice.”
I feel no joy in this monster’s death – better he would never have been born. But I feel satisfaction that fewer innocent civilians will die now that he has been terminated.
Haniyeh came to thank Iran for its support. Now he’s on a spit in hell.
Israel almost certainly assassinated the terrorist chief of Hamas on Iranian soil, demonstrating the long arm of its justice and vengeance.
What a stupid and evil man Haniyeh was. He could have provided a bright future for the Palestinian people and his own family after Israel’s catastrophic withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. He could have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in international aid into schools, universities, and hospitals, giving his family and the Palestinian people a Singapore-like future.
Instead, he hated the Jews so much that he was consumed with killing every last one. And now, along with his wicked sons, he is roasting on a spit in hell, and his family and the innocent Palestinians, from whom this grifter stole billions, are living in a devastated wasteland ruined by Hamas terrorism.
What a fool. What a monster. The Palestinian people, especially, are so much better off with him under the ground. (…)
Even with Haniyeh’s killing, Jews should not rejoice – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Antisionisme : quand l’extrême gauche parle comme la propagande soviétique
Holocauste inversé, génocide, apartheid… Si l’URSS n’existe plus, les éléments de langage de ses théories du complot anti-Israël sont aujourd’hui partout à l’extrême gauche. (Le Point, 31 juillet, tribune, article payant)
Extrait:
L’idée qu’Israël commettrait un génocide à l’encontre des Palestiniens constitue l’un des plus vieux mensonges colportés sur ce pays. « Génocide à l’israélienne », « génocide sioniste », « solution finale à la question palestinienne ». On pourrait croire ces formules tirées d’une manifestation propalestinienne récente, mais non, elles nous viennent d’un pamphlet de l’époque soviétique. Ayant pour titre « Les sionistes profitent de la terreur », ce texte fut publié en 1984 par Novosti, un organe soviétique de propagande étrangère se faisant passer pour une agence de presse. Le but de cette brochure ? Promouvoir la vision soviétique d’Israël et du sionisme auprès d’un public anglophone.
Autant de lecteurs du monde entier à qui l’on voulait faire croire que les sionistes étaient d’horribles colonisateurs génocidaires et racistes, des serviteurs de l’impérialisme mondial usant de méthodes nazies pour réprimer la lutte anticoloniale de libération du peuple palestinien. Dans ses 76 pages, le texte recourt à des variations des mots génocide, terreur et racisme quelque 300 fois. Novosti nous fait aussi lire noir sur blanc, et sur une centaine d’occurrences, que les sionistes sont de perfides félons roulant pour la CIA, au MI6 et, bien sûr, le Mossad. Et quand les Juifs se disent victimes d’antisémitisme ? Rien d’autre que des artifices sionistes servant à détourner l’attention des crimes d’Israël.
Des calomnies qui vous seront sans doute familières si vous avez prêté l’oreille à la rhétorique ayant déferlé sur les milieux progressistes au lendemain du 7 octobre – jour où le Hamas allait prendre d’assaut les kibboutz du sud d’Israël pour y violer, torturer, massacrer et piller en masse. Est-ce que ce pamphlet de propagande soviétique vieux de quatre décennies parle le même langage que l’extrême gauche contemporaine ? Oui, tout à fait. Ou, pour être plus précis, c’est l’extrême gauche contemporaine qui parle le langage de la propagande soviétique. (…)
En décembre, dans le New Yorker, la journaliste et essayiste Masha Gessen exhortait l’Allemagne à sortir de « l’ombre de l’Holocauste » en se libérant des contraintes de la « culture mémorielle » et en faisant sauter le tabou interdisant d’assimiler Israël à l’Allemagne nazie. Selon Gessen, Gaza serait l’équivalent d’un ghetto juif nazi et ce qui se passe aujourd’hui dans la bande de Gaza, l’équivalent israélien de sa liquidation. En d’autres termes, un génocide.
À en juger par les échanges subséquents à son article, Gessen l’avait écrit persuadée que sa comparaison était jusqu’alors inédite. Pourtant, ce procédé rhétorique – il a même un nom : l’inversion de l’Holocauste – est vieux de plusieurs décennies. Son origine est soviétique et sa première utilisation, à des fins de propagande de masse, date des lendemains de la guerre israélo-arabe de 1967.
Nos progressistes n’ont plus du tout peur de ressembler à des nazis, comme ils ne se souviennent plus de qui a voté pour la création d’Israël – ni même que la naissance de ce pays a été votée par l’ONU. Dépourvus de conscience historique, ils sont des cibles faciles pour les manipulateurs contemporains qui les abreuvent d’agit-prop d’une force industrielle datant d’années passées.
Dans une vidéo de 1979, Georges Habache, fondateur du Front populaire de libération de la Palestine, groupe terroriste palestinien marxiste-léniniste soutenu par l’Union soviétique, reprend à son compte la propagande soviétique et affirme : « Notre véritable ennemi n’est pas seulement Israël et le sionisme. C’est l’impérialisme américain, qui soutient Israël parce qu’il est le garde du corps des intérêts impérialistes américains. » Un clip récemment réapparu de nulle part sur des comptes Twitter anonymes arborant une faucille, un marteau, un poing serré ou une rose rouge. Sans doute encore une coïncidence…
* Izabella Tabarovsky est historienne, spécialiste de l’antisionisme soviétique et de l’antisémitisme contemporain.
Antisionisme : quand l’extrême-gauche parle comme la propagande soviétique (lepoint.fr)
Hamas, Hezbollah et le long bras d’Israël
En tuant coup sur coup deux chefs terroristes, l’État hébreu enregistre deux succès bienvenus dans sa lutte contre l’Iran et ses affidés. (Le Point, 31 juillet, édito, article payant)
Extrait:
Il était temps. Après dix mois de guerre, Israël vient d’enregistrer deux succès notables dans la lutte à mort qu’il mène contre « l’axe de résistance », ce réseau de milices terroristes orchestré par l’Iran qui entend le rayer de la carte du monde. (…)
Côté israélien, ces liquidations viennent conforter politiquement le Premier ministre Benyamin Netanyahou, qui n’avait jusqu’ici que peu de succès probants à mettre à son actif depuis les massacres perpétrés par le Hamas le 7 octobre 2023 dans le sud d’Israël (1 200 morts, plus de 250 otages).
Cependant, elles marquent aussi un pas de plus vers la régionalisation d’un conflit en grande partie confiné depuis dix mois à la bande de Gaza. Les risques d’une escalade n’ont probablement jamais été aussi élevés qu’aujourd’hui, même s’ils restent incertains. (…)
Les moyens militaires du Hamas ont été réduits à leur plus simple expression, sous les coups portés par l’armée israélienne. En revanche, ceux du Hezbollah et de l’Iran, y compris via d’autres milices que ce dernier contrôle en Irak ou au Yémen, sont considérables.
L’Iran, en outre, n’est pas loin de se doter de la bombe atomique. (…)
Le patron de la sécurité intérieure d’Israël (Shin Beth), Ronen Bar, a prévenu après le 7 octobre que ses chefs seraient éliminés un par un, « à Gaza, en Cisjordanie, au Liban, en Turquie, au Qatar, partout dans le monde ». Leur liquidation ciblée n’est pas une panacée mais elle est une juste rétribution pour les massacres du 7 Octobre.
Hamas, Hezbollah et le long bras d’Israël (lepoint.fr)
Israel’s weakness exposed: Nasrallah murders Israeli children, and we do nothing – opinion
Israel has not yet responded. Hassan Nasrallah understands and smiles. And he is not alone (The Jerusalem Post, 30 juillet, tribune, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Excerpt:
It is 6:18 pm. Exactly 48 hours ago, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, murdered 12 Israeli children playing on the grass in a field near their home. Two days have passed, and nothing has happened.
“We’re working on it;” “The target bank is being updated;” “waiting for an opportunity to take down a senior official;” “Precision the targets.” So many excuses and the clock is ticking. In the Middle Eastern neighborhood, if you don’t respond with force and on time, you lose the remaining deterrence.
What will happen if you don’t respond strongly and on time? Nasrallah will understand, Iran will understand, the Druze will understand, Syria will understand, Recep Tayyip Erdogan will understand. And we will understand too.
Nasrallah understands that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, or what is left of it, is worthless. Children’s blood on this side of the border is abandoned. In the coming years, there will be no more normal civilian life south of the border because Israel is unable to protect its citizens or deter Hezbollah from harming them – Jews, Muslims, or Druze. Because Israel is incapable of anything. (…)
And we also understand. Slowly, with many tears and pain – but we understand. That our existence here was built on illusions and lies. And that the political and military establishment, which was supposed to ensure our existence and that of our children and grandchildren, has failed and caused failure. And if we don’t act quickly and replace everyone who needs to be replaced, in suits or uniforms – we are in real danger.
The writer is the editor-in-chief of Walla.
Is Israel weak in their response to Nasrallah? – opinion – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Politische Bücher
Israels Furcht und das Elend der Palästinenser (FAZ, 30 juillet, Buchkritik, article payant)
Excerpt:
(…)Und da sind wir bei der zweiten großen Frage: Ergeben sich neue Perspektiven durch den Gazakrieg? Shehadeh sagt, dass ihn angesichts des enormen Leidensdrucks bei den Menschen in Gaza die Tatsache der Eruption nicht überrascht habe, wohl aber die Dimension der israelischen Reaktion: Der 7. Oktober war ein so harter Schlag für Israel, dass er sich für die Menschen nur aushalten ließ, wenn man ihnen einen totalen Sieg, die totale Vernichtung des Feindes in Aussicht stellte. Entsprechend war dann auch das Vorgehen der israelischen Armee, dessen Auswirkungen Shehadeh im Einzelnen beschreibt und das auch wir zur Kenntnis nehmen können, das den Israelis aber weitgehend verborgen bleibt.
Dieses Vorgehen bringt immer schärfere globale Kritik an Israel mit sich, die zwar die israelische Führung vorläufig glaubt ignorieren zu können, die dem Land aber doch sehr schaden dürfte, denn es ist auf äußere Unterstützung existenziell angewiesen – in erster Linie auf die der USA, auf deren Haltung und mehr noch auf deren tatsächliches Verhalten daher sehr viel ankommt, von denen Shehadeh aber nichts Positives erwartet, wenn sie alleiniger Schiedsrichter bei künftigen Verhandlungen sein sollten.
Das Buch endet mit einem Anflug von Skepsis und Hoffnung gleichzeitig. Für die Palästinenser und Israelis, „die mit unerschütterlicher Gewissheit wissen, dass die einzige Zukunft der beiden Völker darin liegt, zusammenzuleben, mag die Zukunft trostlos erscheinen. Und doch, wenn man auf die Geschichte der Region zurückblickt, folgen hoffnungsvolle Konsequenzen nur nach großen Umwälzungen.“
Raja Shehadeh: What Does Israel Fear from Palestine?Profile Books, London 2024. 128 S., 7,99 £.
Israels Furcht und das Elend der Palästinenser (faz.net)
Israels Besatzung: Die Richter werden der Wirklichkeit nicht gerecht
In aller Deutlichkeit hat das höchste Gericht der Vereinten Nationen die israelische Besatzung im Westjordanland verurteilt. Das ist Wasser auf die Mühlen der Scharfmacher (FAZ, 29 juillet, tribune, entretien, chronique, article payant)
Excerpt:
(…) Dieses Mal bezeichnen die Richter die gesamte Siedlungspolitik als das, was sie ist: die gewaltsame Aneignung von Land, eine faktische Annexion. Israel verstoße damit gegen gleich zwei Grundsätze des Völkerrechts: das Annexionsverbot, das es untersagt, sein Territorium gewaltsam zu erweitern, und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker, das es den Palästinensern dauerhaft vorenthält. Bis zu diesem Punkt wird die Eindeutigkeit des Gutachtens der Wirklichkeit in Nahost gerecht.
Doch es ist nicht der letzte Schritt, den die Richter gehen. Weil Israel seine Position als Besatzungsmacht missbrauche, um das Völkerrecht zu brechen und die Palästinenser zu entrechten, werde die Besatzung insgesamt unrechtmäßig, befinden sie mit elf zu vier Stimmen. Von Israels Sicherheitsinteressen, seinem Recht auf Selbstverteidigung und der Gefahr einer Machtübernahme durch die Hamas ist praktisch keine Rede.
Juristisch lässt sich diese Ansicht gut belegen. Es ist ein alter und allseits anerkannter Grundsatz, dass ein Recht verwirkt, wer es missbräuchlich verwendet. Überträgt man das Prinzip aber auf die Wirklichkeit im Nahen Osten, bedeutet es, dass Israel sein Recht auf Selbstverteidigung mit Blick auf palästinensisches Gebiet kaum noch ausüben kann. Die Unwucht zeigt sich schon darin, dass der Gerichtshof selbst einst zum Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen feststellte, welch hohen Rang das Recht und die Pflicht eines Staates haben, seine Bürger zu schützen.
Drei der Richter, die gegen die Mehrheit stimmten, legen in ihrer abweichenden Meinung den Finger in die dogmatische Wunde: Die Frage, ob eine Gewaltanwendung erlaubt ist (das ius ad bellum), wird im Völkerrecht getrennt von der Frage, wie sie ausgeübt wird (ius in bello). Das Gutachten bleibe eine Erklärung schuldig, wie man von der (berechtigten) Erkenntnis, dass die Annexionspolitik der Besatzungsmacht illegal sei, zu dem Punkt komme, dass die Besatzung an sich illegal werde. „Fair“ wäre es gewesen wäre, schreiben die drei Richter, hätte man anerkannt, dass Israel Gefahren gegenüberstehe, die einen bestimmten Grad an Kontrolle über das besetzte Gebiet weiter rechtfertigen. (…)
IGH-Gutachten zum Westjordanland: Die Richter werden der Wirklichkeit nicht gerecht (faz.net)
One big step closer : Israeli retaliation in Lebanon seems inevitable
But it still wants to avoid all-out war against Hizbullah (The Economist, 29 juillet, article payant)
Excerpt:
FOR ALMOST ten months Israel and Hizbullah, a Lebanese Shia militia and political party, have stuck to unwritten rules in their low-intensity war. Both sides know their foe has fearsome firepower and so have tried to limit their strikes. They have aimed either for military targets or for evacuated border towns from which an estimated 150,000 civilians have fled.
On July 27th those rules were shattered. A rocket hit a football pitch in the town of Majdal Shams on the Golan Heights, killing 12 children and wounding dozens of others. It was the deadliest attack on Israel-controlled territory since October 7th, when Hamas, a Palestinian militant group, massacred some 1,200 people. (…)
The strike on Majdal Shams has increased pressure on Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, to act decisively against Hizbullah. He had hoped to bask, at least for a few days, in the speech he gave to America’s Congress on July 24th. Instead he was forced to cut short his American trip.
Israeli officials have promised a harsh response: “The citizens of Lebanon have become the hostages of Hizbullah and now will have to pay for [Hassan] Nasrallah’s reckless actions,” says one security official, referring to the leader of Hizbullah. But that response may not come immediately.
Military planners are still anxious not to be dragged into an all-out war while they are also fighting in Gaza. (…)
The bloodshed in Israel’s north could also affect the situation in Gaza. In recent weeks both Israeli and American officials have predicted a breakthrough in talks with Hamas. They hope for an agreement that would start with a temporary truce, and the release of some Israeli hostages held in Gaza, which could then lead to further talks about a lasting ceasefire.
Negotiators worry that escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese border could divert efforts from those talks. But it could also do the opposite: the desire to avoid war in Lebanon could incentivise Israel to go for a deal with Hamas. Hizbullah is unlikely to stop shooting at Israel until there is a pause in the disastrous war in Gaza. Increasingly, Israel’s only alternative to a ceasefire looks like war on multiple fronts.■
Israeli retaliation in Lebanon seems inevitable (economist.com)
Massacre d’enfants : le Hezbollah, il résiste à quoi au juste ?
On ne vous a rien dit du massacre d’enfants israéliens par le Hezbollah ce week-end ? Pas de panique : vous saurez tout de la « réponse disproportionnée » qui lui sera apportée (Atlantico, 29 juillet, entretien, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Excerpt:
Les cadavres des douze enfants massacrés par le Hezbollah dans le nord d’Israel sont encore chauds mais Jérôme Legavre, député LFI de Seine-Saint-Denis, s’inquiète déjà de la réplique vraisemblablement disproportionnée que ne manquera pas d’apporter Tsahal aux bombardements de ce week-end.
Ça vaut le coup d’être signalé parce qu’il est bien le seul chez les Insoumis, du moins à l’heure où j’écris ces lignes, à avoir vu passer l’info. Et pour cause : le reste du gang est encore occupé à faire l’exégèse du retour à Dieu de Mélenchon et de sa bienveillance toute fraîche à l’égard de l’Ancien régime…
D’un autre côté, les médias n’en ont pas beaucoup parlé non plus, de cette nouvelle fantaisie du groupe terroriste iranien qui colonise le sud du Liban depuis quarante ans. Une brève par-ci, une dépêche par-là… Quand la « une » d’un quotidien n’a que cinq colonnes, et qu’il faut déjà en consacrer quatre aux terribles bacchanales naturistes de Philippe Katerine, il ne reste plus beaucoup de place pour l’anecdotique…
En plus, les gosses tués sont des Druzes et il faudrait commencer par expliquer ce que c’est, un Druze. Pas vraiment des Arabes mais presque, pas vraiment des musulmans mais pas loin, pas des juifs non plus, mais des patriotes Israéliens pure laine néanmoins… Ça perturberait la narration destinée aux manichéens qui viennent tout juste d’apprendre pour quelle mer et quel fleuve ils manifestent depuis le 7 octobre…
Mais bon, ce Legavre en parle, c’est toujours ça de pris, mais c’est surtout pour expliquer qu’Israël s’en servira certainement sournoisement comme prétexte « justifiant » sa réponse militaire. Les salopards ! Ils s’apprêteraient donc à réagir par la force à une énième attaque venue d’un pays complètement étranger au conflit israélo-palestinien, avec lequel ils n’ont pas le moindre conflit territorial, au motif dérisoire que des roquettes seraient venues interrompre un obscur tournoi de foot de poussins…
Et pourquoi pas une réplique aux drones qui viennent frapper le centre de Tel-Aviv depuis le Yemen, 2 000 kilomètres plus au sud, si on va par là…
Bah, qu’importe : Israël répliquera effectivement ; le Hezbollah ayant à peu près la même pratique « bouclière » que ses cousins du Hamas, il y aura sans doute des victimes chez des civils libanais qui n’en peuvent mais ; Rima Hassan et Thomas Portes prendront le relais de Jérôme Lagarve et, là, don’t worry, vous serez tenu au courant minute par minute…
Massacre d’enfants : le Hezbollah, il résiste à quoi au juste ? | Atlantico.fr
Jaw-jaw and war-war : Bibi Netanyahu offered spectacle over substance in America
His fourth address to Congress was historic, but held few answers for Israelis (The Economist, 26 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Mr Netanyahu used every rhetorical flourish, assuring an adoring audience that Israel and America were at war together and would win together. He told rousing tales of the bravery of Israeli soldiers on October 7th, but failed to mention how his army had been caught unawares. He supplied harrowing details of the atrocities carried out by Hamas, the group responsible for the massacres, but dismissed the tens of thousands of Palestinians killed since, contentiously insisting that the war had seen “one of the lowest ratios of combatants to non-combatants’ casualties in the history of urban warfare”. (…)
The address lacked policy details or a strategy, beyond “total victory”. Mr Netanyahu said that after the war Gaza would need to be “demilitarised and deradicalised” and governed by “a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not want to destroy Israel”. He gave no hint as to how to achieve that. Relatives of some hostages were brought along as props; others protested in the gallery. There were all also large pro-Palestinian demonstrations outside Congress.
Mr Netanyahu’s flamboyant oratory is unlikely to change Mr Biden’s foreign policy in the few months he has left as president. (…)
For the prime minister the spectacle was more important than any policy substance. Just before taking off, he reminded everyone he was going to speak to Congress for the fourth time. The mere fact that he is the first world leader to have done so, breaking a record set by Winston Churchill, is, to Mr Netanyahu, a demonstration of his standing as a statesman capable of conjuring up support from the world’s greatest power.
This has always been the basis of Mr Netanyahu’s appeal to Israeli voters; he launched his political career after a successful stint as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, during which he became a media star in America. To this day, it has also been the main criticism of him: that his capabilities as a leader do not match his gift of the gab. For Israel’s prime minister his address was a personal landmark. For its people it was just another speech. ■
Bibi Netanyahu offered spectacle over substance in America (economist.com)
A Gazan ‘Marshall Plan’: Israel must not only defeat Hamas but provide an alternative – opinion
Only independent nationhood can demonstrate to Palestinians that there is a better and more attractive alternative to Hamas (The Jerusalem Post, 24 juillet, tribune, article payant)
Voir Article du jour
To defeat the Hamas ‘idea’, there must be sovereignty for Gazans – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Ein palästinensischer Staat kann unter den heutigen Umständen nur ein gescheiterter Staat werden – wer sollte an einem solchen Gebilde Interesse haben?
Nach wie vor gibt es keinen Palästinenserstaat. Warum nicht? Weil die Mehrheit der Menschen in Gaza und im Westjordanland einen solchen gar nicht wirklich will. Sie hätten ihn sonst längst gründen können, und wenn er in Frieden prosperieren würde, würde er auch anerkannt (NZZ, 22 juillet, tribune article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Entscheidend aber ist: Die Mehrheit dieser Menschen will keinen «Palästinenserstaat». Sie hätten ihn sonst, angesichts der weltweiten Unterstützung und der israelischen Kompromissbereitschaft, längst gründen können. Oder wenigstens die Grundlagen für einen solchen Staat geschaffen, die Wirtschaft, die Strukturen und Institutionen, die alltäglichen Einrichtungen des Zusammenlebens, auf denen Staatlichkeit basiert.
Nichts davon ist geschehen. Die israelische Besatzung der Gebiete sei schuld, behauptet die weltweite Anhängerschaft dieses Phantasiestaates, die «Okkupation» und die jüdischen Siedler. Aber in Gaza haben «Palästinenser» von 2005 bis 2023, volle achtzehn Jahre lang, ganz ohne israelische Truppen und Siedler gelebt und dennoch keinerlei Anstalten zu einer Staatsgründung oder deren Vorbereitung getroffen. (…)
Die von der Uno verlangte Koexistenz mit einem jüdischen Staat ist einer der Gründe, aus dem heraus religiös-fundamentalistische «Palästinenser» keinen eigenen Staat nach dem Muster der Uno wollen: Sie müssten dann mit einem Teil des Gebietes vorliebnehmen, das ihnen nach ihrer Ansicht ganz gehört: «From the river to the sea . . .» (…)
Zahlreiche «Palästinenser» lehnen einen «Palästinenserstaat» aus einem anderen Grund ab: weil er korrupt und ineffizient wäre. Sie würden lieber als vollberechtigte Staatsbürger im Staat Israel leben, auf dessen Zahlungsfähigkeit, Humanität und Rechtsstaatlichkeit sie sich verlassen könnten, als in der korrupten Vetternwirtschaft des «Präsidenten» Mahmoud Abbas oder einer ähnlichen Marionette. (…)
Die Frage ist, warum gewisse europäische Regierungen darauf bestehen, einen weiteren Staat dieser Art zu gründen. In diesem Fall aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach einen Terrorstaat nach dem Muster des Hamas-Regimes in Gaza, das nicht nur die eigene Bevölkerung in Armut, Unterdrückung und Unwissenheit hält und die internationalen Hilfsgelder in Raketenbau und weltweite Terroraktivitäten investiert, sondern ausserdem zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt einen neuen regionalen Krieg auslöst. Wozu soll ein solcher Staat nutzen, wenn von ihm nicht Frieden ausgeht?
Chaim Noll, geboren 1954 in Berlin, wanderte 1995 mit seiner Familie nach Israel aus. Er unterrichtete an der Ben-Gurion-Universität in Beer Sheva und verfasste zahlreiche Bücher.
Ohne Nutzen: ein palästinensischer Staat kann nur ein gescheiterter Staat werden (nzz.ch)
After Hamas is gone, how will Israel deradicalize Palestinians in Gaza? – opinion
Most Gazans approve of Hamas’s decision to launch the war on October 7 and would prefer Hamas rule over the US-backed Palestinian Authority (The Jerusalem Post, 22 juillet, opinion, article payant)
Extraits :
In June, Fadi al-Wadiya, a physiotherapist from Doctors Without Borders, was killed in an Israeli strike in Gaza. Doctors Without Borders quickly took to social media, condemning the “abhorrent” attack in multiple languages in a post that received millions of views and thousands of shares.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) responded by publishing photographic evidence that al-Wadiya was an operative in the missile program of the terrorist group Islamic Jihad in Gaza and therefore, a legitimate target. He was a physiotherapist, but he was also a terrorist.
Upon returning from a trip to the region last month, we have been struck by the inclination among Americans to assume that Hamas represents only a narrow slice of Gaza’s population. Many seem unaware, at best — or purposely ignoring, at worst — of the extent to which Hamas has its tentacles entrenched into Gazan society. That is why a sustainable peace will depend on the creation of a deradicalization campaign that helps to erode Hamas’s base of support.
Palestinian polling from June suggests that the majority of Gazans are still satisfied with Hamas and that the level of satisfaction has gradually increased since last year. Similarly, most Gazans approve of Hamas’s decision to launch the war on October 7 and would prefer Hamas rule over the US-backed Palestinian Authority (PA). Shortly after the Hamas massacre, videos surfaced of Gazan residents cheering at the sight of wounded or dead Israeli hostages arriving on trucks and motorbikes. (…)
Frighteningly, Hamas’s tools for indoctrinating children parallel scenes from Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust memorial, which features books and games from early 1930s Germany similarly teaching kids to hate Jews. One Israeli speaker told us that the Germans didn’t stop hating Jews after World War II out of the goodness of their hearts. Rather, occupying Allied personnel forced de-nazification upon them. (…)
Gaza needs a smart and purposeful investment and a radical deradicalization agenda.
If Germans moving past their hatred in the 1940s was hard, what needs to happen in Gaza may be tougher – but not impossible.IDF can deal with Hamas, but what of Palestinian Islamist extremism? – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Gaza could become “Mogadishu on the Med”
Even if there is a ceasefire, its prospects are grim » (The Economist, 21 juillet, Leader, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) A ceasefire would be welcome. It could allow the release of Hamas’s surviving hostages in return for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. It would allow a flood of aid and a de-escalation on Israel’s northern border, where the Israel Defence Forces (idf) and Hizbullah, a militia which like Hamas is backed by Iran, are engaged in tit-for-tat strikes that could turn into a war. Yet there should be no illusions about the vacuum in Gaza. Its 2.2m people live in a devastated, lawless hellscape, without a reliable supply of food or water. The idf directly controls perhaps a quarter of the territory. Elsewhere gangs and criminals roam, along with the rump of Hamas.
Many of the platitudes about Gaza are bunk. It is common to say that the Palestinian Authority (pa) in the West Bank could become Gaza’s governing body. Our interview with Mohammad Mustafa, the pa’s prime minister, shows it has plans to administer and provide security for the exclave. Yet the pa’s finances are shot, partly because Israel is withholding tax revenues owed to it, and any pa security force would be unwilling to confront Hamas. Similarly, it is often said that Arab governments could step in. The Gulf states are willing to provide cash, and Jordan could train security forces. But they are unlikely to put boots on the ground, for obvious reasons: an Arab force could face a guerrilla war with Hamas and would be viewed by most Arabs as being complicit with Israel. On the present trajectory, two grimmer scenarios are likely. One is anarchy, with crooks, warlords and Hamas competing for turf, and the idf controlling the border and transport arteries while conducting periodic strikes. The other is a gradual re-occupation of parts of Gaza, with the idf steadily being sucked in, hoping to buttress Israel’s security. Israel’s far right might then seek to re-establish settlements. In both cases there would be little hope for Gazans and none of the predictability that reconstruction requires. (…)
Releasing funds to the pa would strengthen its capacity to administer parts of Gaza. Opening a path to talks on a two-state solution would foster long-term bipartisan support for Israel in America. It would also make it easier, politically, for Arab states to support the pa in Gaza and for the pa to co-operate with the idf to contain and deter what remains of Hamas. Repairing Arab-Israeli relations would allow deeper defence co-operation between America, the Gulf states and Israel, which would help counter Iran. The day after in Gaza is going to be hellish. Magical thinking won’t help. ■
Gaza could become “Mogadishu on the Med” (economist.com)
Tightrope over Gaza : Jordan’s Islamists have been boosted by the war in Gaza
The king is caught between his country’s peace with Israel and his angry people (The Economist, 17 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Islamists have long been entrenched in Jordan under the aegis of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is a branch. Opinion polls conducted a month after Hamas’s attack on October 7th (and Israel’s retaliation) suggested that 66% of Jordanians approved of the group’s actions.
King Hussein had a stick-and-carrot approach to the Brotherhood, sometimes co-opting it as an ally against communism; in the 1990s he asked it to join a national-unity government. King Abdullah has been less keen to co-operate with it, though he has never outlawed it: in parliament it sits as the Islamic Action Front. However, he long ago kicked Hamas’s leadership out of Jordan for interfering in domestic affairs.
(…) the war in Gaza has reunified the movement. The streets near the Israeli embassy have become a battleground between demonstrators and the security forces. Almost every night crowds chant the names of Yayha Sinwar and Muhammad Deif, the Hamas leaders in Gaza.
The king’s government has tried to outflank the Islamists. Ayman Safadi, the foreign minister, has repeatedly denounced Israel’s campaign as genocide. Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian origin, has castigated it on television. Jordan has taken a lead in trying to send aid to Gaza.
For many Jordanians this is not enough. “There is a genuine feeling that the country is selling out the Palestinians,” says a Western ambassador. Islamists prominent in the demonstrations have been stoking anger against Jordan’s intelligence services and even against the monarchy. Some Islamists in Jordan have called for Hamas’s external headquarters to be relocated to Jordan if it is kicked out of Qatar. (…)Since March the regime has got tougher against the demonstrators, beating many of them up, arresting dozens and accusing them of getting foreign help, including from Iran, to topple the monarchy.
Israel has not helped by airing reports that Jordan helped defend it in April from a barrage of missiles and drones launched by Iran. Social-media reports that King Abdullah’s daughter, a fighter pilot, took part in downing some of the drones were rife. In the eyes of Jordan’s Islamists, that was another royal betrayal. ■
Jordan’s Islamists have been boosted by the war in Gaza (economist.com)
Friend in need is a friend indeed: Vance’s Israel support is most welcome – editorial
Without taking sides in the US election, we welcome Vance’s nomination, thank him for supporting Israel in its war against terror, and wish him well (The Jerusalem Post, 17 juillet, édito, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits :
(…) In a speech at the Quincy Institute in Washington in May, Vance made a point of distinguishing between US funding for Ukraine and support for Israel. “It’s sort of weird that this town assumes that Israel and Ukraine are the same,” he said. “They’re not, of course, and I think it’s important to analyze them in separate buckets.”
Explaining that “a big part of the reason why Americans care about Israel is that we are still the largest Christian-majority country in the world,” he said, adding that, “The idea that there is ever going to be an American foreign policy that doesn’t care a lot about that slice of the world is preposterous.”
Without taking sides in the US election, we welcome Vance’s nomination, thank him for supporting Israel in its war against terror, and wish him well.
Vance, outspoken about antisemitism, Israel, is a good running mate – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
With victory starting to slip away, Deif strike comes at worst time for Sinwar
Hamas’s Gaza leader was sure he was winning as the world piled on Israel and the IDF spun its wheels; now, even if his main co-conspirator survived, the momentum has shifted (The Times of Israel, 16 juillet, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits :
(…) Even if Deif turns out to have escaped again, the fact that Israel knew exactly where he was and determined that bombing the compound was legitimate — even with civilians in the area, because of the essential military value of the targets — should give Sinwar further reason to worry about his own fate. Netanyahu and Israel’s war leadership continue to promise they will reach him, and Israel’s intelligence on Gaza is only improving the more its soldiers map out tunnels and interrogate captured Hamas fighters.
Notably, after Saturday’s strike, while characteristically denouncing Israel for the deaths of civilians, Hamas’s officials were still quick to deny rumors that it was pulling out of hostage talks — indicating that it sees a deal as more pressing than in the past.
If Sinwar is indeed feeling the walls closing in and ultimately agrees to release hostages, it will be at least a partial vindication of Netanyahu’s oft-mocked war strategy. He has insisted throughout that Israel will reach Hamas’s leaders, and that only the combination of military pressure and diplomacy can bring hostages home.
With victory starting to slip away, Deif strike comes at worst time for Sinwar | The Times of Israel
Finding the balance: What Jewish law teaches us about avoiding political extremes? – opinion
The liberals are cursing the conservatives; the conservatives are cursing the liberals. Accusations from friends and congregants alike, seeing only the other at fault, blind to our own shortcomings (The Jerusalem Post, 15 juillet, tribune, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Jewish people must be balanced with politics – opinion – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Dance of death : A history of Hamas dispenses with some pervasive myths
But it does not offer much hope for the future (The Economist, 13 juillet, Book Review, article payant)
Extraits :
Hamas: The Quest for Power. By Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell. Polity; 340 pages; $79.95 and £60
(…) Hamas, which means “zeal” and is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, emerged as a political force in the late 1980s. The authors’ close-up portrait of the group dispenses with some myths. No, Hamas is not simply a puppet of Iran, even though the Sunni Muslim group relies on the Shia Islamic Republic for some of its arms and funding.
The authors also explore in detail the question of Hamas’s antisemitism and find greater nuance than many may expect. The group’s more sophisticated leaders have sought to distance Hamas from the baldly Jew-hating language of its original charter, an effort revealed in the much milder revised version released in 2017. Though Israelis may not believe it, what attracts many Palestinians to Hamas is its rhetoric about land and waging war against their enemy more than differences of faith, the authors contend. (…)
In a recent poll 67% of Palestinians said that Hamas’s attack on October 7th was a “correct” move, even after months of Israeli bombardment. Meanwhile, a survey in May by Pew Research Centre, a think-tank, found that 73% of Israeli Jews think that the country’s military response in Gaza has been “about right” or “not gone far enough”. So the cycle goes on.
The authors offer two lessons. One is that no matter how much of Hamas’s military capacity Israel obliterates, it will not be able to destroy the group’s ability to act as a spoiler. The other message is that only a political path, leading to an end of Israeli rule over millions of unhappy Palestinians, can hobble Hamas. ■
A history of Hamas dispenses with some pervasive myths (economist.com)
The flow of aid : Why food is piling up on the edge of Gaza
Thousands of tonnes of food and medicine are still waiting to get in (The Economist, 13 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
Judging by the amount of aid that has arrived at the Egyptian side of the border with Gaza, the embattled Palestinians should be well catered for. Canvas warehouses rise out of the desert, piled high with blankets and tents. Depots are packed with medicines and sanitary kits. Lorries loaded with food line the roadsides in their thousands. And a floating hospital with 100 beds, courtesy of the United Arab Emirates, is docked at a nearby Egyptian port.
Yet all of this stuff, worth millions of dollars, waits in vain. Since early May, when Israel launched its assault on Rafah, Gaza’s last city still standing, it has controlled the crossing to Egypt and kept traffic through it to a bare minimum (see chart). “They’re women and children who are dying and we can’t get to them,” says a doctor on the hospital ship. “We’re just watching.” (…)
Israel argues other factors are to blame. un agencies fight turf wars and wrangle over contracts, causing bottlenecks. Looters run riot as prices soar and shortages grow. Hamas nabs aid convoys, feeding its own fighters first. Many aid workers refuse to travel except in armoured vehicles because 197 un people have been killed since October. The security wall Egypt has put up makes the crossing almost impenetrable. Israel also says that the un does not count all aid entering Gaza because it does not have people at all crossings.
Though Israel says it has wound down its military operation in Rafah, it keeps the gate on the southern border shut. Aid workers say this is to squeeze Hamas into agreeing to the terms of a ceasefire. “They won’t open Rafah until they get back the hostages,” says the same Gulf official at the crossing.■
Why food is piling up on the edge of Gaza (economist.com)
The reformists return : A reformer wanting a nuclear deal with America wins Iran’s election (The Economist, 8 juillet, article payant)
Voters turned their backs on hardliners for Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist candidate
Extraits :
(…) Mr Pezeshkian says, too, that he hopes to ease sanctions by reviving the nuclear deal that Iran reached with America and other global powers in 2015, and which the Trump administration then abandoned in favour of “maximum pressure” on Iran three years later. He has recruited prominent advocates of a new deal to his side. In recent weeks, Javad Zarif, Iran’s former foreign minister and chief negotiator, acted as his campaign manager. But Mr Khamenei will probably shy away from negotiating a deal with an outgoing American administration that an incoming Trump presidency might again overturn.
With so few levers to pull, Mr Pezeshkian will struggle to meet popular expectations. The ongoing tussle between regime power and people power will dog his term. He might, though, have one saving strength. Iranians have at best given Mr Pezeshkian the benefit of the doubt. To keep his people at bay, Mr Khamenei needs his president almost as much as his president needs him. “If Pezeshkian can’t open Iran’s cage,” says a farm manager who voted for him on the outskirts of Tehran, “their little window of hope will be closed forever.” ■
A reformer wanting a nuclear deal with America wins Iran’s election (economist.com)
The northern front : The next terrifying war: Israel v Hizbullah (The Economist, 5 juillet, article payant)
It would feature kamikaze drones, mass blackouts and the largest missile barrage in history
Extraits :
(…) Iran wants to avoid a direct clash with America or Israel. It would almost certainly encourage drone and missile attacks by proxy forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Israeli assessments also suggest that Iran might intervene directly, probably through long-range missile strikes, if Israel were to target Hizbullah’s leadership.
The point of any war for Israel would ultimately be to remove the sense of dread hanging over northern Israel that is preventing citizens from returning. After Hamas’s attacks of October 7th Israel cannot tolerate the notion of such a threat on its borders. But Israeli experts are sceptical that this is presently achievable at acceptable cost. The army is tired from Gaza and needs at least six months to prepare for another war and to let its political leaders repair their ties with America and other allies, says a veteran Mossad bigwig. That is one reason why he, like so many other ex-spooks and generals, wants a deal.
The idf could create a 10km buffer zone in Lebanon, suggests Tamir Hayman, a recent Israeli military-intelligence chief. But the result would be an exhausting war of attrition, much like the one it waged through the 1990s. “If you want to create a change, you need to destroy all of [Hizbullah’s] system,” he says. “And right now I think it cannot be achieved.”
The next terrifying war: Israel v Hizbullah (economist.com)
Mosab Hassan Youssef, fils d’un fondateur du Hamas, au Figaro: «Si le projet du Hamas réussit, la région retournera au Moyen Âge» (Le Figaro, entretien, 3 juillet, article payant)
Proche d’Israël, ce architecte de 46 ans dénonce la tyrannie du mouvement terroriste palestinien
Né à Ramallah, Mosab Hassan Youssef, qui vit aux États-Unis, en Californie, depuis 2007, est aussi l’un des principaux contempteurs du Hamas. Il s’est d’abord rapproché d’Israël en devenant, en prison, un informateur du Shin Beth, le service de renseignement intérieur de l’État hébreu. Il a reçu le titre de « prince vert » pour avoir aidé Israël à déjouer de nombreux attentats terroristes pendant la Seconde Intifada, dans les années 2000. Âgé de 46 ans, architecte, il est resté proche d’Israël, s’est éloigné de l’islam et s’est rapproché de la foi chrétienne. Au lendemain du 7 octobre, il s’est rendu sur les lieux du pogrom en Israël et milite depuis pour une éradication du mouvement terroriste à Gaza. Il appelle aussi Israël et l’Europe à lutter contre le djihad et l’islamisme.
Qu’avez-vous ressenti le 7 octobre pendant les attentats du Hamas ?
Mosab HASSAN YOUSSEF. – J’ai été surpris par l’ampleur de l’attaque. Le pogrom du 7 octobre donne une idée de ce qu’il peut se passer ailleurs si les groupes terroristes comme le Hamas obtiennent davantage de pouvoir dans la région. L’utilisation des boucliers humains, le sacrifice des civils est la principale arme du Hamas. Je pense que si le mouvement disposait de l’arme nucléaire, il l’utiliserait contre Israël. Même chose pour l’Iran.
Quels sont les objectifs du Hamas ?
Son but principal est la destruction d’Israël, et de façon plus générale la destruction de tous ceux qui ne sont pas d’accord avec la vision islamiste de ses dirigeants. Le Hamas est une organisation totalitaire qui ne peut accepter la diversité et les opinions divergentes et n’est mû que par la violence. Si son projet réussit, la région replongera dans le Moyen Âge pour très longtemps. Il faut prendre au sérieux les menaces contre Israël, car le but du régime islamiste et de ses affidés dans la région est de détruire la civilisation occidentale.
Est-il possible d’annihiler le Hamas, comme le prétend Benyamin Netanyahou ?
Oui et c’est ce qu’Israël est en train de faire en détruisant peu à peu les infrastructures du mouvement. C’était une erreur d’avoir laissé le Hamas se développer et se présenter comme un mouvement de résistance. La seule solution aujourd’hui est de chasser le Hamas du pouvoir et de prouver aux Palestiniens à quel point ce mouvement était dans l’erreur. Il faut le faire par la force.
Mais peut-on tuer une idéologie ?
Oui, si on agit comme on l’a fait avec le nazisme. Comme le nazisme, le Hamas véhicule une idéologie totalitaire, qui regroupe tous ses partisans sous la bannière d’Allah. Comme le nazisme, l’idéologie du Hamas est une idée folle qui veut dominer tout le monde. Il faut la détruire. On peut déconstruire cette idéologie en éliminant les sources du mal, en coupant l’arbre à la racine, afin de la réduire à son strict minimum. Cela prendra du temps, mais c’est possible. Il faut mettre en place une politique de déradicalisation. Il faut abattre les têtes du Hamas, arracher la tête du serpent, celui qui a commis un massacre de masse le 7 octobre. Je pense que l’exécution des dirigeants du Hamas est une punition adéquate. (…)
👍BRET STEPHENS: What Would a Better Israeli Prime Minister Do? (NYT, 3 juillet, opinion, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits :
A better Israeli prime minister than Benjamin Netanyahu would immediately hold an election. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would declare the following policy on a Palestinian state: Israel’s government will work toward one that looks like Costa Rica or the United Arab Emirates. It will oppose and obstruct one that is likely to look like Yemen or Afghanistan. If the character of a Palestinian state would be moderate, not militant, committed to the prosperity of its people, not to the destruction of its neighbors, then the likelihood of its creation would be far greater. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would create long-term safe zones within Gaza — at least while Israel remains in the territory — for women, children, the elderly and the sick. These would be monitored and financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development and its European counterparts, open to foreign journalists, and well provided with food, shelter and medicine. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would offer a postwar vision for Gaza: No Israeli occupation of any part of the territory in exchange for a 10-year Arab mandate for Gaza. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would offer safe passage out of Gaza to Qatar for all Hamas fighters and leaders in exchange for the release of all remaining Israeli hostages, living and dead. Yahya Sinwar and the other masterminds of Oct. 7 can be brought to justice later. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would set a clear deadline for the full implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701 of 2006, which requires Hezbollah to retreat behind the Litani River, several miles north of Lebanon’s border with Israel. (…)
A better Israeli prime minister would articulate the real stakes in this war — not a war of Israel against Hamas, but a multifront campaign against an “Axis of Resistance” that includes not just Hezbollah and the Houthis but also their masters in Iran and its allies in Russia, Syria, China and North Korea. In other words, the fighting we see in Gaza isn’t a regional war between Jews against Muslims. It’s a battle in a long global struggle between the free and unfree worlds.
A better Israeli prime minister would do this and more. Israel’s crises will abate when it gets one.
Opinion | What Would a Better Israeli Prime Minister Do? – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
The northern front : The next terrifying war: Israel v Hizbullah (The Economist, 3 juillet, article payant)
It would feature kamikaze drones, mass blackouts and the largest missile barrage in history
Extraits :
A war is looming in Lebanon. For months, Israel and Hizbullah have traded drones, rockets and missiles (see charts). Northern Israel has been blasted and depopulated: 70,000 people have been displaced. More have left southern Lebanon. Several countries including America are telling their citizens to leave Lebanon. Israel’s leaders talk of war as though it is inevitable. It would be the most intense conflict in the region in decades—a calamity for Israel and a disaster for Lebanon.
There are still ways out. American and European diplomats continue to shuttle between Israel and Lebanon, hoping, with less and less optimism, to persuade Hizbullah to withdraw 7-10km away from the border. On July 2nd the group said it would stop firing if there was a ceasefire in Gaza. Even then, the result would be a tenuous peace at best, with the threat of cross-border raids by Hizbullah on Israel dissuading many Israelis from returning. (…)
The point of any Israeli war would ultimately be to remove the sense of dread hanging over northern Israel which is preventing citizens from returning. After Hamas’s attacks of October 7th Israel cannot tolerate the notion of such a threat on its borders. But Israeli experts are sceptical that this is presently achievable at acceptable cost. The army is tired from Gaza and needs at least six months to prepare for another war and to allow its political leaders to repair ties with America and other allies, says a veteran Mossad bigwig—one reason why he, like so many other ex-spooks and generals, wants a deal.
The idf could create a 10km buffer zone in Lebanon, suggests Tamir Hayman, a recent Israeli military intelligence chief, but the result would be an exhausting war of attrition, much like the one it waged through the 1990s. “If you want to create a change, you need to destroy all of [Hizbullah’s] system,” he says. “And right now I think it cannot be achieved.”
The next terrifying war: Israel v Hizbullah (economist.com)
‘Only two or three people know Sinwar’s whereabouts,’ say Hamas officials (The Jerusalem Post, reportage, 3 juillet, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
This restrained circle ensures Sinwar’s needs and his ability to communicate with the Hamas leadership in Qatar, the officials reportedly said.
Hamas officials speak of Yahya Sinwar’s close circle in Gaza – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Ein Israeli und ein Palästinenser wollen Versöhnung statt Rache: «Wir hätten allen Grund, uns zu töten. Aber wir umarmen uns» / Un Israélien et un Palestinien veulent la réconciliation plutôt que la vengeance: “Nous aurions toutes les raisons de nous tuer. Mais nous nous embrassons” (NZZ, interview, 1 juillet, article payant)
Der Israeli Maoz Inon hat am 7. Oktober seine Eltern verloren, der Palästinenser Aziz Abu-Sarah verlor seinen Bruder. Sie vergeben den Tätern und wollen Frieden. Warum gelingt ihnen, was andere nicht schaffen?
Extraits :
(…) AZIZ : Nous devons faire tomber les murs qui nous séparent, nous devons nous rencontrer et nous tendre la main.
C’est beau et bon. Mais très concrètement : vous êtes devenu un militant pour la paix, pas un extrémiste – où sont passés vos désirs de vengeance ?
AZIZ : J’ai appris l’hébreu. J’ai eu des professeurs juifs et j’ai commencé à mieux comprendre l’autre côté, qui m’avait été décrit auparavant comme hostile. Aujourd’hui, je suis guide touristique et activiste. J’essaie de jeter des ponts. Si un Israélien et un Palestinien comme Maoz et moi parvenons à nous serrer la main, alors tout le monde y parviendra. Nous aurions toutes les raisons du monde de nous haïr et de nous tuer – mais nous nous embrassons.
Et vos parents, Aziz, sont-ils aussi pour la paix ?
AZIZ : Entre-temps, oui. Mais cela leur a demandé un effort. Aujourd’hui, mon père vient aux manifestations pour la paix que j’organise. Une fois, il était assis dans le public lorsque tout le monde a été invité à poser des questions, même les plus désagréables. Il a alors levé la main et a voulu savoir si l’Holocauste avait vraiment existé. Mon sang s’est glacé dans mes veines, au début personne ne savait comment réagir. Mais ensuite, tout le monde a trouvé cela juste, car il abordait un tabou. Et nous avons réussi à le convaincre de la réalité historique. (…)
Krieg in Gaza: Ein Israeli und ein Palästinenser wollen Vergebung statt Rache (nzz.ch)
Are Gazan citizens who hold hostages a legitimate military target? (The Jerusalem Post, 28 juin, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Discourse on “involved” and “uninvolved” civilians in Gaza is alive in Israel. What makes civilians a legitimate target in war? The question requires clear definitions and practical implications
Extraits :
(…) In South Africa’s arguments against Israel at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, senior Israeli officials were quoted as saying that there are no uninvolved civilians in Gaza as inciting and encouraging genocide. When understanding the distinction between “involved” and legitimate targets, it is also clear that not every statement by politicians and public figures should be seen as encouraging genocide (unless that was indeed their intent, which is obviously illicit and dangerous).
The fighting in Gaza is complex, and the challenges facing the IDF in carrying out the mission are unprecedented. Our tendency to simplify the rules into a binary framework of “involved” and “uninvolved” citizens is understandable. However, it is important to understand that only the civilians who take a direct part in the fighting are legitimate targets for attack.
Israel’s dealings in the international arena, especially in the global legal arena, require one to be careful of inaccurate and sweeping statements that are much more harmful than helpful.
Israeli officials: ‘There are no uninvolved people in Gaza’ – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Is the American-built pier in Gaza useful or a fiasco? The Economist went there to find out (The Economist, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Israel blames Hamas for the delays. The group has repeatedly attacked the pier and Kerem Shalom, periodically halting aid deliveries from there. “The distribution problem is something hard to manage,” says Mr Hagari. “The international community has to make more of an effort.”
Aid workers say much the same about Israel. On June 25th the un warned that it would suspend its operations in Gaza unless the Israeli army co-ordinates more with them. Sending a convoy to pick up supplies involves many delays, often in areas with spotty communication and nearby fighting. “We’re going to ask for the green light to move that empty truck to a waypoint, and then wait for the green light to move to another waypoint,” says Matthew Hollingworth of the wfp. “Your 12-hour days have one hour of action.”
Many Palestinians are sceptical of the pier. On June 8th Israeli troops freed four hostages being held by Hamas a few kilometres away. A video filmed by an Israeli soldier showed them being brought to a helicopter near the pier and then evacuated from Gaza. It has fuelled conspiracy theories that America built the pier for military purposes rather than aid deliveries.
At Kerem Shalom, where aid has been piling up for weeks, Mr Hollingworth likens the stretch of highway leading away from the crossing to something out of a Mad Max film: “Any truck that goes is going to lose its wing mirrors, people will try to smash the windscreen, people will try to get in.” Much of the violence is the work of criminal gangs using aid lorries to smuggle cigarettes (which now cost up to $25 each) into the enclave. Neither the Israeli army nor Hamas provide security on the road.
The un insists that only a lasting truce will solve the humanitarian crisis. (…)
Is the American-built pier in Gaza useful or a fiasco? (economist.com)
Hamas stands firm against global pressure to accept hostage deal (The Jerusalem Post, 26 juin, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Hamas has reiterated its call for a full ceasefire, while Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met with US officials, including counterpart Lloyd Austin to discuss phases of the war
Extraits :
(…) US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller told reporters in Washington that Hamas had sent a written response to the deal several weeks ago. That response “rejected the proposal that had been put forward by Israel, [which] President Biden had outlined,” he said. (…)
Despite global pressure, Hamas stands firm against hostage deal – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
Unyielding reality: why an Islamic Middle East rejects Israel (The Jerusalem Post, tribune, 25 juin, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
In the Islamic Middle East, doctrinal antisemites have remained faithful to their most primal hatreds
Extraits :
In the Islamic Middle East, doctrinal antisemites have remained faithful to their most primal hatreds. Essentially, this is because the antisemite, individually and collectively, responds not to any authentic qualities of “The Jew” or the Jewish state, but to his own overwhelming fears and anxieties. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in Anti-Semite and Jew (1948): “If the Jew did not exist, the antisemite would invent him.” (…)
“The antisemite,” says Sartre, “is a man who is afraid, not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself, of his own consciousness, of his liberty, of his instincts, of his responsibilities, of solitariness, of change, of society, and of the world – of everything except the Jews.” (…)
WHEN PERICLES delivered his Funeral Oration and other speeches, with their elaborate praise of Athenian civilization, his perspective was largely military. Recorded by Thucydides, a historian whose main interest was to study the growth and use of power for military objectives, the speeches of Pericles express confidence in ultimate victory for Athens, but also express grave concern for self-imposed setbacks along the way: “What I fear more than the strategies of our enemies is our own mistakes.”
Though Pericles exaggerated the separateness of enemy strategies and Athenian mistakes (they were interrelated and even synergistic), there is an important lesson for Israel: In observing enemy preparations for war, do not forget that the effectiveness of these preparations will always depend upon Israel’s responses. (…)
At this late stage, Israel ought urgently to acknowledge that a larger and protracted war with Iran is all but inevitable, and that this war should be waged while Iran is still “pre-nuclear.” The single greatest danger to Israel lies in a nuclear Iran, an unprecedented prospect that will not “go away” on its own. The real survival task for Israel, therefore, is not war avoidance with Iran, but its opposite. This is the case whether or not Iran is presumed a rational enemy, and only while Iran is not yet nuclear.
Now, Israel’s leaders should finally understand that the existential enemy is not anti-Zionism (that is deflecting Islamist rhetoric), but antisemitism. For Israel, the true enemy sentiment is always an underlying hatred of “The Jew.” Though this hatred makes no intellectual sense and is based entirely on crudely manipulated fears, it remains the authentic adversarial reality with which Israel must capably engage.
Why Israel Faces Rejection in an Islamic Middle East – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
War in the Middle East : Israel’s northern border is ablaze (The Economist, 19 juin, article payant)
Can it fight Hamas and Hizbullah simultaneously?
Extraits :
(…) The consensus within Israel’s security establishment is that war with Hizbullah is inevitable. But increasingly the view among the generals is that it should not take place soon. Major General Yitzhak Gershon, who served recently as the second-in-command of the northern front, published an article on June 13th saying that although he had been in favour of attacking Hizbullah immediately on October 7th, he had since changed his mind.
“Israel should be headed to a diplomatic arrangement, not war, at this time,” he wrote, adding that its strategy over the past eight months had amounted to a “mad run with the head into a wall”. The country, he argued, needs a ceasefire in both Gaza and Lebanon to take stock, elect a new government and regroup. “After what happened with Hamas on October 7th, we’ve learned that we can’t allow our enemies to hold destructive capabilities on our borders,” says one veteran intelligence analyst. “But we should choose the timing [of any war] and not be dragged into it by Nasrallah.”
Israel’s northern border is ablaze (economist.com)
Poll: Who do Israeli Arabs think should govern in the Gaza Strip? (19 juin, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
A new poll shows that most Israeli Arabs feel Palestinians should run Gaza after the Israel-Hamas War ends, but are divided on which Palestinians (The Jerusalem Post)
Extraits :
Some 8.4% of Israeli Arabs feel that Israel should govern in the Gaza Strip after the Israel-Hamas war, while some 14.7% feel that Hamas should govern, a study by the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv university presented Wednesday found.
Respondents were asked about their opinions on what the day after the war should look like. When asked, “Who should assume responsibility for governing life in the Gaza Strip after the war?” some 58.5% felt that the Gaza Strip should be governed by Palestinians. (…)
Breaking down the preferences of these respondents: some 24.4% felt that the strip should be governed by local bodies from Gaza. Some 19.4% (the second highest proportion) felt that the Palestinian Authority should govern the Gaza Strip. With the 14.7% who believe that Hamas should govern, representing the smallest proportion of this group.
Some 34.4% of respondents felt that an external, non-Palestinian body should govern life in the Gaza Strip after the war. The preferred option for such a body, with 19.4% of respondents supporting this, is an international force. (…)
Benyamin Netanyahou au Figaro : «C’est une guerre de civilisation !» (19 juin)
Pour le premier ministre israélien, «il n’existe pas d’État palestinien» et Israël gardera le contrôle de la sécurité «du Jourdain à la mer» (Le Figaro, Interview)
Extraits :
Benyamin NETANYAHOU. – Nous avons accepté un cessez-le-feu provisoire, afin de libérer les otages. Le Hamas refuse de les relâcher, car il exige un cessez-le-feu permanent, qui laissera ces terroristes maîtres de Gaza et prêts à réitérer des massacres du type de celui du 7 octobre 2023 (…). Aucun gouvernement responsable ne l’accepterait. Tout le monde reconnaît aujourd’hui que c’est Sinwar (le chef militaire, NDLR) et les dirigeants du Hamas qui font obstacle à un accord. La guerre peut s’arrêter demain s’ils capitulent sans conditions et relâchent les otages. (…)
Les Israéliens veulent vivre en paix avec leurs voisins palestiniens. Mais malheureusement, au cours des cent dernières années, les Palestiniens ont été pris en otages par leurs dirigeants nationalistes, dont le seul objectif a toujours été la disparition de l’État juif, avant comme après sa création, en 1948. Le grand reporter Albert Londres, qui vint ici dans les années 1930, l’avait déjà remarqué. Il a écrit que la devise biblique affichée à la municipalité de Tel-Aviv était : « Nous construirons et reconstruirons », alors que les Arabes palestiniens étaient « en permanence incités à détruire et redétruire ». Malheureusement, c’est ce qui est arrivé au mouvement palestinien depuis cette époque. Il refuse de reconnaître au peuple juif le droit à un État, quelles qu’en soient les frontières.
Quelle est votre position sur la création d’un État palestinien ?
L’État juif d’Israël, avec ses citoyens non juifs dotés des mêmes droits, va continuer à survivre et à prospérer. En ce qui concerne les Palestiniens vivant dans les territoires contrôlés par eux, ils devront avoir tous les pouvoirs pour se gouverner eux-mêmes, mais aucun pour nous menacer. Cela signifie que, dans un avenir prévisible, Israël devra garder le contrôle de la sécurité, du Jourdain à la mer. Si nous abandonnions notre contrôle sur la Judée et la Samarie, l’Iran s’en emparerait immédiatement, via le Hamas ou d’autres groupes islamistes. Nous avons vu cela à maintes reprises, à Gaza comme au Liban.
L’Arabie saoudite s’est placée plus ou moins du côté d’Israël pour contrecarrer le raid aérien iranien du 13 avril 2024 contre l’État hébreu. Quelle est votre vision des relations d’Israël avec l’Arabie saoudite dans les prochaines années ? (…)
Il existe une alliance naturelle entre Israël et de nombreux pays du Moyen-Orient pour bloquer les menaces venant d’Iran. Nous combattons actuellement le Hamas, qui n’est qu’un tentacule de la pieuvre iranienne, comme l’est aussi le Hezbollah libanais. Si vous démontez l’échafaudage de l’ingérence iranienne au Moyen-Orient, le Hamas et le Hezbollah s’effondreront immédiatement. En Iran, on crie « Mort à Israël » et « Mort à l’Amérique », mais les mollahs veulent aussi mettre sous leur joug tous les autres infidèles. Les États arabes modérés comprennent cela. Ils saisissent qu’ils sont, comme Israël, les objets de l’expansionnisme iranien.
Benyamin Netanyahou au Figaro : «C’est une guerre de civilisation !» (lefigaro.fr)
“Experts: ICC, UN blamed Israel for a famine that never happened in Gaza”
Columbia University professors: “We found that the food supply entering Gaza is more than sufficient to feed all 2.2 million Gazans.” (The Jerusalem Post)
Extraits :
(…) While enough aid is entering Gaza, they note that it may not always be distributed to people due to other factors, such as war and Hamas control. “We can say with a high degree of professional confidence that if there was a famine somewhere in Gaza, it was not instigated by Israel. To the contrary, Israel is engaged in a variety of efforts to ensure that sufficient food enters Gaza through land crossings,” they state.
The examination of the data by the professors joins a growing body of evidence pushing back on the claims of famine in Gaza. However, the chaos of the war in Gaza and other factors mean that Israel will continue to be blamed for what is occurring in Gaza, even if Israel is not to blame for the failed distribution of food.
Hamas not only appears to hijack aid trucks but it also benefits from claims of famine because Hamas can then try to leverage these claims to pressure Israel to stop the fighting.
Israel blamed for Gaza famine that never happened – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“New poll reveals inconvenient truth: Palestinians like and support Hamas” (June 17)
A recent poll shows that 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza prefer Hamas to be in control of the Gaza Strip (The Jerusalem Post)
Excerpt :
Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki released a survey of Palestinian attitudes on Wednesday – the third since October 7 – showing that fully 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would prefer to see Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip and that support for the terrorist organization far outstrips that of Fatah.
Nevertheless, the headline of a New York Times front page article on Sunday read, “Gazans voice their distress under Hamas.” The online headline to the story was, “As war drags on, Gazans more willing to speak out against Hamas.”
Three days after a prominent Palestinian pollster referred to as such by a senior New York Times writer in November, released a poll indicating one trend among Palestinians, the Times published a front-page article that seemed to contradict those poll findings.
While the poll showed strong support for Hamas among Palestinians, the Times article, based on “interviews with nearly a dozen Gaza in recent months,” portrayed a different narrative of dissatisfaction with Hamas rule in Gaza.The article acknowledged that while gauging public opinion in Gaza is more difficult now even than it was in the past and, in some instances, renders contradictory results, “some recent surveys reflect the weak or mixed support in Gaza for Hamas and its leaders.”
Palestinians like and support Hamas, poll claims – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
LFI: “Operation Gaza” worked! (June 15)
LFI : “l’opération Gaza” a fonctionné ! – En axant leur campagne sur Gaza, les Insoumis ont réussi leur mission : rafler les voix dans les banlieues populaires. Mais le reste du territoire n’a pas suivi le mouvement. LFI semble de plus en plus se positionner comme le représentant d’une catégorie restreinte de la population. La nature ayant horreur du vide, le RN se frotte les mains (Décideurs Magazine, Edito de Lucas Jakubowicz)
‘Palestine’: An Arab- or Jewish-created entity? (June 15)
Some free articles / week : History attests to a 3,000-year Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, a genuine non-imagined connection, unlike the created idea of an Arab Palestine (The Jerusalem Post, Guest Essay)
Excerpt :
There is a very basic question of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, due to political correctness, is avoided or immediately confronted with harsh castigation: Is Palestine an Arab creation or was Palestine created for the Jews? Can it be that Palestine, a geopolitical defined entity, actually existed historically? (…)
In any case, in antithesis to all this “history,” today’s pro-Palestine proponents see Zionism as a settler-colonial project. Rabea Eghbariah, in the December 2023 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change issue (not his piece in the Columbia Law Review) insists that “settler-colonialism [is] the lens through which we assess Palestine.” What is settler-colonialism? It is “a structure of erasure where the settler displaces and replaces the native.” (…)
In opposition to this portrayal, let us recall the preamble of the 1922 League of Nations decision to create a Mandate for Palestine. It states that “the grounds for reconstituting… [the Jewish] national home in that country” were “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine,” a territory that “formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire.”
What was the “historical connection” that convinced 50 countries to vote to begin the process of the reconstitution, that is, the process of reconstructing something, of putting together elements back into a whole? Moreover, why did they avoid any mention of an Arab people or community in their 2,750-word document? Arabic as a language is noted thrice whereas Jews or Jewish is mentioned 15 times.
Was all this truly a conspiracy to assist some Zionist settler-colonial enterprise? Was antisemitic Europe so conveniently helpful and considerate? Or is there something very wrong and twisted in the foundations of Palestinianism? Worse, is it a created imagination of the mind?
True, there is a “modern Zionism” but that refers to the political mechanism formed in the 19th century. History, however, attests to a 3,000-year Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, a genuine non-imagined connection. That historical, religious, and cultural legacy is real and very legitimate, unlike the created idea of an Arab Palestine.
Unpicking the Palestinian revisionist narrative – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“The markets in the Gaza Strip are full, yet a humanitarian catastrophe looms – how does that fit together?” (June 15)
Pay wall :According to the UN and aid organizations, the supply situation in the Gaza Strip remains catastrophic. Israel replies that it is allowing more and more aid supplies into the war zone. What is true? (NZZ) / Die Märkte im Gazastreifen sind voll, trotzdem droht eine humanitäre Katastrophe – wie passt das zusammen?Laut der Uno und Hilfsorganisationen bleibt die Versorgungslage im Gazastreifen katastrophal. Israel entgegnet, es lasse immer mehr Hilfsgüter in das Kriegsgebiet. Was stimmt? (NZZ)
Excerpt :
The problem is therefore primarily the distribution of aid, not necessarily the number of trucks – the Israeli government and UNRWA agree on this. Nevertheless, it is unclear how many trucks actually reach the Gaza Strip. This is because the figures from the Israeli authority Cogat and those from the UN differ widely.
According to UNRWA, virtually no trucks carrying aid have entered the Gaza Strip since the Rafah offensive. However, if Cogat is to be believed, around 350 trucks passed through the crossings to Gaza every day in May. “I know that there are other figures from various organizations, but they don’t paint an accurate picture,” says Cogat spokesman Shimon Friedman. Only Cogat counts the number of trucks from all organizations together and also includes humanitarian and commercial deliveries.
According to aid organizations, people in Gaza are reporting that more goods can be found in the markets again – apparently as a result of the commercial deliveries. Pictures and videos published by Israeli agencies in recent weeks showing markets full of food in the Gaza Strip are therefore probably true. But whether this food is actually reaching the people is questionable.
“We have always advocated allowing commercial supplies into the Gaza Strip, but they are not a solution to the problem,” says UNRWA spokesperson Jonathan Fowler. “Demand continues to outstrip supply many times over, and inflation in the Gaza Strip is enormous. People often cannot afford the goods on the markets.”
At the same time, there are repeated reports, photos and videos of relief supplies being sold at high prices at markets in the Gaza Strip. Videos from the Israeli army show Hamas looting aid convoys. Supplies that are actually intended for the most needy end up on the markets via this detour – where only those with enough money can buy them.
However, money is scarce in the Gaza Strip. The economy in the heavily contested area has collapsed and paid work is almost non-existent. And even if people had money in their bank accounts, there are hardly any ways of getting hold of it in the Gaza Strip, says Fowler. According to reports, there is currently only one functioning ATM in the entire Gaza Strip.
In Gaza sind die Märkte voll, trotzdem droht eine humanitäre Katastrophe (nzz.ch)
“Arab-Israeli relations depend on the speedy neutralization of Hamas” (June 15)
Some free articles / week :No Arab state wants to be branded as a supporter of Israeli military rule over Gaza, regardless of its contempt for the terror dogma and the actions of Hamas (The Jerusalem Post, Guest Essay)
Excerpt :
Arab fears are high that Netanyahu is only playing for time instead of resolving the crisis and eliminating Hamas’ terrorist leadership inside and outside Gaza. After all, the reverberations are shaking Arab societies to the core and risk a resurgence of terror and radicalism, jeopardizing the hard-won progress made in the fight against the terrorist threat before the Gaza war.
Should the war continue without tangible breakthroughs in the realization of core objectives, exacerbated by an Israeli operational crisis, Hamas will only become more emboldened. Each day that its leader Yahya Sinwar escapes demise – while retaining his ability to threaten – strengthens Hamas’s interests, at least psychologically and visually.
The swift neutralization of Hamas’s terrorist resources and brain trust is therefore central to the revival of regional rapprochement and peace initiatives.
Arab regional concerns around Israel-Hamas war – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“When it comes to Israel, brains go out the window” (June 14)
Some free articles / week :Borrell and Albanese are promoting the reality that if Israel comes under fire while rescuing its people, it should not shoot back and instead let its soldiers die… (The Jerusalem Post, Opinion)
Excerpt :
While Israelis celebrated some of the first good news in a very long time – on beaches, in synagogues, and outside the hospital where Noa, Shlomi, Almog, and Andrey were taken – Israel came under a sharp volley of condemnations for some fictional massacre that it had allegedly carried out in the Nuseirat refugee camp.
It didn’t matter that the hostages were being held in apartment buildings by people whom Hamas tried to portray as doctors and journalists as opposed to captors, or that the IDF came under ferocious gunfire and anti-tank missile attacks when it tried to escape Gaza with the rescued Israelis.
It was as if, for the world, Gaza was some safe and harmless place where Israeli soldiers could quietly walk up to the doors of the apartments where the hostages were being kept and politely ask to take Noa, Andrey, Shlomi, and Almog back. The situation was so ludicrous that people – myself among them –were asked, on foreign news channels, variations of questions like why the IDF didn’t give notice to the residents of Nuseirat before launching the operation. The sad part is that the journalists who asked those questions weren’t kidding.
There were more serious officials, like Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, who posted two tweets after the rescue. In the first tweet, he expressed relief at the rescue of the hostages, but in the second, he openly accused Israel of carrying out a massacre.
And then there was UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, an obsessive Israel basher and hater, who wrote that she was relieved the hostages had been “released” but went on to accuse Israel of using “hostages to legitimize killing, injuring, maiming, starving, and traumatizing Palestinians in Gaza.”
Just look at the word “released” one more time. As if they were let go because Israel politely asked.
A person could be excused for thinking that Borrell and Albanese live in an alternate reality; unfortunately, they do not. Sadly, these useful idiots who pretend to run serious and influential organizations are promoting a system of values that will consistently give terrorist organizations a victory, for at least as long as they are attacking Israel. (…)
And while we never really needed the proof, what The Wall Street Journal revealed a few days ago underscores the point. According to the article, Gaza-based Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar wrote to his terrorist colleagues in Qatar that the deaths of Palestinian civilians were “necessary sacrifices.” Sinwar went on to compare it to the civilian losses in conflicts like that in Algeria, where hundreds of thousands of people died fighting for independence.
A morally absurd view of the hostage rescue – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“Israel’s enemies have no incentive to end the war” (June 13)
Some free articles / week :Israel’s enemies share no common values of freedom, civil rights, or humane principles. Thus, they don’t have the incentive to cooperate (Jerusalem Post, Opinion)
Excerpt :
If they were honest, they would have to admit that the answer is no. Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Qatar have everything to gain by prolonging this war, in their quest to finish off the Jewish state. To end now would, for them, be the same as throwing in the towel, at a time when they’ve come as close as possible to realizing their goals. (…)
Sadly, it is that reality that is either missed or purposely ignored by the same individuals who are shouting, “Ceasefire Now,” in an attempt to force our hand to wrap up a war that has barely degraded the enemy’s capabilities to wreak further harm.
Jerusalem Post writer Liat Collins alludes to the absurdity of this in her column, “Biden’s speech, Hamas’s deeds,” when she notes that US President Joe Biden, in a recent speech, taking credit for the Israeli proposal that would bring back the hostages, stated that “clearly, it’s easier to press Israel into compliance than to force the Hamas terrorist organization to act.”
Collins cites the obvious: “For all the American talk of a ceasefire, Iran and the terrorists it supports continue to call for the elimination of the Jewish state, whatever it takes – more rockets, massacres, cyber attacks, and international isolation through lawfare and pressure. The end goal is to get Israelis to leave – between the river and the sea. Hamas does not have a peace plan. It does not want peace.”
Israel’s enemies have no incentive to end the war – opinion – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“Hamas and Israel are still far apart over a ceasefire deal” (June 13)
Pay wall : A bridge too far?Hamas and Israel are still far apart over a ceasefire deal – For all America’s optimism, the two sides look fundamentally irreconcilable (The Economist)
Excerpt :
The fundamental difference between the two sides is that Israel wants to see more of its 120 hostages (at least 43 of whom are already presumed dead) returning, before it makes any long-term promises. Hamas, meanwhile, is demanding that Israel commit to withdrawing from all of Gaza and accept a long-term ceasefire before any hostages are freed.
Still, the true positions of the two sides are hard to assess. (…)
Even if Mr Blinken is right and the gap between Israel and Hamas is “bridgeable”, the internal differences on either side make this mission hard to conceive.
Hamas and Israel are still far apart over a ceasefire deal (economist.com)
Yahya Sinwar: civilian casualties are “necessary sacrifices” (June 11)
Some free articles / week :’We have the Israelis where we want them’: Sinwar’s words revealed – According to a “Wall Street Journal” report, Yahya Sinwar has been in direct contact with Hamas leaders in Qatar, saying civilian casualties are “necessary sacrifices.” (Jerusalem Post, Wall Street Journal)
Excerpt :
The WSJ report also noted that Sinwar’s recent messages to Hamas allies illustrate an inclination to die while fighting. He equated the Gaza war to the battle of Karbala in Iraq, which occurred in the 7th century and in which the grandson of the prophet Muhammed was killed. “We have to move forward on the same path we started,” Sinwar said. “Or let it be a new Karbala.”
Report unveils Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar’s correspondence – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
‘Palestine depends on destruction of Israel,’ says Green Prince at ‘Post’ Conference (June 10)
Some free articles / week :Mossab Hassan Yousef, son of a Hamas co-founder, argues that Palestine’s existence depends on Israel’s destruction and criticizes the Palestinian Authority’s threat to Israel (The Jerusalem Post)
“Israeli Channel Fires Anchor After Insensitive Comments About Rescued Hostage’s Appearance”
Some free articles / week :’Look at her eyebrows, they look better than mine!’ Arab Israeli TV presenter Lama Tatour wrote posted on Instagram, referencing the physical appearance of Noa Argmani who was released in a hostage rescue operation after nine months in Hamas captivity (The Jerusalem Post)
Israeli Channel Fires Anchor After Insensitive Comments About Rescued Hostage’s Appearance – Israel News – Haaretz.com
“Alone with the hardliners : Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot leave Israel’s war cabinet”
Pay wall : Will this force Binyamin Netanyahu at last to decide to push for a ceasefire? (The Economist)
Excerpt :
The continued rise of populist parties in the eu’s two biggest countries, even if not matched in other countries, will make it harder for centrist parties to run the bloc’s powerful institutions in Brussels without the support of nationalist politicians once considered beyond the pale. (…) Mr Macron will now wager the rest of his political credibility on a gamble that could well leave him with a reduced minority and a thumping vote for the rn.
In Germany the ruling coalition also fared abysmally. All three of its component parties were beaten by the nationalist Alternative for Germany—despite a slew of scandals enveloping the party and its top candidate during the campaign. (It was even, shortly before the election, kicked out of its eu-level alliance with the National Rally and others). The Social Democrats of Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, fell to their worst score in a national election in almost 150 years of existence.
As results came in, projections were for the combined hard-right forces within the parliament, including the various allies of the afd, the rn and of Giorgia Meloni, the prime minister of Italy, to increase their share of seats only slightly, from 17% to 19%.
The first important task for the newly elected parliamentarians will be to approve eu leaders’ choice for the president of the European Commission, the bloc’s powerful executive arm. The incumbent, Ursula von der Leyen, will probably now be given the first shot at staying in the job after her centre-right alliance, the European People’s Party, came top with over 180 seats, roughly the same 25% share as it scored in 2019. The eu’s 27 leaders will meet on June 17th to discuss their proposed candidate for the top job.
But even the modest increase in the seats going to the hard right may be enough to make it hard for the German to cobble a majority for ratification in the Brussels chamber. The 400-or-so seats that will go to the parties that backed her in 2019 may not be enough to secure 361 votes in what will be a secret ballot. The coming weeks were expected to be dominated by whether Ms von der Leyen could convince the likes of Ms Meloni to back her—and at what political cost. Now, however, all the attention will be diverted to France, where the most pro-eu major politician on the European stage may soon find his authority in tatters.
Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot leave Israel’s war cabinet (economist.com)
Nobel-winning Author Herta Müller : ‘On Oct. 7, Hamas Wanted to Evoke the Shoah’ (June 9)
Pay wall :An Interview With Nobel-winning Author Herta Müller – Nobel Literature laureate Herta Müller never tried to hide her family’s Nazi history or to run away from the years she lived in a dictatorship. In fact, she draws on her past to voice her critiques of the present – and her concerns about Israel’s future (Haaretz, Interview)
Excerpt :
In the speech she delivered, entitled “I Can’t Imagine the World Without Israel,” and in an interview with Haaretz, Müller unapologetically draws comparisons between the atrocities of the Nazis and those of Hamas, and expresses alarm in the face of what she describes as the global left’s silence over the events of October 7. As she sees it, these are both symptoms of a broader retreat from democratic values in the West.
As a person who grew up in a dictatorship, she says she assumed that “in democracies, you learn to think individually because the individual counts, in contrast to a dictatorship, where your own thinking is forbidden and the coercive collective tames people.”
That’s why she is “appalled” by “young people, students in the West in particular, who are so confused that they are no longer aware of their freedom. That they seem to have lost the ability to distinguish between democracy and dictatorship.” The American students at pro-Palestinian demonstrations, Müller adds, “seem to endorse violence. The massacre of October 7 is not mentioned at all at these demonstrations, or it is presented as an Israeli staging; not a word is said to demand the release of the Israeli hostages. Instead, Israel’s war in Gaza is portrayed as an arbitrary war of conquest and annihilation by a colonial power.”
“Joe Biden leaked Israel’s first plan to end the war in Gaza” (June 9)
Pay wall : An Israeli ceasefire proposal : Joe Biden leaked Israel’s first plan to end the war in Gaza. But hardliners in Israel and Hamas may yet scupper it (The Economist)
Excerpt :
Hamas will have to agree, too. The group has yet to issue an official response. Its political leaders, who live outside Gaza and are under pressure from the regimes of Egypt and Qatar, are more open to the deal. However, Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas chief in Gaza who remains holed up somewhere underground, will have the final word. He is expected to demand explicit guarantees that Israel will accept a full ceasefire and must stop trying to find and kill him. It is hard to imagine this or any Israeli government agreeing to such a condition for the man who is held responsible for planning the atrocities of October 7th.
Moreover, Hamas may see advantages in continuing the war. The more wrecked Israel leaves Gaza, the less anyone but Hamas will want to rule it. And it reckons that Israel’s diplomatic position is steadily worsening in the Middle East and beyond. The country is in the dock in international courts. The costs of the war are rising, for Israel as well as Hamas.
Joe Biden leaked Israel’s first plan to end the war in Gaza (economist.com)
“The PA returning to Gaza? It can’t even control the West Bank” (June 9)
Some free articles / week :Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority is losing its grip in Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem. Two decades after Hamas forced it out, it is not remotely capable of reasserting itself in Gaza (The Times of Israel, Guest Essay)
Excerpt :
The bottom line is that any attempt to bring the PA back to Gaza would require a major reform of the PA’s institutions — covering integrity, efficiency, governance capability and a whole lot more. To have any prospect of success, this would need to be carried out as part of a credible process, with a timeline, for the PA to be replaced with a Palestinian state.
That is not only a years-long process, but one that seems beyond the bounds of possibility in the current political situation — given the dire state of Israeli-Palestinian ties and the internal Palestinian feuds.
Unless or until these challenges are addressed, the people who speak airily about “the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza” are as unrealistic as those in Israel talking grandly about “total victory.”
The PA returning to Gaza? It can’t even control the West Bank | The Times of Israel
“My Word: Biden’s speech, Hamas’s deeds” (June 8)
Some free articles / week :Biden has a vision of a peaceful Middle East “the day after Gaza.” If only Israel’s enemies shared the same vision. The terrorists are more inspired by Hamas’s “victory” than by Biden’s nice words (The Jerusalem Post, Opinion)
President Joe Biden’s plan to end war in contrast to Hamas’s plans – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
A weekly selection of opinions and analyses from the Arab media around the world (June 8)
Some free articles / week :Voices from the Arab press: Egypt: Difficult decisions toward Israel (The Jerusalem Post)
“Shouting match ensues between senior Arab officials at Blinken meeting” (June 8)
Free access : Shouting match ensues between senior Arab officials at Blinken meeting – The sharp confrontation reflects the skepticism regarding the planned reforms of the Palestinian Authority, and the internal disputes between the leaders of the Arab world (The Jerusalem Post)
“The lure of the Great Satan : The children of Iran’s revolution still want to go West” (June 8)
Pay wall :Some go to undermine the Islamic Republic; others to boost it (The Economist)
The children of Iran’s revolution still want to go West (economist.com)
“Can the Hezbollah threat really be contained?” (June 7)
Some free articles / week : Can the Hezbollah threat really be contained? – Israel’s options are not good. While the government has done everything it can to avoid a wider war with Hezbollah, this might no longer be possible. But it cannot be blamed for trying a bit longer (The Jerusalem Post, Opinion)
Does Israel have the ability to overcome Hezbollah? – The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
“I can’t imagine the world without Israel”: Nobel Prize winner Herta Müller on October 7 and its consequences (June 5)
Pay wall : I can’t imagine the world without Israel: with its terror, Hamas has not only forced Israel into a war in which it is guilty. It is also successfully orchestrating our emotions. Nobel Prize winner Herta Müller on October 7 and its consequences / Ich kann mir die Welt ohne Israel nicht vorstellen : Die Hamas hat mit ihrem Terror nicht nur Israel in einen Krieg gezwungen, in dem es schuldig wird. Sie orchestriert auch mit Erfolg unsere Gefühle. Die Nobelpreisträgerin Herta Müller zum 7. Oktober und seinen Folgen (FAZ, Guest Essay)
Herta Müller über den 7. Oktober und seine Folgen (faz.net)
“Predicted famine in Gaza would likely be caused by hijacking of aid inside Gaza, and not lack of nutrition in Israeli aid, finds research” (June 4)
Some free articles / week : Gazans facing nutrition insecurity despite Israel allowing adequate food aid (The Jerusalem Post)
Articles d’avant le 5 juin 2024