The Wall Street Journal, 17 janvier, article payant
Trump Can Make Russia Pay to Rebuild Ukraine
The West has frozen $300 billion of Moscow’s assets, but Europe has stood in the way of using them.
Extraits :
The key to securing Europe at less cost to U.S. taxpayers may be sitting in European bank accounts. The West has frozen around $300 billion of Russian foreign-exchange assets, but European obstinacy has prevented these funds from being used to compensate Ukraine for war damages. President-elect Trump should insist that the Kremlin’s reserves be mobilized to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and future arms purchases.
Russia has caused more than $150 billion in direct damage to Ukraine and nearly $500 billion in economic losses, according to the World Bank. Ukraine will need external funds of this magnitude to rebuild, and more in the meantime to rearm itself with continued purchases of Western weapons.
Mr. Trump doesn’t want the U.S. to foot this bill, especially with America’s military already spread thin in the Middle East and Asia. European budgeters are planning to increase their own defense spending, as Mr. Trump demands, so they’ll be stretched thin as well. The obvious solution is to use the frozen Russian assets.
The Group of Seven has already agreed to tap the profits from interest produced by the frozen assets. But because of European opposition, aided and abetted by the inept diplomacy of the Biden administration, tapping these profits unlocked only a $50 billion loan for Ukraine and left the underlying assets untouched. This isn’t enough.
Five factors make now the ideal time to use these funds to compensate Russia’s victims.
The first is Mr. Trump’s return to the White House. (…)
Second, the assets have changed. When the war started, most Russian reserves were in the form of foreign-government securities held by European custodians. Now, according to the Hoover Institution’s Philip Zelikow, the securities have largely matured into cash. (…)
Third, it’s clear that the reserves can be mobilized in ways consistent with international law. Ukraine is owed reparations from Russia. (…)
Fourth, Russia has less ability to retaliate economically. Any assets that Western firms still own in Russia are increasingly beyond their control. (…)
Fifth, many European governments are finally warming to the idea. Europeans realize that Ukraine needs a long-term source of funds, and change is coming in the most important country, Germany. Mr. Scholz will likely be replaced in February by Friedrich Merz, who has rightly criticized Mr. Scholz’s bare-minimum support for Ukraine. Mr. Merz has yet to take a stand on the foreign-assets question, but mobilizing Russia’s reserves would fit with his vision—and his need to address Mr. Trump’s insistence that Europe contribute more to its own security.
The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to strike a better deal. Both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from transferring Mr. Putin’s cash to the victims of his aggression—the sooner, the better.
Mr. Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of “Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe.” Mr. Miller is a professor of international history at Tufts University and nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
New York Times, 15 janvier, article payant
Guest Essay : Putin’s Plan for Peace Is No Peace at All
By Lloyd J. Austin III and Antony J. Blinken
Extraits :
President Vladimir Putin of Russia appalled the world with his full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago. He planned to topple Ukraine’s democratically elected government, install a Kremlin puppet regime and expose the West as weak, divided and diminished.
After more than 1,000 days of Mr. Putin’s reckless war of choice, he has failed to achieve a single one of his strategic goals. Russia’s power and influence are greatly diminished; it couldn’t even prop up a valued client like the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Meanwhile, Ukraine stands strong and defiant as a free and sovereign democracy, with an economy rooted in the West.
All this is a testament to the resilience of Ukraine’s troops and the strength of Ukraine’s people. It is also the product of steadfast American leadership, which has rallied allies and partners worldwide to help Ukraine survive the Kremlin’s imperial onslaught. The United States should build on this historic success, not squander it.
Mr. Putin assumed that the world would stand by when he sent his troops across the Ukrainian border. He was wrong. The United States has rallied some 50 countries from around the planet to help Ukraine defend itself — and to uphold the bedrock principle that borders may not be redrawn by force. (…)
As a percentage of G.D.P., more than a dozen contact group members now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the United States does. And these investments in Ukraine are delivering returns here at home, boosting our defense industrial base and creating good jobs. Mr. Putin’s aggression even spurred the very outcome he had sought to prevent: NATO is now bigger, stronger and more united than ever.
As a result, Ukraine has held off the second-largest military in the world — despite Mr. Putin’s reckless escalations and irresponsible nuclear saber rattling. (…)
Ukraine’s success to date is a huge strategic achievement, but its troops still face profound challenges on the battlefield. Russian forces have recently clawed back some of the territory that Ukraine liberated earlier in the war, and Mr. Putin’s bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants and other critical infrastructure is taking a harrowing toll. (…)
Still, Ukraine’s vulnerabilities should not mask Mr. Putin’s own growing dilemmas.
(…) Russia is suffering huge losses — an average of 1,500 casualties a day — to seize small slivers of territory. Russia has suffered more than 700,000 dead and injured since Mr. Putin began his war. Now he increasingly faces a painful dilemma: either endure high casualties for minimal gains, perhaps order a mobilization that triggers domestic instability, or negotiate seriously with Ukraine to end his war. (…)
All of this has given leverage to Ukraine — and to the next U.S. administration. This leverage should be used to end Mr. Putin’s war and usher in a durable peace that ensures Ukrainians can deter further Russian aggression, defend their territory and thrive as a sovereign democracy. That is what peace through strength would look like. But because Mr. Putin retains his imperial ambitions, giving up our leverage now by cutting aid and forcing a premature cease-fire would simply allow Mr. Putin to rest, refit and eventually reattack. This would be peace through surrender, which would be no peace at all.
Not for Ukraine, which would be crushed under Mr. Putin’s boot.
Not for Europe, which would fall under the shadow of a tyrant determined to reconstitute Moscow’s fallen empire.
Not for America’s friends elsewhere, who could face new risks of aggression from other autocrats who would likely see a victory for Mr. Putin as a hunting license of their own.
And not for the United States, which would have to spend more resources and shoulder greater risks to defend not only against an emboldened Russian leader but also against other autocrats and agents of chaos bent on tearing down the system of rules, rights and responsibilities that has made generations of Americans more secure and more prosperous.
Pursuing a policy of peace through strength is vital to Ukraine’s survival and America’s security. The United States and its allies and partners must continue to stand by Ukraine and strengthen its hand for the negotiations that will someday bring Mr. Putin’s war of aggression to an end.
Lloyd J. Austin III is the secretary of defense. Antony J. Blinken is the secretary of state.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/14/opinion/us-ukraine-defense-austin-blinken-russia.html
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14 janvier, article payant
Aufmarsch der Roboter – neue Technologien machen den Krieg in der Ukraine noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser
Immer mehr teure und schwere Grosskampfsysteme erweisen sich auf den Schlachtfeldern der Ukraine als untauglich. Sie lassen sich mit billiger und flexibler Drohnentechnologie aushebeln. Sichtbar wird der Krieg der Zukunft, der nicht weniger grausam ist.
Sergei Gerasimow ist Schriftsteller und lebt in der Grossstadt Charkiw, die nach wie vor von den Russen mit Raketen beschossen wird. – Aus dem Englischen von A. Bn.
Extraits :
25. Dezember, früher Weihnachtsmorgen. Die Strassenlampen sind gerade angegangen. Hier und da schleichen die ersten Autos durch die leeren Strassen, aber die meisten Menschen schlafen noch an diesem festlichen Morgen. Nur ein paar Fenster leuchten in einem gemütlichen gedämpften Licht, das an eine Kerzenflamme erinnert. Es sind die letzten Sekunden vor einem Raketenangriff.
Als unglaublich schnell Feuertropfen vom Himmel herab zu regnen beginnen, treten eine Mutter und ihr Kind an das Fenster. Nicht weit entfernt davon, hinter dem schwarzen Umriss einer Kirche, trifft eine der Raketen ein Wärmekraftwerk: Es besitzt vier hohe Schornsteine, darunter einen, der die anderen überragt und der trotz wiederholten russischen Versuchen, ihn zu zerstören, nach wie vor raucht.
Die Explosion ist so gewaltig, dass der Himmel über halb Charkiw für einen Moment in orangefarbenes Feuer eintaucht, da die Wolken die höllischen Flammen am Boden reflektieren. Dann steigt ein kochender, flackernder Feuerpilz über dem Kraftwerk auf, verschmilzt mit den tief hängenden Wolken und verwandelt sich in etwas, das wie der dicke Wirbel eines Tornados aussieht.
Die Mutter, die das Geschehen vom Fenster aus beobachtet, spricht einen seltsamen Satz, um ihr Kind zu beruhigen: «Hab keine Angst, es wird noch schlimmer werden.» In Momenten wie diesen ist es oft schwer, die richtigen Worte zu finden.
Oreschnik, die Schreckliche
Als ich zehn Tage später am Ort vorbeifahre, sehe ich jedoch, dass das Kraftwerk noch immer in Betrieb ist: Einer der Schornsteine, der höchste, stösst noch immer Rauch aus. Die Fenster des Wohnhauses auf der anderen Strassenseite sind zerborsten, und das ist auch schon alles, was die Russen mit ihrem Angriff am Weihnachtstag erreicht haben.
Jede dieser Raketen kostet etwa so viel wie ein Kampfpanzer, aber im Moment funktionieren die grossen, teuren Raketen nicht. Sie jagen den Menschen nicht einmal mehr wirklich Angst ein. Oreschnik, die Schreckliche, mit der Putin der Welt immer wieder droht, lässt die meisten von uns nur mit den Schultern zucken. Fast täglich werden wir vor einem möglichen erneuten Abschuss dieser Mittelstreckenrakete mit sechs Sprengköpfen gewarnt, aber nur einer meiner Freunde gerät in Panik, wenn ihm eine weitere Warnung unterkommt. Für ihn ist das eine Nervensache: Zu viele russische Raketen sind schon zu nahe an seinem Haus eingeschlagen.
Auch zahlreiche andere Dinosaurier der Militärtechnik haben sich in diesem Krieg als nahezu nutzlos erwiesen. Sie erzeugen nicht mehr dieselbe Wirkung wie früher. So zum Beispiel schwere Panzer, die Millionen von Dollar kosten. Während ein solches Ungetüm Kilometer zurücklegt, um sich einer feindlichen Stellung zu nähern, hat eine leichte und billige FPV-Drohne ausreichend Zeit, ihn zu zerstören. Unscheinbare Marinedrohnen versenken grosse, unhandliche Kriegsschiffe und schiessen Kampfhelikopter über dem Meer ab. Die berühmten intelligenten Excalibur-Artillerie-Granaten mit GPS-Lenkung, die früher eine Treffsicherheit von bis zu 70 Prozent hatten, finden heute nur noch in 6 Prozent der Fälle ihr Ziel. Die elektronischen Abwehrsysteme haben gelernt, mit ihnen umzugehen.
Im Dorf Lipzi, neunzehn Kilometer nördlich von Charkiw, führte die ukrainische Armee die erste vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht ohne Infanterie durch. Zumindest war es das, was in den Medien darüber zu lesen war: eine vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht. Die Ukraine hat gewonnen und den Feind zurückgedrängt. Es wurden keine Einzelheiten über diese Konfrontation bekannt, und sie hat die militärische Landkarte nicht verändert, so dass der Sieg wahrscheinlich nicht wirklich bedeutend war. Russische Telegram-Kanäle spotteten über die Schlacht und veröffentlichten Fotos von beschädigten ukrainischen Bodendrohnen, die wie Spielzeugautos mit grossen Rädern aussahen.
Als ich mich mit einem Mann, der Drohnen herstellt, über den Schlagabtausch von Lipzi unterhielt, äusserte ich die Ansicht, dass die Schlacht ja eigentlich nicht als Roboterschlacht bezeichnet werden könne, da dort keine Roboter, sondern von Operateuren gesteuerte Drohnen gekämpft hätten. Daraufhin antwortete er mir, dass dort auch robotische Geschütze eingesetzt worden seien, die in der Lage seien, ein Ziel selbständig zu finden und auszuwählen. Aus einer Entfernung von fünfzig Metern treffe ein solches Geschütz mit Sicherheit den Kopf des Gegners, selbst wenn dieser gerade einen doppelten Salto mache, und aus einer Entfernung von zweihundert Metern treffe es mit Sicherheit den Rumpf.
Ausserdem seien in der Schlacht bei Lipzi auch die berühmten Roboterhunde eingesetzt worden. Sie schossen nicht, aber sie machten anhand von dessen Wärmeprofil den Gegner aus. Diese Schlacht war also tatsächlich robotisch, wenn auch nicht vollständig. Auf jeden Fall war es der erste Angriff dieser Art in der Geschichte, ohne Beteiligung der Infanterie. Als solcher dürfte er in die Militärgeschichte eingehen.
Die Schlappe bei Lipzi hat die Russen nicht sonderlich beunruhigt, denn sie haben nur eine weitere Portion Kanonenfutter verloren, und davon haben sie immer reichlich: 2024 hat die russische Armee ohne Wimpernzucken 420 000 Mann verloren, also fast eine halbe Million, aber doch rund 4200 Kilometer ukrainisches Territorium erobert, das heisst, grob gesagt, ein Rechteck aus Feldern, Schluchten, verbrannten Wäldern und rauchenden Ruinen von vierzig mal hundert Kilometern. Solches ist natürlich eine grandiose strategische Leistung, die sämtliche Verluste rechtfertigt.
Paradoxerweise ist dieser Krieg einerseits der modernste und am meisten technisierte aller Kriege der Geschichte, andererseits zieht er sich genauso endlos in die Länge und vernichtet genauso sinnlos Menschenmassen wie der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Da ist dasselbe monatelange und jahrelange Sitzen in den Schützengräben. Dieselben täglichen Abertausende von Artilleriegranaten pflügen das Land immer neu um und verwandeln die Wälder in eine Art riesige Haarbürste. Sogar das nach Senf riechende Giftgas Chlorpikrin, auf das Deutschland damals zurückgriff, ist jetzt wieder im Einsatz: Es wird von Russland gegen die Ukraine verwendet. Manchmal, wenn ich auf Videos sehe, wie Schweine aus zerstörten Schweineställen noch lebende Verwundete auffressen, und zwar beginnend mit dem weichen Unterleib, denke ich, dass dieser Krieg noch schlimmer ist als der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Die Grausamkeit und Ausweglosigkeit des Ersten Weltkriegs war das Ergebnis von damals entwickelten neuen Militärtechnologien: Maschinengewehre, Panzer, Stacheldrahtzäune, massive Artillerie. Das Gleiche geschieht jetzt: Neue Technologien machen den Krieg immer noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser. (…)
Aus strategischer Sicht ist nichts Gutes an unbemannten Schlachten – wenn der menschliche Faktor ausgeschaltet wird, werden wirtschaftlich starke Länder wirtschaftlich schwache Länder militärisch dominieren, und dagegen kann nichts getan werden. (…)
Die Zukunft der Kriegsführung liegt indes zweifellos in der künstlichen Intelligenz. Es ist interessant, dass KI während dieses Krieges für eine breite Öffentlichkeit verfügbar geworden ist. Während die Kämpfe tobten, haben die Menschen gelernt, Aids sowie einige Formen von Krebs wirksam zu behandeln, Neuralink-Chips in ein menschliches Gehirn zu implantieren, das Herz eines Schweins in einen Menschen zu verpflanzen und auch die Flugbahn eines Asteroiden zu verändern. (…)
Da wir stark damit beschäftigt waren, uns gegenseitig umzubringen, haben wir all dies kaum bemerkt, aber es scheint, dass der technologische Fortschritt nicht an uns vorbeigeht. Die Ukraine hat bereits Millionen, vielleicht sogar Dutzende von Millionen Stunden an Drohnenaufnahmen gesammelt, die zweifellos dazu dienen werden, KI-Modelle zu trainieren, die in der Lage sein werden, Entscheidungen auf dem Schlachtfeld zu treffen und Menschen mit übermenschlicher Genauigkeit zu töten. (…)
The Economist, 11 janvier, article payant
Russia and the West : Time is not on Russia’s side, argues Finland’s foreign minister
By Invitation: Elina Valtonen calls for a lower oil-price cap and tougher measures against Russia’s shadow fleet
Elina Valtonen is Finland’s foreign minister.
Extraits :
RUSSIA IS FAR from an unstoppable force of nature. The autocrats who run it rely on a war economy that is unsustainable and shows serious cracks. Democracies should take advantage by increasing the economic pressure. It is we who have the momentum.
Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s narrative, and some people’s belief, sanctions do work. Even when they do not prevent certain goods and technologies from entering or—in the case of oil and gas—leaving Russia, they certainly make logistics more cumbersome. That increases costs.
Witness the rise in Russian consumer prices, which are up by more than a third since the end of 2021. This is due mostly to the rise in import costs and the country’s labour shortage translating into high nominal wage inflation.
Owing to a low birth rate, high mortality and an exodus of Russians who oppose Mr Putin or just want a better life elsewhere, Russia’s population is shrinking, ageing and losing its best talent. The senseless war in Ukraine, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is not helping.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
In 2024 Russia’s GDP grew by around 3.5%. This relatively strong performance came almost exclusively from sectors directly related to the war. Most forecasters expect barely any growth in 2025 as Russia runs out of labour and other resources. Despite all this, Russia can maintain the current level of military production, even if it means cutting back on everything else.
Military spending is eating up the budget and Russia has to fund its deficit through borrowing. With little to no access to international capital markets, Russia borrows domestically. New debt is absorbed by domestic banks, which place the government bonds at the central bank for cash. Essentially, the central bank is printing money to finance the government’s spending on the war.
The rouble has weakened significantly and would be on the floor were it not for central-bank support through emergency buying and capital-control mechanisms. (…)
With the economic outlook so bleak, time is not on Russia’s side. So far Mr Putin has prioritised his war against Ukraine over the welfare of his own people. To achieve just and lasting peace in Ukraine, he must be made to understand that the cost of his illegal campaign is getting too high, even for his tolerance.
To this end, we need to increase the economic pressure on Russia and reduce the possibilities for dodging sanctions, including the use of a shadow fleet. Russia uses rusting, non-insured tankers to covertly carry Russian oil around the world, undermining the EU and G7 oil-price cap on Russian crude and petroleum products. (…)
Several measures for limiting the use of the hazardous fleet are in the works. In December, 12 European countries, including my own, announced that their maritime authorities will start requesting proof of insurance from suspected shadow vessels as they pass through the English Channel, the Danish Straits of the Great Belt, the Sound between Denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of Finland. Non-compliant vessels will be placed under sanctions, which, in the EU’s case, would ban them from the bloc’s ports and maritime services.
Across Europe, decoupling from Russian energy is well under way. Direct and indirect gas and oil imports need to be further constrained. The oil-price cap, currently at $60 per barrel, should be lowered further and enforcement of the cap strengthened in conjunction with international partners.
In parallel with increasing economic pressure on Russia, Europe, America and their partners must continue supporting Ukraine militarily and economically. As Donald Trump prepares to take office for a second time, Europeans must stand ready to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security, and make the required financial investments.
Under President Joe Biden, America has been a strong backer of Ukraine’s fight for independence and democracy—underlined by Mr Biden’s recent announcement of an additional $2.5bn in security assistance. Early indications from the incoming American administration are encouraging. Although Mr Trump and his team have made it abundantly clear that they expect Europeans to do more for the continent’s security, I do not expect America to walk away from helping Ukraine, or from Europe as a whole. Such a move would diminish America’s global influence and undermine its ability to compete strategically with China and others.
The war is far from lost. With determined support from its partners, Ukraine will get through this winter in a position to enter peace talks on its own terms and timeline. Ukraine’s international partners need to keep up their joint measures until Russia starts to engage with the world in a peaceful manner, respecting the UN Charter and international law.■.
The Guardian, 27 décembre, libre accès
Can Europe switch to a ‘wartime mindset’? Take it from us in Ukraine: here is what that means
Nato’s warning reached me as I braced for a missile attack in Kyiv – where we’ve learned how to survive in the era of Russian hybrid warfare
Extraits:
Day 1,024 of the invasion. Kyiv, 7am. Friday the 13th. In a former life, someone would have observed that this is a day that portends bad luck. But in a country where shelling is a daily occurrence, it has become irrelevant. I wake up to the sound of an app on my phone warning me of an increased missile threat. While my partner and I are hiding in the corridor, I read the news that the Nato chief, Mark Rutte, has called on members of the US-led transatlantic alliance to “shift to a wartime mindset”.
With the first bang of the air defence system, a thought strikes me: for those who have not already been living with it for nearly three years, how would you explain this mindset? What is this wartime thinking?
Let’s start with the basics. Try to accept the thesis that Russia is your enemy. Everything Russian is your enemy. I know this is complicated. But Russia has been using literally everything as an instrument of hybrid warfare: sports, ballet, classical music, literature, art – these are all platforms for promoting its narratives. Evenyour neatest Russian Orthodox church could conceal Russian intelligence officers, just waiting for the command to put down their incense burners and take up arms. Don’t forget that for advocates of the political doctrine known as “the Russian world”, this world is potentially limitless; it exists wherever the Russian language is spoken and monuments to Pushkin have been plonked down. (…)
It’s hard to believe, but it won’t be Vladimir Putin himself invading your country. It will be hundreds of thousands of ordinary Russians who have been told for decades that your values are evil. No one will care about the nuances and subtleties of your specific leftism, libertarianism or liberalism. What Putin calls the “collective west”, he regards as uniform, and evil. (…)
Wartime mindset means having a “bug-out bag” packed and ready to go, to fit your whole life into one backpack. Copies of documents. A few family photos. A first aid kit. A power bank. A spare pair of underwear and socks. Something you can leave home with.
The most difficult thing to believe is that war could be on your doorstep. And this doorstep is not symbolic, but very real: the doorstep of your own home. The loss of your favourite porcelain, your parents’ books, childhood photos of your grownup children, the inability to take your beloved cat, dog or hamster while being evacuated – all of this is real.
It always seems that war is something that happens to someone else, in some poorer part of the world. They can’t just start dropping bombs on the capital of a European country in the 21st century! Wartime mindset is the realisation that they can.
And no matter how hard you try to prepare, one day you will wake up to an enemy missile attack. You will think that it will be over in two or three weeks, another month at most. Soon you will lose track of the days. But you will love your country with all your heart. You will fall in love with the national humour and character again, and rediscover your national cuisine. In fact, you will come to regard every national dish cooked in the dark (as there will be no electricity) as an element of national resilience and resistance.
While waiting for a miracle, I really want to believe that none of this will happen to you, as it has happened to us.
Kyiv, 10am. End of the air-raid alert. The Russians have launched 90 missiles and 200 killer drones targeting civilian infrastructure. The goal remains the same: to force Ukrainians to live without electricity, heat and gas. Terrorising civilians is a method typical of a terrorist country. An ordinary morning of abnormal reality, and yet the world’s common will is not forceful enough to stop it.
I realise that I have run out of time to tell you the most important things of all: give your partner a kiss right now; take a course in tactical medicine, and another in firearms training; buy a power bank; write a will; and find out where the nearest bomb shelter is. For no reason. Just in case miracles don’t happen, and you find yourself called upon to shift to a wartime mindset.
Oleksandr Mykhed is a writer and member of PEN Ukraine. His book The Language of War was published by Allen Lane in June 2024
Le Monde, 27 décembre, article payant
« La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen »
Dans une tribune au « Monde », un collectif de personnalités et de citoyens parmi lesquels Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Ariane Mnouchkine, le général Vincent Desportes et Adam Michnik, appelle à la mise en place d’une coalition entre Etats européens accordés sur quelques mesures vitales pour un pays qui défend sa liberté et protège les nôtres.
Extraits:
L’Ukraine vit des heures angoissantes. L’armée russe, forte d’un budget militaire de 106 milliards d’euros, qu’elle veut porter à 135 milliards en 2025, poursuit son invasion au prix de dizaines de milliers de morts et de la destruction systématique des infrastructures vitales de l’Ukraine : ses centrales énergétiques, ses hôpitaux, ses usines.
Malgré la résistance héroïque des Ukrainiens, elle gagne du terrain grâce aux demi-mesures et aux retards de l’aide apportée par leurs alliés, qui se gardent bien de désigner la seule issue admissible de cette guerre : le retrait de la Russie dans ses frontières.
Paralysés par le « chantage au nucléaire » de Vladimir Poutine, Joe Biden et les dirigeants occidentaux ont livré à contretemps des armements en quantité et de portée limitées, sans procurer à l’Ukraine les moyens de la victoire. Préoccupés avant tout par le souci de ne pas concourir à une « escalade », ils ont laissé le Kremlin franchir successivement toutes les étapes de la surenchère militaire, jusqu’à l’arrivée ces derniers jours de 10 000 soldats nord-coréens, couronnée par l’emploi de charges chimiques et d’un missile balistique hypersonique.
Tétanisés par les rodomontades de Donald Trump, les gouvernements européens se préparent-ils mezza voce à accepter, avec un lâche soulagement, que la nouvelle administration américaine négocie un accord de cessez-le-feu au détriment de la volonté ukrainienne ?
La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen : triomphant aujourd’hui, Poutine reprendrait dans deux, cinq ou sept ans ses guerres de conquête contre l’Ukraine, mais aussi contre la Géorgie, la Moldavie ou les pays baltes. L’ensemble du continent glisserait vers l’abîme. Notre sécurité, nos libertés et nos valeurs sont directement menacées. Il faut donc agir, vite. (…)
The Economist, 27 décembre, article payant
Ink and blood : Ukrainian troops celebrate a grim Christmas in Kursk
A local paper braves Russian bombs to deliver news on the front line
Extraits:
THE NEWSPAPER round in Velyka Pysarivka can be sketchy. Barely 3km from the Russian border, the village is stalked by death. Oleksiy and Natalia Pasyuga, the husband-and-wife duo behind the Vorskla (the weekly takes its name from the local river) have a survival algorithm. Oleksiy, 56, drives. Natalia, 53, listens out of the passenger window for the drones that grow stealthier with every day. They say they are careful, though they know they are kidding themselves. Delivering the paper to the last remaining residents of the village is not a rational exercise, but a love affair. The tears of subscribers make it worth it, Ms Pasyuga says: “They grab the paper and hold it to their nose to smell the fresh newsprint.”
For its 2,500 readers, the Vorskla is more than a news source; it is a connection to the outside world. Most of Ukraine’s border villages now have no electricity or mobile connection. When televisions work, they pick up Russian channels. The Pasyugas say they feel obliged to stay to debunk the propaganda, though they evacuated their offices from Velyka Pysarivka in March after a glide bomb smashed their car and half the building. Six months later the Russians destroyed the other half, during attacks that coincided with Ukraine’s advance into Russia’s Kursk province just to the north. Now the Vorskla is put together in a library in the nearby town of Okhtyrka. It is printed and hand delivered to front-line villages in a car the couple borrow from their son.
When your correspondent calls, the Pasyugas are preparing a special Christmas issue. They already know what they want: uplifting stories to raise the morale of their weary readers. For once, there will be no obituaries of the local boys lost in battle. The Kursk offensive will be left out too, though that is less unusual. The Pasyugas say they know “too much” to accept the official celebration of the offensive as “Ukraine’s great and only triumph of 2024”. They choose silence instead. (…)
The urgency of Russia’s counter-attack appears tied to Donald Trump’s impending inauguration. Mr Putin wants Kursk to be a done deal by January 20th, rather than an embarrassing topic for discussion. Volodymyr Zelensky seems equally determined to retain the pocket as a bargaining chip. The Ukrainians are holding on, though the conditions on (and under) ground are getting grimmer. “Rain, slush, snow, cold, mud, beetles, worms, rats and glide bombs,” says Ruslan Mokritsky, a 33-year-old non-commissioned officer in the 95th Air Assault Brigade. The Russians can drop as many as 40 glide bombs on one position in the space of a few hours, he says. “In Kursk, death is always close; it practically holds your hand.” (…)
Back in Okhtyrka, Oleksiy Pasyuga says that the soldiers’ struggle puts his own worries into perspective. His five hryvnia ($0.12) margin on the 15 hryvnia cover price is enough to keep his team in business, he says. He is determined not to be the man who ends the Vorskla’s 95-year history. There is not much of a cushion, no adverts, no excess, so the paper’s Christmas edition will be the same lean eight pages as usual. They have decided to lead with a feature on the soldiers’ New Year: how they will mark it, what they might eat. For Major Bakrev, the answer is simple enough. On New Year’s Eve he will be at work; he will not be celebrating while his men freeze in the trenches. “Maybe I’ll mark it with a couple of volleys of our guns,” he quips. Officer Mokritsky, who is likely to spend the night underground, shrugs. The soldiers on the front line will celebrate as best they can. “Maybe we’ll have Coca-Cola.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/16/ukrainian-troops-celebrate-a-grim-christmas-in-kursk
Kiev Post, 26 décembre, libre accès
OPINION: Christmas Thoughts Inspired by John Lennon, and the Enemy of Peace
So, this is Christmas, and what have we done, another year over and the war goes on and on.
Extraits:
Greetings friends. It’s Dec. 25 and I’ve got John Lennon’s “So this is Christmas” song playing over and over in my head. Especially his idealistic refrain: “War is over.” I wish it were, but it’s not.
Christmas is supposed to be a joyous celebration that evokes peace, joy and optimism. But for embattled Ukraine and its supporters, this year it’s unfortunately another bleak one.
In the last 24 hours, the barbaric Russian monster has dropped more missiles and drones over Ukraine, bringing even more death and destruction at this particular time.
While most of you were celebrating with your loved ones, Ukrainians were once again subjected to the latest merciless aerial bombardment, and their brave soldiers were attacked all along the front line.
By whom? From a country whose regime has no respect for human life and hates everything the democratic world stands for. By a cynical imperialist despotism that is prepared to kill and lie to get its way and is prepared to ally itself with other outcast tyrannical regimes.
The heavy missile attack today in Ukraine shows that Russia is livid and desperate.
After waging a cruel war against Ukraine for almost three years, it failed to crush the Ukrainians and assert its control over them and the immediate neighbourhood. Apart from the embarrassment, it has had to pay the price, not only in the form of international isolation and sanctions but also through the heavy losses in human resources, which in practice it regards as mere cannon fodder.
But there is an additional new element that has irked Russia even more. Remember that this is the first Christmas that Ukraine has celebrated jointly with the rest of most of the Christian world on Dec. 25. This occurred after Ukraine’s parliament and churches decided they would extricate the country from the vestiges of Russian imperialistic tutelage which used to dominate over the political and economic spheres, but until recently still extended to the cultural and religious ones.
So, finally, Ukraine is celebrating Christmas on Dec.25 in a move tantamount to spiritual decolonization but is still having to fight to secure this freedom.
Just imagine the fury in the Kremlin or its vicarious agent – the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church – for whom Christmas continues to be celebrated on January 6 and 7 according to the “old” calendar.
So, with all due respect, John, I would like to end on a lyrical note. Allow me to add three stanzas to update your classic song, in the hope that you would endorse them if you were still with us.
Yes, another year over, John,
And peace is not being given a chance.
Unless we unite against the monsters,
On our graves, the Putins will dance.
So, let’s come together right now,
And imagine there’s no haven
For despots and war criminals,
Bullies expecting us to be craven.
All you need is love, John, you once said.
But warned us against minds that hate.
We all want to change the world, you added,
So, this Christmas, let’s think about our fate.
Bohdan Nahaylo, Chief Editor of Kyiv Post, is a British-Ukrainian journalist and veteran Ukraine watcher based between Kyiv and Barcelona. He was formerly a senior United Nations official and policy adviser, and director of Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian Service.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/44469
The Guardian, 24 décembre, libre accès
With Assad’s fall, Putin’s dream of world domination is turning into a nightmare
Complaints about the president are growing among Russian military and business leaders. Now is the time for the west to turn up the heat
Extraits:
As Bashar al-Assad fell, Russian nationalist military bloggers turned on the Kremlin. “Ten years of our presence,” fumed the “Two Majors” Telegram channel to its more than one million subscribers, “dead Russian soldiers, billions of spent roubles and thousands of tonnes of ammunition, they must be compensated somehow.” Some didn’t shy away from lambasting Vladimir Putin. “The adventure in Syria, initiated by Putin personally, seems to be coming to an end. And it ends ignominiously, like all other ‘geopolitical’ endeavours of the Kremlin strategist.” These weren’t isolated incidents. Filter Labs, a data analytics company I collaborate with, saw social media sentiment on Syria dip steeply as Assad fell.
It was in stark contrast to Putin’s silly claim at his annual news conference last week that Russia had suffered no defeat in Syria. Unlike social media, legacy media tried to walk the Kremlin line, but even here there were splits. “You can bluff on the international arena for a while – but make sure you don’t fall for your own deceptions”, ran an op-ed in the broadsheet Kommersant, penned by a retired colonel close to the military leadership. (…)
Assad’s fall is not just a blow to Russia’s interests in the Middle East but to the essence of Putin’s power, which has always been about perception management. (…)
And though the Kremlin maintains Russia and China are an alliance made in economic heaven, the reality is more tenuous. Russian businesses are saying that Chinese banks will no longer work with them now that Russian institutions have been blacklisted by the US. Instead, they worry that the Chinese are offering them “deeply suspicious” ways to move money – yet they have no choice but to play along.
Wall Street Journal, 23 décembre, article payant
Putin Sends Trump a Ukraine Message
The Russian suggests his price for peace is Kyiv’s defeat and U.S. humiliation.
Extraits:
Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine, and who doesn’t? Apparently Vladimir Putin, who used his annual end-of-year news conference last week to send the President-elect a message about his peace terms.
“Now, regarding the conditions for starting negotiations: We have no preconditions,” Mr. Putin said before outlining sweeping preconditions. Talks would be “based on” 2022 negotiations in Istanbul and “proceeding from the current realities on the ground,” he said.
Russia’s 2022 Istanbul proposal called for Ukraine to abandon aspirations to join NATO, become a permanently neutral state, and drastically shrink its armed forces. This would ratify Russia’s territorial gains and render Ukraine defenseless against inevitable future Russian aggression. (…)
Mr. Putin said he’s “ready to talk any time” with Mr. Trump, and some will dismiss his tough talk as merely the opening bid in what will be an inevitable deal. But it’s a mistake to think the Kremlin boss has given up his designs to turn Ukraine into a vassal state like Belarus. Letting Russia prevail in Ukraine on anything close to Mr. Putin’s terms would send a message of appeasement that would surely mean a larger war in the future. Mr. Trump can’t let Ukraine become his Afghanistan.
Kiev Post, 23 décembre, libre accès
Export Season 2024/25: How Much Grain, Oilseed Crops Ukraine Plans to Sell
Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, it remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products.
Extraits:
(…) As emphasized by the ministry, despite Russian armed aggression, Ukraine remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products, such as grain, oilseeds, vegetables and fruit. The agricultural sector not only ensures domestic food security but provides raw materials for processing enterprises.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/44341
The Economist, 21 décembre, article payant
Staying power : Ukraine is winning the economic war against Russia
Whether that lasts depends on its ability to overcome acute shortages of power, men and money
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s economy at large has reinvented itself to navigate wartime realities. It remains one-quarter smaller than in 2021. Yet for the first time since 2022, the start of the all-out invasion, it is healthier than its enemy’s in some key respects. Ukraine’s central bank forecasts GDP to grow by 4% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025. The currency is stable and interest rates, at 13.5%, remain near their lowest in 30 months. Contrast that with Russia, where rates should soon hit 23% to arrest the rouble’s fall, banks look fragile and GDP is set to grow by just 0.5-1.5% in 2025. But Ukraine faces strong headwinds: the uptick of war, the downtick of domestic resources, and Donald Trump. How long can its economy hold out?
Ukraine’s economic history since 2022 has had three phases. In the first, amid heavy fighting, the country scrambled to put out fires. Martial law was introduced and 14m people fled their homes. Russia blockaded Black Sea ports, choking off Ukraine’s exports. The central bank’s actions were subordinated to military objectives. In the first half of 2022 it financed half of the public deficit. It imposed strict capital controls and flooded banks with liquidity. Inflation soared and GDP shrank by a third (see chart 1).
The second phase began after Ukraine repelled Russia’s advances in the country’s south, in mid-2022. As confidence improved, GDP stabilised. (…)
The return of macroeconomic stability allowed the government and firms to war-proof their operations. One priority was to protect productive assets against Russian missiles. Industrial parks were built in safer western regions. Businesses invested abroad to war-proof their income. Expatriates have generated income from abroad, too: last year one in ten new firms in Poland was set up by a Ukrainian. (…)
Private firms have pivoted, too. After Mariupol, a key port on the Sea of Azov, was obliterated in the spring of 2022, Vitalii Lopushanskyi, an entrepreneur, created UADamage, an AI outfit that parses satellite images to build interactive maps featuring every building, road or bridge that has been destroyed. He has since mapped more than 200 cities. He also teaches drones to spot mines and guide robots on the ground to disable the devices.
The last piece was to keep hard currency flowing in. In July 2023 Russia refused to renew the grain deal. Ukraine responded by opening its own maritime corridor, securing it through a remarkable campaign of sea deterrence by drones and missiles. That allowed it to resume shipments of not just grain but also metals and minerals, its second-biggest export.
These measures, together with Western aid, have prevented Russia from robbing Ukraine of the resources and morale it needs to keep fighting. Now a third phase is beginning, during which the country’s economy faces its biggest threats yet: acute shortages of power, men and money.
Take power first. In 2022 and again this spring and summer, Russia relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s grid. Despite continuous repairs, the country can count on less than half of the 36 gigawatts (GW) in generation capacity it could tap before the war. And lately Russia’s campaign has resumed. (…) On a more positive note, the country has become better equipped to absorb such shocks. (…)
The second problem—and the thorniest—is the lack of labour. Since 2022 mobilisation, migration and war have caused the workforce to shrink by over a fifth, to 13m people. Demand is strong: the number of job openings has reached 65,000 a week, up from 7,000 during the first weeks of the war—but the average opening attracts only 1.3 applications, compared with two in 2021. Wages are rising. The economy and defence ministries are locked in a tug of war over mobilisation: where to strike the right balance for the country’s future. Ukraine’s civilian leadership has so far declined the maximalist demands of military leaders, to the detriment of the front line.
There are no easy fixes. (…)
The government, too, is spending much more money than it pockets. In 2025 its budget deficit is projected to near 20% of GDP. In principle nearly all of it—$38bn—will be financed from external sources. In June the G7 agreed to a $50bn debt package for Ukraine, to be repaid from interest generated by Russia’s €260bn-worth ($273bn) of sovereign assets frozen in the West. In early December America transferred its $20bn share to a World Bank fund that Ukraine can use for non-military purposes, though Mr Trump could try to make it harder for Ukraine to access the money.
Ukraine can probably survive without American funds in 2025 anyway. Together with an €18bn tranche the EU agreed to provide under a previous programme, contributions from other G7 members would plug the gap left by Uncle Sam, says Dimitar Bogov of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Ukraine also has healthy foreign-exchange reserves. (…)
Military developments could cause a crunch before 2026. Yet businesses are cautiously optimistic. Mr Travetsky says he turned a small profit this year, the first since taking on the farm. He is thinking about starting a new line in parmesan cheese. “I’ve done the training, and I know the recipe,” he says. But the obstacles remain daunting: “Try making it when you don’t have electricity 12 hours a day.” ■
Le Figaro, 18 décembre, libre accès
Guerre en Ukraine : des «centaines» de soldats nord-coréens morts ou blessés en Russie
Les soldats nord-coréens «n’avaient jamais combattu auparavant», a estimé un responsable américain, jugeant que cela pouvait expliquer «pourquoi ils ont subi de telles pertes face aux Ukrainiens.»https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-des-centaines-de-soldats-nord-coreens-morts-ou-blesses-en-russie-20241218
The Economist, 14 décembre, article payant
Charlemagne : Europeans are hoping they can buy more guns but keep their butter
Reports of a “war economy” are much exaggerated
Extraits:
Russia produces enough military kit to build an army the size of Germany’s every six to 12 months. Under its revanchist president, Vladimir Putin, it is busy invading one European country while meddling in the affairs of several others. Western intelligence officers seem to think a Ukraine-style attack on a NATO ally by 2030 is a distinct possibility. Faced with this sobering analysis, Europeans might have been forgiven for panicking into splurging on all things military, and doing real harm to the continent’s economy in the process. But worry not. With politicians bickering about pensions and social spending, and loth to raise taxes, the reality is of a continent unwilling to inconvenience itself for something so trifling as fending off a potential invader. Europeans want more military spending, sure; some churn out ludicrous soundbites about building a “war economy”. But God forbid that anyone make voters endure the cost of it.
Scrimping on defence is nothing new for Europeans. After the cold war ended, cutting military budgets became the norm, like taking August off or retiring in one’s prime. By 2014 today’s 27 European Union members were spending under 1.4% of their collective GDP on defence—less than on alcohol and tobacco. The military figure has since increased at a steady, if unspectacular, pace (just as booze and fags have gone out of fashion). This year the EU’s members will together finally meet the 2% target set by NATO, to which most belong, after Mr Putin first had a crack at Ukraine a decade ago. A few big countries, notably Italy and Spain, are still far below that level. (…)
Donald Trump, as he prepares to return to the White House, has made clear he will no longer tolerate Europe spending roughly a third of what America does on defence. On December 8th he reiterated that he was willing to stay in NATO only as long as Europeans “pay their bills”. To appease the incoming blusterer-in-chief and dissuade Mr Putin, Europe knows it must find more money. The trouble is, many national exchequers are bare and politics across the continent is messier than ever. Chaos reigns in France; Germany is in the early throes of an electoral campaign that will probably result in a new chancellor only after months of coalition-building. Collective action at EU level is impeded by the fact that certain prime ministers, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, respect the Kremlin more than they do fellow European leaders.
Everyone knows their armies need more cash, not least to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine. So how might it be done? The simplest way is for national governments, who after all oversee their armed forces and spend most of the tax levied in Europe, to cut larger cheques. A few already do. Poland says it will spend 4.7% of its GDP on defence next year, the most of any NATO member. But others are constrained by having maxed out their national credit card: France, Italy and Spain all have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 100%, and are under pressure from both markets and EU wallahs to improve their public finances. Apart from countries bordering Russia, voters clobbered by covid and then by soaring energy prices are in no mood for less social spending or higher taxes. Do not deprive us of butter, is the gist of Europe’s current politics.
Another way to boost defence expenditure is to do it at EU level. (…) Perhaps the money could be borrowed by EU members collectively instead, as it was to fund a €750bn pandemic-recovery fund in 2021? France has mooted such a joint bond, which would help skirt the issue of fiscal constraints. But more EU-level debt is unacceptable to “prudent” countries like the Netherlands that see common borrowing as a scheme to make frugal northerners pay for spendthrift southerners. (…)
Europe thus needs clever tricks to fund military stuff without crossing various red lines. One idea is for a “coalition of the willing” in Europe to raise €500bn by creating a fund essentially backed by promises of higher future defence spending. (…)
Details of the plan are vague. Its main selling point is that it has not been shot down since the Financial Times reported iton December 5th. A big figure would help send Mr Trump the message that Europe is doing something. In practice an extra €500bn would push outlays to just 2.4% of EU GDP (meanwhile a new NATO target of 3% is being floated). And a squabble would ensue over spending. Who decides whether to buy Europe-made kit (as France prefers, to ensure the long-term “strategic autonomy” of the EU) or off-the-shelf weaponry from America (as many others would like, to ensure the stuff is delivered soon), say? Raising money for defence is hard, paying it out may be even harder. ■
Wall Street Journal, 11 décembre, article payant
Stopping ‘Endless Wars’ Is Easier Said Than Done
Trump will need to overcome four foreign-policy fallacies to resolve entrenched conflicts.
Extraits:
Donald Trump’s promise to “put an end to endless wars” resonates with an American public fatigued by decades of military entanglements. His calls for efficient, clear objectives and reduced U.S. involvement abroad reflect a pragmatic approach to the nation’s challenges.
But Mr. Trump’s ambitions also underscore the enduring complexity of war. Wars are rarely resolved on convenient timelines or with numerical or technological superiority alone. As 19th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously warned, the first act of a statesman is to recognize the type of war he is in. Clausewitz described war as a contest of wills in which human determination outweighs material advantages. Misunderstanding the character of a conflict can lead to unintended consequences.
To reach his goals, Mr. Trump must heed Clausewitz’s advice. Achieving global success requires understanding the human and ideological dimensions of war and seeing past at least four common foreign-policy fallacies.
The first is the “abacus fallacy,” the belief that wars are won by tallying resources. Analysts often reduce military conflict to a numbers game, focusing on troop counts, tanks or artillery rounds. (…)
This fallacy persists today. In February 2022, many commentators predicted a Ukrainian defeat based on Russia’s numerical military advantages. But Ukraine’s innovative use of resources—information warfare, decentralized command structures, and asymmetric tactics such as using swarms of cheap, expendable drones to complement limited advanced-fire capabilities—highlight the qualitative dimensions of war. Numbers alone fail to account for human ingenuity, resilience and the will to fight.
The second is the “vampire fallacy.” First referenced in 2014 by Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, who later served as Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, the vampire fallacy promises that technological superiority will deliver swift victories. This too led observers to predict that Kyiv would fall within days of Russia’s invasion. Ukraine’s resilience shattered this illusion, proving that like numerical advantage, technological advantage can’t always replace determination. (…)
Gen. McMaster has warned of a third narrative, the “Zero Dark Thirty fallacy,” which elevates precision strikes and special operations to the level of grand strategy. After Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, some analysts initially suggested Israel could achieve its objectives through targeted raids and bombings alone. These recommendations ignored Gaza’s hostile environment, radicalized population and war-adapted terrain. (…)
This leads to the fourth error, the “peace table fallacy”—the belief that all wars end in negotiations. This approach isn’t always feasible. Simple calls for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia or for Israel to seek peace with Hamas ignore ideological and political stakes. Wars don’t end simply because one side desires peace; they end when one side achieves its objectives or both reach a stalemate.
The U.S. has fallen victim to these fallacies throughout history. (…)
Mr. Trump’s desire to simplify U.S. foreign policy and focus on achieving clear goals is admirable. But the complexity of war demands a careful and nuanced approach. Clausewitz’s reminder to recognize the type of war being waged remains vital. Wars are not contests of spreadsheets but struggles of will, shaped by leadership, morale and adaptability. To be successful, Mr. Trump must resist the allure of quick fixes and instead embrace strategies that reflect the unique nature of each conflict.
Mr. Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute.
Le Figaro, 11 décembre, libre accès
Pour Donald Trump, la «priorité» est de résoudre la guerre en Ukraine
Dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi, le président élu estime que «le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais (…) c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie».
Extraits:
Le président américain élu Donald Trump a estimé que sa priorité serait de «résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie», parmi les multiples crises en cours dans le monde, dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi. «La priorité, c’est de résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie. Ces deux pays subissent des pertes humaines incroyables. Des centaines de milliers de soldats sont tués», a affirmé samedi Donald Trump à l’hebdomadaire lors de son passage à Paris pour la réouverture de la cathédrale Notre-Dame.
«Il y a énormément de crises dans le monde. Depuis quelques jours, on en a une nouvelle en Syrie. Ils devront se débrouiller tout seul car nous ne sommes pas impliqués là-bas, et la France non plus», a-t-il ajouté. «Le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais je pense que c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie», a-t-il précisé.
(…) Samedi, pour la première fois depuis son élection, Trump a rencontré à Paris le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky, sous les auspices du président français Emmanuel Macron.
Le lendemain, il a appelé à un «cessez-le-feu immédiat» et à des négociations, écrivant sur sa plateforme Truth Social que Zelensky était prêt à «conclure un accord et mettre fin à cette folie». Le président ukrainien a exprimé de son côté mardi sa «profonde reconnaissance» envers le président républicain pour «sa forte détermination» à mettre fin à la guerre avec la Russie. (…)
Ukrainska Pravda, 9 décembre, libre accès
After Syria, world must realise that Russia can be defeated – Polish PM
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has linked the fall of the Syrian regime to the possibility of defeating Russia and its allies.
Extraits:
Quote: “The events in Syria have made the world realise once again, or at least they should, that even the most cruel regime may fall and that Russia and its allies can be defeated.”
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/12/8/7488259/
Wall Street Journal, Opinion, 6 décembre, article payant
Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
The Russian ruler wants to scare the West. But he has problems that escalation in Ukraine wouldn’t solve.
Extraits:
When Vladimir Putin announced in a Nov. 21 video address that Russia had launched a new high-speed ballistic missile with nuclear capacity against Ukraine, he didn’t move his hands or fingers for nearly eight minutes. Observers concluded that the video had been doctored to hide that Mr. Putin suffers from hand tremors. Before the announcement, he had been absent from public view for 13 days. According to reliable Kremlin watchers, Mr. Putin’s appearances as shown on his website during that period were “canned goods,” or prerecorded.
Whatever the reason for the president’s prolonged absence, the Kremlin is going all out to show the world that its leader is indomitable, an important message as the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and Mr. Putin raises the specter of nuclear conflict. (…)
The Kremlin clearly aims to instill fear of nuclear escalation in Ukraine and NATO countries. According to political commentator Abbas Gallyamov, “in recent weeks, the number of mentions of nuclear weapons by the authorities has skyrocketed. . . . Even the Russian patriarch has joined in: he says that nuclear war is OK.” Western arms analysts have also raised the alarm, portraying Russia’s new system as a devastating threat to Europe. Tucker Carlson warned in a video from Moscow this week that “we are far closer to nuclear war than at any time in history.”
The key question is whether Mr. Putin would follow through on his threats. (…) Russian political analyst Maksim Katz observed recently: “Everything we know about Vladimir Putin tells us that such a decision is unlikely.” “For his entire quarter of a century in power,” Mr. Katz writes, “he has clearly demonstrated that he is not going to risk his life. The use of nuclear weapons in any form is a big step toward the grave.” (…)
By all accounts, Mr. Putin is unusually fearful of death. Covid caused him to retreat into paranoid isolation in his residence outside Moscow. Visitors had to quarantine for as much as two weeks and pass through a disinfectant tunnel before meeting with him at the end of a 20-foot-long table. Mr. Putin often brings his own white thermos mug to conferences and dinners with foreign leaders and uses a special, heavily armored train for travel in Russia. To keep safe in the event of a nuclear attack, Mr. Putin reportedly has several lavish underground bunkers, including at least one in the Ural Mountains and another under his palace at Gelendzhik on the Black Sea.
According to Russian military expert Ian Matveev, Mr. Putin is making nuclear threats because he is desperate. (…)
Mr. Matveev states that Mr. Putin “doesn’t understand what to do and how to respond, because he doesn’t want to drop a nuclear bomb. He doesn’t want to start a war with NATO, as he promised after [Ukraine’s] long-range strikes. So, he has to make such a showy action in the spirit of—‘look, I have a ballistic missile.’ ”
Time isn’t on Mr. Putin’s side. Thanks to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the ruble’s value has plummeted, inflation is rising, and declining economic growth is causing dissention among the country’s elite. The military is so desperate for manpower that it is using North Korean troops to regain territory in Kursk. (…)
As Mr. Katz observed, the Russian president is “trying to impress everyone with some kind of wonder weapon, while people do nothing but look at the dollar exchange rate.” For ordinary Russians, Mr. Putin’s nuclear swagger might not be enough to compensate for the exorbitant price of butter.
Ms. Knight is author, most recently, of “The Kremlin’s Noose: Putin’s Bitter Feud With the Oligarch Who Made Him Ruler of Russia.”
L’Express, 6 décembre, libre accès
La Russie prête à se défendre par “tous les moyens” : la dernière menace du Kremlin
Guerre en Ukraine. Le chef de la diplomatie russe dit avoir envoyé “un signal” aux alliés de Kiev après le tir d’un puissant missile à moyenne portée sur l’Ukraine, fin novembre.
The Economist, 6 décembre, article payant
Death from above : How Ukraine uses cheap AI-guided drones to deadly effect against Russia
Ukraine is making tens of thousands of them
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s drone war is evolving rapidly. Once a cheap answer to Russia’s artillery dominance, Ukrainian small and inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drones are now a force in their own right. They are used on a huge scale, with Ukraine projected to produce 2m this year. Ukraine now observes 1,000 Russian drones in every 24-hour period, says an insider. That has made some sections of the front lines, for example around Siversk in Luhansk province, practically no-go areas for humans. Drones are now responsible for a majority of battlefield losses, overtaking artillery, according to Ukrainian sources. (…)
The biggest change of all is that electronic warfare—essentially jamming—has consumed the battlefield. (…)
Data from the battlefield suggest that the hit rate for these AI-guided drones is currently above 80%. That is higher than the rate of manually piloted drones. (…)
The result is that Ukraine has become the furnace of a new kind of software-defined warfare which combines precision with mass. (…)
In both cases the drones themselves are made in Ukraine, by Ukrainians. One advantage of that is scale. Auterion’s largest partner in Ukraine, one of many, churns out 300,000 drones per year. Although recent Chinese sanctions have threatened to disrupt Ukraine’s drone supply chain, Mr Meier says that alternatives from Taiwan are now available. (…)
The tech entrepreneur rejects talk of military automation as some kind of dystopian future. “Using AI to accurately target is far more ethical than lobbing missiles and artillery,” he says. Ultimately, a human still has to make the final call on any engagement, says Mr Scherf. But Western and Ukrainian companies are busy working on deep-strike drones whose AI systems will be able to hunt for a wide range of potential targets far from the human operator. Mr Azhnyuk of The Fourth Law sees current technology as just the start. He hopes to have a prototype of a fully automated system, from launch to strike, built by early next year.■
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
NATO Chief Urges More Weapons for Ukraine Ahead of Any Peace Talks
Mark Rutte said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia — and that the West should help strengthen Kyiv’s position beforehand.
Extraits:
NATO’s new top diplomat suggested on Tuesday that Ukraine should put off any peace talks with Russia until Western allies can send enough military aid to help Kyiv push ahead on the battlefield and garner a stronger negotiating position.
Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia in a war that has dragged on for nearly three years.
But with U.S. President-elect Donald J. Trump vowing to secure a quick cease-fire that officials in Kyiv fear would be favorable to Russia — and despite war fatigue hanging over parts of Europe — Mr. Rutte urged the military alliance’s members to step up shipments of weapons, ammunition and air defenses before they try working toward a truce.
“Let’s not have all these discussions, step by step, on what a peace process might look like,” Mr. Rutte said ahead of two days of meetings of foreign ministers, including Ukraine’s, at NATO headquarters in Brussels. “Make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to get to a position of strength when those peace talks start.”
“So I would say more military aid, and less discussions on what the peace process could look like,” Mr. Rutte added.
His comments came even as President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has recently shifted his public stance on a potential peace deal. After years of insisting that Ukraine would cede no territory to Russia in a deal, he has recently signaled that Ukraine would be willing to do so — for now, at least — in return for NATO membership.
While NATO membership remains unlikely while the war is ongoing, Mr. Zelensky’s rhetoric is a marked change. Officials in Kyiv have even provided a rationale that could potentially allow them to temporarily cede territory, asserting that Russian-controlled land in Ukraine would not be internationally recognized as part of Russia. (…)
Mr. Trump has been vague about how he would bring peace to Ukraine in as little as 24 hours, as he has pledged. But senior officials in his administration, including Vice President-elect JD Vance, have proposed such ideas as allowing Russia to keep the territory it has captured and guaranteeing that Ukraine will not join NATO, or withholding military aid to Ukraine until it agrees to negotiate. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/nato-ukraine-trump-peace-talks.html
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
Investigation Into Forced Adoptions From Ukraine Points Finger at Putin
Yale researchers traced hundreds of children taken to Russia in the war, finding what they described as “a higher level of crime than first understood.”
Extraits:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and senior Kremlin officials “intentionally and directly” authorized a program of coerced fostering and adoption of Ukrainian children during the war in Ukraine, according to a Yale University report that was released on Tuesday.
The report provides strong new evidence for a war crimes case against Putin and other officials, the researchers said.
An investigation by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified 314 children from Ukraine who have been placed in a “systematic program of coerced adoption and fostering” since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to the report. It details evidence of direct orders from senior Russian officials, including Mr. Putin, to carry out the adoption program.
“It reveals a higher level of crime than first understood,” the Research Lab, which is part of the Conflict Observatory, a program supported by the U.S. Department of State, said in a statement.
Yale’s investigation could bolster the case against Mr. Putin and his commissioner for children, Maria Lvova-Belova, who were named in an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in March last year for their roles in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. (…)
The report says the Russian president’s office provided direct financial support and other assets for the program.
The treatment of the Ukrainian children may constitute a war crime or crimes against humanity, and could even support a case of genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Research Lab said. (…)
The Kremlin has denied committing war crimes, and maintains that the adoptions are a patriotic and humanitarian effort to help abandoned children. (…) The report also accused the Russian authorities of working to conceal the origin and whereabouts of the Ukrainian children. After the international court issued its arrest warrants, Russia removed much of the evidence from relevant websites, the report said.
“Russia engaged in acts of deception to conceal the full scope of this program and related activities,” the report said. “Most critically, children taken from Ukraine are fundamentally presented in Russia’s databases as if they were from Russia.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-children-deportation-adoption.html
😮 Le Figaro, 3 décembre, article payant
Sergueï Karaganov, architecte de la politique étrangère russe: « La dissuasion ne fonctionne plus, il faut réinstaurer la peur»
ENTRETIEN – Écouté au Kremlin, président d’honneur du très influent Conseil de politique étrangère et de défense (SVOP) qu’il a cofondé en 1992, Sergueï Karaganov est une figure clé de la pensée stratégique russe.
Extraits:
LE FIGARO. – Que pensez-vous des changements apportés récemment par Vladimir Poutine à la doctrine nucléaire russe ?
Sergueï KARAGANOV. – L’objectif de la politique de la Russie est d’abaisser le seuil d’utilisation des armes nucléaires et de barrer la route à une guerre nucléaire majeure. Poutine a précisé que la Russie a le droit d’utiliser des armes nucléaires, y compris contre des puissances non-nucléaires qui mènent la guerre contre nous avec le soutien de puissances nucléaires. Il s’agit d’une innovation importante, mais il existe également d’autres changements. Je m’en félicite car cela fait plusieurs années que je plaide pour de tels changements et je suis heureux d’avoir contribué à lancer une discussion sur ces sujets. Nous proposons d’ailleurs d’autres évolutions dans notre dernier livre. (1)
Depuis de nombreuses années, je suis extrêmement troublé par le fait qu’une grande partie de la population, en particulier des élites – en Occident mais pas seulement – ont été gagnées par une sorte de parasitisme stratégique : les gens se sont habitués à la paix ; ils n’ont plus peur de la guerre. Je considère que c’est très dangereux. Depuis une quinzaine d’années, le monde est entré dans une période de bouleversements tectoniques qui conduiront inévitablement à des crises. La menace qu’un grand nombre de ces crises dégénèrent en une guerre mondiale et nucléaire générale augmente rapidement. Nous devons tout faire pour empêcher le monde de glisser vers la troisième guerre mondiale.
Comment faire, selon vous ?
Pendant soixante-dix ans, les armes nucléaires nous ont sauvés de la guerre. Mais la peur de ces armes s’est apaisée et il est nécessaire de la réinstaurer car des crises et des conflits surgiront inexorablement compte tenu des changements tectoniques que j’évoquais. Je me suis aperçu que nous étions tous intellectuellement bloqués aux années 1970-1980, alors que le monde a changé de façon spectaculaire, y compris sur le plan nucléaire. La dissuasion nucléaire ne fonctionne plus. Il faut réintroduire un fusible nucléaire dans l’ensemble du système international et cela ne s’applique pas seulement aux relations entre la Russie et l’Occident.
Vos propositions risquent de mener à une escalade…
Oui, il est nécessaire de conduire à l’escalade. J’encourage la Russie à progresser sur l’échelle de l’escalade vers la dissuasion et l’intimidation. Des pas ont déjà été faits en ce sens mais il faut aller plus loin pour dégriser tout d’abord nos voisins européens qui, de mon point de vue, ont perdu la raison. Comme il y a cent ans, ils sont en train de pousser le monde vers une guerre mondiale tandis que les Américains misent cyniquement sur une guerre entre la Russie et l’Europe en espérant qu’un tel conflit épuise la Russie et dépouille en même temps l’Europe. (…)
(1) « De la dissuasion à l’intimidation » (2024, non traduit en français)
The Economist, 2 décembre, article payant
Rouble worries : Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort
Supplies from China are about to become more expensive
Extraits:
AT FIRST GLANCE, it did not look that different from other sanctions. On November 21st America’s Treasury Department imposed new restrictions on more than four dozen Russian banks, including Gazprombank, the financial arm of the giant state gas firm. The bank, the largest in Russia not already subject to American sanctions, had been excluded from previous packages in order to allow some central and eastern European countries, including Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, to continue paying for imports of Russian gas. After December 20th, when the measures take full effect, European buyers of Russian gas will be forced to find workarounds involving either third-party banks or currencies other than the dollar, which will take time.
America’s announcement came at a bad moment for the Russian economy, meaning that foreign-exchange markets were quick to respond. The prospect of new restrictions on access to hard currency sent the rouble down by 10% against the dollar to a low of 115 on November 27th, before the central bank inspired a modest rally by using its reserves to buy roubles. Even after this rally, the rouble is still down by 8% against the dollar over the past month and by more than 15% in the year so far. Russia’s currency is at its weakest since immediately after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The government is putting a brave face on the news. Speaking in Kazakhstan on November 28th, Vladimir Putin told reporters that “there are certainly no grounds for panic.”
wrong. Indeed, the latest fall in the rouble’s value makes the job of Russia’s central bank much more difficult. Wartime spending has used up spare capacity in the economy, driving down unemployment to just 2.4%. The government’s latest budget, unveiled in September, will raise defence and security spending by another 25% next year, to around 8% of Russia’s GDP, a post-cold-war high. Annual inflation is running at more than 8%.
In this context, a weaker rouble is a doubled-edged sword. A lower level against the dollar increases the rouble value of oil exports, helping plug the government’s widening deficit. Yet it also pushes up the price of imported goods—something that matters for both consumers and the government’s war effort. (…)
Against a backdrop of high inflation and fears over the value of the currency, Russia’s central bank has already lifted interest rates to 21% this year. Traders now expect rates to end the year at 25%, up from expectations of 23% before the recent slide in the rouble’s value. So far, the Russian government has shielded both consumers and firms from the effects of higher rates via a variety of subsidised-borrowing schemes. But with public finances under pressure, support has recently been scaled back. (…)
The combination of a declining currency and a ballooning budget deficit has led to talk of a hard landing for the Russian economy in 2025. After two years of strong growth, which has confounded many analysts’ gloomy predictions, the pace of expansion will slow sharply. The economic bill for the war is at last coming due. It could be a big one. ■
The Economist, 29 novembre, article payant
The least bad deal for Ukraine : How to make a success of peace talks with Vladimir Putin
The key is robust security guarantees for Ukrainians
Extraits:
FOR TWO years the war in Ukraine has been fought metre by blood-soaked metre. Suddenly, dramatic change is at hand. One reason is that Russia’s grinding advance has exposed grave weaknesses in manpower and morale that could eventually lead to a collapse in Ukraine’s lines. More urgent, Donald Trump has made clear that, as president, he will be impatient for the shooting to stop.
The great worry is that Mr Trump will impose a disastrous deal on Ukraine. Vladimir Putin says he might be willing to freeze the front lines, though Russia occupies just 70-80% of four Ukrainian provinces it has annexed. But he is also demanding that the West should lift sanctions; that Ukraine should renounce NATO membership; that it be demilitarised and formally neutral; that it “denazify” itself by jettisoning its leaders; and that it protect the rights of Russian-speakers.
Should Mr Trump back this, Mr Putin would have achieved most of his war aims and Ukraine would have suffered a catastrophic defeat. What is more, Russia’s president would not respect a piece of paper. He would hope that post-war Ukraine, consumed by infighting and recriminations against the West, would fall into his lap. If it did not, he might seize more territory by force. As the self-appointed guardian of Ukraine’s Russian-speakers, he could easily concoct a pretext.
That is the fear. But it is not inevitable, nor even the likeliest outcome. Capitulation to Mr Putin would be a public defeat for America and Mr Trump. It would spill over into Asia, where America’s foes might become more aggressive and its friends might lose confidence in their ally and curry favour with China instead. And Mr Trump would surely want to avoid the humiliation of being known as the man who lost Ukraine by being out-negotiated by Mr Putin. It is in his own narrow interest to forge a deal that keeps Ukraine safe for at least the four years of his term. In that time Ukraine can accomplish a lot. (…)
Mr Trump has leverage over Russia if he wants to use it. Because he is unpredictable, he could threaten to go all-in with Ukraine by sending it more and deadlier weapons, and Mr Putin would have to take him seriously. In addition, the Russian economy is hurting, the rouble is tumbling and Russians are tired of fighting. (…)
What, then, should a deal aim for? Restoring the borders of 1991 is a pipe dream. Morally and legally, all that land belongs to Ukraine, but it does not have the soldiers, arms or ammunition to recapture it. Instead, the aim should be to create the conditions for Ukraine to thrive in the territory it now controls.
For that it will require stability and reconstruction, both of which depend on being safe from Russian aggression. That is why at the heart of the talks will be how to devise a credible and durable framework for Ukrainian security.
The Economist has argued that the best way of protecting Ukraine would be for it to join NATO. Membership would help prevent it from becoming unstable, embittered and vulnerable to co-option by Mr Putin in pursuit of his ultimate aim, which is to destabilise and dominate Europe. It would also bring Europe’s largest, most innovative and battle-hardened army and defence industry into the alliance—something that Mr Trump might welcome, because NATO would then need fewer American troops.
Membership raises hard questions, because of the alliance’s “Article 5” pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all. But answers exist. The guarantee need not cover the parts of Ukraine that Russia now occupies—just as it did not cover East Germany when West Germany joined in 1955. (…)
We still favour these arguments. (…)
It would also need a change of approach in Europe, particularly in Germany. (…)
A ceasefire would present two competing visions of Ukraine’s future. Mr Putin’s calculation is that he will win from a deal because Ukraine will rot, Russia will re-arm and the West will lose interest. But imagine that, with Western backing, Ukraine used the lull to rebuild its economy, refresh its politics and deter Russia from aggression. The task is to ensure that this vision prevails over its grim alternative. ■
The Economist, Briefing, 28 novembre, article payant
Inaugural call : How will Donald Trump handle the war in Ukraine?
And how will Ukraine, Russia and Europe respond?
Extraits :
“THEY’RE DYING, Russians and Ukrainians,” lamented Donald Trump last year. “I want them to stop dying. And I’ll have that done…in 24 hours.” In January Mr Trump returns to the White House. Can he put an end to the largest war in Europe since 1945? The odds are stacked against him. He will need to overcome Russian recalcitrance, Ukrainian indignation and European disunity. “It’s like Christopher Columbus trying to see over the ocean, thinking he is headed for India,” says Konstantin Gryshchenko, a former Ukrainian deputy prime minister and foreign secretary. The fear is that Mr Trump will push through a bad deal for appearances’ sake.
If Mr Trump’s priority is to strike a deal—any deal—then he could simply cut aid to Ukraine and insist that it accept Russia’s demands. Some in his circle, such as his son Donald junior, delight in the idea that Mr Trump will cut off Ukraine’s “allowance”, ie, the billions America is giving it in military and economic support to fend off Russia’s full-scale invasion. “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another,” declared J.D. Vance, the vice-president-elect, in 2022. “I…remain opposed to virtually any proposal for the United States to continue funding this war,” he added in April this year. (…)
If America cut Ukraine adrift, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, could more or less dictate terms. (…) In November Russian officials told Reuters, a news agency, that they would consider merely freezing the current lines with “room for negotiation over the precise carve-up” of territory. But with Ukrainian forces retreating, the Russian defence industry humming and North Korean troops joining the fray on Russia’s side, Mr Putin believes he has the upper hand. Although economic and social pressures are rising at home, he is in no rush to end the war. (…)
Some observers believe, however, that Mr Trump would consider a Ukrainian defeat bad both for America and his own image. “Trump won’t be played for a sucker,” argues Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank in Washington, DC, who recently co-authored an article for The Economist with Mike Waltz, whom Mr Trump has chosen as his national security adviser. “He will walk away from a bad deal.” Mr Trump, insiders say, fears a failure in Ukraine would dent his popularity, just as the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 hurt President Joe Biden. (…)
Another question is what role Europe will play. (…) Mr Trump is still “playing with ideas,” says the diplomat, “and he’s looking for input from Europeans”.
Input, yes, but perhaps also a pound of flesh. Mr Trump believes that when it comes to helping Ukraine, as with European defence in general, Europeans should be bearing most of the cost. European countries allocated around €118bn ($124bn) in aid to Ukraine from January 24th 2022 to August 31st 2024, compared to America’s €85bn—almost a 60:40 ratio (see chart). But if Mr Trump were to demand an 80:20 split instead, so be it, suggests the European diplomat, who thinks that a modest price to pay for America’s continued involvement. Europe’s war fatigue is overstated. In Germany, for instance, according to a recent Politbarometer poll, 43% of respondents would like aid to Ukraine to increase whereas only 24% want it reduced.
The problem is that, if a deal is done, political support for maintaining aid might dissipate quickly. Russia is spending more than 8% of GDP on defence, and so could continue to re-arm. Ukraine, meanwhile, would be forced to demobilise to revive its economy. That might tempt Mr Putin to try again in a year or two.
Ukraine, naturally, would like firm security guarantees. That would ideally come in the form of NATO membership. But Mr Trump has often disparaged the alliance. (…)
Some in Mr Trump’s entourage have suggested that Europe instead form a coalition of the willing to deploy troops inside Ukraine. Any deployment would severely tax Europe’s armed forces. Eastern European countries, several of which host multinational NATO battlegroups, would not want to give them up. Nor would NATO’s high command want to hand over the alliance’s reserve forces. Money is another concern. (…)
European governments do not appear to have thought all this through in detail, says a person familiar with the issue. (…)
Mr Macron has publicly aired the idea of sending French troops to Ukraine. Britain would also be a plausible member of any expeditionary force. Its armed forces have been heavily involved in Ukraine and Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, is keen to rebuild security and defence ties with European partners. German officials are more hesitant. But Friedrich Merz, the leader of the right-wing Christian Democrats and the likely chancellor after elections in February, is thought to be more open to the idea. (…)
These plans depend, however, on Mr Trump retaining some interest in a deal. (…)
More out of hope than conviction, America’s allies express confidence that Mr Trump will not sell out Ukraine. Many of Ukraine’s top officials welcomed Mr Trump’s election. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has floated special access for American firms to Ukraine’s deposits of rare minerals as a quid pro quo that may appeal to the transactional Mr Trump. Admiral Rob Bauer, the head of NATO’s military committee, speaking at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada in late November, declared, “I cannot imagine it’s in the interest of the United States that Putin comes out of any possible peace negotiations as the winner.” A European foreign minister refused to entertain the idea that Ukraine would be abandoned. “It would be such a shock that it’s not going to happen.” ■
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/11/27/how-will-donald-trump-handle-the-war-in-ukraine
The Economist, 27 novembre, article payant
Counting the dead : How many Ukrainian soldiers have died?
Three charts show the country’s losses
Extraits :
BOTH SIDES have paid a horrific price for Russia’s three-year long war in Ukraine. A report in the Wall Street Journal in November, citing anonymous Western intelligence officials, said that up to 200,000 Russian soldiers have died so far. The Economist’s most recent estimate, published July 2024, said that 106,000-140,000 Russian troops had died as of June 21st. The data on Ukraine’s losses are harder to come by, in part because its allies are reluctant to provide estimates.
Data from UAlosses, a website, suggest that at least 60,435 soldiers have died since 2022. Unlike other sources, UAlosses catalogues the names and ages of the dead, making it possible to calculate casualties by age group and as a percentage of the male population. (Although some women serve on the front lines, the vast majority of fighters are men.)
The figures suggest that more than 0.5% of Ukraine’s pre-war population of men of fighting age (18-49-year-olds) have been killed. (…)
In both countries battle deaths as a share of population are higher than those that America suffered in the Vietnam and Korean wars combined. Their combat death toll is fast approaching America’s losses in the second world war. Russia’s losses in Ukraine since 2022, not including deaths of foreign fighters it has recruited, dwarf the number of casualties from all its wars since 1945 combined.
After nearly three years of fighting morale on the front lines is plummeting. Ukraine’s and Russia’s allies want the fighting to end. A growing number of Ukrainians accept that a ceasefire might be the only way forward.■
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/11/26/how-many-ukrainian-soldiers-have-died
Wall Street Journal, 26 novembre, article payant
Europe Can’t Make Ukraine Enough Weapons—So It’s Paying Kyiv to Do It
‘Danish Model’ of funding cuts costs, delays and corruption, boosters say
Extraits :
KYIV, Ukraine—Ukraine’s European allies, struggling to produce enough weapons for Kyiv’s war effort, are pioneering a new method: giving Ukrainians money to do it themselves.
In the new approach, Europeans are financing Ukrainian government contracts with cash-strapped Ukrainian arms makers to produce equipment for the country’s armed forces, including long-range missiles and drones that can strike Russian territory. Kyiv tells its allies which companies to work with and armaments to buy, and the Europeans vet the producers independently before agreeing to deals.
Ukraine will still rely on Western allies for advanced weapons such as Patriot surface-to-air interceptor missiles. But officials say the new approach will allow Kyiv to acquire weapons faster and in greater number than waiting for European arms to be produced. Ukraine can do this because its arms industry is operating far below its production capacity—30% of its potential, by some estimates—because of insufficient funding.
Proponents of the approach say Ukrainian defense firms are able to churn out many systems faster and less expensively than Western suppliers can. Ukrainian firms also tailor equipment more specifically to the country’s ever-changing front-line needs, while bolstering its defense industry for the future.
Dubbed the “Danish Model” after Copenhagen developed the approach with Ukraine earlier this year, the system is drawing growing participation and interest from other countries. Norway, Sweden and Lithuania have provided money, and other nations have expressed interest, according to Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen. Germany has already applied a similar approach and the Netherlands, in parallel, is contracting directly with Ukrainian companies.
Denmark developed its approach because it, like many allies, had already donated to Kyiv almost all of its available weaponry, say officials. The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and the Baltic states are also in this group.
The model is part of a broader effort by Northern European and Baltic countries to consolidate cooperation to boost Ukraine. It emerged after France, Germany and other big countries failed to unite the continent behind a coherent plan, and as Europe braces for the incoming Trump administration, which could reduce U.S. engagement across the continent. (…)
The Guardian, Guest Essay, 26 novembre, libre accès
Who is really escalating the war in Ukraine? It certainly isn’t the west
The policy of the US and Europe remains the same: drip-feeding resources while never giving Ukraine the chance to push Russia out
Extraits :
Even for a country that has been at war for more than 1,000 days, the past month has been rough for Ukraine: its nemesis, Russia, has acquired 11,000 troops from North Korea and mercenaries from Yemen to assist in its project to delete Ukraine. Russia has also pulverised Ukraine’s energy grid with renewed ferocity as temperatures fall below freezing and fired off experimental intermediate-range weaponry, and it continues to make gains in the east. As if that weren’t enough, Russia’s preferred candidate has been elected as the American president, promising to end the war in “24 hours” – and not in Ukraine’s favour.
And yet after all this, the question I have been asked continuously over the past week is: “Is the west escalating the war?” The question refers to the rescinding of some of the limitations imposed on Ukraine which forbade it from using western missiles to strike inside Russian territory. Far from being escalatory, western policy on the war is in fact best described as incrementalism – a drip-feed release of weaponry, which keeps Ukraine on a lifeline but certainly doesn’t allow it the possibility of pushing Russia out. (…)
Had the equipment been given before the invasion, and the permission to use it appropriately been given just after, Ukraine would surely be in a better position now. One can’t say for certain that Ukraine would have pushed Russia out of its territory. But then equally one can’t say for certain that Russia would have invaded at all if Ukraine had been better armed. What one can say, however, is that it would have been a fairer fight and that fewer Ukrainians would have died – both on the frontline and in major cities.
Their blood is on Russia’s hands first and foremost. But to some extent it is also on ours, as we could have prevented some of it. (…)
What is needed for Ukraine to stand any chance of continuing as a sovereign and whole state is to stop the drip-feed and learn from professional cycling the concept of “incremental gains” – small changes, none of which alone bring a team victory butwhich, when deployed together in the right volumes and permutations, do.
These include using Russia’s stranded $300bn in reserves; tightening sanctions (especially against Russia’s shadow fleet transporting oil); sending existing stocks of equipment and munitions (especially air defence systems); investing in European member states’ defence industries with the specific aim of supplying Ukraine; removing any still-existing restrictions on weapons usage for the targeting of Russian troops, supplies, supply lines or infrastructure inside Russia; destroying Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory as is done for Israel; deploying Nato troops in western and central Ukraine to assist with logistics, supplies and training to ease pressure on Ukraine’s own military; and drawing up a membership plan for Nato accession for future security. (…)
There’s one more reason why the west has not done all it could. And that is that we’re talking about Ukraine. Because if this were Portugal or France, we would surely have moved heaven and earth to protect it in full. Ukraine, however, is deemed “not Europe” and is more easily ignored.
There’s only one problem with that (two, if you count the moral vacuousness). Ukraine is the frontline. Moldova, also once part of the Kremlin’s empire, is leaving Russia’s orbit and is surely in danger. Poland and the Baltic states also “antagonise” Russia by existing independently of Moscow’s control.
At what point does the western world decide that enough is enough and realise that this war needs to be fought and won, not managed and lost?
James Nixey leads the Russia-Eurasia programme at Chatham House
Kiev Post, 25 novembre, libre accès
Moscow Recruits Yemeni Mercenaries for War in Ukraine, Report Says
The number of mercenaries is in the hundreds, though many of them claimed they were duped into fighting after being lured by high salaries.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/42769
The Economist, 25 novembre, article payant
An assault on Zaporizhia looms : Ukraine’s warriors brace for a Kremlin surge in the south
Vladimir Putin’s war machine is pushing harder and crushing Ukrainian morale
Extraits :
(…) The situation on the front lines is widely accepted to be as difficult as at any time since the early days of the war, with many fearing a significant Ukrainian retreat may soon be inevitable. For now, the looming threat keeps the soldiers in Zaporizhia focussed. They say they remember the atrocities that followed Russian advances and occupation. The experience of resistance still counts for something. As weak as Ukraine is, Russia can be beaten, argues Forest. The proof? An ambush in February, when his battalion singlehandedly destroyed a mechanised column of two dozen Russian vehicles. “To those who shout we’re screwed, I ask them when hasn’t Ukraine been screwed?”
But Ukraine’s systemic weakness is clearly taking its toll on the morale of its front-line fighters. With no hope for rotation or demobilisation, some of the once most committed now wonder if a ceasefire might be the only way out. “Chechen”, the brigade officer leading the new soldiers’ training session, says he remains determined to fight to the end. “Giving away territories to these disgusting people is no guarantee it will stop.” But he admits that fewer soldiers than ever share his resolve. “It’s not even 50-50 any more, but 30-70.” Lemberg puts the situation in even starker terms. “In 2022 I was ready to tear the Russians apart with my teeth,” he says. “In 2023, I just needed rest. This year? I almost couldn’t give a fuck.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/24/ukraines-warriors-brace-for-a-kremlin-surge-in-the-south
United24Media, 24 novembre, libre accès
L’Ukraine et le monde commémorent les victimes de l’Holodomor à l’occasion du Jour du Souvenir
Extraits :
Le samedi 23 novembre, l’Ukraine commémore les victimes de l’Holodomor, une famine provoquée par l’homme qui s’est produite en plusieurs vagues, notamment en 1932-1933. Cette journée de commémoration est célébrée chaque quatrième samedi de novembre pour rendre hommage aux millions d’Ukrainiens qui ont péri lors de ces tragédies.
Cette année, le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a souligné l’importance de se souvenir des atrocités commises. Dans un message sur Telegram, Zelensky a déclaré : « Notre devoir est de nous souvenir, de réfléchir et de dire au monde la vérité sur ce crime cruel, sur le génocide perpétré contre les Ukrainiens. »
Alors que le monde entier commémore cette journée solennelle, le ministère de l’Intérieur ukrainien a rendu public des milliers de dossiers criminels liés à l’Holodomor. Les documents, numérisés et mis à disposition du public, comprennent plus d’un millier de dossiers d’archives et des données supplémentaires sur les dossiers détruits en 1956.
Le ministre de l’Intérieur Ihor Klymenko a souligné que ces documents démontrent l’utilisation délibérée de la faim comme outil d’oppression contre le peuple ukrainien. « Nous devons nous en souvenir pour ne jamais renoncer à notre liberté », a déclaré Klymenko.
L’Holodomor, qui a duré plusieurs années, y compris les famines de 1921-1923 et de 1946-1947, reste l’un des chapitres les plus dévastateurs de l’histoire ukrainienne.
Le bilan exact des victimes reste inconnu, mais les historiens estiment que des millions d’Ukrainiens sont morts de faim. Ces dernières années, plus de 30 pays ont reconnu l’Holodomor de 1932-1933 comme un génocide contre la nation ukrainienne, et le processus de reconnaissance s’accélère dans le contexte de l’invasion russe en cours de l’Ukraine.
Au sein de l’Union européenne, les dirigeants ont également commémoré cette journée en rendant hommage aux victimes de la famine de 1932-1933. La présidente du Parlement européen, Roberta Metsola, a exprimé sa solidarité en déclarant : « En ce jour, l’Europe se joint au peuple ukrainien pour rendre hommage aux millions de victimes de l’Holodomor. » (…)
Pravda Ukraine, 24 novembre, libre accès
President of European Parliament calls on Berlin to provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles
Extraits :
Roberta Metsola, the President of the European Parliament, has called on the German government to finally decide on the transfer of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine.
German newspaper Der Spiegel; European Pravda; Roberta Metsola in an interview with a group of German media
Roberta Metsola stressed that “time matters” for Ukraine and that Russia is increasing its pressure, with more air targets striking Ukrainian cities.
Roberta Metsola stressed that Ukraine “cannot wait forever” and that the European Parliament has broad support for Germany’s decision.
The Taurus debate has resumed after the US lifted restrictions on the use of long-range weapons by Ukraine to strike Russian territory, and Germany is approaching early elections. The leader of the largest opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, Friedrich Merz, who has a good chance of becoming the next chancellor, is in favour of the Taurus transfer, while the Social Democratic Party of Germany partners are also in favour of the decision, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz insists that he will not do so.
Recently, Spiegel published an editorial harshly criticising Scholz for delaying the decision.
More than 60% of Germans oppose providing Ukraine with Taurus missiles.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/11/23/7485999
Wall Street Journal, Interview, 23 novembre, article payant
Will Trump Help Ukraine Win?
The former Soviet dissident Yuri Yarim-Agaev believes he will, because you can’t make a deal with a totalitarian like Vladimir Putin.
Extraits :
If you believe the media, Donald Trump’s election cast Ukrainians into a state of misery. In fact, according to every source I queried, most Ukrainians now have a halting sense of hope. Mr. Trump’s ascendancy means that the bloody standoff to which the Biden administration has consigned them for nearly two years might, emphasis on might, begin to change.
For more than a year, the U.S. administration has supplied Ukraine with enough materiel not to lose the war, but not enough to win it. Several times, and for a variety of reasons, Washington has delayed military aid authorized by Congress, often ensuring the weapons showed up too late to do much good. The administration has restricted the Ukrainian military from firing U.S.-supplied missiles beyond certain ranges into Russian territory. The justification for these and related restrictions seems to be that Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets could provoke Vladimir Putin into nuclear retaliation. The fact that he required no provocation to invade Ukraine in the first place doesn’t seem to register. The policy’s upshot was to allow the Russians to move their materiel out of range, and to maneuver and resupply with impunity.
Most unpardonably, President Biden has almost totally neglected to explain to the American public his reasons for arming the Ukrainians. (…)
This week, as if to concede its failure in Ukraine in its final weeks, the Biden administration scrapped its restrictions on the use of long-range missiles. (…) Nearly three years after its leadership was expected to flee and its government to fall, Ukraine has managed to hold off its much larger foe. Thanks to a brilliant surprise attack last summer, Ukraine occupies several hundred square miles of Russian territory in Kursk. That Ukraine has performed so well despite the fetters placed on it by the U.S. administration tempts one to think that an emancipated Ukrainian military could win the war after all. (…)
Mr. Trump has no easy choices on Ukraine. (…)
On the other hand, cutting off Ukraine and forcing it to accept humiliating terms would make him what Mr. Biden became after the Afghanistan withdrawal—betrayer of a viable U.S. ally. (…) Worst of all: Just as the Afghanistan debacle of 2021 occasioned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, in turn, the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, America’s abandonment of Ukraine would, as sure as the sun rises in the east, invite aggressions elsewhere around the globe. (…)
Mr. Yarim-Agaev, 75, was born in Russia and attended the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. In the 1970s he worked in physics, chemistry and applied mathematics at the Soviet Union’s Academy of Sciences. There, in 1976, he joined the Moscow Helsinki Group, an association of dissident scientists, writers, intellectuals and activists who openly demanded the U.S.S.R. abide by its commitments under the 1975 Helsinki Accords and guarantee its people freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (The government of Leonid Brezhnev had signed the accords in bad faith, as everybody knew.)
Some members of the Helsinki Group, such as Yuri Orlov and Natan Sharansky, were imprisoned for years. Others, like Mr. Yarim-Agaev, were exiled. He came to America in 1980 and taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford. (…) Mr. Yarim-Agaev isn’t famous—he lacks even a Wikipedia page. But he has earned a reputation as someone who speaks perceptively on the global aims of antidemocratic regimes. He maintains many contacts in the Russian government. (…)
I’m barely able to explain what I want to ask him when he begins: “The main thing to understand about this war is that it is not a war between Russia and Ukraine. It’s a war between totalitarian bloc and democratic alliance. It’s proxy war.” (…) “It is first and foremost war against America. Putin’s aggression is for one and only one reason: Ukraine shows democratic way of development and pro-Western way, pro-American way, and becoming ally with America and the West.” (…)
“No,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, “in totalitarian country, individual leaders don’t rule. Ideology rules. . . . Stalin, Mao, they never had power. They were always first priests and servants of ideology, and they couldn’t deviate from that ideology. If they did, that would be death for them. To stay in power, they must serve it.” Mr. Yarim-Agaev cites the example of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet premier from 1958-64, whose modest attempts to soften state control of Soviet life ultimately got him ejected from power. To ask a dictator like Mr. Putin or Xi Jinping to behave in a way that contradicts his totalitarian ideology, Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, “would be to ask him to commit political suicide. He is not going to do that.” Mikhail Gorbachev was the exception that proved the rule.
With regard to Russia and its aims in Ukraine, he says, we aren’t dealing with an individual tyrant, Vladimir Putin. “We are dealing with ideology. And you cannot charm totalitarian ideology, you cannot have a good relationship with totalitarian ideology, you cannot make deals with it.”
So the question of Ukraine will have to be settled on the battlefield? “Yes,” he says. (…)
“It’s very simple,” he begins. “There is such a thing as totalitarian socialism. Now, all those countries are forms of totalitarian socialism. Totalitarian socialism can exist in three forms: international totalitarian socialism, which we also call communism; national totalitarian socialism, which we call Nazism, and religious totalitarian socialism, which we know in form of Islamism.” What these forms of tyranny have in common is an absolute commitment to destroy democratic capitalist nations, especially America.
Accordingly, Mr. Yarim-Agaev puts forward the provocative thesis that Iran wants to destroy Israel not because it’s a Jewish state. “Iran itself claims that Israel is little satan and big satan is the United States,” he points out. “So it always aims at America, and it does it through Israel. It’s not antisemitism, although the mullahs are antisemites. It’s because Israel is democratic country and American ally.” (…)
What about the fear of provoking Mr. Putin into the use of tactical nuclear weapons? “It’s blackmail, and nothing but that,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says. “And first of all, all military experts say that tactical nuclear weapon doesn’t work. It is senseless—you cannot conquer with it because you shoot it in front of you and then you cannot enter the territory.” Never mind the assurance of counterattack, in which case “there would be no more Russia, and Russia knows that.”
The larger point, he says, is that Russia, Iran, China, North Korea and lesser totalitarian states—Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua—will do anything to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. “They fight against America,” he says, “but they always fight through somebody else. They attack Israel, they attack Ukraine. China may attack Taiwan at any moment, maybe even the Philippines. But they don’t want confrontation with United States because they know that’s suicide.” (…)
Giving up on Ukraine, or forcing it to accept terms odious to its people, “is incompatible with position, peace through strength,” Mr. Yarim-Agaev says, employing a phrase Mr. Trump and those around him often use. “You cannot implement policy of peace through strength by losing wars.”
Kiev Post, 23 novembre, libre accès
OPINION: Team Biden Resorts to ‘Not My Fault’
Sullivan denies the truth: the issue isn’t manpower, it’s Russia’s unabated ability to generate combat forces, equipment and weaponry; White House policy has given sanctuary to Moscow’s war machine.
Extraits :
(…) The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have been quite efficient in killing and wounding Russian soldiers in the close fight – or as Sullivan would say, the “front lines” – 728,300 as of Friday. Russia is losing over 1,000 soldiers a day. On Nov. 11 they lost over 2,000 soldiers in the Kursk Oblast alone. At that pace, they will amass over 1 million casualties by the New Year.
So no, the issue is not manpower at the front lines, it is Russia’s ability to generate combat power and flow forces, equipment, and weapons onto Ukrainian battlefields unabated. It is the White House policy of providing sanctuary for these forces and their weapons systems in Russia that is undermining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts to win the war. It is the incessant cowering to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin every time they call foul.
“Close with and destroy the enemy” is not in the Biden lexicon. Instead, Sullivan offers, “We supply the means to Ukraine to defend its sovereignty on territorial integrity” and excuses.
“Just enough“ and “weaken Russia“ remain the policies. General George S. Patton said it best, “Nobody ever defended anything successfully, there is only attack and attack and attack some more.” (…)
As we stated in the Kyiv Post, “The AFU requires the ability to interdict Moscow and Pyongyang’s forces before they arrive on the battlefield – at the railheads, seaports, and airfields… That requires precision deep strike capability and the authorities to use them whenever and wherever the threat resides.”
Furthermore, “Ukraine urgently needs the ability to strike ballistic missile and drone launch sites – from wherever they are fired. Shooting individual missiles out of the sky does not defeat the weapon system. If left unchecked, that weapon system and its crew will fire again, and again.” (…)
Slow rolling capabilities, restricting use of weapon systems, and an uncompromising policy of staying defensive are why Ukraine cannot win. Trying to shift blame to Zelensky’s prosecution of the war is typical of this “not my fault” White House. Biden’s policies have contributed to this war of attrition.
President-elect Trump could right this wrong. Stop the flow of forces into Ukraine and the unending ballistic missile drone assaults, and Zelensky wins this war.
Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a US Army intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/42703
The Economist, 22 novembre, article payant
Once the rockets are up : Vladimir Putin fires a new missile to amplify his nuclear threats
The attack on Ukraine is part of a new era of missile warfare
Extraits :
AT DAWN ON November 21st the Russian missiles slammed into the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro. Some were Kh-101 cruise missiles, carried by hulking Russian bombers. Others were Kinzhal ballistic missiles, fired from Russian jets. And at least one was new and nameless. Videos showed six warheads descending, almost vertically, onto the city, each releasing a slug of smaller projectiles. What was this mysterious weapon?
Ukraine’s air force suggested it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Those are almost exclusively associated with nuclear weapons and have never been fired in anger. Other observers pointed to the RS-26, a missile straddling the boundary between intermediate range (roughly, between 3,000,km and 5,500km) and intercontinental (more than 5,500km). Western officials hinted that the missile was an experimental prototype.
Later that day Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, speaking from his wood-panelled office in the Kremlin, declared that it was in fact a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile known as Oreshnik. The missile, which struck a Ukrainian military-production facility, was fired in response to Ukraine’s use of American ATACMS and British Storm Shadow missiles on Russian soil days earlier, claimed Mr Putin. He added that it travelled at more than ten times the speed of sound and could not be intercepted.
Mr Putin’s claims ought to be taken with a pinch of salt. He has made lurid boasts of hypersonic missiles in the past, sometimes exaggerating their capabilities. Oreshnik itself was “based on” the RS-26, a missile first tested 13 years ago, said Sabrina Singh, the Pentagon’s deputy press secretary. It was not any sort of revolutionary new weapon. Nevertheless, the strike looks very much like part of a larger Russian effort to dissuade Western countries from deepening their involvement in Ukraine. (…)
On November 19th Russia published a revised nuclear doctrine that spelt out in more detail—and in some cases expanded—the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used. The new doctrine specifies that large conventional attacks on Russia, or allies like Belarus, could meet with a nuclear response. It also says that attacks by non-nuclear states (like Ukraine) backed by nuclear states (like America and Britain) could be treated as a joint attack. The strike on November 21st was almost certainly intended to amplify that nuclear signalling. (…)
Simply put, Mr Putin wants Ukraine and its Western allies to believe that he might escalate either “vertically” within Ukraine or “horizontally”, by directly attacking NATO states. “We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons,” he noted on November 21st, as he described Oreshnik, “against the military facilities of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities.” (…)
America plans on deploying medium-range non-nuclear missiles in Germany in 2026. Europeans are co-operating to build their own conventional “deep-strike” systems. And countries are also investing huge sums in anti-missile defences to cope with all this—though there are few viable and cost-effective means to defend a particular area against very long-range missiles, which enter at a speed and angle that makes them hard to intercept. Oreshnik is the first-ever intermediate-range missile with multiple warheads to be fired in combat. It may not be the last. ■
Kiev Post, 22 novembre, libre accès
Russia Imposes Forced Enlistment in Occupied Ukraine Contrary to International Law
While Ukrainians protest against forced mobilization, Russia has begun to force young people from the occupied territories into its armed forces – another violation of the Geneva Convention.
Extraits :
Young people from the occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are being sent by the Kremlin to serve in the Russian Armed Forces. The first reports came from Bataisk, in the Rostov region, and Simferopol, Crimea on Nov 16 when ceremonies marking for their deployment took place.
According to the Izvestia Russian news agency, the conscripts will not be sent to the front lines but will serve in units of Russia’s Southern Military District, in Rostov, Krasnodar Krai, and annexed Crimea. During enlistment, conscripts undergo medical examinations, are fingerprinted, allocated a military trade, and issued with identity cards.
The conducting by Russia of a compulsory conscription campaign in the occupied territories of Ukraine, is a gross violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Under this resolution, an occupying power is prohibited from forcing individuals to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces, as well as from exerting pressure or conducting propaganda to encourage voluntary enlistment in the military.
However, since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, residents of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (DNR and LNR) have been forcibly recruited into their “people’s militia,” often without proper equipment or training, and have been sent into combat, which has led to significant losses from among those individuals. In the fall of 2022, units from these self-proclaimed republics were integrated into the Russian army, which in turn contributed to even greater losses and problems in their combat potential. (…)
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/42607
Le Figaro, 22 novembre, article payant
Guerre en Ukraine, armes nucléaires, Proche-Orient… L’inquiétude stratégique de l’armée française
DÉCRYPTAGE – Au sein de l’état-major, les généraux alertent sur un basculement stratégique irréversible.
Extraits :
Les généraux français posent un regard froid. Le renversement de l’ordre mondial est sans retour en arrière, disent-ils. « Le monde a basculé dans l’incertitude, le monde d’avant a disparu », souligne le général Bruno Baratz, à la tête du commandement du combat futur, dont la mission consiste à préparer l’armée aux conflits de demain. Le monde « que nous avions façonné » après la fin de la guerre froide « vacille », a commenté le chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre, le général Pierre Schill, jeudi lors d’un discours à l’École militaire. « L’instabilité du contexte pousse à la gravité, a-t-il ajouté en plaidant pour que l’armée se tienne prête à tous les scénarios. Qui sait quel sera notre rôle demain dans des garanties de sécurité offerte à l’Ukraine ou au Liban ? ». Le général veut encore croire qu’une aggravation des crises n’est pas inéluctable. « Nous sommes capables de modifier le cours des événements. L’enjeu, c’est d’être redouté, c’est d’être craint », assure-t-il en plaidant pour un renforcement des capacités militaires françaises et occidentales.
Le monde a changé. L’Occident est détesté pour ce qu’il représente, répète le chef d’état-major des armées, le général Thierry Burkhard, à chacune de ses interventions, pour prévenir son auditoire afin qu’il abandonne ses illusions. Le modèle occidental est récusé par une large part de la population mondiale et accusé de tous les maux : colonialisme, réchauffement climatique, impérialisme militaire… Les crises et les guerres s’entremêlent et menacent d’entraîner l’Europe dans leur engrenage : l’Ukraine et le Proche-Orient mais aussi l’Afrique où prospèrent toujours les djihadistes, avant qu’en Indo-Pacifique la situation ne s’aggrave peut-être. « Toutes ces zones de crise ont leurs caractéristiques particulières et il n’est pas certain qu’il faille prioriser l’une sur l’autre. Il est nécessaire de gérer l’ensemble de ces théâtres, qui sont plus ou moins chauds, où la France est plus ou moins impliquée », confiait récemment le général Burkhard au Figaro . « Cette situation nécessite une action et une vision globale, et surtout d’agir de manière très coordonnée avec nos partenaires. Aucun pays ne peut gérer seul ces crises », disait-il en insistant sur le rôle de l’Otan et celui de l’Union européenne. La question des coalitions – « avec qui ? » – revient fréquemment dans ses interrogations. Mais l’élection de Donald Trump aux États-Unis va soumettre l’Europe à de nouvelles tensions internes. (…)
The Economist, 21 novembre, article payant
Let’s talk : Most Ukrainians now want an end to the war
Polls show that 52% want negotiations. Some say they are willing to give up land to Russia
Extraits :
RUSSIAN SOLDIERS have captured some 645 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory in the past 30 days, according to our daily war tracker. As their advance grinds on, war fatigue among Ukrainians is deepening. Surveys published on November 19th and 20th by Gallup, a pollster, show that 52% of Ukrainians now support negotiating an end to the war as soon as possible, a sharp rise from just 27% a year ago. The share of those determined to fight “until victory” has dropped from 63% in 2023 to 38%. Even Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has shifted tone: he recently expressed hope for a diplomatic resolution next year. That reflects a change in rhetoric since the re-election of Donald Trump in America, who has promised to bring the war to an end within 24 hours.
The surveys, conducted in August and October 2024, show that support for continued resistance against Russia has fallen in every part of Ukraine (see maps). In Kyiv, the capital, Gallup data show that support has dropped by 39 percentage points since 2022; in eastern regions close to the front line the figure is even starker: just 27% of respondents now favour pressing on, compared with 63% who want the war to end. Roughly half of those who favour talks are open to territorial concessions—Russia has seized 19% of Ukraine’s land since 2014. Less than 40% of them oppose ceding any land. (The pollsters did not ask which areas or how much land should be given up.)
What explains this fatigue? The immense human and economic toll of the war no doubt weighs heavily on Ukrainians. But growing disillusionment with the West, and what support Ukraine can expect, might also play a role. The Gallup data show that the share of Ukrainians who think their country will join NATO within the next decade dropped from 69% in 2023 to 51% in 2024. (…)
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/11/20/most-ukrainians-now-want-an-end-to-the-war
Le Figaro, 21 novembre, libre accès
Guerre en Ukraine : la Russie a tiré un missile balistique intercontinental sur la ville de Dnipro, affirme Kiev
Ce serait la première fois que ces armes seraient utilisées avec une charge conventionnelle au combatdepuis qu’elles ont été développées pour la dissuasion nucléaire durant la Guerre froide. Le Kremlin a annoncé qu’il ne commentait pas.
New York Times, 21 novembre, article payant
Russia Intensifies Assaults on an Exhausted Ukraine
Overextended Ukrainian forces lack manpower and artillery against Russian forces willing to absorb staggering casualties.
Extraits :
A small band of Ukrainian soldiers was trapped. They were holding the line on the battlefield, but Russian forces had managed to creep in behind their trench and encircle them.
“Even if the position holds, supplies — ammunition, provisions — eventually run out,” Capt. Viacheslav, the 30-year-old commander of an elite drone unit, said last week as he monitored events from an outpost a few miles away in eastern Ukraine. “Any vehicle attempting to reach these positions will be ambushed.”
“We are always getting stuck in these kinds of tough situations,” he said.
As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth winter and the first snowfall blankets cratered fields strewed with bodies, the situations are only growing tougher for Ukrainian forces.
Ukraine got a boost on Sunday when the United States, after months of pressure from Kyiv, said it had granted permission for Ukraine to use American-provided weapons to fire deeper into Russia. On Tuesday, they used American-made ballistic missiles, called ATACMS (for Army Tactical Missile System), in an attack on a munitions depot in Russia.
But the election of Donald J. Trump to the American presidency this month injected an extra dose of uncertainty over the fate of the Ukrainian war effort.
While questions over whether the United States would continue to provide robust military support to Ukraine have resulted in a frenzy of diplomatic activity around the world, nowhere will those decisions be felt more acutely than on the front lines, where beleaguered Ukrainian troops are engaged in a fierce and bloody defense of their land.
Outnumbered by more than six to one along some stretches of the front, soldiers and commanders say they are hindered by a lack of combat infantry after years of heavy fighting and, just as important, by a shortage of experienced platoon and company commanders to lead untested recruits into battle. That has led to a fraying of Ukraine’s lines that has allowed Russia to make its largest gains since the first weeks of the war. (…)
“We’re stretched thin,” Captain Viacheslav said. “People need to step up and serve. There’s no other way.”
As well as being short of personnel, Ukraine lacks the medium- and long-range weapons needed to conduct a consistent and effective campaign aimed at Russian logistics, command and control centers and other key targets. (…)
Despite their struggles, Ukrainian forces continue to make the Russians pay a high price for every advance, using their fleet of drones to slow the Russian onslaught.
“Our pilots and everyone working here knows that if we don’t stop them while they’re advancing, they’ll reach our positions 100 percent, and a gunfight will begin,” said Sergeant Major Vasyl. “It’s relentless: 24/7.”
He said he had taken part in some of the deadliest battles of the war but that the intensity of the Russian assaults in the southern Donbas was unlike anything he had witnessed.
“Once, they dropped off 30 infantry soldiers from an armored personnel carrier, and we took them all out in one spot,” Sergeant Major Vasyl said. “Another A.P.C. came in immediately after and unloaded 30 more soldiers. We lost count of how many times they sent more troops to the same spot. In half a day of fighting, the Russians lost more than 200 men.”
“In another six-hour clash,” he added, “we recorded a record 132 infantry killed.”
“These are staggering numbers,” Captain Viacheslav said.
But at the end of each engagement, the Russians took the land.
“If they’re willing to lose that many men just to advance, I’m not sure what could stop them,” he said. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-attacks-trump.html
The Guardian, 21 novembre, libre accès
Ukraine fires UK-made missiles into Russia for first time
Storm Shadow missile attack comes day after Kyiv used US-supplied long-range weapons to strike within Russia
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/20/ukraine-uk-missiles-strike-russia
Le Monde, éditorial, 20 novembre, article payant
Guerre en Ukraine : sur les missiles à longue portée, un feu vert des Etats-Unis tardif et limité
Les alliés occidentaux de Kiev ont perdu un temps précieux à peser le pour et le contre avant de lever l’interdit concernant les missiles à longue portée. Il faut espérer que l’autorisation donnée par les Etats-Unis à l’Ukraine de frapper en profondeur le territoire russe à l’aide des ATACMS soit suivie rapidement de décisions similaires d’autres pays alliés.
Extraits:
(…) On ne peut donc que regretter, comme la vice-première ministre ukrainienne, Olga Stefanishyna, que cette annonce intervienne bien tard. « Si cette décision avait été prise plus tôt, elle aurait permis de sauver de nombreuses vies », a-t-elle regretté le 18 novembre. L’armée russe l’a par ailleurs anticipée en repositionnant notamment une majorité de ses bombardiers sur des aérodromes situés hors de portée des ATACMS. Cette autorisation américaine reste en outre assortie de conditions. Elle ne sera levée qu’au cas par cas, en fonction des objectifs ukrainiens, dans une logique qui n’est pas vraiment celle d’une guerre de haute intensité.
Il faut espérer désormais que cette annonce américaine soit suivie rapidement de décisions similaires des pays fournissant des missiles à longue portée à Kiev. Il s’agit de la France et du Royaume-Uni. Il faut également souhaiter qu’elle contribue à lever les réticences allemandes à propos de leurs missiles Taurus, dont le rayon d’action est de 500 kilomètres.
Le chancelier Olaf Scholz ne peut inviter la Russie à se tenir « prête à des négociations sérieuses avec l’Ukraine dans le but de parvenir à une paix juste et durable », comme il l’a fait au cours d’un appel téléphonique malencontreux avec le maître du Kremlin, Vladimir Poutine, le 15 novembre, sans renforcer au préalable la main de Kiev. Au lendemain de cet échange, la Russie lançait de nouveaux bombardements destructeurs contre les infrastructures énergétiques civiles ukrainiennes. Un cruel rappel à la réalité.
The Economist, 19 novembre, article payant
The 21% war : Vladimir Putin is in a painful economic bind
Russia’s reliance on China is becoming a problem
Extraits :
Most central banks are cutting interest rates. Not Russia’s. Last month policymakers raised rates to 21%, a two-decade high; markets expect them to reach 23% by the year’s end. The shift is all the more unusual as it is happening at a time of war, when central bankers are normally loth to supress economic activity.
Russia’s economy has confounded analysts since the country invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Despite facing one of the tightest sanction regimes in modern history, it has undergone its fastest expansion in more than a decade. Russia enjoyed growth of 3.6% last year and is expected to maintain such a pace this year. Yet rather than being a demonstration of strength, the central bank’s decision to lift interest rates is a warning of trouble to come.
Government outgoings are increasingly difficult to sustain. Russia’s budget, unveiled in September, included a plan to increase defence spending by a quarter next year. Taken together, annual expenditures on defence and security—a separate budget item that covers the intelligence services—are now expected to rise to 17trn roubles ($170bn), an amount representing more than 40% of all government spending or 8% of Russia’s GDP. Defence spending alone will be 6% of Russian national income, the most since the cold war.
That is a lot, but not unusual for a country at war. America’s defence spending, for example, was 8-10% of GDP during the Vietnam war. During the second world war the great powers devoted 40-60% of their total economic output to military ends. The crucial difference is to be found in monetary policy. British policymakers in the early 1940s endeavoured, and mostly succeeded, in fighting what they termed “a 3% war”, keeping interest rates near that level. America’s Federal Reserve held rates at 2.5% during the same conflict. Lower borrowing costs helped keep the large deficits affordable. By contrast, in Russia, the yield on ten-year sovereign debt has risen from around 6% before the war to 16%. (…)
And there is another reason why the country has been forced to tighten monetary policy. For most of the second world war neither Britain nor America had to be especially concerned about the external value of their currency. The dollar benefited from being seen as a haven, while America’s “Lend Lease” programme provided Britain with both military equipment and resources such as oil and food, doing so pretty much for free. Had Britain lacked an ally with the deep pockets and industrial capacity of America, willing and able to supply two-thirds of its imports, then the fall in the value of the pound would have become a military problem.
Mr Putin’s difficulty is that he lacks such an ally. China has become Russia’s most important trading partner, providing a third of all imports and more than 90% of microelectronics, which are used in drones, missiles and tanks. Yet such support is not being offered for free. Russian officials must therefore keep a wary eye on the value of their currency in terms of the yuan; this year it has fallen by 10%, to near its lowest since the war began. Russia, unlike the allies in the second world war, faces an external vulnerability. That, rather than inflation, is ultimately what has pushed interest rates to record highs. (…)
Higher interest rates will crimp spending by both firms and consumers. The IMF expects Russian economic growth to slow sharply to 1.3% next year. Even VEB, the state-run development bank, has cut its growth estimate to 2%. A combination of lower investment and manpower lost to the front is taking a toll. The need to maintain the value of the rouble to pay for crucial imports is a vulnerability for Mr Putin, and one which could soon take a toll on his ability to fight. He may be hoping that Donald Trump keeps his promise to bring the conflict to an end. Waging a 3% war is one thing; a 21% war is quite another. ■
The Economist, 19 novembre, article payant
Attack ’em : Ukraine can, at last, use its American missiles inside Russia
Joe Biden wants to send North Korea a message
Extraits :
THE NAME of the weapon, designed in the late 1980s, was both an acronym—Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)—and, when said aloud, an exhortation—“attack ’ems”. But Ukraine could not, in fact, attack ’em—at least not inside Russia, not until November 17th, when American news outlets reported that Joe Biden, America’s president, had changed course and given Ukraine permission to use the advanced long-range missiles on Russian soil. The decision will not dramatically change Ukraine’s flagging fortunes on the front lines, though it will boost morale and strengthen the country’s hand ahead of negotiations pursued by Donald Trump after January 20th. A tumultuous two months lies ahead first.
America first gave Ukraine HIMARS rocket launchers in the summer of 2022, though equipped only with shorter-ranged GPS-guided rockets. In late 2023, after over a year of debate, it relented and provided the 300km-range ATACMS. Ukraine used the weapons to devastating effect in Russian-occupied territory, including Crimea—it destroyed nine helicopters in two strikes that October—but it was denied permission to fire them over the border into Russia against the airfields, ammunition depots and command posts that were being used to strike it.
Mr Biden imposed that restraint for three reasons. One was the Pentagon’s argument that it had limited stocks of ATACMS and that these were needed for war plans in various parts of the world, notably against North Korea. The second was that their military utility would, supposedly, be limited. (…) The third was the risk of escalation. Ukraine has frequently used its own drones and missiles to strike inside Russia—one attack at Toropets in September took out three to four months’ worth of ammunition—but ATACMS strikes typically require American assistance with intelligence and targeting. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, has said that the use of Western missiles in Russia would constitute “direct involvement” in the war.
Mr Biden’s decision now leaves three significant questions. One is the extent of his reversal. (…)
The second question is whether Britain and France will now follow suit and allow Ukraine to use their own advanced cruise missiles—known as Storm Shadow and SCALP respectively—inside Russia. These missiles, like ATACMS, require considerable Western involvement for effective targeting. British officials are thought to have been reluctant to authorise their use inside Russia without America leading the way and providing cover. They are now likely to relent. And France in that case would surely do the same.
The decision might also put pressure on Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, to reconsider his own refusal to provide Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. He is likely to come under growing attack on the issue from Friedrich Merz, head of the opposition centre-right Christian Democrats. But Mr Scholz publicly doubled down on his position a week ago in the Bundestag, during an election campaign in which has portrayed himself as the “prudent” choice in contrast to the more hawkish Mr Merz.
The third and most consequential issue is how Mr Putin will choose to respond. America was throwing “oil to the fire”, said a spokesman for the Kremlin. (…)
Mr Biden may be hoping that Mr Putin will not respond aggressively in order to keep open the prospect of cutting a deal with Mr Trump next year. The president-elect reportedly told Mr Putin on a phone call that he should not escalate the war. If that is true—the Kremlin denies that the phone call took place—then both Mr Biden and Mr Trump will have had their answer in the skies above Ukraine in the early hours of November 17th: the largest air attacks since last year, crippling Ukraine’s power grid and killing a reported 18 people.■
Wall Street Journal, 18 novembre, article payant
How Trump Can Help Ukraine Win
He could sway Putin by mobilizing the $300 billion in Russian money frozen in Western banks.
Extraits :
Donald Trump’s most consequential foreign-policy priority will be Russia’s war on Ukraine. A conclusion to the conflict that preserves Ukraine’s long-term security will end widespread death and destruction and bolster America’s image as a force for good. A policy that leads to the collapse of Ukraine will cause needless loss of life, unleash a massive refugee crisis for America’s European allies, and embolden a loose alliance of tyrannies.
Mr. Trump’s promise to end the war heralds an ambitious, activist foreign policy. His pledge to do so in 24 hours is clearly an exaggeration but signals eagerness for a diplomatic solution to what will soon be a three-year war.
The terms of a Trump-led settlement, while not set in stone, have been discussed in the media. Such a deal is reported to include an end to hostilities, with European (and perhaps other) peacekeepers policing a line of separation between the two warring parties. It also would include a commitment by both sides not to use military means to capture or reclaim territory, Western support for a strong Ukrainian defense, and a 20-year moratorium on Ukrainian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Settling the war on these terms, however, will face formidable hurdles. The most important is Vladimir Putin’s opposition to any settlement that falls short of Ukraine’s capitulation. Mr. Putin’s conditions for the war’s end include cession of more territory in Ukraine’s eastern regions, Ukrainian neutrality, and Ukraine’s demilitarization. Taken together, these would mean a de facto end to Ukraine’s sovereignty.
The Trump administration must find new levers to move Mr. Putin from his intransigence. (…)
There is another Trumpian path that could both finance Ukraine’s war effort and reduce U.S. contributions to it. This path requires mobilizing the $300 billion in Russian hard currency in Western banks, most of it at Euroclear, an international clearing and settlement service in Belgium. The Biden administration and European leaders have been reluctant to tap these assets, wrongly fearing such a course could undermine the dollar and the euro.
But today’s extraordinary conditions warrant seizure. Russia not only has invaded a sovereign country; it has annexed the internationally recognized territory of a sovereign state. Since the creation of the United Nations in 1948, there has been only one other such case: Iraq’s invading and annexing Kuwait. George H.W. Bush’s administration seized billions in Iraqi hard-currency reserves held in the U.S. and transferred them to Kuwait as compensation for the invasion. (…)
A diplomatic effort bolstered by the threat of turning these Russian assets against Russia itself could help compel the Kremlin—already grappling with an economy strained by defense spending—into settling. Coupled with a threat to permit Ukraine to use missiles to strike deep into Russian territory, including targeting Moscow and its power grid, such a policy could drive the Kremlin to accept a settlement Mr. Trump proposes.
Any settlement that leaves 20% of Ukraine’s territory in Russia’s hands will be hard for Ukrainians to accept. But most war-ravaged Ukrainians are likely to accept one that enhances their country’s sovereignty through bilateral security guarantees and deters future Russian aggression with resources that let Ukraine strengthen its military capabilities and rebuild its cities.
Mr. Karatnycky is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Battleground Ukraine: From Independence to the War with Russia.”
The Economist, 18 novembre, article payant
The Telegram : The terrifying perils of appeasing a warlike Russia
Finland’s cold-war past offers urgent lessons for Ukraine’s future
Extraits :
(…) When the cold war divided Europe, Finland made many sacrifices to survive as an independent nation. To preserve its capitalist system and parliamentary democracy, it became a neutral buffer state between the West and the Soviet Union. Until 1956 the Soviet navy was allowed to lease a base on the Finnish coast, within artillery range of Helsinki. KGB officers meddled shamelessly in Finland’s politics and society (though some Finnish officials and military officers quietly sent intelligence to the West, too). Bound by treaty to take Soviet security interests into account, the country’s compromised form of sovereignty was dubbed “Finlandisation” by critics. Finnish defenders of close relations with the USSR described their mission as “co-operating without losing one’s soul”.
Today, Finlandisation is back, this time as a model for Ukraine’s post-war relations with Russia. On a doomed peace mission to Moscow, days before Russia’s invasion in 2022, France’s President Emmanuel Macron called Finlandisation “one of the options on the table” for Ukraine. Mr Macron might not use the term now, for his line on Russian aggression has hardened greatly since then. But if the war ends soon, as America’s president-elect Donald Trump insists it must, leaders in Kyiv can expect pressure from many quarters to make painful compromises. A loss of some territory will surely be one price of peace. Then will come a hard question : how to secure Ukraine’s sovereignty in the future. Some Western governments may put their faith in deterrence of Russia, encouraging Ukraine to build a strong army and economy and to align its political system with European values. Other world leaders may push Ukraine to appease its neighbour by declaring itself neutral and accepting a place in Russia’s sphere of influence.
In Helsinki, foreign-policy thinkers have strong views on those seemingly opposite approaches to security, because cold-war Finland tried both at the same time. Finland maintained armed forces strong enough to make Soviet leaders recoil from the potential costs of trying to occupy the country formally. At the same time, it bought peace with many compromises, some of which look distinctly shabby in hindsight. In Helsinki today, the term Finlandisation is taken as a slur. (…)
A plaque next to the winter-war memorial offers a strikingly geopolitical take on those long-ago horrors. It blames the conflict on Hitler and Stalin’s secret agreement in 1939 to push Finland into “the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union”. The loss of over 25,000 Finnish lives is presented as an investment in a better tomorrow: a sacrifice to preserve Finland’s “independence, freedom and potential to develop into the Nordic welfare state that it is known as today”. Finland did not choose its geography. But—even in its darkest hour—it fought to choose its own fate. Literal Finlandisation would be a terrible model for Ukraine, turning it into a Russian satellite. But Finland’s sense of itself as a nation, and its will to survive, is an example worth studying.■
Le Figaro, 18 novembre, article payant
«On savait qu’ils attendaient l’hiver»: la Russie ravage le réseau électrique ukrainien
DÉCRYPTAGE – La veille de cette attaque survenue dimanche, «massive» selon Kiev, le président Volodymyr Zelensky avait évoqué son espoir de voir la guerre se résoudre diplomatiquement en 2025.
Extraits :
Une fois de plus, l’Ukraine s’est réveillée dans le fracas des explosions des frappes russes et des batteries antiaériennes ukrainiennes. Dimanche 17 novembre, dès 3 heures du matin, les grandes villes ont été frappées par plusieurs missiles et drones russes, qui visaient les infrastructures énergétiques du pays, déjà fragilisées par près de trois années de guerre. Bien que quotidiennement visée par les attaques de drones, c’était la première fois depuis la fin du mois d’août que l’Ukraine faisait face à une attaque balistique d’une telle ampleur : selon le président Volodymyr Zelensky, 120 missiles et 90 drones ont été lancés dans l’attaque, dont 70 engins ayant réussi à franchir les défenses antiaériennes.
Les frappes ont visé « les infrastructures de génération et de transmission à travers toute l’Ukraine », précise Herman Halouchtchenko, le ministre ukrainien de l’Énergie. Le ministère russe de la Défense a confirmé de son côté que l’objectif de cette campagne de frappes était les « infrastructures énergétiques essentielles qui soutiennent le complexe militaro-industriel ukrainien ». (…)
Doté d’un réseau énergétique décentralisé hérité de l’Union soviétique, l’Ukraine est particulièrement vulnérable aux frappes qui visent ces infrastructures. Dimanche matin, la Russie a fragilisé davantage un réseau déjà déficitaire. Au creux de l’hiver, la demande en électricité en Ukraine pourrait grimper à 18,5 gigawatts, selon l’Agence internationale de l’énergie, quand l’Ukraine ne dispose que de 12,5 gigawatts de capacité de production. Il manquerait donc 6 gigawatts à l’Ukraine pour répondre à ses besoins énergétiques – soit l’équivalent de la consommation du Danemark lors d’un pic de demande. (…)
New York Times, 17 novembre, libre accès
Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles
With two months left in office, the president for the first time authorized the Ukrainian military to use the system known as ATACMS to help defend its forces in the Kursk region of Russia.
Extraits :
President Biden has authorized the first use of U.S.-supplied long-range missiles by Ukraine for strikes inside Russia, U.S. officials said.
The weapons are likely to be initially employed against Russian and North Korean troops in defense of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of western Russia, the officials said.
Mr. Biden’s decision is a major change in U.S. policy. The choice has divided his advisers, and his shift comes two months before President-elect Donald J. Trump takes office, having vowed to limit further support for Ukraine.
Allowing the Ukrainians to use the long-range missiles, known as the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, came in response to Russia’s surprise decision to bring North Korean troops into the fight, officials said. (…)
But they said Mr. Biden determined that the potential benefits — Ukraine will be able to reach certain high-value targets that it would not otherwise be able to, and the United States will be able to send a message to North Korea that it will pay a significant price for its involvement — outweighed the escalation risks.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html
Le Figaro, 17 novembre, article payant
Les camps de la honte: notre reportage à Sfax, auprès des migrants africains bloqués en Tunisie
RÉCIT – Au nord de Sfax, plus de 50.000 migrants subsahariens campent dans l’attente d’une traversée vers l’Europe. Vivant comme des bêtes à l’ombre des oliviers, à la merci des passeurs tunisiens et des assauts de la Garde nationale financée par la Commission européenne, ils se sentent pris au piège. Certains souhaiteraient même rentrer chez eux.
Kiev Post, 15 novembre, libre accès
Ukraine Braces for Critical Winter Phase as Front Line May Shift 35 km Westward
Kyiv’s plans to draft an additional 160,000 troops by February are underway, though experts doubt they will hit the target, expecting closer to 100,000.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/42201
New York Times, 14 novembre, libre accès
Ukraine Prioritizes Security, Not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks
President-elect Donald J. Trump may accelerate the timetable for a truce. Kyiv views guarantees against renewed aggression as crucial to any settlement.
Extraits :
Ukrainian officials have said for months that they would not cede territory occupied by Russia in any peace settlement. Now, as Ukraine contemplates an accelerated timetable for negotiations pushed by President-elect Donald J. Trump, it is putting at least as much importance on obtaining security guarantees as on where an eventual cease-fire line might fall.
With Ukrainian forces steadily losing ground in the east, two senior officials said that defending Ukraine’s interests in potential talks would hinge not on territorial boundaries, which are likely to be determined by the fighting, but on what assurances are in place to make a cease-fire hold.
“Talks should be based on guarantees,” said Roman Kostenko, the chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Defense and Intelligence Committee. “For Ukraine, nothing is more important.”
A senior Ukrainian official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, was more direct. “The territorial question is extremely important, but it’s still the second question,” the official said, “The first question is security guarantees.”
Ukraine sets its borders based on its 1991 declaration of independence. Russia has since gained control of about 20 percent of Ukrainian land, but Kyiv would not formally renounce its claim over any territory under Russian occupation, Mr. Kostenko said.
That appears to be the approach Ukraine is taking to justify any possible deal in which Russia would retain control of Ukrainian land. In October, President Volodymyr Zelensky, discussing a cease-fire, said “Everyone understands that no matter what path we take, legally no one will recognize the occupied territories as belonging to other countries.” (…)
Officials in Kyiv have been seeking membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a guarantee against renewed attacks from Russia. Western officials have signaled they want Ukraine to join NATO, but not on any kind of accelerated timetable.
Officials in Kyiv have also said that a robust arsenal of conventional weapons — to be provided by the West — would enable Ukraine to quickly strike back, serving as a deterrent to a resumption of hostilities. (…)
Russia has long said that it considers Ukrainian entry into NATO unacceptable. It has signaled that such a move would be a deal breaker for any cease-fire agreement, while also indicating it will want to keep control of the territory it has captured in Ukraine. (…)
Support for ceding territory in exchange for peace is rising among Ukrainians. A poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in October showed 32 percent of Ukrainians would support such an agreement, up from 19 percent last year. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/europe/trump-ukraine-russia-peace.html
Wall Street Journal, 13 novembre, article payant
The ‘Deathonomics’ Powering Russia’s War Machine
Payments for soldiers killed on the front lines are transforming local economies in some of Russia’s poorest regions
Voir “Article du Jour”
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-military-death-pay-6cfe936e?mod=hp_lead_pos8
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, opinion, 13 novembre, article payant
Peter Graf Kielmansegg : Putins Kalkül: Der deutsche Pazifismus ist eine Gefahr für die Ukraine
Wie Putin das Durchhaltevermögen der westlichen Demokratien einschätzt, ist ein wesentlicher Faktor im Krieg des Diktators gegen die Ukraine. Aber die deutsche Politik vernachlässigt bis anhin die Aufgabe, die sich damit verbindet.
Peter Graf Kielmansegg ist Politikwissenschafter und Historiker. Er lehrte an den Universitäten Köln und Mannheim und ist Mitglied der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Extraits :
(…) Verliert die Politik der Unterstützung für die Ukraine in Deutschland ihren Rückhalt bei den Wählern? In Ostdeutschland jedenfalls ist ein kritischer Punkt erreicht. Putin wird es wahrgenommen haben. (…)
Wie Putin das Durchhaltevermögen der westlichen Demokratien einschätzt, ist ein wesentlicher Faktor im Krieg des Diktators gegen die Ukraine. Die Wähler haben darauf entscheidenden Einfluss. Aber die deutsche Politik vernachlässigt bis anhin auf erstaunliche Weise die Aufgabe, die sich damit verbindet.
Vordringlich ist die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Pazifismus von AfD und BSW. Der Friedenslockruf der beiden Parteien ist unredlich, weil er seine Verführungskraft entfaltet, indem er die entscheidende Frage offenlässt: Welcher Frieden zu welchem Preis? Redlich ist es, sich illusionslos Rechenschaft über den Preis des Friedens abzulegen oder einzustehen für die eigene Überzeugung, dass der Friede mehr wert sei als der Preis, den er kostet. Unredlich ist es, sich und andere über diesen Preis hinwegzutäuschen oder gar ihn bewusst zu verschleiern.
Die Werbung von AfD und BSW für ein durch Verhandlungen herbeizuführendes Kriegsende in der Ukraine ist ein Musterbeispiel des unredlichen Pazifismus. Denn der Kern dieses Friedensprogramms ist die Forderung, die Unterstützung der Ukraine einzustellen. Das aber ist nichts anderes als der Versuch, die Ukraine zur Selbstpreisgabe zu zwingen. Der Frieden, dem AfD und BSW das Wort reden, ist der Frieden der Kapitulation. (…)
Unredlich ist das Friedensgerede von AfD und BSW nicht nur, weil es den Preis des Friedens verschleiert. Unredlich ist es auch, weil es ignoriert, mit wem die Ukraine und mit wem auch der Westen es zu tun hat, eine Ignoranz übrigens, die an die Appeasement-Politik der letzten Jahre vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erinnert. Putin will keinen Kompromiss, er will den Sieg. Er wird den Sieg umso entschlossener wollen, je mehr sich bei ihm der Eindruck verfestigt, dass in den westlichen Demokratien – von deren moralischer Schwäche er ohnehin überzeugt ist – erwähnte Pazifisten die Oberhand gewinnen.
Warum sollte Putin weniger als den Sieg wollen, wenn er sieht, dass er ihm zufallen wird? Schon jetzt fordert er als Vorbedingung einer Teilnahme an Gesprächen die Kapitulation: den vollständigen Rückzug der Ukraine aus den ukrainischen Gebieten, die er für Russland beansprucht, dazu ihren Vorabverzicht auf die Nato-Mitgliedschaft. Das ist die unverblümte Forderung nach Unterwerfung ohne auch nur den Schein einer Gegenleistung. Die Teilnahme an Gesprächen verpflichtet Russland zu nichts, es kann die Gespräche jederzeit abbrechen. Wer Verhandlungen will, die zu einem der Ukraine zumutbaren Kompromiss führen, muss Putin an den Verhandlungstisch zwingen, indem er ihm die Aussicht auf den Sieg nimmt. (…)
Schliesslich hat Putin jeden Anspruch auf Vertrauen verspielt. Er hat die Lüge zum Prinzip erhoben – noch am Tag vor der Invasion machte er der Welt bekanntlich weis, es handele sich nur um ein Manöver. Verträge hält Putin nicht länger, als er es für zweckmässig ansieht – jenen Vertrag beispielsweise, in dem Russland als Gegenleistung dafür, dass die Ukraine Moskau ihre Atomwaffen überliess, eigentlich die Integrität des Nachbarlandes garantiert hat. Wie umgehen mit einem Gewaltherrscher, der keinerlei Vertrauenswürdigkeit mehr besitzt? Dem unredlichen Pazifismus möchte man die Antwort nicht überlassen. (…)
Die Friedensparolen von AfD und BSW sind töricht. Man muss sich darüber im Klaren sein, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit weiterer imperialistischer Vorstösse Russlands wächst, wenn der Angriff auf die Ukraine Erfolg hat. Es wachsen folglich die Risiken für das östliche Mitteleuropa. (…)
The Economist, 12 novembre, article payant
Russian ruins : Kremlin-occupied Ukraine is now a totalitarian hell
The Trump administration should remember Vladimir Putin’s dark vision
Extraits :
ON GOOGLE STREET VIEW it is possible to “drive” around parts of towns that have been occupied by Russia in Ukraine since its invasion in February 2022. To do so is to drive back in time. The images were taken before the assault. Since then, many buildings have been destroyed, some streets have new names and the clocks have changed. The area runs on Moscow time, an hour ahead of the rest of Ukraine.
Donald Trump’s incoming administration may push for an armistice or peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. That might leave a fifth of Ukraine under Russian occupation, and the size of this area could easily expand in the coming months if the Kremlin intensifies its offensive, which has been gaining ground. To get a sense of Vladmir Putin’s dark vision for any territory he permanently gains, it is worth looking at conditions in occupied Ukraine now.
ON GOOGLE STREET VIEW it is possible to “drive” around parts of towns that have been occupied by Russia in Ukraine since its invasion in February 2022. To do so is to drive back in time. The images were taken before the assault. Since then, many buildings have been destroyed, some streets have new names and the clocks have changed. The area runs on Moscow time, an hour ahead of the rest of Ukraine.
Donald Trump’s incoming administration may push for an armistice or peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. That might leave a fifth of Ukraine under Russian occupation, and the size of this area could easily expand in the coming months if the Kremlin intensifies its offensive, which has been gaining ground. To get a sense of Vladmir Putin’s dark vision for any territory he permanently gains, it is worth looking at conditions in occupied Ukraine now.
“Kiril”, a Ukrainian agent in occupied territory reached by phone, says that “this is a prison society” because the fear of being denounced forces everyone to keep their views to themselves. To be without a Russian passport these days is “like being a refugee in your own land”. Important jobs are almost all held by Russians. Anyone with pro-Ukrainian views fears being sent “to the basement”, an expression for Russia’s network of detention and “filtration” camps.
All traces of Ukraine are being expunged. Schools have switched to the Russian curriculum, and Russian youth and paramilitary organisations work in the territories. Repression combined with Russification aims to transform the social and political fabric of the territories, says Nikolay Petrov, the author of a new report for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. (…)
In January 2022 the Ukrainian authorities estimated that there were 6.4m people in the occupied regions, excluding Crimea. Now, according to Mr Petrov, there are about 3.5m. Even Russia’s statistical service admits that people continue to flee, with up to 100,000 from the “new regions” doing so last year. Mr Petrov says there are also about 1.8m people in Crimea, including some who immigrated there after 2014.
Russia has compelled the remaining residents to take Russian citizenship. From January 1st 2025 anyone aged 14 or above who has not will be deemed a foreign citizen and thus be at risk of deportation. Already it is impossible to live normally without it. It is needed in order to send children to school, and to get medical treatment, pensions or social benefits. The Russian authorities have re-registered property and businesses; citizenship is also required for that. Some people who had fled have even returned in an attempt to hold on to their property.
The exodus of people has led to acute labour shortages in the occupied territories. To fill the gap 40,000-50,000 people from Russia and central Asia now work there, Mr Petrov reckons. Many of them are construction workers, but thousands of teachers, medics and administrators also come on well-paid short-term contracts. (…)
The identity of the occupied territories is changing, fast. Some residents have always been pro-Russian. Now oppression, brainwashing and an exodus means that the balance has shifted further. Some 5-30% of residents in the occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson regions are pro-Russian, 20-35% are pro-Ukrainian while the rest, possibly more than half, “have a wait-and-see” attitude, according to the NRC. “That is why,” says Mr Petrov, “we should not believe in the idea that they are all suffering under occupation and waiting for liberators to come and free them.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/10/kremlin-occupied-ukraine-is-now-a-totalitarian-hell
Wall Street Journal, 10 novembre, article payant
Why North Korean Soldiers Are Prepared to Die in Russia
Nearly all would raise their hands to go, ex-military defectors explain, owing to regime loyalty, promise of higher status and a glimpse of the outside world
Extraits :
SEOUL—Ryu Seong-hyeon doesn’t need to imagine what the thousands of North Korean soldiers deployed to the Russian front lines might now be thinking. Not long ago, he was one of them.
Ryu darted across the Korean Demilitarized Zone to freedom in 2019—a rare soldier defection. He had a profile that mirrors many of the freshly dispatched troops today: young, underfed and blind to the outside world. Before he chose to flee, Ryu remembers moving bricks at construction sites and shivering outside as he stood guard. He ate mushy rice mixed with corn. Meat was a holiday treat.
Back then, if ordered to fight with the Russians, the now 28-year-old Ryu would have given a resolute answer: “Thank you.” His rationale: “Wouldn’t the meals be better at least?”
The North Korean fighters in Russia have been dismissed as mercenaries, cannon fodder and second-rate. But what gets overlooked, former North Korean soldiers and other military experts argue, is how ready to die many of these troops are—and how eager they might be to escape grim conditions back home.
It is unlikely the roughly 10,000 North Korean troops in the Kursk region, where Russia is trying to repel a Ukrainian incursion, will turn the tide of the bruising 2½-year war. But they provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with much-needed manpower and pose new threats on the deadlocked front lines. One of the biggest mysteries is the level of resolve these North Korean troops will bring to a battle far from home and for an unfamiliar cause. (…)
Nearly all of the troops sent to Russia—who include special-forces fighters—would have a similar set of motivations, the North Korean ex-soldiers say. They have been indoctrinated from a young age to sacrifice everything for the supreme leader. Children get urged in their school textbooks to prove their regime loyalty by volunteering to be the targets of hypothetical artillery strikes.
The troops’ deployment would be seen as the opportunity of a lifetime to bring back cash and glory to the Kim Jong Un regime. Those who die get valorized; those who survive come back heroes. (…)
“North Korean special-operation forces training produces highly disciplined soldiers with intense loyalty, often willing to undertake extreme risks with limited equipment,” Maxwell said. (…)
What makes North Korea’s initial deployment a concern is its ability to send more. North Korea has one of the world’s largest standing armies, at roughly 1.2 million, with several million more in reserves, according to South Korean estimates. The Kim regime fields the world’s largest special-forces unit at around 200,000, military experts say.
Soldiers sent to Russia are expected to be paid a monthly wage of around $2,000, much of which will go to the regime, South Korean officials say. Still, that is a staggering sum where most of the country lives on monthly earnings of a few dollars.
For decades, North Korea has struggled to supply enough food for its people due to international isolation and economic mismanagement, exacerbated by natural disasters. Around 45% of North Korea’s population of 26 million is undernourished, according to a World Food Program report. Even the military, which typically receives special privileges, experiences chronic food shortages.
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-war-7496e24b?mod=hp_lead_pos9
Le Point, 10 novembre, article payant
Ukraine : le temps du réalisme est venu
LA CHRONIQUE DE GÉRARD ARAUD. L’élection de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche annonce un changement de posture de la part des alliés de Kiev.
Extraits :
Qu’on se souvienne : il y a deux ans, galvanisés par la courageuse résistance ukrainienne à l’agression, on appelait à la défaite totale de la Russie et au retour aux frontières de 1991. Émettre des doutes revenait à se faire l’avocat de Poutine. Qu’importait la disproportion des forces, qu’importait le pessimisme publiquement exprimé par le chef d’état-major américain, le Bien devait l’emporter sur le Mal. Les Européens faisaient chorus pour promettre à Zelensky leur soutien quel qu’en soit le coût et pour repousser avec horreur toute notion de compromis qui récompenserait l’agresseur.
Et puis la réalité a repris ses droits. L’envahisseur, qui avait conçu son intervention comme une opération rapide et courte, a dû revoir ses plans, quitte à renoncer à des territoires qu’il avait occupés. Il a mobilisé sa puissante industrie de défense et a renforcé ses effectifs. Un pays de 140 millions d’habitants bandait ses forces pour vaincre un voisin plus pauvre, qui n’en compte plus que 28. Pourtant, l’Ukraine, loin de céder, a tenu bon grâce au courage de sa population et à l’aide occidentale.
Cela étant, après presque trois années d’un conflit sanglant, l’évidence s’impose : non seulement l’Ukraine ne peut pas vaincre la Russie – ce qui avait toujours été une proposition absurde –, mais son armée est à la peine face à un ennemi indifférent à ses pertes, qui utilise à plein sa supériorité en effectifs et en artillerie, atouts essentiels dans une guerre de positions. Les Russes progressent donc inexorablement kilomètre par kilomètre. Nul risque d’une chute de Kiev à ce rythme, leur objectif n’est sans doute pas là mais plutôt d’épuiser leur adversaire jusqu’à ce que son moral lâche comme l’armée allemande à la fin de l’été 1918.
Un moment arrive parfois où des soldats qui ont accepté jusque-là des sacrifices incommensurables sentent soudain que « trop, c’est trop » et abandonnent le combat. On n’a sans doute pas atteint ce point du côté ukrainien, mais le pays, dont les infrastructures sont systématiquement bombardées, est las d’un conflit sans fin et sans espoir. La Crimée et le Donbass – terres désormais russifiées et dévastée pour le second – en valent-ils la chandelle ? se demandent certains qui sont avant tout attachés à l’indépendance de l’Ukraine.
Or, un président américain vient d’être élu, qui annonce haut et fort sa volonté de mettre un terme au conflit le plus rapidement possible. (…)
Citant des sources proches du président élu, le Wall Street Journal est allé plus loin, cette semaine. Dans le détail : l’armistice serait garanti par une présence des Nations unies ; l’Ukraine s’engagerait pour vingt ans à ne pas rejoindre l’Otan, mais pourrait continuer à s’armer comme elle l’entend ; les États-Unis ne participeraient ni à la défense ni à la reconstruction de ce pays, confiées aux Européens.
Le diable est dans le détail, mais ces bases ne manquent pas de réalisme à la lumière de la situation sur le champ de bataille, seul critère de l’issue d’une guerre. En tout cas, ces déclarations et ces fuites prouvent que Trump se prépare à agir rapidement pour engager une négociation avec la Russie.
Dans le cas d’un accord russo-américain, que feraient les Européens ? (…) Après trois années de guerre, l’Europe est incapable de fournir le tiers des munitions que vend à la Russie la Corée du Nord, dont le PIB égale celui de l’Isère…
Rappelons-nous le tollé qu’avait suscité la proposition d’Emmanuel Macron d’envoyer des soldats formateurs sur le territoire ukrainien. Les opinions publiques européennes conservent leur sympathie pour la cause ukrainienne, mais elles ne sont pas prêtes à payer plus cher pour la concrétiser en argent et encore moins en hommes. (…)
Dans ce contexte, si Russes et Américains parvenaient à un accord, quels qu’en soient les termes, les Européens s’y résigneraient probablement. Cela étant, Poutine peut décider de pousser son avantage et refuser les avances américaines dans la certitude que les États-Unis laisseraient faire.
Nul ne sait alors, d’une part, comment Trump réagirait entre raidissement guerrier et abandon de l’Ukraine à son sort et, de l’autre, si les Européens soutiendraient le premier ou pallieraient le second. En tout cas, l’Ukraine risque d’être le premier test de la politique étrangère du second mandat de Donald Trump.
https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/ukraine-le-temps-du-realisme-est-venu-10-11-2024-2574898_24.php
The Economist, 9 novembre, article payant
Betrayal or bargain? Why Volodymyr Zelensky may welcome Donald Trump’s victory
Disillusion with Joe Biden has reached deep levels
Extraits :
ON PAPER, Donald Trump’s return to the White House looks like Ukraine’s worst nightmare. America’s incoming president has consistently refused to condemn Vladimir Putin’s invasion. He appears to admire the Russian dictator’s style of rule. He once tried to blackmail Ukraine by withholding military assistance. So it comes as quite a surprise—and as an indication of just how bad things have become in the country in recent months—to learn that many senior officials were hoping for a Donald Trump victory. Faced with the choice of continued bare life-support or a wildcard president who would rip up the rules and almost certainly cut aid, they were prepared to gamble.
President Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to endorse the victory, and in fulsome terms. “We look forward to an era of a strong United States of America under President Trump’s decisive leadership,” he wrote on X (formerly Twitter, and now run by the pro-Trump billionaire Elon Musk). This was not just spin. In private, his staff have become increasingly frustrated by what they describe as the Biden administration’s “self-deterrence”, the habit of fearing escalation with Russia to the point of paralysis, and a growing gap between the rhetoric of “standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes” and actions that suggest the opposite.
America’s refusal to grant Ukraine permission to use its long-range missiles for strikes inside Russia, its chronic delays in supplies of military aid (even the package already approved) and its inability to offer solid security guarantees are increasingly seen as weakness and hypocrisy. Mr Trump’s victory, however, could offer Mr Zelensky a way out of what looks like a bloody deadlock at best, defeat at worst.
During his election campaign, Mr Trump promised to end the war within 24 hours. Nobody—perhaps not even Mr Trump himself—knows what his peace plan actually consists of. For the moment, Ukrainian officials are working from two public formulations. The first, linked to Mr Trump’s running mate J.D. Vance, would see the conflict frozen on current lines and Ukraine forced into neutrality, with no obvious security guarantees or restraints on Mr Putin. A second plan, which Ukraine greatly prefers, was laid out by Mr Trump’s former secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, in the Wall Street Journal. That focuses on enhanced military and financial support as a deterrent to Moscow, while also keeping open the prospect of membership of NATO. Much could depend on which plan Mr Trump is encouraged to favour.
A total sell-out of Ukraine by Mr Trump is unlikely, not least because of opinion within his own Republican base. He will surely not want to be the author and owner of Ukraine’s defeat. (…)
The change in Washington comes at a difficult time for Ukraine’s armed forces. (…)
There is no indication that Ukraine’s soldiers are about to give up fighting more broadly. For now, they have enough weapons to resist and enough ground to fall back on if things go badly. Ukraine still has plenty more American weapons in the pipeline and due for delivery. Russia meanwhile has its own pressures, not least high inflation, which may cause serious problems next year. But the pinch seems likely to hit Ukraine first, perhaps in a matter of six months or so.
Mr Trump would doubtless want to have his deal ready before then, presumably by the time he returns to sit behind his Oval Office desk on January 20th. The unknown element remains Mr Putin and what he would settle for. Sources close to the Russian leader have given contradictory signals about his willingness to negotiate: ready to freeze hostilities along the existing contact line one day; pushing for something akin to Ukrainian capitulation the next. (…)
Mr Putin will have his own way of negotiating. With temperatures now hovering around zero across Ukraine, Russia is renewing its campaign to destroy much of the country’s energy infrastructure. These attacks are bound to intensify. “They will try to do something,” says Mr Prystaiko. “Destroy the grid, attempt to assassinate the leadership. The next three months will be terrible.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/07/why-volodymyr-zelensky-may-welcome-donald-trumps-victory
Kiev Post, 7 novembre, libre accès
ANALYSIS: What Happens to Ukraine Now After Trump’s Victory? Ceding Territories, Probably
Based on available evidence, Trump’s return to office would likely mean forcing Ukraine into exchanging territories for peace, however long that’d last – though it’s too early to say for sure.
Extraits :
With former US President Donald Trump soon returning to the Oval Office after the latest elections, many are concerned Washington’s support for Ukraine could wither.
While that remains a likely scenario based on previous statements and actions by Trump and his running mate JD Vance, nothing is set in stone – and Trump’s unpredictability can still turn things around. (…)
Meanwhile, Trump has repeatedly said he would end the war if elected – including during his victory speech – “in 24 hours” by offering both Kyiv and Moscow “a deal” – but what that deal would be is anyone’s guess.
Trump’s relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is also tumultuous at best.
Trump spoke disfavorably of Zelensky at times, likening him to a “salesman” when the latter requested US support to help defend Ukraine. (…)
That said, Trump did authorize sales of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine during his presidency – the very same missiles eventually used to defeat Russian tanks in the ongoing war.
But if Trump and Vance are to stick to their words, meaning reduced or no aid for Ukraine with the goal of ending the war swiftly, the logical conclusion would be coercing Ukraine to give up territories in exchange for peace – A deal, if you may.
In this scenario – perhaps – the war ends. Trump declares peace brokered. But whether Russia will invade again, as some speculate is, again, anyone’s guess. At the end of the day, it’s a war between Ukraine and Russia – and only they can decide when and how the war should end.
That said, the US has been a major backer of Ukraine’s defense against Russia – albeit with significant delays – which means potentially reduced US support under Trump would likely significantly degrade Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russia’s invasion.
With the recent battlefield setbacks suffered by Ukrainian troops, decreased supplies of ammo and weapons could mean a major setback in its capabilities – but Kyiv’s European allies have been stepping up, and that support might be able to fill in the gaps. (…)
For better or worse, many have described Trump as unpredictable – a trait that could work in Ukraine’s favor, however unlikely.
Interpret it however you will, but the Kremlin’s spokesperson claimed that he believed Trump could alter his stance on Ukraine drastically after returning to the Oval Office.
But that unpredictability is a Catch-22 – the only thing proving he’s unpredictable is his previous unpredictable acts, including the time he threatened, then made amends with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, and no one really knows how that unpredictability would go.
Are there signs that suggest Trump’s unpredictability could translate to steadfast support for Ukraine, considering he also boasted a good relationship with Putin? Only time will tell.
https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/41824
Kiev Post, opinion, 5 novembre, libre accès
War and the Psyche
World Mental Health Day on Oct. 10 reminded us that Ukrainians face unprecedented challenges in maintaining their psychological well-being.
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(…) In February of this year, the Ministry of Health adopted a new, expanded list of free psychological and psychiatric services. They now include disorders caused by military action, forced relocation, and the death or injury of a loved one. However, people who find themselves in a desperate situation rarely turn to psychologists or psychiatrists, but look elsewhere preferring to believe in miracles.
Over the last two and half years, Ukrainian citizens have faced enormous stress and tragedy on a daily basis. They have become accustomed to sharing bad news on their social media pages – fertile ground for the seeds of depression.
Of course, the main root of our bad news is the war. Russia knows how to feed depression and how to use it as a weapon. Russian soldiers regularly shoot Ukrainian soldiers who have surrendered. They then post videos of the murders on Telegram and Facebook. Ukrainians, shocked by such videos, repost them on social media spreading the horror and the pain it engenders even further. (…)
Mental stress among Ukrainian soldiers on the front line is much more destructive to the individual than the problems faced by civilians.
According to military staffing rules, each battalion – between 400 and 800 soldiers – should have one officer-psychologist. This person should monitor the relationships between soldiers, help avoid conflicts, and provide psychological assistance, especially immediately after military action. (…)
Even if an officer-psychologist is able to monitor an entire battalion, they must also take part in military action and can also suffer from combat distress and post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD). This makes it impossible to say that there is effective psychological support for the military in combat zones.
For civilians, the best cure for depression is simply good news from the front. The capture of part of Russia’s Kursk region provided a dose of positivity, but that pill is no longer efficacious. (…)
Hopes are now being pinned on President Zelensky’s recently announced “victory plan” which needs to be a realistic road map to peace, rather than a temporary cure for depression in Ukrainian society.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/40480
Human Rights in Ukraine, 5 novembre, libre accès
Russification at any cost in occupied Ukraine with children even physically punished for speaking Ukrainian
Russia is intent on eradicating the Ukrainian language and all aspects of Ukrainian identity, with young Ukrainians a particular target
Extraits :
Russia’s policy of russification on newly seized Ukrainian territory is being carried out more aggressively and at accelerated pace, according to a recent Radio Svoboda report, with the aim being to eradicate the Ukrainian language and all aspects of Ukrainian identity. Although sources living under occupation cannot be identified for safety reasons and the information cannot be independently verified, the methods are largely the same as those earlier applied in occupied Crimea and Donbas. (…)
Essentially all pretence was dropped on 24 February 2022, with the methods of coercion and terror applied including abductions, torture and enforced disappearances of Ukrainian civilians, as well as extremely aggressive measures to force Ukrainians to take Russian citizenship.
According to Stanislav Zakharevych, Head of the Sophiivka Village Military Administration (Zaporizhzhia oblast), the Russian invaders immediately set about changing names (mainly back to those used before Ukraine’s decommunization). He says that there is also pressure on people to stop them using Ukrainian, with such cases both in the educational sphere, and in day-to-day life.
“In the summer of 2024, parents were directly told that they would be well-advised to not ask for Ukrainian language classes. They were forced to write statements claiming that their children’s native language is Russian and that there’s no need to learn Ukrainian. Therefore, in most schools, Ukrainian language is not taught at all.”
There have also been cases where teachers, many of whom have been brought in from the Russian Federation, have used physical force, smacking children for speaking Ukrainian or ‘surzhyk’ (Ukrainian which has been heavily influenced by Russian), and telling them to speak Russian. (…)
https://khpg.org/en/1608814097
Wall Street Journal, 5 novembre, article payant
The Nerdy Gamers Who Became Ukraine’s Deadliest Drone Pilots
Tech-savvy soldiers target Russian tanks and infantry, holding back advance; a few pounds of explosives make inexpensive aerial devices lethal
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POKROVSK, Ukraine—The Ukrainian drone pilot spotted two Russian soldiers seeking cover from his explosive machine in an outhouse. He sent his aerial craft, the size of a dinner plate with four rotors, swooping toward the narrow open door and performed what is known as fokus—a magic trick.
The Russians’ bodies disappeared in a puff of smoke, blown apart by a couple of pounds of explosives strapped to the drone. As the dust settled, body parts appeared to be sticking out from the toilet.
“They returned to where they came from,” said the drone pilot, Oleksandr Dakhno, as he re-watched the scene, shot from a surveillance drone that accompanied the armed one, a few days later. Then he chuckled.
The cheerful, soft-spoken 29-year-old had added another two to the roughly 300 Russians he says he has killed in about a year and a half, a tally almost double that credited to the reputed deadliest American sniper, Chief Petty Officer Chris Kyle, who served in Iraq. Some of Dakhno’s colleagues have even higher numbers.
Aerial-drone pilots are the deadliest soldiers on the modern battlefield, just as machine-gunners or snipers were in the last century. They can deliver the explosive power of a rocket-propelled grenade with the precision of a sniper, at the range of an artillery gun. (…)
The movie image of elite soldiers as macho hulks has fueled concerns that today’s flabby and screen-addicted youths couldn’t cut it in a real fight. But piloting drones demands quick thinking, sharp eyes and nimble thumbs, the kind of prowess more readily associated with computer games than military combat.
With artillery ammunition in short supply, Ukraine has increasingly relied on its nerdy Rambos to hold back waves of Russian armored and infantry assaults. Ukraine is the first country to integrate drone units into most brigades of its armed forces, where they tend to operate as a creative subculture, running their own tech hubs and bomb factories. (…)
“We are a team of civilians who want to kill Russians with our cleverness and technology,” said Heorhiy Volkov, commander of a drone battalion called Yasni Ochi, or Clear Eyes.
For pilots, mostly men in their 20s, the long-distance killing can appear like a realistic videogame without the gut-churning proximity of trench warfare. But the human on the screen sometimes flickers into view.
“You see the flesh torn apart, how you tore a head off,” said Dakhno, who is from the 47th Mechanized Brigade. “It can be horrific. Someone’s legs are blown off and he bleeds to death.”
The former director of a co-working space said he is doing his job, to stop armed invaders, and that joking and laughing about it helps. “If I worried about it I’d have to stop. I know that it’s the enemy, but it’s still a living being,” he said. (…)
FPVs are in plentiful supply as Ukrainian factories are churning out tens of thousands of them a month at $500 apiece.
Behind the best remote killers stand organizations that operate like edgy but orderly tech startups. The key to success, said Volkov, is innovation, logistics and communications, as well as solid military tactics.
“One good pilot doesn’t change anything,” he said. (…)
The vast majority of personnel in drone units were never in the military before and largely ignore the service culture of ranks, including saluting or waiting for an order to get on with their job. (…)
Dakhno said he closely observes the enemy’s reaction as his craft swoops in for the kill. Terror quickly turns to resistance or a desperate attempt to flee, and then, finally, resignation or a last pathetic attempt to shield the fragile body with raised arms.
“They try to shoot, try to throw something, then their shoulders slump and they look at the drone as if to say, ‘I’m done,’” he said.
Pilots say their strike rate is about one in three. The Russians are getting better at jamming the connection between the pilot’s controller and the craft, which sends it crashing to the ground. Sometimes, the drones don’t detonate on impact due to technical faults.
Farmer recently sent three drones, one after the other, in for the kill on one Russian soldier—first when he hid under a rug, then when he emerged and got to his feet and a third time when he ran away through a field. The drones hit near their target, but none of them exploded.
“He must have gone to church and prayed that morning,” said Farmer.
Kiev Post, opinion, 4 novembre, libre accès
Biden and Stopping Russia’s Aggression – Too Little, but Still Not Too Late
Why Biden risks being remembered as ‘the protector of Russia’s war machine.’
Extraits :
There is a growing understanding among those following the war in Europe and all that surrounds it that a critical factor that has complicated matters. This understanding is shrouded with disappointment, frustration and barely concealed disgust at the impedimentary leadership provided by the smiling, “…as long as it takes…”, Biden administration in Washington, DC.
I acknowledge and applaud with all due respect the $Billions worth of equipment, ammunition and intelligence contributed by the United States, during the Biden administration. But, after two and a half years of that support, there is a continuous stream of suffering and loss being inflicted on Ukraine. The end of which is still nowhere in sight. To a great extent, the explanation for this can be boiled down to a single multiple-choice question:
Soldiers and civilians are dying, cities and infrastructure are being destroyed in Ukraine and the future security of Europe is at risk because; [choose only one answer]
- Russia, under the criminal Putin regime, has perpetuated an imperialist war of aggression, guilty of a multitude of war crimes, determined to conquer and take possession of the entire Ukraine landmass.
- Iran and North Korea are providing large quantities of missiles, drones and artillery ammunition to Russia, which Putin is using – without restriction – against schools, hospitals, cities and civilians in Ukraine.
- President Joe Biden’s administration has refused to allow Ukraine to use ATACMS to strike legitimate targets in Russia, from which fatal attacks on Ukraine are being launched.
- All of the above.
(…) If President Biden does not remove the limitation preventing long-range strikes against valid Russian targets soon, he will cement his legacy as “the protector of the Russian war machine.”
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/38555
Le Monde, 4 novembre, article payant
Les espoirs déçus de l’Ukraine, après trois mois d’une opération en Russie qui devait changer le cours de la guerre
Récit : L’offensive ukrainienne lancée en direction de Koursk, début août, n’a pas modifié le rapport de force du conflit. Kiev, qui espère arriver à la table des négociations avec un acquis territorial, manque toujours de moyens humains et matériels.
Extraits :
(…) Trois mois après l’attaque surprise en direction de Koursk, les officiers, soldats et civils rencontrés par Le Monde se montrent mitigés sur l’impact final de ce choix stratégique. « Le Grec » n’en fait pas mystère : « Seuls 56 % des objectifs ont été remplis, les Russes ont réagi vite, ils s’appuient sur des renforts que nous n’avons pas et ils utilisent leurs soldats comme de la chair à canon. » Cette incursion en Russie a certes remonté le moral des troupes et changé le regard de certains alliés sur le cours de la guerre, mais elle n’a pas inversé la tendance sur le plan militaire.
Sur fond de grande lassitude, même les caractères les plus trempés ne cachent pas leur espoir d’en finir avec la guerre. Kiev voulait arriver autour de la table des négociations avec un acquis territorial pour prendre Vladimir Poutine à son propre jeu. Le président russe prône un accord sur les lignes figées du front. Mais acceptera-t-il de discuter avant d’avoir repris l’enclave de Koursk, surtout s’il reçoit l’aide de milliers de soldats nord-coréens, dont le déploiement en Russie a été confirmé, le 23 octobre, par les Etats-Unis et l’OTAN ? (…)
Fin octobre, en effet, le ton a changé. Le temps joue contre l’Ukraine. Rencontré dans un café de Soumy, « Shen », 30 ans, originaire de Lviv, appartient à une brigade d’assaut expérimentée. Tout en parlant, il triture ses lunettes de combat : « Quand j’ai appris où on allait, j’ai trouvé ça insensé. Ils nous ont retirés du Donbass pour venir ici et ils nous ont remplacés par des troupes tout juste enrôlées qui créent plus de problèmes qu’autre chose, qui manquent d’entraînement, de maîtrise des communications et de connaissance du front. »
Symbole, pour lui, de cette fragilité, le suicide, fin septembre, du lieutenant-colonel Ihor Hryb, pris entre le devoir de protection de ses hommes, peu aguerris au combat, et l’ordre donné par le sommet de la hiérarchie militaire de tenir une position sous un déluge de feu russe, près de Vouhledar, qu’il a refusé.
L’affaiblissement, à cause de l’incursion de Koursk, des positions ukrainiennes dans le Donbass ou plus au sud, est un reproche récurrent adressé à l’état-major. « Le Grec », dans son bunker, à Iounakivka, relève que « les Russes ont quand même retiré leur 83e brigade de la région de Zaporijia » , avant d’admettre que, « c’est vrai, l’offensive de Koursk a affaibli [les forces ukrainiennes] dans le Donbass » . L’unité logistique du 225e bataillon d’assaut, composée essentiellement de Biélorusses, dont Viktor et « Zherar », combattait jusque-là dans la zone de Tchassiv Yar, ville ciblée par le Kremlin dans le Donbass depuis la chute de Bakhmout, en mai 2023. Après son départ, les Russes ont réussi à percer. (…)
Les chefs de l’armée ukrainienne n’esquivent pas non plus la question. Vadym Mysnyk, 54 ans, porte-parole du commandement opérationnel de la zone nord, était à la retraite lors de l’invasion russe, en février 2022. Il a passé toute sa carrière dans l’armée soviétique et compte d’anciens camarades d’école dans les troupes adverses. « On nous reproche d’avoir affaibli notre front sur le Donbass, mais il faut garder à l’esprit qu’ici c’est David contre Goliath , se défend-il. On fait ce qu’on peut. Nous avons lancé l’incursion de Koursk avec un nombre limité de ressources. »
L’homme paraît goûter le parler-vrai : « Il faut arrêter de dire qu’on est entrés facilement sur le sol russe ! A côté des conscrits, des Tchétchènes et des gardes-frontières, il y avait des marines russes aguerris. Le risque n’était pas nul. Cette guerre est une horreur, elle use tout le monde. Mais on n’a aucun droit de laisser aux futures générations une guerre gelée. La Russie ne comprend que la force. » Serhiy, l’officier de la brigade d’infanterie croisé à Soumy, tient aussi à démystifier cette incursion : « Soudja a été prise sans combat de rue. La ville et les forces russes ont été contournées et encerclées. » (…)
Enfin, si spectaculaire soit-elle, cette incursion de Koursk est loin d’avoir suscité dans la population ukrainienne l’engouement escompté. Svetlana Rezvan, 49 ans, sommelière dans la vie civile devenue officière porte-parole de la 61e brigade, le constate aussi : « Une majorité de la population ne comprend toujours pas la raison de l’opération, elle pense qu’on veut prendre Koursk, alors que ce n’est pas le but. Ce sentiment est aussi présent chez les volontaires qui soutiennent notre armée. Les soldats ne sont pas loin de ressentir la même chose. Ils reflètent la société, même s’ils font quand même leur job. »
C’est pourquoi le soutien des familles de soldats reste un sujet sensible, y compris pour cette offensive. Cela explique aussi l’embarras de l’état-major ukrainien, pris, malgré lui, dans l’affaire du « silence radio » imposé à tous les militaires postés dans l’enclave russe. Leurs familles dénoncent l’impossibilité de les joindre sur le front, alors qu’elles pouvaient le faire quand ils se battaient en Ukraine. Starlink et les réseaux téléphoniques ukrainiens ne fonctionnent pas dans cette zone. Les unités peuvent communiquer entre elles par talkie-walkie, mais pas avec les familles. (…)
Trois mois après un lancement réussi, l’offensive de Koursk ne paraît pas avoir changé la donne dans cette guerre qui s’enlise. D’autant que les Occidentaux refusent toujours à Kiev le droit de frapper le territoire russe en profondeur avec des missiles – une « ligne rouge » que l’Ukraine espérait faire sauter avec son offensive. De quoi faire dire au « Grec », dans son bunker souterrain de Iounakivka, que « cette opération n’est pas un tournant militaire, seulement un atout politique, et un symbole » (…)
Finalement, l’issue de cette incursion n’est peut-être pas dans les mains des Russes ni des Ukrainiens. Selon l’officier Serhiy, « la date cruciale, c’est l’élection présidentielle américaine. Si Kamala Harris gagne, la guerre ne finira pas en 2025, si c’est [Donald] Trump, elle peut s’arrêter dès la fin 2024 » . La pertinence, au regard de l’histoire, de cette brèche ouverte sur le sol russe dépend aussi de la capacité de Moscou à reconquérir cette enclave avant de commencer à négocier. Le président russe a toujours affirmé que, au moment des discussions, les lignes de front seront considérées comme acquises. On voit mal comment il pourrait tenir cette position, tant que Kiev contrôle une partie de son territoire.
The Economist, 4 novembre, article payant
Combat and casualties : Hell, horror and heroism in Ukraine’s battlefield hospitals
The gruesome lessons its doctors are learning reveal the nature of war in the 21st century
Extraits :
CUT DEEP into the innards of the southern front, Ukraine’s first underground hospital feels like something out of a James Bond movie. State-of-the-art gadgetry begins with admissions. Wounded soldiers arrive directly from the battlefield: in cars, ambulances, quad bikes, or whatever else can carry them. They are assessed and colour-coded into modules by urgency: “red zone” cases for immediate operations, “yellow zone” for other treatment. Alongside an operating theatre, enclosed in steel barrels several metres below ground level, is an intensive care unit. There is a ventilator, and even a laboratory for blood tests. The centre is set up for sophisticated operations: bone repair, soft tissue reconstruction, and even arterial bypass surgery.
In military jargon, this is a “role 2” facility, the second of four treatment tiers from front-line triage to tertiary hospital care. Doctors move people on if they can. Those stable enough are whisked off to “role 3” facilities, approximately 30km away. The rest are treated and stabilised here, a little over 10km from the contact line. The hospital’s immaculately joined wooden beams—chosen over concrete to soften shrapnel in the event of a Russian strike—project a deceptive warmth, like being in a Scandinavian sauna. The drones and glide-bombs that terrorise the skies outside make clear that this is not a place to relax. Ukraine’s medics are here, underground, not by choice. Like the soldiers they treat, they are among the hunted.
Evhen, the underground hospital’s chief medical officer, grunts at any suggestion that Russia might follow the Geneva conventions, which forbid targeting medical units. “They don’t even know what it means,” he says. To the Russian military, doctors are “force multipliers”—they patch up soldiers and send them back to fight, take a long time to train and are hard to replace. Ukraine now tells its medics to remove any markings that might set them apart. “If you put a red cross on a car, you’ll be fired on within 15 minutes.” The goal is still to get wounded soldiers from the front line to a role 2 treatment unit within an hour, but drones drag out the process, often for hours. The delays often mean life or death; limb or no limb. Leave a tourniquet on for more than a few hours, and tissue damage is irreversible.
Ukraine believes survival on the battlefield is the key to regaining the edge in a war that has become largely attritional. The underground hospitals are a key part of the puzzle, says Roman Kuziv, the 35-year-old doctor who helped design them. (…)
Swiping through images on his smartphone—a surreal blend of family photos and flesh wounds—Dr Kuziv reveals the brutal injuries and hard choices his teams face daily. He pulls up a photo of a man with a gaping hole in his upper body, alongside a kidney sliced in two, and a 30cm slab of missile metal that had been lodged deep in his midriff. “Did the man make it?” Remarkably, yes, he did. Another soldier, this time with a deep gash across his back, part of his spine missing, internal organs spilling out. That soldier survived initial surgery in the underground hospital, but died two days later. A third clip shows a soldier in his 30s, convulsing violently as he tries to drink a cup of water. What was up here? “Hydrophobia,” the commander says. “An extreme aversion to water.” In short, the soldier had rabies, caused by a single bite from a cat, and it was too late to save him. The army saw a handful of such cases before culling wild animals in the area. (…)
There have been mistakes, thousands who could have been saved. But Russia’s war without limits would test the resources of any military medical service, Dr Kuziv insists. “All-out war gives you one or two months to study and adapt.” NATO countries should be thinking about how they would cope, he says. “Honestly, they are not prepared. They wouldn’t know what’s hit them.” ■
Survival mode : Ukraine is now struggling to survive, not to win (The Economist, 30 octobre, article payant)
Russia is slicing through Ukrainian defences in parts of the battlefield
Extraits :
“AFTER 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.
Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.
The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. (…)
In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties. (…)
The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win
Blood brothers : North Korea is sending thousands of soldiers to help Vladimir Putin
It shows how far Russia has fallen as a strategic power (The Economist, 24 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT, Volodymyr Zelensky, declared last week that North Korea is sending troops to Russia, in effect joining the invasion as a co-combatant. The appearance of one of the world’s most erratic and heavily-armed nations in the fight might test even the best-resourced and well-rested of defences. After 32 months of grinding war against a much larger enemy, Ukraine’s are neither.
The Ukrainian claims, later backed up by South Korea, are that North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, has decided to commit at least 11,000 troops to the war. General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, says the forces are undergoing training at four ranges in and around the Khabarovsk region in the Russian far east. He says deployment includes at least 500 officers and three full generals. According to Mr Budanov, a contingent of 2,600 is due to be transferred to battle in the Russian region of Kursk by the end of October. A senior NATO official told The Economist that he could not confirm the reports, adding the alliance was yet to see signs of “large-scale” movements towards the front.
If the Ukrainian claims turn out to be true, it would not represent the first time North Korea has come to Russia’s assistance in the war. The dictatorship is already a big supplier of arms to Russia. According to Mr Budanov, shipments that began as long ago as in late 2022 have reached 2.8m shells a year, just 100,000 short of Russia’s own annual production at 2.9m shells. Since late 2023 North Korea has also transferred a number of ballistic missiles, with launch systems serviced by North Korean crews. Pulled mostly from old stock, the battlefield performance of these missiles has been erratic. They regularly overshoot military targets to wreak havoc on Ukrainian towns and cities.
North Korea is not donating its men or weapons out of charity. The enhanced co-operation stems from a mutual assistance treaty, signed by Vladimir Putin and Mr Kim during a fawning dictators’ ceremony in Pyongyang in June 2024. (…)
But if the partnership is indeed a sign of Russian weakness, it is not yet pronounced or immediate enough for Ukraine. On the battlefield, things are still looking grim. Russia is making significant progress pressing simultaneously at several points along the 1,000km frontline, despite staggeringly high casualty numbers that have now surpassed 600,000 dead and wounded, on American estimates. (…)
Meanwhile Russia is busy internationalising the war. Last week Andrei Belousov, the Russian defence minister, met officials in China for talks on strengthening military co-operation. Iran continues to supply Russia with drones, though its long-promised ballistic missiles have not appeared so far. The North Korean relationship is growing in strength. “We have partners, they have allies,” grumbles Mr Budanov. Ukraine is already neck-deep in a world war, he warns. “Just like the early days of the second world war, not everyone sees it yet.” (…)
Russia, in contrast, is not overly concerned about its own escalation plans. How untested North Korean troops will fare on the European battlefield is still an open question. They have not yet been exposed to the realities of a modern war, now dominated by cheap, deadly tactical strike drones. It will take them a few weeks to adjust—if they last that long. But for Mr Budanov, the development is an “unwelcome experiment”. Russian soldiers are one thing, the spy chief says, with the vast bulk of them unmotivated and resigned to their fate. The North Koreans, on the other hand, come with a pre-programmed ideology. They have families back home that could be executed if things do not go well. “They fix some problems for the Russians. There is reason to be concerned.” ■
North Korea is sending thousands of soldiers to help Vladimir Putin
Opinion | L’Ukraine, notre défense et nos déficits
Aider l’Ukraine à gagner la guerre ou réduire nos déficits ? Les deux sont possibles, et urgents, martèle l’économiste Jacques Delpla. (Les Echos, tribune, 23 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
L’enjeu en Ukraine est notre paix, notre sécurité, notre liberté, nos valeurs et… notre pouvoir d’achat. Si l’Ukraine capitulait, la Russie menacerait directement l’Europe de l’Est, du Nord et l’Allemagne. Poutine pourrait utiliser sa menace nucléaire sur ces petits pays et les envahir, pariant sur une absence de réaction des Etats-Unis. La Russie de Poutine menacerait alors la totalité de l’Europe de l’Est et de l’Ouest, dont l’Allemagne. Effet domino assuré.
La France, serait certes protégée par son arme nucléaire, mais serait très appauvrie au milieu d’une Europe ruinée, occupée et asservie par la Russie. La probabilité d’un tel scénario est significativement au-dessus de zéro. Nous devons tout faire pour l’éviter. Il ne s’agit pas ici d’être gentil envers les Ukrainiens. Il s’agit de préserver nos propres intérêts stratégiques et économiques.
Dans cette guerre, les Ukrainiens sont nos 300 soldats spartiates de la Bataille des Thermopyles (480), dirigés par le roi Leonidas. Ils périrent mais donnèrent le répit nécessaire aux Grecs pour s’armer, s’organiser et gagner la bataille décisive de Salamine contre les Perses du Roi Xerxès.
Pour leur propre intérêt égoïste, l’Union Européenne et la France doivent donc financer et armer l’Ukraine pour éviter une nouvelle bataille de Salamine, qui aujourd’hui en Europe serait au mieux catastrophique, au pire atomique !
Rappelons que le chef des services de renseignement militaire allemand a déclaré, devant le Bundestag, qu’une attaque russe contre l’OTAN et l’Europe de l’Est est probable d’ici 2030 – et nous ne sommes pas prêts.
Comment faire, alors même que la France doit redresser ses finances publiques ? Avec deux solutions complémentaires.
Première solution, l’Europe devrait, dès 2025, prêter à l’Ukraine l’argent nécessaire pour gagner sa guerre, par exemple 2 % du PIB de l’UE par an dès 2025, soit 200 milliards d’euros par an. C’est deux fois l’aide occidentale de 2024, dont 60 milliards par an pour la seule France. C’est l’aide à nos Spartiates des Thermopyles qui bloquera les Russes.
Pourquoi des prêts ? Car en comptabilité budgétaire maastrichtienne, les prêts de la France à un Etat ne sont pas comptabilisés dans les déficits budgétaires, car ils sont censés être remboursés un jour. En revanche, ces prêts sont évidemment comptés dans la dette publique de la France. Ces prêts, à 50 ans, ne porteraient aucun intérêt pendant la guerre et les quinze ans après un accord d’armistice. Ils seraient restructurés lors de la reconstruction de l’Ukraine, comme pour l’Allemagne en 1952 pour ses dettes héritées du Nazisme.
Deuxième solution : le gouvernement Barnier devrait demander à la Commission Européenne d’invoquer le cas de force majeure, en l’occurrence la guerre, pour suspendre le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance (PSC) tant que l’Europe aide militairement l’Ukraine – c’est prévu dans le PSC. Monsieur Barnier devrait annoncer alors que la France veut renforcer son arsenal nucléaire et conventionnel. Il devrait aussi exiger que l’ensemble des pays européens portent leurs dépenses de défense de 2 % à 5 % du PIB d’ici 2027, meilleur moyen de dissuader la Russie d’envahir l’Europe.
La Commission, légalement incompétente sur la défense, et l’Allemagne ne pourront rien objecter (surtout s’il est question de dissuasion nucléaire).
Que la France doive réduire drastiquement ses déficits publics est évident. Je suggère une réduction du déficit de 2 % du PIB chaque année pour les dépenses non militaires et une augmentation du budget militaire de 1 % du PIB par an de 2025 à 2027, voire au-delà. L’effort budgétaire d’ici 2027 serait de 3 % du PIB.
Mais laisser la Russie envahir l’Union européenne pour des raisons de PSC est absurde et suicidaire pour l’Europe. Eviter une invasion par la Russie est plus important que la stabilisation de nos finances publiques aujourd’hui. Une Europe envahie par la Russie ferait faillite (défaut sur la dette souveraine, effondrement des banques) et entrerait dans un chaos létal. Les marchés financiers le comprendront très bien, tant qu’il y aura une consolidation de notre budget non-militaire. Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum. Pereat Pactum Stabile.
Jacques Delpla est économiste
Opinion | L’Ukraine, notre défense et nos déficits | Les Echos
„Unsichtbares Bataillon“ – ukrainische Frauen leisten Grosses im Krieg, sei es hinter der Front oder direkt im Gefecht
In ihrem Verteidigungskrieg gegen die Russen fehlt es der Ukraine akut an Männern, so dass die Mithilfe von Frauen unerlässlich ist. Seit dem Beginn der Kämpfe wirken sie als unsichtbares Bataillon mit an der Verteidigung des Vaterlandes – nicht selten mit der Waffe in der Hand. (NZZ, tribune, 23 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
An der Verteidigung ihrer Heimat gegen die russischen Invasoren sind ukrainische Frauen seit 2014 in ganz unterschiedlicher Weise beteiligt. Unzählige Ukrainerinnen sind äusserst aktiv als freiwillige Helferinnen im zivilen und rückwärtigen militärischen Versorgungsbereich. Und es gibt auch viele Frauen, die sich an der Front bewähren, als Ärztinnen oder medizinische Pflegerinnen, aber auch direkt in den Kämpfen. (…)
Im Rahmen des Unsichtbaren Bataillons wurde 2018 die Frauen-Veteranenbewegung gegründet. Dies gab den Anstoss, eine Verbesserung der logistischen Unterstützung von ehemaligen Soldatinnen einzufordern. Das Unsichtbare Bataillon ist zu einer starken Lobby geworden. Frauen helfen sich gegenseitig und treiben den Wandel im Land voran, was die Gleichstellung im Militär betrifft. (…)
Solche Frauengruppen sind in ukrainischen Städten, aber auch in kleineren Ortschaften aktiv. Frauen flechten Tarnnetze, Frauen bereiten Essensrationen vor, organisieren Medikamente, sammeln Kleider, treiben gebrauchte Autos auf und transportieren alles an die Front. (…)
Seit dem 24. Februar 2022 sind viele Frauen selbst an die Front gegangen. Manche meldeten sich zum Militärdienst, nachdem sie Ehemänner oder Söhne im Krieg verloren hatten. Einige ukrainische Soldatinnen geniessen mittlerweile landesweite Prominenz, etwa die Journalistin und ehemalige Abgeordnete Tetjana Tschornowol, eine Mutter von zwei Kindern, deren Ehemann 2014 kämpfend im Donbass gefallen ist. Als Mitglied der Iwan-Bohun-Brigade für besondere Zwecke leitet sie einen Kampftrupp, der die Panzerabwehrlenkwaffe Stugna-P bedient.
Oxana Rubaniak wiederum ist eine jugendliche Kommandantin in einer Einheit der ukrainischen Streitkräfte. Sie stammt aus der Region Iwano-Frankiwsk. Zu Beginn der russischen Invasion war Oxana 19 Jahre alt. Sie schloss sich einer Freiwilligeneinheit von Iwano-Frankiwsk an und half, die öffentliche Ordnung in der Stadt aufrechtzuerhalten. Seit Mai 2022 dient sie als Maschinengewehrschützin in der 72. separaten mechanisierten Brigade. Sie war die einzige Frau in ihrem Zug. Im März 2023 wurde Oxana Rubaniak bei einem Artilleriebeschuss in Wuhledar ernsthaft verletzt, doch kehrte sie bereits im August wieder an die Front zurück.
Laut einer Aussage der stellvertretenden Verteidigungsministerin der Ukraine, Natalia Kalmikowa, belief sich die Gesamtzahl der Frauen bei den ukrainischen Streitkräften Anfang 2024 auf 66 900. 47 200 leisten ihren Dienst als Soldatinnen. Gleichzeitig haben 6500 Frauen Führungspositionen inne, und etwa 4000 operieren direkt an der Front.
Die Ukrainerin Halyna Petrosanyak ist Autorin und Übersetzerin, sie lebt seit 2016 in der Schweiz.
Unsichtbares Bataillon – ukrainische Frauen leisten Grosses im Krieg
Putin’s Rising Price for Peace in Ukraine
Facing years of aid for a costly war, the West is now likely to seek, not offer, an off-ramp. (WSJ, opinion, 22 octobre, article payant)
Voir “Article du Jour”
Putin’s Rising Price for Peace in Ukraine – WSJ
Ukraine : l’insoutenable légèreté de l’Ouest
TRIBUNE. En dévoilant sa stratégie de victoire contre la Russie, le président Zelensky place ses alliés occidentaux face à leurs responsabilités. Que veulent-ils vraiment ? interroge l’eurodéputée. (Le Point, 22 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
L’Ukraine revient – un peu – dans les conversations. Il a fallu que son président se déplace à Bruxelles auprès des Vingt-Sept puis à l’Otan et nous rappelle qu’une guerre ravage toujours un pays européen. Il l’a dit clairement : la situation dans le Donbass est difficile, la Russie pilonne des infrastructures civiles dans tout le pays et l’Ukraine a besoin que nous l’aidions davantage. Les dirigeants américain, allemand, britannique et français se sont réunis à Berlin pour en « discuter ». La question qui se pose est : que voulons-nous vraiment ? (…)
Nous avons depuis lors apporté notre soutien au compte-gouttes, avec un temps de retard systématique qui ne s’accorde pas à nos discours. Si la menace sur la sécurité de l’Europe est « existentielle », si « la Russie ne doit pas gagner » et puisque nous « soutiendrons l’Ukraine aussi longtemps qu’il le faudra », à quoi jouons-nous ?
Combien de temps s’écoule-t-il entre nos promesses et leur réalisation ? J’ai posé la question au ministre de la Défense ukrainien Roustem Oumerov. Sa réponse fut courtoise mais embarrassée. Nous réagissons toujours trop peu et trop tard et pratiquons sans le dire le soutien militaire homéopathique, dont l’efficacité est à peine supérieure à la médecine du même nom.
Des avions de chasse ? Bien peu volent au-dessus de l’Ukraine. Le droit d’utiliser les armes à longue portée pour viser des cibles militaires en Russie ? Toujours pas octroyé. Des missiles Taurus pour Kiev ? Olaf Scholz [le chancelier allemand, NDLR] s’y refuse. Si l’on ne parle que des munitions, nous en avions promis un million à l’Ukraine. Nous en avons livré la moitié.
Pendant ce temps, Moscou se fournit en Iran, en Corée du Nord et vraisemblablement, en Chine. On retrouve des composants européens dans des armes russes. La Hongrie bloque obstinément de nouveaux financements pour l’aide militaire européenne à Kiev. (…)
Deux freins nous retiennent. La sempiternelle peur de l’escalade, qu’il vaudrait mieux appeler par son nom : la trouille, que Poutine nous cherche noise, comme s’il ne le faisait pas déjà. Nous sommes les premiers à théoriser la guerre hybride qu’il nous mène, sans réagir. (…)
Et puis comment continuer à payer l’armement de l’Ukraine quand nos finances sont en berne ? Voilà les pays les plus riches de la planète en panne et surpassés par l’Iran, la Russie et la Corée du Nord. Est-ce vraiment le message que nous voulons envoyer au monde ? Ne comptez plus sur nous, même quand notre propre sécurité est menacée, même quand les Ukrainiens sont au front pendant que nous sommes au chaud, nous avons d’autres priorités et plus les moyens de les aider ? (…)
Les moyens, pourtant, existent et ne coûteraient rien aux contribuables européens. Trois cents milliards d’avoirs russes sont gelés. Nous avons commencé à utiliser les intérêts qu’ils génèrent au profit de l’Ukraine, mais nous tremblons à l’idée de les confisquer. Il faudrait les garder pour reconstruire l’Ukraine, quand la Russie sera forcée de verser des réparations. (…)
Et surtout, soyons enfin sérieux. L’issue de la guerre d’Ukraine dépend de nous. Une victoire russe nous coûterait infiniment plus cher demain qu’un soutien décisif à Kiev aujourd’hui. On ne peut pas traiter notre sécurité avec désinvolture.
*Nathalie Loiseau, eurodéputée Horizons, a été ministre aux Affaires européennes dans le gouvernement Édouard Philippe, de 2017 à 2019.
Ukraine : l’insoutenable légèreté de l’Ouest
The other Russian soldiers : The foreigners fighting and dying for Vladimir Putin
Many were tricked into the war in Ukraine (The Economist, 21 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
ANEPALI, a Slovak and a Brazilian sit in a room in a prisoner-of-war camp and explain that they had never signed up to fight in the Russian army but that they were tricked into doing so. The Ukrainian authorities do not give any official figures for the number of foreign fighters they have captured, but say that these men are a burden they would like to be rid of. In the past year, since they have begun to be captured, not one has been exchanged or gone home. (…)
Prisoner A, from Nepal, said he had gone to Russia to study. A month after he got there he was unable to pay his university fees, because he had been cheated of his money by agents, who have lured hundreds from the poor Himalayan country to Russia. Desperate, he signed a contract with the Russian army, whose recruiters assured him he would not have to fight, “just help injured people”. Within weeks, however, he was forced to go to the front, and found himself under fire, with four other compatriots. “I don’t know what happened to them,” he says. (…)
Estimates of the numbers of foreigners who have been recruited to fight with the Russians vary from the low thousands to tens of thousands. On October 17th, Ukraine’s spy chief, Kyrylo Budanov, claimed that there are nearly 11,000 North Korean troops training in eastern Russia to fight in Ukraine. There is no way to confirm this, though South Korea’s spy agency has stated some training is under way. The highest numbers of non-Russian POWs are from Sri Lanka and Nepal, says Lieutenant Matvyenko. In the last couple of months there have been fewer of them though. Stories about how those who have gone in search of big bucks have been scammed or killed have dampened enthusiasm for a Russian adventure. ■
The foreigners fighting and dying for Vladimir Putin
Wie gefährdet ist der Frieden in Europa und der Welt? «Jetzt ist es ernst. Die Lage war im Kalten Krieg nie so ernst wie heute»
Der ehemalige deutsche Viersternegeneral Erhard Bühler fordert Deutschland auf, der russischen Bedrohung klarer entgegenzutreten und mehr für die Ukraine zu tun. Mit der Verteidigungspolitik der Koalition geht er hart ins Gericht. Er sieht einen Vertrauensverlust in der Truppe. (NZZ, Interview, 21 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Herr General, der deutsche Oppositionsführer Friedrich Merz hat den Bundeskanzler am vergangenen Mittwoch aufgefordert, den Marschflugkörper Taurus zu liefern und der Ukraine zu gestatten, damit militärische Ziele auf russischem Territorium anzugreifen. Hat er recht? Muss Deutschland mehr tun, um die Ukraine bei ihrem Abwehrkampf zu unterstützen?
Ja. Ich halte es seit langem für richtig, wie es die Franzosen handhaben. Sie gestatten der Ukraine, mit ihren Waffen weit entfernte Ziele in Russland anzugreifen, solange es sich um militärische handelt, von denen eine unmittelbare Bedrohung ausgeht. Deutschland sollte sich Frankreich zum Vorbild nehmen und weitreichende Waffen wie den Taurus liefern, wie es der Bundestag gefordert hat.
Ist das wirklich notwendig?
Die russische Armee ist an der Front nicht zu schlagen. Sie zermürbt die Ukrainer durch ihre pausenlosen Angriffe, ohne Rücksicht auf eigene Verluste, und hinterlässt einen Streifen der Zerstörung in Städten und Dörfern. Dadurch soll der ukrainische Durchhaltewillen gebrochen werden. Gleichzeitig ist der russische Ansatz, auch den Westen mürbe zu machen und zu spalten. Die operative Idee der Ukrainer, der russischen Armee in der Ukraine die Grundlagen für die Angriffe zu entziehen, ist richtig; durch Angriffe auf Logistikeinrichtungen, Führungsstellen, Versorgungslinien, Flugplätze und Raketenabschussbasen. Diese befinden sich bis zu 200 bis 300 Kilometer hinter der Grenze. Dieser Ansatz muss unterstützt werden, wenn man will, dass die Ukraine ihren Abwehrkampf am Ende erfolgreich führen kann. (…)
Der deutsche Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius und ranghohe Militärs warnen davor, dass Russland in einigen Jahren bereits in der Lage sein werde, weitere Länder in Europa zu überfallen, potenziell auch Nato-Bündnispartner. Ist diese Sorge nicht übertrieben? Die Nato hat immerhin Atomwaffen.
Unsere Regierung ist der Ansicht, dass Russland auf absehbare Zeit die grösste Bedrohung für Frieden und Freiheit im euroatlantischen Raum ist. So steht es in der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie. Darüber hinaus haben Bundesverteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius und auch der Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr festgestellt, dass wir in drei bis fünf Jahren eine Abschreckungsfähigkeit gegenüber Russland aufgebaut haben müssen. Denn in den Folgejahren könnte Russland in der Lage und willens sein, Europa anzugreifen. Das sind keine Zahlen, die jemand leichtfertig in die Welt setzt. Sie beruhen auf ernsthaften und ressortübergreifenden Analysen. Noch nie haben deutsche Geheimdienste und die Spitze unserer Streitkräfte so vor der von Russland ausgehenden Gefahr gewarnt. Wir sollten diese Warnungen ernst nehmen. (…)
Geht es Russland nicht einfach nur darum, einen Keil zwischen die Mitglieder der Nato zu treiben?
Wir könnten stundenlang darüber spekulieren, was Russland genau erreichen will und was es als Nächstes tut. Entscheidend ist aus meiner Sicht etwas anderes: Russland hat dem Westen eindeutig gezeigt, dass es bereit ist, zum Äussersten zu gehen, um seine Ziele zu erreichen. Deshalb bleibt der Nato nichts anderes übrig, als auf eine starke Abschreckungsfähigkeit zu setzen. Wir müssen ausschliessen, dass Russland überhaupt auf die Idee kommt, im Baltikum, in Polen oder im Schwarzmeerraum in irgendeiner Weise gegen die Nato vorzugehen. (…)
Laut Umfragen will aber mehr als die Hälfte der Deutschen, dass sich das Land bei internationalen Krisen stärker zurückhält. BSW und AfD, die im Moment von Wahlsieg zu Wahlsieg eilen, lehnen die militärische Unterstützung der Ukraine ab und sind der Ansicht, dass Deutschland Russland bedroht.
Wir bedrohen Russland nicht. Das haben wir zu keinem Zeitpunkt getan. Ganz im Gegenteil. Die Devise der Nato und der Bundeswehr war Kooperation. (…)Sind die Ängste der Menschen nicht nachvollziehbar?
Natürlich sind die Ängste der Menschen vor einem Krieg nachvollziehbar, aber Frau Wagenknecht und die AfD schüren sie mit ihren Thesen, ohne jede Idee, wie man ihn eigentlich vermeidet. Was sie fordern, liefe für die Ukraine auf die einseitige Abtretung der russisch besetzten Gebiete hinaus. Damit ist der Krieg aber nicht vorbei. Nach einer Pause, in der Russland sich militärisch neu aufstellt, wird das Land die Hände ausstrecken nach der gesamten Ukraine. Und wenn das gelingen sollte, wird es sich ermutigt fühlen, auch andere Länder anzugreifen, Moldau, Georgien, das Baltikum. (…)
General a. D. Bühler über Russland: «Mache mir Sorgen um den Frieden in Europa»
Mehr Hilfe für Ukraine: Ein Fall für Artikel vier des NATO-Vertrags
Die Serie russischer Anschläge in Europa beweist: Moskau führt einen hybriden Krieg gegen die NATO. Das Bündnis kann und sollte darauf reagieren – und die Ukraine viel entschiedener unterstützen. (FAZ, opinion, 21 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Bruno Kahl, der Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, sagt, wegen der ständigen russischen Attentate in Europa könne sich „irgendwann die Frage eines NATO-Bündnisfalles stellen“. Aber wann ist „irgendwann“? Gerade ist ein neuer Brandanschlag aus Birmingham gemeldet worden. Vorher waren Leipzig, London, Madrid, Prag und Warschau dran. Der offenbar geplante Mord an Armin Papperger, dem Vorstandsvorsitzenden des Rüstungskonzerns Rheinmetall, konnte gerade noch verhindert werden. Der britische Geheimdienstchef McCallum meint dazu, Russland wolle jetzt „Chaos“ in Europa.
Diese Angriffe sind keine defensive Reaktion Russlands auf die Hilfe der NATO für Kiew. Umgekehrt wird ein Schuh daraus: Putins Überfall auf die Ukraine war von Anfang an Teil eines Angriffes auf das Bündnis. Denn weil die Allianz der Wiederherstellung des sowjetischen Herrschaftsgebiets in Europa, das noch vor 35 Jahren bis zum Brandenburger Tor reichte, entgegensteht, muss sie aus Moskauer Sicht aus Mitteleuropa verschwinden.
Das ist keine bloße Behauptung, sondern Kern der russischen Ultimaten vom 17. Dezember 2021. Darin hat Putin von der NATO verlangt, alle ihre neuen Mitgliedstaaten preiszugeben. An Amerika erging die Order, seinen Atomschirm über Europa zuzuklappen. Damit wäre der Osten des Kontinents wie zu Zeiten des Warschauer Pakts wieder zu einem Satellitensystem Moskaus geworden. Auch Deutschland ist auf den nuklearen Schutz Amerikas angewiesen.
Als der Westen Putins Forderungen zurückwies, begann Russland die gewaltsame Rückeroberung des Imperiums mit dem Angriff auf die Ukraine. Und weil die sich mit Hilfe der NATO-Staaten wehrt, intensiviert Putin jetzt den hybriden Krieg gegen den Westen. Wenn die Sicherheit seiner Mitglieder in Gefahr ist, muss das Bündnis aber tätig werden. Die erste Stufe dafür sind Konsultationen nach Artikel vier des NATO-Vertrags.
Weil Abschreckung der Kern der Verteidigung ist, müssen solche Konsultationen zu Ergebnissen führen, die Putin beeindrucken. Vieles wäre schnell möglich – wenn darüber im Bündnis Einigkeit bestünde, an der es jedoch fehlt. Die NATO könnte einige Punkte aus dem Siegesplan des ukrainischen Präsidenten Selenskyj sofort verwirklichen, zum Beispiel die Erlaubnis zum Einsatz weitreichender Waffen gegen Ziele in Russland. NATO-Flugabwehrbatterien, die ohnehin schon in Polen oder Rumänien stehen, könnten über die Grenzen hinweg die Westukraine vor russischen Marschflugkörpern schützen.
Außerdem könnten die Verbündeten der Ukraine das gesamte eingefrorene russische Vermögen – etwa 260 Milliarden Euro – zur Verfügung stellen, statt nur einen Bruchteil, wie jetzt geplant. Damit wäre auch für Ausfälle nach einem möglichen Wahlsieg Donald Trumps in Amerika vorgesorgt. Dass so ein Schritt dem Vertrauen in den Finanzplatz Europa schaden könnte, ist unplausibel. Nach der jetzigen Beschlusslage wird Russland dieses Geld ohnehin nie wiedersehen.
Wladimir Putins hybride Angriffe auf die NATO
The invasion of Ukraine : How a second nuclear disaster was avoided at Chernobyl in 2022
The Russian occupation underscored the risks posed by nuclear sites in wartime (The Economist, Book Review, 14 octobre, article payant)
Chernobyl Roulette. By Serhii Plokhy. W.W. Norton; 240 pages; $29.99. Allen Lane; £25
Extraits :
IN THE SMALL hours of February 24th 2022, Valentyn Heiko received a phone call at work. Gunfire could be heard at Vilcha, less than 50km away: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was under way. “We’re keeping calm for the time being,” Mr Heiko told his colleague, even though there were no guidelines for what employees at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant should do in the event of war. The invaders were coming—Chernobyl lay on the route from Belarus, a Russian staging-post, to Kyiv—yet there was also no question of Mr Heiko or his team leaving their stations.
By the early afternoon, a special unit of Russian troops had arrived at the plant, with orders to seize it. Threatened with destruction akin to a “meat grinder”, Ukrainian guardsmen put down their weapons. Thus began the Russian occupation of the plant, which would last 35 days. It was thanks only to the actions of the plant’s employees that another calamity at Chernobyl was averted.
In a new book Serhii Plokhy, a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard, offers a gripping, thriller-like account of those days. The nuclear facility is terrain he knows well: Mr Plokhy previously produced an outstanding account of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, the worst nuclear catastrophe in history, which was caused by the explosion of a reactor. (Mr Plokhy’s book partly inspired an award-winning television series in 2019.) “Chernobyl Roulette” offers similarly penetrating insight into the people involved and the decisions made.
Russian forces continued to arrive at Chernobyl after February 24th. Their morale was low, having expected a speedy victory against Ukraine. Many had little understanding or respect for the rules governing the plant. (The reactors are no longer operational and the plant is in the process of being decommissioned, but a large workforce is required to monitor and control radiation levels.) Soldiers were frequently drunk and constantly looted the premises: they started with notebooks and phones, but moved on to computers, vehicles and radiation dosimeters. (…)
At the end of March the Russians began pulling out of both Chernobyl and Slavutych. (By then they had stolen $135m worth of equipment from the plant.) (…)
But Ukraine’s nuclear nightmare is far from over. After a fierce battle, on March 4th 2022 the Russians succeeded in taking control of Zaporizhia, Europe’s biggest nuclear-power station. They are still there. Russia uses it as a military shield from which to attack Ukrainian positions.
Ukrainians fear that Russia might commit an act of nuclear terrorism at Zaporizhia and dress it up as an accident. Those fears are not unfounded, given that Russia blew up the Kakhovka dam in June 2023, which threatened Zaporizhia’s water supply and devastated nearby towns and villages. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, called it “an environmental bomb of mass destruction”.
Mr Plokhy has come to believe that the risks of nuclear power outweigh the benefits. In particular, he argues that the world and its nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, are complacent about the dangers posed by acts of war against nuclear sites; he says that new legal and institutional safeguards are urgently needed. After reading this book, few will disagree. ■
How a second nuclear disaster was avoided at Chernobyl in 2022 (economist.com)
Escape from the meat grinder: the making of a Russian deserter
Thousands are refusing to go into battle for Putin. These are two of their stories (The Economist, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
The house was one of the few in Bakhmut that still had a roof. Rucksacks, rifles and dirty clothes were strewn across the floor. Stepan wished he was alone in the makeshift base, and tried to block out the chatter of the dozen or so other soldiers. He had not washed or shaved for weeks. His clothes were almost black – encrusted in the heat with sweat, blood and mud. An itchy rash had spread all over his body, but Stepan had decided he wasn’t going to clean himself until this was all over. He couldn’t imagine when that would be.
From August 2022 to May 2023, Bakhmut was the site of ferocious fighting between Russia and Ukraine. Stepan had just spent two hellish weeks on the front line, before managing to drag himself back to base. Now he’d been ordered to return to the meat grinder. “I lost faith and I lost hope and I certainly lost trust in any of the commanders,” he said.
He went down into the pitch-black cellar which served as a dormitory. The air was close and smelled of mould. He lay on a bunk and closed his eyes – but he could not sleep, despite the fact that he had been awake for days. Eventually he got out of bed, returned upstairs and sat by himself at the table, trying to put his mind in order. He thought of the cross he always wore around his neck, which he had lost wading through a swamp. The next day he would be expected to take part in an assault on the Ukrainian trenches. “I knew I would not come out alive.”
Stepan picked up a grenade fuze – a small tube that contains the explosives with a ring attached to it. He walked outside to a shed, closed the door and imagined what it would feel like were he to pull the ring. But he didn’t.
Instead, he put the fuze in his pocket and went to join the other soldiers preparing for the assault. Quad bikes dropped the men off by a copse near a railway line. From there, they were to advance directly towards the Ukrainian positions in small groups. Stepan sat under a tree while others scouted ahead. He stared intently in front of him in order to “work himself into a daze and switch off from reality”. Then he took out the fuze and pulled the ring.
Ifirst met Stepan this May in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. He is in his early 20s but, lacking facial hair, he looked younger. His eyes were piercing and his fingers long and delicate. He wore a zip-up fleece, even though it was T-shirt weather. It had been only a few days since he escaped from Russia. During the daytime he slept; his nights were spent scrolling through social media, brooding over his ordeal. He seemed nervous, and kept looking down at the table. Eventually he ordered a glass of sweet liquor: “Otherwise I won’t be able to tell you anything,” he said.
Stepan is one of more than 1,000 men who have deserted from the Russian army with the help of a volunteer group called Idite Lesom (this translates literally as “Go through the forest”, but colloquially means “Get lost”). Idite Lesom has also helped tens of thousands of Russians dodge the draft. The organisation says the number of requests from potential deserters rose tenfold from January 2023 to January 2024. Two-thirds of these deserters have left the country, primarily for Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – states that allow Russians to enter without a passport. The rest are hiding in Russia. Most western countries offer little help. (…)
Escape from the meat grinder: the making of a Russian deserter (economist.com)
Alive or dead? The search for Ukraine’s missing soldiers and sailors
The families of missing loved ones are trying to find them, alive or dead (The Economist, 14 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
IN A NONDESCRIPT office in a nondescript building in Kyiv, with no sign on its door, four middle-aged men are trawling through gruesome films and photos on the internet. Often they are looking at Russian Telegram channels that specialise in parading captured Ukrainian soldiers. In pictures taken in the past few days one man’s face is running with blood; another has his hands tied but a cigarette is in his mouth. A third, seemingly wounded, is being pushed in a wheelbarrow. These Ukrainian policemen are cyber-hunters searching for Ukraine’s missing soldiers, of whom there are tens of thousands.
Oleh zooms in on a face in a video, takes a screenshot, then drops it into facial-recognition software which scours the internet for a match. Within seconds he has seven possibles. Oleh quickly discards most of them and rapidly finds photos of a happy young man with his wife, his friends and his child. With another click he has matched his name against a list of missing soldiers. “Aha! It’s Vytali,” he says, before dispatching his find to the security services, who in turn can inform the family. In one year, says Oleh, his team have found some 600 missing Ukrainians in this way. (…)
As of September 20th Artur Dobroserdov, Ukraine’s commissioner for missing persons under the Ministry of the Interior, had a list of 48,138 people who were still missing. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, some 7,548 people who had earlier been on the missing list have been accounted for. They comprise 3,632 living Ukrainian POWs and civilian prisoners who have been exchanged with the Russians; and 3,916 identified bodies, some of which were also returned. Mr Dobroserdov also has custody of 2,552 bodies that have not yet been identified.
Thanks to evidence from exchanged POWs and from the Red Cross, the Ukrainians know of another 6,000 or so Ukrainians who are being held as prisoners. But that still leaves more than 40,000 unaccounted for. Some are reckoned to be dead but cannot be recorded as such, because no body has been recovered. Mr Dobroserdov says that about 20% of the living POWs whom Russia has returned were not on any list and had often been assumed to be dead. He thinks that more than half of those whose fate is unknown are still alive. (…)
Solomiya Khoma, a founder of the Ukrainian Security and Co-operation Centre, a think-tank, says the issue of missing persons is “a really sensitive topic” in Ukraine. The Russians deliberately leave families in the dark about whether their loved ones are alive or dead. It is done, she says, to “create social tension”. A Ukrainian Facebook group for people appealing for any information about missing soldiers has almost half a million followers.
Close to parliament in Kyiv a dozen people stand with banners and pictures of their missing ones, all of them sailors who went missing after Mariupol fell. No one knows if they are still alive. Some regiments and units have strong lobbies that work hard to get their missing onto lists for possible exchange; but others, such as Ukraine’s tiny navy, do not. All they can do is stand there in the hope that nobody forgets about them. ■
The search for Ukraine’s missing soldiers and sailors (economist.com)
Holding on : Russia continues to advance in eastern Ukraine
But it is encountering growing problems (The Economist, 11 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Now that the excitement of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk two months ago has faded, the prevailing narrative has reasserted its grip. Ukrainian forces are retreating in the face of steady, if costly, Russian advances across the front line in the Donbas, thanks to Russia’s vast superiority in troop numbers and firepower.
The Ukrainian decision last week to pull its forces out of Vuhledar, a staunchly defended bastion that lies on the hinge of the eastern and southern fronts, has added to the gloom about the country’s prospects. The retreat was ordered to prevent their encirclement by the Russians. President Volodymyr Zelensky praised the decision, saying that protecting the lives of the soldiers who had given “heroic service” was “more important than any buildings”. Not that there were many buildings left. Vuhledar, like other towns Russia has taken, is a sprawling, shattered ruin. (…)
On the other hand Russia has not made much progress in taking Chasiv Yar, some 40km to the north of Toretsk, and appears to be stuck by the canal on the eastern side of the city. It is also making heavy weather of its bid to take control of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub that sits on a triangle of road and rail links and which is the main focus of its offensive efforts. In August there was much talk of the imminent fall of Pokrovsk. But the pace of the Russian advance has noticeably slowed, with few territorial gains in the past three weeks.
Despite fears expressed in some quarters of a Ukrainian collapse, there is no sign of one. Ukraine’s approach is to concede some ground while inflicting maximum casualties and equipment losses on Russia and preserving its own forces to fight from newly fortified lines. It is also questionable how much longer Russia can continue to lose more than a thousand men a day, despite huge signing-on bonuses for new recruits. The seemingly inexhaustible stocks of mainly Soviet-era armoured vehicles and tanks it has been able to draw on could be running low by next year. The Institute for the Study of War in Washington reckons that in the Pokrovsk region alone Russia has lost at least five divisions’ worth of tanks and armoured vehicles in the past year. Without sufficient armour, dismounted Russian soldiers are easy prey for increasingly capable Ukrainian FPV drones.
There are also signs that Russia’s advantage in artillery has been declining, even as it increasingly depends on unreliable North Korean munitions. (…)
For all the current despondency about Ukraine’s prospects, Russia is far from achieving its main aim: of gaining control over Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which make up the Donbas region, by the end of this year. And despite setting the goal of driving Ukrainian forces from Kursk by the start of this month, it now looks as if that will take much longer and require substantially greater forces than Moscow has so far been able to commit.
The battle where Russia is unambiguously succeeding, says Mr Lange, is in the “information space”. The notion that Ukraine cannot win, he argues, is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and an excuse for Western leaders to withhold from Ukraine what it needs to prevail. A pattern has emerged in which promised military support arrives late or not at all. As Phillips O’Brien, an American commentator, has noted, American aid actually disbursed to Ukraine so far this year is sharply down on the amount sent in 2023. ■
Russia continues to advance in eastern Ukraine (economist.com)
Policy brief : America’s presidential election marks a fork in the road for Ukraine
If Republicans take power, Kyiv will feel a chill: the latest of our policy briefs (The Economist, 10 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, visited America in September to speak at the United Nations and present a “victory plan” to his American patrons. The trip did not go well. Mr Zelensky enraged Republicans by appearing alongside Democrats at a munitions factory and by criticising Donald Trump. And Biden administration officials were underwhelmed by his proposal to end the war.
Mr Zelensky did hold seemingly positive meetings with both Kamala Harris and Mr Trump. The outcome of their race is likely to have a big impact on Ukraine’s future. Talk of an endgame is gathering, including thorny questions about whether America’s next president might be willing to invite Ukraine to join NATO. Yet neither candidate has offered clarity about strategy or presented a credible plan to change the dynamic on the ground.
That dynamic is grim. As Ukraine slogs to the end of its third year of war, its army has made virtually no progress since retaking the capital of the Kherson region in 2022. Russia has been making slow, grinding gains, at high cost. More than half a million Russians have been killed or wounded, America estimates.
The prospects for peace seem remote. Mr Zelensky insists that his goal remains re-establishing Ukraine’s 1991 borders—including Crimea, which has been in Russian hands for more than a decade. Vladimir Putin’s strategy is to wait out the West, and he has shown no interest in ending the war on anything other than his terms. Yet neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have demonstrated the military strength to achieve the outcomes they seek. (…)
Tough choices will be unavoidable after the next president takes office. America has provided Ukraine with about $174bn in support, most recently through a $61bn assistance bill in April. The Pentagon can stretch aid packages, and Mr Biden may cajole Congress to pass more legislation between the election and his successor’s inauguration. But the next president will have to decide whether to provide more aid—and what caveats to attach to it. (…)
In a joint statement, NATO’s 32 members said in July that Ukraine was on an “irreversible” path to joining the alliance. So far Mr Biden has been sceptical of offering a formal invitation of membership, which Kyiv desperately seeks. Doing so would come with a host of problems, given that the country is at war. But creative thinking on how to use the possibility of NATO membership as leverage against Mr Putin and as backing for Ukraine’s recovery could help stabilise the conflict and perhaps end or reduce its intense violence.
The reality is that Mr Zelensky and his allies in Europe and Washington have yet to articulate a realistic plan for how to win the war. Mr Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, is weaker than Ukraine and the West together, but hopes to outlast his enemies. Mr Zelensky remains a stalwart figure of Ukrainian resilience, but his popularity at home is ebbing. He can only hope that the next American president is devoted to developing a plausible vision of success. ■
America’s presidential election marks a fork in the road for Ukraine (economist.com)
L’OTAN s’inquiète de la faiblesse de la défense européenne face à la menace russe
Les objectifs assignés aux alliés ont été fortement rehaussés, selon des documents révélés par le quotidien allemand « Die Welt ». Au-delà du nombre de troupes, les responsables militaires de l’organisation insistent sur la nécessité de renforcer les capacités de défense antiaérienne des alliés. (Le Monde, 10 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) D’après Die Welt, qui a pu consulter ces documents, les objectifs assignés aux alliés ont été fortement rehaussés depuis le sommet de l’Alliance, à Madrid, à l’été 2022. Alors que le seuil minimum de 82 brigades prêtes au combat était considéré comme suffisant en 2021, avant le conflit ukrainien, l’ambition de l’OTAN est désormais d’atteindre le seuil de 131 brigades à l’horizon 2031, soit une augmentation de près de cinquante unités de 3 000 à 4 000 soldats chacune. Une hausse d’au moins 150 000 effectifs au total qui doit s’accompagner du renforcement des capacités d’encadrement et de soutien de ces forces, pour l’instant largement sous dotées.
La divulgation de ces chiffres intervient seulement quelques jours après la prise de fonction de Mark Rutte, le nouveau secrétaire général de l’OTAN, pour qui le sommet de Ramstein doit constituer le premier grand rendez-vous. Sous la pression des Etats-Unis, qui ne cessent de répéter que leur priorité n’est plus tant l’Europe que l’Indo-Pacifique, et face aux incertitudes de l’élection présidentielle américaine, en novembre, l’ancien premier ministre néerlandais a fait du réarmement des alliés sa priorité. « Nous avons besoin de forces plus nombreuses et mieux équipées, d’une industrie de défense transatlantique plus robuste, d’une capacité de production accrue dans le domaine de la défense », a insisté M. Rutte, lors de sa prise de fonction, le 1er octobre.
Malgré la guerre en Ukraine, seuls 23 des 32 pays de l’Alliance ont atteint l’objectif fixé, il y a dix ans, de consacrer au moins 2 % de leur produit intérieur brut (PIB) aux dépenses militaires. Et si plusieurs d’entre eux assurent que face au Kremlin, il faut désormais davantage, d’autres mettent en avant leurs contraintes budgétaires. « Nous devons aller plus loin et plus vite pour relever l’énorme défi qui nous attend », a ainsi plaidé M. Rutte, lors d’une conférence de presse, le 1er octobre.
« En sonnant l’alarme sur le niveau de préparation des alliés, l’ambition du nouveau secrétaire général de l’OTAN est de progressivement faire mûrir l’idée que ce n’est plus 2 % du PIB qui est nécessaire, mais 3 % », analyse Elie Tenenbaum, chercheur à l’Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) et coauteur d’une note sur le sujet, publiée en juin. (…)
Les lacunes de la défense antiaérienne et antimissile des alliés sont pointées de longue date par de nombreux experts. « Les missiles russes positionnés dans l’enclave de Kaliningrad – dont des missiles Iskander et antinavires – représentent une menace permanente compte tenu du fait qu’ils peuvent atteindre en très peu de temps les capitales européennes », soulignait, en mai 2023, une analyse du Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales (CSIS), un think tank américain. (…)
L’OTAN s’inquiète de la faiblesse de la défense européenne face à la menace russe (lemonde.fr)
Intense Urban Battles Pitch Russia’s Numbers Against Ukraine’s Agility
Russia is advancing gradually and with heavy losses in Ukraine’s east. Kyiv’s forces are striking back deftly where they can. (WSJ, 7 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
KOSTYANTYNIVKA, Ukraine—The tactics Russia’s army used to seize the eastern town of Niu-York recalled Stalingrad, one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. Soldiers advanced in groups of three, darting forward along a street guided by a drone. When Ukrainian defenders opened fire, the survivors would duck into a house. Then another trio would advance toward the position.
They kept coming in waves, taking heavy losses until a dozen or so Russian infantrymen had gathered in one spot. Then they would start the process again.
“Their commanders show them no pity whatsoever,” said a Ukrainian company commander, known as Vodoliy, who was leading troops fighting in the town.
In a high-tech war shaped by drones, precision weapons and electronic jammers, it is still boots on the ground that take and hold territory. Russia is counting on overwhelming Ukraine’s army with waves of untrained infantry dispatched forward with slim hopes of survival.
It is a costly approach: Russia is losing around 1,200 men dead or wounded every day, according to Western intelligence estimates. Russian forces are grinding forward on the eastern front, although Ukrainian officials and some analysts say the mounting losses could cause them to run out of steam.
Fewer in number, Ukrainian troops have to fight smarter. In one operation in Niu-York in August, Vodoliy’s well-equipped men countered the Russian onslaught with fast, decisive actions. (…)
But the triumph soon faded. Russia stepped up attacks in Niu-York with glide bombs, artillery and waves of infantry. The Ukrainian troops who replaced the Russians were forced out of the elevator under withering fire. A further counterattack in the town by another Ukrainian unit temporarily pushed the Russians back, but by the end of September, they had taken control.
Vodoliy’s men, meanwhile, had been rushed to another part of the front that was in grave danger of buckling. “Our morale is much higher,” said Vodoliy. “But there are more of them.”
Intense Urban Battles Pitch Russia’s Numbers Against Ukraine’s Agility – WSJ
Drei massgebliche deutsche Landespolitiker fordern mehr Diplomatie im Ukraine-Krieg. Daran gibt es nun deutliche Kritik
Die Wagenknecht-Partei machte Verhandlungen über einen Frieden in der Ukraine zur Bedingung für Koalitionen im Osten. Die drei designierten Ministerpräsidenten Michael Kretschmer, Mario Voigt und Dietmar Woidke kommen ihr nun entgegen. (NZZ, 5 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Die Christlichdemokraten Michael Kretschmer und Mario Voigt sowie der Sozialdemokrat Dietmar Woidke fordern in einem gemeinsamen Gastbeitrag für die «Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung», Deutschland müsse sich im Geist des Budapester Memorandums für Verhandlungen und einen Waffenstillstand zwischen Russland und der Ukraine einsetzen.
Nur so könnten «weiteres Blutvergiessen und Zerstörungen» vermieden werden, argumentieren sie. Dafür müsse es «belastbare Sicherheitsgarantien» für die Ukraine geben. Im Hinblick auf die Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenraketen in Westdeutschland kritisieren sie, diese Pläne hätte die Politik «besser erklären und breiter diskutieren müssen».
Sahra Wagenknecht reagierte prompt. Sie lobte den Artikel der drei Landespolitiker als einen «wichtigen Beitrag», weil er «endlich eine andere Perspektive» aufzeige. (…)
Der christlichdemokratische Aussenpolitiker Roderich Kiesewetter formulierte seine Kritik noch schärfer. Auf X schrieb er, manche würden «alles tun, um eine Zusammenarbeit mit BSW zu rechtfertigen». Die ehemaligen Bundeskanzler Adenauer, Kohl und Schmidt «würden sich im Grab umdrehen», so Kiesewetter. Russland gehe nur dann an den Verhandlungstisch, «wenn Putin unter Druck ist und sieht, dass er militärisch nicht gewinnen kann».(…)
Die drei designierten Ministerpräsidenten wollen so womöglich ein Signal an ihre Kritiker senden: Die Westbindung der Bundesrepublik steht für sie nicht zur Disposition. Es sei sogar ihre Aufgabe als Landespolitiker, «diese Freiheit und diese Ordnung zu verteidigen und für sie einzustehen», versichern sie. Daran werde «keine landespolitische Zusammenarbeit etwas ändern». Offen bleibt, welche konkreten Schritte aus diesen Forderungen erwachsen können, sollte es zu Koalitionen zwischen den drei Parteien kommen.
Flirt mit BSW? Kretschmer, Voigt und Woidke fordern Diplomatie im Ukraine-Krieg (nzz.ch)
The awkward gas pipe : The West still needs Russian gas that comes through Ukraine
Austria, Hungary and Slovakia are particularly dependent on it (The Economist, 3 octobre, article payant)
Extraits :
When Ukrainian forces stormed into Russia early in August, Europe’s energy markets took fright. Russia’s gas exports to the EU are a fraction of what they once were. Still, news that Ukraine had captured Sudzha—a town in Russia that hosts its last major terminal for exporting the fuel to Europe via Ukraine—was enough to send the continent’s benchmark gas price to its highest level this year.
Ukraine and Russia have agreed—for now—to keep gas moving through Sudzha. But whether it will continue next year is less certain. The deal whereby Russian gas is delivered westward via Ukraine was signed by the two countries alongside the EU in 2019. It is due to expire at the end of this year. The EU, which aims to phase out Russian gas by 2027, does not want to renew it. Nor does Ukraine. “We don’t want to extend the gas contract,” said Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, in July. “We don’t want them making money here.”
Europe’s transition away from Russian energy has been fairly smooth. In 2023 just 8% of the bloc’s pipeline imports were from Russia, compared with 40% before the war. New supplies, especially of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from America, now make up the difference. But some countries still depend heavily on Russian gas and would be hurt by a sudden end to supplies via Ukraine. EU officials are worried.
Three countries are most at risk. Russian supplies made up around 47% of Hungary’s gas imports in 2023. For Slovakia they made up 89%. Austria depended even more: in January 97% of its gas imports were from Russia. Some of this gas, particularly Hungary’s, comes by TurkStream, a pipeline to the Balkans, and will continue next year. But the lion’s share still passes through Ukraine. “They’re really not in a great position,” says a European diplomat. (…)
Politics are another problem. Since Russia’s invasion, Hungary’s Kremlin-friendly government has doubled down on its deal with Gazprom. Last year it even proposed to buy more Russian gas. Robert Fico, Slovakia’s prime minister, says Russian deliveries via Ukraine will continue in 2025—a claim Ukraine’s government has contradicted. Austria’s coalition government’s energy minister, who is a Green, wants OMV to break its contract with Gazprom, but so far the company won’t budge.
European officials are frustrated. “If they had done more to get off Russian gas two years ago, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation,” sighs the diplomat. Ukraine is exploring the option of getting gas delivered from Azerbaijan to keep supplies flowing, though this scheme’s feasibility is unclear. Two winters on from the invasion, Russian gas is still rattling Europe. ■
The West still needs Russian gas that comes through Ukraine (economist.com)
A widening breach : Ukraine is on the defensive, militarily, economically and diplomatically
Russian advances, fatigue among its allies and political divisions at home leave it in a bind (The Economist, Briefing, 30 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
“Russia CAN only be forced into peace,” Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, told the UN Security Council this week. Mr Zelensky has been touring America, glad-handing the great and the good and talking up his “victory plan” to end two and a half years of war with Russia. As usual, he asked for more military, financial and diplomatic support to help face down Russia’s relentless attacks. President Joe Biden obliged, announcing a new consignment of weapons for Ukraine. But Donald Trump, the Republican candidate to replace him, is much less amenable. Mr Zelensky clearly worries that Ukraine, not Russia, may be forced into an unpalatable peace. With his army gradually losing ground, his people’s enthusiasm for the war flagging and Western support in doubt, Mr Zelensky is in a bind. (…)
In theory, Ukraine remains determined to reclaim all its lost territory, restoring the borders it inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. That would entail the reconquest not only of the Russian-occupied bits of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhia provinces, but also of Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014. But that is far out of reach militarily. In practice, the war has become one of attrition, with both sides hoping they can outlast the other, or at least fend the other off for long enough to avoid being forced into a disadvantageous peace agreement. (…)
Mr Zelensky still talks as if outright victory on the battlefield remains within reach, although he has also mentioned a “desire for dialogue”. Ukraine’s hope seems to be that an influx of new recruits, a steady supply of Western arms and the clever application of firepower can hold Mr Putin’s armies at bay, forcing him to bear the political costs of mobilising more reservists and further straining the economy, and so nudging him towards a deal. But it may be Ukraine’s army, economy and society that reach breaking-point first.
Russia’s advances are coming at a horrifying cost. Volodymyr Horbatyuk, the Ukrainian army’s deputy chief-of-staff, claims Russia has recently been losing six men for every Ukrainian casualty. “They are really pushing everyone into the grinder: drivers, cooks, builders,” echoes another high-ranking soldier. An American official says that 100,000 Russians have been killed and 430,000 injured since the start of the war.
The pace of Russian gains, already grindingly slow, has recently reduced even further. (…)
But the balance of attrition nonetheless favours Russia. (…)
Although Ukrainian casualties are much lower than Russia’s (but probably not as low as Mr Horbatyuk claims), Ukraine is finding it harder to replace them. It has fewer soldiers at the front to begin with: 450,000 to Russia’s 540,000. And whereas most of the Russian troops have signed up voluntarily for generous pay, Ukraine is relying ever more on conscription. Officers complain that many of those drafted into service are ill-suited to fighting: too old, too ill, too drunk. There is no clear path out of the army once in it, which makes being mobilised seem like a one-way ticket to the morgue. Some 5-10% of soldiers on active duty are absent without leave. The authorities are prosecuting lots of deserters, but they do not command as much fear as Mr Putin’s regime. Fewer than 30% of Ukrainians consider draft-dodging shameful, according to an opinion poll. (…)
Mr Trump’s latest rhetoric on the war is not reassuring. He joked this week that Mr Zelensky is “the greatest salesman on Earth” who walks away with $100bn every time he comes to America. He also mused that Russia tends to win wars and complained that Mr Biden is not planning for that possibility. Mr Trump’s eldest son, meanwhile, denounced Mr Zelensky’s mild scepticism about his father’s insistence that he can bring the war to a speedy conclusion as “disgraceful”.
At the UN General Assembly this week, Mr Zelensky talked about the dangers of appeasing belligerent powers like Russia and the injustice of trying to impose a lopsided peace on Ukraine. But he has yet to spell out what an acceptable end to the war might be, short of total victory. But in Ukraine’s current straits, total victory does not look like an option. ■Ukraine is on the defensive, militarily, economically and diplomatically (economist.com)
Zelensky in Washington : The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course
Time for credible war aims—and NATO membership (The Economist, Leader, 27 septembre, article payant)
Voir “Article du jour”!
The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course (economist.com)
Avec la 110e brigade ukrainienne de chars à la peine face à la poussée ennemie dans la région de Donetsk
En première ligne lors de la longue bataille d’Avdiivka, cette brigade motorisée apporte aujourd’hui son secours aux fantassins enterrés dans les tranchées sur le front de Pokrovsk. (Le Figaro, 27 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Positionnée au nord-est de la ville de Pokrovsk – point de fuite des assauts russes dans la région depuis le printemps – la 110e brigade motorisée tente de contenir la poussée ennemie pour protéger le nord de la ville et la très stratégique route TO504, qui relie la ville à Kostiantynivka et Tchassiv Yar. « Nous devons défendre cette route à tout prix », résume le commandant Vadym. Car depuis le printemps dernier, les Russes ont largement enfoncé les lignes ukrainiennes, et menacent désormais de prendre Pokrovsk et de couper en deux la ligne de défense ukrainienne au niveau d’un de ses carrefours routiers et ferroviaires les plus importants. « Les assauts ont été d’une violence sans nom, raconte Olexandre, 50 ans. Au pic des combats, les Russes pouvaient lancer jusqu’à 40 assauts par jour », dit-il. (…)
Les chars de la 110e brigade sont positionnés en seconde ligne, en appui des fantassins qui, enterrés dans leurs tranchés, constituent la première défense. L’apparition des drones FPV (téléguidés avec une caméra) kamikazes, très maniables, très rapides, a changé la physionomie du champ de bataille, rendant les chars extrêmement vulnérables. « Désormais, on cache nos chars et on évite de sortir à découvert », explique le commandant Vadym. Les chars, initialement prévus pour mener des offensives et manœuvrer sur le champ de bataille, sont désormais utilisés comme de l’artillerie – très proche des lignes ennemies – en soutien à l’infanterie. Un retour en arrière qui rapproche son utilisation de celle pensée lors de la Première Guerre mondiale. Au fil des mois, la stratégie d’assaut des Russes a évolué. « Au début, ils lançaient de vastes attaques : 5 blindés, des dizaines de gus, raconte Volodymyr, un ancien ambulancier de Poltava devenu mécano. Pour nous, c’est le tir au pigeon, rigole-t-il. Maintenant ils sont plus malins : ils attaquent parfois sans blindé, et les fantassins montent à l’assaut par deux ; ils se regroupent au dernier moment pour attaquer. Pour nous, c’est plus compliqué de les toucher », dit-il. (…)
Sous la toile qui couvre la table à manger, les tankistes revenus de mission s’affaissent sur les bancs de fortune, fourbus par plus de 12 heures passées dans l’habitacle exigu des vieux chars soviétiques. « Les journées sont longues, il faut être en constante observation : un drone peut nous débusquer à tout moment », explique Herey, qui, à 30 ans, commande l’un des deux chars revenus de mission. Le cuistot passe entre les assiettes, servant à chacun une bouillie fumante d’oignons et de tomates. La plupart des soldats rassemblés autour de la table sont des conscrits, mobilisés entre 2022 et 2024. Certains étaient charpentiers, d’autres vendeurs de téléphones. Serguy, lui, polissait les monuments de Poltava. Au bout de la table, Herey a l’œil taciturne, malgré son relatif jeune âge. À 30 ans, il côtoie la mort depuis 2014. (…)
Entre février et septembre 2024, les Russes ont franchi les 40 kilomètres qui les séparaient de Pokrovsk, nœud logistique primordial à la région de Donetsk, et occupé 800 km2 de territoire. « On nous dit que c’est un recul tactique. Qu’on recule pour mieux se regrouper. Moi je dis surtout qu’on ne peut pas tenir sous le déluge de KAB », avance Volodymyr. Les KAB, ces bombes planantes dont les charges peuvent atteindre une tonne d’explosifs, sont devenues la terreur des soldats ukrainiens. « Cet été, les KAB tombaient avec la régularité de la musique, souligne Volodia. Chaque matin, entre 4 heures et 6 heures. Chaque soir, entre 21 heures et 23 heures ». « Quand un KAB est lâché, les murs tremblent à 10 kilomètres de là », reprend Volodymyr d’un air terrifié. Autour de la table, ses compagnons acquiescent et plongent le regard dans leurs gamelles.
American long-range missiles are coming back to Europe
The German deployment is part of a resurgence of deep-strike weapons (The Economist, 25 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
WHEN DONALD TRUMP pulled out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 most European states were aghast. They agreed that Russia had cheated on the cold-war pact, which prohibited all ground-based missiles (conventional and nuclear alike) with ranges between 500km and 5,500km. But they thought Mr Trump’s decision reckless and liable to start an arms race. Who in Europe would host such missiles anyway? Pretty much everyone, it turns out.
On July 10th America and Germany announced that from 2026 a trio of American medium-range missiles—all non-nuclear—would be deployed to Germany. It is the latest manifestation of the Zeitenwende (turning point) in German security policy. But it is also part of a wider resurgence of European interest in “deep-strike” capabilities, fuelled by the lessons of the war in Ukraine. That has implications for European defence industries, the military balance between NATO and Russia and the dynamics of escalation in any future war.
America plans to put three missiles in Germany. One is the 500km-plus range SM-6 ballistic missile, currently used as a ship-based anti-air weapon. The second is the 2,500km-range Tomahawk cruise missile, largely fired today from ships. The third and most capable is the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, also known as Dark Eagle, thought to travel a whopping 3,000km-plus. All far outstrip the longest-range land-based missile in Europe today, the 300km-range ATACMS ballistic missile. (…)
This is not the first time America has stationed missiles in Europe. In the 1980s NATO’s decision to deploy medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in European countries prompted huge demonstrations. But those “Euromissiles” were meant as bargaining chips to secure the removal of Soviet ones—a gambit which succeeded with the INF Treaty in 1987. Today’s deployments are for the long haul. (…)
The new American long-range missiles are meant to serve as a deterrent in what Mr Plötner called the “sub-strategic domain”, ie, below full-fat nuclear weapons. If Russia attempts to coerce European allies during a war by striking cities or high-value targets, American missiles can do the same in return. The point of the French-led initiative, said Mr Plötner, was to let Europeans do this without relying on America. (…)
Some of Mr Scholz’s Social Democrats are nervous that American missiles will expose the country to danger. The radical-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, a significant new Russia-friendly party, vehemently opposes them. Yet this is small fry compared to the mass protests in the 1980s. The deployment “was front-page news in Germany for one day,” noted Mr Plötner.
Some strategists worry that long-range missile strikes might cause inadvertent escalation. Russia might fear that NATO could use Dark Eagle to destroy its land-based nuclear forces or take out the country’s political leadership. That could encourage Russia to strike first. Such fears are “greatly exaggerated”, argue Messrs Schneider and Arnold. There will be too few missiles for that sort of thing. (…)
How realistic are Europe’s hopes of scaling up its own firepower? (…) Perhaps the more important question is whether Europeans will be able to fire their own weapons. At present, Ukraine cannot use its British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike complex targets in Russia. That is thought to be largely because they do best when programmed with American data, gathered from satellites and other high-value sensors. America has withheld permission for fear of escalation. If Europeans are serious about deterrence by deep strike, building the missiles is only half the challenge. ■
American long-range missiles are coming back to Europe (economist.com)
A bloody trade : Danger in Donbas as Ukraine’s front line falters
Russian fighters are trying to encircle the defenders (The Economist, 25 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
IF YOU IMAGINE that the front lines in Donbas are well-defined, you should think again. Oleksandr, an officer with Ukraine’s 79th brigade, watches the battlefield near the frontline town of Kurakhove on control-room screens every day. The Russians are mostly in front of Ukrainian positions, he says, but sometimes cause havoc kilometres behind them. For the wretched pairs of soldiers in scattered positions at the edge of what he calls the kill zone, it is more often than not a one-way mission. As many as 18 Russian soldiers might die to dislodge two worn, hungry Ukrainians. But eventually, they will. “We are exchanging lives and territory for time and the opponent’s resources.” (…)
Yury, a soldier attached to the 59th brigade based near Ukrainsk, says Ukrainian losses have been significant. A reinforcement of inexperienced infantrymen sent from Ukraine’s 71st brigade were wiped out. “Over three days, 100 became zero. Some ran, some fell.” It is not all one-way traffic. A Ukrainian counter-attack on Friday, using tanks and infantry, pushed the Russians back somewhat. They are out of the southern districts of nearby Selydove. But the situation remains precarious. The Russians are still focused on control of the roads leading to Pokrovsk. “We have been fighting with our last guard, and have thrown our logistics guys into the trenches.” (…)
Russian tactics have not changed substantially since the fall of Avdiivka in February. Then as now, they depend on glide bombs and an artillery superiority that still ranges from at least 3:1 up to 10:1 in some sections. The operations are usually led by groups of two or three infantry soldiers, usually dismounted, though recently some have been observed using Lada sedans with the doors removed for a quick exit, Mad Max-style. The groups prowl forward at any opportunity. Andriy, an officer with the 79th brigade, reckons 80% of the Russians do not make it. But the other 20% find ways to get in behind the Ukrainian positions, and sometimes are lost to Ukrainian eyes. “They know that we won’t counterattack because we don’t have the men to do it, so they crawl wherever they can.” (…)
Physicist, whose nom-de-guerre stems from a peacetime job as a science teacher in Kherson, says Ukraine’s weakness stems from a simple equation: low manpower plus low ammunition. The two, he says, are linked in ways that might not seem immediately obvious. When America’s Congress held back supplies of weapons over six months from October 2023, Ukraine had to throw men at the problem. “When we had no shells we used more infantry on the front to stop a breakthrough, which meant losing many skilled soldiers.” The failure of Ukraine’s mobilisation programme exacerbated the problems. Oleksandr from the 79th reckons his brigade has already lost more soldiers in 2024 than in the previous 18 months.
The pushback around Pokrovsk—the Ukrainians’ first for months in the area—has given soldiers hope that they will be able to fight off an encirclement. Perhaps the Russians have even overstretched. But most remain cautious. Ukraine’s key to staying in the game is taking care of its men, says Mike Temper, and that means a flexible approach to holding territory. It cannot win by competing in butchery, he says. Oleksandr wonders if the moment might have passed or if Ukraine is not already fighting on Russia’s terms. “The worst thing is that we’ve all become used to death,” he says. “That’s it: the concept of human life, human losses, human blood. No longer tragedy, just statistics.” ■
Danger in Donbas as Ukraine’s front line falters (economist.com)
Biden dithers : Let Ukraine hit military targets in Russia with American missiles
Hitting back at the forces blasting Ukrainian cities is legal and proportionate (The Economist, 20 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
Every day, Vladimir Putin rains bombs and missiles on civilian targets in Ukraine, spreading terror and trying to shut down the power supply as winter approaches. Ukraine has proposed a proportionate, legal response to these illegal attacks. It would like to use Western missiles to hit military targets in Russia from which Mr Putin’s forces are launching their barrage. So far, America has denied this reasonable request.
The West has been generous to Ukraine. Over the past two and a half years, it has given it over $200bn in weapons and cash to defend itself from Russian aggression, with over $100bn more in the pipeline. But time after time, donors have refused to supply kit that they later agreed was essential. First it was tanks, then missiles, then anti-missile batteries, then fighter jets. “They give us enough to survive, but not enough to win,” one Ukrainian front-line commander complained to The Economist this summer. (…)
America may lift its veto on the use of European missiles, but that will not be enough. What Ukraine really wants is permission to fire American-supplied ATACMS at Russian targets. These have a longer range (up to 300km, against 250km for Storm Shadow and SCALP), and more of them are available. Yet Mr Biden says no. He should change his mind. (…)
Mr Biden’s caution rewards Mr Putin’s recklessness. What is more, it rubs off on other faint-hearts, such as Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, thus dividing NATO. Mr Putin sees that division, and concludes that the West is tired of war and keen to cut a deal that will be to his advantage. Peace talks may indeed begin next year, after America’s election. The best way to raise morale in Ukraine and to strengthen Mr Zelensky’s hand in any talks would be for the West to show that it is fully behind its ally. ■
Let Ukraine hit military targets in Russia with American missiles (economist.com)
👎«Les gens qui ont des idées humanitaires sont une catastrophe» : les confessions de Michel Houellebecq aux Britanniques
L’écrivain français a donné une interview au Financial Times. Il y redit son admiration pour Donald Trump et professe son indifférence à l’égard de la guerre en Ukraine. (Le Figaro, 19 septembre, libre accès)
Extraits :
(…) la journaliste Magdalena Miecznicka, qui a rencontré Michel Houellebecq pour le Financial Times . La parole du célèbre auteur et lauréat du Goncourt n’est dispensée dans la presse qu’avec parcimonie, et Michel Houellebecq aime donner à la presse étrangère les entretiens qu’il refuse aux journaux de son pays. Son dernier roman, Anéantir, est paru ce mois-ci en traduction anglaise. (…)
Viennent les questions internationales, auxquelles l’écrivain propose des réponses plus laconiques. Est-ce qu’il souhaite la réélection de Donald Trump ? «Oui, il n’a pas lancé de nouvelles guerres». Et si Trump cesse de soutenir l’Ukraine ? «Ce serait une bonne chose. Qu’est-ce que j’en ai à faire ? Quand la guerre a commencé, j’étais surpris car je pensais que l’Ukraine était déjà russe… Il faut laisser la nature suivre son cours. Les gens qui ont des idées humanitaires sont une catastrophe. Cela ne marche jamais, et leurs motivations sont douteuses».
Storm Shadow in a teacup : America keeps Ukraine fighting with its hands tied
Russian missiles blast its cities, but it still cannot strike back (The Economist, 17 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Those solutions no doubt include the freedom to use Western missiles to hit military targets in Russia. Ukrainians are deeply angry that while Russia conducts a ruthless campaign against Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure using air-launched “glide bombs”, missiles and drones (some supplied by Iran and North Korea), Ukraine can use only its indigenously produced drones and missiles to strike back.
It is hard, Mr Zelensky wrote on X, “to repeatedly hear, ‘We are working on this,’ while Putin continues to burn down our cities and villages.” Anyone who can see on a map where Russia locates military facilities and launches strikes from “clearly understands why Ukraine needs long-range capabilities”.
Mr Zelensky’s frustration is understandable. In international law, the right of self-defence allows strikes on positions from which the aggressor’s attacks are launched or enabled. “There is no moral or legal reason for not going after these targets,” says Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. (…)
The notion that restraint on missile targeting might improve future relations with Russia seems far-fetched. Mr Putin has declared himself an enemy of the West and seeks the destruction of NATO. A “reset” would be possible only if Donald Trump wins America’s presidential election in November and agrees to give Mr Putin most of what he wants.
The real reason for Mr Biden’s reluctance is almost certainly fear of Russian escalation. (…)
America overplays Putin’s threats, says Kurt Volker, an American former special representative for Ukraine. They are aimed at “deterring us from doing things, not that it has any bearing on what he’s really going to do”. Russia is already bombing Ukrainian cities. Sabotage and cyber-attacks against Ukraine’s allies would also be nothing new. Mr Putin has other options for further escalation; he might provide missiles to the Houthis in Yemen, for example. At the extreme, use of a tactical nuclear weapon can never be completely ruled out. But that would have dire consequences, and it is not clear why a change in American targeting policy would push him over the edge. (…)
America keeps Ukraine fighting with its hands tied (economist.com)
One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War
High losses on both sides are posing problems on battlefield and accelerating demographic fears (WSJ, 17 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
KYIV, Ukraine—The number of Ukrainians and Russians killed or wounded in the grinding 2½-year war has reached roughly one million, a staggering toll that two countries struggling with shrinking prewar populations will pay far into the future.
Determining the exact number of dead and wounded in the conflict has been difficult, with Russia and Ukraine declining to release official estimates or, at times, putting out figures that are widely mistrusted.
A confidential Ukrainian estimate from earlier this year put the number of dead Ukrainian troops at 80,000 and the wounded at 400,000, according to people familiar with the matter. Western intelligence estimates of Russian casualties vary, with some putting the number of dead as high as nearly 200,000 and wounded at around 400,000.
The losses are causing problems for Russia as it uses waves of poorly trained soldiers to try to advance in Ukraine’s east while also trying to counter a recent Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region. But they are significantly more damaging for Ukraine, with a population less than one-quarter the size of its giant neighbor’s.
The high—and fast-rising—tolls on both sides highlight what will be a devastating long-term effect for countries that were struggling with population declines before the war mainly because of economic turmoil and social upheavals. They also illuminate one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s own motivations behind launching the invasion in 2022: to boost Russia’s population by absorbing Ukrainians. Russia’s invasions and capture of Ukrainian territory over the past decade have caused Ukraine to lose at least 10 million people under occupation or as refugees, according to government estimates and demographers. (…)
Exclusive | One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War – WSJ
Europe Has a Painful Choice: War vs. Welfare
Despite promising to raise military spending, nations such as Germany are proving reluctant to sacrifice their generous welfare programs to pay for it (WSJ, 14 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
GÖRLITZ, Germany—When the Cold War ended, European governments slashed their military budgets and spent a windfall of several trillion dollars on social programs—a popular policy with voters when Europe faced few external threats and enjoyed the security protection of the U.S.
Now, European nations are finding it difficult to give up those peacetime benefits, even as the war in Ukraine has revived Cold War-era tensions and the U.S. tries to shift its focus to China. Most are failing to get their armies in fighting shape.
The lesson: It was easy to swap guns for butter; reversing the trend is far more challenging.
That means—despite promises to raise military spending—defense ministers say they are struggling to get what they need. In Germany, Europe’s largest economy, military bases are crumbling or have been converted to civilian use, including sports centers, old people’s homes and pension fund offices. The army, which numbered half a million in West Germany and 300,000 in East Germany during the Cold War, has today just 180,000. It now has a few hundred operational tanks, compared with more than 2,000 Leopard 2 main battle tanks its West German predecessor had in the late 1980s.
“That’s frustrating to me,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told journalists recently, after getting much less than he had requested for next year’s military spending. “It means there are certain things I can’t do at the pace that…the level of threat requires.” (…)
Europe Has a Painful Choice: War vs. Welfare – WSJ
Ignore the Defeatists. America’s Strategy Is Working in Ukraine.
Kyiv remains far from victory, but the U.S. is achieving its primary goal: containing the spread of Russian power. (WSJ, 14 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Amid the distressing footage of damaged cities and murdered civilians, a common refrain in the U.S. and among allies has been that we lack a strategy or endgame for the conflict, that our war aims are unclear. In October 2023, two Republicans, Rep. Michael McCaul of Texas and Sen. James Risch of Idaho, published an open letter accusing the Biden administration of failing “to articulate a strategy outlining how U.S. assistance to Ukraine will help them achieve victory over Russia.” Vytautas Landsbergis, foreign minister of Lithuania, echoed the sentiment this past July, declaring that “we finally need a strategy that will lead to Ukraine’s victory in this war.” (…)
There is certainly plenty to criticize in how the U.S. and its allies have approached the war. Judged in retrospect, the decisions to withhold (and then provide) one or another weapons system have often been baffling. With too much reluctance, the U.S. sent to Ukraine the Himars rocket system, ATACMS missile system, Abrams tanks and F-16 fighters. A more resolute commitment to providing weapons before and right after Russia’s 2022 invasion would undoubtedly have benefited the embattled country.
But no combination of tanks and jet fighters and missiles could itself have ended the war. And we will wait in vain for a simple victory in Ukraine. To be truly beaten, Russia and President Vladimir Putin would have to be beaten at home, a massive and massively dangerous undertaking.
And, in fact, the U.S. and other countries supporting Ukraine have embraced (but not always articulated) a clear strategy: They have applied a formidable array of military, diplomatic and economic means to the crucial goal of containing the revanchist power of Putin’s Russia. They have executed this strategy with energy and determination, to the great benefit of Ukraine, and its future prospects are bright—but only if we have the patience to stick with it. (…)
But whoever wins the election should recognize that the strategy of containing Russia is working. It has not come at an exorbitant cost, and it has produced remarkable cooperation among partners and allies across the globe. The transatlantic edifice of support for Ukraine (so often alleged to be cracking) has held firm. And in the U.S., Republicans and Democrats have more often collaborated than diverged on Ukraine. It was a Republican Speaker of the House who brought forward the most recent military aid package. Almost all House Democrats voted for it, and President Biden happily signed it.
U.S. policy toward Ukraine may have been chaotic in the early days of the war, but since 2022 it has coalesced into an effective, sustainable strategy. Today more than 80% of Ukraine remains sovereign and independent—an astounding achievement against a brutal, determined and much more powerful adversary.
If the next president, whether Trump or Harris, can expand U.S. assistance to Ukraine while cajoling allies to do more, Ukraine may be able to make some modest progress on the ground. If all the next president can do is hold the line and continue containing Russia, that would be a major accomplishment too.
Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at Catholic University and is currently the Richard C. Holbrooke Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin. His most recent book is “Collisions: The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability.”
Ignore the Defeatists. America’s Strategy Is Working in Ukraine. – WSJ
Guerre en Ukraine : les alliés partagés sur l’utilisation de leurs missiles pour frapper la Russie en profondeur
Le secrétaire d’Etat américain, Antony Blinken, et le chef de la diplomatie britannique, David Lammy, étaient à Kiev mercredi. Le gouvernement ukrainien presse ses alliés d’assouplir l’emploi des armes à longue portée. (Le Monde, 12 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
La pression est de plus en plus forte sur les dirigeants des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France concernant les conditions d’usage des missiles à longue portée fournis aux Ukrainiens ces derniers mois, capables de frapper le territoire russe en profondeur pour détruire ses bases militaires. Alors que Kiev cherche à conserver les zones conquises durant son offensive surprise de l’été (environ 1 300 kilomètres carrés) dans la région russe de Koursk, tout en limitant l’avancée de l’armée ennemie dans le Donbass, les prises de position se multiplient en faveur d’une levée des restrictions d’emploi de certaines armes fournies par les Occidentaux, celles qui peuvent dépasser 250 kilomètres de portée. (…)
« Si nous étions autorisés à détruire des cibles militaires [en Russie] ou des armes préparées par l’ennemi pour ses attaques en Ukraine, cela apporterait plus de sécurité à nos civils, à notre peuple, à nos enfants », a argumenté le premier ministre ukrainien, Denys Chmyhal, après un entretien avec David Lammy. « Sans cela, nous n’avons aucune chance de succès. Nous voulons juste survivre, on ne veut pas vous impliquer dans cette guerre », plaidait aussi un responsable ukrainien de passage à Paris ces derniers jours, confirmant que les discussions à ce sujet entre Kiev et ses alliés étaient intenses. (…)
Comme les chars et les avions de chasse, l’envoi de missiles à l’Ukraine a longtemps été freiné par les pays occidentaux, de crainte que cela ne contribue à des dérapages et une escalade mal maîtrisée avec la Russie. Mais en 2023, après de longs mois de lobbying, Kiev a fini par obtenir des Etats-Unis qu’ils livrent des premiers modèles : des missiles sol-sol appelés ATACMS, d’une portée d’environ 150 kilomètres et lancés par des systèmes d’artillerie commeles lance-roquettes multiples. La première utilisation de ces armes a été revendiquée par Kiev en octobre 2023. (…)
Iran liefert Raketen an Russland – ganz konfliktfrei ist Teherans Verhältnis zu Moskau aber nicht
Nach längerer Verzögerung hat Teheran Hunderte Kurzstreckenraketen an Russland verkauft. Sie könnten schon in Kürze in der Ukraine zum Einsatz kommen. Die westlichen Staaten reagierten prompt und verhängten weitere Sanktionen. (NZZ, 12 septembre, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Das «Wall Street Journal» und andere Medien berichteten unter Berufung auf amerikanische und europäische Vertreter, Teheran habe auf dem Seeweg Hunderte Raketen nach Russland verschifft. Der amerikanische Aussenminister Antony Blinken sagte vor einer Reise nach Kiew, die Raketen könnten schon in den nächsten Wochen zum Einsatz kommen. Die Ukraine bestellte aus Protest Irans Geschäftsträger in Kiew ein und erklärte, alle Optionen seien auf dem Tisch.
Die Regierung in Teheran bestritt dagegen die Lieferungen. Irans Mission bei den Vereinten Nationen betonte am Wochenende, Iran habe keiner Partei im Ukraine-Krieg Waffen geliefert und rufe andere Länder auf, ebenfalls darauf zu verzichten. Dies entspricht Teherans alter Position in der Frage. Sehr glaubwürdig ist diese aber nicht: Es gibt zahllose Berichte, die den Verkauf von iranischen Shahed-Drohnen an Russland und ihren Einsatz in der Ukraine belegen. (…)
Die Lieferung der Raketen markiert eine weitere Ausweitung der Unterstützung für Russland. Sie steht im Widerspruch zum Versprechen des neuen iranischen Präsidenten Masud Pezeshkian, sich für eine Verbesserung des Verhältnisses zum Westen und für eine Aufhebung der Sanktionen einzusetzen. Wahrscheinlich wurde die Lieferung aber noch vor Pezeshkians Wahl Anfang Juli vereinbart. Auch hat der Präsident in Iran nur bedingt Einfluss auf die Aussenpolitik. (…)
Irans Aussenminister Abbas Araghchi sagte Anfang September, jede Veränderung der Grenzen sei eine rote Linie für Iran. Aus Protest bestellte die Regierung den russischen Botschafter in Teheran ein. Kommentatoren in den iranischen Medien klagten, Russland nehme keine Rücksicht auf die iranischen Interessen. Einige stellten auch Irans Unterstützung für den Krieg in der Ukraine infrage. Offensichtlich war der Ärger über Moskau am Ende aber nicht gross genug, um Teheran von der Lieferung der Raketen abzuhalten.
Iran liefert Kurzstreckenraketen an Russland für den Ukraine-Krieg (nzz.ch)
A bloody trade : Danger in Donbas as Ukraine’s front line falters
Russian fighters are trying to encircle the defenders (The Economist, 9 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Russian tactics have not changed substantially since the fall of Avdiivka in February. Then as now, they depend on glide bombs and an artillery superiority that still ranges from at least 3:1 up to 10:1 in some sections. The operations are usually led by groups of two or three infantry soldiers, usually dismounted, though recently some have been observed using Lada sedans with the doors removed for a quick exit, Mad Max-style. The groups prowl forward at any opportunity. Andriy, an officer with the 79th brigade, reckons 80% of the Russians do not make it. But the other 20% find ways to get in behind the Ukrainian positions, and sometimes are lost to Ukrainian eyes. “They know that we won’t counterattack because we don’t have the men to do it, so they crawl wherever they can.”
Recently the Russian pressure has grown more insistent and wider, spanning a front from Pokrovsk to Vuhledar in the south. This, Ukrainian soldiers believe, is evidence their enemy has been reinforced with new reserves. The wide front gives the Russians more options to attack, says Mike Temper, the nom-de-guerre of a mortar-battery commander with the 21st battalion of Ukraine’s Separate Presidential Brigade. “They are using their numerical advantage to see gaps in our defence, and develop where they can.” (…)
The pushback around Pokrovsk—the Ukrainians’ first for months in the area—has given soldiers hope that they will be able to fight off an encirclement. Perhaps the Russians have even overstretched. But most remain cautious. Ukraine’s key to staying in the game is taking care of its men, says Mike Temper, and that means a flexible approach to holding territory. It cannot win by competing in butchery, he says. Oleksandr wonders if the moment might have passed or if Ukraine is not already fighting on Russia’s terms. “The worst thing is that we’ve all become used to death,” he says. “That’s it: the concept of human life, human losses, human blood. No longer tragedy, just statistics.” ■
Danger in Donbas as Ukraine’s front line falters (economist.com)
The Future of Warfare Is Electronic
An audacious Ukrainian incursion into Russia shows why. Is the Pentagon paying enough attention? (WSJ, 5 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
The Ukrainian army has launched a stunning offensive into Kursk, Russia, under a shield of advanced electronic weapons. The war in Ukraine is demonstrating that 21st-century conflicts will be won or lost in the arena of electronic warfare.
Think of electronic warfare as casting spells on an invisible battlefield. Combatants strive to preserve their own signals, while disrupting those of the enemy. In Kursk, the Ukrainians took advantage of their technical knowledge to achieve a leap in battlefield tactics. Using a variety of electronic sensing systems, they managed to figure out the key Russian radio frequencies along the invasion route. They jammed these frequencies, creating a series of electronic bubbles that kept enemy drones away from Ukrainian forces, allowing reconnaissance units, tanks and mechanized infantry to breach the Russian border mostly undetected. This is the chaotic way of modern combat: a choreography of lightweight, unmanned systems driven by a spiderweb of electronic signals. (…)
The Russians have so far been unable to dislodge these innovators but have begun using their own jammers to counter the waves of Ukrainian drone fleets supporting them, effectively creating a classic blockade. With the local electronic environment scrambled, Ukrainian drones have difficulty operating. If the Russians succeed, they could isolate the Ukrainian forces on the island. As these struggles reveal, the ultimate prize in modern warfare is spectrum dominance: ensuring one’s own control of drone networks while detecting and denying the adversary’s. (…)
America has a reputation as a global innovator, yet it trails in the dark arts of electronic warfare. Improvised jamming systems and dozens of counter-drone systems have created a spectral environment that the U.S. military isn’t yet prepared to navigate. American drones and munitions frequently can’t overcome the jamming of their guidance systems. Yet we send them to Ukraine, where the Russians often scramble them before they reach their targets. (…)
A military that can’t build a dynamic electronic shield around its own forces will likewise be unable to maneuver in the coming drone wars. Modern electronic-warfare systems mounted on low-cost drones are now as necessary as munitions. New companies are in the early stages of building the right weapons but need the Pentagon to recognize the same future—and spend accordingly.
We aren’t the only ones watching Ukraine. China moves at the speed of war, while the U.S. moves at the speed of bureaucracy. If we retool our approach to electronic warfare, America will tip the scales in favor of deterrence and, if necessary, victory. If not, we will be subject to the harsh lessons inevitably faced by those who fight the last war.
Mr. Smith is a former U.S. Army attack aviator and officer of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Mr. Mintz, an aerospace engineer, was founding CEO of the defense startups Epirus, Spartan Radar and now CX2.
The Future of Warfare Is Electronic – WSJ
Die Vergangenheit kehrt wieder – nicht nur alte geopolitische Strukturen scheinen wieder auf, auch die Ökonomie der Kriegsführung gerät neu in den Fokus
Mit dem zynischen und brutalen Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine dämmert es Europa langsam, wie militärisch entblösst es nach Jahren blauäugiger «Friedensdividende» dasteht. Kriegswirtschaft ist keine Option, doch in Sachen Aufrüstung sind neue Anstrengungen nötig. (NZZ, tribune, 5 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
Historiker werden bisweilen belächelt, wenn sie erzählen, dass die Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart weiterwirke. Es gilt als ausgemacht, dass wir in einer einzigartigen Zeit leben und es sich nicht lohnt zurückzuschauen. Der ehemalige Präsident George W. Bush brachte es einmal folgendermassen auf den Punkt: «Ich glaube, wir sind uns alle einig, dass die Vergangenheit vorbei ist.»
Seit dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine sind solche Stimmen leiser geworden. Die Vergangenheit ist zurück. Dabei werden nicht nur alte geopolitische Strukturen sichtbar. Auch bei den ökonomischen Aspekten der Kriegsführung sind vergangene Erfahrungen plötzlich präsent wie seit langem nicht mehr. Noch vor fünf Jahren interessierten sich nur wenige Wirtschaftshistoriker für die Frage, wie eine Kriegswirtschaft organisiert werden kann. Heute ist sie zentral geworden.
Gemäss dem Stockholmer Friedensforschungsinstitut Sipri hat Russland seine Militärausgaben letztes Jahr um 24 Prozent erhöht, was rund 7 Prozent des russischen BIP entspricht. Gemäss Budget sollen diese Ausgaben im laufenden Jahr um 70 Prozent zunehmen, womit bald die Grenze von 10 Prozent des BIP erreicht wird. Die Ukraine gibt sogar fast 40 Prozent des BIP für den Krieg aus – ohne Einberechnung der Hilfe aus dem Westen. Ein solcher Anteil erinnert direkt an den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die beiden Achsenmächte Deutschland und Japan gaben auf dem Höhepunkt des Kriegs rund 70 Prozent aus, die USA mehr als 40 Prozent und Grossbritannien mehr als 50 Prozent. (…)
Eines der grössten Probleme jeder kriegswirtschaftlichen Organisation ist die Inflation. In Russland stieg sie unmittelbar nach der Invasion von 9 auf 18 Prozent, sank dann innerhalb der nächsten zwölf Monate auf 2 Prozent und stieg bis im Sommer 2024 auf mehr als 8 Prozent. Die russische Notenbank hat Ende Juli den Leitzins auf 18 Prozent erhöht, um den Aufwärtstrend zu stoppen. In der Ukraine kletterte die Inflationsrate im dritten Quartal 2022 deutlich über 20 Prozent, ging dann aber kontinuierlich bis auf 3 Prozent zurück. Zurzeit steigt sie wieder leicht an. Auch hier verfolgt die Notenbank einen äusserst restriktiven Kurs, indem sie an einem Leitzins von 13 Prozent festhält. (…)
Kaufkraftbereinigt sind die Volkswirtschaften der USA und der EU jeweils fünfmal grösser als das russische. Aber mehr Anstrengungen sind nötig.
Viele europäische Länder erfüllen bekanntermassen die Nato-Vorgabe von 2 Prozent des BIP noch nicht. Aber auch die USA müssen zulegen, wenn sie ihre militärische Vormachtstellung aufrechterhalten wollen. Der Anteil der amerikanischen Militärausgaben am BIP beträgt zurzeit nur noch 3 Prozent. (…)
Tobias Straumann ist Professor für Wirtschaftsgeschichte an der Universität Zürich.
Die Vergangenheit ist wieder da: Rückblick auf die Kriegswirtschaft (nzz.ch)
Deadliest Russian Missile Strike This Year Highlights Ukraine’s Air-Defense Shortage
Zelensky has pleaded for more missile systems and jet fighters to shield the country (WSJ, 4 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
KYIV, Ukraine—Two Russian ballistic missiles hit a military institute and a hospital in a central Ukrainian city, killing 51 and injuring 271 in the deadliest strike this year, Ukrainian officials said.
The attack in Poltava on Tuesday highlighted how a shortage of air-defense systems is leaving Ukraine vulnerable to Russian strikes, as well as exposing apparent Ukrainian military shortcomings for failing to better protect the training center. (…)
“Long-range strikes that can defend against Russian terror are needed now, not sometime later,” Zelensky said. “Every day of delay, unfortunately, means more lives lost.” (…)
“The interval between the air-raid alarm and the arrival of the deadly rockets was so short that it caught people at the moment of evacuation to the bomb shelter,” the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense said.
The strikes came after 9 a.m. on the second day of the academic year, as students and teachers began their classes. Ukraine said Russia used ballistic missiles, which travel quickly and can only be intercepted by a few of Ukraine’s air-defense systems.
The air-raid siren continued to sound over the course of an hour after the strike, Serhiy Kaplin, a Poltava city councilor, said on television. That forced rescuers to seek shelter, interrupting their search for victims.
“The Russians did not give us a chance to save these people,” he said. (…)
Ukrainian officials have been pushing Washington to allow American-supplied weapons to strike Russian territory, such as warehouses and airports, which they say could help thwart Russia’s ability to launch powerful air attacks. The Biden administration has refused, part of its strategy of seeking to avoid taking steps that would be seen by Russia as a major escalation.
Deadliest Russian Missile Strike This Year Highlights Ukraine’s Air-Defense Shortage – WSJ
Taking the war to the invaders : American restrictions on hitting Russia are hurting Ukraine
The Biden administration’s justifications keep changing (TheEconomist, 3 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
UKRAINE’S FRUSTRATION is growing by the day over restrictions that the Biden administration has imposed on the use of American-supplied weapons against targets inside Russia.
As Russia launched massive missile and drone attacks on cities and energy infrastructure over two days last week (August 26th and 27th), Ukraine’s defence minister, Rustem Umerov, and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, led a delegation to Washington as part of a fresh bid to get the policy changed. According to reports, the Ukrainian team was seeking permission to go after a specific number of high-value targets with American missiles.
Their mission is a direct response to the shifting excuses coming from the Pentagon and from national security officials about why the restrictions should hold while other supposed red lines have become blurred to the point of invisibility. (…)
The reason given in the past for forbidding Ukraine from using American weapons against targets in Russia was that this could trigger an escalatory response from the Kremlin that would end up doing more harm to Ukraine and might even result in Russia resorting to nuclear weapons. However, that justification has become increasingly strained.
Vladimir Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling has been exposed as just that, while Russia has hardly held back in other ways. As Sir Lawrence Freedman, a military historian, says, the missile and drone attacks last week are part of a systematic campaign to make life as miserable as possible for ordinary Ukrainians this winter. “Russia,” he says, “wants hundreds of thousands to leave their homes, perhaps creating yet another refugee crisis in neighbouring European countries”. (…)
Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe, describes this as “constant excuse-making, which is both misleading and inaccurate”. It is not clear, for example, why inadequate numbers of ATACMS should be a restraint. A detailed report by Defence Express, a Ukrainian consulting firm, suggests that America probably holds stocks of at least 2,500 of the missiles, which first entered service more than 30 years ago. (…)
Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are showing that they are capable of producing alternatives to Western systems. Their increasingly sophisticated long-range drones are regularly hitting targets deep inside Russia. On August 28th oil depots were struck in Rostov and Kirov provinces–up to 1,200km from the Ukrainian border. On September 1st, as part of one of Ukraine’s largest drone attacks of the war, an oil refinery near Moscow was hit.
Ukraine has even more powerful weapons in development. Mr Zelensky recently announced the successful test of Ukraine’s first ballistic missile. (…)
However, Ben Barry, a land-warfare specialist also at the IISS, warns that although Ukraine is already waging a “deep battle” against a variety of targets in Russia, it may struggle to scale up production of its long-range systems. Yet by showing what they can do, says Mr Barry, the Ukrainians make an even stronger case for being allowed to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP against such targets. For now, as the Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, put it following last week’s onslaught against cities in Ukraine: “Russian planes are better protected by Western guarantees than are Ukrainian civilians.”■
American restrictions on hitting Russia are hurting Ukraine (economist.com)
The Last Days of Pokrovsk: Ukrainians Dig Trenches and Say Goodbye to Their City as Russians Close In
Mining town on the eastern front prepares for impending destruction by Moscow’s troops, now just miles away (WSJ, 3 septembre, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Pokrovsk, once home to 80,000, is steadily emptying out and shutting down as the Russians close in.
In 2½ years of war, Russia has destroyed dozens of Ukrainian cities, with its army entering the ruins of front-line ghost towns that it pummeled with relentless artillery and aerial barrages. Pokrovsk is next.
Ukraine has pressed its incursion into Russia’s Kursk region with the aim of diverting Moscow’s forces away from eastern Ukraine. But Russia has only doubled down on its push to seize Pokrovsk. After visiting troops there last week, Ukraine’s top military commander, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy, said Russia “is throwing anything that’s able to move and advance” into the fight for the strategic city. (…)
On Sunday, Russian troops were just 6 miles from Pokrovsk. If they capture the city, it would bring Russia closer to achieving President Vladimir Putin’s goal of taking the entire Donetsk region. Eighteen miles to the west, a statue of the Virgin Mary stands beside a sign marking the entrance to the region, which is draped in Ukrainian flags.
“Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariupol, and now Pokrovsk,” said Oleh Tkachenko, the baker, referring to Ukrainian towns that have been razed by the Russian forces who now control them. “Who’s going to stop them?” The 55-year-old is one of thousands in the city who have refocused their energies on the defense effort. (…)
“We used to accept thousands of refugees. We had no plans to leave, because we believed in our armed forces,” said Idrisova, who is one of the officials tasked with persuading people to evacuate the city before it is too late. “We still believe in our troops, but nothing will save us from artillery.” (…)
Pokrovsk was founded in the 19th century as a major rail hub for the Russian Empire. During World War II, it was liberated by Soviet forces. Russia later renamed the town in honor of the Red Army, before Ukraine changed the name again in 2016. The train station the city is built around has now become the point of departure for those fleeing another military force commanded from Moscow.
Among those on the platform in recent days was Dichko, the miner. After weeks of holding out, he had decided to send his family to a safer place. His wife lost her job after the supermarket where she worked as a cashier closed. She was making a 24-hour train journey with their two children to live with relatives in western Ukraine. With 18 months until retirement, and a job that pays the family’s bills, Dichko will stay behind.
As the final passengers boarded the train, he watched his 8-year-old son, Illia, sobbing in his seat beside his mother. Dichko walked over to the window, raised his hand and drew a large grin in the condensation that had formed on the glass.
“Don’t be sad,” he said to Illia through the open window. “This smile will travel with you the whole way.”
Habermas und die Ukraine: : Der blinde Fleck des Kriegs
Ist das Denken, für das Jürgen Habermas steht, durch die Zeitenwende hinfällig geworden? Oder hat er recht mit seiner Kritik, dass der Westen an einem überholten Selbstverständnis festhält? Ein jetzt erscheinendes Interview gibt Aufschluss. (FAZ, 2 septembre, commentaire, article payant)
Extraits:
Ist es Altersstarrsinn? Ein störrisches Nicht-zur-Kenntnis-Nehmen all dessen, was für alle anderen zwingend ist? In einem großen Interview zu seinem Lebenswerk, das kommende Woche im Suhrkamp Verlag erscheint, beharrt Jürgen Habermas auf seiner Kritik am westlichen Vorgehen im Ukrainekrieg. Er befindet, dass sich „das Bewusstsein der politischen Eliten im Westen von der Logik des Krieges mehr und mehr vereinnahmen“ lasse, und warnt vor dem „Rückfall in eine bellizistische Mentalität“, die nur noch auf militärische und nicht diplomatische Mittel setze.
Gegen diese Habermas’sche Position ist von Anfang an, seitdem er sie zwei Monate nach dem russischen Angriff zum ersten Mal formuliert hat, vorgebracht worden, was gegen Mahnungen zu Verhandlungen mit Russland generell eingewendet wird: dass sie verschleierten, wer der Aggressor ist, von dem letztlich der Frieden abhängt; dass Putin ja gar keine Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen erkennen lasse und seine Angriffe noch verstärke; dass die Friedensforderungen zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt daher nur ihm nutzten und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der überfallenen Ukraine sträflich missachteten.
Warum bringen diese Argumente Habermas von seiner Kritik nicht ab? Die Beharrlichkeit des Philosophen in dieser Sache kann kaum überbewertet werden. Sie ist ja nicht einfach eine Meinung wie jede andere, sondern ist – wie das jetzt erscheinende Interview der beiden Habermas-Biographen Stefan Müller-Doohm und Roman Yos eindrucksvoll dokumentiert – aufs Engste mit einem Theoriegebäude verknüpft, das für die alte Bundesrepublik und deren Perspektiven für die Zukunft stand. Die Frage nun ist: Ist dieser Denktypus angesichts des Ernstfalls eines Krieges, der direkten Bedrohung durch einen skrupellosen Aggressor, hinfällig geworden? Ist es ein Denken, das nur unter den windgeschützten Bedingungen der NATO-Vorherrschaft möglich war, unter denen man der Illusion erliegen konnte, normativer Vorreiter einer künftigen Weltinnenpolitik zu sein? Oder ist es ein Denken, dessen große Stunde im Gegenteil noch kommt, dessen universalistischer Kern nach dem Zerbröseln der westlichen Hegemonie erst recht seine Wirkung entfalten kann? Je nachdem, welche Antwort man gibt, verändert sich der Blick auf den Krieg und die Einordnung des gegenwärtigen Moments erheblich. (…)
Ist Jürgen Habermas nach der Zeitenwende noch relevant? (faz.net)
Percée de Koursk : héroïsme ukrainien, lâchage européen
L’offensive de l’armée ukrainienne est une tentative désespérée de Kiev de remotiver les Occidentaux, dont le soutien s’érode. (Le Point, 26 août, éditorial, article payant)
Extraits:
L’envahisseur est envahi. La conquête surprise, au mois d’août, d’une partie de la région de Koursk, en Russie, est un coup de maître de l’armée ukrainienne, le premier qu’elle réussit sur le front terrestre depuis la fin 2022. On disait les troupes de Kiev démoralisées, affaiblies, sur le point de craquer ? Elles ont, au contraire, renversé la table en portant le fer sur le territoire de l’ennemi, pris au dépourvu. Elles contrôlent désormais plus de 1 200 kilomètres carrés du côté russe de la frontière.
Pour que la performance ne soit pas sans lendemain, pour que la percée tactique se mue en succès stratégique, pour que la Russie soit enfin contrainte à s’asseoir à la table des négociations, il est essentiel que les Ukrainiens ne soient pas obligés de battre en retraite, la queue basse, dans les semaines qui viennent. Pour cela, ils ont besoin d’un soutien militaire continu face à un adversaire supérieur en force et en nombre. Plus au sud, sur le front du Donbass, la pression russe ne faiblit pas.
Or, que font les Européens ? Juste au moment où l’audace ukrainienne portait ses fruits, l’Allemagne, premier pourvoyeur d’aide militaire à Kiev sur le Vieux Continent, décidait de réduire de moitié l’an prochain sa contribution bilatérale – qui passerait ainsi de 7,5 à environ 4 milliards d’euros. Le chancelier, Olaf Scholz, qui promettait encore en juin que Berlin soutiendrait l’Ukraine « autant que nécessaire », a donné la priorité aux économies dans l’avant-projet de budget 2025. L’Ukraine n’est plus un impératif politique pour l’Allemagne, au moment où les partis prorusses d’extrême droite et d’extrême gauche s’apprêtent, selon les sondages, à enregistrer des scores historiques lors des trois élections régionales programmées en septembre en Saxe, en Thuringe et dans le Brandebourg.
Le tableau est tout aussi décourageant dans le reste de l’Europe. Réduite de moitié, l’aide allemande restera encore supérieure à l’aide française. À Paris, où « l’économie de guerre » promise par Emmanuel Macron n’a jamais trouvé de traduction concrète, la crise politique qui se prolonge a fait passer le conflit ukrainien au second plan. En Italie, la présidente du Conseil, Giorgia Meloni, refuse tout autant de jouer les premiers rôles pour ménager son partenaire de coalition prorusse, la Lega. Parmi les grands pays européens, seuls la Pologne et le Royaume-Uni, désormais dirigé par les travaillistes de Keir Starmer, restent fidèles à Kiev.
La France, l’Allemagne et l’Italie – mais aussi l’Espagne, la Belgique, l’Autriche ou la Hongrie –, n’ont toujours pas compris ce qui est en jeu dans les steppes ukrainiennes. Vladimir Poutine est en guerre contre l’Europe, contre l’autodétermination des peuples, contre les aspirations à la liberté politique, contre tout ce qui risque de menacer son pouvoir autocratique. (…)
Offensive de Koursk en Russie : héroïsme ukrainien, lâchage européen (lepoint.fr)
The Russian economy : The mysterious middlemen helping Russia’s war machine
Sanctions are as watertight as a sieve (The Economist, 26 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Along with military aid, sanctions are the West’s main contribution to Ukraine’s war effort, but unlike long-range rockets, they have so far failed to deal much of a blow. Two and a half years in, Russia’s economy is holding up well. It is hard to tell which European firms are simply adjusting well to the new restrictions and which are circumventing sanctions. But as it happens the biggest boosts in trade flowing through third countries have been among products that are now heavily restricted. European policymakers are desperate to close the leaks, but that means getting tough on the governments of some of Europe’s most prickly neighbours.
Three strands lie behind the boom in intermediated trade. The first is trade in banned goods, which clearly flouts sanctions. The EU has adopted 14 packages of sanctions, most recently on June 24th. They ban firms making anything that could be used on a battlefield from exporting to Russia. That includes semiconductors and drones, but also ball-bearings and microwave ovens. Even so, more than half of the battlefield equipment that Russia acquired between February and August 2022 contains components made in Europe or America, according to the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London. (…)
Shipments can pass through several middlemen on their way to Russia. Some exporters in Turkey and Central Asia genuinely have no idea where the goods they are shipping came from. But others know very well. Last year America imposed sanctions on a network of European firms organised by Mayak, a Russian conglomerate, to transport forbidden equipment through Uzbekistan and Armenia. In June, it uncovered two different networks of European toolmakers shipping to Russia, one via Turkey for Ostec, a Russian state-owned company, and one via Kyrgyzstan for Newton-ITM, a Russian aerospace firm. (…)
The second reason for rising indirect trade is that Russia has barred lorries from entering directly from the EU since 2022. The EU allows the export of some products to Russia, such as agricultural goods, but they must now take circuitous routes. The EU is not too worried about this: it makes transport more costly, which discourages trade with Russia but lets firms that heavily depend on it survive. Agricultural products flowing from Europe into Kazakhstan doubled from 2021 to 2023, official numbers show.
The third trend is the hardest for Europe to stop. It comes from a manufacturing boom in third countries. Third-country firms import some materials and parts from Europe, which does not necessarily break the rules. Sanctioneers have yet to touch some exports, such as textiles, raw iron and raw steel. (…)
For Europe’s policymakers, this is all bad news. “We expected some leakage,” says one official, “but not on the scale we now know about.” In December, the EU’s 12th round of restrictions targeted firms in Armenia and Uzbekistan for the first time. Bureaucrats have since threatened more sanctions on third countries and Europeans exporting to them, but have taken action only against a few firms. For each firm added to the blacklist, another is registered elsewhere.
A real solution would require enlisting the help of the governments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. That is a tall order. Regional politicians value their closeness to Russia and often profit personally from rule-breaking. Still, the Europeans could offer them goodies. Armenia recently started to shut down firms trading with Russia, after the EU awarded it €270m in aid, loans and contracts.
Alternatively, Europe could use sticks rather than carrots. It could extend export bans to third countries or restrict their banks. That could jeopardise Europe’s remaining sources of gas in Azerbaijan and hurt European firms. The question is whether the EU thinks that the benefit to Ukraine of a tighter sanctions regime is worth it. Its current approach suggests it doesn’t. ■
The mysterious middlemen helping Russia’s war machine (economist.com)
Is Putin’s Inner Circle Wobbling?
A prominent oligarch is publicly critical of the war. He likely isn’t alone. (WSJ, 26 août, opinion, article payant)
Extraits:
Vladimir Putin isn’t new to leadership crises. The first came 24 years ago this month, when Russia’s Kursk submarine sank in the Barents Sea, killing 118 crew members. Mr. Putin was vacationing on the Black Sea and slow to respond—a public-relations disaster.
Yet the latest crisis—Ukraine’s unanticipated invasion of Russia’s Kursk district and the forced evacuation of thousands of civilians—may test his grip on power as never before. Pro-Kremlin military bloggers have begun to question Moscow’s defense establishment, and at least one oligarch has publicly denounced the war.
(…) the choir of discontent gained a new member this month when Oleg Deripaska—one of Russia’s richest businessmen—spoke up. In an Aug. 5 interview with Nikkei Asia, he criticized the Kremlin’s defense spending, called the Ukraine war “mad,” and urged an “immediate, unconditional cease-fire.” (…)
Mr. Putin likely won’t dispose of Mr. Deripaska as he might other figures, say, in a plane crash or a push out of a window. As Mr. Deripaska told Nikkei Asia, “[The Kremlin] don’t touch me, and we [businessmen] stay out of politics.” He likely wouldn’t have spoken so candidly if other members of the business and political elite didn’t agree with him. As political analyst Abbas Gallyamov observed on Telegram, “Deripaska is a very analytical person, so before saying such things, he always absorbs the mood of other elites. This is not the voice of Deripaska alone.” (…)
Russia has made only modest military progress after 2½ years of conflict, which has spread across Russia’s borders. It has suffered around 500,000 casualties and is draining its coffers. Ordinary Russians, fed a steady stream of propaganda about defending their country against the “evil” West, are unlikely to protest. But Mr. Putin’s support among elites, essential to his remaining in power, is less certain. He shouldn’t assume they will always back a war with no end in sight.
Ms. Knight is author, most recently, of “The Kremlin’s Noose: Putin’s Bitter Feud With the Oligarch Who Made Him Ruler of Russia.”
Is Putin’s Inner Circle Wobbling? – WSJ
À Soudja, bourgade russe abasourdie par l’irruption de la guerre: le récit de l’envoyée spéciale du Figaro
REPORTAGE – Dans ce village de Russie tombé aux mains de l’armée ukrainienne, les habitants n’ayant pu fuir vivent dans des conditions précaires en espérant un accord entre les deux camps. (Le Figaro, 23 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) La demi-douzaine de civils russes interrogés par Le Figaro à Soudja déclarent qu’ils sont bien traités par l’armée ukrainienne, mais difficile de savoir ce qu’ils pensent réellement, dans une ville contrôlée par l’armée ennemie. Pour la moitié des interviews, notamment en extérieur, des soldats ukrainiens étaient présents à proximité. « La seule chose dont on a besoin, c’est de la stabilité, car les gens commencent à perdre la tête, ils ont très peur », dit Oleg. Quand on lui demande ce qu’il pense de « l’opération militaire spéciale » menée par le Kremlin, il répond simplement : « Je ne suis pas politique, les petites gens ne peuvent rien changer. Ce n’est pas nous qui allons arrêter la guerre en un jour. On aimerait bien la paix, comme ils disent, mais je pense que ni notre côté, ni le leur ne veulent la paix. » (…)
Quand on demande aux habitants s’ils seraient d’accord pour un échange entre les territoires occupés par la Russie et leur région occupée par l’Ukraine, les avis divergent. « C’est vrai que ça a commencé par notre armée qui a occupé le Donbass, non ?, s’avance Anna*, une mamie désorientée qui n’a pas voulu donner son nom. Peut-être qu’il faudrait les rendre. » « Il faut juste que les bombardements s’arrêtent », la coupe Kateryna. Un bourdonnement l’interrompt. Les civils se lèvent précipitamment pour rejoindre le sous-sol. « Ce n’est qu’une voiture, ce n’est pas un drone ! », crie un militaire ukrainien. Chacun rejoint sa place en poussant un soupir de soulagement.
Oleksiy sort un ordinateur : « Je vais vous montrer un film, dit-il aux babouchkas. Je veux vous montrer ce qui s’est passé à Boutcha pour que vous puissiez comparer ce qui se passe chez vous et ce qui s’est passé chez nous », lance-t-il en russe. « Je sais que c’était horrible, il faut que la guerre s’arrête », répond Anna. « Pour que la guerre s’arrête, il faut que les gens sachent la vérité », rétorque le militaire. La vieille dame soupire, prend sa tête entre ses mains et dit : « Venez, on arrête tout ça et on s’unit, on vivra dans l’amitié. » Oleksiy lui répond calmement, presque sur un ton d’excuse : « Après ce qu’il s’est passé, l’amitié ne pourra pas exister. »
Vladimir Poutine embrassant le Coran en Tchétchénie : anatomie d’un baiser
LA CHRONIQUE DE KAMEL DAOUD. En visite en Tchétchénie, Vladimir Poutine s’affiche en sympathisant de l’internationale islamiste. Il ne faut pas seulement y voir de la propagande… (Le Point, 23 août, chronique, article payant)
Extraits:
Comme à son habitude, Vladimir Poutine est froid et impassible. Cependant, il s’incline rapidement pour embrasser respectueusement le Coran en or qui lui est présenté. Dans la mosquée d’Abu Isa (Jésus), il reçoit le livre sacré en cadeau et le brandit, sous les appareils qui mitraillent pour la photo officielle. Près de lui, l’adjoint de Kadyrov (le dictateur de la Tchétchénie) lui lit un verset du Coran.
Depuis quelques jours, la scène enflamme les machines de propagande islamiste dans le reste du monde. Le tsar de la Russie en guerre visite la Tchétchénie, une principauté vassale depuis des lustres, fait oublier la contre-offensive ukrainienne et excite les fidèles : a-t-il le droit de toucher le Livre sans ablutions ? Va-t-il embrasser l’islam et libérer la Palestine ? Se moque-t-il de nous en tuant des musulmans en Syrie ?
Une opération de com, une revue des troupes mercenaires ou une consolidation des murs de la sainte Russie, on peut y lire ce que l’on veut. Ou bien, prosaïquement, une tentative un peu grossière de faire passer Poutine pour un sympathisant de l’internationale islamiste et capitaliser les ferveurs des musulmans de par le monde, contre l’Occident « décadent et colonial ».
Alors, pourquoi ce théâtre ? Parce qu’en dessous du sourire, au-delà de la crédulité des « fidèles », Poutine n’embrasse pas l’islam, à l’évidence, mais les islamistes. Une question se pose comme une petite musique militaire en sourdine depuis Lawrence d’Arabie : les musulmans (et, cette fois, les djihadistes) feront-ils de bons mercenaires et à bas prix ?
(…) Août 2024, c’est donc Poutine qui entre en souriant dans une mosquée dans le Caucase, et embrasse le Coran alors que le portefaix de Kadyrov récite un verset précis, le 17e de la sourate Anfal : « Vous ne les avez certes pas tués, mais Allah les a tués ; et lorsque tu as jeté [une poignée de terre], [ce n’est pas toi qui] l’as jeté, mais [c’est] Allah [Qui] l’a jetée. ». Le même verset qu’on « utilisait » contre les tanks russes il y a quarante ans.
Pour l’imaginaire djihadiste, c’est une ironique et savoureuse victoire symbolique. Pour Poutine, embrasser le Coran, sans comprendre peut-être ce verset, apparaît comme un calcul simple pour recruter l’internationale islamiste et les musulmans contre le reste du monde occidental colonial et décadent sexuellement. Il y voit des mercenaires en solde, et ses hôtes y voient un immense converti symbolique. Qui va gagner ? On connaît la fin de ce genre d’histoires de dupes occidentales.
Vladimir Poutine embrassant le Coran en Tchétchénie : anatomie d’un baiser (lepoint.fr)
Juristen uneins: Darf russisches Geld an die Ukraine überwiesen werden?
Die G-7-Staaten haben rund 260 Milliarden Euro russischen Staatsvermögens beschlagnahmt. Inwieweit eine Überweisung an die Ukraine zulässig ist, darüber sind sich Völkerrechtler nicht einig. (FAZ, 23 août, article payant)
Extraits:
Die finanzielle Unterstützung der Ukraine mit russischem Geld wirft rechtliche Fragen auf. Seit Putins Angriffskrieg liegen große Guthaben der russischen Zentralbank auf westlichen Konten. Die G-7-Staaten haben rund 260 Milliarden Euro russischen Staatsvermögens beschlagnahmt und zuletzt beschlossen, daraus einen 50-Milliarden-Dollar-Kredit zu stricken, mit dem sie Militärhilfen für Kiew finanzieren.
Einige Fragen der Kreditfinanzierung sind noch zu klären. Im Abschlussdokument des G-7-Gipfels im Juni heißt es, man wolle die „außerordentlichen Einnahmen“ aus dem beschlagnahmten russischen Vermögen verwenden. Damit sind die Erträge aus den Zinsen des Zentralbankguthabens gemeint. Das Guthaben selbst soll – jedenfalls vorerst – nicht angerührt werden. Das dürfte auch rechtliche Gründe haben.
Bedenken bestehen insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der völkerrechtlichen Staatenimmunität. Ausgehend von Artikel 2 Absatz 1 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen, steht es keinem Staat zu, über einen anderen Staat zu urteilen. Wie weit dieser Immunitätsschutz gilt und ob er auch ausländisches Staatsvermögen umfasst, ist unter Juristen umstritten. Die einen legen ein enges Verständnis zugrunde und argumentieren, der Immunitätsschutz beschränke sich nur auf Gerichtsverfahren. Er käme hier also gar nicht zur Anwendung, weil Russland wegen des eingefrorenen Geldes nicht vor einem ausländischen Gericht stehe.
Andere Juristen wie Professor Christian Tietje von der Universität Halle-Wittenberg meinen hingegen, der Immunitätsschutz sei weit zu verstehen und könne neben gerichtlichen Verfahren auch Zugriffe auf ausländisches Staatsvermögen umfassen. Gegenüber der F.A.Z. führte er aus, dass die Abschöpfung von Erträgen aus den Zinsen des Zentralbankguthabens trotzdem keinen Verstoß gegen die Staatenimmunität darstelle. Diese Zufallsgewinne stünden der Euroclear Holding zu, der belgischen Clearinggesellschaft, bei welcher der überwiegende Teil des russischen Geldes liegt. Etwas anderes gelte jedoch im Hinblick auf das russische Zentralbankguthaben. Weil dieses Geld immer noch dem Eigentum des russischen Staats zuzurechnen sei, wäre ein direkter Zugriff darauf völkerrechtlich unzulässig.
Sollte dies der Fall sein, die Abschöpfung russischen Staatsvermögens also einen Verstoß gegen die Staatenimmunität darstellen, könnte dieser Schritt aber als sogenannte Gegenmaßnahme völkerrechtlich gerechtfertigt sein. Hierzu zählen Handlungen, die aufgrund einer vorausgehenden Völkerrechtsverletzung ausnahmsweise erlaubt sind. Hintergrund ist, dass auf globaler Ebene ein zentraler Rechtsdurchsetzungsmechanismus fehlt. Staaten sind zur Durchsetzung des Völkerrechts deshalb auf Maßnahmen der Selbsthilfe angewiesen. Dabei gibt es jedoch Einschränkungen: Nicht jede Maßnahme gegen einen Aggressor ist zugleich eine zulässige Gegenmaßnahme. Denn ihr Sinn besteht allein darin, den völkerrechtswidrig handelnden Staat dazu zu bringen, seine Völkerrechtsverletzung abzustellen.
Aus diesem Grund müssen Gegenmaßnahmen verhältnismäßig, zeitlich befristet und reversibel sein. Rechtlich problematisch sind im Falle des russischen Zentralbankguthabens die letzten beiden Punkte. (…)
Dürfen G7-Staaten russisches Geld an die Ukraine überweisen? (faz.net)
Stop the war : Anti-war parties are set to clean up in eastern German elections
Scepticism about support for Ukraine runs deep in parts of the former communist republic (The Economist, 20 août, article payant)
Extraits:
ANATOLI CALUTCOV, who was born in the Soviet Union, slotted right in when he moved to Dresden 20 years ago. Visiting western parts of Germany always felt a bit strange, he says, but Dresden was like home—perhaps because it used to sit in the communist East German republic (GDR). Business is still brisk in Kalinka, the Russian food shop he runs, even if these days his Russian customers have been largely replaced by Ukrainian refugees.
Saxony, the east German state of which Dresden is the capital, holds an election on September 1st. Although Mr Calutcov is impressed by Michael Kretschmer, Saxony’s conservative premier, he will opt for the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (bsw), a new party named for its founder, a charismatic MP and former communist. The bsw, an offshoot from a hard-left party, blends leftist economics with conservative positions on culture. Crucially for Saxony—as well as Thuringia and Brandenburg, two eastern states that also vote next month—the bsw has a doveish line on Russia that, when Ms Wagenknecht turns on the demagogy, can be hard to distinguish from Kremlin propaganda. (Russian media celebrate her as a hard-nosed teller of truth to power.)
(…) Ms Wagenknecht is a “black box”, a sceptical Mr Kretschmer tells The Economist from the Dresden state chancellery. But such is her party’s momentum that he has begun to emphasise his own (long-held) “pro-diplomacy” positions, thereby irritating his pro-Ukraine Christian Democrat colleagues. Mr Kretschmer says Germany should lean on China and India to bring Russia to the negotiating table. But he also says Germany should cut military aid to Ukraine. “Peace can’t be reached on the battlefield, only with diplomacy,” he says. “We must end the killing.” Many observers expect him to form an unholy alliance with the bsw after the election.
Ms Wagenknecht calls the elections a “vote on war and peace”. In fact they are about education, housing and policing; state politicians have no foreign-policy powers. But the Ukraine war has come to stand for something else in parts of the east, says Jan Claas Behrends, a history professor at European University Viadrina in Frankfurt on the Oder. He sees scepticism towards Ukraine as a legacy of East German “peace propaganda” blended with stick-it-to-the-elites defiance and anti-Americanism. Such claims do not necessarily trouble the insurgents. “If people in the east who share our views are told that everyone who thinks like that is a Kremlin asset, they recall propaganda they heard in the gdr,” says Fabio de Masi, a bsw mep. (…)
For the BSW to enter government in Saxony or elsewhere would not directly undermine Germany’s solid support for Ukraine. But, says Sarah Pagung, a Russia analyst at the Körber Foundation in Berlin, it could strengthen the hand of those in the ruling Social Democrats who are uncomfortable with Germany’s stance on the war. That in turn might influence the party’s position in next year’s federal election. Perhaps more important, next month’s votes could illustrate something that is troubling politicians across Germany. Namely that 35 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, eastern and western Germany appear if anything to be growing apart. ■
Anti-war parties are set to clean up in eastern German elections (economist.com)
War Is Draining Ukraine’s Male-Dominated Work Force. Enter the Women.
More and more women are replacing men mobilized in the army. But there are not enough of them to make up for the labor shortage affecting the economy. (NYT, 20 août, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
(…) They are part of a wider trend in Ukraine, where women are increasingly stepping into jobs long dominated by men as the widespread mobilization of soldiers depletes the male-dominated work force. They have become truck or bus drivers, welders in steel factories and warehouse workers. Thousands have also voluntarily joined the army.
In doing so, these women are reshaping Ukraine’s traditionally male-dominated work force, which experts say has long been marked by biases inherited from the Soviet Union. “There was this perception of women as second-class and less reliable workers,” said Hlib Vyshlinsky, the executive director of the Kyiv-based Center for Economic Strategy.
Mr. Vyshlinsky said that Ukrainian women had long been excluded from certain jobs, not only over the physical demands but also because such roles were considered too complicated for them. Women, he said, could drive trolley buses, but not trains. “It was full of stereotypes.” (…)
Before the war, 47 percent of Ukrainian women worked, according to the World Bank. Since then, some 1.5 million female workers, about 13 percent of the total, have left Ukraine, Mr. Vyshlinsky said.
“The share of women currently working in Ukraine is higher than before the war,” Mr. Vyshlinsky said. But too many have left Ukraine to allow the country to overcome its work force shortages, he said. (…)
At the Pavlohrad mine, several women hired during the war are now hoping to make a career for themselves and move up the ladder. Ms. Yatsina, the former nanny who is now a conveyor belt operator, said she would like to become an electromechanical technician. “I’ve thought about it,” she said, a faint smile creeping onto her youthful face. “I like it here.”
Late arrival : How much of a difference will Ukraine’s new F-16s make?
Too few to beat Russia’s air force, but a strong symbolic start (The Economist, 7 août, article payant)
Extraits:
BETTER LATE than never. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has been pleading for F-16 fighter jets. The first ten (of an eventual 79) arrived in Ukraine on the last day of July, a year after the reluctant Biden administration finally gave its more eager European allies the green light to send them. By the end of 2024, Ukraine should be flying 20 of the American-made fighter jets. The rest, promised by the so-called F-16 coalition led by Denmark and the Netherlands, will arrive in batches during 2025.
Frustration about how long it has taken to get the aircraft to Ukraine is intense, says Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. One reason for the delay in providing sufficient numbers of F-16s to make an impact, he says, is a “pitiful” lack of training slots for Ukrainian pilots–a “policy decision by the administration”. Language difficulties have also contributed. Ukraine has excellent, battle-hardened pilots. But F-16s, even these relatively old ones, are both very different and more complex than the Soviet-era Mig-29s and Sukhoi-27s they are used to.
Another factor has been the time needed to get the infrastructure in place to receive them. The aircraft requires more maintenance than its Russian equivalents. Flight engineers need as much training as the pilots (even though some Western civilian contractors are almost certainly on the ground in Ukraine). Some repair and maintenance may also be carried out in the neighbouring NATO countries of Poland and Romania, which will infuriate Russia. (…)
Another factor has been the time needed to get the infrastructure in place to receive them. The aircraft requires more maintenance than its Russian equivalents. Flight engineers need as much training as the pilots (even though some Western civilian contractors are almost certainly on the ground in Ukraine). Some repair and maintenance may also be carried out in t
Still, the F-16s’ arrival marks the start of building a NATO-standard air force. It plugs Ukraine into the F-16’s well-developed supply chain. NATO weapons systems such as Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles will be far more effective when carried by a plane they were designed for, rather than lashed on to elderly MiGs and Sukhois. Ukraine’s F-16s also come equipped with Link-16, a NATO tactical data-link that allows secure communications and improved situational awareness. Too few and too late though they may be, the F-16s’ importance should not be underestimated.■
How much of a difference will Ukraine’s new F-16s make? (economist.com)
War Shatters Dating Scene for Women in Ukraine
While the pursuit of love might seem secondary to dealing with the horrors and privations of the war, many Ukrainians say they need romantic relationships to help them cope. (NYT, 5 août, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
For the past two and a half years, Kateryna Bairachna has wanted to meet someone special. But war always gets in the way.
Ms. Bairachna met a soldier, but then he was sent to the front. She traded text messages with another man, but those fizzled out because he was in no mood to meet, fearing he might soon be drafted. On the dating app Bumble, Ms. Bairachna liked the looks of a hipster. But when she scrolled through his photographs, she noticed his amputated leg.
“I looked at his profile for 15 minutes and felt so sorry for him,” Ms. Bairachna, 35, a marketing director for a clothing brand in Kyiv, said in an interview. She wondered if she could handle a relationship with a maimed war veteran. Then she swiped left, removing him from potential matches. “I feel I’m not ready for that.”
Russia’s full-scale invasion has upended nearly every facet of daily life in Ukraine. Two-thirds of Ukrainians have lost a relative or friend to the conflict. Hourslong blackouts are now routine across the country, and entire cities have been obliterated by Russian strikes.
It has also wreaked havoc on the dating scene. While the pursuit of love might seem secondary to dealing with missile attacks, power outages and food shortages, many Ukrainians say they need romantic relationships to help them cope with the trauma of living in a nation at war.
For women, the problem is particularly acute. Tens of thousands of men have died. Many more are on the front lines, some have fled the country and others are reluctant to leave their homes, fearful of being stopped in the street by draft officers. In cities like Kyiv, the capital, the presence of men has noticeably dwindled. In some villages, conscription has hollowed out the male population.
“This leaves a small percentage of men who are ready for and want relationships,” said Margarita Stelmashova, a Ukrainian psychotherapist and sexologist. (…)
The grubby price of freedom : Some Germans think the hostage exchange with Russia was a dirty deal
But preserving good relations with America was more important (The Economist, 3 août, article payant)
Extraits:
AGREEING TO free a convicted murderer was “not easy” said Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, with typical understatement. Germany would probably have preferred to play no role in the complex, multi-country deal that saw the release of Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter, and 15 other prisoners from Russian and Belarusian jails. But it could not remain aloof, because Vladimir Putin was adamant about securing the release from German captivity of Vadim Krasikov, a hitman who in 2019 was sent by Russian security services to murder a Chechen exile in Berlin. Yesterday, after serving less than three years of a life sentence that he was given by a Berlin court in 2021, a tracksuited Mr Krasikov was greeted on the Moscow airport tarmac with a bearhug by Mr Putin himself.
The reaction to the swap in Germany—a proud Rechtsstaat, or state that obeys the rule of law—has been decidedly mixed. RND, a German news network, called it a “dirty deal”, and several columnists fulminated at the news. Prosecutors ordered by Germany’s Justice Ministry to release Mr Krasikov are reported to be furious. Marco Buschmann, the minister who issued the instruction, acknowledged that it was “a bitter concession”. Other politicians were yet more sceptical, warning that the release would only embolden Mr Putin and other autocrats to take more hostages.
(…) Germany’s concession also represents the fruition of a long diplomatic effort by President Joe Biden’s administration to work closely with its most important European ally. In explaining his decision yesterday Mr Scholz said that Germany “has an obligation…to stand in solidarity with the United States”. Mr Biden, for his part, was unambiguous in his praise. “I owe a great sense of gratitude to the chancellor,” he said in the Oval Office. The German government, he added, had at first concluded “that they could not [make these concessions] because of the person in question. But everybody stepped up.” (…)
Once the hostages had been released, Mr Biden placed himself at the centre of the deal, publicly greeting Mr Gershkovich and others when they landed at Andrews Air Force Base. Yet Mr Scholz, an unpopular chancellor who could do with a political boost, was more reticent. The chancellor was present at Cologne-Bonn airport for the arrival of several of the former prisoners, including Mr Kara-Murza, but restricted himself to a short statement and was not filmed meeting them. That probably reflects Germans’ ambivalence over the deal. The criticism will not die down quickly. ■
Some Germans think the hostage exchange with Russia was a dirty deal (economist.com)
Michail Schischkin: «Man hat als Russe drei Möglichkeiten – man kann patriotische Lieder singen, man kann schweigen oder emigrieren»
Der russische Schriftsteller Michail Schischkin kam vor fast dreissig Jahren freiwillig in die Schweiz. Heute könnte er nicht mehr in seine Heimat zurückkehren. Ein Gespräch über die Schweiz, Russland und den Krieg. (NZZ, 3 août, entretien, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Wie hat sich Ihr Bild von Russland verändert – jenseits von der Sprache?
Eigentlich überhaupt nicht. Sie werden über das Land, in dem Sie aufgewachsen und in die Schule gegangen sind, nie etwas Neues erfahren. Ich habe von Russland nie ein neues Bild bekommen. Für mich war schon in den 1990er Jahren alles klar. 1991 gab es nach dem gescheiterten Putsch eine Euphorie, ich hatte so viel Hoffnung, dass Russland nun anders sein und zurück zur Zivilisation und zur Weltkultur finden würde. Was passierte? Die Russen hatten die Möglichkeit, ein neues Haus zu bauen. Stattdessen errichteten sie noch einmal die alte Baracke.
Wann haben Sie gemerkt, dass sich Russland so entwickeln würde?
Das war beim ersten Tschetschenien-Krieg, 1994. Von da an war alles klar. Wir waren wieder in der Diktatur, in einem Update der Sowjetunion. (…)
Könnten Sie zurzeit zurück nach Russland reisen?
Nein, für das, was ich sage, werden Menschen in Russland zu grossen Strafen verurteilt. Wenn ich nach Russland reisen würde und mich so benehmen würde wie in der Sowjetunion, hätte ich keine Probleme: ruhig auf der Datscha sitzen, verbotene Bücher lesen, mit anderen leise über Politik reden. Das wäre auch jetzt möglich. Aber ich bin anders geworden. Ich würde heute eine öffentliche Lesung machen, ich würde da alles sagen, was ich denke – über Putin und den Krieg. Und dies hätte schlimme Folgen für mich und meine Familie.
(…) Sie empfinden angesichts des Kriegs in der Ukraine eine Scham, in russischer Sprache zu schreiben.
Dieser Krieg hat meine Sprache zur Sprache der Mörder und Kriegsverbrecher gemacht. Ich habe eine Mission. Ich muss der ganzen Welt zeigen, dass Russisch auch Teil der Weltkultur ist, dass das Russische nicht nur etwas von Putin Verseuchtes ist. Ich verteidige die Würde meiner Sprache. Ich versuche der Welt zu erklären: Die russischen Soldaten haben ihre Verbrechen in Butscha nicht begangen, weil sie zu viel Tolstoi und Tschechow gelesen haben. Die Kultur ist der Hauptfeind des russischen Staates. Und gleichzeitig hat die Kultur immer gegen das Regime gekämpft. Das Regime benutzt die Sprache für diesen Krieg. Die Sprache gehört aber mir, nicht Putin. (…)
Ist die Bevölkerung Opfer des Regimes, oder sind die Russen Mittäter?
Es gibt keine klare Antwort darauf. Jeder, der individuell oder anders denkt, wurde in Russland eliminiert oder musste emigrieren. Und da blieben nur Leute, die schweigen, oder die, die sich mit diesem Stamm identifizieren. Wenn man diese Leute jetzt fragen würde, warum sie diesen Krieg angefangen haben, dann würden sie antworten: «Wir? Wir haben nichts damit zu tun. Das war die Obrigkeit, das war die Macht.» – Es ist wie der Dinosaurier und das Ei. Die Bevölkerung gebärt dieses System und dieses die Bevölkerung.
Michail Schischkin wurde 1961 in Moskau geboren, wo er Anglistik und Germanistik studierte. Er hat mehrere Romane und essayistische Werke veröffentlicht und wurde mit den wichtigsten russischen Literaturpreisen ausgezeichnet. Seit 1995 lebt er in der Schweiz.
Michail Schischkin: Der russische Autor über Putin und sein Schweizer Exil (nzz.ch)
Navalny Couldn’t Be Freed Until Gershkovich Was Kidnapped. Gershkovich Couldn’t Be Freed Until Navalny Was Dead. (NYT, 3 août, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits:
(…) On Thursday, Russia released the Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, along with 15 other inmates. In exchange, Germany, the United States, Slovenia, Norway and Poland together released a total of eight prisoners, including the Russian assassin Vadim Krasikov. It was the largest and most complicated prisoner swap in U.S. history. It was also the largest such bargain the West has ever struck with Russia, a country whose legal system is designed to punish opponents of the regime and to generate hostages. (…)
To give up someone accused of espionage, the Russians would need a bigger reward. Someone like Krasikov, a Russian who was serving a life sentence in Germany for carrying out a political assassination in the middle of the day in a Berlin park.
Americans had previously gauged German interest in releasing Krasikov in exchange for Whelan. Germany had said no — a rare and painful rejection for the White House, and one that made it all that more unlikely that Secret Project Silver Lake could succeed.
But in March 2023, the terrain shifted again. (…)
Russian authorities arrested Evan Gershkovich, a reporter with The Wall Street Journal, and charged him with espionage.
The last time Russia had arrested an American journalist was in 1986, when it accused the U.S. News & World Report correspondent Nicholas Daniloff of espionage. (…)
Rubin summed up the German dilemma as “moral imperative versus moral hazard.” The moral imperative was to save hostages. The moral hazard was the danger of establishing precedent by releasing an assassin, one who had acted brazenly on German soil. Even inside the German cabinet, there was no agreement. (…)
For Grozev himself, the risk is more specific. The man he had helped put behind bars had been welcomed back to Moscow by Putin himself, with a warm embrace at the bottom of aircraft steps. “I don’t know how I feel about Krasikov being free,” Grozev said. “He stared at me in court.” The moral hazard of this swap may translate into mortal danger for the people who made it possible.
One of the people who made it possible was Aleksei Navalny. If he had not been arrested, Grozev and Pevchikh wouldn’t have concocted Secret Project Silver Lake. If he had not died, the swap would most likely have never happened. Putin would probably never have let him go free. “This should have been such a happy day,” Pevchikh said to me. “But — ” She paused. “This ‘but’ is as big as Earth itself.” (…)
Deutschland gehört zu den Verlierern des Ukraine-Kriegs. Wird das Land zum Spielball Trumps und Putins?
Die Bundesrepublik ist militärisch so verwundbar, dass sie sich jetzt noch abhängiger von Amerika macht. Und in Ostdeutschland steht die fünfte Kolonne Moskaus vor einem Wahlsieg. (NZZ, 2 août, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Deutschland ist jetzt noch mehr auf amerikanischen Schutz angewiesen. Der hat einen hohen Preis in einer Zeit, in der Donald Trump vielleicht wieder ins Weisse Haus einzieht. Das Szenario liegt nahe, dass ein Präsident Trump im Gegenzug für die Stationierung verlangt, Berlin müsse erheblich mehr als zwei Prozent seiner Wirtschaftskraft für Verteidigung aufwenden.
Gegenwärtig heisst es in Berlin offiziell, die amerikanischen Raketen und Marschflugkörper sollten stationiert werden, bis Deutschland vergleichbare Waffen entwickelt habe. Trump, der Blackmailer-in-Chief, könnte den Zeitplan obsolet machen.
Oder Trump verlangt, dass Berlin als Gegenleistung für den ausgebauten militärischen Schutz seine Chinapolitik mit ihren Sanktionen und Zöllen ohne Abstriche übernimmt. Für die deutsche Exportindustrie wäre das ein Desaster.
Das Wehklagen über den Republikaner ist scheinheilig, weil Deutschland die Galgenfrist seit dessen Amtsantritt 2016 nicht genutzt hat, um die Abhängigkeit von Amerika zu reduzieren. Stattdessen wurde Berlin noch erpressbarer. Von den grossen Ländern in Europa ist keines so verletzlich wie Deutschland. Wird es zum Spielball Trumps – und Putins? Das Powerplay der grossen Mächte nimmt zu, und Deutschland ist denkbar schlecht dafür gerüstet. (…)
Kulturell und politisch gehen die Landesteile unterschiedliche Wege. Der Krieg vertieft den Graben noch, da Ostdeutsche und Westdeutsche Russland und die Nato völlig anders beurteilen. Moskau beutet die Spaltung mit seiner Propaganda aus – unter Beihilfe von AfD und Sahra Wagenknecht. Die beiden Parteien bilden die fünfte Kolonne Putins. (…)
Die geopolitische Widerstandskraft eines Landes hängt wesentlich von seiner Energieversorgung ab. Die Ampelkoalition meisterte die akute Notsituation nach Kriegsausbruch gut, als sie rasch Alternativen zum russischen Gas fand.
Zugleich verstärkte die Regierung die Verwundbarkeit noch, indem sie die letzten drei Atomkraftwerke abschaltete. Der ideologische Charakter der Energiepolitik ist ein weiteres Sicherheitsrisiko. (…)
Während der Euro-Krise stand Deutschland im Zenit seiner Macht. Noch nie seit 1945 war Europa so abhängig von den in Berlin getroffenen Entscheidungen wie in den Jahren, in denen Bundesregierung und EZB den Fortbestand des Euro garantierten. (…)
Während der Euro-Krise stand Deutschland im Zenit seiner Macht. Noch nie seit 1945 war Europa so abhängig von den in Berlin getroffenen Entscheidungen wie in den Jahren, in denen Bundesregierung und EZB den Fortbestand des Euro garantierten. (…)
Noch immer kann sich Berlin in der EU durchsetzen. Aber das Land ist zu sehr mit sich selbst beschäftigt, als dass es in Brüssel Durchschlagskraft entwickeln würde.
Deutschland ist nicht der kranke Mann Europas, weil der Rest des Kontinents nicht besser dasteht. Aber die deutsche Macht nimmt ab. Oder wie Wolfgang Schäuble sagen würde: «Isch over.»
Deutschland gehört schon jetzt zu den Verlierern des Ukraine-Kriegs (nzz.ch)
Häftlingsaustausch mit Putin: Ein verhängnisvoller Fehler
Für Putins Geiseln ist die Freilassung ein Glück. Der Preis, den der Westen dafür zahlt, ist jedoch hoch. Nun steht fest, dass er sich einem Erpresser fügt (FAZ, 2 août, opinion, article payant)
Extraits:
(…) Der Preis, den die westlichen Demokratien, darunter auch Deutschland, für die Befreiung ihrer Bürger und russischer politischer Gefangener zahlen, ist jedoch so hoch, dass die Freude nicht lange währen kann. Die Freilassung eines verurteilten Mörders, der nach Feststellung des Gerichts im Auftrag Moskaus in Berlin einen Tschetschenen erschossen hatte, quält jedes Rechts- und Gerechtigkeitsempfinden.
Aber auch rein realpolitisch betrachtet ist dieser Handel ein verhängnisvoller Fehler. Er verstößt gegen die oberste Regel im Umgang mit Geiselnehmern, die lautet: Niemals deren Forderungen erfüllen. Wer sich als erpressbar erweist, wird weiter erpresst werden, vom selben Erpresser oder von anderen. (…)
Dem Kreml wird es nicht schwer fallen, weitere Agenten zu finden, die bereit sind, im Westen für ihn zu morden. Denn nun weiß jeder, dass Putin seine Killer nicht im Stich lässt, sondern alles tut, um sie heimzuholen. Und dass selbst der Rechtsstaat Deutschland dabei mitspielt.
Gefangenenaustausch mit Putin: Ein verhängnisvoller Fehler (faz.net)
Niederlage der Ukraine global auf dem Spiel steht
Der russische Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine ist ein Verbrechen und eine Tragödie und doch nur ein Symptom grösserer destruktiver Trends. An seinem Ausgang entscheidet es sich, in welche Richtung sich die Welt entwickeln wird: in Richtung Freiheit oder Tyrannei. (NZZ,1er août, tribune, article payant)
Extraits:
Gängige, aber unpräzise Ausdrücke wie «Ukraine-Krise» oder «Ukraine-Krieg» haben nicht wenige zu der Annahme verleitet, der russisch-ukrainische Krieg sei ein ausschliesslich osteuropäisches Problem. Nach dieser irrigen Auffassung hätte eine ukrainische Führung, die sich Russland gegenüber gefügiger gezeigt hätte, nicht nur den unseligen Krieg vermeiden können. Kiew könnte damit angeblich immer noch den Anstieg globaler Risiken eindämmen, die vom «Krieg in der Ukraine» auf andere Gebiete und Regionen übergreifen.
In einer historischen und vergleichenden Perspektive sieht der russisch-ukrainische Waffengang anders aus. Er ist nur eine von mehreren Ausprägungen des Moskauer postsowjetischen Imperialismus und nur eine Facette grösserer regressiver Entwicklungen seit dem Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine ist eine Wiederholung oder Vorschau auf Pathologien, die nicht nur Osteuropa, sondern auch andere Weltregionen betreffen. Die angebliche «Ukraine-Krise» ist weder ein singuläres noch ein lokales Problem. Sie ist weniger der Auslöser als vielmehr eine Manifestation grösserer destruktiver Trends.
Zugleich ist der russisch-ukrainische Krieg eine Schlacht um die Zukunft Europas und den Grundsatz der Unverletzlichkeit von Grenzen. Darüber hinaus geht es in diesem Krieg um das Existenzrecht eines regulären Uno-Mitgliedsstaates sowie eines Gründungsmitglieds von 1945. Er hat damit globale Bedeutung. Gewiss ist er nur einer von mehreren Ausdrucksformen grösserer internationaler Unordnung.
Dennoch werden der Verlauf und das Ergebnis des Krieges die breiteren politischen, sozialen und rechtlichen Zerfallserscheinungen der Menschheit entweder beschleunigen, eindämmen oder umkehren. Ein Teilsieg Moskaus in der Ukraine würde das Völkerrecht, die Weltordnung und internationale Organisationen dauerhaft erschüttern; er könnte anderswo bewaffnete Konflikte oder/und Wettrüsten auslösen. Eine erfolgreiche ukrainische Verteidigung gegen die militärische Expansion Russlands wird dagegen weitreichende positive Auswirkungen auf weltweite Sicherheit, Demokratie und Wohlstand haben.
Ein ukrainischer Sieg würde zu einer Stabilisierung der regelbasierten Uno-Ordnung führen, die sich nach 1945 herausgebildet und mit der Selbstzerstörung des Sowjetblocks und der UdSSR nach 1989 konsolidiert hat. Er würde zudem eine Wiederbelebung internationaler Demokratisierung auslösen, die seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts zum Stillstand gekommen ist und einen neuen Anstoss braucht. (…)
Russlands Angriff auf die ukrainische Demokratie ist nicht nur ein revanchistischer Krieg eines ehemaligen imperialen Zentrums gegen seine einstige Kolonie, sondern wird auch von der russischen Innenpolitik angetrieben. Er ist eine Folge der Re-Autokratisierung Russlands seit 1999, die wiederum einem grösseren regressiven Trend weltweiter Verbreitung von Autoritarismus folgt. Die Ukraine war weniger ein Auslöser als vielmehr ein Hauptopfer der jüngsten zerstörerischen internationalen Tendenzen.
Gleichzeitig kann der Kampf der Ukraine einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, der globalen Ausbreitung von Revanchismus entgegenzuwirken. Er wird die weltweite Demokratisierung wieder ankurbeln. Ein ukrainischer Sieg und Aufschwung vermag nicht nur die Ukraine und ihre Nachbarn vor dem russischen Imperialismus zu bewahren und dem europäischen politischen Ordnungsgefüge wieder Geltung zu verschaffen. Der Kampf der Ukraine trägt auch zur Lockerung des Würgegriffes bei, in den der Autoritarismus verschiedenster Couleur weite Teile der Welt genommen hat.
Andreas Umland ist Analyst beim Stockholmer Zentrum für Osteuropastudien (SCEEUS) am Schwedischen Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten (UI).
Was mit dem Sieg oder der Niederlage der Ukraine global auf dem Spiel steht (nzz.ch)
Red alert : America is not ready for a major war, says a bipartisan commission
The country is unaware of the dangers ahead, and of the costs to prepare for them (The Economist, 30 juillet, article payant)
Excerpt:
GENERAL CHARLES “CQ” BROWN, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, America’s top military officer, recently told the Aspen Security Forum, a gathering of the country’s foreign-policy elite, that the nation’s armed forces were the “most lethal, most respected combat force in the world”. Steely-faced, and to jubilant whoops, he declared: “I do not play for second place.” In reality, America’s military position is eroding. That is the message of a report published on July 29th by a bipartisan commission entrusted by Congress with scrutinising the Biden administration’s national defence strategy (NDS), a document published two years ago.
The NDS commission was chaired by Jane Harman, a former congresswoman, with Eric Edelman, an undersecretary of defence in the George W. Bush administration, deputising. In 2018 the previous such commission had warned that America “might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia”. This time the language is starker. The threats to America, including “the potential for near-term major war”, are the most serious since 1945, it says. The country is both unaware of their extent and unprepared to meet them.
The most serious problem is China. “We’re at least checkmating China now,” boasted Joe Biden, America’s president, on July 6th. In fact, China is “outpacing” America not only in the size but also the “capability” of its military forces, as well as in defence production, and is probably on track to meet its target of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027, argues the commission. In space and cyber, the People’s Liberation Army is “peer- or near-peer-level”.
Russia is a lesser concern but, despite its quagmire in Ukraine, still poses a serious threat. (…)
Compounding these threats is the increasing political and military alignment between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, including the transfer of arms, technology and battlefield lessons. That presents “a real risk, if not likelihood,” says the commission, “that conflict anywhere could become a multi-theatre or global war”. (…)
A conflict would also find America wanting in other respects. “Major war would affect the life of every American in ways we can only begin to imagine,” warns the commission. Cyber-attacks would pound critical infrastructure including power, water and transport. Access to critical minerals for civilian and military industry “would be completely cut off”, they say.
Casualties would far exceed any Western experience in recent memory. (…)
There is something here to irritate everyone. To pay for all this, the report proposes additional taxes and cuts to spending on health care and welfare. Both parties will balk at that. Democrats shy away from more defence spending. Republicans are allergic to more taxes. The defence-policy wonks in Donald Trump’s orbit will like the idea of beefing up the armed forces, but many will recoil at the idea of putting more troops into Europe, rather than Asia.
For the commission, there is little time to waste. “The US public are largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs…required to adequately prepare,” says the commission. “They do not appreciate the strength of China and its partnerships or the ramifications to daily life if a conflict were to erupt…They have not internalised the costs of the United States losing its position as a world superpower.”■
America is not ready for a major war, says a bipartisan commission (economist.com)
Ukraine : sur le front, les drones font mentir la stratégie militaire
REPORTAGE. Plus précises que les obus, moins chères que les missiles, ces armes volantes, devenues incontournables, bouleversent les rapports de force (Le Point, 30 juillet, article payant)
Excerpt:
(…) « Tout est visible d’en haut désormais. Nous suivons les déplacements des Russes et ils suivent les nôtres. L’effet de surprise n’existe plus car, si nous n’avons pas de secret pour eux, ils n’en ont pas pour nous », constate le commandant des dronistes de Skala – Nemo de son nom de guerre. (…)
« Grâce aux drones, explique un ex-militaire suédois qui en fournit à Kiev, les Ukrainiens ont besoin de beaucoup moins d’hommes pour tenir le front qu’il ne le fallait auparavant. Les drones font mentir les livres de stratégie militaire. Ils ont bouleversé les anciennes équations. Il fallait un rapport de trois contre un pour mener une offensive avec succès. Désormais, c’est six ou sept contre un si le défenseur bénéficie de l’appui tactique de drones kamikazes. Quelques drones pilotés à distance suffisent à détruire une colonne de chars. » (…)
Ces drones de reconnaissance, principalement des DJI-Mavic 3, fabriqués en Chine pour un usage civil et récréatif, ont été peu à peu améliorés par les Ukrainiens pour qu’ils puissent larguer de petites bombes. Les drones FPV (first-person view, « pilotage en immersion ») ont débarqué au printemps 2023.
Peu onéreux et de toutes les tailles, ils sont facilement convertibles en drones kamikazes pouvant transporter des bombes de plusieurs kilos. Des centaines d’ateliers de développement technique ont vu le jour, qui adaptent la technologie civile aux besoins militaires. (…)
Ukraine : sur le front, les drones font mentir la stratégie militaire (lepoint.fr)
The Geneva Conventions at 75 : Could America fight its enemies without breaking the law?
The speed and intensity of prospective conflicts could test the laws of war (The Economist, 29 juillet, article payant)
Excerpt:
GLOOM WILL accompany the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions next month. Debates rage as to whether this batch of treaties, which govern how wars may be fought, and later protocols, which ban genocide, torture and more, remain fit for purpose. The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has warned of “increasing elasticity” in how countries apply the laws of war, which the conventions underpin.
Take Russia. In Ukraine and Syria the country has disdained the laws of war and frequently hit civilian targets without compunction: on July 8th a children’s hospital in Ukraine’s capital was bombed. Israel is also criticised for its conduct in Gaza as it fights Hamas. Some 38,000 Palestinians have been killed. Yet Israel insists on the legality of its strikes on schools, hospitals and refugee camps. Meanwhile, in Sudan conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, has flattened swathes of the country. More than 750,000 people are at risk of famine.
Courts are scrambling to keep up. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor has requested arrest warrants for Binyamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, Israel’s prime minister and defence minister, as well as the leaders of Hamas, on charges of war crimes. It has also issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. In Sudan’s Darfur region, ICC prosecutors are collecting evidence of atrocities committed by both the SAF and RSF. And in May the the International Court of Justice, which tackles governments rather than individuals, ordered Israel to restrain its Rafah offensive.
The erosion of respect for the laws of war looks likely to continue as the world enters a new era of great-power rivalry. (…)
Whether laws can actually regulate wars has long been debated. Many of the related moral principles are centuries old; some even stem from religious texts. But it was the horrors of the second world war, from Nazi atrocities to Allied atom bombs, that prompted new international rules on conduct in conflict.
The Geneva Conventions do not outlaw warfare; at their core they seek to reconcile a clash between humanity and military necessity. What is necessary to defeat the enemy is permitted. Inflicting unnecessary suffering is not. (…)
The laws of war do not presume that civilians in war zones must be—or even should be—spared. Armed forces are granted broad discretion to achieve legitimate military objectives. “It’s a very permissive system to begin with,” argues Aurel Sari of the University of Exeter in Britain. Though always imperfect, the laws of war continue to tackle “the very fundamental needs of people in armed conflict”, argues Cordula Droege, the ICRC’s chief legal officer. They try to advocate for war’s victims, both present and potential. (…)
One problem military planners identify is that wars will speed up. A fight against China or Russia “will not provide commanders the luxury of time, nor…near certainty regarding collateral effects”, write Lieutenant-General Stuart Risch, currently the US Army’s top lawyer, and his colleague Colonel Ryan Dowdy in the Army Lawyer, another journal. “ (…)
A second issue is the sky-high stakes in any big conflict. (…)
A third challenge is how to apply the laws of war in emerging arenas of conflict. (…)
These problems will worsen when battles are fought in cities, whether Gaza today or Taipei tomorrow. Almost any piece of infrastructure—a road, a reservoir, an energy grid—can serve both military and civilian purposes. A new report on Israeli operations in Gaza by the Royal United Services Institute, a British think-tank, argues that many of the humanitarian demands placed on the Israel Defence Forces “are incompatible with achieving the military tasks which they have been assigned”. (…)
Could America fight its enemies without breaking the law? (economist.com)
Fixing the roof : European countries are banding together on missile defence
The Ukraine war shows how dangerously few interceptors they have (The Economist, 26 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
Europe’s air defences are in a bad state. Its armies have not thought seriously about defending their own skies for some time. But as Russian missiles and drones pound Ukrainian cities, Europe is scrambling to retool. The continent’s missile defences are stretched thin; most countries lack enough interceptors to thwart massed attacks. Many have donated precious batteries to Ukraine.
Germany, usually a defence laggard, is leading efforts to rearm. In August 2022 Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the European Sky Shield Initiative (essi), a plan to jointly procure air-defence systems. Fully 21 countries have joined, enticed by the potential economies of scale. The hope is that co-operation will eventually stretch to logistics, maintenance and training. “It’s about cutting costs and quickly acquiring capabilities,” says Fabian Hoffmann of the University of Oslo. (…)
Sky Shield has its critics. France was irked by Germany’s selection of Israeli and American launchers. Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, has long argued for buying more European kit to strengthen the continent’s industrial base. But Sky Shield has snubbed samp/t, a Franco-Italian system that operates in the same range as Patriot. (…)
Nonetheless, air-defence initiatives are multiplying. Greece and Poland recently mooted a plan to develop a pan-European shield with funding from the European Union. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, has endorsed the idea. France is likely to demand that eu funding goes to European manufacturers. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Hungary have already agreed to jointly buy more Mistral short-range air-defence systems built by mbda, a European firm. Europe needs to rebuild its air defences; it does not need more squabbling. ■
European countries are banding together on missile defence (economist.com)
Das russische Glück bedeutet die Verletzung jeder Norm. Der Krieg gegen die Ukraine wird darum mit grösster Unerbittlichkeit geführt
Putin ist jetzt wie einst Stalin der Steuermann des russischen Glücks, schreibt der Schriftsteller Viktor Jerofejew. Der Kremlchef braucht in der Ukraine einen Sieg, koste es, was es wolle (NZZ, 26 juillet, tribune, article payant)
Extraits :
In seiner ganzen Geschichte strebt Russland unermüdlich nach Glück. Eine Idée fixe. Die Utopie vom allgemeinen Glück ist typisch sowohl für das zaristische Russland als auch für Lenins und Stalins kommunistische Doktrin. Unfähig, eine menschenwürdige Gegenwart zu erschaffen, die in vielerlei Hinsicht aus Unglück für die Bevölkerung besteht, lockt der Staat das Volk mit einer schönen Zukunft.
Das gilt übrigens auch für die Opposition. Nawalny glaubte an das «schöne Russland der Zukunft», befreit vom Autoritarismus. Indessen erschuf gerade die Autokratie das historische Modell staatlichen Glücks. Um glücklich zu werden, müssen die Einwohner Russlands unbedingt akzeptieren, dass der Staat wichtiger ist als der Mensch mit seinen individuellen Problemen von Leben und Tod. Sie haben sich mit Leib und Seele dem Staat zu widmen, sich ihm geradezu in erotischer Leidenschaft hinzugeben.
Kein Wunder, dass der russische Staat individuelle Formen von Erotik stets als Hemmnis für das Erreichen der beschworenen schönen Zukunft ansah. Im Ergebnis entstand in Russland ein neuer Mensch, ein Mensch des Staates, der ein mustergültiger Bürger wurde, indem er sein Leben dem geliebten Heimatland opferte. Man pries ihn in Liedern, schrieb Romane über ihn, beschenkte ihn mit Orden, staatlichen Wohnungen und kostenlosen Kuraufenthalten in Sanatorien. Seit Beginn von Putins Krieg gegen die Ukraine steht diese Art Held erneut auf dem staatlichen Ehrenpodest. (…)
Schaut man sich an, wie sich die Armee der «russischen Befreier» in der Ukraine aufführt, wie sie ihre militärische Präsenz dort begründet, welche Aufgaben sie sich im Namen des Sieges stellt, dann ist die Frage nach dem russischen Glück durchaus nicht müssig.
Im Krieg findet ein verstörender Ausbruch von Gewalt statt, ein grausamer Genuss der Missachtung sämtlicher moralischer Normen. Mehr noch, Krieg bedeutet kollektive Vergewaltigung des Feindes, seiner gesamten Bevölkerung, vor allem von Frauen. Im Sieg über die Ukraine geht ein weiteres Mal die Sonne des russischen Glücks auf. Für die Feinde der russischen Welt ist es eine böse Sonne. Für die Mehrheit des russischen Volkes das kollektive Glück. (…)
Der Kremlherrscher ist jetzt wie seinerzeit Stalin der Steuermann des russischen Glücks. Er braucht den Sieg, koste es, was es wolle. (…)
Demokratie hat sich bei uns im Jahr 1917 nicht halten können. Gebt uns etwas Neues, den Kommunismus! Doch das Neue stolperte über die Webfehler der menschlichen Natur. Da nimmt Stalin das Thema des magischen Kommunismus auf und versucht die menschliche Natur zu verändern. Sie zu verbessern. Aber wie? Durch den grossen Terror. Das Glück des grossen Terrors. Ist so etwas denn möglich?
Und ob! Die Geschichte kennt passionierte Schergen, die sogar ihre arbeitsfreien Tage opferten, um in den Katakomben des NKWD möglichst viele Menschen hinzurichten.
Als Glanzlicht der russischen Kultur erweist sich letztlich der weise Puschkin: «Es gibt kein Glück auf Erden, doch Frieden gibt’s und Freiheit.»
Behalten wir also aufmerksam die Sonne des russischen Glücks im Auge, damit sie Europa nicht versenge. Einige westliche Beobachter meinen, Russland sei nur eine ungefegte Hütte im europäischen Dorf. Man brauche bloss einen Besen in die Hand zu nehmen und den politischen Müll fortzuschaffen, und schon gehöre Russland zur Familie der demokratischen Völker. Doch das Loch, in das das russische Bewusstsein mit seinen Vorstellungen von Glück gefallen ist, ist nicht fünf, sondern ganze fünfzig Meter tief. Seil oder Strickleiter, einfache Hilfsmittel, werden da nichts ausrichten. Es braucht viel geschickte Arbeit, um Russland aus dieser Lage herauszubefördern.
Der russische Schriftsteller Viktor Jerofejew lebt seit Beginn des Ukraine-Krieges im Exil in Deutschland. – Aus dem Russischen von Beate Rausch.
Putin braucht für das russische Glück einen Sieg um jeden Preis (nzz.ch)
Russia is lying about its economic strength: sanctions are working – and we need more
Eight European finance ministers : The signs are clear that not everything is as rosy in Putin’s Soviet-style war economy as Moscow would have us believe (The Guardian, 25 juillet, tribune, libre accès)
Extraits :
President Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian regime are peddling the false narrative that the Russian economy is strong, and that its war machine is unharmed by western sanctions. This is a lie that must be rebutted. In fact, there are many signs that the Russian war economy is deteriorating. The sanctions and other measures to weaken the Russian economy are effective, but even more can be done. We must continue to increase pressure on Putin’s regime and support Ukraine. (…)
While Russian GDP may be growing, the economy is increasingly geared towards the war industry, upheld by large fiscal stimulus. This is not an endless source of growth, nor a sign of a stable economy. The Kremlin’s war factories are already at maximum capacity. Unemployment has fallen to the point that there are reports that Vladimir Putin approved the replacement of imprisonment for forced labour. The tight labour market has put upward pressure on wages, while the weaker ruble increases import prices and is contributing to increasingly high inflation, despite Russian central bank efforts to fight it with high interest rates.
To finance the war, the Russian government has tapped into the liquid assets of Russia’s national wealth fund. (…)
The Ukrainians are fighting an existential battle for freedom and democracy against oppression and authoritarianism. Supporting Ukraine and undermining Russia’s capacity to wage war at every turn should be the top priority of every democratic country. By re-Sovietising the Russian economy, Putin has put it on a path towards its own decline. Now it is time for the west to up the pressure even more.
Elisabeth Svantesson, minister for finance, Sweden
Stephanie Lose, minister for economic affairs, Denmark
Mart Võrklaev, minister of finance, Estonia
Riikka Purra, minister of finance, Finland
Arvis Ašeradens, minister of finance, Latvia
Gintarė Skaistė, minister of finance, Lithuania
Eelco Heinen, minister of finance, Netherlands
Andrzej Domański, minister of finance, Poland
MILITARISIERUNG IN RUSSLAND: Granaten werfen ist gesund
Ferienlager für junge Soldaten: In Russland wird der Sportunterricht militarisiert. Internate, die den Sicherheitsorganen unterstellt sind, erziehen eine neue, auf gewalttätigen Patriotismus gedrillte Elite (FAZ, 25 juillet, tribune, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) Mascha möchte, dass ihr Sohn aufhört, in der Schule oder anderswo Sport zu treiben, denn dieser Unterricht ähnelt immer mehr einem Vorbereitungskurs für Soldaten. Für Schüler der Mittel- und Oberstufe werden Wettbewerbe im Rahmen des Programms „Bereit zur Arbeit und Verteidigung“ abgehalten, eines hässlichen Erbteils der Sowjetunion, das 2014 wieder belebt wurde. Im Frühjahr und im Sommer werden Kinder und Jugendliche in militärisch-patriotische Sammelpunkte geschickt, Zehntausende Schüler aus allen Regionen Russlands von Sachalin bis Kaliningrad lernen dort marschieren, schießen und den Hindernislauf. Erklärtes Ziel ist es, eine „aktive staatsbürgerliche Haltung, eine positive Einstellung zu den Streitkräften der Russischen Föderation und zum Armeedienst zu entwickeln“. Im ganzen Land gibt es ein stetig sich vergrößerndes Netz militärisch-sportlicher Ausbildungszentren, in denen, wie es auf einer Website heißt, „Patrioten der neuen Generation“, also künftige Soldaten ausgebildet werden. (…)
Doch an allen Schulen nimmt der ideologische Druck zu: Montags hissen die Kinder die Staatsfahne und werden in der Stunde „Gespräche über Wichtiges“ politisch instruiert. Das Schreiben von Briefen an Soldaten in der Ukraine ist fester Teil des Unterrichts geworden, ebenso wie Wettbewerbe im Singen patriotischer Lieder, Gedichtvorträge sowie Theatersketche zu militärischen Themen. Waffen und den Umgang mit ihnen demonstriert man den Kleinen bereits im Kindergarten. Sämtliche sportlichen Aktivitäten in der Schule haben eine entweder sportlich-patriotische oder militärisch-sportliche Ausrichtung. Das „Konzept zur Entwicklung des Kinder- und Jugendsports in der Russländischen Föderation bis zum Jahr 2030“ geht davon aus, dass sportliche Aktivitäten neben der körperlichen Entwicklung auch die „patriotische Erziehung der Kinder und die Bildung ihrer staatsbürgerlichen Identität“ fördern. (…)
Den Schülern wird eingeredet, Russland sei ein Heilsbringer und müsse jetzt die ganze Welt vor dem Faschismus retten, wie es einst ihre Urgroßväter taten. Man bringt ihnen bei, Russland sei immer ein Opfer gewesen, habe niemals jemanden angegriffen, und der kollektive Westen trage die Schuld am russisch-ukrainischen Konflikt. Die Kinder müssen Uniformen für das Militär nähen, Tarnnetze weben, Amulette und Lampen für die Schützengräben basteln, Geld sammeln für Drohnen und an „patriotischen“ Kundgebungen teilnehmen. Überzeugt, dass nur Verräter gegen den Staat sein können, denunzieren einige ihre Mitschüler, Lehrer, Bekannten und Verwandten. So begeht der russische Staat täglich Verbrechen an ukrainischen Kindern, indem er sie deportiert und ihnen ihre Nationalität und Sprache raubt, aber auch an russischen Kindern, indem er sie von klein auf am Krieg mitwirken lässt.
Der Faszination des Umgangs mit Waffen, der Romantik der Wehrhaftigkeit, erliegen besonders Jungen. Doch in den paramilitärischen Internaten entwickelt sich kein Zusammenhalt, keine Freundschaft und Solidarität. Das verhindert der tägliche physische und ideologische Drill. Hier zählt nur Stärke. Weder die Lehrer noch der Staat kümmern sich um diese Kinder, gebraucht werden gehorsame Soldaten, Ressourcen für neue Kriege. (…)
Russland militarisiert den Sportunterricht: Granaten werfen ist gesund (faz.net)
Students of destruction : To see the future of urban warfare, look at Gaza
Western armies are studying the horrifying conflict for tactical lessons (The Economist, 23 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
For armies lucky enough to be at peace, other people’s wars are learning opportunities. Take Israel’s northern front, where the Israel Defence Forces (idf) have been exchanging rockets and drones with Hizbullah, the Lebanese militant group. To stop Hizbullah’s increasingly capable drones, the idf has resorted to heavy jamming. The impact on the electromagnetic spectrum is so strong that Israeli soldiers have had to eschew digital maps for printed ones. That is one of many tactical lessons identified in a new report by the Royal United Services Institute (rusi), a think-tank in London, based on extensive interviews with idf officers. (“Hamas commanders were not accessible for interview,” the authors observe, laconically.)
Many Western armies believe future wars will involve intense urban combat, whether they are nato defending Baltic cities from Russia or America parrying a Chinese invasion of Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. The battle for Gaza city, which began in November, is a cautionary tale. Israel’s heavy firepower reduced much of it to rubble. Tank drivers struggled to judge the depth of craters through night-vision goggles, causing vehicles to roll over. Troops calling in artillery or air strikes found it harder to describe precise locations, because distinguishing features had been blasted away, and to differentiate fighters from civilians. (…)
Some might question whether these lessons are truly useful for American or nato forces. Most European armies are far smaller and more feebly equipped than the idf, which has deployed more than 20 brigade combat teams thanks to the use of conscription and defence spending that exceeds 5% of gdp. Those armies are, in turn, contemplating a war against adversaries that are larger and better armed than Hamas, which has fought sporadically using small platoons and with no air power and only rudimentary jamming capabilities. Mr Watling and Mr Reynolds flip the proposition around with a slightly mischievous analogy. “For the British Army, it is in some respects more useful to consider itself in Hamas’s position,” they suggest, “defending urban areas with a coastline to the rear against a numerically superior enemy operating at divisional scale.” ■
To see the future of urban warfare, look at Gaza (economist.com)
While stocks last : Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out
It may have to scale back its offensive in Ukraine (The Economist, 17 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
For a long time, it seemed that a war of attrition between Ukraine and a Russia with five times its population could only end one way. But the much-vaunted Russian offensive against Kharkiv in the north that started in May is fizzling out. Its advances elsewhere along the line, especially in the Donbas region, have been both strategically trivial and achieved only at huge cost. The question now is less whether Ukraine can stay in the fight and more how long can Russia maintain its current tempo of operations.
The key issue is not manpower. Russia seems able to go on finding another 25,000 or so soldiers each month to maintain numbers at the front of around 470,000, although it is paying more for them. Production of missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure is also surging. But for all the talk about Russia having become a war economy, with some 8% of its gdp devoted to military spending, it is able to replace its staggering losses of tanks, armoured infantry vehicles and artillery only by drawing out of storage and refurbishing stocks built up in the Soviet era. Huge though these stocks are, they are not infinite.
According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is “significantly higher”.
Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together. (…)
According to most intelligence estimates, after the first two years of the war Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, puts the number of Russian tank losses for which it has either photo or videographic evidence currently at 3,235, but suggests the actual number is “significantly higher”.
Aleksandr Golts, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, says that Vladimir Putin has the old Politburo to thank for the huge stockpiles of weapons that were built up during the cold war. He says that Soviet leaders knew that Western military kit was much more advanced than their own, so they opted for mass, churning out thousands of armoured vehicles in peacetime in case of war. Before its demise, says Mr Golts, the Soviet Union had as many armoured vehicles as the rest of the world put together.
Russia’s vast stocks of Soviet-era weaponry are running out (economist.com)
Racing against time : Half Ukraine’s power is knocked out; winter is coming
Ingenuity can get you only so far (The Economist, 16 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) “The irony of this destruction and this war is that it accelerated the decarbonisation of the energy industry of Ukraine,” says Mr Timchenko. dtek finished building a 114mw wind farm just 100km from the front line last year. When a Russian missile hit one of their solar-panel fields, they repaired the damage in just four days. Wind and solar are not just greener options, they are strategically resilient. “It’s only one missile to destroy a 300mw coal-fired power station,” points out Mr Timchenko. “But they need 50 missiles to destroy the same capacity in a wind farm.”
Whatever new projects come online, Ukraine urgently needs more power this winter, just a few months away. There is too little time and too few of the billions of dollars needed to install several hundred small power plants, renovate bombed-out power stations or build wind and solar farms. Rolling blackouts will be routine.
Ukrainians have already learned how to adapt to electricity shortages. Small businesses have diesel generators. Medium-sized factories have invested in gas turbines and can even sell their extra supply to the national grid. Cafés are open for co-working. All buildings have generators to power lifts. People buy battery cells they can charge and use at home for Wi-Fi connections and usb lamps. But all this will be sorely tested. ■
Half Ukraine’s power is knocked out; winter is coming (economist.com)
A bridge too far? When will Ukraine join NATO?
Its road to membership could be blocked if Donald Trump becomes president (The Economist, 13 juillet, article payant)
Extraits :
(…) All this highlights the fact that nato membership remains a binary question. Some countries are allies, enjoying the protection of Article 5, which holds that an attack on one is an attack on all, backed by America’s conventional and nuclear might. And other countries are not allies. nato leaders were at pains to say that all the help they are giving Ukraine does not “make nato a party to the conflict.” For Mr Stoltenberg, membership is for the day after the war, to seal any peace.
nato’s promises about Ukraine’s future were weakened by caveats, for example, the demand that it make further “democratic, economic and security reforms”. Moreover, Ukraine would be invited to join nato only “when allies agree and conditions are met”. The biggest ally, President Joe Biden, is anyhow sceptical. Earlier this year he said he opposed “the natoisation of Ukraine”. In his opening speech he did not mention Ukraine’s membership at all. (…)
When will Ukraine join NATO? (economist.com)
How Can Europe Reduce Its Military Dependency on the United States?
With Washington looking toward China, and the possibility of another Trump presidency, Europe should do more for its own defense. Here are four key areas to watch (NYT, 13 juillet, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits :
(…) Even the European members of NATO say that they must do more to defend themselves as the war in Ukraine grinds on and the United States shifts its priorities to Asia and a rising China.
The possibility that former President Donald J. Trump will return to the White House heightens the concern, given his repeated threat to withdraw collective defense from countries that don’t pay their way in the alliance.
In fact, European member states have made considerable progress in the last few years to restore more credibility to deterrence against Russia. But they began from a low base, having cut military spending sharply after the collapse of the Soviet Union and reacting with complacency to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
There is a lot more that the Europeans should do to become less dependent on the United States, NATO officials and analysts said this week during the alliance summit in Washington. That includes committing more money to defense, building up arms manufacturing and coordinating the purchase of weapons systems that could replace those now provided solely by the Americans. (…)
Nothing happens without money.
Ten years after NATO members pledged to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on the military, two-thirds will do so by year’s end. But a third will not.
And while the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, insists that 2 percent “is a floor, not a ceiling,” a lot of planks are still missing, including Spain and Italy. The most important European allies, like Britain, France and Germany, have not firmly committed to spending at least 2 percent or more long term, while 2.5 percent or even 3 percent is what European defense really needs. (…)
The Nuclear Umbrella
In many ways, this is the most sensitive issue. NATO, a nuclear alliance, relies on the American nuclear umbrella as the ultimate deterrent against a Russian attack. No one is suggesting that Washington intends to fold up the umbrella, but doubts inevitably arise about the willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe and in what circumstances.
President Emmanuel Macron of France has said that his country’s interests have “a European dimension.” But French nuclear doctrine is strictly national, and France currently plays no part in NATO’s nuclear plans. Would France be willing to put nuclear assets outside France?
Similarly with Britain, which possesses only a submarine-based nuclear deterrent and is having trouble financing its modernization.
And then there would be serious questions for nonnuclear allies: Would they be willing to host nuclear facilities, or fly nuclear weapons on their planes or invest in more missile defense? Should there be some sort of “Eurobomb,” and who would control it?
“Let’s at least take this debate seriously,” Mr. Grand said. “Let’s talk about what France and Britain are willing to do.”
As NATO Convenes, Leaders Worry About a Hole in Its Center
A summit meant to convey confidence in the newly expanded alliance now faces uncertainty over President Biden’s future, and the looming possibility of the return of Donald Trump (The Economist, 9 juillet, quelques articles gratuites / sem.)
Extraits : (…)
Mr. Trump once declared NATO “obsolete,” threatened to exit the alliance and more recently said he would let the Russians do “whatever the hell they want” to any member country he deemed to be insufficiently contributing to the alliance. In recent days, as Mr. Trump has edged up in post-debate polls, key European allies have begun discussing what a second Trump term might mean for the alliance — and whether it could take on Russia without American arms, money and intelligence-gathering at its center. (…)
As they arrived, NATO leaders acknowledged that the alliance was facing a test they did not anticipate: whether it could credibly maintain the momentum it has built in supporting Ukraine when confidence in its most important player has never been more fragile. (…)
The White House criticized the visit on Monday. John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said Mr. Orban’s visit “certainly doesn’t seem to be productive in terms of trying to get things done in Ukraine,” adding, “It’s concerning.”
But to avoid any public split within NATO on the eve of the summit, Mr. Stoltenberg stopped short of criticizing Mr. Orban, noting that “NATO allies interact with Moscow in different ways, on different levels.”
Still, he suggested that trying to reach a settlement while Mr. Putin advances in Ukraine would not, ultimately, bring peace. “We all want peace,” Mr. Stoltenberg said. “It is always possible to end a war by losing a war. But that will not bring peace — that will bring occupation, and occupation is not peace.”
As NATO Convenes, Leaders Worry About a Hole in Its Center – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
75 Jahre Nato: Der Jubiläumsgipfel steht im Schatten von Trump und Putin
Das grösste Verteidigungsbündnis der Welt feiert sein 75-jähriges Bestehen – und fürchtet sich vor der Rückkehr seines lautesten Kritikers (NZZ, 9 juillet, article payant)
Nato-Gipfel wird von Trump und Putin überschattet (nzz.ch)
Paix en Ukraine : Viktor Orban rend une visite surprise au président Xi Jinping (Le Figaro, 8 juillet, article payant)
Après Kiev et Pékin, le premier ministre hongrois poursuit ses visites dans le cadre d’une «mission de paix». Le président chinois appelle à «créer les conditions» pour un dialogue entre Kiev et Moscou
Extraits :
Le premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orban, proche du Kremlin, s’est rendu ce lundi 8 juillet à Pékin pour rencontrer le président chinois Xi Jinping. Après une tournée à Kiev et à Moscou, cette visite se déroule selon lui dans le cadre d’une «mission de paix». À Moscou vendredi, le dirigeant hongrois s’était entretenu avec le président russe Vladimir Poutine à propos de la guerre en Ukraine.
Viktor Orban, dont le pays exerce pour six mois la présidence tournante de l’Union européenne (UE), a hérissé les partenaires européens de Budapest, qui affichent un soutien sans faille à Kiev et ont coupé les ponts avec la Russie depuis son invasion de l’Ukraine en février 2022. Le premier ministre hongrois est le seul dirigeant dans l’UE à être resté proche du Kremlin. (…)
Chine : Viktor Orban rend une visite surprise au président Xi Jinping (lefigaro.fr)
How many Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine? (The Economist, 8 juillet, article payant)
Four charts illustrate a grim new milestone
How many Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine? (economist.com)
Don’t Doubt NATO. It Saved My People (NYT, tribune, 5 juillet, article payant)
Some in the United States have downplayed the importance of NATO. Many European partners worry that after the U.S. presidential election in November, the American commitment to the alliance will wane. But as NATO prepares for the start of its summit in Washington on Tuesday, marking 75 years since its birth, I would like to remind the world of how NATO is etched into the cultural and political identity of one country in Europe: my own, Kosovo.
In 1999, a ruthless Serbian campaign led by the Serb leader and Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic brought massacres, rapes and the expulsion of about half of Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. It was a humanitarian disaster. NATO’s sustained aerial bombardment of Serb forces and positions put a stop to the horror. The alliance sent in nearly 50,000 troops immediately after.
Who among my people could forget the sight of NATO soldiers being cheered as they arrived? (…)
A quarter-century after its intervention, NATO’s role in Kosovo proves the organization is more crucial than ever. Its strong track record in the country demonstrates that the democracy and institutional support it helped establish, along with the external threats it prevented, successfully maintained peace. Unfortunately, 25 years later, we are facing war and threats of war in Europe once again. Here, peace is sustained only by our ability to defend it when directly challenged, and the threat of such a challenge is more real than ever.
Opinion | Don’t Doubt NATO. It Saved My People. – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
A black hole : Ukraine’s war has created millions of broken families (The Economist, 3 juillet, article payant)
Children and wives have been apart from their fathers and husbands for more than two years
According to a survey conducted this year by the International Rescue Committee, an ngo that supports refugees all over the world, an astonishing 74% of Ukrainians report being separated from a close family member because of the war. (…)
Some 6m Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have taken refuge abroad. Another 3m or more have been internally displaced by the fighting; some since 2014 when the war in the Donbas began and Russia illegally annexed Crimea. Elderly parents and siblings are cut off in occupied territories; mothers and fathers serving in the army are deployed for months at a time, and, as the army has been stretched thin with new Russian offensives, home leave is often deferred.
What Ukrainians have begun to call “the Big War” is now in its third year. For families like Anna and Alex and Yara, there are difficult decisions to make, an often impossible tug between geography and financial considerations; children’s education and well-being and love. (…)
At the front, soldiers try to maintain relationships as best they can via intermittent internet connections. Mr Kulikov says fathers often make videos of animals; trench cats, a unit’s mascot dog, even birds and mice, to bring a little lightness to their messages. Often, he says, single mothers serving in the army quit and go home. (Single parents are allowed to demobilise; and 30% of the army is female.) It’s a painful irony, he says, that, “the main motivation for a soldier is to protect their family and provide for their family, and at the same time, the main problem for them when they serve is that they can’t see their families.”
Ukraine’s war has created millions of broken families (economist.com)
Negotiated outcome most likely result of Russia-Ukraine war, major poll says (The Guardian, 3 juillet, libre accès)
In thinktank’s survey of 15 European countries, few respondents believe Ukraine can secure an outright victory
Extraits :
(…) A total of 34% of Ukrainians currently say they trust the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, “a great deal”, while a further 31% trust him “quite a lot” – meaning that those who are keeping faith with their leader outnumber those who are not by two to one.
When asked about the most likely outcome of the war, 58% of Ukrainians foresaw a Ukrainian victory, 30% said it would end in a settlement, and only 1% expected Russia to emerge victorious. But a majority preferred ceding territory rather than abandoning sovereignty, defined by the right to join Nato and the EU.
Inside 14 European countries surveyed, only in Estonia was there a prevailing view (38%) that Ukraine would win the war outright. Nevertheless, majorities in Sweden and Poland wanted Europe to help Ukraine fight until all its territory is regained. Majorities in Italy, Greece and Bulgaria opposed this to the extent that they thought it was a bad idea to increase the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Overall, Italy emerged as the largest major European power least supportive of Ukraine. But in most European countries, large majorities still support sending more arms to Ukraine, even if it is to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating hand. (…)
„Die Zeit läuft gegen Russland“ / “Le temps joue contre la Russie” (FAZ, interview, 1 juillet, article payant)
Der Militärökonom Marcus Keupp hat ausgerechnet, wie viele Panzer Russland jeden Tag verliert. Seine Prognose: Ende 2025 könnte der Krieg vorbei sein. / L’économiste militaire Marcus Keupp a calculé le nombre de chars que la Russie perd chaque jour. Son pronostic : fin 2025, la guerre pourrait être terminée
Extraits :
Manche sagen, man sollte Russland nicht unterschätzen. Größter Flächenstaat der Erde, hohe Einnahmen aus Öl und Gas, Technik aus China, Artilleriemunition aus Nordkorea.
Entschuldigen Sie, aber diese Pseudoargumente sind mir alle seit Langem bekannt. Warum hat Russland den Krieg dann nicht schon längst gewonnen, wenn es doch so groß und mächtig ist? Zu Beginn des Krieges hatte Russland ideale Voraussetzungen, gefüllte Lager, keine Sanktionen, riesige finanzielle Reserven. Und was ist passiert? Ja, sie kriegen Munition aus Nordkorea, aber nicht in kriegsentscheidendem Umfang. Ja, sie kriegen Drohnen aus Iran, aber achtzig Prozent davon werden abgeschossen. Ja, China liefert ihnen Golf Carts vom Typ Desertcross 1000, aber keine schweren Waffen. Der Ölpreis ist hoch, aber Russland verkauft weniger Volumen, weil es das gesamte westliche Ölgeschäft verloren hat. An China und Indien verkaufen sie nur mit großem Abschlag. Der Nettopreis für Öl liegt nur knapp über den Produktionskosten. Die Differenz wird von einem nationalen Wohlfahrtsfonds abgedeckt, und der ist schon von 200 Milliarden Dollar auf 50 Milliarden abgeschmolzen. In Deutschland gibt es immer diese Traumbilder von Russland: das Märchen vom Land der unendlichen Ressourcen. In anderen Ländern ist das nicht so, da wird Russland realistischer gesehen. (…)
Im März 2023 haben Sie mal gesagt, Russland werde den Krieg im Oktober verloren haben. Jetzt haben wir Mitte 2024, und der Krieg läuft immer noch. Haben Sie sich also geirrt?
Ich hatte damals von der einsatzfähigen Reserve gesprochen. Sprich: Von den 3000 Panzern, mit denen Russland in den Kampf gegangen ist. Die sind mittlerweile weg. Insofern stimmte meine Prognose. Dann hat Russland begonnen, aus seinen Lagern zu schöpfen, und diese Lager sind umfangreicher, als ich ursprünglich gedacht habe. Ich war also in mancher Hinsicht zu optimistisch. Ich bin auch nicht davon ausgegangen, dass der Westen seine Hilfen verzögert. Hätte man der Ukraine schon 2022 und 2023 entschlossen geholfen, wären viele Probleme nicht entstanden. Die russischen Truppen hätten sich zum Beispiel nicht eingraben können. Es wird sicher länger dauern, als ich damals prognostiziert habe. Aber dass Russland diesen Krieg verlieren wird, davon bin ich nach wie vor überzeugt.
Militärökonom Marcus Keupp glaubt an Sieg der Ukraine (faz.net)
Putin’s delusions, Ukrainians’ pain : A clear-eyed account of Ukraine under siege (The Economist, 29 juin, book review, article payant)
Do not underestimate the lunacy of aged dictators, a new book argues*
Extraits :
Will Show You How It Was: The Story of Wartime Kyiv. By Illia Ponomarenko. Bloomsbury; 288 pages; $28.99 and £22.99
“I Will Show You How It Was”, Mr Ponomarenko’s book about wartime Kyiv, serves two useful functions: it is a gripping account of Ukrainians’ struggle and it offers moral clarity about the causes of the war. The conflict has nothing to do with nato or imaginary Western provocations. The problem is that Russia is a dictatorship. The state is geared to serve Vladimir Putin’s interests, not those of the Russian people. That is why the Kremlin spent “years and billions on the propaganda of hatred, revanchism, territorial grabs and confrontation with the West”, all designed to cement Mr Putin’s hold on power, “while more than 12% of Russians did not have toilets in their homes”. (…)
Mr Putin’s invasion plan was built on a fantasy: that Ukraine was not a “real nation”, and that, “except for a handful of grotesque Nazis and armed nationalists”, it would not resist the invaders. This was such a preposterous delusion that, at first, Ukrainians did not take the signs of looming war seriously. In 2021 Mr Putin published an essay twisting centuries of history into a list of supposed crimes committed by foreigners against Russia, and threatening that if Ukraine did not end its anti-Russian policies it might lose its statehood. Many dismissed it as a bluff rather than the rationale for “one of the most shamelessly trumped-up, absurd and unnecessary wars the world had ever seen”. (…)
As for how the war will end, Mr Ponomarenko is grimly realistic. He has seen what happens to towns the Russians capture: the torture, the rape, the death pits. If Ukrainians do not keep fighting, their nation will “simply cease to exist”.
For the Russian troops who commit atrocities, the author reserves a chilled fury. Yet he musters empathy for those who are merely cannon fodder. Seeing the patch on the uniform of a dead conscript, he searches the man’s name online. He was from “a poor village of log houses and dusty, unpaved streets” in the Russian far east, near Mongolia. His mum is a teacher; he loved football. “You could have just stayed home,” laments Mr Ponomarenko. “You could have had a family.” Instead, the soldier died “7,000km away…in an idiotic war for the sake of just one delusional old man’s monstrous act of megalomania”.
A clear-eyed account of Ukraine under siege (economist.com)
Wut, Frust und Trauer im Westen der Ukraine: Die Suche nach neuen Soldaten belastet das Land / Colère, frustration et tristesse dans l’ouest de l’Ukraine : la recherche de nouveaux soldats pèse sur le pays (NZZ, 29 juin, article payant)
Viele Ukrainer sind wütend über die oft plumpen Versuche, Soldaten zu rekrutieren. Die Mobilisierung stockt. Das setzt auch jenen zu, die gekämpft haben oder weiter an der Front stehen. / De nombreux Ukrainiens sont en colère contre les tentatives souvent grossières de recruter des soldats. La mobilisation est au point mort. Cela affecte également ceux qui ont combattu ou qui restent sur le front.
Ukraine-Krieg: Mobilisierung von Soldaten wird zur Zerreissprobe (nzz.ch)
High alert on high : The race to prevent satellite Armageddon (The Economist, 29 juin, article payant)
Fears of a Russian nuclear weapon in orbit are inspiring new protective tech
Extraits :
In early 2021 Micross Components, a designer of highly specialised circuitry in Melville, New York, received an intriguing request. An American aerospace giant wanted components that could protect a military system’s electronics from the radiation generated by a nuclear detonation. Micross signed the contract, and set about doing the work, but was left in the dark about why such a system would be needed. The puzzle pieces fell into place earlier this year, says Mike Glass, a product manager at Micross, when American officials began to talk about Russian plans to place a nuclear weapon in space.
That talk was motivated by a Russian satellite called Cosmos-2553, which is thought to be secretly testing the necessary electronics some 2,000km above Earth’s surface. A nuclear detonation there would probably be too high to wreak any meaningful direct damage on the surface of Earth. But it could cause what Lieutenant-Colonel James McCue, an outgoing official with America’s Defence Threat Reduction Agency, calls a “satellite Armageddon”. Many of the nearby spacecraft tightly packed in lower orbits would be immediately fried; a greater number farther afield would slowly succumb to the radioactive aftermath. The blast would affect all countries’ satellites indiscriminately. (…)
The race to prevent satellite Armageddon (economist.com)
A Lviv, avec des agents recruteurs pour l’armée ukrainienne : « Là où on passe, les rues se vident » (Le Monde, reportage, article payant)
Dans la grande ville de l’ouest de l’Ukraine, des patrouilles traquent les hommes en âge de combattre pour remplacer les soldats tués ou blessés au front, mais aussi pour offrir des rotations à des militaires épuisés après deux ans et demi de guerre. Impopulaires, ces contrôles sont devenus courants
Extraits :
(…) Les deux agents recruteurs avisent ensuite un homme athlétique, la trentaine. Celui-ci vient soudainement de rebrousser chemin. Serhiy Furman sort, prêt à l’interpeller, tandis qu’Oleksandr Matsiouk opère un demi-tour en voiture afin de le suivre dans une ruelle. Après avoir jeté un discret regard derrière lui, le passant finit par s’enfuir en courant à travers une zone piétonne. Il ne sera pas poursuivi. « J’ai honte pour eux », souffle simplement Oleksandr Matsiouk, employé du centre de recrutement depuis un an après avoir été soldat dans une unité de la défense territoriale, au début de l’invasion russe de février 2022. « Certains ne comprennent pas que nous allons perdre cette guerre si nous ne nous mobilisons pas, dit-il. Nous nous battons pour l’existence de notre pays. » (…)
Selon les chiffres des autorités ukrainiennes, la moitié des employés des centres de recrutement sont des soldats démobilisés ou en rotation. Pour ces derniers, l’animosité à leur égard est encore plus douloureuse. « D’un côté, je comprends que les civils ne devraient pas être forcés » à rejoindre l’armée, reconnaît Andriy, 41 ans, « Gida » de son nom de guerre, un employé du centre de Lviv, ancien soldat de la 24e brigade mécanisée gravement blessé dans la bataille de Bakhmout. Mais, d’un autre côté, ajoute-t-il avec amertume, « pourquoi est-ce que moi j’ai dû me battre quand d’autres restent chez eux ? Le soir, à Lviv, tu sors, et tu as l’impression qu’il n’y a pas de guerre ». Engagé dans la 80e brigade d’assaut aérien dès 2019, Grigory, 25 ans, « Gekman » de son nom de guerre, blessé dans un bombardement de missiles S-300 en février à côté de Bakhmout, désormais occupée par l’armée russe, confie ne plus voir ses amis d’avant l’invasion russe, à l’exception d’un seul. « Ils vivent dans leur propre réalité imaginaire. Ils ne veulent pas comprendre, dit-il. Je n’arrive plus à parler la même langue qu’eux. »
Belgorod : Death and destruction in a Russian city (The Economist, 26 juin, quelques article payant)
Russians in the border city of Belgorod have become victims too in the war Vladimir Putin launched against Ukraine
Extraits :
(…) Mr Ivankiv senior, an ethnic Ukrainian, was born and bred in Soviet Kazakhstan, where his grandfather, a native of western Ukraine, was exiled after spending several years in Stalin’s gulag. He grew up a Soviet man, served in the Soviet army and lived in Pskov, in north-western Russia. In 2013 the family moved to Belgorod. They were attracted by its mild southern climate, its modern feel, its fertile agricultural land and its proximity to Ukraine, where many of their relatives lived.
Kharkiv and Belgorod, 80km apart and connected by a highway, were not just formally sister cities; they formed a common historic, cultural and linguistic space. Belgorod was settled by free Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks who fled Polish rule and Tatar raids. There was no distinction between the accents and dialects. It was a rare family in Belgorod that did not have relatives on the other side of the border.
For Belgorod, a city of 340,000 people, Kharkiv was a capital. A metropolis four times its size, “Kharkiv had a greater influence on us than Moscow or St Petersburg,” says Noize mc, a Russian rapper and singer, who was born and bred in Belgorod and gained fame in Kharkiv. Kharkiv had cooler bars and bigger shopping malls and cinemas. It had a McDonald’s that attracted schoolchildren from Belgorod, and the Barabashova open-air market, one of the largest in Europe, that drew traders and buyers from Russia and across the former Soviet Union. The border between Belgorod and Kharkiv was largely notional.
In 2014 that changed. That is when Russian forces first invaded Donbas and tried to incite strife in Kharkiv. (…)
Death and destruction in a Russian city (economist.com)
Russia and the West : Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is part of his revolution against the West (The Economist, Tribune, 25 juin, article payant)
He is leading Russia into a new phase of strategic confrontation, says Stephen Covington, a longtime NATO adviser
Extraits :
When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, many Western observers thought it a temporary regional crisis that ultimately would settle into a frozen conflict. Two and a half years later, this view is challenged by a more consequential reality.
The Russian leader’s goal is not just to break Ukraine and stop its quest for a place in the family of Western democracies, but to dismantle the American-led security system that emerged after the second world war. In that sense Mr Putin is fomenting a revolution: using the strategy and tactics of revolution against the Western system. His war against Ukraine is inextricably linked to the strategic objective of his revolution. (…)
Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is part of his revolution against the West (economist.com)
Le revenu de citoyenneté pour les Ukrainiens crée de fausses incitations / Das Bürgergeld für Ukrainer setzt falsche Anreize (NZZ, opinion, 25 juin, article payant)
Le chrétien-démocrate Alexander Dobrindt veut renvoyer les réfugiés d’Ukraine dans leur pays s’ils ne travaillent pas. Cela va trop loin. Mais le débat qu’il a lancé est important. / Der Christlichdemokrat Alexander Dobrindt will Flüchtlinge aus der Ukraine in ihre Heimat zurückschicken, wenn sie nicht arbeiten. Das geht zu weit. Aber die Diskussion, die er angestossen hat, ist wichtig.
Extraits :
Les partisans du revenu citoyen pour les Ukrainiens aiment à dire que la plupart des réfugiés de guerre sont des mères célibataires dont les maris sont au front. Mais le fait est qu’environ 200 000 Ukrainiens en âge de servir vivent en Allemagne. C’est à peu près le nombre de soldats que compte la Bundeswehr. Leur taux d’activité est également étonnamment faible, avec 29 pour cent.
Les Ukrainiens reçoivent 563 euros d’allocation citoyenne par mois de l’État allemand, qui paie en outre le loyer du logement et une partie des charges. Pour les enfants, il y a de l’argent en plus. Une famille ukrainienne peut ainsi obtenir entre 2000 et 3000 euros de prestations sociales par mois.
Ce n’est peut-être pas énorme selon les normes européennes, mais ça l’est selon les normes ukrainiennes. On peut donc se demander si le revenu de citoyenneté empêche les Ukrainiens de travailler. Il est certain que dans certains cas, l’État allemand a aussi sa part de responsabilité, car l’accès au marché du travail est pavé d’obstacles bureaucratiques.
Das Bürgergeld für Ukrainer setzt falsche Anreize (nzz.ch)
“Everyone turns a blind eye”: in May, Europeans consumed more Russian gas than American (June 18)
Free access : «Tout le monde ferme les yeux» : en mai, les Européens ont consommé plus de gaz russe que d’américain
Les importations en provenance de la Russie sont en hausse continue depuis septembre (Le Figaro)
Excerpt :
L’Europe est encore loin d’être sevrée du gaz russe. Certes, les importations de gaz russe qui, en 2022 fournissaient 40% de la consommation européenne, ont baissé pour ne représenter plus que 15% des besoins. Il n’empêche, le mois dernier, Gazprom, le fleuron du Kremlin, a exporté 2,5 milliards de mètres cubes vers l’Europe, contre 1,8 milliard en mai 2023, marquant neuf mois de hausse continue. Depuis janvier, les ventes du géant russe aux Européens ont augmenté de 28 % sur un an, « alors que les responsables politiques de l’UE continuent de parler de réduction de la demande intérieure et des approvisionnements russes », tance le spécialiste français de l’énergie, Thierry Bros. (…)
Pour autant, ce n’est pas parce que les Européens achètent encore du gaz russe que Gazprom se porte bien. En 2023, le géant public a enregistré une perte nette de 6,9 milliards de dollars, sa première en plus de 20 ans, en raison de la chute des ventes en Europe après l’invasion en Ukraine, souligne Thierry Bros. De plus, alors que le Kremlin prévoit d’augmenter encore la charge fiscale sur Gazprom en 2024 pour alimenter les caisses de l’État, l’entreprise va réduire de 15% ses investissements cette année.
Mykola Bielieskov: “Those who advocate a ceasefire must be prepared to pay the price” (June 15)
Pay wall :Mykola Bielieskov : «Ceux qui préconisent un cessez-le-feu doivent être prêts à en payer le prix»
L’expert estime que les partenaires occidentaux de l’Ukraine doivent être prêts à intensifier leur aide s’ils veulent voir advenir une «stratégie réaliste vers la victoire» (Le Figaro, Interview)
Excerpt :
À ce stade, l’Ukraine n’a pas dit qu’elle était prête à transiger. Par ailleurs, il faut être clair sur le fait qu’elle n’admettra jamais de considérer que les Territoires occupés appartiennent à la Russie. Enfin, si on se met à parler d’un cessez-le-feu négocié, il faudra absolument convaincre les Ukrainiens que celui-ci peut être durable et garanti. Notre pays est traumatisé à la fois par le mémorandum de Budapest (1994) et par les accords de Minsk (2014-2015), qui n’ont pas empêché la Russie de nous agresser en février 2022.
En l’absence de garantie solide, comment ne pas craindre que celle-ci utilise une éventuelle trêve pour reconstruire ses forces avant de nous attaquer de nouveau ? Les accords bilatéraux que l’Ukraine a récemment signés avec plusieurs pays, dont la France, risquent de ne pas suffire à persuader Poutine de nous laisser en paix. Seul un renforcement de la coopération avec l’Otan, dans la perspective d’une adhésion d’ici trois à cinq ans, constituerait une véritable garantie de sécurité. Ceux qui espèrent limiter les frais à la faveur d’un éventuel arrêt des combats se trompent lourdement.
Garantir la durabilité d’un cessez-le-feu impliquerait de se donner les moyens de reconstruire nos forces armées, de développer notre complexe militaro-industriel et de multiplier les partenariats entre des entreprises ukrainiennes et occidentales. Autrement dit : il faudrait que vos pays soient capables de dépenser la même quantité d’argent pour leur défense que pendant la guerre froide (soit 4 % à 5 % de leur produit intérieur brut), et qu’ils acceptent de diriger une partie de ces ressources vers l’Ukraine.
Nous sommes actuellement dans une situation très étrange : le produit intérieur brut de l’Otan est vingt fois supérieur à celui de la Russie, mais celle-ci dispose d’obus d’artillerie en bien plus grand nombre. La Suède, qui s’est récemment engagée à fournir à l’Ukraine 7 milliards d’euros sur trois ans, nous montre l’exemple. Mais je pense que les Occidentaux n’ont pas encore vraiment conscience des efforts à fournir. Ceux qui préconisent un cessez-le-feu doivent être prêts à en payer le prix.
“Peace for Ukraine? A peace conference over Ukraine is unlikely to silence the guns” (June 14)
Pay wall :Peace for Ukraine? A peace conference over Ukraine is unlikely to silence the guns. Serious negotiations are unlikely to begin before the year’s end at the earliest (The Economist)
Excerpt :
Officially, America says it is up to Ukraine to determine what it wants. In reality, patience is waning, and a conversation is already happening about what America believes might be an acceptable end to the war. That does not mean negotiations are under way. For now at least, Russia does not appear to be talking to any major Western country. Relations between America and Russia have been largely reduced to technical contacts. Links between America and China are more intensive, with the Biden administration working hard to limit China’s support for Russia. Both Britain and Ukraine believe this support now includes lethal aid.
One Western diplomat says that several factors are at play that would determine the timing and conditions of any ceasefire. It would for a start depend on the battlefield: if Ukraine is able to hold its lines past Russia’s current summer offensive, it will find itself in a stronger negotiating position. It depends on Mr Putin’s health. And it also depends on the American elections in November. The end of this year is thus the earliest foreseeable date for talks to begin, and possibly much later. “The Russians are betting everything on Trump,” agrees the senior Ukrainian source. “Until then, it’s all gossip.”
A peace conference over Ukraine is unlikely to silence the guns (economist.com)
“Politics overshadows a conference to raise money for Ukraine” (June 12)
Pay wall :Build back better : Politics overshadows a conference to raise money for Ukraine. Not to mention the continued fighting (The Economist)
Excerpt :
Perhaps the greatest worry is that no big aid packages may be forthcoming in the future. European politics are shifting towards the Russia-friendly far right, and America may re-elect Donald Trump in November. But those were questions the Ukrainians at the conference were in no position to answer; they were simply happy for the help they are getting. Ihor Terekhov, the mayor of Kharkiv, which has been mercilessly bombed by Russia for months, signed a pre-financing agreement on a multimillion-dollar loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The money will go towards upgrading his city’s metro. It will also, he said, free up municipal funds for generating heat and power this winter: “It’s a matter of life and death.”
Politics overshadows a conference to raise money for Ukraine (economist.com)
“Donald Trump’s lead over Joe Biden is small, but real” (June 12)
Pay wall :Donald Trump’s lead over Joe Biden is small, but real (The Economist, Graphs)
Donald Trump is likely to beat Joe Biden | The Economist