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The Economist, 25 avril
Deal or no deal? America is selling a Ukraine peace plan. No one is buying, yet
If they can’t seal the deal, Donald Trump’s team may walk away
Full text:
FOR A MAN who promised to end the war in Ukraine within a day of taking office, Donald Trump has been taking his time. His first hundred days expire next week and have so far failed to produce even a short-term ceasefire, let alone a peace deal. Instead, as his vice-president, J.D. Vance, warned on April 23rd, he seems to be preparing to “walk away” from a process that has turned out to be as hard as everyone, apart from Mr Trump and his team, had predicted.
America has been hawking around Europe proposals that would reward Russia’s aggression against Ukraine with formal recognition of its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, a promise that Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO, and an end to the sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasions of 2014 and 2022. In return, America is neither offering to provide Ukraine with security guarantees, nor to help with any other such guarantees the Europeans might offer. Nor is there any sign that America is proposing to make its sanctions relief conditional on continued Russian good behaviour. But Ukraine would get an end to the fighting along current lines, at least for as long as Vladimir Putin manages to keep his word.
The best that can be said for the American plan is that it fails to give Mr Putin everything he wants. There is no formal recognition of his annexation in 2022 of the four provinces in south-eastern Ukraine that Russia now partially occupies. And there is, according to leaked reports, no acceptance of Russian demands that caps be placed on Ukraine’s armed forces after any peace agreement comes into effect.
So far, no one has endorsed the American proposals. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said his country will never formally recognise Russia’s seizure of Crimea, prompting Mr Trump to call him “inflammatory”. But Russia has not yet accepted the plan either: Mr Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, will visit Moscow soon to try and get Mr Putin’s assent to it. European countries have been publicly silent, but will not want to undercut Ukraine.
The big question is what happens next. If Mr Trump does walk away, will he end arms supplies to Ukraine? Will he end intelligence-sharing? Will he unilaterally lift sanctions? Perhaps most vital, will he at least let Europe buy crucial weapons from America, especially Patriot air-defence systems, to give to Ukraine? As so often, no one has a clue. ■
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 avril
Trump fällt der Ukraine in den Rücken: Ein fauler Frieden bringt Europa keine Sicherheit
Die USA wollen den Krieg auf eine Weise beenden, die Russland zum grossen Gewinner macht und die Ukraine schwächt. Das ist nicht im amerikanischen Interesse – aber erst recht nicht im europäischen: Nun braucht die Ukraine umso tatkräftigere Hilfe aus Europa.
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Der amerikanische Präsident Donald Trump beklagt sich darüber, dass für ihn der Umgang mit der Ukraine viel schwieriger sei als derjenige mit Russland. Erstaunen sollte dies jedoch niemanden. Denn Trump zeigt bei seiner Vermittlungstätigkeit eine geradezu groteske Einseitigkeit. Während er den Ukrainern schmerzhafte Zugeständnisse abgerungen hat und ihnen weitere abpressen will, kann er bis jetzt keine einzige echte Konzession der Russen vorweisen.
Der in den letzten Tagen durchgesickerte «Friedensplan» der USA ist für den Kreml extrem vorteilhaft. Russland wäre im Rahmen einer solchen Vereinbarung der grosse Kriegsgewinner, ohne sich den Weg zu weiteren Eroberungszügen zu verbauen. Die Ukraine müsste nicht nur den Verlust von fast zwanzig Prozent ihres Territoriums akzeptieren. Sie verlöre auch jede reale Aussicht darauf, diese Gebiete irgendwann auf diplomatischem Weg zurückzugewinnen. Denn Trump will die Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland aufheben und hochfliegende Geschäftsideen mit Moskau verwirklichen. Er würde damit das letzte amerikanische Druckmittel beseitigen, nachdem er bereits die Bewilligung von neuer Militärhilfe an die Ukraine gestoppt hat.
Obendrein bietet Trump an, die besetzte Halbinsel Krim formell als russisches Staatsgebiet zu anerkennen. Putins Landraub erhielte damit einen völkerrechtlichen Persilschein. Dies wäre nicht nur ein gravierender taktischer Fehler, sondern auch eine Abkehr von einem Grundprinzip amerikanischer Aussenpolitik der letzten hundert Jahre. Seit der Stimson-Doktrin von 1932 hatten republikanische und demokratische Präsidenten klargemacht, dass Amerika keine durch Aggressionskriege erzwungenen Grenzverschiebungen akzeptiert. Die Annexion der baltischen Staaten durch die Sowjetunion im Jahr 1940 beispielsweise wurde von den USA nie anerkannt – bis diese Republiken 1991 ihre Freiheit wiedererlangten.
Trump missachtet auch die Krim-Deklaration seiner eigenen Regierung vom Juli 2018, die das Prinzip der territorialen Integrität als Grundlage der internationalen Stabilität betonte. Landet es auf dem Abfallhaufen der Geschichte, so wird dies Potentaten rund um die Welt zu Eroberungskriegen ermuntern – eine Entwicklung, die nicht im amerikanischen Interesse sein kann.
Was erhielte die Ukraine in einer solchen Vereinbarung im Gegenzug? Fast nichts. Für die Ukraine besteht die zentrale Frage darin, wie sie sich gegen künftige russische Angriffe wehren kann. Ein Einfrieren des Krieges entlang der jetzigen Frontlinien, wie es Washington vorschlägt, bringt keinen echten Frieden, sondern nur eine vorläufige Verschnaufpause. Der Kreml würde sie zur weiteren Aufrüstung nutzen; daraus macht er kein Geheimnis. Entscheidend ist daher, in dieser Zeit die Verteidigungsfähigkeit der Ukraine zu stärken. Trump scheint zu glauben, dass Putin ein mit ihm unterzeichnetes Stück Papier honorieren würde. Aber angesichts der Dutzende von Abkommen und Zusicherungen, die der Moskauer Diktator gebrochen hat, ist diese Haltung naiv. Kein «Trump-Deal», sondern nur handfeste Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine werden Russland von weiteren Invasionen abhalten.
Der amerikanische Friedensplan ignoriert dieses Problem. Er enthält keine konkreten Schutzzusagen und schliesst die beste Sicherheitsgarantie sogar explizit aus: Der Weg der Ukraine in die Nato soll dauerhaft blockiert werden. Über amerikanische Militärhilfe schweigt sich der Plan aus. Der Hinweis auf eine europäische Schutztruppe ist wenig wert, weil eine solche Truppe ohne amerikanischen Rückhalt entweder nie zustande kommen wird oder zum Scheitern verurteilt ist.
Die Ukraine droht zum Sündenbock zu werden
Der ukrainische Widerstand gegen eine so einseitige Vereinbarung ist daher verständlich. Zu Recht verlangt Kiew, dass Moskau als ersten Schritt wenigstens einem Waffenstillstand zustimmt. Ohne eine solche Geste des Friedenswillens ist der amerikanische Plan auf Sand gebaut. Trump behauptet, eine Einigung mit Russland in der Hand zu haben, doch in Wirklichkeit ist nichts Zählbares erkennbar.
Wie geht es nun weiter? Möglicherweise spielt Putin seine Rolle in dem üblen Spiel weiter, lässt die Waffen dem Schein nach für eine Weile schweigen und kassiert dafür die Vorteile von Trumps Friedensplan ein. Mindestens so wahrscheinlich ist aber, dass die Amerikaner nur eine Ausrede suchen, um die Ukrainer für das Scheitern verantwortlich zu machen und sie ihrem Schicksal zu überlassen.
Für Europa ist das Problem damit aber nicht gelöst. Allem Friedensgerede zum Trotz sind die Sicherheitsrisiken in Europa seit Trumps Machtantritt stark gewachsen. Der Kontinent sieht sich einem Amerika gegenüber, das nicht bloss eine fairere Lastenteilung in der transatlantischen Allianz anstrebt. Trump macht die USA vielmehr zum Gegenspieler, der sich wie ein heimlicher Verbündeter Russlands gebärdet, im Zollstreit mutwillig Europas Prosperität schädigt und dessen Sicherheit untergräbt.
Entscheidend ist daher nun, der Ukraine umso tatkräftiger beizustehen – im ureigenen Sicherheitsinteresse Europas. Ein fauler Friede nach Trumps Vorstellungen wird die russische Gefahr nicht bannen. Dass Putins Bildungsberater bereits angekündigt hat, den Vermittler Trump in Russlands Schulbüchern zu feiern, braucht niemanden zu erstaunen. Wichtiger ist die Frage, welchen Platz diese kritische Phase dereinst in Europas Geschichtsbüchern einnehmen wird. Europas Führungsnationen, aber auch kleinere Länder wie die Schweiz, haben nicht mehr lange Zeit, die richtigen Antworten darauf zu liefern.
The Wall Street Journal, 24 avril
Ukraine Could Become Trump’s Afghanistan
If the U.S. cuts off military assistance before Europe can significantly ramp up its support, Russia won’t hesitate to step up aggression.
Full text:
If President Trump wants to achieve a peace in Ukraine that lasts beyond his presidency, he should continue providing U.S. military assistance—at least until Europe is able to ramp up its support significantly. The days of blank checks and $61 billion appropriations bills are over, but Russia’s capacity and intent to control Ukraine continue to grow. An abrupt cutoff could turn Ukraine into “Trump’s Afghanistan.”
Mr. Trump wants to “stop the killing.” He can do so only by brokering an agreement that deters Russia from resuming hostilities at the first opportunity. Two options—admitting Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and stationing NATO troops in Ukraine—are nonstarters for Russia and probably within NATO itself. The next best option is for NATO countries to guarantee military assistance to Ukraine, at least until Ukraine can defend itself.
Mr. Trump shouldn’t repeat President Biden’s mistakes. An agreement that involves zeroing out U.S. military assistance smacks of Mr. Biden’s willful blindness in withdrawing from Afghanistan. In the middle of the withdrawal in July 2021, Mr. Biden dismissed questions about whether the Afghan government would fall: “Look, we were in that war for 20 years. Twenty years. . . . I want to talk about happy things, man.” This was despite U.S. intelligence repeatedly warning him that the Afghan National Security Forces would struggle to hold the Taliban at bay.
The Afghan government wasn’t ready then, and Europe isn’t ready now, especially given Russia’s increasing might. A report released last month by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence said that “Moscow’s massive investments in its defense sector will render the Russian military a continued threat.” Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, warned Congress on April 3 that Russia’s economy is on a “war footing” and that Moscow enjoys strong military support from China, Iran and North Korea. Past European free-riding makes it tempting for the Trump administration to wash its hands of Ukraine, but Mr. Trump must reject this urge.
Like the Taliban, Russia has violated many internationally brokered cease-fires and agreements. Chechnya offers a particularly clear example of Vladimir Putin’s treachery and ambition. After the breakaway republic humbled Russia’s military in 1996—and the two sides signed a “forever” peace agreement—Moscow spent three years rebuilding before forcefully bringing Chechnya back into its domain. Today, Mr. Putin’s territorial designs in Ukraine are clear. He demands the surrender of land across Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, including areas that Russia hasn’t conquered and doesn’t occupy.
Mr. Trump insists that Mr. Putin respects him so much that he won’t reinvade Ukraine after an agreement is signed. Even if he’s correct, Mr. Putin will likely outlast Mr. Trump in office. If Mr. Trump strikes a deal with Mr. Putin and Ukraine’s military readiness and morale plunge without U.S. support, Mr. Putin will be tempted to resume hostilities. Mr. Trump’s 2024 victory was in part a rebuke of the Biden administration’s foreign-policy weakness. A Russian reinvasion would contradict Mr. Trump’s promise to create “peace through strength.”
Finally, Mr. Trump has proved adept at using leverage in negotiating matters from real estate to international relations. But American leverage over Russia is rooted in U.S. military support to Ukraine. The U.S. can’t achieve better relations with Russia unless Mr. Putin needs something from Mr. Trump. Unilaterally ending assistance to Ukraine would eliminate a key American lever to influence Mr. Putin and blunt his territorial ambitions.
The U.S. doesn’t have to back Ukraine indefinitely. Mr. Trump’s insistence that Europe do more is already succeeding. The U.K. has pledged to increase defense spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product by April 2027, and Germany has announced major investments as well. French President Emmanuel Macron has pushed for European countries to devote 3% to 3.5% of their GDP to defense.
These spending increases will take time to bear fruit. But a recent report from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy noted that Europe can make early progress in areas where it already produces supplies that are vital to Ukraine, such as howitzers, tanks, drones and infantry fighting vehicles. This would allow the U.S. to scale down its provision of these materials.
That said, Europe’s defense industrial base shortcomings mean it may take longer for the Continent to produce certain types of ammunition and rocket artillery. Restricting U.S. military assistance in these categories before Europe has time to develop this capacity would give Russia a window to surge forward.
Mr. Trump rightly describes the Afghanistan debacle as one of the most ignominious moments in U.S. history. Mr. Biden never recovered from it: His approval ratings tanked, and it left a stain on his presidency. Mr. Trump is also correct that in many ways the Russia-Ukraine conflict is “Biden’s war.” But if he hastily cuts off assistance to Ukraine, and Russia advances westward, Mr. Trump will go down in history for making the same reckless mistakes as his predecessor.
Mr. Allen served as special assistant to the president and senior director for counterproliferation strategy (2007-09) and majority staff director of the House Intelligence Committee (2011-13). He is author of “Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence After 9/11.”
The Wall Street Journal, 24 avril
Trump’s Ukraine Ultimatum
The President puts pressure only on one side—not on Russia.
Full text:
President Trump on Wednesday unleashed another broadside against Ukraine, and his dislike for President Volodymyr Zelensky isn’t news. But what matters to U.S. interests—and Mr. Trump’s Presidency—are the terms of a negotiated settlement. Mr. Trump’s current offer looks more like an ultimatum than grounds for a durable peace.
“We’ve issued a very explicit proposal to both the Russians and the Ukrainians, and it’s time for them to either say yes or for the United States to walk away from this process,” Vice President JD Vance said from India on Wednesday. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sounded similar notes last week, and by “walking away” the Administration seems to mean abandoning Ukraine to Vladimir Putin’s designs.
Stipulate that even Ukraine’s ardent supporters understand the war will end in a negotiation. Ukraine won’t regain all of its territory, as regrettable as that is for a country of free people who have resisted Mr. Putin with valor. The Biden Administration squandered the chances for a strategic victory for Ukraine and the U.S. with its hesitant, fretful response to the 2022 invasion.
But Mr. Trump also can’t expect Ukraine to surrender and accept a peace on its knees. The Administration has said Kyiv can’t join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Never mind that the alliance would be stronger with Ukraine’s military, now highly experienced on the battlefield. But even without NATO, Ukraine will need a security guarantee worth more than Mr. Putin’s word. The Russian dictator has refused to accept a Ukraine armed by the West with European troops on its soil.
Mr. Trump is angry that Ukraine won’t accept a deal that legitimizes Russia’s occupation of Crimea, as if this is a minor map revision. The U.S. refusal to credit territory seized by invasion is a principle intended to deter future marauders. Letting Russia keep its navy in Crimea is a threat to Europe as much as to Ukraine.
A peace, or even an armistice, worth the name requires compromise on both sides. But Mr. Trump has applied pressure only on Ukraine. Mr. Trump proposed a 30-day cease-fire and Mr. Zelensky accepted. Mr. Putin simply blew off the proposal.
Press reports say the Russian dictator is now pretending it’s a concession to freeze the conflict along current lines—instead of demanding entire provinces it hasn’t been able to seize. The lack of pressure on Mr. Putin is particular malpractice as the Russian dictator is struggling to drum up more troops. Why would Mr. Putin compromise if he will pay no price for refusing—not even more U.S. arms for Ukraine after the current supply runs low this summer?
Mr. Trump likes to say Ukraine doesn’t have the cards, but it does have one ace: The President won’t be able to abandon Ukraine without paying a heavy political price. As the historian and Stalin biographer Stephen Kotkin said in an interview recently, Americans hate war but they hate losing a war even more.
President Trump may prefer to focus on a nuclear deal with Iran or his trade war with China, but he won’t leverage failure in Europe into success in Asia or the Middle East. A U.S. flag officer told Congress recently that China has provided 70% of the machine tools and 90% of the legacy chips that have allowed Russia to rebuild its war machine, and that’s a testament to how the world’s problems are now intertwined.
Mr. Trump can still salvage a deal in Ukraine, but the current “final” settlement offer looks like it would set up Mr. Putin to win the war now or later. The world’s rogues will notice, and Mr. Trump’s headaches will have only begun.
L’Express, 23 avril
Peter Pomerantsev : “Après l’Ukraine, la prochaine étape pour Poutine sera de détruire l’Union européenne”
Grand entretien. Le chercheur, spécialiste du monde russe, estime que tout n’a pas été tenté pour contenir la Russie de Poutine. Il détaille ce que les Occidentaux doivent vraiment faire pour stopper le maître du Kremlin.
Full text:
Pendant la campagne présidentielle, il s’était vanté de pouvoir régler le conflit en 24 heures. Mais trois mois après son retour à la Maison-Blanche, Donald Trump et sa stratégie pour instaurer la paix en Ukraine semblent dans l’impasse. Le cessez-le-feu en Ukraine proposé par le président américain lui échappe peu à peu, notamment en raison de l’offensive militaire russe qui se poursuit et s’intensifie. Pour sa troisième rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine depuis février, l’envoyé spécial de Donald Trump à Moscou, Steve Witkoff, est rentré bredouille. Et les Etats-Unis menacent même de claquer la porte sans avancées dans les prochains jours. Volodymyr Zelensky, lui, a une nouvelle fois appelé à accentuer la “pression” sur le Kremlin pour “mettre fin à la guerre et garantir une paix durable”.
Selon Peter Pomerantsev, chercheur à l’université Johns Hopkins de Baltimore, plusieurs leviers restent pourtant à la disposition des Occidentaux pour tenter de faire plier le maître du Kremlin. A commencer par le levier énergétique, alors que la rente pétrolière qui permet à la Russie de continuer sa guerre contre l’Ukraine est indirectement mise à mal par la guerre tarifaire lancée par Donald Trump. “La symbolique des cours du pétrole et du rouble exerce une influence déterminante sur la population russe en termes de psychologie politique”, rappelle Peter Pomerantsev, auteur de plusieurs ouvrages de référence sur la propagande russe dont Rien n’est vrai tout est possible – Aventures dans la Russie d’aujourd’hui(Saint-Simon, 2015). Or, prévient-il, “le destin politique de Poutine est totalement lié aux prix du pétrole”. Les Occidentaux ont également intérêt, ajoute-t-il, à saper avec subtilité la relation – “plus fragile qu’on ne le pense” – entre la Russie et son allié chinois. Et le temps presse, pour les Européens surtout : “Aux yeux de Poutine, ce conflit en Ukraine n’a pas de fin. C’est le projet du reste de sa vie : être le nouveau Pierre le Grand”, alerte-t-il. Entretien.
L’Express : Vous avez récemment écrit : “Si vous laissez à Poutine le temps et l’espace de résoudre un défi – économique, militaire, social – il fera une pause, y réfléchira, puis trouvera un moyen de le contourner. La clé est d’agir de façon asymétrique, frapper là où il s’y attend le moins, puis enchaîner les problèmes si rapidement qu’ils deviennent ingérables. En d’autres termes : lui faire vivre un cauchemar”. Comment les Occidentaux doivent-ils s’y prendre?
Peter Pomerantsev : C’est une excellente question. Jusqu’ici, notre approche pour contenir la Russie de Poutine a été mauvaise. En réalité, depuis plus de trois ans, notre approche s’est limitée à envoyer des signaux d’intention, avec ce message implicite : “A la fin, nous avons plus d’argent que vous, et nous finirons par l’emporter.” Même si cela pourrait durer un an, voire une décennie. C’est pour cela que Joe Biden affirmait que les alliés de l’Ukraine la soutiendraient “aussi longtemps qu’il le faudrait”.
Concrètement, lorsque la Russie agit, nous réagissons lentement en envoyant un message du type : “Voilà ce que nous allons faire, nous allons armer l’Ukraine indéfiniment.” Mais en dehors des sanctions financières imposées au début de la guerre en Ukraine, nous n’avons jamais véritablement cherché à exercer une pression intense et soutenue sur la Russie. Les Occidentaux ont estimé que ces sanctions ne produiraient de toute façon leurs effets qu’à très long terme. Il faut bien comprendre que nous avons laissé d’importantes brèches, notamment pour l’industrie pétrolière russe. Nous avons sanctionné leur Banque centrale tout en laissant leurs entreprises gazières et pétrolières commercer en dollars. Ces entreprises sont devenues, en quelque sorte, la nouvelle Banque centrale russe.
Comment expliquez-vous cette frilosité de la part des alliés de l’Ukraine?
Nous avons, de manière tout à fait délibérée, évité toute mesure trop perturbatrice, de peur de provoquer un effet domino sur l’économie mondiale. C’était un choix assumé. L’idée selon laquelle nous aurions “tout essayé” est tout simplement fausse. Nous avons adopté une approche géopolitique de long terme. Mais le vrai cauchemar, pour Poutine, c’est tout l’inverse. Il faut identifier ses véritables peurs et déclencher contre lui une série de crises rapides et en cascade.
Comment?
La paranoïa de Poutine se nourrit de deux grandes peurs : la perte des revenus pétroliers et la perte de la stabilité intérieure. Il faut commencer par mettre la pression sur les revenus pétroliers, car même si ce n’est pas leur unique source “d’oxygène”, c’en est un pilier fondamental. Augmenter la production de pétrole aux Etats-Unis, imposer des sanctions plus sévères à la Russie, appliquer des sanctions secondaires plus dures à toute entité achetant du pétrole russe sur les marchés parallèles… Il y avait beaucoup de leviers à disposition des Occidentaux qui n’ont été que partiellement mobilisés, notamment du côté américain.
Il existe peut-être aujourd’hui un peu d’espoir sur ce front. Les prix du pétrole ont baissé, en partie à cause des décisions imprévisibles de Trump sur les tarifs douaniers. Or, même si les stratèges économiques du Kremlin disposent d’outils sophistiqués et savent manoeuvrer sur les marchés pétroliers, la symbolique des cours du pétrole et du rouble exerce une influence déterminante sur la population russe en termes de psychologie politique, et la réussite politique de Poutine y est directement liée. Les Russes se souviennent très bien des années 1990 et de l’instabilité de la monnaie nationale à cette époque. Or, la méfiance à l’égard du rouble reste forte. Les Russes sont beaucoup plus sensibles à l’inflation que d’autres populations, précisément parce qu’ils ont en mémoire cette période où leur monnaie ne valait plus rien.
Au pétrole et la stabilité intérieure, s’ajoute, selon vous, un troisième facteur de vulnérabilité pour le régime de Poutine : la question de ses alliances internationales. En l’espèce, “Trump n’a pas tort de penser qu’il y a des fissures potentielles dans la relation entre Moscou et Pékin.”, avez-vous récemment commenté. Pourquoi?
La relation entre Poutine et Xi Jinping est solide. D’un point de vue idéologique et au regard de l’évolution actuelle du monde, si j’étais Poutine et que je devais choisir entre Xi et Trump, je choisirais Xi sans la moindre hésitation. Trump est tout simplement trop instable. Cependant, il existe de fortes tensions des deux côtés, parmi les différentes parties prenantes. Du côté russe, il y a un excellent rapport de Filter Labs, une entreprise d’analyse de données avec laquelle je collabore. En Russie, les élites économiques jugent illusoires les chiffres annoncés concernant les investissements chinois dans le pays, estimant que Pékin se contente d’exploiter le pétrole et le gaz, sans investir dans de nouveaux pipelines. Parmi la population, il y a aussi l’idée que les Chinois se servent de la Russie, et que tout est à leur avantage. Enfin, chez les soldats, domine le sentiment que la technologie fournie par la Chine est de très mauvaise qualité.
Du côté chinois, le monde des affaires s’interroge : “Pourquoi devrions-nous payer le prix des problèmes de la Russie?”. Certains ont perdu l’accès à des marchés européens clés à cause de la proximité avec Moscou et subissent des sanctions secondaires imposées par Washington contre les entités financières qui collaborent avec la Russie. La décision des Etats-Unis d’imposer des sanctions secondaires aux banques chinoises, qui étaient l’un des piliers de l’économie russe, a marqué un tournant. Ces banques ont aussitôt lâché Moscou, lui préférant sans hésitation la stabilité financière. Cela montre à quel point cette relation entre les deux alliés est en réalité fragile. Donc ce qu’il faut faire, ce n’est pas de chercher à provoquer une rupture ouverte entre Poutine et Xi, ce serait irréaliste, mais d’alimenter les doutes, d’accentuer les interrogations sur les limites réelles de leur engagement mutuel.
On sait que les Chinois veulent la paix, non pas dans un sens idéaliste, mais dans une recherche de stabilité. Les rares fois où ils critiquent la Russie, c’est lorsque celle-ci agit à l’encontre de cette stabilité. Donc il faut faire comprendre à la Russie que si elle rompt un cessez-le-feu, la Chine ne la soutiendra pas, parce que nous, Occidentaux, prendrons des mesures concrètes à l’encontre de Pékin. Le message est donc le suivant : “Ne comptez pas sur la Chine pour vous soutenir, car dans le cas contraire nous prendrons des mesures spécifiques à son encontre, or vous n’êtes pas assez importants à ses yeux pour qu’elle prenne ce risque.” L’idée, c’est de recalculer l’équation mentale de Poutine, de le pousser à se dire : “Peut-être qu’on ne devrait pas rompre le cessez-le-feu, parce que cette fois, la Chine ne nous suivra pas.” C’est une stratégie qui repose sur l’accumulation de pressions et d’incertitudes.
L’administration de Donald Trump organise depuis plusieurs semaines des pourparlers séparés avec des hauts responsables russes et ukrainiens. Pour le moment, les discussions n’ont pas abouti… Que faut-il en conclure?
Pour l’instant, nous ne pouvons tirer aucune conclusion sur le fond des négociations, car tout cela relève encore largement du théâtre politique. Nous ne savons pas réellement ce qui s’est dit, ni ce qui s’est passé lors de la dernière rencontre entre Vladimir Poutine et l’émissaire de Donald Trump, Steve Witkoff. Ce que l’on peut affirmer, en revanche, c’est qu’il semble que la Maison-Blanche cherche à normaliser ses relations avec la Russie, presque indépendamment de la question ukrainienne. On parle désormais d'”opportunités commerciales”, de “normalisation des relations”… Clairement, la posture adoptée par les Etats-Unis oscille entre une neutralité et, par moments, une attitude quasiment pro-russe.
Une chose est claire : ils ne manifestent plus un réel soutien envers l’Europe et l’Ukraine. Ils affirment vouloir la paix, mais on ne sait pas du tout ce qu’ils entendent par là. En ce sens, l’Amérique ne semble plus être un allié automatique de l’Europe. Je ne dirais pas qu’elle est devenue un adversaire, mais en tout cas, ce n’est plus l’Amérique d’avant. Les Etats-Unis donnent désormais l’impression d’être le plus grand pays non-aligné du monde. Et à ce titre, la relation euro-atlantique a irrémédiablement changé. Je ne sais pas si elle est définitivement rompue, mais elle a basculé. Et de ce point de vue, on peut dire que Poutine a accompli bien plus que ce que Staline, Khrouchtchev ou Brejnev n’auraient jamais osé imaginer. Il a été, sinon l’artisan, du moins le témoin de la distanciation entre l’Europe et l’Amérique. Ce qui nous oblige à poser la question suivante : qui a vraiment gagné la Guerre froide? Il semble que 1989 n’a été en réalité qu’une parenthèse. Et il se pourrait bien que la Russie, au final, soit en passe d’être la grande gagnante.
La Russie a poursuivi sans relâche ses attaques contre l’Ukraine ces dernières semaines, et ce malgré la pression exercée par Trump pour mettre un terme au conflit.Qu’est-ce que cela dit des rapports entre Trump et Poutine, que l’on jugeait plutôt bons jusqu’ici?
Il semble assez clair que Trump est inspiré par Poutine. Souvenez-vous de ce moment où il disait que ce que la Russie avait fait en Crimée était “vraiment intelligent”. Et la manière dont il parle du Groenland, par exemple, n’est pas sans rappeler celle dont Poutine parlait de la Crimée. Je pense qu’il voit en Poutine une sorte de leader qu’il aimerait être. Une sorte de modèle.
Dans quel état d’esprit se trouve actuellement Poutine selon vous? Finira-t-il par s’asseoir à la table des négociations?
Pour Poutine, ce conflit en Ukraine n’a pas de fin. C’est, en quelque sorte, le projet du reste de sa vie : l’expansion. J’ai le sentiment que Poutine se voit comme le plus grand dirigeant russe depuis Pierre le Grand. Sa mission, c’est d’étendre le territoire de la Russie et d’accroître sa puissance. Et ce n’est pas uniquement une question liée au conflit actuel. L’Ukraine, en réalité, est le symbole de ses ambitions globales. Il s’agit pour lui de se répartir le monde, avec Xi et Trump, à la manière du XIXe siècle. À ses yeux, l’ancien monde – celui de 1945 à 2025 – est mort. Et la Russie sera l’un des acteurs qui façonnera le monde suivant. Le principal enjeu, c’est l’Europe.
C’est-à-dire?
Le principal point de contact stratégique entre la Russie et l’actuelle administration américaine, c’est l’Union européenne. La prochaine étape, pour Trump et Poutine, sera de briser l’UE. Il s’agit d’aider les partis d’extrême droite, ouvertement anti-européens, à accéder au pouvoir, ce qui n’est pas si difficile puisqu’ils y sont presque. Dans quatre ans, l’AfD pourrait gouverner en Allemagne. En France, ce ne sera peut-être pas Le Pen, mais quelqu’un d’autre. Le Royaume-Uni est déjà sorti de l’UE. La Pologne posera des difficultés, certes, mais cela importe peu.
L’essentiel, c’est de faire tomber Bruxelles et de démanteler l’Union européenne. L’objectif officiel, aussi bien du côté russe que de cette administration américaine, c’est d’avoir des relations bilatérales avec de petits pays faciles à influencer ou à manipuler. Ils n’aiment pas l’Union européenne, du moins en tant qu’entité capable d’imposer des sanctions. Les États-Unis vont probablement commencer à parler de lever les sanctions contre la Russie, peut-être même à le faire d’ici un an. L’Union européenne, elle, refusera. Mais au fond, cela ne changera pas grand-chose sur le fond. Trump et Poutine veulent neutraliser l’Union européenne en tant qu’organe cohérent de prise de décision. La Russie et les États-Unis oeuvrent dans le même sens : affaiblir l’Union européenne, la rendre impuissante. Vont-ils y parvenir? Je ne dis pas que cela va arriver. Mais une chose est sûre : l’Europe, elle, n’a absolument aucune idée de ce qui l’attend.
The Wall Street Journal, 22 avril
Russia Welcomes U.S. Proposal to Deny NATO Membership to Ukraine
Moscow remains uncommitted to reaching a quick deal on Ukraine war
Full text:
Russia said it was pleased with a Trump administration proposal to rule out Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a way to end the war but showed no urgency in reaching a deal.
The administration presented the idea as part of a package of proposals to Ukrainian and European officials last week, The Wall Street Journal has reported. The U.S. is awaiting Kyiv’s response, which is expected during a meeting with Ukrainian and European officials in London later this week. If the American, European and Ukrainian positions align, the proposals might then be presented to Moscow.
“We have heard from Washington at various levels that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is out of the question,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Monday. “This is something that satisfies us and coincides with our position.”
Peskov, however, declined to comment on the prospects of an agreement on solving the conflict and “especially about a time frame.” President Trump on Sunday said he hoped Ukraine and Russia would make a deal this week.
Later Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Moscow had a “positive attitude” toward any peace initiatives but that Kyiv needed to show a similar willingness. He said fighting had resumed after the Easter cease-fire he had declared, which didn’t actually lead to a halt in the shooting. Analysts said Putin’s call for a cease-fire was likely a gambit aimed at Trump, who had threatened to stop pursuing peace talks.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday he spoke with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer ahead of this week’s meeting in London. He said Ukraine was ready to move constructively toward an end to the conflict.
“An unconditional cease-fire must be the first step toward peace, and this Easter made it clear that it is Russia’s actions that are prolonging the war,” Zelensky said in a post on X.
Attempts by the Trump administration to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war have been unsuccessful thus far. Although the U.S. has held multiple rounds of talks, including the first direct dialogue between Washington and Moscow since the full-scale invasion, the efforts haven’t halted the fighting. Moscow has been slow-walking the peace talks, calculating that battlefield gains give it more leverage for maximum concessions in the discussions.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Friday that the U.S. would shift to other diplomatic priorities if it determined that a deal wasn’t doable in the next few weeks. Trump later said the U.S. was “going to take a pass” if either Moscow or Kyiv were hindering progress on a peace deal.
Russia has long claimed that Ukraine joining NATO is unacceptable, viewing it as a direct threat to its security and an encroachment into what it considers its sphere of influence.
“Ukraine should not be a member of NATO and should not have prospects for integration with it,” Peskov said. “This would be a threat to the national interests of the Russian Federation. And this is one of the root causes of the conflict.”
Western officials have countered that NATO is a defensive alliance that isn’t threatening Moscow and that Ukraine as an independent nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements and alliances.
Besides excluding Ukraine from NATO, the Trump administration’s proposals include potential U.S. recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Another U.S. idea calls for designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia as neutral territory that could be under American control.
The ideas were outlined in a confidential document presented by senior Trump administration officials to their Ukrainian counterparts in Paris on Thursday, the Journal reported. They were also shared with senior European officials.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said continued attacks by Russia suggested Moscow wasn’t serious about a truce after Russian President Vladimir Putin called for an “Easter Cease-fire” across the front lines. Photo: Kyodo News/Zuma Press; Vyacheslav Prokofyev/AFP/Getty Images
Peskov on Monday declined to comment on U.S. peace proposals beyond the one regarding Ukrainian NATO membership, saying efforts to resolve the conflict shouldn’t take place in public.
“There are many such reports now, many discussions,” he said. “Of course, work on finding ways to peacefully resolve the situation cannot and should not take place in the public arena. It should take place in an absolutely discreet mode.”
Kyiv Post, 22 avril
Team Trump Returns to Europe for More Talks as Trump Says ‘Hopefully’ Russia and Ukraine ‘Will Make a Deal This Week’
Despite Trump’s belief Moscow and Kyiv “will make a deal this week,” a policy analyst asks what the White House will do about Russian intransigence, telling Kyiv Post: “Something has to change.”
Full text:
WASHINGTON, D.C. – President Donald Trump raised expectations once again on Sunday over a possible peace agreement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, writing in a social media post that he hoped for a diplomatic breakthrough in the coming days without specifying what that might entail, Kyiv Post’s Washington correspondent reports.
“Hopefully Russia and Ukraine will make a deal this week,” Trump wrote in all capital letters on Truth Social platform. “Both will then start to do big business with the United States of America, which is thriving, and make a fortune,” he added.
Trump’s optimism was at odds with the Kremlin’s official rejection of a White House-backed proposal for a 30-day pause in the war.
Trump’s post came immediately before the expiration of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s “Easter truce” announced a day before, which was never really in effect due to Moscow’s violations, according to Ukrainian officials.
The move also came just days after the White House threatened to exit peace talks if progress wasn’t made. Trump repeatedly called on Kyiv and Moscow to show willingness to compromise.
In the meantime, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, along with Presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, are expected to return to London this Wednesday to continue their talks with their Ukrainian counterparts and representatives of European allies, two Trump officials told Kyiv Post Sunday afternoon.
The warning comes as Ukraine faces the compounded effects of war, migration, and a generational decline in births.
“The full composition of the delegation and some other details are yet to be finalized, but regardless… Our team is ready to pick up from where they had left off last week in Paris,” one official said.
The White House officials didn’t rule out the possibility of another Witkoff visit to Moscow later this week, to sit down with Putin and “see if the Russians really want to end this [war].”
Razom for Ukraine, a US-based organization that advocates for Ukraine and provides humanitarian aid to the war-torn country, said in a social media post Sunday night that if Putin won’t stop attacking civilians, “it’s clear he isn’t ready for peace.”
The likelihood is that, unless Trump reverses course very soon, any hope of a ceasefire in the near future will vanish.
“This is a moment of truth for President Trump,” the organization noted.
For Doug Klain, a policy analyst at Razom, the question now is what, if anything, the Trump administration will do about Russian intransigence.
Speaking to Kyiv Post, Klain said he’s not optimistic about Russia agreeing to stop fighting without a pressure on it to change its behavior.
“I certainly hope President Trump is right that we’ll have progress towards peace this week. To try to force Putin to stop stringing the US along, Ukraine proposed a ceasefire on all civilian infrastructure – either Putin wants to stop the fighting or he wants to keep murdering civilians, and it’s time the White House stopped making excuses for Putin,” he said.
Klain went on to add, “Russia doesn’t care about the massive human suffering it is inflicting on Ukraine and itself, and the dangling of a business deal with Trump is a deeply unserious carrot to induce Putin to stop fighting.”
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/51155
Atlantico, 21 avril
Guerre en Ukraine : voilà la raison pour laquelle la Russie cible délibérément les civils
L’Ukraine est de plus en plus ciblée par des bombardements touchant des populations civiles. A Soumy, 35 personnes sont décédées et des centaines d’autres blessées. Des enfants sont morts. Est-ce une stratégie délibérée ? Pour en parler, Stéphane Audrand.
Full text:
Atlantico: La Russie a reconnu son attaque sur Soumy mais a indiqué « avoir ciblé des militaires ». Pourtant, le bilan humain est édifiant. On décompte plusieurs dizaines de victimes civiles, dont des enfants. Le ministère russe de la Défense a même déclaré que la frappe avait touché le site d’une réunion de l’état-major de la force opérationnelle de Seversk et a accusé Kyiv d’utiliser des civils comme boucliers en organisant des rassemblements militaires dans le centre de la ville, ajoutant que 60 miliaires avaient été tués sans fournir de preuves. Est-ce une stratégie délibérée ?
Stéphane Audrand : Oui, bien sûr. La Russie ne vise pas par hasard les centres urbains. Tout ce qu’elle fait est volontaire. Il ne faut pas oublier que l’objectif premier de Vladimir Poutine reste de briser l’Ukraine en tant que pays indépendant. Son message aux civils ukrainiens est d’une diabolique simplicité : « Soumettez-vous ou partez. Je vais gagner et je suis prêt à vous tuer ainsi que vos enfants pour cela ». Il est souvent expliqué que les campagnes de bombardements ne marchent pas, en utilisant des exemples anciens comme l’ex-Yougoslavie ou l’Irak. De fait, cela n’a en effet jamais marché dans l’histoire. Mais je crois que, pour la première fois, c’est une stratégie qui pourrait malheureusement fonctionner. L’Ukraine n’est pas la Grande-Bretagne ou l’Allemagne de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les populations civiles n’avaient alors pas d’autre choix que celui de rester. Cette fois-ci, le but est de provoquer l’effondrement démographique de l’Ukraine en poussant les femmes à l’exode, lesquelles prennent leurs enfants avec elles. Des millions de femmes ont fui l’Ukraine, s’établissant dans divers pays d’Europe. Le but de Vladimir Poutine est d’enkyster les réfugiés. Cela incite aussi les hommes à déserter, de peur de perdre leurs familles qui veulent échapper aux bombardements. Cette logique échappe complétement aux Européens, car elle est étrangère à leur conception des choses, à leur morale. Les bombardements de Poutine ne visent d’ailleurs pas à raser des villes entières, mais à générer une pression psychologique sur les civils qui ne savent pas quand et où des missiles vont tomber. C’est criminel. Purement et simplement criminel.
Atlantico: La Russie a reconnu son attaque sur Soumy mais a indiqué « avoir ciblé des militaires ». Pourtant, le bilan humain est édifiant. On décompte plusieurs dizaines de victimes civiles, dont des enfants. Le ministère russe de la Défense a même déclaré que la frappe avait touché le site d’une réunion de l’état-major de la force opérationnelle de Seversk et a accusé Kyiv d’utiliser des civils comme boucliers en organisant des rassemblements militaires dans le centre de la ville, ajoutant que 60 miliaires avaient été tués sans fournir de preuves. Est-ce une stratégie délibérée ?
Stéphane Audrand : Oui, bien sûr. La Russie ne vise pas par hasard les centres urbains. Tout ce qu’elle fait est volontaire. Il ne faut pas oublier que l’objectif premier de Vladimir Poutine reste de briser l’Ukraine en tant que pays indépendant. Son message aux civils ukrainiens est d’une diabolique simplicité : « Soumettez-vous ou partez. Je vais gagner et je suis prêt à vous tuer ainsi que vos enfants pour cela ». Il est souvent expliqué que les campagnes de bombardements ne marchent pas, en utilisant des exemples anciens comme l’ex-Yougoslavie ou l’Irak. De fait, cela n’a en effet jamais marché dans l’histoire. Mais je crois que, pour la première fois, c’est une stratégie qui pourrait malheureusement fonctionner. L’Ukraine n’est pas la Grande-Bretagne ou l’Allemagne de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les populations civiles n’avaient alors pas d’autre choix que celui de rester. Cette fois-ci, le but est de provoquer l’effondrement démographique de l’Ukraine en poussant les femmes à l’exode, lesquelles prennent leurs enfants avec elles. Des millions de femmes ont fui l’Ukraine, s’établissant dans divers pays d’Europe. Le but de Vladimir Poutine est d’enkyster les réfugiés. Cela incite aussi les hommes à déserter, de peur de perdre leurs familles qui veulent échapper aux bombardements. Cette logique échappe complétement aux Européens, car elle est étrangère à leur conception des choses, à leur morale. Les bombardements de Poutine ne visent d’ailleurs pas à raser des villes entières, mais à générer une pression psychologique sur les civils qui ne savent pas quand et où des missiles vont tomber. C’est criminel. Purement et simplement criminel.
A l’ONU, les Etats-Unis ont voté le 17 avril contre une résolution sur la coopération avec le Conseil de l’Europe, invoquant des objections à une clause condamnant «l’agression russe contre l’Ukraine». En raison de ce libellé spécifique, les États-Unis se sont opposés à l’ensemble de la résolution, qu’ils affirment être de nature à faire capoter les négociations de paix. Du reste, en dépit d’une condamnation assez molle du bombardement de Soumy par Donald Trump, l’administration semble étrangement apathique. Comment l’expliquer ?
Stéphane Audrand : L’administration Trump a une vertu ; elle est prévisible. C’est très clair désormais, l’Ukraine ne compte plus dans le calcul stratégique de Donald Trump qui y voit un sujet secondaire. La nation ukrainienne l’indiffère assez. C’est un fait. Il veut que ça s’arrête vite et éventuellement obtenir un gain au passage. Il n’a pas d’empathie pour le sort de cette population. Mais ce qui est plus préoccupant, c’est l’apathie de la société civile américaine face à cela. Et j’aimerais dire que les démocrates en sont aussi responsables que les républicains, car ils ont contribué ces dernières années à atomiser les luttes en mettant sur le même plan des sujets picrocholins et les grandes valeurs que devraient défendre les démocraties libérales. L’Amérique est une société moralement faible qui ne se préoccupe tout simplement pas de ce qui se passe à Soumy ou à Butcha. Cette faiblesse morale est aussi celle des institutions.
On sent pourtant quelques voix s’élever. Celle de l’essayiste britannique Douglas Murray face à Joe Rogan ou encore celle du pasteur Mark Burns, le conseiller spirituel de Donald Trump qui a clairement expliqué de retour d’Ukraine que « la Russie était opposée aux valeurs américaines ». Ne sont-ce pas là des signaux faibles positifs ? Et même la preuve que les Ukrainiens commencent à comprendre quel soft power ils doivent employer pour convaincre les Etats-Unis du bien fondé de les aider ?
Stéphane Audrand : Les Ukrainiens ont été très mauvais en matière de politique d’influence au commencement de la guerre. Ils ont fait preuve d’une grande naïveté « campiste », à l’image des populations de l’Europe de l’est dans leur ensemble. Si en Europe de l’ouest, singulièrement en France, il arrive souvent qu’on explique tout en accusant les Américains, c’est le contraire à l’est. Les Ukrainiens pensaient que les Américains allaient les aider quoi qu’il puisse arriver et quoi qu’il puisse en coûter, avec un logiciel de guerre froide et reaganien. Zelensky a compris trop tard qu’il avait à s’adresser directement aux Américains et qu’il devait convaincre l’opinion publique locale. Il aurait dû envoyer des gens dans les usines et remercier les ouvriers qui fabriquent les armes utilisées sur le champ de bataille. Aujourd’hui, ces erreurs initiales ont été entendues et elles sont corrigées. Les Ukrainiens réinvestissent dans le « soft power ». Je l’ai constaté avec notre pays à l’issue d’un échange avec un officier ukrainien. Il m’a envoyé une vidéo qu’ils destinaient à la France, montrant les Ukrainiens en super soldats vaillants. J’ai dû lui expliquer que ce type de messages ne marcheraient pas véritablement chez nous, qu’il fallait plutôt montrer l’armement français, son utilité et sa qualité. Faire preuve d’humour aussi, comme la vidéo avec la chanson « Je t’aime moi non plus » ou celle dans un café.
Comment se fait-il que la Russie semble imperméable à la critique internationale, ne reculant ni devant le crime de guerre ni devant le viol du droit international ? Sont-ils à ce point persuadés de leur invulnérabilité et si peu intéressés par leur image ?
Stéphane Audrand : De Butcha à Soumy, la Russie n’a jamais prêté attention aux populations civiles. Elle ne recule devant rien. Elle est totalement désinhibée. Il y a d’ailleurs des bruits qui circulent sur le fait qu’ils empoisonneraient leurs drones, afin qu’on ne puisse pas les examiner. Leur seul objectif, je le répète, est d’anéantir l’idée même d’une nation ukrainienne. La Russie répond à une eschatologie propre, c’est la grande stratégie de l’Empire byzantin sans cesse renouvelée. Dans cet ensemble, Vladimir Poutine joue avec les Américains. La seule chose qui fonctionne est historiquement la fermeté. A partir des années 2000, un fossé important s’est creusé entre les élites occidentales et les élites russes, un fossé psychologique. Les nouveaux dirigeants qui ont progressivement accédé au pouvoir sont des gens qui n’avaient pas connu la Seconde Guerre mondiale, pour qui la guerre est une impossibilité, un impensé. Ils considèrent que l’action violente n’est jamais légitime. En Europe, ils ont jugé que les Américains allaient être là pour toujours pour protéger le continent et que tous les conflits pouvaient être réglés par la négociation. Angela Merkel en est un exemple édifiant. À l’époque de l’annexion de la Crimée, elle a été clouée. Elle pensait qu’elle pouvait reprendre le fil des discussions, alors que le sujet ne pouvait pas être rouvert sur le plan diplomatique, la suite l’a prouvée. Cette centralité de la non-violence est aussi incarnée chez Emmanuel Macron, qui, même quand il adopte des accents martiaux, finit immanquablement par croire en sa « parole performative ». Donald Trump déteste pareillement le conflit. Il milite par exemple pour le désarmement nucléaire. En ce moment, c’est plutôt cocasse.
Antoine Léaument a commenté le bombardement de Soumy en diffusant la photo du cercueil d’une victime, décoré du blason de la division Azov. Il n’a pas eu un mot pour les victimes. Que dire de l’hémiplégie de LFI entre Gaza et l’Ukraine, dont elle se moque ?
Stéphane Audrand : Tout simplement que Jean-Luc Mélenchon est objectivement pro Poutine et pro russe. Je n’ai rien à ajouter.
Entretien conduit par Gabriel Robin
The Economist, 18 avril
When politics becomes the weak point : Power is being monopolised in Ukraine
Critics say the presidency is becoming too mighty, and making mistakes
Full text:
Behind the nondescript façade of a light-industrial building in Kyiv, an eclectic crew of video-gamers, architects, scientists and film-makers is mass-producing deep-strike drones and cruise missiles. They do not look like old-style defence types, but they are transforming Ukraine’s war. Three years ago they were making 30 drones a month. Now they are up to 1,300 a month, ranging from slow drones ($580,000 for a set of ten) to a new ballistic missile (at $1m a piece). They cost a fraction of what foreign ones do, and are based on open-source designs, meaning that they are not bound by foreign-usage restrictions. “We don’t want to have any dependence on America’s politics,” says the firm’s founder, whose name cannot be disclosed for security reasons.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s war-fighting effort utterly depended on American and European supplies. Yet over the past three years its own military manufacturing capacity has gone from $1bn- to $35bn-worth of materiel per year, according to Oleksandr Kamyshin, a presidential adviser overseeing the industry. Faster than anyone would have predicted, Ukraine is becoming self-sufficient in many types of weaponry. But big gaps remain. Ukraine still cannot make systems capable of knocking out incoming Russian missiles.
Manpower is another problem. Mobilisation has been mishandled: troops’ rotations away from the front are infrequent; draft agents seize people arbitrarily; and the government has hesitated to lower the age of conscription. Still, the army has grown, and elite units continue to attract recruits. Most important, drones have sharply reduced Russia’s numerical advantage: according to some estimates, 75% of all casualties suffered by the Russian army are inflicted by them.
Ukraine’s worst fragility may be not military but political. Since the start of the war, many liberal and moderate Ukrainians have faced a dilemma. Drawing attention to incompetence, corruption or mismanagement by the government risks undermining international support. But keeping silent means accepting Mr Zelensky’s increasing monopoly of power, which has sometimes undermined the state’s effectiveness and even the war effort itself. “While the Western media and European leaders have lionised Zelensky and turned him into a celebrity, we feel trapped,” says Yulia Mostovaya, the editor of ZN.UA, an independent online daily.
If criticising Mr Zelensky was difficult before Mr Trump attacked him in February for being “a dictator”, doing so now is all but impossible. Ukrainians have rallied around the president to such an extent that he appears to be considering holding elections. “If Zelensky feels he has no competitors, that means elections are approaching,” quips one official. In preparation for the possibility of them, the state appears to be tightening its grip.
In February Petro Poroshenko, who leads the largest opposition party, was penalised for unspecified “threats to national security”. His assets have been frozen. He is also being charged with “treason” in a legal case which looks to critics like lawfare. The sanctions in effect bar him from contesting any election. However much Ukrainians may dislike Mr Poroshenko, many see this as a dangerous precedent. “If Poroshenko can be barred from an electoral process without any court decision, so can anyone else,” says Olexiy Honcharenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada.
Civil-society activists are also being harassed. Vitaly Shabunin, an anti-corruption crusader, who had enlisted in the first days of the war while also exposing graft in Ukraine’s defence ministry, has long been targeted. His latest investigation was met with snide vengeance. To punish him, he has been sent close to the front; details of his work there are sent daily to the authorities. Such methods recall Vladimir Putin’s early years of rule, says Mr Shabunin, at least in their pettiness.
Ukraine’s politics is a far cry from Russia’s, and concentrating power is a natural consequence of war. But some of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters increasingly worry it may be going too far. True, Ukraine’s democracy was never really based on the rule of law. Its pluralism was provided by the diversity of its regions, the competing interests of its power groups, and a vocal civil society that relied on the support of Western embassies and the media. But all these checks are being weakened or removed.
In the name of efficiency, power is being concentrated not in the government or the parliament, but in the hands of a few unelected officials in the presidential administration, including Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff, Dmytro Lytvyn, Mr Zelensky’s speechwriter, and Oleh Tatarov, who oversees the security agencies. The administration is reluctant to share power not just with opponents but with anyone seen as a potential rival. Loyalists are rewarded with seats on the boards of state firms. Those who show too much independence, have too much popular support or enjoy direct lines of communication to Western countries have been fired or sidelined. This includes Valery Zaluzhny, the popular commander of Ukrainian forces, removed in February 2024 and sent to be ambassador in London. Others pushed out include Oleksandr Kubrakov, a former minister of infrastructure; Dmytro Kuleba, a former foreign minister; and Mustafa Nayem, who led the agency for reconstruction.
Differences of opinion and critical media are seen as a threat, rather than a strength. Sevgil Musaeva, the editor of Ukrainska Pravda, the country’s leading independent online publication, complains that instead of dealing with the reasons that prompt journalistic investigations, the presidential office responds by restricting access, targeting advertisers and seeing any contact with its journalists as treachery. “This is not systemic censorship, but if we don’t resist, the free space will disappear before we know it,” she says.
Ukraine’s move towards more authoritarian rule is unsurprising given the pressures it faces as the war grinds on well into its fourth year. Yet the risk is that it undermines the country’s self-organising resilience. As Mr Honcharenko puts it: “We have demonstrated that a small democracy can resist a larger autocracy and turn itself into a porcupine. But a small autocracy can be swallowed by a larger one.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/04/16/power-is-being-monopolised-in-ukraine
The Wall Street Journal, 17 avril
How a Teenage Romance Was Cut Short by a Russian Missile
The young Ukrainian sweethearts were among nine children killed when a missile exploded near a playground
Full text:
KRYVIY RIH, Ukraine—It was a warm spring evening, and two teenagers were walking hand-in-hand down a street in this central Ukrainian city, near a busy playground. Danylo Nikitskiy and Alina Kutsenko, both 15, had been dating for less than two months, but were inseparable.
An air-raid siren pierced the calm, but there was hardly time to seek cover from the Iskander-M ballistic missile headed for the city at six times the speed of sound. Russia said it was targeting a meeting of military commanders and Western instructors in a restaurant.
Around two minutes after the missile launched, its high-explosive warhead detonated no more than 50 yards from the playground, spewing fragments of hot metal through the air.
Danylo and Alina were cut down, along with seven other children. Among the other victims were a 9-year-old who loved playing with Legos and a 7-year-old who was driving home with his parents.
It was the deadliest single strike on children since Russia’s 2022 invasion. The attack, which killed a total of 20 people, shocked Ukraine and exposed the limits of President Trump’s efforts to end the war.
Russia has intensified strikes across Ukraine since Trump took office pledging to bring peace. On Palm Sunday, two ballistic missiles killed 35 people in the northern city of Sumy in the deadliest strike this year.
“Yes, the war must end. But to end it…we must pressure Russia—the one choosing to kill children instead of choosing a cease-fire,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in response to the attack on his hometown of Kryviy Rih.
This account of the blast and its aftermath is based on interviews with investigators from Ukraine’s main security and intelligence service, the SBU, and witnesses, as well as a review of footage from surveillance cameras at the restaurant and police body cameras. The Wall Street Journal saw no evidence of any military presence in the area.
Russia said it killed 85 servicemen and foreign officers in a “high-precision strike” on the restaurant, also destroying 20 military vehicles.
After school on April 4, the day of the strike, Danylo took the family’s pet Yorkshire terrier to the groomer and rushed over to Alina’s house. They hadn’t seen each other for days because he had received a bad grade the previous week and had stayed home to focus on his schoolwork.
“He said he really missed her,” said his mother, Natalya Nikitska, who gave him permission to go and see Alina.
Danylo helped Alina’s mother, Marta Kutsenko, carry her groceries up four flights of stairs to their apartment and waited for Alina to get ready. “She was trying on a lot of clothes in her room,” said Kutsenko.
The war had cast a shadow over Danylo and Alina’s early teenage years, but they adapted. Like teenagers anywhere, they had their first romances and went to McDonald’s, though most of their classes took place online because of the threat of Russian attacks.
It was around 5 p.m. when Alina headed out with Danylo and two friends, walking through residential neighborhoods of Kryviy Rih, an industrial town built on an iron-ore seam. Danylo called his mother to ask for permission to stay out later than usual so he could spend more time with his girlfriend.
Their path took them past Soviet-era apartment blocks toward the RoseMarine restaurant, where staff were winding down after a busy day. The restaurant had hosted a birthday party as well as a beauty business forum, organized by a Kryviy Rih business association. Around 80 people, mostly women, attended the event.
When the last guest had left around 6:30 p.m., the kitchen staff went out for a cigarette break behind the restaurant. A cook was testing out a new GoPro camera and was filming when an alert flashed up on the phone of one of the kitchen staff, who said: “There’s a missile coming.”
The next instant, an explosion threw the cook to the ground with the restaurant’s head chef on top of him. The missile had exploded less than 100 yards from the restaurant, hurling fragments that cut through metal, trees and flesh.
Russia often struck again after an initial attack, but the cook’s urge to help was stronger than his instinct to seek shelter. The camera kept filming as the cook sprinted, breathing heavily, toward a woman standing over a small boy in a yellow jacket lying face down on the ground beside a tricycle.
“Call the ambulance, please!” she implored. The cook tried to call emergency services but the network was down.
Police body camera footage captured scenes of anguish at the site of the blast. Survivors pulled the wounded out of cars, including the lifeless body of a 7-year-old who had been driving past with his parents.
A cracked mirror at RoseMarine restaurant, which is near where the missile exploded in Kryviy Rih, Ukraine. The hall at RoseMarine, where a children’s birthday party was being held, was damaged in the Russian strike.
On the playground, a body lay next to a merry-go-round. Another child’s body was supine on a bench beside two distraught adults consoling each other. A paramedic tried in vain to resuscitate a 3-year-old.
“They’re all 200s,” said the policeman wearing the body camera, using a military code word for dead.
Danylo’s parents had heard the explosion and could see smoke through the window. It was rising from the direction of Alina’s house. They couldn’t get through to Danylo but at first hoped it was just that the phone network was down. Minutes later, when they still couldn’t reach him, they jumped in their vehicle and joined the crush of ambulances and rescue vehicles heading to the scene.
As Danylo’s parents searched frantically for their son, the air-raid siren sounded again. Russian drones were attacking another residential neighborhood of the city.
A short distance from the playground, several bodies had been covered up. Roman Nikitskiy, Danylo’s father, drew back a towel laid over one of them to reveal the jeans and Nike sneakers his son had been wearing. Danylo’s hand was still clasped together with Alina’s.
“Even the blast couldn’t tear them apart,” said Nikitska, Danylo’s mother.
Marta Kutsenko’s own desperate search for her daughter had also brought her there, uniting the parents in anguish over the loss of their only children. A video showed the three of them bent over the lifeless bodies. “My sunshine, my darling,” Nikitska said. The two friends they had been walking with were also dead.
The children were buried over three days of mourning, Danylo and Alina in matching white coffins.
Days after the attack, the ambassadors of 32 countries including the U.S. gathered at the playground as snow drifted down.
An air-raid siren sounded as Roman Nikitskiy addressed the ambassadors with an appeal to Trump. “You are president of the most powerful country in the world,” he said. “Our kids are asking you to lend us a Patriot so that together we can stop the enemy: Russia,” referring to a U.S. missile-defense system.
Nikitskiy also called on other Western countries to help Ukraine build a bomb shelter next to every playground in the country.
Russia’s representative to the United Nations said during a Security Council session that a Ukrainian air-defense interceptor had caused the civilian casualties. But Ukraine’s SBU security service said fragments of the projectile recovered from the site and seen by the Journal proved Russia was lying.
More than a week on, dazed residents were still picking pieces of shrapnel and glass out of the grass. Natalya Kalynychenko was filming a video to prove to relatives in Russia that the strike hadn’t successfully targeted the restaurant, as Moscow claimed.
“It’s pointless to try to explain anything to them,” said Kalynychenko, whose apartment overlooks the playground. Still, she tried.
Children came to look with curiosity at the swings, seesaw and sandpit covered with flowers, candy and stuffed animals.
“Where was the explosion?” said one boy.
“Let’s go look at that hole in the ground,” said another, pointing at a crater gouged by a fragment of the missile.
A 9-year-old called Kyrylo stood quietly looking at the tributes, before pulling a toy truck from the pocket of his padded jacket. “I’m not a little boy anymore; I don’t need this toy,” he said, adding it to a mountain of stuffed animals. “Does it mean we’ll never be able to play here again?”
Alina and Danylo were buried side by side, near 3-year-old Tymofiy—the youngest victim of the strike. A stuffed beaver that Danylo had given Alina was placed alongside her in the coffin. With the last 1,100 hryvnias ($27) in Danylo’s piggy bank, his parents bought a bouquet for her grave. They were the only flowers that hadn’t faded when they returned to the cemetery a week later, his mother said.
On the ribbon, they wrote: “To my Alina, forever yours—Danylo.”
The Economist, 16 avril
Fighting and talking : Trump’s Ukraine ceasefire is slipping away
The American president increasingly looks like Russia’s willing dupe
Full text:
Donald trump promised to end the war in Ukraine within a day. Now, insiders say, he hopes to secure a ceasefire within his first 100 days—ie, by the end of this month. He has started to refer to the conflict as “Biden’s war”. But if it drags on, he worries it will increasingly become his.
How to stop the fighting? Russia has ignored America’s call for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, which Ukraine accepted on March 11th. Instead it has played for time and intensified its attacks. On April 13th two Russian missiles struck the town of Sumy, killing 34 people, many of them gathering to attend Palm Sunday services. It followed a similar strike on Kryvyi Rih on April 4th that killed 20 people.
Radek Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, said Mr Trump’s team should realise that the Kremlin was “mocking their goodwill”. Mr Trump, though, seems immune to shame. He has proved peculiarly indulgent of Russia and hostile towards Ukraine. Even as some of his aides denounced the Russian attack on Sumy, Mr Trump suggested it was a “mistake”, albeit a “horrible” one. Astonishingly, on April 14th he blamed Ukraine for being invaded by Russia, shrugging off a Ukrainian request to buy American missiles. “You don’t start a war against somebody that’s 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles,” he declared.
Admirers of Mr Trump insist he is ready to get tough with Russia. He has renewed his predecessor’s sanctions on Russia, and has expressed impatience with the Kremlin, telling one interviewer that he was “pissed off” with Russia and floating the idea of imposing “secondary tariffs”, presumably on countries buying Russian oil. On April 11th he said, “Russia has to get moving.” European leaders are clamouring for additional sanctions on Russia to make such words count, so far to no avail.
In March Mr Trump briefly cut the weapons and intelligence to Ukraine. Keith Kellogg, an adviser, compared this to “hitting a mule with a two-by-four across the nose”. It worked: within days, Ukraine agreed to the 30-day ceasefire. For the obdurate Russians, however, there have been no sticks, only carrots. American and Russian officials met in Istanbul on April 10th to discuss upgrading their embassies. The countries also exchanged two prisoners. Russian media say the rapprochement is proceeding regardless of the Ukraine talks.
When Mr Trump announced his worldwide “reciprocal tariffs” this month, he whacked Ukraine with the minimum 10% universal rate while excluding Russia (supposedly because it was already under sanctions). One solace for Ukraine is that the turmoil of the trade war is such that the price of oil has tumbled from around $80 a barrel in January to $65, sharply cutting Mr Putin’s revenues.
Notably absent from Mr Trump’s discourse is any notion of additional military aid for Ukraine. Indeed, America’s support is dwindling. The flow of weapons approved by Joe Biden will run out in the coming months, and Mr Trump has not authorised any more. Another budget allocation to support Ukraine looks unlikely.
America is withdrawing troops and equipment from Rzeszow, a vital hub in Poland for weapons being sent to Ukraine. Their duties will henceforth be carried out by European troops. Meanwhile, Pete Hegseth, the American defence secretary, stayed away from a meeting in Brussels on April 11th of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, a gathering of 50-odd countries contributing military help that was created and led by his predecessor, Lloyd Austin, though Mr Hegseth joined by video link.
Another sign of the times is that Pentagon figures recently questioned one ally about why it was still supplying weapons to Ukraine—a challenge that was ignored. Diplomats in Washington also report that some Trump aides say privately that they are “fed up” with Europe’s effort to strengthen Ukraine. As always with such a chaotic administration, it is hard to distinguish the true signal from the noise.
For now Europeans are pushing along two tracks. The first is the effort by Britain and France to create a European “reassurance force” to help Ukraine after a ceasefire. Russia objects to that deployment, even if America is offering no assurance that it will back the Europeans. The force would not seek to police the front lines between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Instead it would stay away from the front, probably in western Ukraine, where it would concentrate on training Ukrainian forces, and perhaps do joint air patrols.
Europeans hope to show Mr Trump that they are taking up the burden of European security, hoping to retain at least some kind of American commitment, to NATO if not to Ukraine. Under this emerging scheme, the future “deterrence” of Russia would come in three zones: reinforced Ukrainian troops holding the line against Russia in the east, European forces in the west and, at least for now, a lingering American presence in NATO countries.
But the creation of such a force depends on an ever-elusive ceasefire. Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s envoy to Russia, is reported to have said that the quickest way of securing one would be to let Russia take four Ukrainian provinces which it claims, including territory it has failed to conquer. That would be unacceptable to Ukraine and its European partners.
All this reinforces the need for the second track: increasing Europe’s military assistance to Ukraine. David Shimer, a former official in Mr Biden’s National Security Council, says there is no time to waste. Europeans should give away more of their stocks of weapons despite the risks; finance Ukraine’s military industries; negotiate with Mr Trump to buy American air-defence systems for Ukraine; and use frozen Russian assets to pay for it all.
With Russia determined to press its invasion, and America seemingly determined to pull away, Ukraine will have to fight on, Mr Shimer says. “Now is the time for the Europeans to intensify their aid to Ukraine—so that Ukraine has the support it needs to defend itself and to push Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/04/15/trumps-ukraine-ceasefire-is-slipping-away
Le Point, 16 avril
« Vladimir Poutine possède le meilleur atout, la patience »
Le géopolitologue Fiodor Loukianov est l’un des meilleurs connaisseurs de la pensée stratégique de Vladimir Poutine. « Le Point » l’a interviewé.
Full text:
Fiodor Loukianov est expert en relations internationales à Moscou, rédacteur en chef de la revue La Russie dans la politique internationale et directeur scientifique du Club Valdaï, le Davos russe. À ce titre, c’est lui qui modère chaque année, depuis 2017, les discussions du public face au président Vladimir Poutine. Le Point l’a rencontré à Moscou (avant le bombardement de Soumy) pour discuter de la guerre d’Ukraine et des négociations américano-russes qui ont été lancées à l’initiative du président Donald Trump pour tenter d’y mettre fin.
Le Point : Avez-vous constaté un changement au fil du temps de la pensée de Vladimir Poutine ou de sa façon de l’exprimer ?
Fiodor Loukianov : Non, la logique du président reste constante. Vladimir Poutine est sûr à 100 % que ce qu’il fait est nécessaire. Il estime que la question ukrainienne est existentielle et qu’il faut la régler. Dans les dernières années, il s’est même mis à penser que c’était son devoir, parce que la prochaine génération ne le ferait pas. Je ne suis pas dans sa tête, mais je ne crois pas qu’il se soit dit, d’un coup, bon, on va régler ça militairement. C’est venu avec le temps. Cette crise a commencé bien avant 2014, ça fait longtemps que la Russie cherchait une forme de cohabitation avec l’Ukraine. Mais comme rien n’a abouti…
C’est donc un échec ?
Choisir la guerre n’est jamais un succès mais le résultat de politiques infructueuses. Depuis la fin de l’URSS, la politique de l’Ukraine envers la Russie n’a pas été la bonne. Si nous en sommes là, c’est parce que l’Ukraine n’a pas compris la situation, et l’Occident non plus. Dans les pays dépendant des cycles électoraux, les dirigeants se concentrent sur les questions du moment. Ils ont beaucoup plus de mal pour les questions de long terme. Ici, même si, comme dans n’importe quel système, on fait aussi attention à l’opinion publique, on ne vit pas sous le diktat des cycles électoraux. Et Poutine a la conviction que tout est interdépendant. C’est capital…
Il n’est pas le seul à le penser…
Chez les dirigeants occidentaux, c’est de plus en plus rare. Sur l’élargissement de l’Otan, le système de la sécurité européenne, l’Ukraine, la ligne russe est restée constante. En 2008 à Bucarest, lors du dernier sommet de l’Otan auquel il a assisté, Poutine a dit à George W. Bush de ne pas toucher à l’Ukraine, lui expliquant que c’était un État artificiel. Si vous la touchez, nous réagirons, lui a-t-il dit. Mieux vaut avoir une vision, vraie ou fausse, que ne pas en avoir du tout.
Commencer une guerre pour immédiatement penser à se retirer est idiot
La Russie ne cesse de bombarder l’Ukraine. Poutine veut-il vraiment la paix ?
Souvenez-vous des guerres de Corée et du Vietnam : la paix n’est pas advenue parce que, sur le champ de bataille, on arrêtait de tirer ! Au Vietnam, pendant la phase des négociations, la guerre a continué. Idem pour la Corée. C’est exactement le cas aujourd’hui en Ukraine mais, en Occident, vous avez complètement oublié ce qu’est la guerre ! Vous êtes habitués aux opérations en Afrique, en Afghanistan, en Irak, mais pas à la guerre entre deux États industrialisés. D’autant que toutes ces « guerres » récentes se sont terminées par une « stratégie de sortie » de la part des Américains. Mais commencer une guerre pour immédiatement penser à se retirer est idiot (rires). La guerre sert à atteindre des résultats, même s’ils ne le sont pas forcément. La Russie, par exemple, n’a pas atteint ses buts initiaux.
Que pensez-vous des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Russie ?
Avec l’équipe précédente [de Joe Biden, NDLR], nous nous acheminions lentement mais sûrement vers un conflit avec l’Otan. Mais les Américains ont compris que si la Russie perdait, elle serait prête à utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition, y compris l’arme nucléaire. Maintenant que Donald Trump est revenu au pouvoir, le dialogue est complètement différent. Bien sûr, il était naïf de penser que le président stopperait en 24 heures un conflit qui dure depuis 40 ans, mais vendredi dernier, Poutine et Witkoff [l’émissaire du président américain, NDLR] ont parlé quatre heures et demie.
Nous sommes revenus à la diplomatie du XIXe voire du XVIIIe siècle
Est-ce bon signe ?
C’est très positif. Premièrement, ça veut dire que nous sommes revenus à la diplomatie du XIXe, voire du XVIIIe siècle, la diplomatie des rois et des empereurs qui, au bout du compte, décident eux-mêmes comment régler la situation. Deuxièmement, et ça, personne ne le comprend en Occident : dans les dernières décennies de l’après-guerre froide, tous les processus diplomatiques, en Yougoslavie ou au Moyen-Orient, se déroulaient sous influence américaine. Il n’était pas question de rapprocher deux points de vue différents mais de se rapprocher du point de vue américain. Aujourd’hui, pour la première fois, ni les Américains ni les Russes ne savent comment ça va se terminer. D’où la nécessité de se rencontrer. Avant, on était dans une impasse diplomatique et militaire.
Sommes-nous pour autant sortis de l’impasse ?
Elle subsiste dans le sens où rien n’a encore changé notablement mais des négociations sont en cours ! Quant à l’Ukraine, elle reste très dépendante : imaginons que les États-Unis s’accordent avec la Russie et que Trump ne la soutienne plus, elle ne s’en sortira pas et l’Europe ne remplacera pas les États-Unis. Depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, il est admis que les frontières sont intangibles.
Pourtant, au cours des années, certaines ont été modifiées : l’Union soviétique a éclaté pour des raisons internes, la Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie aussi… En 2014, la Russie a violé ce principe en Crimée. Mais maintenant, tout a changé : ce que fait Israël sur le plateau du Golan paraît normal et Trump évoque, lui, le Groenland ! D’autre part, le XXe siècle a produit un certain culte pour les États souverains. La décolonisation a créé un grand nombre de nouveaux États, mais la plupart d’entre eux ne sont pas en capacité de fonctionner seuls. Or que dit Trump à l’Ukraine ? Il propose un accord sur ses ressources en minerais, une proposition coloniale ! Voilà les tendances mondiales…
Trump et Poutine se comprennent
Sur ce plan-là, les visions de Trump et de Poutine sont-elles identiques ?
Je pense qu’ils se comprennent et que les dirigeants qui sont sur cette même longueur d’onde vont être de plus en plus nombreux. L’exception restera l’Europe parce que, construite comme elle est, elle ne peut pas s’adapter à ce nouveau monde où la notion d’intérêt national règne avec brutalité.
Pourquoi ?
Parce que l’Europe n’est pas un État ! Cette guerre montre que l’Europe est restée dans une époque révolue.
Il fut un temps où Poutine souhaitait se rapprocher de l’Europe. Pourquoi a-t-il changé d’avis ?
Parce que ce qu’il souhaitait a échoué. Il n’y a jamais eu un président aussi pro-occidental que Poutine les trois ou quatre premières années de son mandat. Après avoir réussi à faire fonctionner le pays et mis au pas les oligarques, il s’est intéressé à l’Europe : nous possédons des ressources et des hommes, vous avez la technologie et l’argent…
Poutine s’entendait alors très bien avec Chirac, Schröder et Berlusconi. La Russie était prête à intégrer un système occidentalo-centré à ses conditions, car la Russie n’est ni la Pologne, ni les pays baltes, ni la Roumanie. Mais elle n’aurait jamais été prête à faire la queue pour entrer dans l’UE. Si seulement nous avions réussi à nous mettre d’accord sur ces conditions particulières ! Or les discussions n’ont jamais été jusque-là parce qu’on nous a fait comprendre qu’il fallait suivre une procédure. Aux arguments géopolitiques de Vladimir Poutine, on a opposé des arguments administratifs.
Et c’est ainsi que la déception est née ?
Je dirais plutôt à propos de l’Irak, quand Poutine a soutenu Schröder et Chirac contre les États-Unis. En 2003, quand il est devenu clair que les États-Unis attaqueraient, la position de la Russie était la suivante : vous commettez une grossière erreur, mais c’est votre problème. Par crainte de détériorer ses relations avec Bush, Poutine n’avait pas l’intention de se prononcer clairement contre les États-Unis. Mais la France et l’Allemagne ont exprimé leur désaccord avec Washington. Et le talentueux Chirac a convaincu Poutine. Celui-ci a donc mis dans la balance sa relation avec Bush, cru que son geste serait apprécié et modifierait les relations avec l’Europe !
Au moment de l’invasion russe en Ukraine, vous attendiez-vous à la manière ferme dont l’Europe a réagi ?
Pas à ce point. Ceux qui nous dirigent pensaient que cette réaction serait vive mais qu’elle ne durerait pas. Par rapport à ce que disait Poutine au départ, la « dénazification » s’est muée en la volonté d’un changement de régime à Kiev. Pour ce qui est de la « démilitarisation », il s’agit plutôt de la garantie de non-appartenance de l’Ukraine à l’Otan et qu’elle ne devienne pas une puissance militaire.
Je ne vois pas comment, après cette guerre, vous ne pourrez pas accepter l’Ukraine dans l’UE
Mais elle l’est déjà !
C’est vrai, et je ne vois pas comment, après cette guerre, vous ne pourrez pas accepter l’Ukraine dans l’UE. L’Europe va donc au-devant d’immenses transformations. Les négociations d’Istanbul du printemps 2022 prévoyaient pourtant de limiter ses possibilités militaires. On aimerait y revenir. Et il me semble que les Américains seront plus facilement enclins à reconnaître les nouveaux territoires [annexés par la Russie, NDLR]. En revanche, je ne pense pas qu’on arrive à un accord qui satisfasse pleinement la Russie.
Poutine n’est pas prêt à accepter des compromis. Mais comme il est réaliste, il est prêt à reconnaître qu’on ne peut pas tout obtenir ! S’il est possible qu’il n’ait pas pleinement compris à quel genre d’adversaire il se trouvait les premiers mois de la guerre, aujourd’hui c’est lui qui possède le meilleur atout : la patience. Nous avons plus ou moins conscience que là où le conflit s’arrêtera, les frontières de la Russie seront scellées. Ça n’ira pas plus loin.
Сe n’est pas l’idée dominante en Europe !
D’un côté, les médias occidentaux affirment que la Russie est très faible, de l’autre, ils sont convaincus qu’elle ira plus loin ! Mais la Russie n’a ni les moyens, ni la force d’aller plus loin. D’autant que, comme le souligne Poutine, la situation stratégique mondiale va encore bouger. Le désintérêt des États-Unis pour l’Europe n’a pas débuté avec Trump et, inéluctablement, la Chine prend une place de plus en plus importante face aux États-Unis. Donc, l’Histoire ne tourne pas uniquement autour de l’Ukraine.
The Wall Street Journal, 15 avril
Aides Push Trump to Adopt Tougher Approach With Moscow
Some senior officials are skeptical of Putin’s interest in halting Ukraine fighting
Full text:
In comments Monday to reporters from the Oval Office, Trump called the attack a “mistake.” When pressed by reporters about who was responsible, he blamed former President Joe Biden for “letting the war happen.”
Kellogg said Sunday in written statements that the Russian attack “crosses any line of decency,” while Rubio labeled it “horrifying” and “tragic.”
In a rare criticism of the Russian leader, Trump said that Putin was chiefly to blame for the war, along with Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. “I want to stop the killing, and I think we’re doing well in that regard,” Trump added. “I think you’ll have some very good proposals very soon.”
During White House deliberations about whether the U.S. should increase sanctions on Russia to force it to negotiate, Rubio and Kellogg have advised Trump to be more wary of Putin’s diplomatic intentions, the officials said.
Zelensky said Monday that Putin aims to continue the war because “in Moscow, they are not afraid. If there is no strong enough pressure on Russia, they will keep doing what they are used to—they will keep waging war.”
National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said: “The missile attack on Sumy is a clear and stark reminder of why President Donald Trump’s efforts to try and end this terrible war comes at a crucial time. Our hearts go out to the victims, their loved ones, and all those impacted.”
Daniel Fried, a former senior State Department official, said the State and Treasury departments were preparing options to increase sanctions on Russia. But “all that means is that they now think they have the political cover or the policy cover to look at this in the event that Trump actually decides that he’s had enough of Putin,” he said.
The State Department and Treasury Department declined to comment. Kellogg didn’t respond to requests for comment.
On April 1, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R, S.C.) and other lawmakers introduced legislation targeting Russia’s oil and energy exports should Moscow fail to make peace with Ukraine, disregarding a request from the White House to hold off, congressional aides said. An administration official confirmed the delay request, noting the administration wanted to maintain a leverage point during negotiations with Russia.
Graham said at least 50 senators were supporting the measure during a private dinner this month with Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, also attended by Witkoff, according to congressional aides.
Trump’s attempt to reset relations with Russia has been tried by many of his predecessors, all of whom became disillusioned at the meager results, said Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russian affairs on former President George W. Bush’s National Security Council.
Moscow wants to annex swaths of Ukraine’s territory and to install a pro-Russian government to rule over what remains—goals that haven’t changed since its invasion in 2022, he said.
Trump said during the presidential campaign that he could compel Putin and Zelensky to stop fighting within 24 hours of re-entering the Oval Office. Kellogg later extended the deadline to Trump’s first 100 days, which arrives on April 30.
“We will know soon enough—in a matter of weeks, not months—whether Russia is serious about peace or not,” Rubio said this month in Brussels. “I hope they are. It would be good for the world if that war ended, but obviously we have to test that proposition.”
The Guardian, Book Review, 14 avril
Same River, Twice: Putin’s War on Women by Sofi Oksanen – review
This harrowing study of the Russian leader’s weaponising of sexual violence argues that misogyny goes hand in hand with imperialism
Full text:
In 1944, the Red Army pushed the Germans out of the Baltic state of Estonia. Soon afterwards, Soviet officers took away Sofi Oksanen’s great-aunt for interrogation. It was night. When she returned the next morning Oksanen’s young relative appeared unscathed. In fact, she had been raped. She could only mutter a few words: “Jah, ära”, or “Yes, please don’t”.
The consequences of her unspoken ordeal were lifelong. As Oksanen relates it, her great-aunt became mute. She never married, had children or a relationship. Nor were the men who abused her punished. After the Soviet reoccupation – which saw Estonia erased from Europe’s map – she lived quietly with her ageing mother. Black-and-white family photos and the stories that went with them were hidden.
Oksanen’s bestselling novels and plays explore themes such as murder and betrayal during the long decades of Soviet rule. Her parents are Finnish and Estonian and as a child she visited her Estonian grandparents inside the USSR. Her new nonfiction book is a blistering account of how Russia uses sexual violence as a weapon of state power.
Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine took many in the west by surprise. For Estonians, though, it “felt like a rehash of the 1940s, as if someone insists on pressing the replay button”, Oksanen says. Despite a gap of 80 years, Russian practices were the same. They included terror against civilians, torture and deportations. Also propaganda, Russification, sham trials and wholesale “cultural annihilation”.
Then as now, Russian troops carried out war crimes in areas they occupied, including sexual offences. This was systematic and genocidal, Oksanen argues. Victims were women, men and children. In spring 2022 one Russian soldier, Mikhail Romanov, broke into a house in a village outside Kyiv. He killed its owner and “raped the woman he had just widowed”, as the victim’s child sobbed in the next room.
In the city of Bucha soldiers grabbed a local resident, 23-year-old Karina Yershova, in the street. They tortured and repeatedly raped her, then shot her in the head. Those at home in Russia offered encouragement. One Russian serviceman, Roman Bykovsky, rang his wife, Olga, from the frontline. According to a phone intercept, she told him she didn’t mind if he raped Ukrainian women, so long as he used a condom.
In contrast to Baltic and Nordic countries, women are mostly absent from the top levels of Russian political life
Ukrainian prisoners of war captured by Russians, meanwhile, suffer hideous sexual abuse. Some are castrated. Others are repeatedly tortured, with electrodes applied to their genitals. This violence is done to degrade targets, to break their resistance, and to stop the next generation of Ukrainian children from being born, Oksanen says. Most men won’t discuss what happened. The topic is so distressing it is easier to look away, she says.
Oksanen describes herself as a post-colonial writer. East Europeans went through totalitarianism twice – first with the Nazis, and then for nearly half a century, under the Soviets, she says. Typically, though, the experiences of those who lived behind the iron curtain “do not find a place” in the west’s cultural consciousness. Without a reckoning of Russia’s“colonial” crimes, where the present echoes the lurid past, justice is impossible, she thinks.
Same River, Twice is thoughtful, instructive and deeply harrowing. Today’s anti-Kyiv Kremlin rhetoric has deep historical roots, she points out. Stalin demonised the Estonians and other rebellious ethnic groups as “fascists” – an enemy within. The state film industry in Moscow cast actors from the Baltic Soviet republics in the role of Nazis or American spies. Under communism, “fascist” became a synonym for non-Russians.
In the run-up to his Ukraine attack Putin reactivated this “dehumanising and racist” language. Russia’s president said his “special military operation” was necessary to free Kyiv from “neo-Nazis”. The claim is absurd. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is Jewish. Most of his male relatives perished during the second world war fighting against German invaders. Zelenskyy’s defence minister is a Muslim Tatar from Crimea.
The book makes a compelling case that misogyny and imperialism are linked. At the same time as killing Ukrainians, Putin has rolled up women’s rights within Russia. In 2017 the pro-Kremlin Duma effectively legalised domestic abuse. Russia’s patriarch argued that criminal sanctions for men who hit women amounted to foreign interference. There was, one female deputy argued, nothing wrong with a mere “slap”.
Putin’s regime likes to portray itself as bastion of conservative Christian Orthodoxy. It has restricted the rights of sexual minorities and denigrates feminists as terrorists and extremists. “Russia is a classic example of a patriarchal authoritarian state,” Oksanen says. In contrast to Baltic and Nordic countries, where talented female politicians become president or prime minister, women are mostly absent from the top levels of Russian political life.
Over the past two months Donald Trump has abandoned US support for Ukraine, dismissed Zelenskyy as a dictator, and repeated Kremlin talking points. His admiration for Putin can be partly explained by ideology. Maga supporters regard Moscow as a useful ally in the battle against “woke”. With communism gone, Russia uses misogyny masked as “traditional values” to find like-minded communities in the west.
Oksanen’s brave public criticism of Russia has come at a price. Paid internet trolls slate her online and pro-Putin activists have disrupted her book launches. Russian disinformation campaigns have targeted other prominent women, such as Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock. Oksanen’s message: see Russia for what it is and fight back. “In that resistance I hear my great-aunt’s voice,” she writes.
Luke Harding’s Invasion: Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival, shortlisted for the Orwell prize, is published by Guardian Faber
Same River, Twice: Putin’s War on Women by Sofi Oksanen is published by HarperVia (£16.99).
The Economist, 14 avril
Remote-control war crimes : Russia continues to rain down death on Ukrainian cities
Soldiers can hold the line, but drones and missiles are killing civilians
Full text:
AS HE SPEEDS down Zalaeherseh Street in Kherson, Artem, a Ukrainian soldier, points to blown-out apartments and debris. “The Russians call this the red zone,” he says. No one lives here any more. Close to the Dnieper river, which forms the front line in Kherson, this part of the city is under constant drone attack. Artem wheels the car about and heads for a safer part of town, where he parks in front of a café. On Ukraine’s south-eastern approaches, talk of a ceasefire is just distant chatter.
Drinking a cappuccino, Artem peers at his phone and watches a live feed from a Russian drone flying over the red zone. It is a cheap one, he says, so its communications have been hacked. In theory, this means you could watch yourself being attacked. The Russians are testing different types of drones in Kherson, he says, but so are the Ukrainians.
Russia continues to bomb civilian targets. On April 13th two ballistic missiles killed at least 32 people in the north-eastern city of Sumy, including two children. The missiles struck while many worshippers were at Palm Sunday services.
But Kherson is especially hard hit by drones. There were 7,000 drone attacks in the province last month, according to Oleksandr Prokudin, the head of Kherson’s military administration; 6,300 were thwarted by jamming. “It is Star Wars here,” he says. He spoke while inspecting a school basement that had been converted into bunker classrooms. Along the river a defensive electronic curtain has been created, according to Artem.
In November 2022 the centre of Kherson was full of Ukrainians rejoicing at the Russians’ retreat from the city, which they had held for more than eight months. Now its central square is empty and dangerous. The city is bounded by the mighty river. While the Russians are dug in on the Dnieper’s left bank, troops engage in desultory clashes over marshy ground on the mostly uninhabited islands that lie between them. The Russian aim is to retake the city, whereas the Ukrainian one is to expel them from areas they are occupying. The stalemate pins down soldiers who would otherwise be freed up to fight elsewhere.
Map: The Economist
More than 70% of the provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhia are occupied by the Russians. They are two of the four Ukrainian regions that the Kremlin claims to have annexed in 2022. (Only North Korea and Syria, then led by former dictator Bashar al-Assad, officially recognised Russia’s claim.) Last year Vladimir Putin said that the parts of these provinces still controlled by Ukraine would have to be turned over to Russia as a condition for a ceasefire. “We are prepared for all kinds of scenarios,” says Mr Prokudin, but surrendering the unoccupied part of Kherson is not one of them. The Russians have tried four times to assassinate him, according to Ukrainian intelligence sources.
Inspecting another brand-new bunker school in neighbouring Zaporizhia, Ivan Fedorov, the province’s governor, is equally trenchant. Ukraine faced a far tougher time in February 2022, when the full-scale invasion began, he says: “Now we are stronger.” At the time of the invasion Mr Fedorov was mayor of Melitopol, a city now in the occupied part of the province. He was arrested by the Russians but released in a prisoner exchange after refusing to collaborate with them.
Ukraine will never accept the loss of the occupied lands, he says. “We understand that without British, European and American support we can’t liberate our territories,” but if a ceasefire were imposed on Ukraine it would only be a matter of time before the war resumed. “Trump can make decisions about the territory of the United States,” he says, “but not that of Ukraine.”
On the Orikhiv front 60km south-east of Zaporizhia city, the fighting is constant. But soldiers there say they have not yet seen any major new offensive. Morale and confidence are higher than a few months ago. “Battle Witch”, the deputy commander of an artillery battalion, says that the supply of ordnance has improved greatly, though she has never had enough of either foreign- or Ukrainian-made shells. New battlefield technology has improved accuracy, meaning fewer shells are needed per target.
While politicians are defiant and soldiers are quietly confident, the mood in Kryvyi Rih, 115km to the west of Zaporizhia city, is very different. Here grief is curdling into calls for revenge. On April 4th a ballistic missile killed 19 people, including nine children in a playground. The Russians said they had launched a “precision strike” against a meeting of soldiers and Western military instructors in the RoseMarine restaurant. In fact, said staff who were cleaning up, a children’s birthday party had just ended, along with a meeting of a local business association. The missile fell hundreds of metres short of the restaurant, just beyond the playground next to it.
Five days after that strike the district of 1970s-era low-rise flats was eerily quiet. A steady stream of people carried teddy bears, flowers and toys to leave on growing piles. One of those who died was nine-year-old Herman Trempolets. After the invasion his family had first fled to Poland, said his mother Ilona, sobbing. They returned after a year because “we did not think this could happen to us. This is not war, it is Putin’s terror.”
At a small nearby shop, Natalya, a paramedic, recalled the carnage after the strike and the fear that a second missile might follow. Outside the shop stood flowers in memory of Vita Holovko, a friend of Natalya’s who had worked there. When Ms Holovko died she fell on top of her small granddaughter, saving her from the shrapnel slicing through the air. Natalya, standing beside a cabinet of frozen food and ice cream, was implacable. “We need revenge.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/04/13/russia-continues-to-rain-down-death-on-ukrainian-cities
The Economist, 11 avril
Soldiers of misfortune : Why are Chinese soldiers fighting in Ukraine?
They have been showing up on both sides of the battlefield throughout the war
Full text:
On april 8th Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, posted a video on X that he said showed one of two Chinese citizens captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. China was now militarily supporting Russia, he added in a press briefing, and “the United States of America should pay attention”. The next day he posted a second video of both men, who gave their names as Zhang Renbo and Wang Guangjun, and shots of their Chinese passports. Mr Zelensky claimed Ukraine knows of more than 150 Chinese nationals fighting on Russia’s side.
China’s foreign ministry responded that it is verifying the Ukrainians’ claims and that it does not support its nationals’ participation “in any party’s military operations”. Though China has supplied dual-use components for Russia’s defence industry, kept Russia’s economy afloat with energy purchases, and promoted propaganda blaming Ukraine and nato for the war, its leaders have consistently claimed neutrality and been careful to avoid direct military involvement. There is no proof that the Chinese nationals fighting for Russia in Ukraine are state-supported. It is no surprise, however, that they are there. Chinese fighters on both sides in Ukraine have been posting videos of their exploits on social media throughout the war.
Those who fight for Russia have said they go seeking thrills and cash. Some are also driven by nationalism. A 23-year-old from Gansu province told Initium, an independent outlet based outside China, that he flew to Moscow in 2023 after seeing a social-media video promising high wages. He had been a firefighter making 3,000 yuan ($400) a month. As a mercenary he could make five times more. Another fighter calling himself “Red Macaron” on Douyin, China’s TikTok, said he wanted to experience war, inspired by jingoistic Chinese films. He joined the Russian side because it was easier to get a visa, he told Chinese media. Zhao Rui, a 38-year-old from Chongqing, reportedly joined the war because he wanted to fight any Japanese who were helping Ukraine. He was killed in 2023 by a Ukrainian drone.
What unites most Chinese soldiers is regret. Before his death, Mr Zhao had posted videos on Douyin telling fellow Chinese not to come. “Find a job in China, you can make the same amount,” he said. Zhou Zhiqiang, another mercenary, said on Douyin that the Russians “don’t treat us like humans”. In a recent interview with Chai Jing, an exiled Chinese journalist, “Red Macaron” said the Russians were using them for “cannon fodder”. He had been locked in a pit alongside Russian deserters after complaining about poor equipment. Now he had lost the will to fight but was not allowed to leave, and did not think the Chinese embassy would help.
Some volunteers are also fighting on Ukraine’s side. Peng Chenliang from Yunnan province had been detained in China for seven months after posting anti-Russia and pro-Ukraine messages on X in 2023. In 2024 he joined the Ukrainian army’s foreign legion. He was killed later that year. Before his death Mr Peng made a video holding a Taiwan flag, saying he wanted to be remembered alongside Tseng Sheng-kuang, a Taiwanese volunteer who died fighting for Ukraine in 2022.
The deaths of Chinese fighters on both sides have sparked debate on the internet over whether they are brave heroes, dirty mercenaries or deluded nationalists. The Chinese government has not weighed in on that debate. Now it might have to. ■
https://www.economist.com/china/2025/04/10/why-are-chinese-soldiers-fighting-in-ukraine
The Economist, 9 avril
Advantage, defence : Ukraine thinks it can hold off Russia as long as it needs to
Russia may have Chinese volunteers, but Ukraine has drones
Full text:
LAST MONTH Russia drove Ukrainian forces out of most of the territory in Russia’s Kursk region that they had seized the previous August. The Russians deployed their own elite brigades, North Korean troops and a new weapon—fibre-optic drones that are controlled by a long, lightweight filament rather than by radio signals, making them impossible to jam. Now the fighting has spilled back over the border into Ukraine. Settlements close to the frontier are being pummelled, and several thousand civilians have fled or been evacuated. Some Russian assault units have crossed the border—though so far, insists Volodymyr Artyukh, the head of Sumy province’s military administration, “they have been eliminated.”
Ukrainian troops still hold slivers of territory inside Russia. In a diversionary attack in the last week of March, they advanced over the border into the neighbouring Belgorod region. Russian forces are bombing the towns and villages inside Ukraine through which Ukrainian forces passed to get to Belgorod. To the east, meanwhile, in the Donbas region, the fighting continues. On April 8th Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, said Ukrainian forces had captured two Chinese citizens fighting with the Russians—confirming months-old reports from other foreign prisoners of war of a Chinese presence. Mr Zelensky said he would raise the issue with China’s government.
Many of those fleeing the border regions near Kursk end up in Sumy, a modest city 23km south of the border with a prewar population of about 250,000. Nadia Gorbliuk, aged 64, was evacuated from the rural village of Uhroidy. She had not wanted to leave her livestock, she says, bursting into tears: as the bombs fell she thought: “This is my destiny, to die with my turkeys!” When soldiers ordered her to leave, she kissed the birds farewell. All nine of them, she has since heard, were evacuated to safety.
Russia tried and failed to seize Sumy in February 2022, at the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within six weeks its forces had been driven out of the entire region. Now, says Mr Zelensky, Russia is preparing for a new offensive here. It is unclear whether that might entail a real effort to occupy the area, or simply a relentless series of attacks aimed at tying down Ukrainian troops and creating a buffer zone.
Access to the city is strictly controlled by the SBU, Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service. Beyond the checkpoints, new bunkers, trenches and defensive lines can be seen slicing across the fields which surround the city. Sumy itself is bustling: despite the increase in attacks, its population has grown since the war’s start, says Mr Artyukh. The number of displaced people arriving from border regions is double that of former residents who have left. He interrupts the conversation periodically to identify background noises: first the boom of something outgoing; then two low roars from Ukrainian jets overhead, one a Soviet-era MiG, the other an American-made F-16.
In the first three months of the year the Sumy region was hit by 8,925 drones, glide bombs and other missiles, up from 3,693 in the same period last year, says Mr Artyukh. Yet there is no sign of panic in the city. It is too well-defended for the Russians to take, says Yurii Butuzov, a military analyst. He thinks their current aim is to retake the hills along the Russian side of the border still occupied by Ukrainian forces.
Control of those hilltops would make it easier for them to use drones to try to establish a 10km-wide, Russian-controlled buffer zone inside Ukraine. That, says Mr Butuzov, would allow the Russians to redeploy most of the troops fighting here to eastern Donbas. Russia has officially annexed that region, but virtually no countries recognise its claim, and some of it remains under Ukrainian control. “Donbas is a strategic goal for Putin,” says Mr Butuzov.
It is unclear whether the traumatised evacuees from border towns and villages will ever return home. Ms Gorbliuk is now sleeping in a former clinic with other evacuees, cared for by Pluriton, an organisation which helps the displaced. It is run by Kateryna Arisoy, herself a refugee from Donbas. Many elderly evacuees whose lives revolved around their homes, gardens and animals find it impossible to adapt once uprooted, she says: they develop “health conditions, mental problems and die”.
Many in Sumy would welcome a ceasefire, but no one is counting on one. The residents are phlegmatic; the mood is that life must go on. The same holds for Kharkiv, the much bigger city to Sumy’s south-east. On a Saturday afternoon dozens of energetic pensioners bopped lustily to music in the city’s central Freedom Square. The dance event has gone on every weekend for more than a decade; it moved to the square after the park where it was previously held was bombed twice.
Further east, in a village between the Russian border and the frontline region of Kupiansk, soldiers from a drone unit known as Typhoon said things were quiet. No new Russian offensive was expected, and they were preparing to redeploy to Pokrovsk, a besieged town in Donbas. In the last month the unit has started using its own fibre-optic drones, says Mihailo, its commander—a couple of months after the Russians got them.
The drones will make it even harder for soldiers or vehicles to move along the front lines than it is now, says Mihailo. That means fewer soldiers are required to man positions. Where six months ago Ukraine’s forces worried that the enemy was slowly rolling them back, they now think that drones and well-prepared defensive positions can hold the Russians off. Indeed, Russian forces have made very little progress for well over two years. Whether a ceasefire deal will come is uncertain. Ukraine is relying on its own strengths. ■
The New York Times, 8 avril
Russia Strikes Kyiv as Ukraine Mourns Deadly Attack on Zelensky’s Hometown
While Russian missile and drone bombardments have been unrelenting over more than three years of war, they have intensified in recent weeks amid U.S.-led peace talks.
Full text:
Russia bombarded Ukraine with ballistic missiles and drones on Sunday that killed one person and wounded at least seven others, the latest in a series of deadly attacks that President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said makes clear Moscow has little real interest in cease-fire negotiations.
While Russian drone and missile attacks have been unrelenting throughout more than three years of war, they have intensified in recent weeks amid ongoing peace talks led by the Trump administration.
The Ukrainian authorities said the barrage on Sunday killed one man, damaged buildings and started fires in three neighborhoods of Kyiv, the capital. Damage and injuries were also reported elsewhere in Ukraine, as the country declared a day of mourning for a deadly strike on Friday in the city of Kryvyi Rih in central Ukraine.
A missile strike on a residential neighborhood there killed 19 people, including nine children, and wounded 74 others. It damaged the courtyard of an apartment block, and emergency medical workers found some of the wounded in a playground, videos released by Ukraine’s emergency services showed. Russia’s ministry of defense said the missile hit a gathering of Ukrainian and foreign military personnel.
But a U.N. team that visited the site said, citing witnesses, that a meeting of beauticians, not military personnel, had been underway at a nearby restaurant when the missile struck.
Most of the children died while playing in a park, the United Nations said in a statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Turk. It was the deadliest single strike for children of the war, said Mr. Turk, who called the attack with a cluster munition warhead “an unimaginable horror.”
Image
Though he has expressed support for the Trump administration’s efforts to secure a cease-fire, Mr. Zelensky was critical of the tepid U.S. response to the attack on Kryvyi Rih, his hometown.
He said he was “unpleasantly surprised” by a social media post from the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Bridget A. Brink, that expressed horror over the strike but did not directly condemn Russia.
And in his nightly address on Saturday, Mr. Zelensky said that he was “thankful to every country whose representatives have spoken out” about the strike and — although he did not single out the United States — emphasized that silence would embolden Moscow to “continue the war and keep ignoring diplomacy.”
“We must all remember: The war continues,” Mr. Zelensky added.
Ukrainian officials have accused President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia of playing for time in cease-fire negotiations mediated by the Trump administration.
After the attack on Kyiv, Mr. Zelensky said in a post on X, “The pressure on Russia is still insufficient, and the daily Russian strikes on Ukraine prove it.” He added, “These attacks are Putin’s response to all international diplomatic efforts.”
While Ukraine agreed last month to accept an unconditional 30-day halt in the fighting, Russia did not. Both sides have agreed in principle to halt strikes against energy infrastructure temporarily, only to accuse each other of violating the agreement. Kyiv and Moscow also considered a cease-fire on the Black Sea last month in separate U.S.-mediated talks but are still negotiating whether or how it will come into force. Russia asked for an easing of sanctions in exchange.
In the meantime, a Russian frigate and a Russian submarine in the Black Sea launched some of the cruise missiles fired on Sunday, a spokesman for Ukraine’s navy, Dmytro Pletenchuk, said.
Among a small crowd standing outside the police perimeter at one missile strike site in Kyiv, the scene of smoldering, collapsed concrete fueled anger at Russia, as attacks have throughout the war, but also at what was seen as hapless American mediation.
“The negotiations are taking place in one reality, and the war is going on in another reality in which we live,” said Maria Savchenko, whose family-owned business printing advertising posters was obliterated in the strike.
“The president of the United States doesn’t really want to understand what is happening here,” she said. Russia, she said, intends to carry on fighting.
Ukrainian officials say that, as the talks continue, Russia has shifted tactics in the missile and drone war by increasing the overall number of exploding drones and singling out certain cities for intense bombardments on some nights, rather than scattering attacks around the country.
The Ukrainian Air Force said on March 30 that 4,133 drones and missiles were fired that month, an increase from earlier months.
In Sunday’s attack, the air force said, Russia launched a mix of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones.
In Kyiv, the aerial assault began with exploding drones. Missiles then followed, setting off air-raid alarms through the night and early morning.
Valentyn Maidaniuk, a Kyiv resident, said he saw explosions flashing in the sky and heard buzzing from the drones’ engines as he walked to an air-raid shelter early Sunday. In the end, he said, “I didn’t manage to sleep at all.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/06/world/europe/ukraine-kyiv-attack-russia.html
Le Point, 7 avril
« L’histoire de l’Estonie nous enseigne ceci : ne jamais céder à la Russie »
ENTRETIEN. Kristen Michal, Premier ministre estonien, assure qu’il est inutile d’essayer de se montrer conciliant avec Vladimir Poutine.
Full text:
Les Européens sont-ils prêts à mourir pour l’Estonie ? La proposition peut paraître brutale mais elle pourrait se poser à tous les alliés des pays baltes – au premier rang desquels les pays de l’Otan et de l’UE – alors que l’impérialisme russe est toujours aussi vivace. Qui sait ce que Vladimir Poutine a en tête ? Conforté en Ukraine, où il profite du désengagement américain, le maître du Kremlin pourrait être tenté de pousser son avantage jusqu’au sein de l’UE. L’Estonie, et ses 338 kilomètres de frontière avec la Russie, se sait en première ligne. Ce petit pays (1 350 000 habitants) subit depuis des années des vagues de cyberattaques et des opérations de déstabilisation visant la minorité russe (environ 70 000 personnes).
Kristen Michal a été nommé Premier ministre en juillet 2024 quand sa prédécesseure Kaja Kallas est devenue la Haute Représentante de l’Union européenne pour les Affaires étrangères. Il était à l’Élysée le 27 mars pour le sommet sur l’Ukraine autour d’Emmanuel Macron, de Volodymyr Zelensky et de la coalition des volontaires. Il appelle les populations européennes à ne pas se leurrer sur les intentions de Vladimir Poutine.
Le Point : L’Europe est-elle suffisamment mobilisée face à Poutine ?
Kristen Michal : L’Europe est plus forte qu’elle ne l’était il y a quelque temps et elle peut compter sur d’autres pays comme le Canada, la Turquie et le Royaume-Uni. Ils ne font pas partie de l’UE mais ils partagent les mêmes idées concernant la guerre en Ukraine. Selon moi, le triangle Paris, Londres, Bruxelles fonctionne bien. Keir Starmer et Emmanuel Macron semblent avoir de bonnes relations, et Macron a également des connexions avec Trump, ce qui est utile. À chaque fois que nous nous réunissons, nous élargissons le spectre des pays qui comprennent la vraie nature de la menace que représente Poutine.
Pendant des années, de nombreux pays européens n’ont pas pleinement réalisé ce qu’est la Russie. Certains avaient une vision romantique de la Russie : des gens avec des chapeaux en fourrure buvant de la vodka. Désormais, il est clair pour tous que la Russie de Poutine ne veut pas seulement s’emparer d’un territoire ; elle veut saper la souveraineté de l’Ukraine et la transformer en un État vassal. Poutine est une menace réelle et crédible, non seulement pour l’Ukraine, mais aussi pour l’Europe.
Quelles leçons l’Estonie peut-elle enseigner aux Européens ?
L’histoire de l’Estonie nous enseigne ceci : ne jamais céder à la Russie. Ce que nous considérons comme de la politesse, elle le perçoit comme une faiblesse. Si vous cédez, elle demandera plus. La Russie n’a pas renoncé à son vieux rêve : agrandir son territoire par la force. Beaucoup d’entre nous, y compris les Estoniens, espéraient que le capitalisme et la démocratie changeraient la Russie, mais cela ne s’est pas produit. Ce qui existe maintenant en Russie ressemble à du capitalisme, mais il n’y a pas de démocratie. Face à Poutine et ses alliés, vous ne pouvez pas faire de concessions. Le seul langage qu’ils comprennent est celui de la force. Vous devez rester ferme, investir dans la défense, tracer des lignes claires et vous y tenir.
Diriez-vous que les menaces venant de la Russie deviennent de plus en plus pressantes ?
L’Estonie a été l’un des premiers pays à subir de graves cyberattaques en 2007, après que nous avons déplacé un monument de Tallinn datant de l’époque soviétique. Depuis, les cyberattaques de la Russie n’ont fait qu’augmenter, même pendant la guerre en Ukraine alors qu’on pourrait penser que les Russes ont d’autres choses à faire.
Un autre sujet me préoccupe : que se passera-t-il après la guerre ? La Russie a plus d’hommes sous les armes qu’avant la guerre. Que deviendront-ils ? Ils ne vont pas se reconvertir en enseignants… Ils chercheront probablement des opportunités lucratives, peut-être dans la sécurité privée ou d’autres entreprises prorusses à travers le monde, y compris en Europe, en Asie et en Afrique. Cela crée une menace réelle d’influence russe se répandant à l’échelle mondiale.
L’Estonie se sent-elle en sécurité ?
La plupart des Estoniens se sentent en sécurité, mais il y a forcément aussi des inquiétudes concernant la Russie. C’est pourquoi nous avons décidé d’investir au moins 5 % de notre PIB dans la défense l’année prochaine. Cela augmentera considérablement nos capacités de défense, garantissant que nos alliés peuvent compter sur nous.
L’Otan est-elle toujours la meilleure garantie de sécurité pour l’Estonie ? Pensez-vous que l’alliance se portera à votre secours en cas d’invasion russe ?
L’Otan reste la garantie la plus forte de notre sécurité. Un exemple : lorsque nous avons synchronisé notre réseau électrique avec l’Europe centrale, l’Otan nous a rapidement aidés à protéger nos infrastructures critiques. Cela montre que l’Otan est prête et capable. La meilleure façon de prévenir un conflit est d’être fort et uni. Nos adversaires potentiels ne se lanceront pas dans un combat qu’ils ne peuvent pas gagner. Concernant Donald Trump, son message a été constant : les pays européens devraient investir davantage dans la défense. Nous sommes d’accord avec cela. C’est pourquoi nous augmentons nos investissements.
Vous avez récemment adopté une loi interdisant aux citoyens non européens de voter aux élections. Une façon de lutter contre les 70 000 citoyens russes présents dans votre pays ?
Pour nous, cela est devenu une question de loyauté. Comment quelqu’un qui vote aux élections russes – une mascarade destinée à renforcer le pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine – peut-il avoir son mot à dire dans les affaires intérieures estoniennes ? Il n’est pas difficile d’obtenir la citoyenneté estonienne, et beaucoup de gens l’ont fait. Mais si quelqu’un reste loyal à un État agressif comme la Russie ou la Biélorussie, il ne devrait pas avoir le droit d’influencer les décisions en Estonie. La loi attend maintenant la décision du président. Si elle est approuvée, elle entrera en vigueur à temps pour les élections locales cet automne, et les citoyens russes ne pourront plus voter sur les questions estoniennes.
The Economist, March 28
Russia plays for time in Ukraine ceasefire talks
A Black Sea deal starts sinking as soon as America announces it
Full text:
As american spooks tell it, Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky may be willing to talk about ending their war, but they are not ready to stop fighting. “Both leaders for now probably still see the risks of a longer war as less than those of an unsatisfying settlement,” concluded an annual threat assessment by America’s 18 intelligence agencies published on March 25th.
That helps explain why President Donald Trump’s promise to end the war between Russia and Ukraine (within a day, as he used to say) is proving difficult. His officials say they have achieved “epic” results. In fact the deal is being whittled down with each round of shuttle diplomacy. Russia seems intent on imposing conditions at every stage as its forces grind on.
Take the progress thus far. On March 11th America and Ukraine proposed an immediate and unconditional 30-day ceasefire. On March 18th Russia narrowed that to halting aerial attacks on energy infrastructure and shipping in the Black Sea, with details to be worked out. On March 25th America announced an agreement to “ensure safe navigation”, but it was immediately thrown into doubt. Russia insisted it would not be enacted until a Russian state bank was reconnected to the swift payment system. The eu, in turn, said that would not happen until Russia withdrew from Ukraine (SWIFT is based in Belgium).
In any case, the Black Sea deal would alleviate only a minor problem. Western sanctions already exclude Russian exports of food and fertilisers. And Ukraine has already re-opened its maritime trade corridor by fighting back the Russian navy and sending cargo through the territorial waters of friendly states. At best, if the accord prevents attacks on ports, facilities in Mykolaiv, a Ukrainian port, could reopen and insurance rates could fall a bit. Russia might enjoy easier terms for exports.
Ukrainian and European officials worry that America is moving to ease sanctions against Russia without real concessions. A White House statement promised to “help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertiliser exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions”.
Kremlin-huggers in Washington seem to have the upper hand. Sticks have been applied mostly to Ukraine, which for a time was cut off from the flow of American weapons and intelligence. Russia is being offered mainly carrots: the Americans speak of recognising its annexation of territory, and denying Ukraine nato membership or security guarantees. Officials are drawing up options to lift sanctions.
In a revealing interview on March 21st Steve Witkoff, America’s envoy for Ukraine, said he sought not just an end to the war but a new geopolitical pact with Russia. It would include co-operation on oil and gas production in the Arctic, exports of liquefied natural gas, artificial intelligence and handling Iran. “Who doesn’t want to see a world like that?” he asked. He mocked European countries for rushing to arm Ukraine and fortify themselves, trying “to be like Winston Churchill”. The fear that Russia would attack the rest of Europe, he claimed, was “preposterous”.
As the talks drag on, Russia seeks to convince Mr Trump to ignore Ukrainian and European concerns and look to a grand bargain. Ukraine, in turn, wants to prove that Russia is negotiating in bad faith, in the hope that Mr Trump might turn against the Kremlin. In an interview with Newsmax TV on March 25th, Mr Trump conceded that Mr Putin may be stalling but seemed unperturbed. “It could be they’re dragging their feet. I’ve done it over the years, you know.” He was confident, though, that both Russia and Ukraine “would like to see it end”.
American officials hope to clinch a ceasefire within Mr Trump’s first 100 days in office. The danger is that a rushed agreement will mean forsaking Ukraine and caving in to Russia. As America’s spies put it, Mr Putin has good reasons to play for time, because “positive battlefield trends allow for some strategic patience.” Mr Zelensky fears a bad deal would “prompt domestic backlash and future insecurity”. ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/03/26/russia-plays-for-time-in-ukraine-ceasefire-talks
The Wall Street Journal, March 28
France-U.K. Plan for European Troops in Ukraine Falters
Paris and London struggle to broaden coalition without clear U.S. security guarantees
Full text :
PARIS—Britain and France are faltering in their campaign to persuade other European allies to send troops into Ukraine to secure any peace deal, amid mounting doubts about the U.S.’s willingness to guarantee their security.
French President Emmanuel Macron convened dozens of leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, inside the Élysée Palace on Thursday in a bid to hammer out an agreement for a European deployment of land, air and maritime forces that could go to Ukraine.
The French leader, however, emerged from hours of negotiations—including a phone call with President Trump—without a public commitment from other European countries to send troops. Macron told a news conference that several countries privately expressed a willingness to put boots on the ground.
For now, he said, the U.K. and France plan to dispatch a team to Ukraine to determine how many European troops Kyiv needs and where to station them. The advisers, Macron said, will also work with the Ukrainian military to make sure it is trained and equipped to deter Russian aggression.
Central to the concerns of European countries is whether the U.S. would play some role in supporting a European deployment if it came under fire from Russia. Washington has so far offered no commitment, and Trump’s chief negotiator with Russia, Steve Witkoff, last week dismissed the Franco-British initiative as a “posture and a pose” and an attempt “to be like Winston Churchill.”
“My wish is that the Americans are engaged at our side,” Macron said. “But we have to be prepared for a situation in which they maybe don’t join in.”
The question of whether European capitals will ever be ready to fill Washington’s shoes as a guarantor of regional security is looming over the continent. European governments are boosting military spending. Germany recently passed a €1 trillion defense and infrastructure package and Brussels is floating a plan that aims to raise €800 billion in military spending by 2030.
“We are at a decisive moment of our history,” Macron said.
Still, the war in Ukraine is laying bare persistent divisions over how to steer European resources onto the battlefield. The European Union had hoped to provide a €40 billion package for 2025 giving Ukraine additional access to ammunition, missile defense and long-range strike capabilities, but some of the bloc’s member states—including France, Spain and Italy—balked at the plan.
On Thursday, European countries at the Paris meeting did agree to supply two million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine in the coming months, an EU official said, part of €17 billion in fresh military aid raised so far this year among the bloc’s member states for Ukraine.
Germany’s parliament approved an additional €3 billion for Ukraine military aid this week, and Macron said on Wednesday that France would provide €2 billion in additional military aid this year. Non-EU countries, like Britain and Norway, have also pledged to supply billions of dollars worth of military aid.
Macron had called Thursday’s meeting, which brought together 31 countries, including Canada and Australia from outside of Europe, with the specific purpose of shoring up military aid to Ukraine and defining what kinds of security guarantees European countries were prepared to offer Kyiv.
French and British officials see the plan as a means to secure a seat at the negotiating table after the Trump administration largely sidelined European capitals in its talks with Russia. By placing troops in Ukraine, France and the U.K. aim to deter future Russian attacks while demonstrating to Washington that Europe is prepared to carry the burden of Ukraine’s security.
French officials say they are confident that European countries will provide the maritime and air assets they plan to add to any troops on the ground. There are bigger question marks over finding enough troops to deploy on land.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said it remained crucial that Washington would support any deployment and that it remained unclear whether a peace or cease-fire deal will be in place to enable the sending of troops.
“Obviously, we don’t know yet whether there will be a deal, what exactly the deal will be like. And therefore politically, what we are requiring is options that are credible,” he said.
As the U.S.-Russia talks have deepened, European officials have been alarmed by signs that Washington is bending to Russian demands.
On Tuesday, the U.S. agreed to help Moscow bolster agricultural and fertilizer sales, steps that Russia says will require Europe to relax financial restrictions that sit at the heart of the sanctions regime on Russia. Those restrictions depend on European decisions.
The EU said on Wednesday that it had no plan to do so and Macron said in a news conference after the meeting that leaders had agreed that “this was not the time for the lifting of sanctions.”
Nonetheless, European diplomats are wary of being portrayed by Moscow and the Trump administration as obstacles to ending the conflict—a charge that Russian officials have leveled in recent days.
European leaders say it is Russia that is dragging its feet on a cease-fire. Speaking after the meeting, Zelensky said that all the leaders in Paris “understand that Russia for today doesn’t want any sort of peace.”
Starmer contrasted Russia’s agreement to a partial cease-fire with the Kremlin’s stepped-up bombardments of Ukraine. He said there should be a deadline for Russia to agree to a cease-fire deal.
“It’s over a week since Putin agreed to an energy and infrastructure cease-fire, but since then Russia has hit energy infrastructure in cities across Ukraine,” he said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In London, a number of scenarios are being studied, from a cease-fire to a full-blown peace treaty. But they all rely on a degree of U.S. support. For instance, even a pause in the fighting along the front line would require U.S. satellites to monitor in real time.
French and British officials have said they also want U.S. missile-defense systems to back up any troops they place in Ukraine, as well as logistical support like midair refueling and troop transport planes.
The Wall Street Journal, March 25
Steve Witkoff Takes the Kremlin’s Side
Trump’s favorite negotiator falls for Russian talking points.
Full text :
Steve Witkoff, the Trump Administration’s special negotiator on Ukraine, says he’s not taking sides as he tries to mediate an end to the war Vladimir Putin started in 2022. He could have fooled us after a podcast interview this weekend in which Mr. Witkoff parroted one specious Russian talking point after another.
The biggest howler during a long podcast with Tucker Carlson—we’ve struggled to narrow down the list—is Mr. Witkoff’s claim that Mr. Putin “100%” doesn’t want to overrun Europe. Mr. Witkoff suggested Russia doesn’t even want to control Ukraine, with the exception, that is, of the large areas Mr. Putin already occupies.
“Why would they want to absorb Ukraine?” he mused of the Russians. “That would be like occupying Gaza. Why do the Israelis really want to occupy Gaza for the rest of their lives? They don’t.” Does Mr. Witkoff know anything about Russian or Mr. Putin’s history?
Tell this to Georgia and Moldova, among others, and especially the Baltic states. All of these are under threat from Mr. Putin’s long-stated intention to reconstitute a Greater Russian empire, and Georgia endured an invasion and Russian land grab in 2008. Russia doesn’t need to occupy Ukraine if it can impose a Russian-friendly, authoritarian government like the one in Belarus. The Soviets dominated Eastern Europe for more than 40 years.
Another Russian talking point Mr. Witkoff has fallen for concerns the regions of eastern Ukraine Mr. Putin attempted to annex in 2014. “They’re Russian-speaking,” Mr. Witkoff said of these regions. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated they want to be under Russian rule.”
Setting aside the many Ukrainians who voted with their feet by fleeing these regions for free parts of Ukraine, Mr. Witkoff thinks a referendum staged by an autocrat under military occupation means something.
Mr. Witkoff also continued the Administration’s bad habit of disparaging allies, as when he described Britain’s peacekeeping proposal for Ukraine as “a posture and a pose.” Europeans, he suggested, have a “simplistic” desire to mimic Winston Churchill. It’s more accurate to say Europeans understand what’s at stake in this major war on their doorstep. Europe will be safer if Ukraine is safe, and Washington can at least not mock allies as they finally take concrete steps to provide for their own and their neighborhood’s defense.
We can understand the need to tone down hostile rhetoric amid negotiations, but the Administration’s propensity to fall for Russian propaganda is something else. Certainly no one would accuse them of following in Churchill’s footsteps. Whether they follow in Neville Chamberlain’s will depend on what the final details are in the peace accord that Messrs. Witkoff and Trump are negotiating.
The Wall Street Journal, March 21
Putin Rejects the Trump Cease-Fire
The Russian wants much bigger concessions that would cripple Ukraine.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/21-mars-1.pdf
The Wall Street Journal, Editorial, March 14
Russia Says Nyet to Trump’s Ukraine Cease-Fire
As his troops take more territory, Putin rejects what Kyiv accepted
Full text :
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Tuesday that if Russia rejected the 30-day U.S.-brokered cease-fire that Ukraine had accepted, “we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace here.” We knew that before, but now we know even on Mr. Rubio’s terms, as the Kremlin on Thursday said nyet.
President Trump’s envoy, Steven Witkoff, is visiting Moscow, and the Kremlin welcomed him with the back of its hand. Yuri Ushakov, a close adviser to Vladimir Putin, told Russian television that a cease-fire would be “nothing other than a temporary breather for Ukrainian soldiers.” He added, “our goal is long-term peaceful resolution. . . . Steps that imitate peaceful actions are not needed.”
Mr. Putin emerged later to sand the rougher edges off Mr. Ushakov, saying he really wants peace. But it must be a “lasting peace,” and not merely a temporary cease-fire. Mr. Putin said there are “nuances” that require “painstaking research,” and those no doubt include conditions as part of a cease-fire that limit Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
In other words, Mr. Putin wants the killing to continue until he gets closer to achieving his war aim of subjugating Ukraine.
And killing he continues to do. Since Washington and Kyiv agreed on the cease-fire Tuesday, Russia has launched at least 250 drones and four ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Russian forces are also continuing to advance on Ukrainian positions in the Kursk region in Russia that Ukraine had taken in a surprise offensive in August.
The Russians on Wednesday took the town of Sudzha, and Mr. Putin donned fatigues and visited the region to cheer on his troops. Russia claims to have captured several hundred Ukrainian soldiers, and videos circulating on social media appear to show Russians executing unarmed Ukrainian prisoners. Mr. Putin called the prisoners “terrorists under Russian law.” This violates the Geneva Conventions since Ukrainian soldiers in uniform are legal combatants under the laws of war.
Meanwhile, the Washington Post says a think tank close to Russia’s security service, the FSB, last month produced a report arguing that the Kremlin should stoke divisions between Washington and Europe. Russia could then continue its assault on Ukraine unimpeded.
The Post says the think tank says that if the U.S. agrees to stop arming Ukraine in return for a Kremlin promise not to arm regimes hostile to America, such a commitment from Russia would be “difficult to realize.” No doubt. We can’t vouch for the Post’s reporting, but this has the smell of Kremlin truth and is consistent with Mr. Putin’s behavior
As for Mr. Trump, he somehow detected good news in the Kremlin comments. The President said at the White House that there was “a very promising statement” from Mr. Putin but “it wasn’t complete.” Merely uttering the word “peace” isn’t promising.
With his bludgeoning of Ukraine to make a deal without promises of U.S. aid or security, Mr. Trump has given Mr. Putin every incentive to keep the war going to put himself in the strongest possible position if there ever are serious peace talks. Does Mr. Trump have a Plan B beyond beating up Ukraine to make more unilateral concessions?
Mr. Trump suggested last week that Mr. Putin “wants to get it ended,” referring to the war, and that “in terms of getting a final settlement, it may be easier dealing with Russia.” Nothing Mr. Putin has done or said since Mr. Trump began his war tilt toward Russia suggests that Mr. Putin has any such intention.
The Economist, March 13
Ukraine and Russia : Will Vladimir Putin really agree to stop his killing machine?
The offer of a ceasefire creates a dilemma for the Kremlin
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/13-mars-2.pdf
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13. März
Wiedergeburt der Sowjetunion – der Kreml verordnet Patriotismus, doch die Parolen ziehen in der Bevölkerung immer weniger
Man muss in Moskau schon zweimal hinschauen, um zu erkennen, wie der Krieg Russland verändert hat. Hinter den glitzernden Fassaden herrschen Ernüchterung, Erschöpfung und Angst.
Excerpts :
(…) Die Intelligenzia am Nullpunkt
Das ist nur eine Geschichte. Eine andere ist, dass viele Buchpräsentationen und öffentliche Diskussionen abgesagt werden. Früher strotzte Moskau vor intellektuellem Leben, aber jetzt hat es sich praktisch auf null reduziert. Organisatoren haben Angst und sagen Veranstaltungen manchmal vorsorglich selbst ab, manchmal reagieren sie auf einen Anruf von «oben».
Die Intelligenzia hat sich auf ihre eigene Blase zurückgezogen, sie versammelt sich in kleinem Kreis und kehrt zurück in die Küchen der Sowjetära, die nachgerade in vorteilhaftem Licht erscheint. Damals gab es wenigstens einige verständliche Regeln im Umgang mit den Behörden, heute gibt es keine mehr. Damals gab es keine «ausländischen Agenten» und «unerwünschten Organisationen».
Gut, man konnte wegen exzessiven «dissidenten» Verhaltens zu einem Verhör aufgeboten werden oder gar den Job verlieren. Aber es gab niemanden, der als «ausländischer Agent» gebrandmarkt war und aufgrund gesetzlicher Beschränkungen keine Stelle als Lehrer bekommen konnte, und es kam nicht vor, dass eine Person, die einer «unerwünschten Organisation» angehörte, ins Gefängnis musste. Es scheint, dass der lustige alte Breschnew weit netter war als der harte und unlustige alterslose Putin.
Wenn es doch kein Friedensabkommen gibt, wird dieses fragile Gemeinwesen zumindest in einen depressiven Zustand zurückfallen. Die Zukunft wird vertagt. Einige Leute werden noch wütender sein als bisher und noch eifriger nach den Schuldigen suchen – den «Feinden» im Westen und den «Verrätern» im eigenen Land. Und wenn dann noch eine Stagflation einsetzt . . .
Es scheint, dass selbst Putin sich über ein solches Szenario Sorgen machen muss. Die Russen möchten, dass er nicht nur als Präsident des Krieges dasteht, der die Nation zu mobilisieren imstande war, sondern als Sieger. Diesem Wunsch muss er nachkommen, wenn er die Unterstützung für seinen Kurs aufrechterhalten will. Doch die Nation lässt sich auch damit weiter mobilisieren, dass der Krieg gegen den Westen mit anderen Mitteln geführt wird – nämlich hybrid. Kein heisser, aber ein fortgesetzter kalter Krieg 2.0 liegt durchaus in Putins Interesse.
Andrei Kolesnikow ist Journalist und Buchautor. Er lebt in Moskau, ist Kolumnist von «The New Times» und schreibt für die Online-Zeitung «Nowaja Gaseta». – Aus dem Englischen von A. Bn.
The Economist, March 12
Dodging diplomatic bullets : Ukraine hopes its ceasefire offer will turn the tables on Russia
By agreeing to a truce it wins back some American support and puts heat on the Kremlin
Excerpts :
ON THE battlefield Ukraine has more than once turned looming catastrophe into partial success against Russia. It might have pulled off a similar feat in the diplomatic realm on March 11th, when it agreed in principle to an American proposal for an “immediate” 30-day ceasefire. The commitment to stop fighting—if Russia reciprocates—was enough to unblock the flow of American weapons and intelligence. It may also turn the tables on the Kremlin. “We’ll take this offer now to the Russians, and we hope that they’ll say yes; that they’ll say yes to peace,” said Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state. “The ball is now in their court.”
Ukraine and America have been at loggerheads since a televised shouting match at the White House between their leaders, Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump, on February 28th. (…) Mr Zelensky worked hard to repair the breach. On March 4th he wrote an assuaging letter to Mr Trump describing the bust-up as “regrettable”, pledged to seek peace and proposed a partial ceasefire that would halt mutual attacks from the air or at sea. British and French leaders worked assiduously behind the scenes to ease the crisis.
The setting for the reconciliation meeting—on neutral ground in Jeddah, with Saudi mediators on hand to facilitate the discussions—was more suitable for talks between rivals than ostensible allies in a long war. But being away from the febrile politics of Washington may have helped, given the tensions in Mr Trump’s camp over the direction of his “America First” foreign policy. If the rupture at the White House was in large part the work of J.D. Vance, the vice-president with a history of disdain for Ukraine, the repair job was left to Mr Rubio and Mike Waltz, the national security adviser, both of whom are hawkish, old-style conservatives. A salvo of drones launched against Moscow hours before the talks, which Ukraine said struck a refinery among other targets, did not derail the discussions.
The talks in Jeddah lasted several hours. According to participants, the Ukrainians opened with Mr Zelensky’s idea for partial ceasefire. The Americans countered with the idea of a complete ceasefire, limited to an initial 30 days, renewable if both combatants agree. After consultations with Mr Zelensky, the Ukrainians agreed. The discussion then turned to restoring military aid and intelligence sharing. Within hours, an American general confirmed the support would resume, recounted one participant, Colonel Pavlo Palisa, deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office.
There was little detail of what else, if anything, had been agreed upon. (…)
Both sides also said they would “conclude as soon as possible a comprehensive agreement for developing Ukraine’s critical mineral resources to expand Ukraine’s economy and guarantee Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security.” An outline of this agreement was supposed to have been signed at the ill-fated White House meeting. Now the sides are aiming for the full accord, numbering hundreds of pages. The details remain unclear, but Mr Trump has presented it both as payback for past American support for Ukraine and an implicit guarantee that America would defend its economic interests in the country.
Mr Zelensky has hitherto resisted any ceasefire without an explicit American security guarantee, fearing that Russia would use a cessation of hostilities to re-arm and attack again in future. Mr Waltz said guarantees had been discussed but offered no further details. (…)
Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an American think-tank, argues that the Jeddah deal is better than Ukraine might have expected: “A clean ceasefire benefits the Ukrainians. It would give them time to rest, and has the potential to put Russia on the back foot.” Moreover, he notes, Ukraine has not had to make concessions, even if Mr Trump appears to have in recent weeks prematurely yielded important points to Russia: for instance, saying Ukraine would not recover all of its lost territory and ruling out its hopes of joining NATO. (…)
All eyes will turn next to Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, who has set out expansive conditions to end his three-year-old war. They include more than just a ceasefire on current lines. He wants the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces, the neutrality of Ukraine, a reduction of its armed forces and dealing with the “root causes” of the conflict, implying a retreat of NATO forces from much of eastern Europe. Russia has rejected the deployment of a European force in Ukraine.
With his troops grinding forward, and seeking to squeeze Ukraine out of a chunk of Russian territory in Kursk province, Mr Putin may not be ready for a ceasefire. If he rejects the American proposal, however, he risks pushing a sympathetic Mr Trump into greater support for Ukraine. That, at least, is what Ukraine and its friends will be hoping for. “If they say no, then we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace here,” said Mr Rubio.
Even so, the process will remain ever vulnerable to one of Mr Trump’s mood swings. (…)
Right now Ukraine is in a better position than it was after the ill-fated encounter at the White House, and seems to have regained some initiative. Asked what would happen if Russia rejected the ceasefire, Colonel Palisa replied: “Only God knows. But think about it—over the last three weeks, the media has been saying that Ukraine doesn’t want peace. Now we’ve proven that’s not true.”
At the diplomatic table as in the trenches, short-term success is no guarantee of victory. But Ukraine has staved off defeat and survived to fight another day. ■
The Wall Street Journal, Editorial, March 12
Ukraine Bows to Trump’s Cease-Fire
The U.S. denial of aid was costing Ukrainian lives on the battlefield.
Full text :
Ukraine yielded to U.S. pressure on Tuesday and agreed to the cease-fire terms with Russia that President Trump demanded. In return the U.S. says it has restored its intelligence help to Ukraine, as Russia keeps attacking.
Ukraine agreed to a 30-day cease-fire if Russia also accepts, which is an offer Kyiv couldn’t refuse. Mr. Trump’s withdrawal of intelligence and military aid to Ukraine was costing Ukrainian lives on the battlefield. Russia was gaining ground in particular against Ukrainian positions in the Russian region of Kursk. The unfrozen American aid includes $1 billion in equipment that the Biden Administration had approved but was still in the pipeline.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. will now present its cease-fire offer to Moscow. “I hope they’re going to say yes. And if they do, then I think we made great progress,” Mr. Rubio said in Saudi Arabia after the talks with Ukrainian leaders. “If they say no, then we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace here.”
If Russia accepts the cease-fire offer, this will not mean peace in our time. Vladimir Putin has made many cease-fire promises, only to tell his troops to take ground when they can and then blame Ukraine. That’s what happened in the Minsk accords of the 2010s. Mr. Putin may want a cease-fire as an opportunity for a military respite and to rearm.
A particular test of the cease-fire will be if the fighting stops in the Kursk region. Ukraine took territory inside Russia in part as negotiating leverage to induce Moscow to cede some of the ground it has taken from Ukraine.
The bigger question is how Mr. Trump will persuade Mr. Putin to agree to peace terms that Ukraine can accept. Mr. Trump has been willing to bludgeon Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept a cease-fire without security guarantees. Mr. Putin has made no concessions of any kind to date. Everyone welcomes even a temporary end to the killing, but it will resume with a vengeance if Ukraine is unable to defend itself as Mr. Putin waits for his next opportunity to mount another assault.
The Economist, March 10
Desert gambit : America and Ukraine prepare for brutal negotiations
To get a deal in Jeddah Ukraine must first make peace with Donald Trump
Full text :
FOR TEN DAYS, since the shouting-match in the Oval Office, Ukraine has been scorched by Donald Trump’s wrath. Now comes a moment of catharsis—or another round of brutal punishment. On March 11th America and Ukrainian delegations are due to meet in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The American side says the goal is to create “a framework for a peace agreement and an initial ceasefire”. Yet on the Ukrainian side, amid the hope, there are fears the meeting could be a shake-down, a delaying tactic or an attempt by Mr Trump to win concessions that benefit Russia. The summit comes as Russia is escalating its military pressure on Ukraine. Drone and missile strikes are hammering Kyiv and other cities. Russian and North Korean soldiers are making a new push to eject Ukraine from Kursk, the enclave inside Russia it captured last year.
The talks involve powerful teams on both sides. The American delegation will include Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, and Mike Waltz, the national security adviser. But the negotiating will probably be led by Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s confidant and roving envoy, who recently met Vladimir Putin and who is negotiating for the president over the Middle East, too. The Ukrainian side will be led by Andriy Yermak, Volodymyr Zelensky’s closest aide and a powerful figure behind the throne. He will be joined by the foreign minister, Andriy Sibiha, the defence minister, Rustem Umerov, and Pavlo Palisa, a military aide. All were technically appointed by Mr Zelensky, but are also widely considered to be Yermak loyalists. One problem, however, is that Mr Yermak is not popular with the Trump team. And, in a strange situation that Ukraine insists is a coincidence, Mr Zelensky himself will be in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, on Monday, for talks with the Kingdom.
Ukraine has several objectives and has been shaping its strategy with France and Britain, which have become intermediaries between the White House and Kyiv. At a minimum it wants to sign a framework for joint American and Ukrainian mineral development. On March 7th Mr Zelensky also proposed an air and naval cease-fire: the idea, according to a Western official, is to put the ball back in Russia’s court by making demands on it. Both developments would, Western officials hope, create a sense that Ukraine is ready to engage with Mr Trump. If Russia says no to a framework that has been accepted by America and Ukraine, it would be up to Mr Trump to try to press Vladimir Putin to accept its terms. But it is still not remotely clear what terms America will bring to Saudi Arabia.
Ukraine will probably make clear that any peace deal that limits its ability to re-arm, forces it to legally recognise occupied territory as Russian, or interferes in Ukrainian domestic politics—for instance by insisting on elections which are currently impossible because the country is under martial law—is unacceptable. Lastly, Ukraine may continue to demand security guarantees from America. It seems unlikely it will make progress on this point. Britain and France are asking that America provide a “backstop” force for European peacekeepers, should a full ceasefire be agreed. But so far, there has been no commitment from Washington. Last week America curtailed its intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
What does Russia want? Some reports in recent days have suggested that Mr Putin may be open to a truce under certain conditions. But the game unfolding may well be more sophisticated and cynical than that. A highly-placed source close to the Kremlin suggests Russia intends to demand a Ukrainian declaration of neutrality, and that foreign peacekeepers be ruled out. It is probably impossible for Ukraine to even consider such conditions—at least not before real negotiations have even begun. Kurt Volker, who served as Special Representative to Ukraine in Mr Trump’s first administration, says Russia will twist any truce proposal. “They’ll say: we can’t agree to that, but let’s do something else. Putin is smart enough not to just say no.” A former Ukrainian diplomat says American and Russia have been mirroring each others’ tactics, “salami-slicing” concessions from Ukraine before substantial negotiations begin. Any subsequent talks will seek to move further into Ukrainian red lines. The American end game has become a moving target, he says.
Any successful and enduring peace deal would require America to put pressure on the Kremlin to comply and then continue to do so. On March 7th Mr Trump did threaten to impose major sanctions on Russia. But most of the evidence suggests that he is sympathetic to Mr Putin. Hours later Mr Trump said “I’m finding it more difficult, frankly, to deal with Ukraine…In terms of getting a final settlement, it may be easier dealing with Russia.” Mr Volker says that “Trump is trying to keep Ukraine on a short leash because he wants them to accept whatever peace he can get…the Ukrainians are the obstacle because they’re not surrendering.”
A senior Ukrainian security official says he has seen no evidence that the Americans are contemplating a complete exit from Ukraine, yet, let alone Europe. “The hope is that as soon as we have a truce, we’ll be on a more rational track again,” he says.
Others are less sanguine. The dangerous prospect looms for Ukraine that failed talks could trigger even more pressure from America. Another Ukrainian official warns that America’s approach, if it continues, could leave Ukraine in a “grey zone”. That would force it to use more vicious military tactics for its survival. Already, he says, strong personalities dominate the negotiations, adding a Ukrainian proverb: “Yake yikhаlо, take y zdybalo” (like attracts like). The stakes of Tuesday’s talks could not be higher. If they collapse, Ukraine is unlikely to get another chance: “The Americans will double down on instructional mode, and force whatever they and Russia decide on us.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/03/09/america-and-ukraine-prepare-for-brutal-negotiations
The Economist, March 6
Pluses and minuses : Ukraine is scrambling to find fresh fighters
A heavy-handed mobilisation campaign is unable to fill gaps in the front lines
Full text :
FOR OLEKSANDR SIKALCHUK it was a routine mission, far from the front line. The 39-year-old draft officer had been escorting a group of conscripts when, during a midnight stop for petrol in Poltava province, a man with a hunting rifle stepped out from the dark. He asked for Mr Sikalchuk’s weapons. The soldier refused, and the man shot him dead. The killer escaped with one of the conscripts, someone he seemed to know. The incident was the first in a shocking spate of attacks on draft officers in the first week of February. Ukraine’s security services blamed the events on Russian infiltrators. Soldiers suspect the Poltava attack was home-grown. “It’d be nice to blame Russia,” said Roman Istomin, a colleague of the slain soldier. “But perhaps it’s something far worse.”
The attacks on Ukraine’s draft system could hardly come at a worse time. Though movement on the eastern front lines has slowed during the past few weeks, as Russian forces regroup ahead of a possible new push, the fighting remains bloody. Potential recruits see this, and many prefer to hide, or run. So Ukraine’s draft officers have responded by turning up the dial of coercion. Their excesses are captured on film, and amplified gleefully by Russian social-media networks. “We botched mobilisation,” says “Artem”, an officer from the 46th brigade, who argues that political constraints have got in the way of military need. He saw his unit pushed out of Kurakhove, a stronghold in eastern Ukraine, in early January when it ran out of men. “Ten Russians to one Ukrainian. A group of four soldiers with responsibility for holding multiple high-rises, each with three or four entrances. It wasn’t even close.”
Russia’s manpower superiority isn’t immediately obvious from the overall numbers. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, says his country’s army is 880,000-strong. Russia’s grouping in and around Ukraine is thought to be 720,000, including reserves and security forces. That seems a reasonable ratio, given the fact Ukraine is largely defending home ground.
But the raw comparison is misleading. Where it matters—on the front line, in the trenches—Russia is replacing its losses much faster than Ukraine. It is able to throw men forward, often with the incentive of Russian rifles pointing at their backs, in a way Ukraine is not. In 2024 Russia added 430,000 men without reverting to general mobilisation. Even after staggering losses the headcount grew by about 140,000, and it is planned to increase by about the same amount this year. Russia’s Ukraine grouping is also supported by other elements of its wider, officially 1.5m-strong army. “I guarantee at least 1m Russian soldiers are involved in the war against us,” says a senior Ukrainian official.
To close the gap, Ukraine faces tough choices. One way would be to lower its mobilisation age from 25 to 18. The idea would be very unpopular in the country and does not even sit well with all its commanders. Artem, from the 46th, is one of the doubtful ones. “Many fathers are fighting precisely so their sons don’t have to,” he says. But Western advisers appear fixated on it, arguing that it would provide the quickest boost in combat strength.
Even Mr Zelensky’s officials admit that Ukraine will have to expand its mobilisation if it is to stay in the fight. Officially the government is prioritising the war effort over everything else. Unofficially it is keeping a trickier balance: reconciling the front-line needs with those of an economy under pressure. Right now, the government protects just under 1m “critical” workers from the draft. But the contradictions of the policy, which takes into account factors like tax revenue, are demonstrated by the fact that some workers in one well-known chain of perfume stores are protected, but many drone manufacturers are not. “Zelensky is trying to have it both ways,” argues one European official. “But he may need to risk his economy more if he is to have a country at all.”
Anticipating pressure from Western allies, Mr Zelensky has already announced his own programme to boost voluntary recruitment, starting with 18-24-year-olds. The programme in some ways mirrors the Russian recruitment scheme: large sign-up bonuses, competitive pay and the opportunity to leave after a year. Mr Zelensky’s adviser insists that is where the similarity ends. The young recruits will not be “cannon fodder”, he says, but trained to the highest standards in one of half a dozen of Ukraine’s elite brigades. The goal is at least 4,000 young recruits per month, another official says. Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former defence minister, says that manpower alone cannot stop a slow retreat. Ukraine must also change the way it fights so that its operations are cleverer, hit Russians deeper and require fewer people. “We cannot win if we continue to play Russia’s attrition games,” he says.
Mr Trump guarantees one thing if nothing else: tomorrow will be different. Perhaps, amid the chaos and ultimatums, he will engineer a ceasefire on reasonable terms. A month into his second presidency it is looking more likely that he won’t. If the war indeed carries on, and Russia continues to recruit as it has done, Ukraine’s mobilisation will have to get even tougher. “The tightening will continue,” says the Ukrainian official, “because no one has come up with a better solution.” That prospect risks cracking open divisions in an already exhausted nation, and spurring more violence against draft officers. ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/02/26/ukraine-is-scrambling-to-find-fresh-fighters
The Wall Street Journal, March 5
Zelensky Issues a Tacit Apology
Will Trump now take yes for an answer and lift his arms embargo on Kyiv?
Full text :
Volodymyr Zelensky took a major step on Tuesday toward mending ties with President Trump, issuing what amounts to a tacit apology for what he called last Friday’s “regrettable” White House slugfest. The question now is whether Mr. Trump will take yes for an answer and put comparable pressure on Vladimir Putin to
“My team and I stand ready to work under President Trump’s strong leadership to get a peace that lasts,” Mr. Zelensky said in a post on X.com. He reiterated Ukraine’s gratitude for U.S. weapons and financial support. Ukraine is ready at “any time and in any convenient format” to sign the minerals agreement that Mr. Trump sees as a precursor to a broader peace deal, Mr. Zelensky added.
Give credit to Ukraine’s president for the grace note, which recognizes the reality that his country needs American help to forge an honorable peace, and maybe to survive as a sovereign nation. The important point is to move past Friday’s mess.
Will Mr. Trump accept this show of respect? It isn’t clear after Administration officials leaked that they have “paused” the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. This includes arms already in the pipeline. Sources say a main weapons transit point in Poland was essentially shut down on Tuesday.
The Trump embargo was announced before Mr. Zelensky’s statement, and at least the U.S. doesn’t appear to have suspended intelligence support and weapons targeting assistance. Ukraine has enough weapons to last through the summer, but the U.S. is the free world’s arsenal of air defense missiles, which are defending Ukraine’s troops, cities and power grid. A Ukraine weapons crunch is an invitation for Mr. Putin to accelerate his attacks—and increase Russian leverage at the negotiating table.
Ukrainians have fought with valor as Mr. Trump has said himself, but a public U.S. abandonment will hurt front-line morale. For all the talk of the war as a stalemate, the Russians are still trying to break through Ukraine’s defensive lines, and Mr. Putin is still gaining territory, albeit slowly and at great cost.
Everybody understands that Ukraine won’t recover its borders from 2014 or, alas, even 2022. But what is Mr. Putin giving up? As Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute noted recently, Mr. Putin is demanding as the price of a deal Ukrainian territory he doesn’t even occupy. If the Russian wants a cease-fire, it’s to take a breather, rearm, and await the next invasion opportunity.
No doubt Mr. Trump views this as a bitter truth, but his own political fortunes are tied up with Ukraine’s fate. If Ukraine falls to Russia, Mr. Trump will own what would be his version of Joe Biden’s Afghanistan. Americans should be rooting for a Trump-Zelensky diplomatic reconciliation.
The Guardian, March 5
Trump praises letter from Ukraine’s Zelenskyy backing talks ‘to bring lasting peace closer’
Excerpts:
US president appears to soften tone in wake of clash with Ukrainian counterpart, but repeats threats to take control of Greenland
Donald Trump has said he appreciated Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s willingness to sign a minerals deal with the United States and come to the negotiating table to bring a lasting peace in Ukraine closer.
“Earlier today, I received an important letter from President Zelenskyy of Ukraine,” the US president said in a speech to Congress following last week’s disastrous meeting at the White House. Quoting from the letter, Trump said Zelenskyy told him that “Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer. Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians.”
“My team and I stand ready to work under President Trump’s strong leadership to get a peace that lasts,” Trump quoted Zelenskyy as writing. “We do really value how much America has done to help Ukraine maintain its sovereignty and independence.”
Trump also said he had been in “serious discussions with Russia” and claimed he had “received strong signals that they are ready for peace”.
“Wouldn’t that be beautiful?” he said. “It’s time to stop this madness. It’s time to halt the killing. It’s time to end this senseless war. If you want to end wars you have to talk to both sides.”
The comments marked a slight softening of Trump’s language on Ukraine in the wake of the Oval Office clash, after which he ordered a pause on all US military aid to Ukraine.
Trump was expected to further outline his plans for Ukraine and Russia in the speech to Congress, but did not reveal any more details. (…)
The Economist, March 5
America and Ukraine : The lesson from Trump’s Ukrainian weapons freeze
And the grim choice facing Volodymyr Zelensky
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/5-mars-1.pdf
Link: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/03/04/the-lesson-from-trumps-ukrainian-weapons-embargo
The Economist, March 4
Bracing for the off-switch : As Trump suspends military aid, what are the brutal chokeholds on Ukraine?
The war-torn country can substitute some—but nothing like all—of the kit it gets from America
Full text :
IN A SLEEK business tower in Kyiv, a group of engineers huddle around a new, carbon black attack drone called Batyar, the “rogue”. It looks a near analogue of the Iranian-Russian Shahed drones that have been terrorising Ukrainian cities for the past few months. With a range of up to 1,500km, a cost of just $25,000, and an optical terrain-recognition system that renders it resistant to most electronic jamming, the model is likely to offer its Russian rival stiff competition. It is the joint effort of Ukrainian and American firms, one of many collaborations where technology is shared and refined in combat. “Big American corporations are frightened,” says the Ukrainian officer co-ordinating the project. “They know that they can’t compete.”
The war has made Ukraine a world leader in drone technologies—superseding many Western weapons, such as Javelin anti-tank missiles. Yet its war effort remains deeply reliant on Western and American military support. Late on March 3rd the White House suspended all military aid to Ukraine, until the government in Kyiv showed more of a commitment to Donald Trump’s plans for peace. Rumours of such a move began before the meeting of Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office on February 28th. Talk of a cut-off had only heightened in off-the-record briefings since then. No wonder Ukraine is anxious. “No one wants to believe in the worst-case scenario,” says a source close to the military leadership, “but there is worry that some items will be simply impossible to replace.”
The critical elements of American support are weapons; the ability to maintain and repair them; the air-defence missiles that keep cities functioning; the Starlink system that is the backbone of military communications; and, perhaps most critically, intelligence sharing. Ukrainian soldiers know what follows when the flow of American weapons dries up. In late 2023, Donald Trump instructed Republicans in Congress to hold up approval of the next package of military aid. The consequent shortage of shells continued for six months. Senior-Lieutenant Nazary Kishak was one of the soldiers who saw that afflict the front lines. In Bakhmut the Russians used a 10:1 artillery advantage to kill some of Ukraine’s best officers and destroy the city completely. Many Ukrainians lost their lives needlessly, he says.
Ukraine can substitute a lot of artillery firepower with its own drone systems. In this respect, it is simply a matter of finding the money: the local defence industries are running below full capacity. Ukrainian drones have proven themselves on the battlefield, are often more effective than artillery, and come at a fraction of the cost. Artillery, however, still has its place, and the dozens of new systems rolling off Ukrainian production lines every month will be of limited use without shells. The loss of American Bradley fighting vehicles would be just as damaging. The end of GPS-guided GMLRS rockets would also give Russia much greater freedom of manoeuvre tens of kilometres behind the front lines. Lieutenant Kishak says a stop order on such weapons would simply result in “more Bakhmuts” and more dead Ukrainians.
Ammunition flows are less important than other components of American assistance. Only America is able to produce high-end weapons like the Patriot missiles that can intercept the Russian hypersonic and ballistic missiles raining down on cities. On paper, the French/Italian SAMP/T system could be a substitute, if it could be produced at scale. In practice, the system is unable to neutralise the fastest missiles, though a more advanced version is expected next year. Halting supplies of Patriot missiles would see more of Ukraine subjected to the kind of destruction experienced in cities near the front, such as Kharkiv, where it is generally too dangerous to deploy the expensive systems. Other sources of Patriot interceptors might be available—America has been working to enable Japan to co-produce these, for instance—but probably not in large numbers. And America would need to approve any transfer.
The Starlink satellite network, which is paid for by Poland, but controlled by the Americans, is another irreplaceable resource. It is not clear whether the cut-off in military aid will affect the system, but the Ukrainians have produced workarounds before—not least during operations in Russia’s Kursk region, where Starlink systems are mostly disabled. Here, engineers used mobile technologies and drone relays to provide soldiers with communications. A Ukrainian official says a back-up using similar technologies is in the works. “We have one that could roll out in days, a more extensive solution in three months.” But the switch would be difficult and leave the Ukrainians without one of their key battlefield advantages. Lieutenant Kishak, who led some operations in Kursk, says the alternative systems are inferior in important aspects, not least their susceptibility to Russian electronic warfare.
Most vital of all is American intelligence, which is provided via NATO arrangements. This is what allows the country’s armed forces to see all manner of threats: Russian planes when they are about to strike; Russian forces as they prepare to launch new invasions; the flow of Russian, Iranian and North Korean weapons; the stores, logistics and operational hubs of the Russian war machine. It allows Ukraine to guide, in real time, rockets and drones to targets inside Russia. Ukrainian drones can see in the short distance behind the current front lines. But American eyes let them see deep. American officials in Europe Command (EUCOM), which oversees all American forces on the continent, use artificial intelligence to fuse data from satellite images, electronic intelligence and other sources to identify high-value targets. A Western military official says Europe might be able to provide some of the capability—Britain, for example, routinely flies Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft over the Black Sea—but not quite as quickly. “With this kind of warfare, it’s all about timing. Without US intelligence, Ukraine will struggle with dynamic targeting,” a phrase that refers to seeing and striking new targets as they appear.
Despite the ominous signs, Ukrainian officials decline to make apocalyptic predictions. For one thing, nothing has yet been decided in Washington. Arms production in key election states might also make it hard for Mr Trump to halt aid completely. But part of the assurance stems from a quiet confidence that Ukraine is managing to stabilise its eastern front. Precision strikes on logistics and fuel depots deep inside Russia have been successful. Ukraine’s army also appears to be in a more effective fighting shape under a new operational commander, Mykhailo Drapaty. Denys Yaroslavsky, a reconnaissance officer in Kharkiv, says Ukrainian brigades could potentially withstand future Russian offensives even if American aid dries up. Another senior Ukrainian predicts, “there will be a slow decline, and perhaps the front line may recede somewhat, but there will be no tragedy.”
For those involved in Ukraine’s defence industries, the psychological blow might be as damaging as the material one. It would feel like a betrayal, they say—especially for those accustomed to the seamless technological collaboration seen in projects like the Batyar drone. Sergiy Koshman, a prominent figure in Ukraine’s mil-tech sector suggests a rupture would hurt the West, too. “Americans have been developing and testing their own capabilities here. If the worst comes to pass and our partners prove unreliable, we will have to make our choices accordingly. As a result of this scenario everyone in the West will be a loser.” ■
The Wall Street Journal, March 4
Ukraine Holds a Weak Hand
If Zelensky rejects the Trump framework for peace, he’s unlikely to force a better deal.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/4-mars-3.pdf
The Telegraph, March 4
Trump is being played by Putin – Russia will never accept a peace deal
The invasion of Ukraine wrecked Moscow’s finances – but it’s now the Kremlin’s only source of growth
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/4-mars-2.pdf
New York Times, March 3
Guest Essay: Ukraine Is Europe’s War Now
By Dmytro Kuleba, the foreign minister of Ukraine from 2020 to 2024. He wrote from Kyiv, Ukraine.
Full text:
On Friday, after a grim-faced Volodymyr Zelensky departed the White House, President Trump wrote on social media that the Ukrainian leader could “come back when he is ready for Peace.”
Peace is a powerful word, but to grasp its true meaning one has to look at the context in which it is uttered. On the same day that Mr. Trump spoke of the importance of peace and sent Mr. Zelensky home to think about it, Russia launched more than 150 attack drones on Ukrainian cities. While Mr. Trump emphasizes that he is making great progress with President Vladimir Putin of Russia toward peace, the latter has only increased his strikes since the inauguration.
On Sunday, European leaders, Secretary General Mark Rutte of NATO and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada gathered in London at the invitation of Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, and pledged to bolster support for Ukraine and develop a plan to end the war that could win the support of Mr. Trump.
Europeans understand, as the Trump administration appears not to, that Ukraine wants a peace deal — it just doesn’t want to end up destroyed by the peace terms. The obsession of Mr. Putin is all of Ukraine, nothing less. It is neither NATO nor a strip of Ukrainian land. If Ukraine is still independent and armed by the end of negotiations, Mr. Putin will not see that as the end. He will settle for a piece of Ukraine today only to come for the whole tomorrow.
If it were about NATO, then Mr. Putin would not have so meekly accepted Sweden and Finland’s accession in 2023. Today, NATO’s frontier is closer to St. Petersburg than Ukraine’s border is to Moscow.
Nor is the point to retain the roughly 20 percent of territory that Russia has managed to wrest from Ukraine so far in this war. Mr. Putin cannot tolerate an independent Ukraine because for the last 300 years almost none of his predecessors could. And because if Ukraine is successful as a democratic, Western democracy, it will pose a direct threat to the Russian people’s acceptance of Mr. Putin’s autocratic model.
Mr. Trump has made a cease-fire in Ukraine too central to his foreign policy to not succeed. He cannot fail to make a deal and he certainly cannot allow Ukraine to become what Afghanistan was to President Biden, a foreign policy failure that defined the rest of his presidency. Trapped by his own ambition, Mr. Trump craves fast success — hence last week’s attack on Mr. Zelensky, whose insistence on terms Ukraine can live with seems to stand in the way of it. Mr. Putin understands this. He therefore may concede to a cease-fire to take the maximum benefits offered by Mr. Trump, but he will not concede on abandoning his strategic goal of destroying Ukraine. Without security guarantees the war will, at some point, start again.
Friday’s events were the formalization of a new reality that has been becoming apparent for several weeks: America may still seek to lead the world, but it’s a different world. And if there was any silver lining to the scene of Mr. Trump and Vice President JD Vance berating Mr. Zelensky in the Oval Office, it was the shock waves it sent across Europe. European leaders who had heard Mr. Vance’s words of admonishment at Munich in February already grasped that they could not simply wait out Mr. Trump as they did during his first term. Any who still doubted that were surely convinced by Friday’s performance.
Europe has already taken important steps and it’s promising to do more: Summits, telephone calls, draft decisions on a surge in defense spending and announcements of assistance to Ukraine are now happening at a blistering pace. As welcome as these developments are, they fail to answer the most fundamental question about the future of Ukraine and the rest of Europe: When? When will these ideas become implemented decisions?
Mr. Trump’s leverage over Ukraine is weapons and money, both of which Ukraine needs to sustain its fight for survival and maintain economic stability. Europe could wrest the cards from the president’s hands in two moves: offer an alternative agreement on Ukraine’s minerals and confiscate Russian frozen assets to use them to finance the production and purchase of arms — including from the United States, if they wish. The European Union, Britain and Norway could not entirely replace the United States as Ukraine’s supporters, but these pragmatic steps would instantly elevate Europe’s role and give Ukraine the breathing room it needs.
In 1918, Bolshevik Russia entered into a treaty with Germany, undertaking to recognize Ukraine’s independence, withdraw its forces and cease propaganda on Ukrainian territory. At the same time, Kyiv signed an agreement with Germany to exchange vast natural resources — primarily grain and meat — in return for German boots on the ground to protect its independence. Within a year the deal collapsed. Germany moved out, Russia’s Red Army moved in and the state of Ukraine ceased to exist. It took 104 years between then and the Russian invasion in 2022 for Europe to finally recognize that Ukraine belongs to it by putting it on the track of the E.U. accession process.
Moscow never really changes, but Europe still might.
Dmytro Kuleba was the foreign minister of Ukraine from 2020 to 2024. He is a senior fellow at the Harvard Belfer Center.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/03/opinion/ukraine-war-zelensky-trump.html
The Wall Street Journal, March 2
White House Clash Raises Tough Question for Ukraine: How Long Could It Fight Without U.S.?
Kyiv would have to lean on Europe and its own defense production, likely facing shortages within months
Excerpts:
KYIV—A combative White House meeting has presented Ukraine with the prospect of fighting Russia without the support of its primary military backer through the first three years of the war.
Now, the question is whether Europe has the firepower—and the political will—to help Ukraine hold off the Russians.
Without Washington at its side, Ukraine would have to lean more heavily on its European allies and its own domestic defense production. It could likely maintain its current fighting strength for at least a few months, officials and analysts say. After that, it could face shortages of ammunition and lose access to some of its most sophisticated weapons. (…)
A parade of European leaders have expressed solidarity with Ukraine after the meeting in the Oval Office descended into an unusual on-camera clash between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. (…) The coming weeks will show whether Europe can back up its rhetoric by stepping up support for Ukraine if Washington walks away. (…)
In the past, Zelensky has been skeptical of Europe’s ability to act alone to defend Ukraine. He has consistently said that the U.S. would be needed to deter the Kremlin from attacking his country again in the future if there were a cease-fire deal. He stressed that again on Friday in his meeting with Trump. (…)
The U.S. has sent nearly $70 billion in military aid—dwarfing contributions from any of Kyiv’s other allies—since the start of the war, according to Zelensky.
But European nations have been steadily stepping up their support throughout the war. The EU and its member states have given over $50 billion in military assistance.
Last year, the EU, the U.K. and Norway combined gave Ukraine around $25 billion in military aid—more than the U.S. sent, according to European officials.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has vastly expanded its domestic arms industry, producing $30 billion a year in weaponry, according to Ukrainian officials. Last year, the country produced 1.5 million drones, which have played an increasingly important role on the front lines, allowing Ukraine to hold off Russian forces with minimal casualties. Ukraine says it can produce 3,000 missiles and 30,000 long-range drones this year. (…)
Some advanced U.S. weapons, such as its air-defense systems and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, will be impossible for Ukraine to replace in the short-term once supplies begin to run out. Europe doesn’t make enough of them. (…)
On Friday, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, one of Trump’s closest European allies, called for a summit between the U.S. and Europe to discuss Europe and other security challenges.
The EU has already earmarked 30 billion euros, equivalent to about $31 billion, for Ukraine for this year, and some of that could be used as military aid. But much of that sum is expected to go toward budget assistance that Kyiv needs to pay salaries and keep basic services going as well as potential military aid.
Some European diplomats say the EU should commit to at least matching last year’s 20 billion euros in military assistance for Ukraine. But reaching agreement on that ahead of the meeting in Brussels in two weeks will be a challenge, given the need for most EU leaders to back such a plan. (…)
Pressure is rising in Europe to seize nearly 200 billion euros in frozen Russian assets sitting mainly in Belgium to bolster support, but the idea still lacks backing from Europe’s most powerful countries. (…)
Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics and Ukraine’s former economic development minister, said that Europe had the capacity to help Ukraine—including, potentially, buying American weapons to send to Kyiv.
But he said it was an open question whether European leaders would continue standing with Ukraine if Trump started pressing them to back away. He noted that Trump had leverage over European leaders, and he could potentially threaten, for example, to cut them off from U.S. intelligence.
“Right now, Europe is showing solidarity and support,” Mylovanov said. “They’re less independent from Trump than they think.”
Fox News, 1 mars
Zelensky vient de donner une interview à la chaîne conservatrice et pro-Trump Fox News.
Résumé en français :
Les principales déclarations de Zelensky dans son interview avec Fox News :
• Il a remercié Donald Trump et les États-Unis pour leur aide, affirmant qu’elle avait permis à l’Ukraine de survivre.
• Il se dit prêt à signer un accord sur les ressources minérales, le considérant comme un premier pas vers la sécurité.
• L’accord sur les minéraux est important mais insuffisant : il attend davantage et espère que Trump a un plan pour stopper Poutine.
• Il n’a pas l’intention de s’excuser auprès de Trump.
• Question du journaliste : « Retourneriez-vous à la Maison-Blanche en ce moment ? » Zelensky : « Non. »
• L’Ukraine ne renoncera pas à ses valeurs, même si l’absence d’aide américaine compliquera la situation. • Des garanties de sécurité sont essentielles. L’option la plus rapide est l’adhésion à l’OTAN, mais si cela n’aboutit pas, l’Ukraine est prête à bâtir son propre système de sécurité.
• L’Europe se renforce, mais elle a besoin d’un allié aux États-Unis.
• L’Ukraine a besoin d’une paix durable, et non d’un simple cessez-le-feu que la Russie violerait.
• Les Ukrainiens ne renonceront pas, même face à la menace du retour de Poutine.
• La démission de Zelensky est une décision qui appartient exclusivement au peuple ukrainien.
• Il ignore si l’altercation à la Maison-Blanche était planifiée. • Il ne veut pas perdre le partenariat avec les États-Unis.
• Regrette-t-il ce qui s’est passé ? Oui, il estime que c’était une mauvaise situation.
• Selon lui, le conflit avec Trump a été alimenté par des récits exagérés affirmant que l’Ukraine était détruite, que des millions de personnes avaient péri et qu’il était devenu un dictateur.
• Zelensky dément : « Nous n’avons pas subi des pertes de l’ordre d’un million. »
• Il croit en la possibilité de restaurer les relations avec Trump, car le lien historique entre les peuples ukrainien et américain reste fort.
https://x.com/AmourskyCyrille/status/1895618530881781981
New York Times, March 1
Bret Stephens : A Day of American Infamy
Full text :
In August 1941, about four months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill aboard warships in Newfoundland’s Placentia Bay and agreed to the Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration by the world’s leading democratic powers on “common principles” for a postwar world.
Among its key points: “no aggrandizement, territorial or other”; “sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them”; “freedom from fear and want”; freedom of the seas; “access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”
The charter, and the alliance that came of it, is a high point of American statesmanship. On Friday in the Oval Office, the world witnessed the opposite. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s embattled democratic leader, came to Washington prepared to sign away anything he could offer President Trump except his nation’s freedom, security and common sense. For that, he was rewarded with a lecture on manners from the most mendacious vulgarian and ungracious host ever to inhabit the White House.
If Roosevelt had told Churchill to sue for peace on any terms with Adolf Hitler and to fork over Britain’s coal reserves to the United States in exchange for no American security guarantees, it might have approximated what Trump did to Zelensky. Whatever one might say about how Zelensky played his cards poorly — either by failing to behave with the degree of all-fours sycophancy that Trump demands or to maintain his composure in the face of JD Vance’s disingenuous provocations — this was a day of American infamy.
Where do we go from here?
If there’s one silver lining to this fiasco, it’s that Zelensky did not sign the agreement on Ukrainian minerals that was forced on him this month by Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary who’s the Tom Hagen character in this protection-racket administration. The United States is entitled to some kind of reward for helping Ukraine defend itself — and Ukraine’s destruction of much of Russia’s military might should top the list, followed by the innovation Ukraine demonstrated in pioneering revolutionary forms of low-cost drone warfare, which the Pentagon will be keen to emulate.
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But if it’s a financial payback that the Trump administration seeks, the best place to get it is to seize, in collaboration with our European partners, Russia’s frozen assets and put them into an account by which Ukraine could pay for American-made arms. If the United States won’t do this, the Europeans should: Let the Ukrainians rely for their arms on Dassault, Saab, Rheinmetall, BAE Systems and other European defense contractors and see how that goes over with the “America First”-ers. Hopefully that could serve as another spur to Europeans to invest, as quickly and heavily as they can, in their depleted militaries, not simply to strengthen NATO but also to hedge against its end.
There is a second opportunity: While Trump’s abuse of Zelensky might delight the MAGA crowd, it isn’t likely to play well with most voters, including the almost 30 percent of Republicans who, even now, believe it’s in our interest to stand with Ukraine. And while most Americans may want to see the war in Ukraine end, they almost surely don’t want to see it end on Vladimir Putin’s terms.
Nor should the Trump administration. A Russian victory in Ukraine, including a cease-fire that allows Moscow to consolidate its gains and recoup its strength before the next assault, will have precisely the same effect as the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan: emboldening American enemies to behave more aggressively. Notice that, as Trump has ratcheted up pressure on Ukraine in recent weeks, Taiwan reported a surge in Chinese military drills around the island, while Chinese warships held live-fire exercises off the coast of Vietnam and came within 150 nautical miles of Sydney.
Those are points honorable conservatives should press: Can Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Representative Don Bacon of Nebraska — two Republicans who haven’t sold their souls on Ukraine — lead a delegation of like-minded conservatives to Kyiv?
More so, this should be an opportunity for Democrats. Joe Biden was right when he called this a “decisive decade” for the future of the free world; he just happened to be too feeble and cautious a messenger.
But there are tough-minded Democrats with military and security backgrounds — Representative Jason Crow of Colorado, Representative Seth Moulton of Massachusetts and Senator Elissa Slotkin of Michigan come to mind — who can restore the spirit of Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy to the Democratic Party. It’s a message of toughness and freedom they might also be able to sell to at least some Trump voters, who cast their ballots in November for the sake of a better America, not a greater Russia.
Still, there’s no getting around the fact that Friday was a dreadful day — dreadful for Ukraine, for the free world, for the legacy of an America that once stood for the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Roosevelt and Reagan must be spinning in their graves, as are Churchill and Thatcher. It’s up to the rest of us to reclaim America’s honor from the gangsters who besmirched it in the White House.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/opinion/a-day-of-american-infamy.html
New York Times, March 1
This Never Happened With an American President Before
By Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion Columnist
Full text :
What happened in the Oval Office on Friday — the obviously planned ambush of President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine by President Trump and Vice President JD Vance — was something that had never happened in the nearly 250-year history of this country: In a major war in Europe, our president clearly sided with the aggressor, the dictator and the invader against the democrat, the freedom fighter and the invaded. (…)
It is hard to express what a break this is in American foreign policy. We stood on the side of liberty and those fighting for it around the world. There are times the isolationist forces in our population have held us back and had to be persuaded. There have been times when — in support of the larger cause of liberty — against dangerous foes like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, we had to align ourselves temporarily with dictators.
But I can’t think of a single time when an American president declared that the democratically elected leader of a country preserving liberty was a “dictator” who started the war with his neighbor — when it was the vicious neighboring dictator who actually started the war.
If you listen to Trump, everything we have done for Ukraine is pure altruism. We have no actual interests at stake ourselves in its fate or the triumph of liberty there. We have no actual interest in the fact that Ukraine is protecting the European Union — a giant, pro-American alliance of free markets and free people. It doesn’t matter a whit to Trump what happens to the E.U. or Ukraine. All that matters is that Zelensky says “thank you” louder for our altruism and that, in the middle of his war of survival, sign over a generation of Ukraine’s mineral wealth to us.
This is a total perversion of U.S. foreign policy practiced by every president since World War I. My fellow Americans, we are in completely uncharted waters, led by a president, who — well, I cannot believe he is a Russian agent, but he sure plays one on TV.
Thomas L. Friedman is the foreign affairs Opinion columnist. He joined the paper in 1981 and has won three Pulitzer Prizes. He is the author of seven books, including “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/opinion/trump-zelensky.html
The Wall Street Journal, Editorial Board, March 1
Putin Wins the Trump-Zelensky Oval Office Spectacle
Vice President Vance starts a public fight that only helps Russia’s dictator.
Full text :
Toward the end of his on-camera, Oval Office brawl with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday, President Trump quipped that it was “great television.” He’s right about that. But the point of the meeting was supposed to be progress toward an honorable peace for Ukraine, and in the event the winner was Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
“He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office,” Mr. Trump wrote on social media on Friday afternoon after the exchange, while booting the Ukrainian president from the White House. “He can come back when he is ready for Peace.” The two didn’t sign a planned agreement on minerals that would have at least given Ukraine some hope of future U.S. support.
The meeting between Messrs. Trump and Zelensky started out smoothly enough. “It’s a big commitment from the United States, and we appreciate working with you very much, and we will continue to do that,” Mr. Trump said of the mineral deal. Mr. Zelensky showed photos of Ukrainians mistreated as prisoners of war. “That’s tough stuff,” Mr. Trump said.
But then the meeting, in front of the world, descended into recriminations. The nose dive began with an odd interjection from Vice President JD Vance, who appeared to be defending Mr. Trump’s diplomacy, which Mr. Zelensky hadn’t challenged. Mr. Zelensky rehearsed the many peace agreements Mr. Putin has shredded and essentially asked Mr. Vance what would be different this time.
Mr. Vance unloaded on Mr. Zelensky—that he was “disrespectful,” low on manpower, and gives visitors to Ukraine a “propaganda” tour. President Trump appeared piqued by Mr. Zelensky’s suggestion that the outcome in Ukraine would matter to the U.S. “Your country is in big trouble. You’re not winning,” Mr. Trump said at one point.
Why did the Vice President try to provoke a public fight? Mr. Vance has been taking to his X.com account in what appears to be an effort to soften up the political ground for a Ukraine surrender, most recently writing off Mr. Putin’s brutal invasion as a mere ethnic rivalry. Mr. Vance dressed down Mr. Zelensky as if he were a child late for dinner. He claimed the Ukrainian hadn’t been grateful enough for U.S. aid, though he has thanked America countless times for its support. This was not the behavior of a wannabe statesman.
Mr. Zelensky would have been wiser to defuse the tension by thanking the U.S. again, and deferring to Mr. Trump. There’s little benefit in trying to correct the historical record in front of Mr. Trump when you’re also seeking his help.
But as with the war, Mr. Zelensky didn’t start this Oval Office exchange. Was he supposed to tolerate an extended public denigration of the Ukrainian people, who have been fighting a war for survival for three years?
It is bewildering to see Mr. Trump’s allies defending this debacle as some show of American strength. The U.S. interest in Ukraine is shutting down Mr. Putin’s imperial project of reassembling a lost Soviet empire without U.S. soldiers ever having to fire a shot. That core interest hasn’t changed, but berating Ukraine in front of the entire world will make it harder to achieve.
Turning Ukraine over to Mr. Putin would be catastrophic for that country and Europe, but it would be a political calamity for Mr. Trump too. The U.S. President can’t simply walk away from that conflict, much as he would like to. Ukraine has enough weapons support to last until sometime this summer. But as the war stands, Mr. Putin sees little reason to make any concessions as his forces gain ground inch by bloody inch in Ukraine’s east.
Friday’s spectacle won’t make him any more willing to stop his onslaught as he sees the U.S. President and his eager deputy unload on Ukraine’s leader. Some Trumpologists have been suggesting Mr. Trump will put pressure on Mr. Putin in due time. But so far Mr. Putin hasn’t made a single concession on territory, or on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the future after a peace deal is signed.
President Trump no doubt resents having to deal with a war he thinks he might have prevented had he won in 2020. But Presidents have to deal with the world they inherit. Peace in Ukraine is salvageable, but he and Mr. Zelensky will have to work together on an agreement that Ukrainians can live with.
Mr. Trump does not want to be the President who abandoned Ukraine to Vladimir Putin with all the bloodshed and damage to U.S. interests that would result. Mr. Vance won’t like to run for President in such a world either.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1. März
Mit Schimpf und Schande aus dem Weissen Haus geworfen – von diesem Fiasko kann sich Selenski nicht so leicht erholen
Nach dem hässlichen Streit im Oval Office ist das Verhältnis zwischen Donald Trump und dem ukrainischen Präsidenten zerrüttet. Es droht ein politischer Bruch, der für die Ukraine katastrophale Folgen hat. Der lachende Dritte heisst Putin.
Excerpts:
Jahrelang hat der ukrainische Präsident Wolodimir Selenski im Umgang mit Donald Trump einen bewundernswerten Hochseilakt vollführt. So übel ihm der amerikanische Präsident auch mitspielte – Selenski behielt die Nerven. Als Trump 2019 in seiner ersten Amtszeit die Ukraine politisch zu erpressen versuchte und dadurch in den Strudel eines Impeachment-Verfahrens geriet, zog sich Selenski diskret aus der Affäre. Er kritisierte Trump auch nicht, als dieser im letztjährigen Wahlkampf offen für ein Ende der Militärhilfe an die Ukraine warb. Das war taktisch geschickt. Doch an diesem schwarzen Freitag brannten Selenski offenkundig alle Sicherungen durch. Die Folgen werden drastisch sein. (…)
Noch nie in der Geschichte des Weissen Hauses hat die Weltöffentlichkeit einen solchen Streit im Amtszimmer des amerikanischen Präsidenten erlebt. 40 Minuten lang schien das Treffen zwischen den beiden Staatsmännern in einigermassen guten Bahnen zu verlaufen. Doch dann eskalierte das Ganze in wenigen Augenblicken. Der Eklat begann, als sich Vizepräsident J. D. Vance in das Gespräch einschaltete und Selenski ihm klarzumachen versuchte, dass nach den unzähligen Wortbrüchen des Putin-Regimes Diplomatie mit Russland illusionär sei. Das war ein offener Angriff auf Trumps Versuch, einen Frieden zu vermitteln. (…)
Auf einer persönlichen Ebene hat Selenski viel Sympathie verdient: All die Falschinformationen, die Trump in den letzten Wochen über die Ukraine und ihren Präsidenten verbreitete, hinterliessen eine verständliche Frustration. Erst recht enttäuschend ist die Weigerung der neuen amerikanischen Regierung, gemeinsam mit den Europäern zu Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine beizutragen. Stattdessen äusserte Trump bei dem Treffen die naive Ansicht, dass man Putin vertrauen könne und allein schon die Präsenz amerikanischer Rohstofffirmen in der Ukraine genug Abschreckung gegenüber Russland darstellen werde.
Aber Selenski beging den Fehler, vor laufenden Kameras eine Grundsatzdebatte führen zu wollen, für die das Oval Office der falsche Ort war. Seine abweichende Haltung hätte er besser hinter verschlossenen Türen deutlich gemacht. (…)
Selenski hat in der Sache zwar recht – dem Kreml ist nicht zu trauen, ohne entschlossenen westlichen Rückhalt wird es für die Ukraine keinen Frieden geben, und Hilfe an Kiew ist kein blosses Almosen, sondern dient ebenso amerikanischen Interessen. Die abschätzige Art, wie die Administration Trump mit der vom Untergang bedrohten Ukraine umspringt, wirkt beschämend. Aber Selenski hätte sich keiner Illusion hingeben sollen, wer in dieser schwierigen Beziehung der Schwächere ist. (…)
Nun haben die Interessen der Ukraine Schaden erlitten; auch ihre politischen Unterstützer in Amerika geraten in die Defensive. Selenski muss deshalb schnell handeln, um einen völligen Bruch mit der Regierung Trump abzuwenden. Ohne eine förmliche Entschuldigung für seine Rolle bei dem Eklat wird dies kaum funktionieren. (…)
Niemand weiss, wie Trump nach dem peinlichen Vorfall handeln wird. Sicher ist, dass die ohnehin schon geringen Chancen auf neue grosse Waffenlieferungen der USA weiter gesunken sind. Kündigt Washington die Unterstützung vollständig auf, so hätte dies katastrophale Auswirkungen auf die Ukraine. (…)
Die Weltmacht verfügt auch über Waffensysteme, die den Europäern fehlen. Sie hat einzigartige Möglichkeiten bei der satellitengestützten Aufklärung sowie die federführende Rolle bei der Logistik hinter den internationalen Hilfslieferungen. Nicht zuletzt ist mit amerikanischem Rückhalt stets eine hohe politische Symbolik verbunden.
Es stehen deshalb Dinge auf dem Spiel, welche die Europäer selbst mit viel Geld nicht aufwiegen können. Freuen kann sich in dieser Situation nur eine Seite – das Putin-Regime in Moskau. Es kann triumphierend zuschauen, wie der Stern Selenskis sinkt und sich die westliche Allianz gleich selbst zerlegt.
New York Times, March 1
Putin Is Ready to Carve Up the World. Trump Just Handed Him the Knife.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/1-mars-1.pdf
Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/opinion/putin-trump-ukraine.html
The Economist, March 1
Friday fiasco : A disaster in the White House for Volodymyr Zelensky—and for Ukraine
J.D. Vance set a trap for the Ukrainian president, who declined to flatter Donald Trump
Excerpts:
“I’m not aligned with anybody. I’m aligned with the United States of America,” Mr Trump explained, sitting in the Oval Office alongside Mr Zelensky, Mr Vance and several aides. The American president offered to take another question, and Mr Vance interjected. He suggested that “what makes America a good country is America engaging in diplomacy. That’s what President Trump is doing.”
At this point Mr Zelensky might perhaps have flattered and cajoled Mr Trump, a course of action favoured by other recent visitors to Mr Trump’s White House including Emmanuel Macron of France and Sir Keir Starmer of Britain. Instead he recited a history of the conflict stretching back to 2014 and noted that Vladimir Putin had broken past deals. “What kind of diplomacy, J.D., are you speaking about?” Mr Zelensky asked in imperfect but clearly sardonic English. This played straight into the hands of Mr Vance, who had doubtless intended all along to attack and humiliate Mr Zelensky. (…)
Mr Zelensky had gone to Washington with two principal tasks: to protect Ukraine’s war effort with a continued flow of weapons, and to lay the basis for a peace deal that will last. Ukraine rightly believes that a ceasefire without credible Western-backed security guarantees is a trap that would allow Russia to rearm, and destabilise Ukraine internally. Mr Zelensky said as much: “We will never accept just a ceasefire.” But it was the wrong time to have that discussion with America’s leaders.
“I think it’s disrespectful for you to come into the Oval Office and try to litigate this in front of the American media right now,” the vice-president shot back. He then attacked Ukraine for “forcing conscripts to the frontlines” and, when asked by Mr Zelensky whether he had visited Ukraine, dismissed visits by other international leaders to the country as nothing more than “propaganda tour[s]”. (…)
During the Vance-Zelensky scuffle, Mr Trump initially appeared almost passive, the good cop to Mr Vance’s bad cop. Then Mr Zelensky went too far. “During the war, everybody has problems,” he asserted. With a “nice ocean” America was insulated for now “but you will feel it in the future.”
Mr Trump plainly did not like that. “Don’t tell us what we’re gonna feel,” he snarled, as the summit meeting tipped into catastrophe. He then added that Ukraine was in a bad place and was “gambling with world war three”. He warned that “what you’re doing is very disrespectful to this country.” (…)
Mr Macron, France’s president, had visited Washington on February 24th; Sir Keir did so on the 27th. Both trips were viewed in Europe as successes: each leader pressed Mr Trump on the issue of security guarantees, and both meetings ended on encouragingly upbeat terms. But the blow-up on February 28th has already caused deep alarm in European capitals. (…)
Meanwhile, in Moscow, there was unalloyed glee. “The insolent pig finally got a proper slap down in the Oval Office,” enthused Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s security council. “The Kiev regime is ‘gambling with WWIII’. (…)
At the end of the shouting match, Mr Trump quipped, “This is gonna be great television.” The president of Ukraine scowled as he sat with his hands clasped. Mr Vance smirked. His work was done. ■
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/1-mars.pdf
The Guardian, February 28
Trump says Putin would keep his word on a Ukraine peace deal
President claims presence of US workers in Ukraine would deter Russian aggression after talks with Keir Starmer
Full text :
Donald Trump has insisted that Vladimir Putin would “keep his word” on a peace deal for Ukraine, arguing that US workers extracting critical minerals in the country would act as a security backstop to deter Russia from invading again.
During highly anticipated talks at the White House with the prime minister, Keir Starmer, the US president said that Putin could be trusted not to breach any agreement, which could aim to return as much of the land as possible to Ukraine that was seized by Russia during the brutal three-year conflict.
But, sitting alongside Starmer in the Oval Office taking questions from journalists, Trump refused to commit to deploying US forces to support a European-led peacekeeping force, although he said the US would “always” help the British military in the unlikely event it needed it.
He later indicated the US would make “great trade agreements” with the UK that could progress “very quickly”, adding that Starmer had tried to persuade him against imposing tariffs, saying: “He earned whatever the hell they pay him over there.”
The US president also appeared to make a significant concession on the Chagos Islands, saying that he was “inclined” to back the deal struck by Starmer, who at the talks delivered a letter from King Charles offering Trump an unprecedented second state visit.
The relationship between the two men appeared convivial for much of the meeting, and Trump praised Starmer as “an outstanding person” and “a very special person”.
The talks came at the most precarious moment for European security in decades, as the new US administration aligns with Russia, breaking a years-long transatlantic consensus on Ukraine.
The prime minister used the meeting, just 24 hours before Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, travels to Washington to sign a critical minerals deal, to push the president on providing security protections for Kyiv in the event of a peace deal being secured to deter Russia from launching another attack.
After their bilateral meeting, Starmer said: “We’ve discussed a plan today to reach a peace that is tough and fair. That Ukraine will help shape. That’s backed by strength to stop Putin coming back for more.
“I’m working closely with other European leaders on this and I’m clear that the UK is ready to put boots on the ground and planes in the air to support a deal. Working together with our allies, because that is the only way that peace will last.”
Starmer stressed that any deal had to be one that lasted, and that was why security guarantees were so crucial. But Trump suggested that keeping the peace would be “the easy part” and the difficult bit was getting the deal done.
Trump stopped short of providing a firm commitment on security guarantees, but instead suggested the US having a multibillion dollar stake in Ukraine’s rare earths sector would be enough of a deterrent for Russia.
“We’ll be working there. We’ll have a lot of people working and so, in that sense, it’s very good. It’s a backstop, you could say. I don’t think anybody’s going to play around if we’re there with a lot of workers and having to do with rare earths and other things which we need for our country.”
Asked whether returning territory seized by Russia could play a part in any peace deal for Ukraine, Trump added: “We will certainly try and get as much as we can back.”
The US president appeared to disagree with Starmer’s suggestion that, without a US military backstop, Putin would invade again. “I don’t think so. I think when we have a deal, it’s going to be the deal,” he said.
“I think he’ll keep his word. I’ve known him for a long time now, and I think he will. I don’t believe he’s going to violate his word. I don’t think he’ll be back when we make a deal. I think the deal is going to hold now.”
However, Trump reiterated his support for the Nato principle of collective defence, saying: “I support it. I don’t think we’re gonna have any reason for it. I think we’re going to have a very successful peace.”
He said that the British had an “incredible military” that “don’t need much help” and could “take care of themselves” very well but added that if UK peacekeeping forces came under attack “if they need help, I’ll always be with the British”.
Trump also distanced himself from his previous remarks falsely calling Zelenskyy a dictator. “Did I say that? I can’t believe I said that,” he said, before admitting that the relationship between the two men had got a “little testy” over financial support but was now on firmer ground.
In a further sign of a healing relationship between the two, Trump praised Zelenskyy as “very brave” and said he got along with him “really well”.
He added: “We’ve given him a lot of equipment and a lot of money, but they have fought very bravely, no matter how you figure, they have really fought. Somebody has to use that equipment and they have been very brave in that sense.”
A trade deal between the UK and the US, centring on technology, is also on the cards, although British officials suggested this might require further deregulation. Trump did not rule out imposing tariffs on the UK but said he had a “warm spot” for the country, which was in a very different place” from the EU, highlighting his own investments in Scotland.
He added that Starmer had tried to persuade him not to introduce tariffs as the two countries had a balanced trading relationship. “We have a very good chance of arriving at a trade deal that could be really terrific for both countries.”
In the only slightly terse exchange of the Oval Office session, Starmer pushed back against JD Vance, Trump’s vice-president, after Vance repeated some of his criticisms of a supposed lack of free speech in European countries.
Asked about this, Vance talked of “infringements on free speech that actually affect not just the British – of course what the British do in their own country is up to them – but also affect American technology companies and, by extension, American citizens, so that is something that we’ll talk about today at lunch.”
Starmer replied immediately: “Well, we’ve had free speech for a very, very long time in the United Kingdom and it will last for a very, very long time. Certainly, we wouldn’t want to reach across US citizens, and we don’t, and that’s absolutely right, but in relation to free speech in the UK I’m very proud of our history there.”
The Economist, February 27
Round one : Ukraine hopes its minerals deal will dig it out of a hole with Trump
A provisional draft of the agreement is vague but better than feared
Extraits:
UKRAINE’S GOVERNMENT is set to approve a deal with America to jointly exploit Ukrainian mineral resources later today after a painful period of negotiation. The document, expected to be signed by Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky during a face-to-face meeting in Washington, DC, on February 28th, pulls both leaders back from a damaging war of words. Mr Trump will doubtless declare it to be his victory. What it actually ties Ukraine down to is less clear.
The agreement now ready for Mr Trump’s Sharpie pen is a framework deal, the first step in a two-part settlement. Much of the detail is to be determined in future negotiations. But Ukraine appears to have steered away from America’s first brazen, extractive demands into something that is closer to a joint investment venture. The deal looks to be a good way short of the $500bn “payback” that Mr Trump had demanded from Ukraine, itself a vastly inflated bill for supposed past military and financial assistance, which is independently assessed at more like $120bn.
The draft text removes all the most contentious American demands, which were often delivered with hostility, according to accounts from officials. On one occasion, the Ukrainians were given an “hour to sign”; on another just six minutes. What the text does now is commit the two sides to the idea of creating a joint fund for investments into Ukraine. The Ukrainians are expected to contribute 50% of the revenues from future government-owned resource projects—including minerals, hydrocarbons, oil, gas and infrastructure such as LNG terminals and ports—into the fund. Crucially, however, this will not include current operations, like the big oil and gas projects that are already contributing significant sums to the Ukrainian budget.
There is no mention of Mr Trump’s $500bn bill. An American demand for 100% ownership of the investment fund has also been dropped. Instead, ownership will be “proportional” to the sums invested by both sides, indicating the prospect of continued American support. A clause that required the Ukrainians pay twice the amount of any future aid into the fund—Mr Zelensky had likened that to a debt on “ten generations of Ukrainians”—has also gone.
As far as guarantees go, the framework only goes as far as mentioning “protecting mutual investments”. But a preamble to it references a broader “architecture of …agreements”, and “support…to obtain security guarantees”. A government source with knowledge of the negotiations says that Mr Zelensky does not intend to sign any second, fuller agreement that does not include broader security guarantees. The initial framework document will not require ratification by parliament, but a future agreement will.
After two weeks of increasing pressure from Mr Trump’s envoys, Ukraine may feel it has skilfully survived a bare-knuckle fight. The framework deal that has resulted from this process is somewhat vague and largely theoretical. The true extent of Ukraine’s resource wealth is unknown. There has been no serious assessment of mineral deposits using modern exploration techniques. Much of it is deep in the ground, or in concentrations that are too low for profitable extraction. Perhaps 40% of the metal resources are in Russian-occupied territory. Neither does the agreement offer any detail on processing and refining facilities, which is where the real value will accrue. There are many other lacunae. Yet by agreeing on something, Ukraine has provided Mr Trump with a result, moved back from the brink and bought time. In the world it has unexpectedly found itself in, that counts for quite a lot.■
The Kyiv Post, 26 février
Ukraine’s Earth Riches are Rare and Difficult to Reach
Ukraine ranks 40th among mineral-producing countries, according to the 2024 edition of World Mining Data. It was the world’s 10th largest producer of iron in 2022.
Full text :
Ukraine’s soils hold some five percent of the world’s mineral resources, which US President Donald Trump is anxious to secure, but not all of them are yet exploited — or easily exploitable, according to experts.
Ukraine ranks 40th among mineral-producing countries, all categories combined (including coal), according to the 2024 edition of World Mining Data. It was the world’s 10th largest producer of iron in 2022.
Geologists, including at France’s Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BRGM), found more than 100 resources, including iron, manganese and uranium, in a study of Ukraine published in 2023.
Minerals can be described as critical or strategic by countries for their economy or energy production. The United States designates about 50 and the European Union more than 30.
“There are many deposits of interest in Ukraine,” BRGM told AFP.
The European Commission has said “Ukraine is a significant global supplier of titanium and is a potential source of over 20 critical raw materials.”
The country is a notable producer of manganese (the world’s eighth largest producer, according to World Mining Data), titanium (11th) and graphite (14th), which is essential for electric batteries.
Of the latter, Ukraine makes up “20 percent of the world’s estimated resource,” BRGM noted. It’s also “one of Europe’s leading countries in terms of potential” for lithium — essential for batteries and considered critical.
Ukraine has also said it “possesses one of the largest lithium deposits in Europe”. However, the government added that the soft metal it is not yet extracted.
– Rare earths not yet exploited –
Rare earth elements (REE) are a very specific classification of 17 metals within the much wider category of critical minerals.
Ukraine is not known for its reserves of rare earths, which are essential for screens, drones, wind turbines, and electric motors. Trump has particularly declared he wants rare earths and demanded an accord on getting minerals in return for US aid for Ukraine to fight its war with Russia.
“Ukraine has several deposits containing rare earth elements” but none of these deposits have been mined, said Elena Safirova, a Ukraine specialist at the US Geological Survey.
BRGM confirmed Ukraine had significant rare earth resources, adding it was not aware of any plans for commercial production.
The Ukrainian government said that “rare earth metals are known to exist in six deposits”. It said investment of $300 million would be needed to develop the Novopoltavske deposit, “which is one of the largest in the world”.
At least one site for rare earths identified by the government falls within a region occupied by Russia.
Technically, some of the elements cited by the Ukrainian government (tantalum, niobium, beryllium, strontium, magnetite) are not on the list of 17 rare earths.
And some of the Ukrainian government projections are based on “a Soviet-era assessment of difficult-to-access rare earths deposits,” rating agency S&P said in February.
Because the country’s rare earths may be too low in concentration or too difficult to access, “Ukraine’s deposits of rare earth elements might not be profitable to extract”, S&P said.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/47830
BFM TV, 26 février
Ukraine: “95.000 soldats russes” tués depuis le début de la guerre? Le Kremlin refuse de commenter
Le site Mediazona travaille sur ce projet, avec le service russe de la BBC, et publie régulièrement un bilan actualisé à mesure que des morts sont identifiés.
Article intégral :
Des chiffres extrêmement difficiles à vérifier. Le média russe indépendant Mediazona a indiqué avoir identifié, en collaboration avec la BBC, 95.000 soldats russes tués via des données en sources ouvertes, un bilan que le Kremlin n’a ni commenté ni démenti mardi 25 février.
Une nouvelle infographie détaillée, publiée lundi à l’occasion du troisième anniversaire de l’assaut contre l’Ukraine, identifie des dizaines de milliers de soldats russes, donnant leur nom, date de naissance, date de décès, unité et leur région d’origine.
Ces identités, souvent accompagnées d’une photo, ont été rassemblées sur un site pour former une reproduction du tableau “L’apothéose de la guerre”, une œuvre du peintre russe Vassili Verechtchaguine montrant une pyramide de crânes humains. Célèbre en Russie, il est exposé à la galerie Tretiakov de Moscou.
Le site permet de classer les morts par région d’origine, grade militaire et unité ou encore de rechercher une personne précise.
Mediazona, un site fondé par Piotr Verzilov, un opposant russe ayant combattu du côté de l’Ukraine et qui a également co-fondé le groupe punk anti-Poutine Pussy Riot, souligne que le bilan n’est pas exhaustif, estimant que quelque 165.000 militaires russes ont pu être tués en trois ans.
Mediazona travaille sur ce projet avec le service russe de la BBC et publie régulièrement un bilan actualisé à mesure que des morts sont identifiés.
Motus au Kremlin
Interrogé par l’AFP lors d’un briefing téléphonique régulier avec des journalistes, le porte-parole du Kremlin n’a pas commenté ce travail d’enquête et le bilan humain qui en résulte, disant ne pas en avoir pris connaissance. Il ne l’a pas pour autant démenti.
“Toute information sur les pertes subies durant l’opération militaire spéciale (l’assaut russe contre l’Ukraine, ndlr) ne peut être fournie que par le ministère de la Défense de la Fédération de Russie. Il s’agit d’une prérogative exclusive du ministère”, a-t-il dit.
Ce ministère n’a pas publié de bilan depuis l’automne 2022, lorsqu’il avait admis la mort de moins de 6.000 soldats.
Fin 2024, le secrétaire américain à la défense de l’époque, Lloyd Austin, avait lui évoqué un bilan de 700.000 militaires russes morts ou blessés. Côté ukrainien, le président Volodymyr Zelensky avait fait état mi-février de quelque 46.000 soldats tués et 380.000 autres blessés.
Le correspondant de guerre ukrainien Iourii Boutoussov, un journaliste indépendant, a lui affirmé en décembre 2024 que ses sources au sein de l’armée avaient décompté 70.000 morts et 35.000 disparus.
New York Times, February 25
Guest Essay : America and Russia Are on the Same Side Now
Extraits:
During the Cold War, large and influential Communist parties in Western Europe maintained ties with Moscow, ranging from sympathetic to subservient. The United States kept its distance and in many cases supported their opponents financially and politically.
Now Europe is confronted with a loose alliance of Russian-leaning parties, this time on the other end of the spectrum: the far right. And the U.S. government has taken the opposite approach: a warm embrace.
By doing so, the United States is condoning Russia’s subversion of the postwar Europe that America helped create and secure. The parties Russia favors are hostile to the European Union, opposed to higher military spending and receptive to Russia’s arguments about the recklessness of NATO expansion and the need to assert right-wing Christian values.
Should these parties and their populist cousins eventually dominate Europe — they are in government in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia, and making an impact in France and Germany — they could eviscerate NATO and geopolitically neuter if not subjugate Europe itself. That is certainly Russia’s hope.
A Europe thus benighted would dash America’s post-Cold War vision of a continent “whole and free” that the European Union and the Atlantic alliance, for all their problems, have done much to advance and which has been an enduring source of geopolitical stability.
Of course, the Trump administration has made clear its disdain for those accomplishments. (…)
Earlier this month, Vice President JD Vance exhorted European leaders at the Munich Security Conference to stop shunning the extreme parties in their midst. German politicians, he argued, should remove the “firewall” against working with populist parties, clearly referring to the far-right and anti-immigrant Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. (…)
Mr. Trump followed up the conference by ludicrously suggesting to reporters that Ukraine had started the war by refusing to cede territory to Russia. Calling President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine a “dictator,” he has set the stage for satisfying President Vladimir Putin’s ultimate war aim: removing Ukraine’s Jewish leader as a prelude to installing a Russian stooge on the pretext of “denazifying” the country.
Moscow could hardly have scripted a result more in line with its dubious argument that NATO enlargement forced it to reclaim its sphere of influence and invade Ukraine. This narrative, largely embraced by Europe’s far right, reinforces Russia’s threat to NATO’s eastern members, starting with the Baltic States, if Ukraine is defeated or forced to capitulate. (…)
Western Communist parties were more formally linked to the Soviet Union than today’s far-right European parties are to Mr. Putin’s Russia. (…)
The consistent factor, however, has been Moscow’s affinity for fifth columns to advance its interests — the Cominform early in the Cold War, an international right-wing grouping today. Today’s right-wingers include quasi-fascists and Christian white supremacists whose views bolster and attract Christian nationalist conservatism in the United States; Mr. Putin’s nationalist autocracy, safeguarded by the Russian Orthodox Church; and Mr. Orban’s “illiberal democracy.”
Moscow is busy in Europe. The Kremlin’s political and material support for far-right groups has deepened European social and political divisions, enabling it to keep discrediting Western democracy. Russian interference includes covert influence operations that German officials believe have penetrated Germany’s political institutions and the AfD. (…)
Czech authorities believe Voice of Europe, a Prague-based news website, has funneled money to politicians in at least six European countries as part of what the authorities called a Russian influence operation. Russia has consistently denied involvement in disinformation campaigns against the West.
Regardless of Russia’s tactics, Europe’s extreme-right parties today share the Trump administration’s hostility to wokeness and immigration, much as the Western Communist parties of the 20th century advocated causes that Democratic administrations in the Cold War found congenial: social justice, civil rights for African Americans and an anticolonial agenda. Yet Democratic administrations, unlike Mr. Vance now, never suggested that European governments should accommodate them.
American administrations back then assessed the Soviet threat as too dangerous to indulge in political experiments. Today, the stakes are at least as high: If a bellicose Russia thoroughly infiltrated European politics, its far-right proxies could undermine the political structures that European nations have painstakingly built to prevent a regional return to authoritarianism.
In a mild rebuke to Mr. Trump, Mr. Vance and Mr. Musk, the AfD did not fare as well as some expected in Sunday’s elections in Germany. With the far right on the rise, however, European governments today are more vulnerable to them than they were to Communism by the 1960s, when the political center in Europe had stabilized.
The Trump administration appears not to care. Mr. Vance made it clear that moderate European leaders cannot rely on American moderation, that Trump administration officials are unlikely to welcome intelligence illuminating the depth and breadth of the Russian threat to Europe and that heedlessness and betrayal have become part of U.S. policy.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/opinion/russia-europe-trump-vance.html
The Economist, February 24
A “transaction of love” : Donald Trump makes Ukraine an offer it can’t refuse
A proposed economic deal would be punitive. Saying “no” could be worse
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/24-fevrier-2.pdf
Link: https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/02/23/donald-trump-makes-ukraine-an-offer-it-cant-refuse
The Wall Street Journal, February 24
A Brief History of Broken Russian Promises to Ukraine
Here’s why Ukrainians want security guarantees in a cease-fire deal.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/24-fevrier-3.pdf
The Wall Street Journal, February 22
Notable & Quotable: Thom Tillis on Ukraine
‘The world is watching. The strength of our alliances are on the line and the future of democracy and the world is on the line if we do anything less than defeat Vladimir Putin.’
Sen. Thom Tillis (R., N.C.) speaking on the Senate floor Feb. 20:
Full text :
There is no moral person on this planet who can consider Putin to have a legitimate reason to effect this sort of carnage. And I saw it firsthand, and I will never be able to forget it. And what the American people and the world population will never be able to forget either is the aftermath of appeasing Vladimir Putin. Ladies and gentlemen, China is already helping Russia. North Korea has sent thousands of troops, and North Korea don’t [sic] really care about life. They’ve allowed 4,000 to 5,000 of their soldiers die on the battlefield within six weeks of getting on the ground. They are throwing body after body after body, trying to kill and break the will of the Ukrainian people. And it’s just unacceptable.
So look, I’m a Republican. I support President Trump, and I believe that most of his policies on national security are right. I believe his instincts are pretty good. But what I’m telling you—whoever believes that there is any space for Vladimir Putin and the future of a stable globe better go to Ukraine. They better go to Europe. They better invest the time to understand that this man is a cancer and the greatest threat to democracy in my lifetime. And it will be a cancer that spreads into the South China Sea, into Taiwan, and metastasize across the globe. So ladies and gentlemen, when I tell you that Vladimir Putin is a liar, a murderer and a man responsible for ordering the systematic torture, kidnapping and rape of innocent civilians, believe me, because the evidence is mile high. So for those of us who have invested to [sic] time and understand this, believe me when I tell you this is important to every single one of you. If you believe that Ukraine is a country an ocean away and not relevant to our national security, think again. The world is small. The world is watching. The strength of our alliances are on the line and the future of democracy and the world is on the line if we do anything less than defeat Vladimir Putin.
The Guardian, February 22
US envoy to Ukraine hails Zelenskyy as ‘embattled and courageous leader’
Keith Kellogg takes different tone from Trump, who contrasted ‘very good talks’ with Putin with cooler relationship with Ukraine’s leader
Extraits:
The US envoy to Ukraine, Gen Keith Kellogg, has praised Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “the embattled and courageous leader of a nation at war”, striking a dramatically different tone from Donald Trump, who has called Ukraine’s president a “dictator”.
Kellogg left Kyiv on Friday after a three-day visit. Posting on social media, he said he had engaged in “extensive and positive discussions” with Zelenskyy and his “talented national security team”. “A long and intense day with the senior leadership of Ukraine,” he said.
The general’s upbeat remarks are in glaring contrast to those of the US president and his entourage, who have heaped abuse on Zelenskyy during a tumultuous week. Trump claimed Ukraine was to blame for starting the war with Russia, and accused Zelenskyy of doing “a terrible job”. (…)
Kellogg is known to be the most pro-Ukrainian of Trump’s senior team. Nevertheless, the difference in rhetoric suggests a chaotic and contradictory approach to foreign policy from a White House that has dumped Ukraine as an ally and publicly sided with Moscow. (…)
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22. Februar
Trump verstört mit Lügen und Halbwahrheiten über die Ukraine. Dennoch gibt es keine Alternative zu den Friedensgesprächen
Drei Jahre schaute der Westen zu, wie Russland die Ukraine zermürbt. Da ist ein Frieden auf der Basis der machtpolitischen Realitäten besser.
Extraits:
Donald Trump hat Wort gehalten. Zwar endete der Ukraine-Krieg nicht einen Tag nach seiner Wahl, wie er gar vollmundig angekündigt hatte. Aber nur einen Monat nach seiner Vereidigung beginnen Gespräche zwischen den USA und Russland. In den Begriffen der Diplomatie ist das geradezu Lichtgeschwindigkeit.
Das ist auch deutlich mehr, als sein Vorgänger Joe Biden hinbekommen hat – ganz zu schweigen von den Europäern. Diese kritisieren zwar laut, dass sie bei den Verhandlungen nicht dabei sind. Aber sie hatten drei Jahre Zeit, das Sterben zu stoppen.
Es waren drei Jahre der halbherzigen Unterstützung Kiews. Zwar gab es Geld und Waffen, aber im Verhältnis zum gesamteuropäischen Bruttoinlandprodukt in einem beschämend geringen Ausmass.
An grossen Worten fehlte es nie, an entschlossenen Taten schon. Daher spricht aus ihrem trotzigen Gegen-Gipfel zu den russisch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen mehr verletzte Eitelkeit als die Sorge um das Wohl der Ukraine.
Die US-Regierung tut gut daran, die europäischen Empfindlichkeiten zu ignorieren und sich auf Moskau zu konzentrieren. Wladimir Putin befindet sich in einer Position der Stärke. Seine Truppen rücken im zentralen Frontabschnitt vor. Der Nachschub ist vorerst gesichert; die Wirtschaft kollabiert auch im vierten Kriegsjahr nicht.
Natürlich sterben die russischen Soldaten wie die Fliegen. Das aber hat den Kreml noch nie sonderlich bekümmert. Putin kann es sich leisten, abzuwarten. Er benötigt keinen Frieden, wenigstens nicht jetzt.
Trump umschmeichelt daher den Zaren. Dass er direkt mit Washington verhandeln kann, ist für ihn der Jackpot. Denn der Kreml sieht sich auf Augenhöhe mit den USA. Die EU, diesen komplizierten Bund ewig uneiniger Staaten, betrachtet Putin (wie vor ihm Jelzin) nicht als gleichwertig.
Russland huldigt dem klassischen Grossmachtdenken. Die Idee, Europa unter den Grossen aufzuteilen, ohne die Kleinen beizuziehen, gefällt Putin und Trump. Dieser attackiert mit einer verstörenden Mischung aus Halbwahrheiten und Lügen Wolodimir Selenski, weil der zu Recht einen Platz am Verhandlungstisch verlangt.
Aber noch ist es zu früh, zu behaupten, dass der US-Präsident die Ukraine im Stich lässt. Wäre dem so, müsste er nicht verhandeln, sondern könnte den Kurs Bidens fortsetzen: Kiew bekam zu wenig zum Leben und zu viel zum Sterben. Fatalistisch schaute der Westen zu, wie Moskau die Ukraine zermürbt.
Da ist selbst ein prekärerer Frieden auf der Basis der machtpolitischen Realitäten besser. Ohnehin stehen die Verhandlungen erst am Anfang. Statt alles zu zerreden, sollte man erst ihr Resultat abwarten.
Trump will den Krieg schnell beenden, weil er ihn als Ablenkung betrachtet. Im Zentrum seines Denkens steht China. Darin ist er bemerkenswert konsistent. Manchmal ist er das pure Gegenteil des sprunghaften Sonnenkönigs, als der er gerne porträtiert wird.
Schon am G-7-Gipfel 2017 beklagte sich der Präsident, dass die Ukraine auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das sei keine Angelegenheit der Amerikaner und der Japaner, beschied er die Europäer. Diese waren also gewarnt. Dennoch vertrödelten sie acht wertvolle Jahre.
Militärische Macht bedeutet auch diplomatische Stärke. Die Europäer ignorierten das lange und müssen sich daher mit den billigen Plätzen begnügen. (…)
Vielleicht wiederholt sich München 1938, und man reagiert auf die Unverschämtheiten eines Diktators wieder mit Appeasement. Das ist möglich. Doch für Trump geht es jetzt vor allem darum, dass Putin nicht den Gesprächen den Rücken kehrt. So scheint sich das Weisse Haus darauf einzulassen, auch andere Fragen zu besprechen: die europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur etwa oder den Nahen Osten. Am Ende könnte hier der eigentliche Sprengstoff liegen.
Trump ist ein gebranntes Kind. In seiner ersten Amtszeit traf er sich mit dem nordkoreanischen Machthaber Kim Jong Un, weil er glaubte, dieser sei zu einem «Deal» bereit: Verzicht auf Atomwaffen gegen Aufhebung der Sanktionen. Doch Kim hatte nichts dergleichen im Sinn. Am Schluss stand Trump blamiert da.
Eine solche Pleite kann er sich mit Putin nicht leisten. Trump hat sich unter hohen Erfolgsdruck gesetzt. Ein Diktatfrieden zu Putins Bedingungen liesse ihn genauso schwach aussehen wie gar keine Vereinbarung.
In diesem Kontext sind zwei Zugeständnisse zu sehen, die Trump vor Gesprächsbeginn gemacht hat. Washington schliesst einen Beitritt der Ukraine zur Nato aus und akzeptiert, dass Moskau die besetzten Gebiete vorderhand behält.
So gross sind die Konzessionen allerdings nicht. Erstens gab Moskau noch nie Gebiete preis, die es mit Waffengewalt erobert hat. Zweitens dachte Washington nie auch nur im Traum daran, ein förmliches Schutzversprechen für Kiew abzugeben.
Auch die Europäer waren nie dazu bereit, die ukrainische Freiheit mit dem eigenen Leben zu verteidigen. Das hindert sie freilich nicht daran, die angebliche amerikanische Nachgiebigkeit zu verurteilen. Heuchelei in Sicherheitsfragen war schon immer eine Untugend der Europäer.
Trump baut Partnerschaften nicht auf Werten auf, sondern auf Nutzen. Auch das ist keine neue Erkenntnis. Dafür hätte es jedenfalls keine Brandrede von Vizepräsident Vance in München gebraucht. Weil aber die Europäer unfähig sind, strategisch zu handeln, arbeiten sie sich jedes Mal aufs Neue an den Provokationen Washingtons ab. Das wirkt reichlich infantil.
Dabei liegt in dem opportunistischen Umgang mit Bündnissen auch eine Chance. Wenn sich die Europäer verpflichten, einen Waffenstillstand zu überwachen, wird Trump den Wert der Nato genauso umstandslos anerkennen, wie er sie jetzt beiseiteschiebt.
Bisher konnten sich die Europäer nie auf eine gemeinsame Schutztruppe verständigen. Auch das gehört zum Kollateralnutzen von Trumps Blitz-Diplomatie. Er schafft Handlungszwänge. Gegenwärtig werden exorbitante Truppenstärken genannt, die angeblich zur Kontrolle der Demarkationslinie nötig sind. Die Aufgabe der nächsten Monate wird darin bestehen, das Wünschbare an das Machbare anzupassen.
Dass die personellen Ressourcen der Nato ohne die USA überschaubar sind, ist unbestritten. Daher sollten Länder wie Deutschland die Wehrpflicht wieder einführen. (…) Das wird zu mehr Schulden führen, aber Europa muss jetzt seine Machtbasis stärken.
Wenn die EU nicht nur kritisieren, sondern auch handeln will, gibt sie der Ukraine eine konkrete Perspektive: weniger als eine Vollmitgliedschaft, mehr als eine Assoziierung. Das wäre auch ein Angebot an die Türkei.
Putin wird sich den Kontinent nicht untertan machen, sofern Europa (inklusive der Schweiz) die Kraft zu einem neuen Marshall-Plan aufbringt. Dazu gehört der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine. Alle wollen ihr helfen, aber jeder wird entschuldigend auf seine leeren Kassen verweisen. Deshalb ist der wichtigste Beitrag, den die EU zum Frieden leisten kann, die Stärkung ihrer Wirtschaftskraft. Ob Green Deal oder Lieferkettengesetz: Die Abschreckungsfähigkeit des Bürokratiemonsters Brüssel ist gering. Ohne robustes Wachstum gibt es auf Dauer keine angemessene Verteidigung.
Bei Trump weiss man nie, woran man ist.
Europa benötigt daher eine Rückversicherung für den Fall, dass die USA ihre Schutzgarantie inklusive Nuklearschirm aufkündigen. Atomwaffen sind die ultimative Lebensversicherung. Diese hat an Aktualität nichts verloren, wie der Ukraine-Krieg in aller Brutalität aufzeigt.
Seit zehn Jahren diskutiert Europa, ob die Nuklearmächte Grossbritannien und Frankreich einen Reserve-Schirm aufspannen können. Seit zehn Jahren hakt es an zwei Punkten. Paris und London wollen ihre alleinige Verfügungsgewalt über die Waffen nicht aufgeben. Berlin und die anderen Staaten wollen möglichst wenig für den Schutz zahlen. Es ist das typische europäische Strategie-Mikado: Wer sich zuerst bewegt, hat verloren.
Trump ist wirklich nicht das grösste Problem, das der alte Kontinent heute hat.
https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/trumps-ukraine-diplomatie-endlich-wird-verhandelt-ld.1871612
The Wall Street Journal, February 21
Russia Wants to Erase Ukraine’s Future—And Its Past
The memory of Soviet-era famines, mass killings and other traumas makes Ukraine determined not to return to Russian rule.
Yaroslav Trofimov is the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal. His new novel “No Country for Love,” based on his family’s history in mid-20th century Ukraine, was published this month by Little, Brown.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/21-fevrier-3.pdf
The Wall Street Journal, February 20
Trump Tilts Toward a Ukraine Sellout
He puts more pressure on Kyiv for a deal than he does on the Kremlin.
Full text :
One challenge in the Trump era is distinguishing when the President is popping off for attention from when his remarks indicate a real change in policy and priorities. President Trump’s rhetorical assault on Ukraine in recent days appears to be the latter, and perhaps it is a sign of an ugly settlement to come.
Mr. Trump on Tuesday mimicked Russian propaganda by claiming Ukraine had started the war with Russia and that Kyiv is little better than the Kremlin because it hasn’t held a wartime election. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky replied on Wednesday that Mr. Trump was living in a “disinformation space,” which may have been imprudent but was accurate.
Mr. Trump escalated on Wednesday, as he usually does, calling Mr. Zelensky a “dictator,” and suggesting Ukraine’s leader snookered the U.S. into supporting a war “that couldn’t be won, that never had to start.” Mr. Zelensky “refuses to have Elections, is very low in Ukrainian Polls, and the only thing he was good at was playing Biden ‘like a fiddle.’”
It’s tempting to dismiss this exchange as mere rhetoric, but it has the feel of political intention for Mr. Trump. He may be trashing Ukraine’s democracy to make voters think there’s no real difference between the Kremlin and Kyiv. He may think this will make it easier to sell a peace deal that betrays Ukraine.
We doubt most Americans will overlook his false moral equivalence. Mr. Putin’s war of conquest started three years ago this month when Russian troops rolled over the border and tried to capture Kyiv. The war began not because Mr. Putin had legitimate security fears—but because the aging former KGB agent wants to reassemble most of the Soviet empire he saw crumble as a young man.
Ukraine has delayed elections while it is operating under martial law and fighting a war for survival. Its constitution allows this, and Britain under Nazi siege didn’t hold an election during World War II. Was Churchill a dictator?
Ukraine’s democracy is fragile and would be stronger if it could affiliate with Western institutions like the European Union. The only dictator in the war is Mr. Putin, who poisons exiled Russians on foreign soil and banishes opponents to Arctic prison camps. Call us when he holds a free election.
Mr. Trump may also think he can turn Ukrainians against Mr. Zelensky. But the irony is that Mr. Trump’s lashing may have the opposite effect, especially if they see Mr. Zelensky opposing a bad deal forced on them by a U.S.-Russia pact that includes no credible security guarantee against future Russian marauding.
The U.S. has a profound interest in denying Mr. Putin a new perch on more of the NATO border, which is the real reason America has been right to arm Ukraine. A deal that amounts to Ukrainian surrender will be a blow to American power that will radiate to the Pacific and the Middle East. It would be the opposite of Mr. Trump’s promise to restore a golden age of U.S. prestige and world calm.
The oddity so far is that Mr. Trump seems to want a “peace” deal more than Mr. Putin does, which is the opposite of leverage in any negotiation. Mr. Trump wants to be able to claim he brought peace as he promised as a candidate, but a cautionary tale is Joe Biden.
President Biden tried to wash his hands of Afghanistan, but instead his retreat set in motion a chain of global crises that defined his Presidency. Mr. Biden tried to sell his withdrawal as a triumph of military logistics, but the public knew better. Americans may have a similar reaction if they see Russia emerge triumphant and realize this wasn’t the peace they had in mind.
Last week Mr. Trump said Ukraine can’t join NATO and must give up much of its territory to Russia—concessions to Mr. Putin with nothing in return. Mr. Putin’s response this week has been more drone attacks on Ukraine. And here we thought Mr. Trump doesn’t like being played.
The better strategy than beating up Ukraine is making clear to Mr. Putin the arms and pressure he’ll face if the Russian doesn’t wind down the war to accept a durable peace. As it stands now, Mr. Trump’s seeming desperation for a deal is a risk to Ukraine, Europe, U.S. interests—and his own Presidency.
The Wall Street Journal, February 20
The Rapid Rehab of Vladimir Putin
The Russian marauder has become an ostensible peace-maker in a month.
Extraits:
President Trump campaigned on ending the war in Ukraine, and his negotiators on Tuesday began the process with a meeting in Saudi Arabia between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart. Global politics can be an ugly business, but the looming rehabilitation of Vladimir Putin is especially hard to take.
Mr. Trump said last week after a phone call with Mr. Putin that he’s convinced the Russian dictator wants “peace.” He didn’t say what kind of peace Mr. Putin has in mind, though if history is a guide it won’t be what most Americans understand by the word.
The Kremlin overlord in 2022 started the biggest land war in Europe since Hitler, and his “special military operation” has killed or maimed hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. His missiles have targeted apartment houses and train stations. His forces have tried to freeze Ukrainian civilians into surrender by crippling electric-power plants.
His troops have kidnapped hundreds of Ukrainian-born children from their parents to new homes in Russia. They have tortured and executed Ukrainian troops in violation of every rule of international warfare.
Russian hit squads have also been dispatched to assassinate enemies of his rule at home and abroad. This includes killing Alexander Litvinenko with polonium in London and an attempted murder of a former spy in Salisbury, U.K., with Novichok nerve gas that killed an innocent bystander. The British government has said it believes Mr. Putin ordered the Novichok attack.
No one should forget the death of Alexei Navalny, the brave opposition politician who was poisoned abroad, then arrested upon his return and killed in prison. Numerous Russians are taken by a sudden and mysterious desire to leap from tall buildings to their deaths.
Mr. Putin has been charged with war crimes by an international court, and the U.S. sanctioned his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in 2022 as one of the “architects of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Mr. Lavrov sat across the table from Mr. Rubio on Tuesday and denied that Russia targets Ukrainian power plants despite mountains of evidence.
We realize that the ruthless men who rule much of the world can’t be ignored. But usually those men aren’t rewarded with a visit to the U.S., as Mr. Trump hinted last week, before they’ve made any compromises. Visits with Soviet leaders during the Cold War at least had some preparation to assume the U.S. would get something from the diplomacy. Any peace Mr. Putin strikes has to be made with all of his legacy of destruction in mind.
The Economist, February 20
Three years on : Which countries provide the most, and least, support to Ukraine?
A ranking of bilateral aid shows how European countries compare with America
Full text :
AMONG THE many complaints made by President Donald Trump is that America has been much more generous than European countries in providing military and economic aid to Ukraine. On February 12th he claimed that America had given Ukraine $350bn in aid, whereas the Europeans had provided just $100bn—and that in the form of loans rather than grants.
The disparity, he avers, justifies his demand that America should take control of an estimated $500bn-worth of rare-earth and other minerals in Ukraine—not as a means to ensure future support but as back payment for past assistance.
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, retorted on February 18th that “financially and militarily, Europe has brought more to the table than anyone else. And we will step up.” Who is right?
The most authoritative numbers are compiled regularly by the Kiel Institute, a German think-tank. Its latest report, published on February 14th, shows that European contributions—individually from governments and collectively from European institutions—outstrip America’s aid.
Start with the grand total (see chart 1 and 2). Countries worldwide have allocated €267bn ($280bn) in aid to Ukraine, or roughly €80bn per year. America remains the single most important donor by a wide margin but European countries, including the EU, have collectively surpassed its efforts, with €132bn in allocated aid compared with America’s €114bn (although America remains slightly ahead on military aid). Add other commitments yet to be delivered or specified and the gap grows yet wider. However, almost 90% of the financial aid from EU institutions has been in the form of loans (albeit with very generous terms). Roughly 60% of America’s financial aid is given as grants.
Our third chart shows how this has cumulated over time. European support has remained relatively stable since 2022, while American aid has been far more volatile. Its support slowed in 2023 and 2024 amid partisan wrangling in Congress, then picked up again with the passage of a new supplemental bill, and accelerated at the end of Joe Biden’s term.
Europe’s biggest donor is Germany, which has provided some €17bn (including financial, humanitarian and military aid and excluding what is channeled through EU donors). Britain is second, with €15bn, followed by Denmark (see chart 4). But Europe’s biggest economies have the capacity to do much more. Annual commitments by Germany and Britain, along with America, work out to just 0.2% of their GDPs. “Aid to Ukraine thus looks more like a minor political pet project rather than a major fiscal effort,” concludes the Kiel report.
Indeed, in 1990 Germany allocated a greater share of its GDP to support Kuwait than it has for a war on Europe’s doorstep. Similarly, America committed significantly more money per year during the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq wars.
As a share of their output, the Baltic and Nordic states stand out (see chart 5). Estonia and Denmark, for example, have committed more than 2% of their pre-war GDP to supporting Ukraine in bilateral aid.
Generally speaking, the closer a country’s capital is to Russia, the higher its aid to Ukraine as a share of GDP (see chart 6). For example, Latvia and Lithuania—whose capitals are both less than 1,000km from Moscow—contributed 2% of their pre-war GDP. Japan, however, provides more bilateral aid than France, Italy and Spain in absolute terms and as a share of its GDP, despite being more than twice as distant from Moscow.
European leaders have been sent a clear message by the Trump administration: “Stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” as the defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, put it. European countries are already doing more than America to aid Ukraine. If America pulls further funding, they will need to do more still.■
The Wall Street Journal, February 19
The War Over the War
Expect a sloppy Ukraine outcome as the West reorients itself to reality.
Full text :
https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/19-fevrier-1.pdf
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19. Februar
Putins Maximalziele: „Es ist ein Weltkrieg, denn Putin will die Weltordnung ändern“
Moskau feiert die Gespräche in Riad. Dabei geht es nicht allein um die Ukraine. Der frühere russische Diplomat Boris Bondarew rechnet mit einem baldigen Schritt gegen die NATO.
Extraits:
(…) Putin „macht es professionell“, sagt Boris Bondarew der F.A.Z. Der langjährige russische Diplomat, der zuletzt in Genf als Abrüstungsfachmann tätig war, quittierte im Mai 2022 den Dienst aus Protest gegen den russischen Angriffskrieg und lebt nun in der Schweiz. „Er kämpft weiter und hat einfach abgewartet, bis die Amerikaner auf ihn zugehen.“ Putins Unterhändler würden nun sondieren, was die Amerikaner böten und dann mehr und mehr einfordern. Derweil wirke Putin weiter schmeichelnd auf Trump ein.
Auf amerikanischer Seite laufe dagegen ein „Festival der Unprofessionalität“, sagt Bondarew. Es sei unklar, was die Amerikaner wollten, wie Trumps „Deal“ aussehen solle, ob sie überhaupt verstünden, warum Putin den Krieg begonnen habe. „Er will die Weltordnung umbauen“, sagt Bondarew über seinen früheren Chef. Dazu gelte es vor allem, die Amerikaner zum Rückzug aus Europa zu bewegen und die NATO zu erledigen, um dann den einzelnen Ländern seine Bedingungen zu diktieren.
Am Freitag ist Bondarew in seiner Heimat zum „ausländischen Agenten“ erklärt worden und muss stets mit Racheakten der russischen Geheimdienste rechnen. „Putin verachtet Schwache“, sagt Bondarew. So werde Putin zum Beispiel Deutschland wieder Gas verkaufen, aber für mehr Geld als früher, und im Bedarfsfall mit einem Raketenschlag drohen, wenn keine Hilfe der Verbündeten zu erwarten sei. „Darauf läuft es hinaus.“
Den Kampf gegen die NATO aufnehmen müsse Putin dafür nicht, sagt der frühere Diplomat. Er rechnet mit einer „Salamitaktik“: Es reiche beispielsweise wie 2008 gegen Georgien unter dem Vorwand, Russen zu helfen, eine „Operation zur Friedenserzwingung“ zu beginnen und Truppen in ein baltisches Land zu schicken. Wenn sich dann erweise, dass das Bündnis nicht mehr willens sei einzugreifen und „nicht wegen einer solchen Kleinigkeit einen Krieg zu beginnen“, sei das Ziel erreicht, die NATO als Papiertiger zu entlarven. Dann wäre die Bündnisverpflichtung aus Artikel 5 wirklich so leer, wie Putins Scharfmacher schon postulieren. Dann würden sich etliche europäische Länder Moskau zuwenden.
Denkt auch der Kriegsherr so? Putin hält sich bedeckt. Zweifel an der Entschlossenheit der NATO äußerte im vergangenen März der belarussische Machthaber Alexandr Lukaschenko. „Fremde Leute“, sagte Lukaschenko damals über deutsche und amerikanische Truppen, würden „Litauen nicht schützen“, sondern „in der ersten ernsten Situation vom Schlachtfeld fliehen“. Bondarew sagt, sollte der russische Vorstoß doch auf Gegenwehr der Verbündeten stoße, ziehe Putin seine Truppen eben zurück und erkläre, das Ziel der Operation sei erreicht. (…)
Sollte nun der amerikanische Rückhalt fraglich sein, sei der Anreiz für den 72 Jahre alten Putin groß, möglichst rasch zu handeln, warnt Bondarew. Putin werde älter, Russland wirtschaftlich schwächer, die amerikanische Regierung könne sich wieder ändern. Putin könne und wolle seine Armee nicht auseinandergehen lassen. „Er will den Moment nicht verpassen“, vermutet der frühere Diplomat.
Der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj warnte auf der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, Russland werde im Sommer 100.000 bis 150.000 Soldaten vor allem in Belarus zusammenziehen und bereite schon für das nächste Jahr einen Krieg gegen NATO-Länder vor. Auch Bondarew entwirft ein Szenario, in dem Trumps Deal zur Ukraine Putin gibt, was dieser verlangt: die „Demilitarisierung“ und „Entnazifizierung“ der Ukraine. Das käme einer Auflösung der ukrainischen Armee und Neuwahlen gleich, bei denen Putin seine Leute in Kiew unterbringt. Millionen Ukrainer würden dann fliehen, vor allem nach Deutschland, vermutet Bondarew. (…)
Putins früherer Diplomat sieht das Kernproblem darin, dass der Westen in einer Mischung aus Angst, Konfliktscheu und Komfortdenken die Ukrainer viel zu zögerlich unterstützt habe und sich noch nicht einmal darüber einig war, dass Putin den Krieg verlieren müsse. „Die Ukraine hätte für euch den Krieg gewonnen, wenn ihr dem Land gleich genügend Panzer, Artillerie und Flugzeuge gegeben hättet,“ sagt Bondarew. „Aber wenn der Westen nicht will, dass Putin verliert, sind alle Konferenzen wie die in München vergebens. Das ist kein Krieg um Land, um den Donbass. Es ist ein Weltkrieg, denn Putin will die Weltordnung ändern. Jeden Tag bekommt Europa Weckrufe. Aber es wacht nicht auf.“
L’Express, 17 février
Alissa Ganieva, romancière russe : “Vladimir Poutine a transformé ce pays en un monstre”
Livres. Pour l’écrivaine, exilée depuis 2022 , à part des grandes villes prospères comme Moscou ou Saint-Petersbourg, le reste du pays “vit dans des conditions déplorables”.
Extraits:
D’une auteure russe qui s’affiche sur les réseaux sociaux avec un sweat-shirt sur lequel figure un coeur aux couleurs de l’Ukraine, on peut déduire deux choses : qu’elle est particulièrement courageuse; et qu’elle ne vit plus en Russie. Alissa Ganieva a pris la route de l’exil au lendemain de l’invasion de l’Ukraine, en février 2022, certaine qu’elle ne pourrait plus jamais prendre la parole librement dans son pays. Originaire du Daghestan, une région du Caucase, l’écrivaine de 39 ans a travaillé comme journaliste littéraire à Moscou avant de publier plusieurs romans ayant pour décor la région dans laquelle elle a grandi. Ce n’est pas le cas de Sentiments offensés, qui paraît aujourd’hui en France, une satire féroce de la société russe publiée dans le pays de Poutine en 2018. Dans une ville de province, un ministre s’effondre par une nuit de pluie en pleine rue, comme foudroyé. Sa maitresse est aux abois, de même que sa femme et tous les notables de la ville, tandis que chacun spécule sur l’identité du corbeau qui menaçait le potentat d’embarassantes révélations. L’intrigue est le prétexte à un jeu de massacre. Ganieva dissèque avec une ironie ravageuse les turpitudes d’une société phagocytée par la corruption, le népotisme, les dénonciations, le culte du chef jusqu’à l’absurde, l’instrumentalisation de l’histoire, de l’Eglise, et le déni collectif – lequel continue de faire son oeuvre aujourd’hui.
Désormais journaliste freelance basée dans un pays d’Asie centrale, la romancière revient sur la genèse, la réception et la toile de fond de ce livre dont elle se dit certaine qu’il “ne pourrait plus paraître dans la Russie actuelle”.
L’Express : Quelle était votre intention lors de l’écriture du livre?
Alissa Ganieva : J’étais surprise, en tant que critique littéraire, de voir qu’un grand nombre d’auteurs russes évitaient de traiter des problèmes politiques et sociaux contemporains. Le faire revenait pour eux à se comporter en journaliste, alors que par le passé les romanciers russes ont toujours dépeint les problèmes de leur temps. Tolstoï s’intéressait aux guerres contre le Japon, dans les Balkans, aux conflits entre hommes politiques. J’ai voulu renouer avec cela, non sans une certaine anxiété car je sentais que le pays se transformait en un monstre et courrait au-devant d’une catastrophe. (…)
Quand les choses se sont-elles dégradées ?
Après 2014 et l’annexion de la Crimée. Ensuite, le Covid a constitué un très bon prétexte pour interdire les événements dans la rue, tels que les manifestations. Puis a eu lieu l’extension du règne de Poutine [NDLR : une réforme de la Constitution en 2021 lui permet de se maintenir au pouvoir jusqu’en 2038], et l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022 a tout changé.
Quelles ont été les réactions au livre?
Des lecteurs m’ont dit que j’exagérais, que les choses n’étaient pas si graves, que les dénonciations étaient des cas isolés, que les lois répressives étaient certes absurdes, mais peu utilisées… Mais le récit ressemblait trop à leurs propres vies, ce n’était pas une lecture très confortable. Ils n’ont pas aimé le côté satirique du roman, qui a été publié dans une maison d’édition de Moscou très reconnue. Je n’imagine pas un instant qu’il serait à nouveau possible de le publier aujourd’hui.
Vous n’avez pas eu de souci avec les autorités à sa sortie?
Non, en 2018 la Russie prétendait être un pays pacifique, ouvert sur le monde. Le pays avait accueilli la Coupe de monde de football, des supporters étaient venus du monde entier. Le nombre de prisonniers politiques s’allongeait, mais leurs noms restaient inconnus. Si vous écriviez sur ces sujets, vous étiez mal vu dans la communauté artistique, mais vous pouviez le faire du moment que vous ne mentionniez pas Poutine. (…)
Dans le livre, vous racontez une visite du dirigeant du pays, qui n’est donc pas nommé, et la façon dont les autorités locales se hâtent de camoufler tous les problèmes de la ville, jusqu’aux médecins qui prennent la place des patients dans les lits d’hôpitaux. C’est une situation véridique?
C’est une histoire que vous pouviez observer dans n’importe quelle ville de province russe dès lors qu’un représentant du pouvoir la visitait. Les autorités locales faisaient tout pour présenter une façade et donner l’illusion que tout allait bien. C’est un paradoxe de la Russie, où l’on trouve de grandes villes prospères comme Moscou ou Saint-Petersbourg quand le reste du pays vit dans des conditions déplorables. Il existe toujours des régions sans chauffage, sans tout-à-l’égout, où les toilettes consistent en des cabines en bois. Les revenus des gens y sont dérisoires, ils ont juste de quoi s’acheter quelques denrées et n’ont pas les moyens de voyager ou de donner une éducation correcte à leurs enfants. Cela donne un argument à ceux qui veulent adopter une attitude paternaliste envers les Russes, qu’ils voient comme une population soumise, de serfs, incapable d’apprendre et de distinguer le bien du mal. Il a toujours également été plus facile de persécuter les gens originaires des ces régions, comme la Sibérie. Beaucoup de prisonniers politiques, souvent très jeunes, venaient de ces petites villes à l’époque soviétique. (…)
Vous dépeignez également l’infortune d’un professeur d’histoire arrêté pour avoir sous-entendu que les nazis avaient été autant mis en difficulté par le froid glacial de la Russie que par ses soldats lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale…
Une histoire très ordinaire, même si elle a un caractère fictionnel. Il existe une loi qui vise à criminaliser toute comparaison entre Hitler et Staline ou tout rabaissement du rôle de l’armée soviétique. Par exemple, il est interdit d’évoquer le viol de femmes allemandes par les soldats russes, de même que les accords entre Staline et Hitler pour se partager l’Europe [Le pacte germano-soviétique, en août 1939]. A la télévision, on expliquait que les purges de Staline n’étaient pas si massives, la répression pas si terrible. Tous les côtés négatifs de l’Histoire sont mis sous le tapis, les livres qui l’enseignent aujourd’hui sont bien différents de ceux qu’on avait dans les années 1990, qui étaient plus critiques envers l’URSS et la Russie. (…)
Vous relatez également la glorification du passé tsariste à travers un peintre qui représente les puissants de la ville dans des atours d’époque…
Oui, parce que dans sa tête, Poutine prolonge d’un côté l’empire soviétique, le réenforce, et de l’autre, il se situe dans la lignée de l’ère prébolchevique et du tsarisme. Poutine adore Alexandre III [1845-1894], un tsar réactionnaire qui a tout fait pour empêcher les réformes et s’appuyait sur le même triumvirat que l’on retrouve aujourd’hui : l’Eglise, l’Etat et les valeurs traditionnelles. (…)
Vous entrevoyez la possibilité d’un changement?
Aujourd’hui, pas vraiment. La Russie est devenue une dictature, il est quasi impossible d’y faire quoi que ce soit. Si vous donnez 1 rouble à la Fondation anticorruption de Navalny, vous irez en prison le lendemain pour terrorisme et extrémisme, et ce pour plusieurs années. Le nombre de policiers et de militaires par habitants en Russie reste l’un des plus élevés au monde. Il y a quelques années, une fenêtre pour le changement s’était ouverte, lors des grandes manifestations contre Poutine [de 2011 à 2014 essentiellement]. Mais on a laissé passer cette chance et le pouvoir s’est renforcé chaque année depuis.
Un discours que l’on entend consiste à dire qu’il est impossible pour la Russie d’être une démocratie en raison de sa dimension, qu’il est nécessaire d’avoir un pouvoir fort pour maintenir l’unité du pays, mais le fédéralisme pourrait vraiment marcher, s’il était mis en place de façon honnête, pas juste dans la forme. Dans les années 1990, personne n’était préparé à la chute de l’Union soviétique, la pauvreté était immense et la période est restée un traumatisme pour bien des Russes, ce qui a justifié à leurs yeux le fait de vouloir reconstituer l’empire, comme si c’était un paradis perdu. Mais il finira par y avoir d’autres opportunités pour le changement. La nouvelle génération est plus ouverte. C’est une période très importante. Toutes les forces démocratiques doivent se tenir prêtes.
Sentiments offensés, par Alissa Ganieva. Gallimard, 256 p., 22 €.
The Wall Street Journal, February 15
NATO Is Ukraine’s Future and Always Will Be
An illusory concession to Vladimir Putin clears the way for the business that really matters.
Full text : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/15-fevrier-2.pdf
Le Point, 15 février
😕 L’Europe hors jeu : Trump et Poutine négocient l’avenir de l’Ukraine sans nous
CHRONIQUE. Les Européens tombent des nues en constatant que Trump et Poutine négocient entre eux l’avenir de l’Ukraine et d’une partie du continent. Qu’attendons-nous pour nous réveiller ?
Extraits:
Le plus étonnant dans les annonces récentes de Donald Trump sur l’Ukraine, c’est… l’étonnement des Européens. Depuis des mois, non seulement nous savions qu’élu, il entrerait rapidement en contact avec Poutine pour mettre fin à la guerre, mais nous connaissions plus ou moins les termes sur la base desquels il entreprendrait cette démarche. Le surprenant n’est donc pas là, mais dans l’impréparation des Européens, qui donnent l’impression de tomber des nues. (…)
Pourtant, tout était clair : Trump entendait passer par-dessus la tête de l’Ukraine et des alliés européens pour aboutir à un accord dont il demanderait ensuite à ceux-ci d’assumer la responsabilité financière et militaire. Qu’avons-nous fait pour avoir notre mot à dire, pour poser nos conditions ou, à défaut, pour nous y préparer ? Rien.
Comme le lapin dans les phares de la voiture, nous avons attendu l’inévitable, que nous abordons dans les pires conditions. L’Allemagne est aux abonnés absents pour plusieurs mois et la France ne vaut pas beaucoup mieux. Je comprends aujourd’hui les années 1930, lorsque des dirigeants intelligents et patriotes ont pu aller au désastre les yeux ouverts sans faire ce qu’ils savaient nécessaire au fond d’eux-mêmes. Les circonstances sont certes moins tragiques, mais ce lâche renoncement de nos pays présage mal de leur avenir dans le monde de fer qui vient.
Avec Trump ou avec Kamala Harris, je l’avais écrit dans mes chroniques, les États-Unis voulaient s’extraire d’un conflit qui n’était pas leur priorité et où ils ne s’étaient engagés que du fait de l’incapacité des Européens d’apporter un soutien militaire à la victime d’une agression russe dont ils ne pouvaient accepter un éventuel succès. D’ailleurs, ils étaient toujours restés discrets sur les questions territoriales contrairement aux déclarations va-t-en-guerre de certains Européens et ils s’étaient opposés à l’entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan.
La vraie différence entre les deux candidats portait sur la méthode. (…)
C’est la tactique de négociation de Trump qui peut soulever des inquiétudes. Qu’il dévoile d’emblée les points principaux de la position américaine peut encore se justifier dans la mesure où elle correspond, d’une part, à la situation sur le champ de bataille et, d’autre part, aux lignes rouges russes. Ç’aurait été du temps perdu, par exemple, de se battre sur l’entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan, dont on sait depuis longtemps qu’elle est inacceptable par Moscou. Or, Trump veut aller vite. C’est même là le problème essentiel.
En effet, d’expérience, je peux prédire que la Russie conduira la négociation à sa manière, c’est-à-dire, après avoir empoché les concessions américaines, ligne par ligne en ne cédant pas sur le moindre détail. (…)
Revenons aux Européens. Ils doivent maintenant être éveillés et comprendre ce qui les menace. Du moins, on l’espère. Pourquoi Français, Britanniques, Polonais et quelques autres ne se réunissent-ils pas de toute urgence pour définir une position et prendre les dispositions qui s’imposent ? Que feront-ils si la négociation échoue et si les États-Unis renoncent à soutenir l’Ukraine ? Et si elle réussit et si on leur demande de fournir une force sur le territoire de ce pays ? (…) Si c’est une force de combat, quels devraient être sa taille, son mandat et sa mission ? Les questions – il y en a beaucoup d’autres – sont multiples, concrètes et graves. Attendrons-nous passivement que le parrain américain nous dicte notre rôle, dont il aura défini avec la Russie la forme et le fond ? Je le crains.
Or, ce qui se passe aujourd’hui à Washington dépasse de loin la guerre en Ukraine. La réhabilitation spectaculaire de Poutine n’est rien moins que l’affirmation de relations internationales dont le seul fondement est le rapport de force le plus nu et le plus brutal. Le gendarme américain a rejoint les brigands. Le rêve européen d’une société fondée sur le droit international et le compromis s’évanouit. C’est la jungle. À nous de prendre la mesure de la gravité du moment pour y survivre.
The Wall Street Journal, February 14
Vance Wields Threat of Sanctions, Military Action to Push Putin Into Ukraine Deal
In interview with The Wall Street Journal, vice president says Ukraine must have ‘sovereign independence’
Extraits:
PARIS—Vice President JD Vance said Thursday that the U.S. would hit Moscow with sanctions and potentially military action if Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t agree to a peace deal with Ukraine that guarantees Kyiv’s long-term independence.
Vance said the option of sending U.S. troops to Ukraine if Moscow failed to negotiate in good faith remained “on the table,” striking a far tougher tone than did Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who on Wednesday suggested the U.S. wouldn’t commit forces.
“There are economic tools of leverage, there are of course military tools of leverage” the U.S. could use against Putin, Vance said.
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal hours after President Trump said he would start negotiating with Putin to end the war in Ukraine, Vance said: “I think there is a deal that is going to come out of this that’s going to shock a lot of people.”
The vice president’s remarks, coming a day before a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, offered the Trump administration’s strongest-yet support for Kyiv in the face of Russian demands that it disarm and replace the current government.
“The president is not going to go in this with blinders on,” Vance said. “He’s going to say, ‘Everything is on the table, let’s make a deal.’”
On Thursday, Trump told reporters that Ukraine would be a party to talks with Russia, a key demand of Zelensky’s. But Trump also said that Russia should be allowed back into the Group of Seven club of wealthy countries and that membership for Ukraine in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was something Russia couldn’t allow. (…)
The Economist, February 13
An interview with Volodymyr Zelensky : Ukraine fears being cut out of talks between America and Russia
Hours before Trump’s call with Putin, we spoke to an apprehensive Volodymyr Zelensky
Extraits:
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY, Ukraine’s man of action, doesn’t take to limbo easily. His five and a half years as president have been a series of brutal tests. But the waiting game is the most palpably frustrating. Three weeks after Donald Trump took office, the Ukrainian president still doesn’t know what his plans are for Ukraine. Mr Zelensky reveals only minimal contact with the new leader of the free world: just “a couple of calls” since a meeting in September. He says he is “sure” Mr Trump has no oven-ready peace plan. How could there be when no one has been consulting Ukraine about it? He is not being informed about contacts between the White House and the Kremlin; what he knows he gets from the press like everyone else. There are “probably” some ideas that he should know about, but he’s yet to be told about them. “We haven’t seen them, and we haven’t heard any proposals.” The fear for Ukraine is that a deal between Mr Trump and Vladimir Putin could be done over his head.
President Zelensky is in an oddly upbeat mood during an hour-long conversation in his presidential compound in Kyiv. His face is tired, but he has been keeping fit, the calloused palms of his hands testifying to the 7am gym sessions he squeezes in after sleepless nights of military reports and explosions. He even occasionally laughs, subduing the angrier edges of his personality, in what appears to be a communications push ahead of the Munich Security Conference that starts on February 14th. This conference could be the Trump team’s signal to snap into action, he suggests. “There will be two large delegations [America’s and Ukraine’s], there will be meetings.” Yet the mood music is ominous. Just a few hours after this interview, the American president declared on social media that there is “little to show” for support of Ukraine. “This war MUST and WILL end soon,” he wrote. Mr Zelensky confirms he will sit down in Munich with Mr Trump’s deputy, J.D. Vance, a man who once claimed to “not care what happens to Ukraine one way or another”.
Mr Zelensky sidesteps that insult. “Honestly, I think the vice-president of the United States today is focused on domestic issues,” he says. Ditto the rest of the Trump team. But he admits he still doesn’t understand the new administration’s real intentions. “We will be able to discuss some things at the meeting, and then I will find out their vision. I think the most important thing is that they hear our vision.” He warns the Americans not to keep Ukraine out of the loop. That has been Mr Putin’s aim from the start, he thinks, and he worries the White House could be easily misled: “If Russia is left alone with America, Putin with Trump, or their teams, they will receive manipulative information.”
The Ukrainian president is clearly concerned by some of the early signals coming from Team Trump. In January Marco Rubio, now secretary of state, suggested that both Russia and Ukraine must make “concessions” for peace. Too much, the Ukrainian president says, is being asked of the non-aggressor. Readiness to sit down with “the killer” (Mr Putin) is compromise enough. “Imagine that Hitler wasn’t destroyed…Imagine that after everything he did to the Jews…people said, okay, let’s look for a compromise.” Mr Putin, he says, has “acted like Hitler” and the wrong type of diplomacy would rehabilitate him. Ukraine is ready to negotiate, but only with security guarantees that could hold Russia back from fresh aggression. A history of broken deals has shown that talks and ceasefires alone will not work. “Without a security guarantee, it’s zero…[Putin] doesn’t want any peace.”
The trouble is that America and some European states appear unwilling or unable to make credible commitments of the kind Mr Zelensky is demanding. He admits that Nato membership is unlikely because of opposition from America, Germany and Hungary—though, he says, the latter would snap into line if ever Mr Trump asked. “No one is giving up.” But if the door remains shut, Ukraine must “build NATO on its territory”, meaning, he explains, a strengthened Ukrainian army. (…)
Mr Zelensky has a warning for those who think that a quick deal undercutting Ukraine will make their lives easier. Western leaders focused exclusively on domestic politics are “delusional,” he says. Mr Putin is coming for them too, he claims. “No one understands what war is until it comes to your home. I don’t want to scare anyone. It will come. I’m just telling you the facts.” (…)
Amid this moment of peril he insists that his own position is secure and he has public support. But there is growing dissent in the ranks, and he hints at it. “There are people who are very patriotic, and there are people who are not.” He dodges a question about his own future, and whether he will seek re-election, once an election can be held. That is not on his mind, he insists, perhaps unconvincingly. He is disdainful of comments made by Mr Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, General Keith Kellogg, that Ukraine could hold elections during wartime. How could you run them in a city like Kharkiv, under daily Russian bombardment? “It’s interesting when General Kellogg thinks about the elections. He’s 82 [in fact, 80] years old, and he thinks about the elections in Ukraine.” The Ukrainian president insists that power has not poisoned him. That, after all, is what sets him apart from the man in the Kremlin. “And I have time, he doesn’t. He will definitely die soon.”
Mr Zelensky says he is determined that Mr Putin will not use a new American presidency to sideline Ukraine. “Look, I will not let Putin win. This is what I live by.” Ukraine’s president is sticking by his guns to get the maximum he can in the way of security guarantees. Less obvious is what, if anything, he can do if Mr Trump cuts a deal without him.■
The Economist, February 11
The transparent battlefield : The added dangers of fighting in Ukraine when everything is visible
There is no more fog of war
Large excerpts:
For centuries the “fog of war”, the inability to see through the confusion of combat, has been a given. No longer. The front lines in the war between Russia and Ukraine are now saturated with surveillance drones livestreaming video footage in real time. Everyone can see pretty much everything. Armies are having to work out how to fight on what is being called the transparent battlefield.
The surveillance is layered. Orbiting satellites scan the Earth from space. Tactical drones have ranges of 200km or more. Smaller surveillance drones relay sightings to the operators of first-person view drones (FPVs), which carry a small munition to attack soldiers on the ground. Add a thermal-imaging camera and soldiers can also be spotted at night.
“Darwin”, an FPV operator in Ukraine’s 92nd Brigade, says the changes that the drones have wrought are colossal. Three years ago, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, a drone team could operate in open fields. Now they hide in the woods and don’t leave their positions during the day. “Before, operations could be carefully planned,” he says. “Now every mission is a lottery, you can be lucky or unlucky.”
Reconnaissance and foot patrols from forward positions have virtually ceased and it is increasingly perilous to evacuate the wounded or retrieve the dead. Infantry avoid gathering in large groups. Open ground is a killing zone, speed the only protection. Soldiers use quadbikes and motorcycles to outrun the reaction time of an FPV operator. And though it is impossible to move, it is also dangerous to stay in one place. Fortified trench systems are obvious targets. Armoured vehicles have been virtually neutralised. “When a tank appears it’s like dropping a plate of food in front of a table of hungry drone operators,” says Darwin.
To disrupt the omnipresent drones, Russians and Ukrainians are engaged in an electronic-warfare arms race. (…)
Bad weather and night afford some protection. Wind and rain hamper drone flight, cloud and fog reduce visibility. It’s harder to orient a drone in the dark, says Darwin. Thermal cameras can see soldiers at night, but not at any great distance.
Long-standing tactics have been upended. “One of the most obvious”, says Glib Voloskyi, an analyst for Come Back Alive, one of the largest volunteer organisations raising money to donate equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces, “is that it’s hard to achieve surprise.” It is also almost impossible to achieve local force superiority: to gather and concentrate troops for an attack. The lethality of fire is greater because targets are easily identified, and artillery adjustments can be made quickly. The transparent battlefield gives the defender the advantage. “Offensive operations,” says Mr Voloskyi, “are a really nasty business.”
Infantry now operate in small groups, which are harder to spot. The Russians have been able to make advances in recent months by sending handfuls of soldiers forward to gain a foothold. Most are picked off by the drones; this incremental nibbling, says Mr Voloskyi, is working in part because the Russian tolerance for casualties is high and refuseniks are shot.
AI is being used to analyse surveillance data and cross-reference it with signals intelligence and open-source information, like Russian soldiers’ social-media posts, which can reveal their positions. But object-recognition software is in the early stages. Mr Voloskyi says AI can generate false signals, muddling the picture, “and this might actually decrease transparency”. There is a difference, he points out, between seeing something and understanding what you are looking at. Last summer the Russians saw the Ukrainian build-up of troops in the Sumy area, but never imagined they would attack across the border into the Kursk region. “That’s the problem with transparency,” says Mr Voloskyi. “You can see actions, but you don’t necessarily correctly interpret them.” ■
Le Point, 3 février, article payant
« Je vais mourir ? » : à Pokrovsk, le calvaire des soldats ukrainiens blessés
REPORTAGE. Les envoyés spéciaux du Point ont pu passer 24 heures dans un poste médical avancé ukrainien, au plus près du front et des troupes russes.
Extraits:
La veille, il y avait encore un cochon à l’arrière de la maison. Dans le jardin potager, les cultures fanent sur pied. Les sillons tracés dans la terre noire attendent d’être semés, mais les propriétaires sont partis, cédant de bon gré leur ferme aux militaires. Entouré de remises pour les outils et d’un garage pour les engins agricoles, un conteneur vert sombre recouvert de treillis de camouflage et monté sur châssis occupe le centre de la courette. Une rampe métallique grillagée mène à son entrée.
Il pourrait s’agir d’une roulotte, dont les roues auraient été immobilisées, de clapiers ou même d’une remise mobile, mais, à l’intérieur, dans la lumière blanche des néons, deux lits en enfilade, placés sous les spots et reliés à des instruments médicaux, forment le bloc opératoire d’un point de stabilisation mobile. Les blessés sont amenés dans ce poste médical avancé, le plus proche de la zone des combats, pour y être stabilisés avant d’être transportés en ambulance vers un hôpital militaire où ils reçoivent les soins adéquats. Les premières heures sont cruciales pour la survie des blessés de guerre.
Les forces russes contournent par le sud la ville de Pokrovsk. (…) L’intérêt stratégique de Pokrovsk et des routes qui y mènent ainsi que le projet de contrôler l’entièreté du territoire de la région de Donetsk expliquent que l’état-major russe y concentre une partie importante de ses forces.
Pokrovsk et ses alentours constituent ainsi la zone la plus disputée de la ligne de front. Les combats qui s’y déroulent font des victimes par dizaines chaque jour. Les Russes tomberaient en plus grand nombre, mais le camp ukrainien subit aussi des pertes colossales, sur lesquelles Kiev refuse de communiquer. Pour la seule journée de jeudi 23 janvier, Kiev a dénombré, sur l’ensemble de la ligne de front, plus de 100 bombes guidées larguées par des avions russes, 5 400 obus tirés par les canons ennemis et 2 500 attaques avec des drones kamikazes. Mais c’est la portion des alentours de Pokrovsk qui a subi le plus grand nombre de ces assauts : un déferlement de violence.
La nuit est tombée depuis longtemps quand surgissent deux ambulances au bout de la cour. Les médecins ont été prévenus et attendent dans le froid au pied de leur conteneur médicalisé, à côté des brancards, alors que les blessés qui ne peuvent se lever sont débarqués, puis transbahutés en civière vers les châlits. En tout, ce sont quatre militaires qui ont été fauchés par des bombes sur leurs positions au sud-ouest de Pokrovsk. Le soldat le plus mal en point est hissé sur un brancard vers le conteneur, suivi par Andréi, qui tente, lui, de monter la rampe comme s’il était valide. Les pansements enserrent ses mains comme deux moufles ensanglantées.
Les infirmiers l’aident d’abord à s’allonger avant de le déshabiller. Sous le choc, il s’exprime confusément et interpelle de mystérieux interlocuteurs invisibles. « Quelle langue parlent-ils, à l’assaut, à l’assaut ! C’est du russe ! » L’anesthésiste calme le blessé, qui s’endort peu à peu sous l’effet des sédatifs. « Le choc et l’adrénaline rendent les blessés imprévisibles, commente Marik, et parfois même dangereux. Notre premier geste, avant même d’observer le patient, c’est de le désarmer. »
La blessure remonte à plus de six heures, mais le soldat n’a pu quitter sa position plus tôt à cause de la proximité des Russes. Il était retranché dans un blindage, le souterrain fortifié d’une tranchée, lorsque les soldats russes ont donné l’assaut et jeté une grenade au fond de l’abri. Il a protégé son visage dans ses mains et perdu des doigts.
Dans le deuxième lit en enfilade, Sergey grimace de douleur. Alors que Marik, l’anesthésiste, procède calmement à une première injection de kétamine, autant pour relaxer son patient que pour atténuer la douleur, les vêtements de Sergey sont rapidement découpés, mis en charpie : le pantalon d’abord, puis la veste, les couches de laine et les sous-vêtements. En quelques minutes, Sergey est nu comme un ver, tout blanc sous la lumière éblouissante à l’exception des piqûres de sang noirci sur ses mains et son visage. Au milieu de son tibia, un trou béant, d’où débordent, mélangés, les chairs boursouflées et les os déchiquetés.
Ironie du sort, Sergey a mal utilisé son garrot, le tourniquet, qui n’a pas bloqué la circulation sanguine, lui sauvant ainsi la jambe car, explique Marik, si le membre n’est pas irrigué pendant plusieurs heures, il meurt. « La blessure est grave, précise-t-il, mais sa jambe sera sauvée. Sergey sera opéré puis immobilisé durant plusieurs mois. » Andrei a lui aussi été sauvé pour avoir mal placé son tourniquet. (…)
Les militaires blessés ne se plaignent pas, parfois pas assez, et minimisent souvent leurs problèmes. Certains se sentent coupables de quitter leurs camarades. Comme Vassil, venu pour une petite plaie dans le dos, qui ne veut pas déranger, voudrait juste un pansement, mais qui dévoile sous l’omoplate un trou immense qui commence presque à pourrir. « L’odeur ne laisse aucun doute », décrit Marik.
Il a reçu un schrapnell deux jours plus tôt, mais a continué à se battre comme si de rien n’était. Il a gardé son pantalon, ses bottes et son bonnet vissé sur le crâne. « On te le laisse, dit Micha, le chirurgien, puisque tu n’es blessé qu’au dos, mais enlève au moins ton pantalon. » Vassil s’exécute sans zèle. Les médecins tiennent à tout vérifier, car parfois les gars cachent des blessures, les croyant bénignes.
Une pause, les derniers blessés sont emmenés en ambulance dans la nuit. Le silence retombe sur la cour, où la plupart des médecins fument. « On fait ça depuis trois ans. C’est la routine, le boulot, c’est comme boire un café », explique Sergey, médecin-chef, responsable des évacuations et des points de stabilisation de la 59e brigade. L’aide-infirmier lui rétorque : « Oui, mais le café, ça prend plus de temps. » (…)
L’équipe manque bien souvent de médicaments appropriés et d’oxygène, elle doit parfois se tourner vers les associations de volontaires qui leur donnent gracieusement ce dont les soignants ont besoin. À cause de la bureaucratie, de la corruption aussi, les services officiels n’arrivent pas à satisfaire les demandes. « La guerre aggrave les défauts d’un système qui en comptait déjà beaucoup, la corruption notamment. »
Mais le pire pour les médecins et le reste de l’équipe, c’est la fatigue qui les mine. Mobilisés ou volontaires de la première heure, ils n’ont d’autre choix que d’attendre la fin de la guerre, car il n’y aura pas de relève. « On a une semaine ou deux de vacances tous les six mois. C’est dur de rentrer et de se retrouver avec des gens qui ne connaissent pas la guerre, et c’est encore plus dur de repartir pour revenir ici. » Marik n’a plus fêté l’anniversaire de sa fille depuis le début de la guerre, Sergey non plus, et l’aide-soignant regrette le temps où il pratiquait l’apiculture : « Depuis que j’ai entendu le bruit des drones kamikazes, je n’arrive plus à m’occuper de mes abeilles. » (…)
De nouveaux blessés débarquent, branle-bas de combat : il faut réveiller Micha et Marik. Allongé sur le lit médicalisé, celui dont ses frères d’armes disent qu’il s’appelle Gennady, un bandage autour de la tête, dit avoir mal à la tête. « C’est que tu es vivant », lui lance Micha, tout en le prenant en charge. « Un cas léger, une commotion probablement », explique Marik. « Comment t’appelles-tu ? » questionne Micha pour remplir la fiche de prise en charge. « Je ne sais pas », répond l’autre.
Micha lui demande de bouger les jambes pendant qu’on lui découpe ses vêtements : tout fonctionne. Mais lorsque Marik ôte le bandage de fortune, un flot de sang s’échappe de son oreille. Personne n’a besoin d’un signe : c’est grave, un éclat d’obus a pénétré son oreille et s’est probablement niché dans son cerveau. « Quel âge as-tu ? » demande l’infirmière. « Ta date de naissance ? » Micha décoche sa vanne : « Tu lui demandes sa date de naissance alors qu’il ne sait même pas son nom… » Elle revient à la charge et insiste pour savoir quand il est né. « Je sais pas ; peut-être aujourd’hui. » C’était le treizième blessé grave de la nuit, il y en aura encore un dernier. « Je vais mourir ? » L’infirmière sourit. « Oui, mais pas aujourd’hui. »
The Guardian, February 1, free accès
‘Everybody is tired. The mood has changed’: the Ukrainian army’s desertion crisis
Some of those abandoning the frontline say the longer the war goes on, ‘the more people like me there will be’
Extraits:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine three years ago, Viktor* was ready to die for his country. He volunteered to defend Kyiv as enemy tanks appeared and joined Ukraine’s armed forces. In the spring of 2023 he was fighting in the village of Tonenke, near the eastern city of Avdiivka. “When I arrived I was super-motivated. If necessary I would give my life,” he recalled.
Gradually, however, he became disillusioned. The battle was furious. “The Russians would smash our positions to the ground,” he said. Senior Ukrainian commanders gave unrealistic orders. Then, while he was defending a ruined building, a panel fell on his shoulder. After receiving injections to reduce the pain, he was told to return to the front. “I realised I’m nobody. Just a number,” he said.
In May that same year, Viktor left his position to seek further medical treatment. He did not come back. His commander marked him down as awol. Viktor is one of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers who have abandoned their units. The exact figure is a military secret, but officials concede the number is large. They say it is understandable, when tired troops have served for months without a proper break.
The issue of desertion has made headlines in Ukraine. Last week the government launched an investigation into the 155th Mechanised Brigade. Fifty-six soldiers disappeared while training in France. Hundreds of others are said to be missing. The unit’s commander, Dmytro Riumshyn, was arrested. He faces 10 years in jail for failing to carry out his official duties and to report unauthorised absences.
After three years of war, Ukraine is desperately short of soldiers, especially infantry. This has made it easier for Russia’s army to advance in the east. There are structural issues too. New brigades have been built from scratch. They performed poorly. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, recently ordered a change in policy, with inexperienced recruits integrated into existing battalions.
Some who desert keep a low profile. Others live and work openly. Viktor said he went back to his brigade in August 2023 but was told he was not wanted. Once a trained sniper, he now runs a garage in western Ukraine, where he repairs military vehicles for free. Had he killed Russians? “Many,” he replied. “Everybody is tired. The mood has changed. People used to hug soldiers in the streets. Now they worry about being conscripted.”
Viktor added there was a severe lack of frontline manpower. In February 2023 he was given a 10-day break – only to be recalled a day after he got home, as Avdiivka came under attack. Two people from his company had been killed, he said. The others were wounded. “One guy lost an arm. Another a leg. Some had bullet wounds. Nobody is completely OK. Even so, we managed to achieve some tasks,” he said.
Another deserter, Oleksii*, said he took part in Ukrainian offensives in the southern Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. He described one battle as chaotic, with bullets flying, mortars landing in a forest clearing, and insufficient artillery support. During the winter of 2022 he had a row with a new commander, applied unsuccessfully for a transfer, and got hurt. “I reached boiling point. So I decided to go where nobody can find me,” he said. (…)
Andrii Hrebeniuk, the sergeant major of an infantry battalion, fighting in the Donetsk oblast town of Velyka Novosilka, said soldiers went awol “pretty frequently”. “Some return. Some don’t,” he said. “It’s about morale more than injury. They need a psychological reset. They go and see their families and reappear after a couple of months.” Did he understand them? “I don’t sympathise and I don’t condemn,” he replied.
Hrebeniuk’s mechanised brigade, the 110th, last week took the unusual step of saying it was critically short of personnel. It had enough drones and artillery, but no infantry, at a time of constant Russian attacks. “We need to break the stereotype that if you join up you will be dead in five minutes,” Hrebeniuk said. He added: “Simple things keep you alive, like digging in, cleaning your weapons, and paying attention during first aid training.”
Reshetylova said there were hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers staying in their positions and “not going anywhere”. The recruitment crisis could be solved, she added, if Ukraine’s allies sent their own troops. If they did not, and Kyiv fell, Vladimir Putin would keep going. She said: “As I see it, it is Europe’s armies that are absent without leave. They don’t understand – or don’t want to understand – that this is their war too.”
*Names have been changed
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/31/tired-mood-changed-ukrainian-army-desertion-crisis
Trump’s Ukraine Moment
A U.S. president saying that he wants the war over is a big change.
Article intégral : https://kinzler.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/29-janvier-2.pdf
The Economist, January 28, pay wall
Danger in the Donbas : Amid talk of a ceasefire, Ukraine’s front line is crumbling
An ominous defeat in the eastern town of Velyka Novosilka
Extraits:
THE FINAL battle for the small Donbas town of Velyka Novosilka dragged on for six days, though the outcome was obvious long before. Things became critical early in the new year, when Russian troops took over villages immediately to its north-east and west, pinching the Ukrainian defenders on three sides. By Thursday 23rd, the narrow corridor to what had become a nearly-isolated pocket had become impassable. The order to retreat came as soon as a mist descended. It was a nightmareish task that had to be completed on foot, under drone-filled skies, and across a river. The evidence of triumphant Russian propaganda channels suggests that many failed to make it.
Russia’s small victory in Velyka Novosilka (population just 5,000 before the war) followed a familiar pattern: relentless infantry assaults, devastating casualties, collapsing Ukrainian defenses, and their eventual retreat. The immediate focus for the units that had been fighting there will now probably shift back to Pokrovsk to the north, a much-bigger logistical hub that Russia has been attacking at various intensities for the past six months. The fighting there has already prompted the Ukrainians to shut a crucial coking-coal mine—one that previously provided half the needs of the domestic metallurgy industry. Russian forces are also advancing nearby towards the site of useful lithium ore deposits.
The Kremlin’s plan probably depends on where it can make quick progress. The minimum requirement of its “special military operation” appears still to be occupying the entirety of the Donbas region (comprising the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk), regaining control of Russia’s own Kursk region, which Ukraine has partly occupied, and holding on to the “land bridge” it seized in the early stages of the war connecting Crimea to Russia. (…)
The modern battlefield—dominated by drones that spy, stalk and strike—is rapidly changing the nature of the fighting. In Velyka Novosilka, for example, armoured vehicles played a minimal role. “One of our tanks crept out near the frontlines,” says Captain Ivan Sekach, an officer with Ukraine’s 110th brigade defending the town. “Ten drones attacked, setting it alight almost immediately.” The fighting instead was done by infantry—small Russian groups of three, four, five, sent forward in waves. Most met a swift and bloody end. But some managed to establish new positions and move the fight closer, forcing the Ukrainians to retreat.
The Russian tactics are not dynamic, but are causing Ukraine no end of bother. Put simply, Russia has the infantry and Ukraine does not. Issues with mobilisation and desertion have hit Ukraine’s reserves hard. “We struggle to replace our battlefield losses,” says Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, the commander of a Ukrainian tactical grouping in the Donbas. “They might throw a battalion’s worth of soldiers at a position we’ve manned with four or five soldiers.” The brigades that make up the Donbas frontline are consistently understaffed, under pressure, and cracking. The front line keeps creeping back. (…)
The world’s focus has shifted to negotiations that have yet to happen; on the contradictory signals from the Trump administration that one day look positive for Ukraine, and the next less so. For those doing the fighting, the agenda is less abstract. As long as the front line keeps moving, Mr Putin appears to have little reason to compromise. The Russians will not run out of weapons any time soon, says the intelligence officer Cherniak. “They have at least a year, possibly two, to continue fighting as they have been.” (…)
Three years into its grinding attritional fight, it is still unclear if Russia can turn its many tactical gains into something bigger—enough to press deeper behind Ukraine’s weakening lines and to cause real worry. Mr Cherniak says the evidence so far suggests that this is unlikely. “We see their reserves, their missiles, their armour—and it’s not enough. Not yet.” Captain Sekach thinks luck may also have played a role. In Velyka Novosilka, he says, Russian armoured columns on more than one occasion broke through and got behind Ukrainian defences, but without realising it. Lost and disoriented, they turned back. “The Russian army doesn’t reward smart people, that’s my only explanation,” he says. “But we can’t count on it staying that way.”■
The Wall Street Journal, January 22, pay wall
Peace in Ukraine Needn’t Mean Russian Victory
It serves U.S. interests to keep backing Kyiv so that it can negotiate from a position of strength.
Extraits:
As President Trump seeks to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to support the Ukrainian military. Ukraine can reach a just and lasting outcome to this war, but only with our help.
Since Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, the topic of Ukraine funding has become increasingly politicized and detached from the facts on the ground. I worked on Russia and Ukraine policy at the White House over the past four years, and there are clear, straightforward, nonpartisan reasons why the U.S. should keep up its military aid for Ukraine.
First, Ukraine is an effective partner that is degrading the Russian military and, in the process, strengthening its position for a future negotiation. Press coverage of this war is frequently lopsided in portraying Russia as on the march and Ukraine on its back foot. The reality is more complex. (…) But it’s also true that Ukraine is imposing extraordinary costs on Russia, which is suffering an average of 1,500 casualties a day. It’s an open question whether Moscow can continue to recruit enough soldiers to replace its staggering losses, estimated at more than 700,000 casualties overall since 2022. (…)
Second, with U.S. help, Ukraine can push Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations. Russia wants the world to believe it can sustain its military campaign indefinitely, but the current landscape tells a different story. The Russian military is struggling, and the Russian economy is deteriorating. Thanks in part to U.S. and allied sanctions, inflation in Russia is above 9%, and its benchmark interest rate is at 21%. (…)
Maintaining military aid for Ukraine while simultaneously applying economic pressure on Russia would increase the likelihood of a durable peace. The Trump administration has made clear that its objective is to end the fighting. But to secure a just and lasting resolution, Ukraine requires leverage for talks. Cutting off aid would rob Ukraine of leverage, shift battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor and undermine Ukraine’s negotiating position at a critical moment.
Third, helping Ukraine succeed remains fundamentally in America’s national-security interest. Russia is seeking to legitimize territorial conquest by force. If Russian aggression isn’t halted in Ukraine, then Moscow could become emboldened to threaten the eastern-flank members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and aggressors around the world would become more likely to imitate Russia’s behavior. It is no coincidence that Iran, China and North Korea have all been deepening their support for Russia. (…)
Congress should make it a priority to appropriate additional security assistance funding for Ukraine. Only the U.S. has the capacity to provide Ukraine with the equipment it needs to prevail. (…)
As this war persists, it can be tempting for nonparticipating countries to lose interest. Curtailing security assistance to Ukraine now, however, would be a historic mistake that would play to Russia’s advantage.
The U.S. has led a historic, yearslong effort to help Ukraine protect its sovereignty, defend against Russian aggression and generate the leverage needed to secure a just and lasting peace. In the past few months, the U.S. has expanded sanctions on Russia, provided Ukraine with nonpersistent antipersonnel landmines, permitted the cross-border use of American-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems and supplied Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets and hundreds of air-defense missiles. Ukraine has a healthy stockpile of key munitions, while the pressures on Russia’s economy and military are growing.
Ukraine can enter a future negotiation with strength and reach an acceptable outcome to this war, but only if the U.S. continues to support the Ukrainian military and apply economic pressure on Russia. Now is the time to finish the job.
Mr. Shimer served on the National Security Council staff, 2021-25, most recently as the director for Eastern Europe and Ukraine, and previously as director for Russian affairs.
The Economist, January 22, pay wall
Death from above : Russian pilots appear to be hunting Ukrainian civilians
Residents of Kherson are dodging murderous drones
Extraits:
KHERSON, A REGIONAL capital in southern Ukraine, endured eight months of Russian occupation before Ukrainian forces liberated it in November 2022. The Russians retreated to the other side of the Dnieper river, but have indiscriminately shelled the city ever since. In June 2023 they blew up the nearby Kakhovka dam, flooding low-lying areas of Kherson. Now the city’s 80,000 inhabitants, down from a prewar population of 280,000, face a new sort of misery. For six months Russian drones have been attacking civilians daily, chasing cars and pedestrians through the streets in what locals call a “safari”.
There have been more than 1,000 drone strikes since last summer, injuring over 500 people and killing 36, according to municipal authorities. Surveillance drones patrol high up; smaller attack drones (known as FPVs, or first-person-view drones), with a flying time of 20-40 minutes, sit on rooftops to conserve battery power. The munitions dropped are often makeshift: mortar shells, grenades, canisters containing shrapnel or darts, or bottles of petrol that ignite.
Shops, schools, clinics, private houses, delivery vans, buses, firetrucks and other first responders are routinely targeted. Several administrative officials have been wounded. In one case, says Roman Mrochko, the head of the military authority in Kherson, a minibus “was almost completely destroyed, but the driver heroically saved the injured people by driving, you could say on scrap metal, to the hospital.” In the riverside neighbourhoods where the attacks are concentrated, designated “red zones” by Russians on Telegram channels, life has been throttled. There is no gas, water, electricity or municipal heat. Public transport is suspended. Ambulances wait outside the area for police in armoured cars to ferry the wounded to them.
The very few people still living in these areas, mostly pensioners, hardly dare to go out. (…)
The purpose of the Russian campaign is not clear. Mr Mrochko suggests the Russians are training drone pilots on Kherson’s civilians. Or it may be a tactic to establish a buffer zone, or to prepare for an offensive to retake part of the west bank of the river. The incidence of artillery strikes in Kherson has also been rising. (…)
Belkis Wille of Human Rights Watch, a rights watchdog, is compiling a report on the Kherson attacks. She says they are “deliberate” and may be calculated “to force civilians to leave the area”. Civilian casualties often result from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, Ms Wille notes, but the drones target civilians precisely.
Reports of Russian drone attacks on civilians elsewhere near Ukraine’s front lines are increasing. On the battlefield, some lethal drones already have a degree of autonomy, with artificial intelligence and object-recognition software to keep homing in on their targets even in the face of electronic jamming. Lethal drones with human pilots seem brutal enough, but the step to fully autonomous ones seems inevitable. Intentionally targeting civilians with drones is a war crime, but it is effective at depopulating areas. “I think what’s happening in Kherson is a harbinger,” says Ms Wille. ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/01/18/russian-pilots-appear-to-be-hunting-ukrainian-civilians
The Wall Street Journal, 17 janvier, article payant
Trump Can Make Russia Pay to Rebuild Ukraine
The West has frozen $300 billion of Moscow’s assets, but Europe has stood in the way of using them.
Extraits :
The key to securing Europe at less cost to U.S. taxpayers may be sitting in European bank accounts. The West has frozen around $300 billion of Russian foreign-exchange assets, but European obstinacy has prevented these funds from being used to compensate Ukraine for war damages. President-elect Trump should insist that the Kremlin’s reserves be mobilized to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and future arms purchases.
Russia has caused more than $150 billion in direct damage to Ukraine and nearly $500 billion in economic losses, according to the World Bank. Ukraine will need external funds of this magnitude to rebuild, and more in the meantime to rearm itself with continued purchases of Western weapons.
Mr. Trump doesn’t want the U.S. to foot this bill, especially with America’s military already spread thin in the Middle East and Asia. European budgeters are planning to increase their own defense spending, as Mr. Trump demands, so they’ll be stretched thin as well. The obvious solution is to use the frozen Russian assets.
The Group of Seven has already agreed to tap the profits from interest produced by the frozen assets. But because of European opposition, aided and abetted by the inept diplomacy of the Biden administration, tapping these profits unlocked only a $50 billion loan for Ukraine and left the underlying assets untouched. This isn’t enough.
Five factors make now the ideal time to use these funds to compensate Russia’s victims.
The first is Mr. Trump’s return to the White House. (…)
Second, the assets have changed. When the war started, most Russian reserves were in the form of foreign-government securities held by European custodians. Now, according to the Hoover Institution’s Philip Zelikow, the securities have largely matured into cash. (…)
Third, it’s clear that the reserves can be mobilized in ways consistent with international law. Ukraine is owed reparations from Russia. (…)
Fourth, Russia has less ability to retaliate economically. Any assets that Western firms still own in Russia are increasingly beyond their control. (…)
Fifth, many European governments are finally warming to the idea. Europeans realize that Ukraine needs a long-term source of funds, and change is coming in the most important country, Germany. Mr. Scholz will likely be replaced in February by Friedrich Merz, who has rightly criticized Mr. Scholz’s bare-minimum support for Ukraine. Mr. Merz has yet to take a stand on the foreign-assets question, but mobilizing Russia’s reserves would fit with his vision—and his need to address Mr. Trump’s insistence that Europe contribute more to its own security.
The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to strike a better deal. Both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from transferring Mr. Putin’s cash to the victims of his aggression—the sooner, the better.
Mr. Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of “Doom: The Politics of Catastrophe.” Mr. Miller is a professor of international history at Tufts University and nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
New York Times, 15 janvier, article payant
Guest Essay : Putin’s Plan for Peace Is No Peace at All
By Lloyd J. Austin III and Antony J. Blinken
Extraits :
President Vladimir Putin of Russia appalled the world with his full-scale invasion of Ukraine almost three years ago. He planned to topple Ukraine’s democratically elected government, install a Kremlin puppet regime and expose the West as weak, divided and diminished.
After more than 1,000 days of Mr. Putin’s reckless war of choice, he has failed to achieve a single one of his strategic goals. Russia’s power and influence are greatly diminished; it couldn’t even prop up a valued client like the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Meanwhile, Ukraine stands strong and defiant as a free and sovereign democracy, with an economy rooted in the West.
All this is a testament to the resilience of Ukraine’s troops and the strength of Ukraine’s people. It is also the product of steadfast American leadership, which has rallied allies and partners worldwide to help Ukraine survive the Kremlin’s imperial onslaught. The United States should build on this historic success, not squander it.
Mr. Putin assumed that the world would stand by when he sent his troops across the Ukrainian border. He was wrong. The United States has rallied some 50 countries from around the planet to help Ukraine defend itself — and to uphold the bedrock principle that borders may not be redrawn by force. (…)
As a percentage of G.D.P., more than a dozen contact group members now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the United States does. And these investments in Ukraine are delivering returns here at home, boosting our defense industrial base and creating good jobs. Mr. Putin’s aggression even spurred the very outcome he had sought to prevent: NATO is now bigger, stronger and more united than ever.
As a result, Ukraine has held off the second-largest military in the world — despite Mr. Putin’s reckless escalations and irresponsible nuclear saber rattling. (…)
Ukraine’s success to date is a huge strategic achievement, but its troops still face profound challenges on the battlefield. Russian forces have recently clawed back some of the territory that Ukraine liberated earlier in the war, and Mr. Putin’s bombardment of Ukraine’s power plants and other critical infrastructure is taking a harrowing toll. (…)
Still, Ukraine’s vulnerabilities should not mask Mr. Putin’s own growing dilemmas.
(…) Russia is suffering huge losses — an average of 1,500 casualties a day — to seize small slivers of territory. Russia has suffered more than 700,000 dead and injured since Mr. Putin began his war. Now he increasingly faces a painful dilemma: either endure high casualties for minimal gains, perhaps order a mobilization that triggers domestic instability, or negotiate seriously with Ukraine to end his war. (…)
All of this has given leverage to Ukraine — and to the next U.S. administration. This leverage should be used to end Mr. Putin’s war and usher in a durable peace that ensures Ukrainians can deter further Russian aggression, defend their territory and thrive as a sovereign democracy. That is what peace through strength would look like. But because Mr. Putin retains his imperial ambitions, giving up our leverage now by cutting aid and forcing a premature cease-fire would simply allow Mr. Putin to rest, refit and eventually reattack. This would be peace through surrender, which would be no peace at all.
Not for Ukraine, which would be crushed under Mr. Putin’s boot.
Not for Europe, which would fall under the shadow of a tyrant determined to reconstitute Moscow’s fallen empire.
Not for America’s friends elsewhere, who could face new risks of aggression from other autocrats who would likely see a victory for Mr. Putin as a hunting license of their own.
And not for the United States, which would have to spend more resources and shoulder greater risks to defend not only against an emboldened Russian leader but also against other autocrats and agents of chaos bent on tearing down the system of rules, rights and responsibilities that has made generations of Americans more secure and more prosperous.
Pursuing a policy of peace through strength is vital to Ukraine’s survival and America’s security. The United States and its allies and partners must continue to stand by Ukraine and strengthen its hand for the negotiations that will someday bring Mr. Putin’s war of aggression to an end.
Lloyd J. Austin III is the secretary of defense. Antony J. Blinken is the secretary of state.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/14/opinion/us-ukraine-defense-austin-blinken-russia.html
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14 janvier, article payant
Aufmarsch der Roboter – neue Technologien machen den Krieg in der Ukraine noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser
Immer mehr teure und schwere Grosskampfsysteme erweisen sich auf den Schlachtfeldern der Ukraine als untauglich. Sie lassen sich mit billiger und flexibler Drohnentechnologie aushebeln. Sichtbar wird der Krieg der Zukunft, der nicht weniger grausam ist.
Sergei Gerasimow ist Schriftsteller und lebt in der Grossstadt Charkiw, die nach wie vor von den Russen mit Raketen beschossen wird. – Aus dem Englischen von A. Bn.
Extraits :
25. Dezember, früher Weihnachtsmorgen. Die Strassenlampen sind gerade angegangen. Hier und da schleichen die ersten Autos durch die leeren Strassen, aber die meisten Menschen schlafen noch an diesem festlichen Morgen. Nur ein paar Fenster leuchten in einem gemütlichen gedämpften Licht, das an eine Kerzenflamme erinnert. Es sind die letzten Sekunden vor einem Raketenangriff.
Als unglaublich schnell Feuertropfen vom Himmel herab zu regnen beginnen, treten eine Mutter und ihr Kind an das Fenster. Nicht weit entfernt davon, hinter dem schwarzen Umriss einer Kirche, trifft eine der Raketen ein Wärmekraftwerk: Es besitzt vier hohe Schornsteine, darunter einen, der die anderen überragt und der trotz wiederholten russischen Versuchen, ihn zu zerstören, nach wie vor raucht.
Die Explosion ist so gewaltig, dass der Himmel über halb Charkiw für einen Moment in orangefarbenes Feuer eintaucht, da die Wolken die höllischen Flammen am Boden reflektieren. Dann steigt ein kochender, flackernder Feuerpilz über dem Kraftwerk auf, verschmilzt mit den tief hängenden Wolken und verwandelt sich in etwas, das wie der dicke Wirbel eines Tornados aussieht.
Die Mutter, die das Geschehen vom Fenster aus beobachtet, spricht einen seltsamen Satz, um ihr Kind zu beruhigen: «Hab keine Angst, es wird noch schlimmer werden.» In Momenten wie diesen ist es oft schwer, die richtigen Worte zu finden.
Oreschnik, die Schreckliche
Als ich zehn Tage später am Ort vorbeifahre, sehe ich jedoch, dass das Kraftwerk noch immer in Betrieb ist: Einer der Schornsteine, der höchste, stösst noch immer Rauch aus. Die Fenster des Wohnhauses auf der anderen Strassenseite sind zerborsten, und das ist auch schon alles, was die Russen mit ihrem Angriff am Weihnachtstag erreicht haben.
Jede dieser Raketen kostet etwa so viel wie ein Kampfpanzer, aber im Moment funktionieren die grossen, teuren Raketen nicht. Sie jagen den Menschen nicht einmal mehr wirklich Angst ein. Oreschnik, die Schreckliche, mit der Putin der Welt immer wieder droht, lässt die meisten von uns nur mit den Schultern zucken. Fast täglich werden wir vor einem möglichen erneuten Abschuss dieser Mittelstreckenrakete mit sechs Sprengköpfen gewarnt, aber nur einer meiner Freunde gerät in Panik, wenn ihm eine weitere Warnung unterkommt. Für ihn ist das eine Nervensache: Zu viele russische Raketen sind schon zu nahe an seinem Haus eingeschlagen.
Auch zahlreiche andere Dinosaurier der Militärtechnik haben sich in diesem Krieg als nahezu nutzlos erwiesen. Sie erzeugen nicht mehr dieselbe Wirkung wie früher. So zum Beispiel schwere Panzer, die Millionen von Dollar kosten. Während ein solches Ungetüm Kilometer zurücklegt, um sich einer feindlichen Stellung zu nähern, hat eine leichte und billige FPV-Drohne ausreichend Zeit, ihn zu zerstören. Unscheinbare Marinedrohnen versenken grosse, unhandliche Kriegsschiffe und schiessen Kampfhelikopter über dem Meer ab. Die berühmten intelligenten Excalibur-Artillerie-Granaten mit GPS-Lenkung, die früher eine Treffsicherheit von bis zu 70 Prozent hatten, finden heute nur noch in 6 Prozent der Fälle ihr Ziel. Die elektronischen Abwehrsysteme haben gelernt, mit ihnen umzugehen.
Im Dorf Lipzi, neunzehn Kilometer nördlich von Charkiw, führte die ukrainische Armee die erste vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht ohne Infanterie durch. Zumindest war es das, was in den Medien darüber zu lesen war: eine vollständig robotergestützte Schlacht. Die Ukraine hat gewonnen und den Feind zurückgedrängt. Es wurden keine Einzelheiten über diese Konfrontation bekannt, und sie hat die militärische Landkarte nicht verändert, so dass der Sieg wahrscheinlich nicht wirklich bedeutend war. Russische Telegram-Kanäle spotteten über die Schlacht und veröffentlichten Fotos von beschädigten ukrainischen Bodendrohnen, die wie Spielzeugautos mit grossen Rädern aussahen.
Als ich mich mit einem Mann, der Drohnen herstellt, über den Schlagabtausch von Lipzi unterhielt, äusserte ich die Ansicht, dass die Schlacht ja eigentlich nicht als Roboterschlacht bezeichnet werden könne, da dort keine Roboter, sondern von Operateuren gesteuerte Drohnen gekämpft hätten. Daraufhin antwortete er mir, dass dort auch robotische Geschütze eingesetzt worden seien, die in der Lage seien, ein Ziel selbständig zu finden und auszuwählen. Aus einer Entfernung von fünfzig Metern treffe ein solches Geschütz mit Sicherheit den Kopf des Gegners, selbst wenn dieser gerade einen doppelten Salto mache, und aus einer Entfernung von zweihundert Metern treffe es mit Sicherheit den Rumpf.
Ausserdem seien in der Schlacht bei Lipzi auch die berühmten Roboterhunde eingesetzt worden. Sie schossen nicht, aber sie machten anhand von dessen Wärmeprofil den Gegner aus. Diese Schlacht war also tatsächlich robotisch, wenn auch nicht vollständig. Auf jeden Fall war es der erste Angriff dieser Art in der Geschichte, ohne Beteiligung der Infanterie. Als solcher dürfte er in die Militärgeschichte eingehen.
Die Schlappe bei Lipzi hat die Russen nicht sonderlich beunruhigt, denn sie haben nur eine weitere Portion Kanonenfutter verloren, und davon haben sie immer reichlich: 2024 hat die russische Armee ohne Wimpernzucken 420 000 Mann verloren, also fast eine halbe Million, aber doch rund 4200 Kilometer ukrainisches Territorium erobert, das heisst, grob gesagt, ein Rechteck aus Feldern, Schluchten, verbrannten Wäldern und rauchenden Ruinen von vierzig mal hundert Kilometern. Solches ist natürlich eine grandiose strategische Leistung, die sämtliche Verluste rechtfertigt.
Paradoxerweise ist dieser Krieg einerseits der modernste und am meisten technisierte aller Kriege der Geschichte, andererseits zieht er sich genauso endlos in die Länge und vernichtet genauso sinnlos Menschenmassen wie der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Da ist dasselbe monatelange und jahrelange Sitzen in den Schützengräben. Dieselben täglichen Abertausende von Artilleriegranaten pflügen das Land immer neu um und verwandeln die Wälder in eine Art riesige Haarbürste. Sogar das nach Senf riechende Giftgas Chlorpikrin, auf das Deutschland damals zurückgriff, ist jetzt wieder im Einsatz: Es wird von Russland gegen die Ukraine verwendet. Manchmal, wenn ich auf Videos sehe, wie Schweine aus zerstörten Schweineställen noch lebende Verwundete auffressen, und zwar beginnend mit dem weichen Unterleib, denke ich, dass dieser Krieg noch schlimmer ist als der Erste Weltkrieg. (…)
Die Grausamkeit und Ausweglosigkeit des Ersten Weltkriegs war das Ergebnis von damals entwickelten neuen Militärtechnologien: Maschinengewehre, Panzer, Stacheldrahtzäune, massive Artillerie. Das Gleiche geschieht jetzt: Neue Technologien machen den Krieg immer noch brutaler, sinnloser und hoffnungsloser. (…)
Aus strategischer Sicht ist nichts Gutes an unbemannten Schlachten – wenn der menschliche Faktor ausgeschaltet wird, werden wirtschaftlich starke Länder wirtschaftlich schwache Länder militärisch dominieren, und dagegen kann nichts getan werden. (…)
Die Zukunft der Kriegsführung liegt indes zweifellos in der künstlichen Intelligenz. Es ist interessant, dass KI während dieses Krieges für eine breite Öffentlichkeit verfügbar geworden ist. Während die Kämpfe tobten, haben die Menschen gelernt, Aids sowie einige Formen von Krebs wirksam zu behandeln, Neuralink-Chips in ein menschliches Gehirn zu implantieren, das Herz eines Schweins in einen Menschen zu verpflanzen und auch die Flugbahn eines Asteroiden zu verändern. (…)
Da wir stark damit beschäftigt waren, uns gegenseitig umzubringen, haben wir all dies kaum bemerkt, aber es scheint, dass der technologische Fortschritt nicht an uns vorbeigeht. Die Ukraine hat bereits Millionen, vielleicht sogar Dutzende von Millionen Stunden an Drohnenaufnahmen gesammelt, die zweifellos dazu dienen werden, KI-Modelle zu trainieren, die in der Lage sein werden, Entscheidungen auf dem Schlachtfeld zu treffen und Menschen mit übermenschlicher Genauigkeit zu töten. (…)
The Economist, 11 janvier, article payant
Russia and the West : Time is not on Russia’s side, argues Finland’s foreign minister
By Invitation: Elina Valtonen calls for a lower oil-price cap and tougher measures against Russia’s shadow fleet
Elina Valtonen is Finland’s foreign minister.
Extraits :
RUSSIA IS FAR from an unstoppable force of nature. The autocrats who run it rely on a war economy that is unsustainable and shows serious cracks. Democracies should take advantage by increasing the economic pressure. It is we who have the momentum.
Contrary to Vladimir Putin’s narrative, and some people’s belief, sanctions do work. Even when they do not prevent certain goods and technologies from entering or—in the case of oil and gas—leaving Russia, they certainly make logistics more cumbersome. That increases costs.
Witness the rise in Russian consumer prices, which are up by more than a third since the end of 2021. This is due mostly to the rise in import costs and the country’s labour shortage translating into high nominal wage inflation.
Owing to a low birth rate, high mortality and an exodus of Russians who oppose Mr Putin or just want a better life elsewhere, Russia’s population is shrinking, ageing and losing its best talent. The senseless war in Ukraine, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is not helping.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
To combat inflation and capital flight, the central bank has raised its key interest rate to 21%. Double-digit interest rates push up the interest expense of the public sector, incentivise businesses to place liquidity in deposits rather than in investments, and eat into profits. Yields on BBB-rated corporate bonds have climbed to levels that point to a surge in bankruptcies.
In 2024 Russia’s GDP grew by around 3.5%. This relatively strong performance came almost exclusively from sectors directly related to the war. Most forecasters expect barely any growth in 2025 as Russia runs out of labour and other resources. Despite all this, Russia can maintain the current level of military production, even if it means cutting back on everything else.
Military spending is eating up the budget and Russia has to fund its deficit through borrowing. With little to no access to international capital markets, Russia borrows domestically. New debt is absorbed by domestic banks, which place the government bonds at the central bank for cash. Essentially, the central bank is printing money to finance the government’s spending on the war.
The rouble has weakened significantly and would be on the floor were it not for central-bank support through emergency buying and capital-control mechanisms. (…)
With the economic outlook so bleak, time is not on Russia’s side. So far Mr Putin has prioritised his war against Ukraine over the welfare of his own people. To achieve just and lasting peace in Ukraine, he must be made to understand that the cost of his illegal campaign is getting too high, even for his tolerance.
To this end, we need to increase the economic pressure on Russia and reduce the possibilities for dodging sanctions, including the use of a shadow fleet. Russia uses rusting, non-insured tankers to covertly carry Russian oil around the world, undermining the EU and G7 oil-price cap on Russian crude and petroleum products. (…)
Several measures for limiting the use of the hazardous fleet are in the works. In December, 12 European countries, including my own, announced that their maritime authorities will start requesting proof of insurance from suspected shadow vessels as they pass through the English Channel, the Danish Straits of the Great Belt, the Sound between Denmark and Sweden and the Gulf of Finland. Non-compliant vessels will be placed under sanctions, which, in the EU’s case, would ban them from the bloc’s ports and maritime services.
Across Europe, decoupling from Russian energy is well under way. Direct and indirect gas and oil imports need to be further constrained. The oil-price cap, currently at $60 per barrel, should be lowered further and enforcement of the cap strengthened in conjunction with international partners.
In parallel with increasing economic pressure on Russia, Europe, America and their partners must continue supporting Ukraine militarily and economically. As Donald Trump prepares to take office for a second time, Europeans must stand ready to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security, and make the required financial investments.
Under President Joe Biden, America has been a strong backer of Ukraine’s fight for independence and democracy—underlined by Mr Biden’s recent announcement of an additional $2.5bn in security assistance. Early indications from the incoming American administration are encouraging. Although Mr Trump and his team have made it abundantly clear that they expect Europeans to do more for the continent’s security, I do not expect America to walk away from helping Ukraine, or from Europe as a whole. Such a move would diminish America’s global influence and undermine its ability to compete strategically with China and others.
The war is far from lost. With determined support from its partners, Ukraine will get through this winter in a position to enter peace talks on its own terms and timeline. Ukraine’s international partners need to keep up their joint measures until Russia starts to engage with the world in a peaceful manner, respecting the UN Charter and international law.■.
The Guardian, 27 décembre, libre accès
Can Europe switch to a ‘wartime mindset’? Take it from us in Ukraine: here is what that means
Nato’s warning reached me as I braced for a missile attack in Kyiv – where we’ve learned how to survive in the era of Russian hybrid warfare
Extraits:
Day 1,024 of the invasion. Kyiv, 7am. Friday the 13th. In a former life, someone would have observed that this is a day that portends bad luck. But in a country where shelling is a daily occurrence, it has become irrelevant. I wake up to the sound of an app on my phone warning me of an increased missile threat. While my partner and I are hiding in the corridor, I read the news that the Nato chief, Mark Rutte, has called on members of the US-led transatlantic alliance to “shift to a wartime mindset”.
With the first bang of the air defence system, a thought strikes me: for those who have not already been living with it for nearly three years, how would you explain this mindset? What is this wartime thinking?
Let’s start with the basics. Try to accept the thesis that Russia is your enemy. Everything Russian is your enemy. I know this is complicated. But Russia has been using literally everything as an instrument of hybrid warfare: sports, ballet, classical music, literature, art – these are all platforms for promoting its narratives. Evenyour neatest Russian Orthodox church could conceal Russian intelligence officers, just waiting for the command to put down their incense burners and take up arms. Don’t forget that for advocates of the political doctrine known as “the Russian world”, this world is potentially limitless; it exists wherever the Russian language is spoken and monuments to Pushkin have been plonked down. (…)
It’s hard to believe, but it won’t be Vladimir Putin himself invading your country. It will be hundreds of thousands of ordinary Russians who have been told for decades that your values are evil. No one will care about the nuances and subtleties of your specific leftism, libertarianism or liberalism. What Putin calls the “collective west”, he regards as uniform, and evil. (…)
Wartime mindset means having a “bug-out bag” packed and ready to go, to fit your whole life into one backpack. Copies of documents. A few family photos. A first aid kit. A power bank. A spare pair of underwear and socks. Something you can leave home with.
The most difficult thing to believe is that war could be on your doorstep. And this doorstep is not symbolic, but very real: the doorstep of your own home. The loss of your favourite porcelain, your parents’ books, childhood photos of your grownup children, the inability to take your beloved cat, dog or hamster while being evacuated – all of this is real.
It always seems that war is something that happens to someone else, in some poorer part of the world. They can’t just start dropping bombs on the capital of a European country in the 21st century! Wartime mindset is the realisation that they can.
And no matter how hard you try to prepare, one day you will wake up to an enemy missile attack. You will think that it will be over in two or three weeks, another month at most. Soon you will lose track of the days. But you will love your country with all your heart. You will fall in love with the national humour and character again, and rediscover your national cuisine. In fact, you will come to regard every national dish cooked in the dark (as there will be no electricity) as an element of national resilience and resistance.
While waiting for a miracle, I really want to believe that none of this will happen to you, as it has happened to us.
Kyiv, 10am. End of the air-raid alert. The Russians have launched 90 missiles and 200 killer drones targeting civilian infrastructure. The goal remains the same: to force Ukrainians to live without electricity, heat and gas. Terrorising civilians is a method typical of a terrorist country. An ordinary morning of abnormal reality, and yet the world’s common will is not forceful enough to stop it.
I realise that I have run out of time to tell you the most important things of all: give your partner a kiss right now; take a course in tactical medicine, and another in firearms training; buy a power bank; write a will; and find out where the nearest bomb shelter is. For no reason. Just in case miracles don’t happen, and you find yourself called upon to shift to a wartime mindset.
Oleksandr Mykhed is a writer and member of PEN Ukraine. His book The Language of War was published by Allen Lane in June 2024
Le Monde, 27 décembre, article payant
« La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen »
Dans une tribune au « Monde », un collectif de personnalités et de citoyens parmi lesquels Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Ariane Mnouchkine, le général Vincent Desportes et Adam Michnik, appelle à la mise en place d’une coalition entre Etats européens accordés sur quelques mesures vitales pour un pays qui défend sa liberté et protège les nôtres.
Extraits:
L’Ukraine vit des heures angoissantes. L’armée russe, forte d’un budget militaire de 106 milliards d’euros, qu’elle veut porter à 135 milliards en 2025, poursuit son invasion au prix de dizaines de milliers de morts et de la destruction systématique des infrastructures vitales de l’Ukraine : ses centrales énergétiques, ses hôpitaux, ses usines.
Malgré la résistance héroïque des Ukrainiens, elle gagne du terrain grâce aux demi-mesures et aux retards de l’aide apportée par leurs alliés, qui se gardent bien de désigner la seule issue admissible de cette guerre : le retrait de la Russie dans ses frontières.
Paralysés par le « chantage au nucléaire » de Vladimir Poutine, Joe Biden et les dirigeants occidentaux ont livré à contretemps des armements en quantité et de portée limitées, sans procurer à l’Ukraine les moyens de la victoire. Préoccupés avant tout par le souci de ne pas concourir à une « escalade », ils ont laissé le Kremlin franchir successivement toutes les étapes de la surenchère militaire, jusqu’à l’arrivée ces derniers jours de 10 000 soldats nord-coréens, couronnée par l’emploi de charges chimiques et d’un missile balistique hypersonique.
Tétanisés par les rodomontades de Donald Trump, les gouvernements européens se préparent-ils mezza voce à accepter, avec un lâche soulagement, que la nouvelle administration américaine négocie un accord de cessez-le-feu au détriment de la volonté ukrainienne ?
La trahison de l’Ukraine signerait l’arrêt de mort du projet européen : triomphant aujourd’hui, Poutine reprendrait dans deux, cinq ou sept ans ses guerres de conquête contre l’Ukraine, mais aussi contre la Géorgie, la Moldavie ou les pays baltes. L’ensemble du continent glisserait vers l’abîme. Notre sécurité, nos libertés et nos valeurs sont directement menacées. Il faut donc agir, vite. (…)
The Economist, 27 décembre, article payant
Ink and blood : Ukrainian troops celebrate a grim Christmas in Kursk
A local paper braves Russian bombs to deliver news on the front line
Extraits:
THE NEWSPAPER round in Velyka Pysarivka can be sketchy. Barely 3km from the Russian border, the village is stalked by death. Oleksiy and Natalia Pasyuga, the husband-and-wife duo behind the Vorskla (the weekly takes its name from the local river) have a survival algorithm. Oleksiy, 56, drives. Natalia, 53, listens out of the passenger window for the drones that grow stealthier with every day. They say they are careful, though they know they are kidding themselves. Delivering the paper to the last remaining residents of the village is not a rational exercise, but a love affair. The tears of subscribers make it worth it, Ms Pasyuga says: “They grab the paper and hold it to their nose to smell the fresh newsprint.”
For its 2,500 readers, the Vorskla is more than a news source; it is a connection to the outside world. Most of Ukraine’s border villages now have no electricity or mobile connection. When televisions work, they pick up Russian channels. The Pasyugas say they feel obliged to stay to debunk the propaganda, though they evacuated their offices from Velyka Pysarivka in March after a glide bomb smashed their car and half the building. Six months later the Russians destroyed the other half, during attacks that coincided with Ukraine’s advance into Russia’s Kursk province just to the north. Now the Vorskla is put together in a library in the nearby town of Okhtyrka. It is printed and hand delivered to front-line villages in a car the couple borrow from their son.
When your correspondent calls, the Pasyugas are preparing a special Christmas issue. They already know what they want: uplifting stories to raise the morale of their weary readers. For once, there will be no obituaries of the local boys lost in battle. The Kursk offensive will be left out too, though that is less unusual. The Pasyugas say they know “too much” to accept the official celebration of the offensive as “Ukraine’s great and only triumph of 2024”. They choose silence instead. (…)
The urgency of Russia’s counter-attack appears tied to Donald Trump’s impending inauguration. Mr Putin wants Kursk to be a done deal by January 20th, rather than an embarrassing topic for discussion. Volodymyr Zelensky seems equally determined to retain the pocket as a bargaining chip. The Ukrainians are holding on, though the conditions on (and under) ground are getting grimmer. “Rain, slush, snow, cold, mud, beetles, worms, rats and glide bombs,” says Ruslan Mokritsky, a 33-year-old non-commissioned officer in the 95th Air Assault Brigade. The Russians can drop as many as 40 glide bombs on one position in the space of a few hours, he says. “In Kursk, death is always close; it practically holds your hand.” (…)
Back in Okhtyrka, Oleksiy Pasyuga says that the soldiers’ struggle puts his own worries into perspective. His five hryvnia ($0.12) margin on the 15 hryvnia cover price is enough to keep his team in business, he says. He is determined not to be the man who ends the Vorskla’s 95-year history. There is not much of a cushion, no adverts, no excess, so the paper’s Christmas edition will be the same lean eight pages as usual. They have decided to lead with a feature on the soldiers’ New Year: how they will mark it, what they might eat. For Major Bakrev, the answer is simple enough. On New Year’s Eve he will be at work; he will not be celebrating while his men freeze in the trenches. “Maybe I’ll mark it with a couple of volleys of our guns,” he quips. Officer Mokritsky, who is likely to spend the night underground, shrugs. The soldiers on the front line will celebrate as best they can. “Maybe we’ll have Coca-Cola.” ■
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/16/ukrainian-troops-celebrate-a-grim-christmas-in-kursk
Kiev Post, 26 décembre, libre accès
OPINION: Christmas Thoughts Inspired by John Lennon, and the Enemy of Peace
So, this is Christmas, and what have we done, another year over and the war goes on and on.
Extraits:
Greetings friends. It’s Dec. 25 and I’ve got John Lennon’s “So this is Christmas” song playing over and over in my head. Especially his idealistic refrain: “War is over.” I wish it were, but it’s not.
Christmas is supposed to be a joyous celebration that evokes peace, joy and optimism. But for embattled Ukraine and its supporters, this year it’s unfortunately another bleak one.
In the last 24 hours, the barbaric Russian monster has dropped more missiles and drones over Ukraine, bringing even more death and destruction at this particular time.
While most of you were celebrating with your loved ones, Ukrainians were once again subjected to the latest merciless aerial bombardment, and their brave soldiers were attacked all along the front line.
By whom? From a country whose regime has no respect for human life and hates everything the democratic world stands for. By a cynical imperialist despotism that is prepared to kill and lie to get its way and is prepared to ally itself with other outcast tyrannical regimes.
The heavy missile attack today in Ukraine shows that Russia is livid and desperate.
After waging a cruel war against Ukraine for almost three years, it failed to crush the Ukrainians and assert its control over them and the immediate neighbourhood. Apart from the embarrassment, it has had to pay the price, not only in the form of international isolation and sanctions but also through the heavy losses in human resources, which in practice it regards as mere cannon fodder.
But there is an additional new element that has irked Russia even more. Remember that this is the first Christmas that Ukraine has celebrated jointly with the rest of most of the Christian world on Dec. 25. This occurred after Ukraine’s parliament and churches decided they would extricate the country from the vestiges of Russian imperialistic tutelage which used to dominate over the political and economic spheres, but until recently still extended to the cultural and religious ones.
So, finally, Ukraine is celebrating Christmas on Dec.25 in a move tantamount to spiritual decolonization but is still having to fight to secure this freedom.
Just imagine the fury in the Kremlin or its vicarious agent – the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church – for whom Christmas continues to be celebrated on January 6 and 7 according to the “old” calendar.
So, with all due respect, John, I would like to end on a lyrical note. Allow me to add three stanzas to update your classic song, in the hope that you would endorse them if you were still with us.
Yes, another year over, John,
And peace is not being given a chance.
Unless we unite against the monsters,
On our graves, the Putins will dance.
So, let’s come together right now,
And imagine there’s no haven
For despots and war criminals,
Bullies expecting us to be craven.
All you need is love, John, you once said.
But warned us against minds that hate.
We all want to change the world, you added,
So, this Christmas, let’s think about our fate.
Bohdan Nahaylo, Chief Editor of Kyiv Post, is a British-Ukrainian journalist and veteran Ukraine watcher based between Kyiv and Barcelona. He was formerly a senior United Nations official and policy adviser, and director of Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian Service.
https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/44469
The Guardian, 24 décembre, libre accès
With Assad’s fall, Putin’s dream of world domination is turning into a nightmare
Complaints about the president are growing among Russian military and business leaders. Now is the time for the west to turn up the heat
Extraits:
As Bashar al-Assad fell, Russian nationalist military bloggers turned on the Kremlin. “Ten years of our presence,” fumed the “Two Majors” Telegram channel to its more than one million subscribers, “dead Russian soldiers, billions of spent roubles and thousands of tonnes of ammunition, they must be compensated somehow.” Some didn’t shy away from lambasting Vladimir Putin. “The adventure in Syria, initiated by Putin personally, seems to be coming to an end. And it ends ignominiously, like all other ‘geopolitical’ endeavours of the Kremlin strategist.” These weren’t isolated incidents. Filter Labs, a data analytics company I collaborate with, saw social media sentiment on Syria dip steeply as Assad fell.
It was in stark contrast to Putin’s silly claim at his annual news conference last week that Russia had suffered no defeat in Syria. Unlike social media, legacy media tried to walk the Kremlin line, but even here there were splits. “You can bluff on the international arena for a while – but make sure you don’t fall for your own deceptions”, ran an op-ed in the broadsheet Kommersant, penned by a retired colonel close to the military leadership. (…)
Assad’s fall is not just a blow to Russia’s interests in the Middle East but to the essence of Putin’s power, which has always been about perception management. (…)
And though the Kremlin maintains Russia and China are an alliance made in economic heaven, the reality is more tenuous. Russian businesses are saying that Chinese banks will no longer work with them now that Russian institutions have been blacklisted by the US. Instead, they worry that the Chinese are offering them “deeply suspicious” ways to move money – yet they have no choice but to play along.
Wall Street Journal, 23 décembre, article payant
Putin Sends Trump a Ukraine Message
The Russian suggests his price for peace is Kyiv’s defeat and U.S. humiliation.
Extraits:
Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine, and who doesn’t? Apparently Vladimir Putin, who used his annual end-of-year news conference last week to send the President-elect a message about his peace terms.
“Now, regarding the conditions for starting negotiations: We have no preconditions,” Mr. Putin said before outlining sweeping preconditions. Talks would be “based on” 2022 negotiations in Istanbul and “proceeding from the current realities on the ground,” he said.
Russia’s 2022 Istanbul proposal called for Ukraine to abandon aspirations to join NATO, become a permanently neutral state, and drastically shrink its armed forces. This would ratify Russia’s territorial gains and render Ukraine defenseless against inevitable future Russian aggression. (…)
Mr. Putin said he’s “ready to talk any time” with Mr. Trump, and some will dismiss his tough talk as merely the opening bid in what will be an inevitable deal. But it’s a mistake to think the Kremlin boss has given up his designs to turn Ukraine into a vassal state like Belarus. Letting Russia prevail in Ukraine on anything close to Mr. Putin’s terms would send a message of appeasement that would surely mean a larger war in the future. Mr. Trump can’t let Ukraine become his Afghanistan.
Kiev Post, 23 décembre, libre accès
Export Season 2024/25: How Much Grain, Oilseed Crops Ukraine Plans to Sell
Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, it remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products.
Extraits:
(…) As emphasized by the ministry, despite Russian armed aggression, Ukraine remains one of the world’s leading producers and suppliers of certain agricultural products, such as grain, oilseeds, vegetables and fruit. The agricultural sector not only ensures domestic food security but provides raw materials for processing enterprises.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/44341
The Economist, 21 décembre, article payant
Staying power : Ukraine is winning the economic war against Russia
Whether that lasts depends on its ability to overcome acute shortages of power, men and money
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s economy at large has reinvented itself to navigate wartime realities. It remains one-quarter smaller than in 2021. Yet for the first time since 2022, the start of the all-out invasion, it is healthier than its enemy’s in some key respects. Ukraine’s central bank forecasts GDP to grow by 4% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025. The currency is stable and interest rates, at 13.5%, remain near their lowest in 30 months. Contrast that with Russia, where rates should soon hit 23% to arrest the rouble’s fall, banks look fragile and GDP is set to grow by just 0.5-1.5% in 2025. But Ukraine faces strong headwinds: the uptick of war, the downtick of domestic resources, and Donald Trump. How long can its economy hold out?
Ukraine’s economic history since 2022 has had three phases. In the first, amid heavy fighting, the country scrambled to put out fires. Martial law was introduced and 14m people fled their homes. Russia blockaded Black Sea ports, choking off Ukraine’s exports. The central bank’s actions were subordinated to military objectives. In the first half of 2022 it financed half of the public deficit. It imposed strict capital controls and flooded banks with liquidity. Inflation soared and GDP shrank by a third (see chart 1).
The second phase began after Ukraine repelled Russia’s advances in the country’s south, in mid-2022. As confidence improved, GDP stabilised. (…)
The return of macroeconomic stability allowed the government and firms to war-proof their operations. One priority was to protect productive assets against Russian missiles. Industrial parks were built in safer western regions. Businesses invested abroad to war-proof their income. Expatriates have generated income from abroad, too: last year one in ten new firms in Poland was set up by a Ukrainian. (…)
Private firms have pivoted, too. After Mariupol, a key port on the Sea of Azov, was obliterated in the spring of 2022, Vitalii Lopushanskyi, an entrepreneur, created UADamage, an AI outfit that parses satellite images to build interactive maps featuring every building, road or bridge that has been destroyed. He has since mapped more than 200 cities. He also teaches drones to spot mines and guide robots on the ground to disable the devices.
The last piece was to keep hard currency flowing in. In July 2023 Russia refused to renew the grain deal. Ukraine responded by opening its own maritime corridor, securing it through a remarkable campaign of sea deterrence by drones and missiles. That allowed it to resume shipments of not just grain but also metals and minerals, its second-biggest export.
These measures, together with Western aid, have prevented Russia from robbing Ukraine of the resources and morale it needs to keep fighting. Now a third phase is beginning, during which the country’s economy faces its biggest threats yet: acute shortages of power, men and money.
Take power first. In 2022 and again this spring and summer, Russia relentlessly attacked Ukraine’s grid. Despite continuous repairs, the country can count on less than half of the 36 gigawatts (GW) in generation capacity it could tap before the war. And lately Russia’s campaign has resumed. (…) On a more positive note, the country has become better equipped to absorb such shocks. (…)
The second problem—and the thorniest—is the lack of labour. Since 2022 mobilisation, migration and war have caused the workforce to shrink by over a fifth, to 13m people. Demand is strong: the number of job openings has reached 65,000 a week, up from 7,000 during the first weeks of the war—but the average opening attracts only 1.3 applications, compared with two in 2021. Wages are rising. The economy and defence ministries are locked in a tug of war over mobilisation: where to strike the right balance for the country’s future. Ukraine’s civilian leadership has so far declined the maximalist demands of military leaders, to the detriment of the front line.
There are no easy fixes. (…)
The government, too, is spending much more money than it pockets. In 2025 its budget deficit is projected to near 20% of GDP. In principle nearly all of it—$38bn—will be financed from external sources. In June the G7 agreed to a $50bn debt package for Ukraine, to be repaid from interest generated by Russia’s €260bn-worth ($273bn) of sovereign assets frozen in the West. In early December America transferred its $20bn share to a World Bank fund that Ukraine can use for non-military purposes, though Mr Trump could try to make it harder for Ukraine to access the money.
Ukraine can probably survive without American funds in 2025 anyway. Together with an €18bn tranche the EU agreed to provide under a previous programme, contributions from other G7 members would plug the gap left by Uncle Sam, says Dimitar Bogov of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Ukraine also has healthy foreign-exchange reserves. (…)
Military developments could cause a crunch before 2026. Yet businesses are cautiously optimistic. Mr Travetsky says he turned a small profit this year, the first since taking on the farm. He is thinking about starting a new line in parmesan cheese. “I’ve done the training, and I know the recipe,” he says. But the obstacles remain daunting: “Try making it when you don’t have electricity 12 hours a day.” ■
Le Figaro, 18 décembre, libre accès
Guerre en Ukraine : des «centaines» de soldats nord-coréens morts ou blessés en Russie
Les soldats nord-coréens «n’avaient jamais combattu auparavant», a estimé un responsable américain, jugeant que cela pouvait expliquer «pourquoi ils ont subi de telles pertes face aux Ukrainiens.»https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-des-centaines-de-soldats-nord-coreens-morts-ou-blesses-en-russie-20241218
The Economist, 14 décembre, article payant
Charlemagne : Europeans are hoping they can buy more guns but keep their butter
Reports of a “war economy” are much exaggerated
Extraits:
Russia produces enough military kit to build an army the size of Germany’s every six to 12 months. Under its revanchist president, Vladimir Putin, it is busy invading one European country while meddling in the affairs of several others. Western intelligence officers seem to think a Ukraine-style attack on a NATO ally by 2030 is a distinct possibility. Faced with this sobering analysis, Europeans might have been forgiven for panicking into splurging on all things military, and doing real harm to the continent’s economy in the process. But worry not. With politicians bickering about pensions and social spending, and loth to raise taxes, the reality is of a continent unwilling to inconvenience itself for something so trifling as fending off a potential invader. Europeans want more military spending, sure; some churn out ludicrous soundbites about building a “war economy”. But God forbid that anyone make voters endure the cost of it.
Scrimping on defence is nothing new for Europeans. After the cold war ended, cutting military budgets became the norm, like taking August off or retiring in one’s prime. By 2014 today’s 27 European Union members were spending under 1.4% of their collective GDP on defence—less than on alcohol and tobacco. The military figure has since increased at a steady, if unspectacular, pace (just as booze and fags have gone out of fashion). This year the EU’s members will together finally meet the 2% target set by NATO, to which most belong, after Mr Putin first had a crack at Ukraine a decade ago. A few big countries, notably Italy and Spain, are still far below that level. (…)
Donald Trump, as he prepares to return to the White House, has made clear he will no longer tolerate Europe spending roughly a third of what America does on defence. On December 8th he reiterated that he was willing to stay in NATO only as long as Europeans “pay their bills”. To appease the incoming blusterer-in-chief and dissuade Mr Putin, Europe knows it must find more money. The trouble is, many national exchequers are bare and politics across the continent is messier than ever. Chaos reigns in France; Germany is in the early throes of an electoral campaign that will probably result in a new chancellor only after months of coalition-building. Collective action at EU level is impeded by the fact that certain prime ministers, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, respect the Kremlin more than they do fellow European leaders.
Everyone knows their armies need more cash, not least to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine. So how might it be done? The simplest way is for national governments, who after all oversee their armed forces and spend most of the tax levied in Europe, to cut larger cheques. A few already do. Poland says it will spend 4.7% of its GDP on defence next year, the most of any NATO member. But others are constrained by having maxed out their national credit card: France, Italy and Spain all have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 100%, and are under pressure from both markets and EU wallahs to improve their public finances. Apart from countries bordering Russia, voters clobbered by covid and then by soaring energy prices are in no mood for less social spending or higher taxes. Do not deprive us of butter, is the gist of Europe’s current politics.
Another way to boost defence expenditure is to do it at EU level. (…) Perhaps the money could be borrowed by EU members collectively instead, as it was to fund a €750bn pandemic-recovery fund in 2021? France has mooted such a joint bond, which would help skirt the issue of fiscal constraints. But more EU-level debt is unacceptable to “prudent” countries like the Netherlands that see common borrowing as a scheme to make frugal northerners pay for spendthrift southerners. (…)
Europe thus needs clever tricks to fund military stuff without crossing various red lines. One idea is for a “coalition of the willing” in Europe to raise €500bn by creating a fund essentially backed by promises of higher future defence spending. (…)
Details of the plan are vague. Its main selling point is that it has not been shot down since the Financial Times reported iton December 5th. A big figure would help send Mr Trump the message that Europe is doing something. In practice an extra €500bn would push outlays to just 2.4% of EU GDP (meanwhile a new NATO target of 3% is being floated). And a squabble would ensue over spending. Who decides whether to buy Europe-made kit (as France prefers, to ensure the long-term “strategic autonomy” of the EU) or off-the-shelf weaponry from America (as many others would like, to ensure the stuff is delivered soon), say? Raising money for defence is hard, paying it out may be even harder. ■
Wall Street Journal, 11 décembre, article payant
Stopping ‘Endless Wars’ Is Easier Said Than Done
Trump will need to overcome four foreign-policy fallacies to resolve entrenched conflicts.
Extraits:
Donald Trump’s promise to “put an end to endless wars” resonates with an American public fatigued by decades of military entanglements. His calls for efficient, clear objectives and reduced U.S. involvement abroad reflect a pragmatic approach to the nation’s challenges.
But Mr. Trump’s ambitions also underscore the enduring complexity of war. Wars are rarely resolved on convenient timelines or with numerical or technological superiority alone. As 19th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously warned, the first act of a statesman is to recognize the type of war he is in. Clausewitz described war as a contest of wills in which human determination outweighs material advantages. Misunderstanding the character of a conflict can lead to unintended consequences.
To reach his goals, Mr. Trump must heed Clausewitz’s advice. Achieving global success requires understanding the human and ideological dimensions of war and seeing past at least four common foreign-policy fallacies.
The first is the “abacus fallacy,” the belief that wars are won by tallying resources. Analysts often reduce military conflict to a numbers game, focusing on troop counts, tanks or artillery rounds. (…)
This fallacy persists today. In February 2022, many commentators predicted a Ukrainian defeat based on Russia’s numerical military advantages. But Ukraine’s innovative use of resources—information warfare, decentralized command structures, and asymmetric tactics such as using swarms of cheap, expendable drones to complement limited advanced-fire capabilities—highlight the qualitative dimensions of war. Numbers alone fail to account for human ingenuity, resilience and the will to fight.
The second is the “vampire fallacy.” First referenced in 2014 by Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, who later served as Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, the vampire fallacy promises that technological superiority will deliver swift victories. This too led observers to predict that Kyiv would fall within days of Russia’s invasion. Ukraine’s resilience shattered this illusion, proving that like numerical advantage, technological advantage can’t always replace determination. (…)
Gen. McMaster has warned of a third narrative, the “Zero Dark Thirty fallacy,” which elevates precision strikes and special operations to the level of grand strategy. After Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, some analysts initially suggested Israel could achieve its objectives through targeted raids and bombings alone. These recommendations ignored Gaza’s hostile environment, radicalized population and war-adapted terrain. (…)
This leads to the fourth error, the “peace table fallacy”—the belief that all wars end in negotiations. This approach isn’t always feasible. Simple calls for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia or for Israel to seek peace with Hamas ignore ideological and political stakes. Wars don’t end simply because one side desires peace; they end when one side achieves its objectives or both reach a stalemate.
The U.S. has fallen victim to these fallacies throughout history. (…)
Mr. Trump’s desire to simplify U.S. foreign policy and focus on achieving clear goals is admirable. But the complexity of war demands a careful and nuanced approach. Clausewitz’s reminder to recognize the type of war being waged remains vital. Wars are not contests of spreadsheets but struggles of will, shaped by leadership, morale and adaptability. To be successful, Mr. Trump must resist the allure of quick fixes and instead embrace strategies that reflect the unique nature of each conflict.
Mr. Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute.
Le Figaro, 11 décembre, libre accès
Pour Donald Trump, la «priorité» est de résoudre la guerre en Ukraine
Dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi, le président élu estime que «le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais (…) c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie».
Extraits:
Le président américain élu Donald Trump a estimé que sa priorité serait de «résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie», parmi les multiples crises en cours dans le monde, dans un entretien au magazine Paris Match publié ce mercredi. «La priorité, c’est de résoudre le problème de l’Ukraine avec la Russie. Ces deux pays subissent des pertes humaines incroyables. Des centaines de milliers de soldats sont tués», a affirmé samedi Donald Trump à l’hebdomadaire lors de son passage à Paris pour la réouverture de la cathédrale Notre-Dame.
«Il y a énormément de crises dans le monde. Depuis quelques jours, on en a une nouvelle en Syrie. Ils devront se débrouiller tout seul car nous ne sommes pas impliqués là-bas, et la France non plus», a-t-il ajouté. «Le Moyen-Orient est aussi une grande priorité, mais je pense que c’est une situation moins difficile à gérer que l’Ukraine et la Russie», a-t-il précisé.
(…) Samedi, pour la première fois depuis son élection, Trump a rencontré à Paris le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky, sous les auspices du président français Emmanuel Macron.
Le lendemain, il a appelé à un «cessez-le-feu immédiat» et à des négociations, écrivant sur sa plateforme Truth Social que Zelensky était prêt à «conclure un accord et mettre fin à cette folie». Le président ukrainien a exprimé de son côté mardi sa «profonde reconnaissance» envers le président républicain pour «sa forte détermination» à mettre fin à la guerre avec la Russie. (…)
Ukrainska Pravda, 9 décembre, libre accès
After Syria, world must realise that Russia can be defeated – Polish PM
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has linked the fall of the Syrian regime to the possibility of defeating Russia and its allies.
Extraits:
Quote: “The events in Syria have made the world realise once again, or at least they should, that even the most cruel regime may fall and that Russia and its allies can be defeated.”
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/12/8/7488259/
Wall Street Journal, Opinion, 6 décembre, article payant
Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Bluff
The Russian ruler wants to scare the West. But he has problems that escalation in Ukraine wouldn’t solve.
Extraits:
When Vladimir Putin announced in a Nov. 21 video address that Russia had launched a new high-speed ballistic missile with nuclear capacity against Ukraine, he didn’t move his hands or fingers for nearly eight minutes. Observers concluded that the video had been doctored to hide that Mr. Putin suffers from hand tremors. Before the announcement, he had been absent from public view for 13 days. According to reliable Kremlin watchers, Mr. Putin’s appearances as shown on his website during that period were “canned goods,” or prerecorded.
Whatever the reason for the president’s prolonged absence, the Kremlin is going all out to show the world that its leader is indomitable, an important message as the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and Mr. Putin raises the specter of nuclear conflict. (…)
The Kremlin clearly aims to instill fear of nuclear escalation in Ukraine and NATO countries. According to political commentator Abbas Gallyamov, “in recent weeks, the number of mentions of nuclear weapons by the authorities has skyrocketed. . . . Even the Russian patriarch has joined in: he says that nuclear war is OK.” Western arms analysts have also raised the alarm, portraying Russia’s new system as a devastating threat to Europe. Tucker Carlson warned in a video from Moscow this week that “we are far closer to nuclear war than at any time in history.”
The key question is whether Mr. Putin would follow through on his threats. (…) Russian political analyst Maksim Katz observed recently: “Everything we know about Vladimir Putin tells us that such a decision is unlikely.” “For his entire quarter of a century in power,” Mr. Katz writes, “he has clearly demonstrated that he is not going to risk his life. The use of nuclear weapons in any form is a big step toward the grave.” (…)
By all accounts, Mr. Putin is unusually fearful of death. Covid caused him to retreat into paranoid isolation in his residence outside Moscow. Visitors had to quarantine for as much as two weeks and pass through a disinfectant tunnel before meeting with him at the end of a 20-foot-long table. Mr. Putin often brings his own white thermos mug to conferences and dinners with foreign leaders and uses a special, heavily armored train for travel in Russia. To keep safe in the event of a nuclear attack, Mr. Putin reportedly has several lavish underground bunkers, including at least one in the Ural Mountains and another under his palace at Gelendzhik on the Black Sea.
According to Russian military expert Ian Matveev, Mr. Putin is making nuclear threats because he is desperate. (…)
Mr. Matveev states that Mr. Putin “doesn’t understand what to do and how to respond, because he doesn’t want to drop a nuclear bomb. He doesn’t want to start a war with NATO, as he promised after [Ukraine’s] long-range strikes. So, he has to make such a showy action in the spirit of—‘look, I have a ballistic missile.’ ”
Time isn’t on Mr. Putin’s side. Thanks to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the ruble’s value has plummeted, inflation is rising, and declining economic growth is causing dissention among the country’s elite. The military is so desperate for manpower that it is using North Korean troops to regain territory in Kursk. (…)
As Mr. Katz observed, the Russian president is “trying to impress everyone with some kind of wonder weapon, while people do nothing but look at the dollar exchange rate.” For ordinary Russians, Mr. Putin’s nuclear swagger might not be enough to compensate for the exorbitant price of butter.
Ms. Knight is author, most recently, of “The Kremlin’s Noose: Putin’s Bitter Feud With the Oligarch Who Made Him Ruler of Russia.”
L’Express, 6 décembre, libre accès
La Russie prête à se défendre par “tous les moyens” : la dernière menace du Kremlin
Guerre en Ukraine. Le chef de la diplomatie russe dit avoir envoyé “un signal” aux alliés de Kiev après le tir d’un puissant missile à moyenne portée sur l’Ukraine, fin novembre.
The Economist, 6 décembre, article payant
Death from above : How Ukraine uses cheap AI-guided drones to deadly effect against Russia
Ukraine is making tens of thousands of them
Extraits:
(…) Ukraine’s drone war is evolving rapidly. Once a cheap answer to Russia’s artillery dominance, Ukrainian small and inexpensive first-person view (FPV) drones are now a force in their own right. They are used on a huge scale, with Ukraine projected to produce 2m this year. Ukraine now observes 1,000 Russian drones in every 24-hour period, says an insider. That has made some sections of the front lines, for example around Siversk in Luhansk province, practically no-go areas for humans. Drones are now responsible for a majority of battlefield losses, overtaking artillery, according to Ukrainian sources. (…)
The biggest change of all is that electronic warfare—essentially jamming—has consumed the battlefield. (…)
Data from the battlefield suggest that the hit rate for these AI-guided drones is currently above 80%. That is higher than the rate of manually piloted drones. (…)
The result is that Ukraine has become the furnace of a new kind of software-defined warfare which combines precision with mass. (…)
In both cases the drones themselves are made in Ukraine, by Ukrainians. One advantage of that is scale. Auterion’s largest partner in Ukraine, one of many, churns out 300,000 drones per year. Although recent Chinese sanctions have threatened to disrupt Ukraine’s drone supply chain, Mr Meier says that alternatives from Taiwan are now available. (…)
The tech entrepreneur rejects talk of military automation as some kind of dystopian future. “Using AI to accurately target is far more ethical than lobbing missiles and artillery,” he says. Ultimately, a human still has to make the final call on any engagement, says Mr Scherf. But Western and Ukrainian companies are busy working on deep-strike drones whose AI systems will be able to hunt for a wide range of potential targets far from the human operator. Mr Azhnyuk of The Fourth Law sees current technology as just the start. He hopes to have a prototype of a fully automated system, from launch to strike, built by early next year.■
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
NATO Chief Urges More Weapons for Ukraine Ahead of Any Peace Talks
Mark Rutte said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia — and that the West should help strengthen Kyiv’s position beforehand.
Extraits:
NATO’s new top diplomat suggested on Tuesday that Ukraine should put off any peace talks with Russia until Western allies can send enough military aid to help Kyiv push ahead on the battlefield and garner a stronger negotiating position.
Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, said it was up to Ukraine to decide when it was ready to begin negotiations with Russia in a war that has dragged on for nearly three years.
But with U.S. President-elect Donald J. Trump vowing to secure a quick cease-fire that officials in Kyiv fear would be favorable to Russia — and despite war fatigue hanging over parts of Europe — Mr. Rutte urged the military alliance’s members to step up shipments of weapons, ammunition and air defenses before they try working toward a truce.
“Let’s not have all these discussions, step by step, on what a peace process might look like,” Mr. Rutte said ahead of two days of meetings of foreign ministers, including Ukraine’s, at NATO headquarters in Brussels. “Make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to get to a position of strength when those peace talks start.”
“So I would say more military aid, and less discussions on what the peace process could look like,” Mr. Rutte added.
His comments came even as President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has recently shifted his public stance on a potential peace deal. After years of insisting that Ukraine would cede no territory to Russia in a deal, he has recently signaled that Ukraine would be willing to do so — for now, at least — in return for NATO membership.
While NATO membership remains unlikely while the war is ongoing, Mr. Zelensky’s rhetoric is a marked change. Officials in Kyiv have even provided a rationale that could potentially allow them to temporarily cede territory, asserting that Russian-controlled land in Ukraine would not be internationally recognized as part of Russia. (…)
Mr. Trump has been vague about how he would bring peace to Ukraine in as little as 24 hours, as he has pledged. But senior officials in his administration, including Vice President-elect JD Vance, have proposed such ideas as allowing Russia to keep the territory it has captured and guaranteeing that Ukraine will not join NATO, or withholding military aid to Ukraine until it agrees to negotiate. (…)
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/nato-ukraine-trump-peace-talks.html
New York Times, 3 décembre, article payant
Investigation Into Forced Adoptions From Ukraine Points Finger at Putin
Yale researchers traced hundreds of children taken to Russia in the war, finding what they described as “a higher level of crime than first understood.”
Extraits:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and senior Kremlin officials “intentionally and directly” authorized a program of coerced fostering and adoption of Ukrainian children during the war in Ukraine, according to a Yale University report that was released on Tuesday.
The report provides strong new evidence for a war crimes case against Putin and other officials, the researchers said.
An investigation by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified 314 children from Ukraine who have been placed in a “systematic program of coerced adoption and fostering” since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to the report. It details evidence of direct orders from senior Russian officials, including Mr. Putin, to carry out the adoption program.
“It reveals a higher level of crime than first understood,” the Research Lab, which is part of the Conflict Observatory, a program supported by the U.S. Department of State, said in a statement.
Yale’s investigation could bolster the case against Mr. Putin and his commissioner for children, Maria Lvova-Belova, who were named in an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court in March last year for their roles in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. (…)
The report says the Russian president’s office provided direct financial support and other assets for the program.
The treatment of the Ukrainian children may constitute a war crime or crimes against humanity, and could even support a case of genocide under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Research Lab said. (…)
The Kremlin has denied committing war crimes, and maintains that the adoptions are a patriotic and humanitarian effort to help abandoned children. (…) The report also accused the Russian authorities of working to conceal the origin and whereabouts of the Ukrainian children. After the international court issued its arrest warrants, Russia removed much of the evidence from relevant websites, the report said.
“Russia engaged in acts of deception to conceal the full scope of this program and related activities,” the report said. “Most critically, children taken from Ukraine are fundamentally presented in Russia’s databases as if they were from Russia.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-children-deportation-adoption.html
😮 Le Figaro, 3 décembre, article payant
Sergueï Karaganov, architecte de la politique étrangère russe: « La dissuasion ne fonctionne plus, il faut réinstaurer la peur»
ENTRETIEN – Écouté au Kremlin, président d’honneur du très influent Conseil de politique étrangère et de défense (SVOP) qu’il a cofondé en 1992, Sergueï Karaganov est une figure clé de la pensée stratégique russe.
Extraits:
LE FIGARO. – Que pensez-vous des changements apportés récemment par Vladimir Poutine à la doctrine nucléaire russe ?
Sergueï KARAGANOV. – L’objectif de la politique de la Russie est d’abaisser le seuil d’utilisation des armes nucléaires et de barrer la route à une guerre nucléaire majeure. Poutine a précisé que la Russie a le droit d’utiliser des armes nucléaires, y compris contre des puissances non-nucléaires qui mènent la guerre contre nous avec le soutien de puissances nucléaires. Il s’agit d’une innovation importante, mais il existe également d’autres changements. Je m’en félicite car cela fait plusieurs années que je plaide pour de tels changements et je suis heureux d’avoir contribué à lancer une discussion sur ces sujets. Nous proposons d’ailleurs d’autres évolutions dans notre dernier livre. (1)
Depuis de nombreuses années, je suis extrêmement troublé par le fait qu’une grande partie de la population, en particulier des élites – en Occident mais pas seulement – ont été gagnées par une sorte de parasitisme stratégique : les gens se sont habitués à la paix ; ils n’ont plus peur de la guerre. Je considère que c’est très dangereux. Depuis une quinzaine d’années, le monde est entré dans une période de bouleversements tectoniques qui conduiront inévitablement à des crises. La menace qu’un grand nombre de ces crises dégénèrent en une guerre mondiale et nucléaire générale augmente rapidement. Nous devons tout faire pour empêcher le monde de glisser vers la troisième guerre mondiale.
Comment faire, selon vous ?
Pendant soixante-dix ans, les armes nucléaires nous ont sauvés de la guerre. Mais la peur de ces armes s’est apaisée et il est nécessaire de la réinstaurer car des crises et des conflits surgiront inexorablement compte tenu des changements tectoniques que j’évoquais. Je me suis aperçu que nous étions tous intellectuellement bloqués aux années 1970-1980, alors que le monde a changé de façon spectaculaire, y compris sur le plan nucléaire. La dissuasion nucléaire ne fonctionne plus. Il faut réintroduire un fusible nucléaire dans l’ensemble du système international et cela ne s’applique pas seulement aux relations entre la Russie et l’Occident.
Vos propositions risquent de mener à une escalade…
Oui, il est nécessaire de conduire à l’escalade. J’encourage la Russie à progresser sur l’échelle de l’escalade vers la dissuasion et l’intimidation. Des pas ont déjà été faits en ce sens mais il faut aller plus loin pour dégriser tout d’abord nos voisins européens qui, de mon point de vue, ont perdu la raison. Comme il y a cent ans, ils sont en train de pousser le monde vers une guerre mondiale tandis que les Américains misent cyniquement sur une guerre entre la Russie et l’Europe en espérant qu’un tel conflit épuise la Russie et dépouille en même temps l’Europe. (…)
(1) « De la dissuasion à l’intimidation » (2024, non traduit en français)
The Economist, 2 décembre, article payant
Rouble worries : Russia’s plunging currency spells trouble for its war effort
Supplies from China are about to become more expensive
Extraits:
AT FIRST GLANCE, it did not look that different from other sanctions. On November 21st America’s Treasury Department imposed new restrictions on more than four dozen Russian banks, including Gazprombank, the financial arm of the giant state gas firm. The bank, the largest in Russia not already subject to American sanctions, had been excluded from previous packages in order to allow some central and eastern European countries, including Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, to continue paying for imports of Russian gas. After December 20th, when the measures take full effect, European buyers of Russian gas will be forced to find workarounds involving either third-party banks or currencies other than the dollar, which will take time.
America’s announcement came at a bad moment for the Russian economy, meaning that foreign-exchange markets were quick to respond. The prospect of new restrictions on access to hard currency sent the rouble down by 10% against the dollar to a low of 115 on November 27th, before the central bank inspired a modest rally by using its reserves to buy roubles. Even after this rally, the rouble is still down by 8% against the dollar over the past month and by more than 15% in the year so far. Russia’s currency is at its weakest since immediately after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The government is putting a brave face on the news. Speaking in Kazakhstan on November 28th, Vladimir Putin told reporters that “there are certainly no grounds for panic.”
wrong. Indeed, the latest fall in the rouble’s value makes the job of Russia’s central bank much more difficult. Wartime spending has used up spare capacity in the economy, driving down unemployment to just 2.4%. The government’s latest budget, unveiled in September, will raise defence and security spending by another 25% next year, to around 8% of Russia’s GDP, a post-cold-war high. Annual inflation is running at more than 8%.
In this context, a weaker rouble is a doubled-edged sword. A lower level against the dollar increases the rouble value of oil exports, helping plug the government’s widening deficit. Yet it also pushes up the price of imported goods—something that matters for both consumers and the government’s war effort. (…)
Against a backdrop of high inflation and fears over the value of the currency, Russia’s central bank has already lifted interest rates to 21% this year. Traders now expect rates to end the year at 25%, up from expectations of 23% before the recent slide in the rouble’s value. So far, the Russian government has shielded both consumers and firms from the effects of higher rates via a variety of subsidised-borrowing schemes. But with public finances under pressure, support has recently been scaled back. (…)
The combination of a declining currency and a ballooning budget deficit has led to talk of a hard landing for the Russian economy in 2025. After two years of strong growth, which has confounded many analysts’ gloomy predictions, the pace of expansion will slow sharply. The economic bill for the war is at last coming due. It could be a big one. ■
Articles du 29 novembre au 12 juin 2024