

27 novembre (The Economist)

[A brutal battle for southern Gaza beckons after the truce ends \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The Israel-Hamas war

A brutal battle for southern Gaza beckons after the truce ends

The next stage of fighting will be harder and more controversial



image: afp via getty images

Nov 26th 2023 | DUBAI

They were rare moments of peace after weeks of agony. Dozens of Israelis, [held in captivity](#) for seven weeks, have been reunited with their families over the past few days. A brief halt in the Gaza war has allowed Palestinians to emerge from their shelters and search for food and fuel, for [missing relatives](#), and for what [remains of their homes](#).

Yet these moments were bittersweet: most of the hostages have not been freed, and most of the Palestinians who returned home found only rubble. They will also be short-lived. The truce is set to end on November 28th, after four days of quiet meant to facilitate the exchange of 50 Israeli hostages held in Gaza for 150 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. It could last a few more days—but it will end, and the fighting that comes next could be worse than what came before.

Israel's cabinet approved the hostage deal on November 22nd after hours of debate and weeks of indirect negotiations with Hamas. The first day went according to plan. Both sides stopped fighting on the morning of November 24th. That afternoon Hamas released 13 Israeli hostages, ranging in age from a two-year-old girl to an 85-year-old woman, and another 11 foreigners from Thailand and the Philippines. Israel freed 39 Palestinian prisoners from its jails, also women and children.

If the first day was smooth, though, the second was anything but. Hamas delayed the hostage release by hours, claiming that Israel had failed to honour its end of the bargain. Israel was meant to permit 200 trucks of humanitarian aid a day to enter Gaza each day during the truce. Only 137 made it through on the first day: there are long security checks at the border, which is not set up to handle a large volume of aid. But after mediation by Qatar, which helped broker the deal, the exchange went ahead.

The truce could be extended. After the four-day agreement is up, each ten hostages freed by Hamas will buy another 24 hours of calm. Egyptian officials say they have received “positive signals” that might happen, though neither Israel nor Hamas has confirmed anything.

Hamas would have obvious interests in doing so. A longer truce would give the group's military commanders time to regroup and prepare, both to attack Israeli troops stationed in the northern part of Gaza and to defend the south, where the Israeli army has yet to make a large incursion. It would also lead to more pressure on Israel not to resume fighting. Families of the hostages would like to see the deal

extended. So would America's president, Joe Biden, who says his goal is to "keep this pause going beyond tomorrow".

At some point, though, Hamas will run out of hostages it is willing to release in this round of negotiations. It will probably keep both soldiers and Israeli men captive, in the unlikely hope of striking a bigger deal that includes a permanent ceasefire and the release of many more Palestinian prisoners.

When the truce comes to its inevitable end, Israel will resume its fight against Hamas. Speaking from Gaza on November 26th Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, said: "We have three goals for this war: eliminating Hamas, returning all our hostages, and ensuring that Gaza does not become a threat to the State of Israel again," adding, "we will continue until the end, until victory. Nothing will stop us."

In the next round of fighting Israeli troops will continue to scour the rubble of northern Gaza for tunnel entrances, rocket launchers and other military assets. They have yet to enter a few parts of the region, including Shujaiya, to the east of Gaza city. They will also begin turning their attention elsewhere. Officials are coy about how they might proceed in the south. They cannot easily send armoured units to dominate the area, as they did in the north, because it is so densely packed with civilians displaced from the north.

Instead they might seek to do it piecemeal: pushing into one area at a time, probably starting with the central city of Khan Younis, and trying to force Gazans into a designated "humanitarian zone" near the coast. This is fraught with danger, though. Civilians would have to choose between huddling on a desolate strip of beach and hiding in their homes or makeshift shelters; both could have appalling results. Fighting in densely packed areas without heavy armour will also be more dangerous for Israeli troops.

It is hard to assess Hamas's strength—most of its fighters are thought to be holed up in tunnels—but Israeli officers say that close to half of its units have suffered serious losses. On November 26th Hamas confirmed that Ahmed al-Ghandour, the head of its northern brigade, had been killed earlier in the war. A member of the group's military council, and the head of one of its five regional commands, he is one of the highest-ranking militants known to have died since October 7th. There are reports of grumbling in the ranks, especially those deployed to the devastated north, where other Hamas commanders have been killed and conditions are grim. Still, Hamas is hardly close to surrender, and it will undoubtedly fight harder in the south, making what could be a last stand.

All of this makes America nervous. Mr Biden has yet to call for a ceasefire, but his team is worried about Israel's plan for a major offensive in the south. "I've encouraged the prime minister to focus on trying to reduce the number of casualties while he is attempting to eliminate Hamas, which is a legitimate objective he has," he said on the first day of the truce. "That's a difficult task, and I don't know how long it will take."

America would like Israel to hold off on its southern campaign—especially since Mr Netanyahu has no plan for what happens in Gaza after the war. It may urge Israel to continue its offensive in the north and keep the south sealed off, for now, with an expanded flow of humanitarian aid via Egypt. Antony Blinken, the secretary of state, may visit the region again this week. So too will Emmanuel Macron, the French president, who has called for a lasting ceasefire.

If America pressures Israel to hold back, it could spare Gaza's 2.2m people another round of fighting and displacement. But it would also leave them stuck in a cramped, desperate enclave even smaller than the one they lived in before, under a partially disintegrating Hamas regime: it is hard to know which outcome is more depressing.

27 novembre (Haaretz)

[Al-Ahli Hospital Explosion Likely Caused by Palestinian Rocket, Human Rights Watch Says - Israel News - Haaretz.com](#)

Al-Ahli Hospital Explosion Likely Caused by Palestinian Rocket, Human Rights Watch Says

Initial coverage of the incident cited a claim by Hamas that Israel had bombed the hospital, and that 500 people were killed in the explosion – two assertions Human Right Watch now says are unlikely to be correct



Aftermath of the blast at the Al-Ahli Hospital, last month. Credit: Stringer/Reuters

[Sam Sokol](#)

Nov 26, 2023 7:30 pm IST

A Palestinian rocket which fell short was likely responsible for an explosion at Gaza City's Al-Ahli Hospital last month, Human Rights Watch announced on Sunday, contradicting early media reports blaming Israeli forces for the strike.

Initial coverage of the incident cited the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry's [unsubstantiated claim](#) that the IDF had bombed the hospital, killing 500 people, a claim which was strongly denied by Israeli officials, who [countered](#) that a failed missile launch by Palestinian Islamic Jihad was responsible for the carnage.

"Categorically, we do not strike any sensitive facilities – definitely not hospitals. Very much aware of the presence of civilians," IDF International Spokesperson Jonathan Conricus told CNN at the time.

"The explosion that killed and injured many civilians at Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza on October 17, 2023, resulted from an apparent rocket-propelled munition, such as those commonly used by Palestinian armed groups, that hit the hospital grounds," Human Rights Watch stated in its [report](#), adding that "further investigation is needed to determine who launched the apparent rocket and whether the laws of war were violated."

As opposed to initial reports, which claimed that the strike had hit the hospital itself, the human rights organization said that the projectile had "hit a paved area inside the hospital compound, between a parking lot and a landscaped area" and that "the sound preceding the explosion, the fireball that accompanied it, the size of the resulting crater, the type of splatter adjoining it, and the type and pattern of fragmentation visible around the crater are all consistent with the impact of a rocket."

"This crater size is inconsistent with the point detonation of a large, air-dropped bomb with a high-explosive payload" and the remaining shrapnel was taken away by representatives of Hamas' interior ministry, complicating further inquiries.

“Evidence available to Human Rights Watch makes the possibility of a large air-dropped bomb, such as those Israel has used extensively in Gaza, highly unlikely,” the report continued, noting that “analysis of videos shows that a barrage of Palestinian rockets was launched from a location approximately five kilometers southwest of the Al-Ahli hospital toward the northeast 43 seconds before the explosion at the hospital.”

“Human Rights Watch was unable to corroborate the count” of 500, “which is significantly higher than other estimates, displays an unusually high killed-to-injured ratio, and appears out of proportion with the damage visible on site,” it said.

It also noted that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s rockets feature “only rudimentary guidance systems and are prone to misfire, making them extremely inaccurate and thus inherently indiscriminate when directed toward areas with civilians.” Moreover, data released by the IDF indicates that “between 10 and 20 percent of rockets launched from Gaza have failed,” the report stated.

According to the [Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center](#), which is identified with the Israeli intelligence community, during 2021’s Operation Guardian of the Walls around 680 out of the over 4,360 rockets and mortars fired at Israel fell inside the Gaza Strip.

And close to one-third of the Palestinians who died during a short-lived escalation last summer may have been killed by errant rockets fired by the Palestinian side, according to an Israeli military assessment that appears consistent with independent reporting by The Associated Press.

Israel’s narrative was later backed up by the United States, with U.S. intelligence officials expressing “high confidence” that the incident was caused by a Palestinian rocket that broke up mid-flight.

U.S. President Biden said a day after the incident, while visiting Tel Aviv, that the explosion appeared to be the result of an errant rocket fired by a “terrorist group”, echoing Israel's view.

Canada's National Department of Defense and French military intelligence subsequently released statements with [similar findings](#).

Haut du formulaire

"Analysis conducted independently by the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command indicates with a high degree of confidence that Israel did not strike the Al-Ahli hospital on 17 October 2023," it said in a statement on Saturday.

An assessment by French military intelligence points to a Palestinian rocket that carried an explosive charge of about 5 kilograms (11 pounds) and possibly misfired, a senior French military official said.

Several rockets in the arsenal of the Palestinian militant group Hamas carry explosive charges of about that weight, including an Iranian-made rocket and another that is Palestinian-made, the intelligence official said. None of their intelligence pointed to an Israeli strike, the official said.

The Associated Press and Reuters contributed to this report.

27 novembre (The Economist)

[A net-zero world needs new markets and institutions \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The carbon economy

A net-zero world needs new markets and institutions

It is just possible they will be built in time



image: ben denzer

Nov 20th 2023

The earth's great cycles are mostly driven by the sun. Sunlight evaporates water to create rain, thus powering the water cycle; it heats the tropics more than the poles, thus driving the ocean's gyres; it is used by plants and algae to turn carbon dioxide into wood and frond, food and fibre, mulch and decay, spinning the biological carbon cycle. Plate tectonics is the great exception, driven instead by the heat of the inner Earth.

Any anthropogenic addition to the roster of great recyclings will have to be driven, too, and the immediate motive force will be money. At the moment, the money driving durable carbon removals is coming mostly from investors willing to provide companies with the money needed to develop their technology and build their businesses and from rich firms and people willing to pay handsomely for the so far small amounts of removal on offer.

Over the past five years that money has spurred a boom in the sector, albeit from a base so low that even the boom is small. But in the medium term would-be carbon removers will find themselves moving beyond technological uncertainties—what methods are viable? how low can costs for different methods get?—to more fundamental ones. Where is the demand? Who will actually be willing, or required, to buy their services, and for how much?

Some governments are helping. By far the most generous is America's, offering a \$180-a-tonne tax credit for direct-air-capture projects under way by the end of 2032; there is also support for carbon-storage hubs and a small programme for buying removals directly. But "tax credits are not a long-term policy for the level of cdr deployment we'll need to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and meet our net-zero targets," says Brad Crabtree, the assistant secretary for fossil energy and carbon management at the Department of Energy. "There will need to be longer-term policies that reward those actions in the marketplace."

The obvious marketplaces are those of cap-and-trade systems. The inclusion of removals in such markets would mean that emitters could mix allowances issued under the scheme and credits for durable cdr when working off their carbon debt. Net zero would be the point where permits were no longer issued, and removals did all the work.

An obligation to the future

Some emissions-trading schemes (ets) are open to the idea of allowing carbon-removal credits. But the political economy is treacherous. For such schemes to work in terms of net emissions, any credits added to the allowances must have a real effect on what is in the atmosphere. For schemes to be palatable to the industries operating under them, the credits need to be cheap and plentiful, which experience suggests means dodgy. Thomas Gresham, a 16th-century merchant, held that bad money drives out good. The same would prove true of carbon credits.

The European Union, which has the most advanced ets, currently allows no outside credits into its workings. It has said that by 2026 it will have reached a position on integrating removals into the scheme; first, it is concentrating its efforts on an official carbon-removal certification scheme. The California ets allows companies to meet a small portion of their obligation with officially sanctioned offsets that are overwhelmingly based on storing carbon in forests. The South Korean ets and the Colombian carbon tax have similar provisions.

If well monitored, these provisions may bring in some reputable “nature-based” schemes that make use of forestry, coastal mangroves and the like. But the price of the allowances in cap-and-trade markets looks far too low to cover more durable forms of cdr. Hence the attraction of creating a separate mechanism for removals, at least as an interim measure.

One option is a reverse auction: the government sets a target for removals and awards contracts for the companies with the cheapest bids. Sweden is taking this route for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage; Britain is thinking about auctions with a “contract for difference” mechanism like the one it uses to encourage offshore wind and nuclear power: the government would pay not for the whole removal, but for the difference between the price of the removal and the carbon price.

The fossil-fuel industry has a record of being duplicitous and unreliable

Such an auction system could, in time, develop into a market for removals that operated in parallel with a market for emissions. Companies in some sectors would be required to buy removals to cover a fraction of their emissions. One version of this, championed by Myles Allen of Oxford University and his colleagues, would be a “carbon take-back obligation” under which the fossil-fuel industry would be required to cover an increasing fraction of its production with an equivalent amount of removals. When the fraction reached 100%—perhaps in 2050—the industry would be carbon-neutral. Such a predictable long-term increase in demand would motivate innovation.

The problem is trust. Could governments be relied on to ratchet up the obligation to buy removals? The fossil-fuel industry has a record of being duplicitous and unreliable when it comes to emissions reduction; its sheer size makes it a big influence on governments and its well-oiled lobbying operations amplify that. It is disturbingly easy to imagine the fossil-fuel industry contriving to have its removal obligations frozen at a fairly low level while continuing to make possible a lot of emissions.

That makes the case for institutions which build trust. Ottmar Edenhofer, a German economist, and colleagues have suggested that the eu might create a central bank for carbon to supervise the use of removals, preventing politicians from debasing the currency or breaking commitments. Most of the eu’s members have surrendered monetary policy to an independent bank. Perhaps they could do the same for carbon policy. But what other states, or groups of states, might do the same?

The Earth, isolated and ancient, recycles everything. It also brings forth novelties, such as apes ingenious enough to replumb fundamental flows of matter and energy at the level of the planet itself. It is strange to imagine institutions based on agreement and trust acting on a similar giga-scale. But the energy transition is showing that such things can be done, albeit too slowly and too late. If that transition continues in the way it needs to, the experience and planetary perspective gained could be the basis for concerted efforts to fix the remaining leaks in the carbon cycle.

27 novembre (The Economist)

[Carbon-dioxide removal needs more attention \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The lost heart of net zero

Carbon-dioxide removal needs more attention

It is vital to climate stabilisation, remarkably challenging and systematically ignored



image: ben denzer

Nov 20th 2023

The earth is isolated, ancient and the site of ceaseless change. This means that everything that happens on and below its surface is part of a cycle. For every change which uses things up, there must be another which supplies those things anew. The basic elements of life, such as carbon and nitrogen, cycle endlessly in and out of living things, the seas, the land and the atmosphere. Even the planet's crust is recycled.

New crust is created where tectonic plates move away from each other, normally in the middle of an ocean, and molten rocks rise from the mantle below to fill the gap. Old crust is destroyed where two plates are pushed together and one is overridden by the other, sinking back into the mantle. The wheels of this great cycle have been turning slow and steady for billions of years. But there is the occasional glitch. The rocky peaks of the eastern Arabian peninsula bear witness to one.

Most geologists looking at the Arabian peninsula concentrate on the deep and extensive sedimentary basin that underlies the Persian Gulf and the lands around it. Organic matter in this basin's depths has been cooked by heat and pressure into vast amounts of oil and gas which, having percolated upwards, now sit in rocks near the surface. They are very profitable rocks to study. Unfortunately their exploitation, along with that of carbon-rich rocks in other places, has destabilised the climate. On November 30th the governments of the world will meet in Dubai, a city built with the wealth from those rocks, to further negotiate their response to that destabilisation at the 28th Conference of the Parties (cop28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

For those interested in tectonic glitches, though, it is the Hajar mountains to the east that matter. In an early stage of the collision between the Arabian plate and the Eurasian plate to its north a slab of ocean floor was caught between the two encroaching land masses in the sort of circumstances which would normally see it pushed down into the mantle. On this occasion, though, the rocks went not down, but up, lifted like a curl of wood by a carpenter's plane. The ancient sea floor, mostly basalt, and some of the mantle it had rested on, a related rock called peridotite, ended up exposed to the open sky. In time, the sea floor formed the mountains.

Like all mountains the Hajar range is being eaten away by erosion; it is another part of the great recycling. The erosion endlessly exposes fresh rock, and that rock takes up carbon dioxide from the

atmosphere through what is called “chemical weathering”. The alkaline minerals in the rocks react with rain and groundwater made slightly acidic by dissolved carbon dioxide to produce carbonate minerals of the sort that make up limestones. The peridotites in the Hajar are particularly susceptible to this weathering. Their dark stone is shot through with white veins of carbonate.

Chemical weathering is not the fastest of the natural processes which draw down carbon dioxide. Photosynthesis, carried out on land by plants and in the sea by algae and bacteria, operates on a far larger scale, removing more than 300 times as much carbon dioxide from the atmosphere every year. But it does not stay removed for long. The carbon is recycled to the sky by the plants themselves, the creatures that eat them and the soil into which they decay over timescales from days to centuries. The geological carbon cycle is far slower. Carbonates in places like the Hajar will be stable for hundreds of millions of years.

Until recently, adnoc, the national oil company of the United Arab Emirates (uae), concentrated its geological thinking on bringing carbon-rich oil and gas up from the bountiful sediments of the Gulf. Now, though, it has turned its eyes to the peridotites of the Hajar, and to pumping carbon dioxide down. In the hills above Fujairah, a city on the Gulf of Oman, adnoc and 44.01, an Omani startup, are working on a pilot plant at which 44.01 will inject carbon dioxide deep into the rock in a way that encourages its mineralisation into inert carbonate. Musabbeh Al Kaabi, head of “low-carbon solutions” for adnoc, sees his firm’s investments in this rapid mineralisation as part of a comprehensive decarbonisation strategy for the oil industry, one that aims to deliver its “very vital commodity in the most sustainable way”.

The Fujairah experiments are part of a nascent planet-wide effort to undo another glitch in the world’s great cycles: humankind’s transfer of fossil-fuel carbon from its quiet rest in the solid Earth to the hurly-burly of the atmosphere. Roughly 1trn tonnes of carbon dioxide have accumulated there thanks to human activity. The total is growing by a bit less than 20bn tonnes a year.


For a sense of scale, compare that with other planetary flows. It is about 60 times faster than carbon dioxide is removed by the weathering of the Earth’s rocks. It is around a tenth of the rate at which photosynthesis makes new biomass. That an accidental by-product of industry should be remotely comparable in its carbon flux to the process which powers all life on Earth is extraordinary.

More in than out

Average annual flows of CO₂, gigatonnes
2010-19

Sources

Land-use change 6 Fossil fuels 35 Ocean 285 Volcanism 0.4 Biomass 507



Source: IPCC AR6

image: the economist

It might also seem comforting; large though the human flow is, the biological one is comfortably larger. Can it not simply increase to accommodate humankind’s imposition? Alas, no. The biological carbon cycle

is big, but it is also balanced; the rate at which the world's biosphere photosynthesises is almost exactly the rate at which life's other processes return carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. With carbon dioxide from fossil fuels added to the natural emissions, photosynthesis has valiantly tried to keep up, sucking back down as much as it can. But it cannot do enough. It only absorbs about a third of the emissions from human industry and agriculture (see chart).

The build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has raised the planet's temperature by about 1.2°C (2.2°F). The temperature will go on rising until the accumulation stops, which is to say until annual additions are reduced to more or less zero. That is why the governments of the world agreed to work towards that end at the Paris climate conference of 2015.

For the most part, that means cutting emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. But some emissions—those from transport across oceans, from some types of farming, from a variety of industrial processes and more—seem highly unlikely to be entirely eliminated any time soon. So the Paris agreement specified that stabilisation need not be a matter of no emissions at all; instead it could be achieved by means of “a balance between anthropogenic emissions...and removals”. Residual, “hard to abate” emissions of greenhouse gases were to be balanced by the withdrawal of carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere. The project at Fujairah aims to show one of the ways in which what went up can come down, and the way of the world be righted.

This is the logic of “net zero”. Back in 2015 only one country had enunciated a net-zero target for its economy: Bhutan. Now the number is 101, and between them they account for just over 80% of global greenhouse-gas emissions. The increasingly vocal opponents of these net-zero targets on the political right say many of the domestic policies associated with cutting emissions are too expensive, or irksome, or both. Those focused on keeping global warming since the Industrial Revolution well below 2°C, as per the Paris agreement, know those steps being taken to reach net zero are also not yet ambitious enough. As the “emissions gap” report issued by the UN Environment Programme in the run up to the Dubai cop points out, none of the G20 countries is reducing emissions at a pace consistent with its net-zero target.

Business not-as-usual

There is a lot less concern about the burgeoning removals gap. Few of those who have mouthed commitments to net zero appreciate how central greenhouse-gas removal is to the notion; of those who do, few recognise quite how vast the challenge is. Emission cuts of 90% would still see enough gas entering the atmosphere for a balancing level of removals to be a huge undertaking.

Studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggest that if the planet is to stand a decent chance of staying below the 2°C limit on warming it would be wise to plan on removing an additional 5bn tonnes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere every year. According to a report published in 2023 by an international team of academics, if you do not count managed forests, which have only limited room for expansion, the amount of carbon dioxide squirrelled away in durable storage in 2020 was 2.3m tonnes, or around a two-thousandth of that 2050 target. The Fujairah plant's pilot phase runs at just 1,000 tonnes a year.

Humans must be integrated into the planet's great cycles of renewal

New forms of durable removal need to be scaled up far more quickly than is happening. And they need to earn trust. At the moment, many who realise that removals are needed remain sceptical of the technology, not least because it is championed by the oil industry. Mr Al Kaabi's vision of a world free to produce and use oil “in the most sustainable way” does not sit well with those who think it necessary to stop the burning of all fossil fuels. The location of cop28 will bring such questions to the fore.

One reason oil companies are making the running is that they have expertise moving fluids in and out of the Earth's crust. They also have lots of money, and carbon-dioxide removal currently looks very pricey.

The obvious way to fund it efficiently is through markets. But none of the carbon markets around today is up to the job. This means that the net-zero strategies most of the world has embraced depend not just on inchoate technologies which can pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere and store it away, but on the creation of a carbon economy which makes doing so worthwhile. Climate policy insists that humans, their governments and their economy can and must be integrated into the planet's great cycles of renewal. But how is that to be done?

27 novembre (The Economist)

[The temptations of deferred removals \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

St Augustine's climate policy

The temptations of deferred removals

Carbon dioxide removals must start at scale sooner than people think



image: ben denzer

Nov 20th 2023

The realisation that carbon-dioxide removal (cdr) had been seriously neglected, say many of those in the field, dates back roughly five years: it was a reaction to a provision of the Paris agreement of 2015 which took a few years to sink in.

Developed countries wanted the Paris agreement to set a limit on global warming of no more than 2°C above the pre-industrial temperature. Some developing countries, particularly those on small islands, wanted a more stringent limit: “1.5 to stay alive”, as the hallway chant had it. The final compromise strengthened the main goal to “well below 2°C” and advocated “pursuing efforts” towards 1.5°C.

To sweeten things for the 1.5°C brigade, the agreement also asked the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to go and work out how much better the lower target would be. The ipcc reported back three years later: it would be a great deal better—but also much harder. One set of figures jumped out from its report: the four “pathways” found to offer a good chance of 1.5°C foresaw the removal of between 100bn and 1trn tonnes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere before 2100. Those numbers saw cdr go “from a completely niche, academic, propeller-headed discussion to central policymaking,” says Julio Friedmann of Carbon Direct, a carbon-management company.

The trillion-tonne pathway in that 2018 report was particularly arresting. It was the only one based on the assumption, subsequently proved correct, that carbon-dioxide emissions would not peak before the mid-2020s. According to the models used to produce such pathways, that late a peak meant there was no longer any chance of getting to net zero in time to have a 50:50 chance of staying below 1.5°C. Instead the pathway showed an “overshoot” trajectory in which, after the temperature broke the 1.5°C barrier, it was brought back down by “net-negative” emissions which significantly reduced the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. That required heroic levels of cdr: as much as 20bn tonnes a year.

Pathways or slippery slopes?

The requirements for a 2°C limit are not so insanely demanding. Indeed, at the time of the Paris agreement, it was still just about possible to imagine that it might be achieved with very little cdr, should emissions start dropping immediately. Instead, though, they rose; in the eight intervening years the world has emitted 300bn tonnes of carbon dioxide, more than the United States emitted over the entire course of the 20th century. Even if, when emissions do start to fall, they fall considerably faster than was envisaged in 2015, the world will still need a fair bit of cdr.

This is a good example of an aspect of *cdr* which is particularly disturbing. The possibility of removals allows climate policy to take the form of a deal similar to that which St Augustine asked of God: “Oh, Lord, make me chaste and celibate—but not yet.” The possibility of marginally more *cdr* tomorrow is too easily taken, in the world of scenarios and pathways, as licence to reduce emissions marginally more slowly today. The peak isn’t coming soon enough? The reductions aren’t steep enough? Clean it up later!

For 1.5°C this planetary procrastination has run its course; when you are talking about both breakneck emissions-reduction and a trillion tonnes of *cdr*, the game is clearly up. For 2°C it is a work in progress. Currently, pathways offering a decent chance of stabilisation at 2°C require an additional 1bn-13bn tonnes of *cdr* a year by 2050. The longer emissions stay high before their eventual fall, the bigger that number will get.

In a world where every delay in emissions reduction was accompanied by compensating investments in *cdr* designed to make sure the technology would be available at the appropriate scale by the time it was needed, that temporal trade-off might make some sort of sense. This is not that world. It is, instead, a world with significant experience of imagined future solutions which, in practice, prolong the status quo.

The technology of carbon capture and storage is a pertinent example. In the early 2000s people imagined that taking carbon dioxide from the smokestacks of power stations and industrial plants and burying it might be a large part of the response to climate change. Many in the fossil-fuel industry were keen to foster an idea which appeared to offer them a future. Despite some progress, it remains, 20 years on, largely a technology of tomorrow. That experience is one of the reasons some fear the same will be true of *cdr*. (The two approaches, while similar in some ways, are conceptually quite distinct. Carbon capture and storage is a way of greatly reducing the emissions from burning fossil fuels; *cdr* is a way of reducing the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.)

As it could be

Global greenhouse-gas emissions, stylised pathway




image: the economist

The scale of what needs to be done if *cdr* is to be a useful part of climate action, rather than an excuse for inaction, is vast. “The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal”, a report published by an international team of academics earlier this year, shows that there is a lot of carbon dioxide being stored by managed forestry and some more as a result of industrial biomass use, mostly as a by-product of ethanol fermentation. But the more radical technologies being focused on for durable storage today hardly register. Added together they come up to less than 1m tonnes: a megatonne. The burden put on them in net-zero plans requires them to work at a scale a thousand times larger: that of the gigatonne.

A gigatonne (gt) is not a measure that is easy to grasp. It is the weight of 3,000 Empire State Buildings: enough to put one on each block of Manhattan and still have a good few left to scatter over the other boroughs. It is half again as much as the weight of all the world's livestock.

There are, remarkably, some human activities that already move things around by the gigatonne. The 4trn cubic metres of natural gas the world uses each year weighs about 3gt; the oil fix comes in at 5gt. Such figures suggest that capturing and storing carbon dioxide by the gigatonne is a plausible thing for the world economy to do. But it also suggests that it will require a huge industry devoted to doing something for which, today, people are unwilling to pay.

If the scale of the eventual endeavour is not quite unprecedented but still daunting, so is the challenge of creating an appropriately sized industry in just a couple of decades. It is hardly commonplace, but the challenge posed by the climate crisis has already seen the world do just such a thing. In 2000 worldwide solar-power capacity was about a gigawatt. Today the total has three more zeroes—a terawatt. Solar companies and projects attracted \$350bn of investment in 2022, according to Jenny Chase of Bloombergnef, a data company.

Ain't no sunshine...

But the solar industry had two advantages. One was really large subsidies early on: between 2004 and 2012 Germany alone spent over €200bn (\$270bn) on the deployment of solar panels. The other was that the boom was centred on scaling up a single already-understood industrial process—turning semiconducting silicon into photovoltaic cells. Doing something a lot makes it cheaper, a phenomenon that is captured in what management textbooks call an experience curve. Solar's experience curve has seen cells become 20-30% cheaper for every doubling of installed capacity.

The situation for cdr is far less promising. Governments are not supporting the technology anything like as much as they did solar. A recent report by the Boston Consulting Group (bcg) calculated that \$1.7bn was invested in "durable" cdr last year, where durable normally means that the carbon dioxide ends up underground as a stable mineral, or tucked away in depleted oil- and gasfields, or dissolved in aquifers the water from which is never used. The authors reckon that is about 10% of what solar was getting at a comparable stage in its development.

And cdr will probably not benefit from experience curves to the same extent that solar did. Processes which involve dealing with straightforward things in bulk, often out in the field, are much less easily cheapened than the mass production of semiconductors in factories.

What is more, there is an increasingly bewildering range of cdr technologies on offer. Some will doubtless fall by the wayside. But few in the field expect a single technology to become dominant in the way that silicon photovoltaics have. This is in some ways a good thing—different technologies will allow different sorts of application in different situations. But doubling the installed capacity of each of ten separate technologies just once gets you much less by way of savings than doubling the installed capacity of one technology ten times in a row.

And some sort of cheapening is vital. Today's gold standard in cdr is direct-air capture, or dac: large banks of fans are used to pull air through machines which strip it of its carbon dioxide through a chemical-engineering process before storing it away. Two companies dominate the field: Carbon Engineering, a Canadian startup which Occidental Petroleum, an American oil company, has announced that it will buy; and Climeworks, a Swiss startup. Both companies are working on facilities in the 100,000-1m-tonnes a year range.

For now, though, the biggest on offer is Climeworks' Orca, in Iceland. It removes 4,000 tonnes of atmospheric carbon dioxide every year; an Icelandic company called Carbfix then pumps that carbon dioxide down into the island's basalt to be mineralised. Iceland, being on one of the boundaries where tectonic plates are pulling apart and new crust is being made, has both plentiful fresh basalt and lots of

carbon-free hydrothermal power. It hopes that those endowments and some subsequent first-mover advantage will make it a centre for cdr development.

Buy the change you want to be

Early adopters have paid in the range of \$1,000 a tonne for carbon dioxide to be removed and stored at Orca. At that price a gigatonne of carbon dioxide is a trillion-dollar proposition; ten gigatonnes a year would represent a tenth of the world economy. And that would not be a capital investment, like the additional \$2trn the International Energy Agency sees as being needed to get emissions reduction on track over the current decade. It would largely be an operating expenditure for keeping the planet running.

As Climeworks grows, its prices will presumably drop. Nevertheless, a lot of entrepreneurs motivated by both idealism and ambition think they can do better sooner, and they are beginning to attract investment. bcg reckons that between 2017 and 2022 investment in companies offering durable cdr rose from \$28m to \$1.1bn. Frontier, a buyers' club for durable carbon removals, estimates that the number of projects which might offer them such services has now topped 100.

This is in part because a few large companies have stepped up to provide demand. In 2019 Stripe, an online payments company, said it would start paying for durable removals. In 2020 Microsoft started to solicit bids for removals to help it reach its newly announced goal of becoming "carbon negative".

In 2022 Stripe created Frontier with its fellow tech companies Alphabet, Meta and Shopify and with McKinsey, a consultancy. Like the "advance market commitments" pioneered in vaccine development in the 2000s, Frontier is a means of incentivising r&d by promising to buy its fruits. The companies can then borrow against these "offtakes". Frontier has purchases agreed with 15 companies, and its members have committed to spending \$1bn on removals to be delivered by 2030.

The magic number on which this industry is focused, perhaps fixated, is \$100 per tonne of carbon dioxide. A gigatonne of removals becomes \$100bn of revenue, a number that both makes much more economic sense as a running cost to be paid for climate stability and sounds like a healthy global business. What is more, it is not much higher than the price some companies are already paying for their carbon-dioxide emissions.

In the eu's Emissions Trading System companies which emit carbon dioxide at power stations and some sorts of industrial plant—the scheme covers over 11,000—need to surrender allowances to do so. At the moment the market price of these allowances is €80 (\$85) a tonne. Prices in other so-called compliance markets are not as high. But in all of them it is assumed that they will rise. And compliance markets cover a quarter of the world's greenhouse-gas emissions.

This suggests the possibility, somewhere down the road, of a net-zero economy run in a way to delight any free-market economist: for every tonne emitted, the emitter would pay for a tonne to be removed. Rather than being set by governments, the cost of carbon would be a fact of the market, and a signal around which the economy could organise itself with maximum efficiency.

No achievable system will be as simple as that. But if net-zero economies are to be viable, the removals they require will have to be paid for somehow; other things being equal, the greater the role for markets in that system the better.

27 novembre (NZZ)

[Nahost: Eine neue arabische Friedensinitiative ist notwendig \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

KOMMENTAR

Einfach nur Nein sagen reicht nicht – es braucht eine neue arabische Friedensinitiative im Nahostkonflikt

Von den arabischen Staaten sind im Gazakrieg kaum eigene Ideen zur Zukunft der Region zu vernehmen. Dabei wird ohne sie eine Lösung des Konflikts kaum möglich sein. Vor allem in einem Punkt werden die Araber sich bewegen müssen.

Ulrich von Schwerin

27.11.2023, 05.30 Uhr 6 min



Ein israelischer Soldat steht in einem Kibbuz in der Nähe des Gazastreifens vor einer Betonmauer, auf der auf Hebräisch steht: «Der Weg zum Frieden». Leo Correa / AP

Die Massaker der Hamas haben in Israel neben vielem anderen auch die Illusion zerstört, dass der Konflikt mit den Palästinensern, wenn schon nicht zu lösen, so doch einzudämmen sei. Unter Benjamin Netanyahu setzte die Regierung in den letzten Jahren darauf, den eigenen Bürgern ein möglichst ungestörtes Leben zu ermöglichen, während sie die Palästinenser unter Kontrolle hielt. Auch viele arabische Staaten bauten darauf, den leidigen Konflikt ausklammern zu können, während sie mit Israel Frieden schlossen und Geschäfte machten.

Die Greuelthaten der Hamas haben aber gezeigt, dass es keinen Frieden und keine ausreichende Sicherheit geben kann, solange Israels Konflikt mit den Palästinensern ungelöst ist. Der 7. Oktober wird weithin als Wendepunkt gesehen, der den Nahost-Konflikt grundlegend verändert hat. Alle sind sich im Prinzip einig, dass ein Zurück zum Status quo ante keine Option sein kann. Weitaus weniger Einigkeit besteht aber bei der Frage, wie es mit Gaza und dem Nahostkonflikt weitergehen soll.

Einfach einen neuen Zaun um den Gazastreifen bauen und die 2,3 Millionen Einwohner dort sich selbst überlassen, kann nicht die Lösung sein. Israel hat jenseits des Ziels der Zerschlagung der Hamas bisher keinen Plan für die Zukunft des Küstengebiets vorgelegt. Auch von palästinensischer Seite kommen keine Ideen. Die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde des greisen Mahmud Abbas wirkt gelähmt und ist in der Bevölkerung weitgehend diskreditiert.

In den Hauptstädten der Region herrscht Ratlosigkeit

In dieser Situation böte sich die Chance für die arabischen Staaten, eine Friedensinitiative zu lancieren. Sie könnten das Vakuum nutzen, um eigene Ideen zur Gestaltung des Nahen Ostens vorzulegen. Gerade die Regionalmacht Saudiarabien und die Nachbarn Jordanien und Ägypten haben ein akutes Interesse daran, eine Ausweitung des Konflikts zu vermeiden. Auch wenn die libanesische Hizbullah-Miliz und ihre Paten in Teheran augenfällig einen offenen Krieg mit Israel vermeiden wollen, bleibt die Gefahr einer Eskalation gross.

Eine arabische Initiative wäre umso wichtiger, da andere Akteure als Vermittler derzeit ausfallen: Die USA haben sich unter Präsident Joe Biden so vorbehaltlos auf die Seite Israels gestellt, dass sie weithin als parteiisch wahrgenommen werden. Die Staaten der Europäischen Union sind uneins und gespalten zwischen unbedingter Solidarität mit Israel und Empathie mit den Palästinensern. Und der Uno-Sicherheitsrat ist wieder einmal blockiert und handlungsunfähig.

Von einem arabischen Friedensplan ist allerdings wenig zu sehen. Sieben Wochen nach Beginn des Krieges herrscht in Kairo, Amman, Riad und Abu Dhabi vor allem Ratlosigkeit. Ein «Friedensgipfel» in Kairo brachte am 22. Oktober [keine konkreten Ergebnisse](#). Auch ein Krisentreffen der Arabischen Liga und der Organisation für Islamische Zusammenarbeit in Riad bot am 11. November wenig mehr als [einen Aufruf zum Waffenstillstand](#) und einen Verweis auf frühere Beschlüsse.

Von Jordaniern und Ägyptern ist vor allem ein Nein zu hören

Von Saudiarabien, das unter Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman eine Führungsrolle in der Region beansprucht, ist kaum etwas zu hören. Der 38-Jährige scheint den Konflikt aussitzen zu wollen, um sodann die zuvor aufgenommenen Gespräche mit Israel über die Normalisierung der Beziehungen fortzusetzen. An der Palästinenser-Frage war er noch nie interessiert, seine Priorität ist die Modernisierung der Wirtschaft. Statt eine Friedenskonferenz zu Gaza hielt er am 24. Oktober denn auch lieber einen Wirtschaftsgipfel ab.

Jordanien und Ägypten beschränken sich darauf, Nein zu sagen: [Nein zur Aufnahme palästinensischer Flüchtlinge](#), Nein zur Besetzung des Gazastreifens durch Israel und Nein zur Entsendung eigener Friedenstruppen nach dem Ende des Krieges. Zusammen mit den anderen arabischen Staaten rufen sie nach einer Friedenskonferenz. Wer diese organisieren soll und was aus dem verwüsteten Küstenstreifen werden soll, sagen sie aber nicht.

Am aktivsten ist im Moment Katar. In zähen Verhandlungen mit der Hamas und Israel hat es [ein Abkommen für eine Feuerpause](#) und die Freilassung von Geiseln vermittelt. Das kleine Golfemirat erkennt den jüdischen Staat zwar nicht an, hat aber gute Kontakte zum Mossad. Zugleich unterhält es enge Beziehungen zu den Islamisten. Die Hoffnung ist gross, dass die Katarer die Freilassung weiterer Geiseln und ein Ende des Krieges vermitteln können. Eine politische Vision für die Zeit danach haben aber auch die Scheichs in Doha nicht.

Die arabischen Staaten verfolgten stets eigene Interessen

Es zeigt sich wieder einmal, dass die arabischen Staaten keine geeinte Front sind. Bei allen Solidaritätserklärungen an die Palästinenser verfolgen sie vor allem ihre eigenen Interessen. Dies offenbarte sich schon nach der Unabhängigkeit Israels 1948: Während die Syrer, Libanesen und Ägypter gegen den jungen jüdischen Staat ins Feld zogen, einigte sich Jordanien in geheimen Gesprächen mit Israel darauf, dass die jordanischen Truppen nur das Westjordanland besetzen würden.

Nachdem Jordanien und die anderen Nachbarn im Sechstagekrieg 1967 herbe territoriale Verluste erlitten hatten, war ihr primäres Ziel im Jom-Kippur-Krieg 1973, die verlorenen Gebiete zurückzuerlangen. Als Israel Kairo daraufhin die Rückgabe der besetzten Sinai-Halbinsel zusicherte,

schloss Ägypten als erster arabischer Staat 1979 Frieden mit Israel – sehr zur Empörung der anderen arabischen Staaten.

Denn mit dem Friedensschluss versties Kairo gegen die «drei Neins» von 1967. Auf ihrem Gipfel in Khartum hatten sich die Mitglieder der Arabischen Liga damals auf drei Punkte verpflichtet: kein Frieden, keine Anerkennung und keine Verhandlungen mit Israel. Auf Dauer war diese Haltung nicht durchzuhalten. Nachdem sich die Palästinensische Befreiungsorganisation (PLO) von Yasir Arafat 1993 in Oslo mit Israel auf die Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates geeinigt hatte, schloss auch Jordanien Frieden mit dem jüdischen Nachbarn.

Die Friedensinitiative 2002 war eine verpasste Chance

2002 gaben schliesslich auch die anderen Mitglieder der Arabischen Liga ihre Ablehnung Israels auf. Auf Initiative des damaligen saudischen Kronprinzen Abdallah machten sie Israel ein umfassendes Angebot: Wenn sich Israel aus allen 1967 besetzten Gebieten zurückziehe und einen unabhängigen palästinensischen Staat im Gazastreifen und das Westjordanland mit Ostjerusalem als seiner Hauptstadt akzeptiere, würden sie Israel anerkennen und Frieden mit ihm schliessen.

Dies bedeutete die radikale Abkehr von den «drei Neins» aus Khartum und war eine einmalige Chance für Israel, zumal sich auch Yasir Arafat umgehend hinter die arabische Friedensinitiative stellte. In Israel stiess sie aber auf Ablehnung, und in der israelischen Öffentlichkeit blieb sie fast unbemerkt. Dies lag auch daran, dass die Initiative von einem blutigen Selbstmordanschlag überschattet wurde, mit dem die Hamas jede Diskussion über Frieden abwürgte.

Als die Arabische Liga ihr Angebot 2007 und 2017 bekräftigte, war Israels Antwort allerdings erneut negativ. Neben dem anhaltenden Terror der Hamas war ein Grund dafür, dass die Initiative «eine gerechte Lösung für das Problem der palästinensischen Flüchtlinge» im Einklang mit der Uno-Resolution 194 forderte. Diese sieht ein Rückkehrrecht der 1948 vertriebenen Palästinenser vor. Für Israel ist aber eine Rückkehr der Millionen Palästinenser inakzeptabel, weil dies seinen Charakter als jüdischen Staat infrage stellen würde.

Die Araber sollten die Flüchtlinge einbürgern

Heute, da die Region in einer tiefen Krise steckt, ist eine neue arabische Friedensinitiative dringend nötig. Verhandlungen zur Freilassung der Geiseln, zur Beendigung der Kämpfe und zur Lieferung humanitärer Hilfe können nur der Beginn sein. Es braucht einen konkreten Plan, wie es nach der Zerschlagung der Hamas mit dem Gazastreifen weitergehen soll. Wenn Israel das Gebiet nicht selber besetzen und verwalten will, wird es die Araber brauchen, um für Sicherheit zu sorgen, die Bevölkerung zu versorgen und die zerstörten Städte wiederaufzubauen.

Es ist richtig, dass die Araber die Vertreibung der Bevölkerung von Gaza durch Israel ablehnen. Es kann aber nicht die Lösung sein, die Einwohner weiter in dem verwüsteten Landstrich einzusperren. Wer ausreisen will, sollte dies tun dürfen. Zudem sollten die arabischen Staaten endlich den palästinensischen Flüchtlingen auf ihrem Territorium die Einbürgerung ermöglichen. Eine Rückkehr der Flüchtlinge ist längst unrealistisch, und das Beharren darauf nährt nur falsche Hoffnungen.

Im Gegenzug wird aber auch Israel Kompromisse machen müssen – zuallererst den Stopp der Siedlungspolitik und die Anerkennung des Rechts der Palästinenser auf einen eigenen Staat. Ohne politische Perspektive für die Palästinenser kann es keinen Ausweg aus dem Kreislauf der Gewalt geben. Eine Fortsetzung der Besatzung und Blockade wird nur wieder zur Eskalation führen. Daran haben weder Israel noch die arabischen Staaten ein Interesse. Gewiss, ihr apathisches Verhalten gibt wenig Anlass zu Optimismus. Doch soll die Region nicht einfach wieder in ihren alten, mörderischen Konflikt zurückfallen, sind neue Initiativen der arabischen Staaten unerlässlich.

27 novembre (FAZ)

[Wo beginnt israelbezogener Antisemitismus? \(faz.net\)](#)

SUCHE NACH EINDEUTIGKEIT:

Wo beginnt israelbezogener Antisemitismus?

VON [WIBKE BECKER](#)

-AKTUALISIERT AM 27.11.2023-11:34



Dokumenta 2022: Nach heftiger Kritik wurde der Großbanner „People's Justice“ des indonesischen Künstlerkollektivs Taring Padi wegen antisemitischer Bildsprache entfernt. Bild: dpa

In Zeiten, in denen der Hass auf Juden wieder anschwillt, wäre eine unumstrittene Definition von

Im Dezember 2019 beschloss der damalige amerikanische Präsident [Donald Trump](#), ein Gesetz gegen Diskriminierung wegen Hautfarbe, Geschlecht oder Rasse auch auf Juden auszuweiten. Das hatte zur Folge, dass einer Universität die Gelder gestrichen werden konnten, wenn auf dem Campus jemand antisemitisch diskriminiert wurde. Etwa durch Gruppen, die zum Boykott gegen Israel und gegen Israelis aufriefen.

Für die Prüfung, ob es sich um [Antisemitismus](#) handelt, sollte eine Definition verwendet werden: die „Arbeitsdefinition der Internationalen Allianz zum Holocaustgedenken“, kurz IHRA.

Die IHRA ist eine Organisation, die 1998 gegründet wurde und in der sich vor allem europäische Staaten zusammenfinden, außerdem ein paar andere wie etwa [Israel](#) und die USA. Ihr Ziel ist es, an den Holocaust zu erinnern, ihn zu erforschen und über ihn aufzuklären.

2016 einigten sich die Mitgliedstaaten auf eine Arbeitsdefinition von Antisemitismus, und in der Folge übernahmen mehr als drei Dutzend Staaten diese Definition. Sie ist rechtlich nicht bindend, aber dass es diese gemeinsame Definition überhaupt gibt, sehen viele schon als Erfolg an.

Die Definition lautet: „Antisemitismus ist eine bestimmte Wahrnehmung von Juden, die sich als Hass gegenüber Juden ausdrücken kann. Der Antisemitismus richtet sich in Wort oder Tat gegen jüdische oder nichtjüdische Einzelpersonen und/oder deren Eigentum sowie gegen jüdische Gemeindeinstitutionen oder religiöse Einrichtungen.“ Weil diese Grunddefinition sehr vage war, verdeutlichte die IHRA ihre Aussage mit elf Beispielen. Sieben dieser Beispiele bezogen sich jedoch nicht ausschließlich auf Juden, sondern auch auf den Staat Israel.

Zwei Tage, nachdem Donald Trump der IHRA-Definition an den amerikanischen Universitäten zu einer enormen Deutungsmacht verholfen hatte, schrieb der amerikanische Jurist und ehemalige Direktor des Bereichs Antisemitismus des Jewish Committee, Kenneth Stern, einen Gastbeitrag im britischen

„Guardian“. Stern hatte fünfzehn Jahre zuvor sozusagen die Urversion der IHRA-Definition federführend entwickelt – damals für die [Europäische Union](#), die eine solche Definition haben wollte, um Daten über Antisemitismus zu sammeln. Stern schrieb nun, Trumps Verordnung sei „ein Angriff auf die akademische Freiheit“. Dafür sei die Definition niemals gedacht gewesen. Natürlich sollten Juden sich gegen Diskriminierung wehren können, wenn sie ihnen auf dem Campus widerfuhr, schrieb Stern.

Wo hört legitime Kritik auf?

Für ihn ging es aber um etwas anderes: Er hatte beobachtet, wie seit dem Jahr 2010 „rechte jüdische Gruppen“ die Antisemitismusdefinition „zu einer Waffe machten“ gegen freie Meinungsäußerung. Stern bezog sich unter anderem auf [Jared Kushner](#), Trumps Schwiegersohn. Der hatte in der „New York Times“ geschrieben, die IHRA-Definition mache klar, dass Antizionismus Antisemitismus sei.

Dazu schrieb Kenneth Stern: „Ich bin ein Zionist. Aber auf einem Universitätscampus, wo es darum geht, Ideen zu erforschen, haben Antizionisten ein Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung. Ich vermute, wenn Kushner oder ich in eine 1948 vertriebene palästinensische Familie hineingeboren worden wären, hätten wir möglicherweise eine andere Sicht auf den Zionismus, und das muss nicht daran liegen, dass wir Juden verunglimpfen oder glauben, sie hätten sich verschworen, um der Menschheit zu schaden.“

Stern ficht also zwei Kämpfe gleichzeitig aus: gegen Antisemitismus und auch gegen vorschnell als Antisemitismus gedeutete Kritik am Staat Israel. Auch in der IHRA-Definition heißt es, dass „Kritik an Israel, die mit der an anderen Ländern vergleichbar ist, nicht als antisemitisch betrachtet werden“ kann.

Aber gleichzeitig steht im Satz davor, dass Antisemitismus „sich auch gegen den Staat Israel, der dabei als jüdisches Kollektiv verstanden wird“, richten kann (Deutschland hat die IHRA-Grunddefinition übrigens um genau diesen Zusatz noch erweitert). Wo genau hört also legitime Kritik auf? Wo werden Juden illegitim kollektiv mit dem Staat Israel gleichgesetzt – und was bedeutet das, wenn sich doch der Staat Israel selbst als „nationale Heimstätte des jüdischen Volkes“ bezeichnet?



Oktober 2019: In Halle hätte ein rechtsextremer Attentäter beinahe einen Massenmord an Juden begangen. Er konnte die Tür nicht öffnen. Dann erschoss er zwei zufällige Personen. :Bild: dpa

Die Frage nach der Definition von israelbezogenem Antisemitismus mag abseitig klingen in einer Zeit, in der es einen Anschlag auf eine Berliner Synagoge gegeben hat, Davidsterne an die Häuser von Juden geschmiert werden und arabische Demonstranten die Terrororganisation Hamas preisen, nachdem die mehr als 1200 jüdische Zivilisten ermordet und mehr als 200 entführt hat. In einer Zeit, in der in sozialen Netzwerken massiv eindeutige antisemitische Botschaften verbreitet werden.

Für solche Taten braucht man keine Definition. Aber man braucht sie für andere Gelegenheiten: Wie kann man etwa unterscheiden, ob sich die Wut eines Palästinensers, der eine Israelfahne zertrampelt, gegen die Politik Israels oder gegen die Juden in Israel insgesamt richtet? Wann sind Thesen über Israels

Politik antisemitisch, wann sind sie falsch? Ist der Slogan „From the river to the sea – we demand equality“ in Wahrheit eine codierte Version für „From the river to the sea – Palestine will be free“, was viele als Leugnung des Existenzrechts Israels einordnen? Oder drückt er einfach nur Solidarität mit Palästinensern aus – nicht mit der Hamas?

Grauzonen

Antworten würden helfen. Aber auch die Forschung ist zerstritten. Der unabhängige Expertenkreis Antisemitismus hat in seinem zweiten Bericht 2017 ein eigenes Kapitel „Grauzonen“ benannt. Er spricht darin von den „fließenden Übergängen“ zwischen legitimer Kritik und Antisemitismus, die eine „eindeutige Zuordnung“ schwierig machten.

In den letzten Jahren haben sich in vielen westlichen Ländern deswegen fast unversöhnliche Lager gebildet. Es sind (oft jüdische) Intellektuelle, Antisemitismus- und Holocaustforscher, Historiker, Soziologen, Philosophen oder auch Rabbiner. Die eine Seite warnt, dass Kritik an Israel zu schnell als Antisemitismus gewertet wird. Sie widerspricht, dass Antizionismus immer auch Antisemitismus ist. Sie fordert, dass die Sprecherposition stärker beachtet werden muss, also wer etwas sagt, welche realen Erfahrungen er mit dem Staat Israel gemacht hat und welches Wissen er über die Schoa hat.

Diese Forscher sind oft selbst Kritiker von Israels Politik gegenüber den Palästinensern. Sie halten die Kampagne „Boykott, Desinvestitionen und Sanktionen“ (BDS), die Israel und die Israelis wirtschaftlich, akademisch und kulturell ächtet, nicht generell für antisemitisch, obwohl sie sie als falsch verurteilen. Und sie sehen sich mit dieser Haltung wiederum selbst im öffentlichen Diskurs ausgegrenzt. Der Erziehungswissenschaftler Micha Brumlik hat dies vor einigen Jahren als „neuen McCarthyismus“ beschrieben.

Viele dieser Kritiker unterstützen es nicht, dass sich die westlichen Staaten an der IHRA-Definition orientieren. Sie lasse zu viel Spielraum, legitime Kritik als illegitim zu brandmarken, sagen sie. Einige Intellektuelle haben deshalb in den vergangenen Jahren zwei weitere Definitionen von Antisemitismus vorgelegt, die Nexus-Definition und die Jerusalem-Erklärung. In beiden wird benannt, was Antisemitismus ist, aber auch, was er in Bezug auf den Staat Israel eben nicht ist. Die Nexus-Definition enthält unter anderem folgenden Passus: „Generell gilt, dass Kritik am Zionismus und an Israel, Widerstand gegen die Politik Israels oder gewaltfreie politische Aktionen, die sich gegen den Staat Israel und/oder seine Politik richten, nicht als solche, als antisemitisch zu betrachten sind.“

Keine Grauzonen

Politisch haben diese beiden Definitionen bislang wenig Bedeutung. Als die USA in diesem Mai ihre nationale Antisemitismus-Strategie vorstellte, bezeichnete das Weiße Haus die IHRA-Definition als „die bedeutendste“. Allerdings, und das überraschte, hieß es auch, es gebe neben ihr auch noch andere Definitionen, etwa die Nexus-Definition.

Es gibt aber auch sehr viele Verteidiger der IHRA-Definition. Sie sagen, dass israelbezogener Antisemitismus nicht mit Meinungsäußerung verwechselt werden kann. Sie betonen, dass diese beiden Bereiche klar voneinander getrennt werden können. Sie glauben, dass die Verwirrung, die das andere Lager erzeugt, den Kampf gegen Antisemitismus erschwert. Sie entgegnen, dass niemand im Diskurs ausgegrenzt wird – man müsse eben mit Kritik rechnen, wenn man eine abweichende Meinung habe. Sie glauben, dass die Kritiker der IHRA-Definition ein veraltetes Antisemitismusbild bedienen. Sie sagen, dass Identität und persönliche Erfahrung keine Rolle spielen, um Antisemitismus zu erkennen. Sie verurteilen BDS und Antizionismus als klar antisemitisch. Und sie kritisieren Israels Politik an den Palästinensern eher nicht.



Berlin, am 22. Oktober: Zahlreiche Menschen nehmen an der Kundgebung „Aufstehen gegen Terror, Hass und Antisemitismus - in Solidarität und Mitgefühl mit Israel“ teil. :Bild: dpa

Am eindrücklichsten hat diese Position die deutsche Linguistin und renommierte Antisemitismusforscherin Monika Schwarz-Friesel vorgetragen. Sie wollte 2019 bei einem Vortrag in Frankfurt am Ende auf einen Punkt zu sprechen kommen, der für Forscher „besonders ärgerlich“ sei. In den letzten Jahren höre man immer wieder Stimmen, die sagten, es gebe nicht genug Forschung, und man habe nicht genug Kriterien, wie man die sogenannte Israelkritik und den Antisemitismus voneinander abgrenzen solle. Schwarz-Friesel, eine zarte Frau, weiße Perlenkette und Seidenhalstuch, rief ins Mikrofon: „Bullshit!“ Seit 15 Jahren gebe es Forschung darüber, und man könne dies eben doch ganz genau bestimmen. „Ich will das nicht mehr hören“, sagte sie, genauso wenig wie Leute, die sagten, es gebe eine Grauzone. „Es gibt keine Grauzonen im Antisemitismus!“

Die Diskussion um israelbezogenen Antisemitismus ist eigentlich noch relativ jung. Sie begann am Anfang dieses Jahrtausends, mit der Zweiten Intifada, den Anschlägen am 11. September und mit dem Beginn der BDS-Kampagne. Davor hatte man Antisemitismus oft in einen klassischen und einen sekundären eingeteilt, also in einen vor und einen nach 1945 – aber auch da gibt es ganz unterschiedliche Einteilungen. Klassischer Antisemitismus ist es, zu behaupten, dass Juden eine geschlossene Gruppe bildeten, die im Verborgenen zu ihrem eigenen, meist materiellen, Vorteil die Strippen zögen. Juden seien böse, rachsüchtig, geldgierig. Sie seien die „Christusmörder“. Später wurden Juden als Rasse bezeichnet, minderwertig und fremd, schlecht für das eigene Volk.

Würde Christiania eher akzeptiert als Israel?

Nach 1945 wurden solche offenen Äußerungen vermieden, weil klar war, dass sie sanktioniert würden. Es begann die sogenannte Umweg-Kommunikation. Oft bestreitet dieser Antisemitismus, judenfeindlich zu sein. Es geht dabei meist um eine Schuldabwehr, um das Kleinreden der Schoa oder auch darum, endlich einen „Schlussstrich“ unter den Holocaust zu ziehen und nicht mehr mit ihm behelligt zu werden. Juden werden nun kollektiv als störend oder empfindlich bezeichnet, die der Ruhe, die man sich wünscht, entgegenstehen. Ihnen wird unterstellt, dass sie die Deutschen für alle Zeiten zum Täter machten, um daraus einen Vorteil zu ziehen. Mit dieser Täter-Opfer-Umkehr werden schließlich die Juden zu Tätern, auch mit Begriffen wie „Nazimethoden“, und die Deutschen werden zu ihren Opfern gemacht.

Vor etwa zwanzig Jahren begann dann die Debatte über den „neuen Antisemitismus“, der sich auf Israel als den „kollektiven Juden“ bezog. Der britische Philosoph Brian Klug wehrte sich sehr früh dagegen, Antizionismus mit Antisemitismus gleichzusetzen. In seinem Essay „Der Mythos vom neuen Antisemitismus“ machte er ein Gedankenspiel: Gesetzt, nicht Juden hätten sich in Palästina niedergelassen, sondern Katholiken wie die Kreuzzügler des 12. Jahrhunderts, und sie hätten das Land „Christiania“ genannt: „Würde Christiania im Herzen der Region eher akzeptiert als Israel? Ich bezweifle das. Wäre die Abneigung gegenüber Christiania qualitativ anders oder signifikant weniger als die Feindschaft heute gegenüber Israel? Auch das glaube ich nicht.“ Klug folgerte daraus, dass die zugrunde liegende Feindschaft nicht dem Staat als dem Jüdischen entgegengebracht wird, sondern als dem

europäischen Eindringling. Antisemitismus mochte also eine Zutat für die Feindseligkeiten gegen Israel sein. Der Antrieb war sie für ihn nicht.

Für die Antisemitismusforscherin Schwarz-Friesel stellt sich die Sache anders dar. Sie schreibt: „Israelhass basiert auf Judenhass, auf dem uralten Antijudaismus, nicht auf etwas, was Israelis tun oder nicht tun.“ Für sie ist der israelbezogene Antisemitismus „die dominante Manifestation des modernen Judenhasses“ des 21. Jahrhunderts geworden. Für die Leiterin des Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung der TU Berlin, Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, hat sich dagegen weniger der Antisemitismus, sondern vor allem der Begriff davon mit den Jahren immer stärker auf den Staat Israel bezogen und dadurch auch auf Israel verengt. Für sie birgt das die Gefahr in sich, dass so der traditionelle, mit Verschwörungsbildern hantierende Antisemitismus aus dem Blick gerät, wie er etwa in der Corona-Krise zum Ausdruck kam.

Gewissensprüfung als Basis der Förderung?

Der Bundestag hat diesen wissenschaftlichen Streit spätestens 2019 politisch entschieden, als die Bundestagsfraktionen von Union, Grünen, SPD und FDP die BDS-Kampagne verurteilten. Und seit der Debatte am 9. November im Bundestag, einen Monat nach den Terroranschlägen in Israel und 85 Jahre nach den Pogromen in Deutschland, liegen zwei Entschließungsanträge zur Antisemitismusbekämpfung im Innenausschuss – einer von den Ampelfraktionen, einer von der Unionsfraktion. Das bricht mit einer alten Tradition der Zusammenarbeit: dass sich die demokratischen Parteien, wenn es um den Kampf gegen Antisemitismus geht, zusammenraufen und kein politisches Kapital aus ihm ziehen.

Die Union legt in ihrem Antrag einen der Schwerpunkte auf Migranten. Sie will etwa deutschen Doppelstaatlern wegen einer antisemitischen Straftat die Staatsbürgerschaft entziehen, oder Einwanderern ein Bekenntnis zum Existenzrecht Israels abverlangen. Beide Anträge plädieren dafür, ein BDS-Verbot zu prüfen. Beide Anträge fordern, dass die IHRA-Definition eine wichtigere Rolle bei Förder- und Vergabeentscheidungen bekommt. Die Union verlangt, dass sich die geförderten Organisationen ausdrücklich zu der Definition bekennen. Die Ampel will außerdem Kultureinrichtungen, „die das Existenzrecht Israels infrage stellen oder mit Einrichtungen und Personen zusammenarbeiten“, die dies tun, nicht mehr durch die öffentliche Hand fördern lassen.

Die Geschäftsführende Direktorin des Deutschen Bühnenvereins, Claudia Schmitz, sagte der F.A.S., die Sicherheit Israels sei zu Recht Teil der deutschen Staatsräson, und die deutschen Bühnen stünden solidarisch zu Israel. Jedoch: „In der Umsetzung empfehlen wir dringend, nicht an der Person, sondern am Werk anzusetzen.“ Wie sollten Kulturinstitutionen überprüfen, ob Personen, mit denen sie zusammenarbeiten, die BDS-Bewegung unterstützen. „Die Kultureinrichtungen müssten hierzu Gewissensprüfungen durchführen, und Gewissensprüfungen würden dann wiederum zur Basis der Förderung gemacht.“

Überhaupt ist unklar, ob eine Resolution zur Antisemitismusbekämpfung neben einer symbolischen auch eine rechtliche Wirkung hätte. Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat im letzten Jahr entschieden, dass sich die Stadt München nicht weigern darf, der BDS-Bewegung Räume zur Verfügung zu stellen – obwohl diese Verweigerung ein wichtiger Punkt bei der BDS-Resolution 2019 war. Der Grund: Das sei eine „Beschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit“, und die sei „verfassungsrechtlich nicht gerechtfertigt“.

27 novembre (Atlantico)

[Criminalité, délinquance et... immigration : ces leçons permises par la transparence des chiffres venus du Danemark | Atlantico.fr](#)

TABLEAU COMPLET

Criminalité, délinquance et... immigration : ces leçons permises par la transparence des chiffres venus du Danemark

C'est l'institut de statistique danois (ISD) qui traite les données sur les crimes et délits à partir du registre central de la police qui lui est transmis le 1er février de chaque année.

[Michèle Tribalat](#)



La police danoise patrouille autour de l'aéroport de Kastrup à Copenhague.

Ne sont pas retenus dans ce fichier les délits ayant donné lieu à une amende de moins de 2500 DKK (soit 335 euros à peu près) lorsqu'il s'agit d'infractions au code de la route et de moins de 1000 DKK (134 euros à peu près) pour les autres infractions. L'ISD est en mesure de publier - et mettre en ligne - des données sur les personnes déclarées coupables. Lorsqu'une personne est déclarée coupable de plus d'un acte de la même « famille », hors code pénal (par exemple plusieurs infractions au code de la route) elle est enregistrée pour le plus grave. Mais, si elle a été jugée coupable, dans la même année, d'un acte de violence et d'un acte contre la propriété, elle sera comptée deux fois. La statistique couvre les personnes résidant au Danemark du 1er janvier au 31 décembre de l'année considérée. Toute personne qui quitte le pays ou y entre dans l'année n'y figure pas.

Pour être immigré, il faut non seulement être né à l'étranger, mais aussi que ses deux parents soient eux-mêmes étrangers ou nés à l'étranger (ou un seul si l'autre parent n'est pas connu). Si aucune information n'est disponible sur aucun des parents, la personne née à l'étranger est aussi classée comme immigrée.

Ceux que la statistique danoise appelle « descendants » sont nés au Danemark et ont leurs parents immigrés ou descendants d'immigrés de nationalité étrangère. Une partie des petits-enfants d'immigrés figurent donc parmi ces « descendants ».

Lorsque les deux parents sont connus, c'est l'origine de la mère qui est retenue.

Si un seul parent est connu, c'est l'information sur ce parent qui est considérée. Si aucun des parents n'est connu et que la personne est née au Danemark de nationalité étrangère, elle est considérée également comme un « descendant ».

Dans les faits, le pays de naissance des parents des immigrés est très souvent non renseigné. C'est, par contre, très peu fréquent chez les descendants. Par ailleurs, très rares sont les immigrés qui auraient

un ou leurs deux parents nés au Danemark (moins d'1% en 2023). Ça l'est un peu moins chez les descendants mais reste rare (à peine plus de 2 % en 2023).

La définition danoise se distingue donc surtout de la définition française par sa classification montante qui réduit le volume des descendants en privilégiant l'origine danoise sur l'origine étrangère. En France, il suffit d'un parent immigré pour faire partie des descendants[1].

Sont dits d'origine danoise, les personnes nées au Danemark ou à l'étranger dont au moins un parent est un Danois né au Danemark.

Dans les années 1980, les traces d'une immigration étrangère sont infimes. En 1990, encore près de 97 % des habitants sont d'origine danoise. Il faudra attendre 1992 pour que la proportion d'immigrés non occidentaux atteigne 2 % et 1998 pour que la proportion des descendants non occidentaux dépasse 1 %. La population d'origine étrangère va s'accroître progressivement pour atteindre 15,4 % en 2023, contre 9,8 % en 2010 et près de 7,1 % seulement en 2000. Soit une augmentation de 5,6 points de pourcentage en treize ans. Cette population d'origine étrangère est encore démesurément composée d'immigrés (un peu plus des trois quarts). En France, les descendants directs d'immigrés sont majoritaires en raison de la plus grande ancienneté du phénomène migratoire et de la définition plus extensive des enfants d'immigrés (au moins un parent immigré et non les deux).

Statistiques sur la criminalité au Danemark

L'ISD met ainsi une série de tableaux en ligne dans une sous-rubrique de la rubrique « Conditions sociales » et, notamment, des tableaux sur les caractéristiques des personnes reconnues coupables, dont leur origine. Mais il s'agit d'une origine dans la définition bien particulière du Danemark.

C'est évidemment dans l'exploitation des personnes reconnues coupables d'infractions au code pénal, aux lois sur la circulation routière ou aux autres lois que l'origine peut être exploitée.

Convicted persons

Guilty persons

- STRAFNA3 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by sex, age and country of origin (2000-2021)
- STRFSOC1 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by sex, age and socioeconomic status (2015-2021)
- STRFUDD1 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by sex, age and education (2015-2021)
- STRAFNA4 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by type of offence and country of origin (2000-2021)
- STRFSOC2 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by type of offence and socioeconomic status (2015-2021)
- STRFUDD2 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by type of offence and education (2015-2021)
- STRAFNA5 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by country of origin and type of decision (2000-2021)
- STRAFNA6 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by region, sex, age and national origin (2005-2021)
- STRAFNA7 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by region and type of offence (2005-2021)
- STRAFNA8 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by region and type of decision (2005-2021)
- STRAFNA9 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by sex, age and ancestry (2000-2021)
- STRFNA10 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by ancestry and type of offence (2000-2021)
- STRFNA11 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by ancestry and type of decision (2000-2021)
- STRFNA12 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by sex, age, citizenship and ancestry (2018-2021)
- STRFNA13 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by citizenship and type of offence (2018-2021)
- STRFNA14 Persons guilty in crimes aged 15-79 years by citizenship, ancestry and type of decision (2018-2021)




Le Danemark a trois types de variables sur l'origine :

- 1) L'origine nationale : danoise ou étrangère ;
- 2) L'ascendance : regroupée (d'origine danoise, Immigrés, descendants) ou non (d'origine danoise, immigrés occidentaux, immigrés non occidentaux, descendants d'occidentaux, descendants de non occidentaux) ;
- 3) Pays d'origine détaillée.

Les données portent sur les 15-79 ans.

Quelques données sur l'ascendance apportent des éléments d'appréciation utiles.

Une manière de faire est de rapporter le poids d'une origine dans les crimes et délits à celui qu'il occupe dans la population.



Rapport entre le poids de la criminalité/délinquance et celui des personnes âgées de 15-79 ans selon l'origine 2008-2021

Lecture : en 2008, les descendants d'origine non occidentale sont 3,4 fois plus nombreux parmi les coupables de crimes ou délits qu'ils ne le sont dans la population du Danemark.


Source : Statistics Denmark

La criminalité/délinquance des personnes d'origine danoise est légèrement inférieure à son poids dans les 15-79 ans. Toutes les autres catégories d'origines, sauf les immigrés occidentaux, apparaissent plus impliqués qu'ils ne devraient l'être compte tenu de leur part dans les 15-79 ans au Danemark. Les immigrés non occidentaux le seraient entre 1,4 et 1,6 fois plus selon les années. Manifestement, la

surreprésentation dans la criminalité semble être l'apanage des descendants d'origine non occidentale (3,2 à 3,6 fois plus selon les années).

Cette évolution générale reflète assez bien, sans surprise, celle des hommes qui représentent, au Danemark, 75 % à 79 % des personnes reconnues coupables. Quant à la criminalité/délinquance féminine, la surreprésentation des femmes descendantes d'immigrés non occidentaux coupables, qui était cantonnée un peu au-dessus de 2 jusqu'en 2016, a beaucoup augmenté après jusqu'à atteindre 3,2 fois leur poids parmi les femmes âgées de 15-79 ans en 2021.


Mais ces données brutes peuvent être trompeuses. En effet, les différentes populations considérées n'ont pas la même structure par âge. Les immigrés non occidentaux et surtout les descendants d'immigrés non occidentaux sont beaucoup plus jeunes que les personnes d'origine danoise. Chez ces dernières, en 2021, 47,5 % des 15-79 ans ont au moins 50 ans, contre 32,1 % pour les immigrés non occidentaux et 0,4 % seulement pour les descendants d'origine non occidentale (graphique ci-dessous). Ces différences d'âges ne restent pas sans effet sur l'activité criminelle/délinquante.



Répartition par groupe d'âges de la population du Danemark âgée de 15-79 selon l'origine (danoise, non occidentale).

Source : Statistics Denmark

Une façon d'y voir plus clair consiste à appliquer les taux de criminalité par groupe d'âge des personnes d'origine danoise aux mêmes groupes d'âges des deux autres groupes. Standardisation que recommande d'ailleurs Statistics Denmark[2]. Il est alors possible de comparer le nombre de condamnés effectif à celui que le Danemark aurait enregistré pour les immigrés non occidentaux et les descendants de même origine par groupe d'âges mais aussi globalement pour les 15-79 ans, s'ils avaient eu la même activité criminelle que les Danois d'origine. C'est ce que représentent les graphiques ci-dessous. Sans suractivité criminelle, le rapport entre les deux serait égal à 1.



À tous les âges (sauf en 2016, pour les 30-49 ans), les immigrants non occidentaux sont plus souvent coupables d'activité criminelle/délinquante que les Danois d'origine. Les 30-49 ans le sont ainsi entre 40 % et 60 % plus souvent. En moyenne, les immigrants non occidentaux âgés de 15-79 ans le sont 20% à 30 % plus souvent selon les années. La suractivité criminelle/délinquante des immigrants non occidentaux âgés de 50-79 ans - plus élevée que dans les autres groupes d'âges - s'explique probablement par leur plus grande « jeunesse ». En 2021, 58 % avaient moins de 60 ans, contre 38 % chez les Danois d'origine.

Mais on change d'échelle avec les descendants d'origine non occidentale. Pour eux, le groupe des 50-79 ans est trop mince pour qu'on en tire quelque chose. En moyenne, pour les 15-79 ans, l'année 2010 mise à part, leur suractivité criminelle par rapport aux Danois d'origine a été autour de 2,4 fois plus importante jusqu'en 2013. Elle a ensuite augmenté pour être d'un facteur 3 en 2021. Autrement dit, leur activité criminelle/délinquante (mesurée par le nombre de coupables de crimes ou délits) a été trois fois plus intense que ce qu'elle aurait été s'ils avaient eu des taux de criminalité par groupe d'âges identiques à ceux des Danois d'origine. Cette suractivité a été la plus importante parmi les descendants non occidentaux âgés de 30-49 ans. Elle avait pourtant baissé de 3,4 à 2,7 de 2008 à 2016. Mais elle est repartie à la hausse ensuite pour atteindre 3,4 en 2021. Autrement dit les descendants d'origine non occidentale âgés de 30-49 ans sont en 2021 3,4 fois plus souvent déclarés coupables de crimes ou de délits qu'ils ne l'auraient été s'ils avaient eu le même taux de criminalité/délinquance que les Danois d'origine.

La prise en compte des effets de structure par âge n'efface pas la forte suractivité criminelle/délinquante des descendants d'origine non occidentale âgés de 15-79 ans.

27 novembre (The Economist)

[Xi Jinping's grip on Chinese enterprise gets uncomfortably tight \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

Blurred vision

Xi Jinping's grip on Chinese enterprise gets uncomfortably tight

Welcome to the era of party-state capitalism



image: vincent kilbride

Nov 26th 2023 | SHANGHAI

As the head office of Northern Heavy Industries (nhi) comes into view, so does a huge slogan fixed permanently to its roof in metre-high red Chinese characters, where you might usually see a company name. The 22-character mouthful reads: “Wave High the Great Banner of [Xi Jinping](#) Thought in the New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” A billboard-sized image of Mr Xi, China’s leader, waves to visitors as they enter the lobby. In a nearby factory nhi’s tunnel-boring machines, used for digging metro lines, rise four storeys into the air. The company was founded by the state many decades ago. Today more than ever it embodies an archetypal image of a state-owned enterprise (soe).

Except that on paper nhi is private. A company called Fangda Group, which is listed in Shenzhen and fully privately owned, took a 47% stake in nhi in 2019, in a rare instance of a private company bailing out a state one. This made Fangda by far the largest single shareholder. The deal should have privatised nhi.

But in [China's corporate sector](#) nothing is so straightforward. Fangda is not the controlling shareholder. Executives say it does not have one. Some staff in its factories call it a state firm; some say it is private. When asked about Fangda’s involvement in nhi, a manager says the investment was a “policy decision”. An investment adviser says that, for reasons he cannot divulge, investors should approach Fangda itself as if it had the backing of the state—even though the state does not feature in its shareholder register. Fangda’s website is covered in Communist Party imagery such as sickles and hammers. It describes its corporate mission as “listening to the party and following the party”.

Chinese business has become much more professional in the past three decades. Its stockmarket is one of the world’s largest and has been rapidly opening up to Western investors. In futuristic industries like electric vehicles and green energy Chinese firms lead the world. China’s digital economy has produced rare rivals to America’s internet giants. Many have global ambitions and are backed by some of the world’s savviest asset managers.

Yet over the same period the lines between the state sector and private business have grown blurrier. Many global investors increasingly view China’s private sector as a captive of the Communist Party. So do Western politicians, who rail against companies such as Huawei and TikTok for their alleged links to the

party (which the firms deny). A recent paper from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, asks: “Can Chinese firms be truly private?” Monitoring state influence has thus become more important than ever. It has also become more difficult than at any time in the past.

One factor that has complicated matters is the central government’s policy that explicitly seeks to blend state and private interests. Launched in 2013, “mixed-ownership reform”, as it is known, has encouraged private investments in some state firms and vice versa. The philosophy behind the policy was to introduce private capital into clunky state firms.

Most of the investment since then, however, has flowed in the other direction. According to Fitch, a ratings agency, on average 50 state companies a year took the controlling rights of listed private business between 2019 and 2021, up from fewer than 20 in 2018. Privately owned firms’ share of market value among China’s 100 largest listed firms shrank from a peak of about 55% in mid-2021 to just 39% at the end of June this year, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (pie), another Washington think-tank. State companies may have spent around \$390bn investing in private companies since 2018, according to data from Dealogic, a research firm.

Mixed-ownership reform may have helped some soes perform better. Several academic studies found that it improves innovation and the return on assets. However, the reform has also created a vast grey sector that has characteristics of both state and private companies. The rise of government-backed funds armed with \$1trn in capital has injected state funding into many private technology companies, including plenty of promising startups. State investors have also been taking “golden shares”, tiny stakes that grant outsized voting powers, in China’s internet giants. In October it was revealed that a government agency had taken a 1% stake in a subsidiary belonging to Tencent, China’s mightiest internet titan.

With the exception of top executives and government officials no one really understands what golden shares do. Company spokespeople say they are harmless. Investors disagree. When earlier this year such an arrangement came to light at Tencent and Alibaba, another internet giant, their share prices sank. An investment manager in Hong Kong explains that the discount was the result of state links being associated with corporate and financial stability, not risky innovation and animal spirits. From the state’s perspective, he adds, rapid profit growth and high valuations could be perceived as dangerous if they take place in the wrong sectors.

Distinguishing between state and private companies is becoming more difficult because state influence over companies is no longer just tied to ownership, says Margaret Pearson of the University of Maryland, College Park. In “The State and Capitalism in China”, published in May, Ms Pearson and her co-authors say that China is moving from state capitalism, where business is guided by national interests, to “party-state capitalism”, in which it is organised around the interests of the Communist Party.

Until the late 2000s how the party exercised its power over corporate management was mainly evident in its appointments of soe bosses. That has changed significantly since Mr Xi became party chief in 2012. A sweeping anti-corruption campaign, followed by a crackdown on tech companies, has helped deflate and reshape China’s digital economy. Outspoken tech entrepreneurs have vanished. A handful of tech founders and other business leaders have stepped down. Alibaba is splitting itself into several firms. Tencent has shed tens of billions of dollars in assets. New Oriental, China’s most promising private-education group before the state snuffed out its entire industry almost overnight, has become an online marketplace for agricultural and other products. Insiders argue about precisely how much direct influence the party had on such corporate decisions. Most agree that it is pleased with the outcome.

State support, implicit or explicit, can help businesses aligned to Mr Xi’s vision. A lot of innovation in green energy, electric vehicles, robotics and digitisation is done by private firms but bankrolled by the state. Many entrepreneurs report that life is good in those areas. In sensitive domains like generative artificial intelligence (ai), new services are developed hand in hand with the state. Private companies working on ai frequently consult regulators, who provide guidance for what development is and is not

permissible. Rather than regarding such consultations as an obstacle to innovation, Chinese ai firms often see it as a fast track to success.

The party exercises control in subtler ways, too. One tool is its corporate “social credit” system. Launched not long after Mr Xi came to power, it rates companies based on factors including legal and debt-payment record. A recent review of all publicly available scores in Zhejiang, a wealthy coastal province, by Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin at the City University of Hong Kong and Curtis Milhaupt of Stanford Law School, found that companies with more political connections had higher scores. Other than a company’s size, the variable most closely associated with a high score is having directors or a chief executive who served in important government or party positions.

Firms with high scores can be “red-listed”, or given preferential access to credit. Ending up on the system’s blacklist makes it exceedingly hard to get loans. This gives private firms a strong incentive to follow state policies even in the absence of direct state ownership.

Another way for the party to control firms is through party committees, where employees who are party members meet to discuss ideology and its place in corporate life. These cells typically do not have formal administrative clout. But they channel information about the company or its industry to regulators. This information may in turn shape local regulations, notes a banker. As with golden shares, the clearest impact that party committees have had so far is to breed distrust among foreign investors, and between foreign firms’ local subsidiaries and their headquarters.

Many of the changes in the private sector can be explained as an attempt on the part of entrepreneurs to balance commercial activity while also showing loyalty to the party and fulfilling political duties, says Huang Tianlei of [piiie](#). Showing loyalty does not necessarily make them less profit-seeking. They are simply trying to adapt to a political economy founded on the supremacy of the party.

Yet the blurrier the line between the state and the private sector, the harder it becomes for entrepreneurs to strike a balance between party and profit. Ms Pearson and her co-authors find that private companies may not be “secure enough in their autonomy from the state to pursue their own interests with ease”. It is not just investors who find the system tiresomely muddled. The view from within is getting hazier, too.

27 novembre (Haaretz)

[Israelis Massacred and Abducted? Not in the Arab Media - Israel News - Haaretz.com](#)

Israelis Massacred and Abducted? Not in the Arab Media

Instead, Hamas' attack has largely been portrayed as a legitimate act of resistance, though not every country's media equates the terror group in Gaza with the Palestinian people



Former Hamas chief Khaled Meshal, left, being interviewed by Rasha Nabil for the Al Arabiya news channel. Credit: A screenshot from Al Arabiya news channel

[Sheren Falah Saab](#)

Nov 26, 2023 4:26 pm IST

Two weeks into the Gaza war, former Hamas chief Khaled Meshal was interviewed by the Riyadh-based Al Arabiya news channel. Rasha Nabil asked him questions about October 7 that no Arab journalist had yet dared.

“How do you ask the West and the world to support the Palestinian cause when the focus right now is on what Hamas did to Israeli civilians?” she asked. Meshal didn’t really know how to answer.

[Arab TV networks have been broadcasting their share](#) of segments on how the Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, shocked Israel. They've also been fiercely condemning Israel’s rejection of a permanent cease-fire. But Nabil dared to look at the Israeli perspective as well.

As television network Al Araby put it: 'Palestinian resistance fighters infiltrated from Gaza, reached military outposts and fought Israeli soldiers.'

“The West says the war is [Israel’s response to what you did on October 7](#). The international community is allowing Israel to respond with what it calls self-defense. Is there any chance that you will apologize for what happened to Israeli civilians?” Nabil asked.

“The Western world has seen on its television screens an illegitimate Hamas attack on Israeli civilians. You are responsible for the movement's image around the world, and now the movement is being compared to ISIS.”

After the interview, Nabil was lambasted on social media; some called her insolent.

But some of her colleagues supported her, notably Tariq Al-Homayed, the former editor of the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat. In a tweet after the interview, he thanked Nabil and Al Arabiya and added: “That's how professional media works, that's real journalism.”

Since October 7, most leading media outlets in the Arab world [have ignored the attacks on Israeli civilians](#). They haven't reported on Hamas' atrocities and haven't mentioned the 240 or so hostages that were

taken. Al Jazeera opened its first broadcast after the attack with a video explaining its stages, but it ignored the barbarism.

“The fighters managed to breach the fence using motorcycles and vans and reached the settlements near the border,” [Al Jazeera reported](#); in the Arab world, all Israeli communities are referred to as settlements. “They took soldiers and settlers prisoner and returned to Gaza. Some of the fighters continued to fight the soldiers at the outposts.”

As another television network, Al Araby, put it: “Palestinian resistance fighters infiltrated from Gaza, reached military outposts and fought Israeli soldiers. A battle ensued between the two sides, some of the soldiers were killed and others were taken prisoner by Hamas fighters.”

“Al-Aqsa Flood destroys the myth of the occupation,” shouted a headline in the Qatari newspaper Al Sharq, using Hamas' name for its attack. An editorial by the paper described the assault as “legitimate resistance” following the 17-year blockade of Gaza.



Tom Divon, a doctoral student researching digital culture at Hebrew University's Department of Communication and Journalism. Credit: Hebrew University Jerusalem

Outlets make short, rhythmic videos with propaganda messages that frame the war as a war against the Palestinians and not against Palestinian terror.

Tom Divon

The Kuwaiti newspaper Al Qabas published a photo showing Israeli soldiers being dragged away by Hamas terrorists under the headline “Sweeping Palestinian attack against the Zionist entity.” The more moderate Asharq Al-Awsat mentioned that “civilians were murdered,” but there was no reference to Hamas planning a premeditated massacre of civilians including women and children.

The Arab media's terminology remains one-dimensional. Not only have the victims been rendered invisible, they have been described as “Zionists,” a word with very negative connotations in the Arab world. Amjad Taha, a UAE-based political analyst and author of “[The Deception of the Arab Spring](#),” agrees that one-sided reporting plagues the Arab media.

“Selective reporting fuels anger and hatred of Israel,” he told Haaretz. “Many outlets are guilty of one-sided coverage, biased in favor of Hamas while neglecting the broader picture.”

Tunnel vision

[One-sided coverage also reigns on the Arab media's X \(formerly Twitter\) and TikTok accounts](#), says Tom Divon, a doctoral student researching digital culture at Hebrew University's Department of Communication and Journalism.

“Outlets make short, rhythmic videos with propaganda messages that frame the war as a war against the Palestinians and not against Palestinian terror,” Divon says. The Arab media portrays Hamas' massacre of civilians as “legitimate resistance,” providing a very partial version of events.

“The Arab public sees on its screens the IDF attacking, and then it sees this again on digital channels,” he says. “The public has no way to broaden its vision, so it forms a very narrow perception of the war.”

What we're seeing isn't what the Arab world is seeing.

Gershon Baskin



Gershon Baskin, a historian of the Middle East and director of an investment fund promoting coexistence with the Palestinians. Credit: Tomer Applebaum

Gershon Baskin, a historian of the Middle East and director of an investment fund promoting coexistence with the Palestinians, adds: “What we're seeing isn't what the Arab world is seeing; the media there doesn't mention the massacre. I contacted an Egyptian journalist with a proposal to interview families of the hostages and massacre victims, but she said this was forbidden. This was an order from her newspaper: Don't interview Israelis.”

Baskin believes that Arab journalists know that Israelis were murdered and abducted, including children; after all, they have access to the international media. “But still they don't tell the truth about that, because the Arab street is naturally opposed to Israel. The Palestinian topic is burning, so they side with the Palestinians.”

Is the public in Arab countries even willing to hear about the Israeli victims?

“Most people in the Arab world are for the Palestinians, and it's hard for them to identify with Israel, especially when they see the bombing in Gaza and the unidentified bodies. An Arab acquaintance of mine who works in the media told me, ‘There are 1,400 Israeli dead and 14,000 dead in Gaza. ... What do you want us to cover, the 1,400 dead or the 14,000?’”

Before October 7 there was a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, and Hamas was the party that launched the attack. Can the Arab public at least take that into account?

“Before October 7, what the Arab world saw on television was settler violence against Palestinians under the army's protection. ... As they know it, Palestinians are being killed and the olive trees are being uprooted. As far as the Arab public is concerned, the war began before October 7.

“Now, the massive fire by the Israeli army every day and the airstrikes are being broadcast. That explains, at least in part, the large demonstrations in Egypt and Jordan, because the people see only one side of the picture. There's no balance showing what Hamas did in Israel.”

The Arab media also massively manipulates remarks by senior Israeli officials such as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and the main spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces, Daniel Hagari. Many stations air their speeches with an Arabic translation, and even rely on them for certain facts.

“They are the main spokesmen and are perceived as genuine in the Arab world,” says Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

“They mostly quote the number of IDF dead. People know that the reports in the Arab world and on the Palestinian side are fake, so every time they wait for an announcement from the Israeli side to present the situation. The stations also quote the IDF spokesman about the targets bombed and the progress of the IDF forces in Gaza. But when it comes to general messages, they don't report it.”

The incessant bombing, the lines of people carrying their belongings on their backs – these are pictures like from the Nakba 75 years ago.

Michal Milshtein



Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center. Credit: Tomer Applebaum

The ignoring of Hamas' atrocities raises fundamental questions about the media's role in Arab countries. “If the stations in the Arab world referred to Hamas' murders and abductions, the fury at the demonstrations might be more restrained and fewer protesters would be waving its flag,” Baskin says. “But for sure there's no chance that they would identify with the Israeli side. That's a lost cause.”

Is the coverage different than during previous rounds such as the 2014 Gaza war? Or is it more anti-Israel this time?

“In all the wars, the Arab media showed the Palestinian side. But this time, the coverage is far more extreme and anti-Israel because the pictures from Gaza speak. The incessant bombing, the lines of people carrying their belongings on their backs – these are pictures like from [the Nakba](#) 75 years ago.

“The Arab world is hearing proposals by lawmakers Danny Danon and Ram Ben Barak to expel the Palestinians from Gaza. Before that was [Minister Amichai Eliyahu's nuclear bomb remark](#), which only adds fuel to the fire. Comments like these are highlighted in the Arab media. They ostensibly show that Israel isn't just against Hamas, it's against the entire Palestinian people.”

Image of victory

Three days after the war broke out, former Lebanese Information Minister George Kordahi was interviewed by Lebanese station Al Jadeed. He said that Hamas' attack was “like a miracle,” adding that “what happened surprised not only the Israelis, it surprised people in the Arab world who support the Palestinians.”

Open gallery view

Kordahi has worked as an anchorman for a raft of Arab stations and is still popular. His remarks reflect the dominant spirit: Hamas' attack was a Palestinian victory.

“I want to congratulate the heroes of Palestine and Gaza who returned and proved they have the desire and daring to fight with heroism,” he said. “They put the Palestinian issue back in the center despite the attempts to put it to sleep under American and Israeli sponsorship and the Arabs who support them. The Arab public still feels a kinship with the oppressed Palestinian people and must fight for justice for them.”

Kordahi isn't the only person trying to present Hamas and the Palestinians as a single entity. On October 12, Al Araby interviewed Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas official. "We accept the messages of support from the Arab world and the need to bring justice to the Palestinians," he said.

"People are contacting us and want to fight with us against Israel. The Palestinian people are with us. After 75 years of occupation and harm to Palestinian rights, the time has come to open the doors to the Palestinians and join the fighting."

Baskin notes that both Al Jazeera and Al Araby, which are financed by Qatar, are mouthpieces for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Against them are stations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt that express empathy with the Palestinians but don't support Hamas. He says the Jordanian media supports the Palestinians but doesn't mention Hamas.

"Most of the Jordanian population are Palestinians," Baskin says. "Even Queen Rania suddenly remembered she was Palestinian after so many years of silence and is speaking out against Israel."

Taha, the political analyst based in the United Arab Emirates, adds: "Belying the one-sided perspective in the Arab media, part of the Arab public on social media is condemning Hamas, comparing it to ISIS and noting that it's supported by Iran. He says these critics "support the dissolution of the organization."

Milshtein agrees that not every Arab country's media equates the Palestinians with Hamas; this is especially the case in countries that shun the Muslim Brotherhood like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

"But they talk about the suffering of the Palestinian people. The question isn't whether they distinguish between Hamas and the Palestinians – the Arab world can distinguish between them – but how they present things," Milshtein says.

"Qatar wants to show a picture in which Hamas is the Palestinian people and vice versa, but the picture in the Egyptian media is different. Demonstrators identify with the Palestinian people but attack Hamas."

He mentions senior Egyptian journalist Abdel Latif el-Menawy, until recently an editor at the daily Al-Masry Al-Youm, who criticized Meshal and his comment that Hamas' attack was a "calculated risk." El-Menawy wrote: "Who did Hamas endanger? The Palestinians have the right to know what these calculations were. Did these calculations include thousands of casualties?"

In an article, Egyptian author and journalist Mona Nawal al-Halimi added: "Hamas leaders live like kings with their families in palaces in Qatar, Britain and elsewhere. They call on people to donate for the war while not caring about the devastation and destruction, as long as they're somewhere safe."

She also emphasized the organization's radical ideology. "Hamas isn't interested in liberating the Palestinian homeland; fundamentally, it doesn't recognize the idea of a homeland. As far as it's concerned, Islam is the homeland," she wrote.

"What really interests it is what it calls 'the sacred religious duty' of every Muslim everywhere, which is to get rid of the Jews and expel them from everywhere."

27 novembre (The Guardian)

[China's coal addiction puts spotlight on its climate ambitions before Cop28 | China | The Guardian](#)

China's coal addiction puts spotlight on its climate ambitions before Cop28

Power shortages in recent years have tested country's commitment to cutting reliance on coal-fired energy

[Amy Hawkins](#) Senior China correspondent

Mon 27 Nov 2023 03.00 CET



A coal-fired power plant in Hanchuan, Hubei province. Local governments in China approved 50.4GW of new coal power in the first half of 2023. Photograph: Getty Images

China's addiction to building new coal-fired power plants is becoming increasingly entrenched, even as the country is on track to reach peak CO2 emissions before its 2030 target.

As climate officials from around the world prepare to meet in the United Arab Emirates for [Cop28](#), many are hoping that the recent joint climate agreement between the US and China, released days before Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met in California, can lay the groundwork for positive commitments at the UN's climate conference.

The last major breakthrough involving China at Cop was at Cop26 in Glasgow, in 2021. At that conference, China pledged CO2 emissions would peak by 2030. Xi said that China would "strictly control coal-fired power generation projects".

But 2021 was also the year in which severe [power outages](#) blighted many parts of China, leading to rationing, closed factories and cold homes as local authorities struggled to cope with sudden shortages of energy.

In 2022, [further energy crunches](#) in south-west China underlined the importance of stable energy supplies to Chinese officials. That has put the commitment to reduce reliance on coal-fired energy in direct tension with the new emphasis on energy security.

"Chinese officials view coal as the primary guarantee of energy security," said Anders Hove, senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for [Energy](#) Studies. "For this reason, it is now considered sensitive to criticise the country's present investments in coal."

Local governments in China approved 50.4GW of new coal power in the first half of 2023. And in 2022, construction started on 50GW of coal capacity, an amount six times as large as the rest of the world combined.

Despite growing demand for energy, China still has far more coal power capacity than it needs. Last year the average utilisation rate for coal power plants was just over 50%.

Experts say that the way to ensure China's energy security is to improve the technological infrastructure of the grid to make it more stable and efficient, not build new dirty generators.

“Energy storage is the key for China’s energy transition,” said Gao Yuhe, a senior campaigner at Greenpeace East Asia. Energy storage can enable “renewable energy to take a leading role in the whole energy transition”.

Coal power plants take a long time to power up and cool down, meaning that they are relatively inflexible. Renewable energy storage enables the grid to overcome the challenge created by the fact that most of China’s renewable energy is generated in the west of the country, while most of the energy consumption happens in the east.



President Joe Biden with China’s President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Apec summit in California on 15 November. Photograph: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

Getting the energy to the right place at the right time is one of the biggest challenges facing China’s energy transition. Local government officials, who are more concerned with keeping the lights on than with green targets, see coal as a safety net.

During last year’s power crunch in Sichuan, a heatwave raised the demand for energy as people turned on air-conditioning units. At the same time, a drought meant that there was much less hydropower energy generation.

“Sichuan suddenly couldn’t meet their electricity export obligations and meet local demand,” said Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst for the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. A rigid energy planning system meant that Sichuan continued to export energy, even when it created local blackouts.

“Local governments do not want to phase out coal as soon as possible,” said Gao, adding that the central government’s emphasis on energy security empowers local officials further to permit new coal.

Hua Wen, a China project director at the Natural Resources Defence Council, notes that the top five provinces that have approved the most new coal power since 2021 “are China’s industrial powerhouses and net electricity importers. These provinces are seeking to reduce their reliance on imported electricity to meet their increasing electricity demand [and] to prevent or reduce the risk of future power shortages”.

Wen added that some smaller and more inefficient coal power plants have been closed in recent years, partially offsetting the surge in new approvals.

Recent policy developments suggest that China is doubling down on coal, even as the rapid construction of green energy infrastructure means that the average annual increase in China’s energy demands can be serviced entirely by low-carbon energy. China’s [solar capacity](#) now exceeds the rest of the world combined, but coal still accounts for more than half of total energy consumption.

In November, the Chinese government released a long-awaited coal capacity compensation mechanism. The policy, which comes into effect on 1 January, guarantees payments to coal-fired power producers based on their installed capacity. This could incentivise the building of more coal, according to Hove. Other analysts say that the policy will allow more renewables to enter the energy mix without compromising stability.

27 novembre (The Guardian)

[‘Soul-shattering’ Prophet Song by Paul Lynch wins 2023 Booker prize](#) | [Booker prize 2023](#) | [The Guardian](#)

‘Soul-shattering’ Prophet Song by Paul Lynch wins 2023 Booker prize

The Irish author’s novel set in an imagined Dublin descending into far-right tyranny wins £50,000 prize

[Ella Creamer](#)

Mon 27 Nov 2023 00.41 CET



Irish author Paul Lynch has won the 2023 [Booker prize](#) for his fifth novel *Prophet Song*, set in an imagined Ireland that is descending into tyranny. It was described as a “soul-shattering and true” novel that “captures the social and political anxieties of our current moment” by the judging chair, Esi Edugyan.

Canadian novelist Edugyan, who has twice been shortlisted for the Booker prize herself, said the decision to award Lynch the £50,000 prize “wasn’t unanimous” and was settled on by discussion and multiple rounds of voting that lasted “about six hours” on Saturday.

Prophet Song takes place in an alternate Dublin. Members of the newly formed secret police, established by a government turning towards totalitarianism, turn up on the doorstep of microbiologist Eilish asking for her husband, a senior official in the Teachers’ Union of [Ireland](#). Soon, he disappears – along with hundreds of other civilians – and Eilish is left to look after their four children and her elderly father, fighting to hold the family together amid civil war.

“It is with immense pleasure that I bring the Booker home to Ireland,” said Lynch, a former film critic, upon receiving the prize. “I had a moment on holiday in Sicily many years ago where I had this flash of recognition, I knew that I needed to write, and that was the direction my life had to take. I made that decision that day to just swerve, and I swerved. And I’m bloody glad I did.”

His win comes days after [violent protests](#) broke out across central Dublin after a stabbing attack outside a primary school that left three children injured. Police said the disorder was caused by a “complete lunatic faction driven by far-right ideology”.

Asked about his reaction to the events, Lynch said that he was “astonished” and at the same time “recognised the truth that this kind of energy is always there under the surface”.

“I didn’t write this book to specifically say ‘here’s a warning’, I wrote the book to articulate the message that the things that are happening in this book are occurring timelessly throughout the ages, and maybe we need to deepen our own responses to that kind of idea,” Lynch said, later adding that he is “distinctly not a political novelist”.

Edugyan said, when asked whether recent events had influenced the judges’ decision, that “at some point in the discussions, maybe for a few minutes, this was introduced, this was discussed”. However, she said that

timeliness “was not the reason that Prophet Song won the prize” – the judges simply felt it was a “truly a masterful work of fiction”.

This is the second year in a row that a novel about political conflict has won the prize. In 2022, [Shehan Karunatilaka won with The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida](#), set during the Sri Lankan civil war.

“Lynch’s dystopian Ireland reflects the reality of war-torn countries, where refugees take to the sea to escape persecution on land,” wrote Aimée Walsh in an [Observer review](#). “Prophet Song echoes the violence in Palestine, Ukraine and Syria, and the experience of all those who flee from war-torn countries.”

Melissa Harrison called the novel “as nightmarish a story as you’ll come across: powerful, claustrophobic and horribly real” in her [Guardian review](#).

Lynch was born in 1977 in Limerick, grew up in County Donegal and now lives in Dublin. His other novels are *Beyond the Sea*, *Grace*, *The Black Snow* and *Red Sky in Morning*. He is the fifth Irish author to win the prize, following in the footsteps of Iris Murdoch, John Banville, Roddy Doyle and Anne Enright. The Northern Irish writer Anna Burns won in 2018.

Asked what he would spend the prize money on, Lynch said that “half of it has already gone” on his tracker mortgage.

The keynote speech at the prize ceremony in London was given by Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, who was released from prison in Tehran, Iran, last year. She discussed the ways in which books helped her when she was in solitary confinement. “When the guard opened the door and handed over the books to me, I felt liberated; I could read books, they could take me to another world, and that could transform my life,” she said.

“One day a cellmate received a book through the post; it was *The Handmaid’s Tale* by Margaret Atwood, translated into Farsi,” she said. “Who thought a book banned in Iran could find its way to prison through the post?”

The other titles shortlisted for the prize were *The Bee Sting* by Paul Murray, *Western Lane* by Chetna Maroo, *This Other Eden* by Paul Harding, *If I Survive You* by Jonathan Escoffery and *Study for Obedience* by Sarah Bernstein.

Alongside Edugyan on this year’s judging panel was actor Adjoa Andoh, poet Mary Jean Chan, writer and academic James Shapiro and actor Robert Webb. At the ceremony, Andoh read an extract from the 1990 Booker prize-winning novel *Possession* by AS Byatt, [who died](#) earlier this month.

Prophet Song by Paul Lynch (Oneworld £16.99).

27 novembre (NYT)

[Opinion | A Battle Over China's Reproductive Future Is Underway - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com)

GUEST ESSAY

Young Chinese Women Are Defying the Communist Party

Nov. 26, 2023



Credit...Heather Hua

By Leta Hong Fincher

Dr. Hong Fincher is an expert on Chinese feminism.

The pressure to marry began when Amiee was in her early 20s.

By 25, her Chinese parents were accusing her of causing them a public loss of face because she still had no plans to wed. Her father warned her that women are worth less to a man as they near the age of 30, when — according to Chinese government propaganda — their peak childbearing time has passed. When Amiee was 29, her mother threatened to jump off a building if she didn't find a husband.

At family gatherings like Chinese New Year, relatives badgered her to help her “entire clan find peace,” she told me, and at work she was pressured into company-organized blind dates, chaperoned by several colleagues. These were “terrifying,” she said.

Amiee — whose full name is being withheld to avoid potential repercussions for questioning government policy — wasn't against marriage, per se. She simply hadn't found her soul mate at that age and didn't want to rush into marriage to please her parents or a government eager to push up the birthrate. Today, still single and with a successful career in public relations, she is finally enjoying some peace; she's 34, past what China's government says is a woman's reproductive prime, and her family has stopped pressuring her.

I hear similar stories from single women across China, where sexist state propaganda labels single professional women older than 27 as sheng nu, or leftover women. While conducting fieldwork in China for my Ph.D. in sociology from 2011 to 2013, I spoke with many who endured relationships they didn't want, often making great personal, financial and career compromises. I wanted to tell them to just walk away.

Now many young Chinese women are doing exactly that, delaying or shunning marriage and childbirth altogether, mirroring the journey of women in other, wealthier patriarchal East Asian societies such as [Japan](#), [South Korea](#) and [Taiwan](#). As individuals, these Chinese women are generally unwilling to challenge official policy. But through their reproductive choices, they collectively pose a radical and complicated problem for the Chinese Communist Party.

Facing a shrinking population and a long-term economic slowdown, the party wants China's women to be docile, baby-breeding guarantors of social, economic and demographic stability. Instead, many Chinese women, who now have greater personal freedom and control over their lives than during the early Communist era, are quietly resisting.

In the late 1970s, the government imposed its one-child policy to rein in population growth. But this led to plummeting birthrates, an aging population and a gender imbalance as millions of female fetuses were aborted because of a traditional preference for male heirs. (As of 2020, China still had about [17.5 million more men than women](#) between the ages of 20 and 40, which government media has warned [could pose a threat](#) to social stability.) Worried, the government abandoned the one-child policy beginning in 2016, allowing all married couples to have two children and raising that to three in 2021.

But a hoped-for baby boom has not materialized. Marriage registrations have fallen for nine consecutive years leading up to 2022, when they sank to the [lowest level](#) since the government began releasing figures in 1986. New births have also [continued to fall](#), with only [9.56 million](#) babies being born last year, the fewest since records began with the founding of Communist China in 1949. The nation's population shrank in 2022 for the first time in six decades, allowing India to overtake China as the world's most populous country.

Many young Chinese men are also avoiding marriage. But this seismic demographic shift appears to be driven largely by an increasing unwillingness of women to make the requisite career and lifestyle sacrifices or bear the rising cost of educating children. Recent [surveys](#) have shown that young Chinese women have a significantly more negative view of marriage than men. A [Communist Youth League survey](#) released in 2021 found that 30.5 percent of urban youths ages 18 to 26 said they "don't believe in marriage"; 73.4 percent of those respondents were women.

That's the last thing the party wants to hear. While Mao Zedong famously said that "women hold up half the sky," President Xi Jinping has made clear that subjugating women is [essential to his plans for Chinese modernization](#). This year, the government began a [drive](#) to encourage women to marry and have children, and at a top political gathering of women in October, Mr. Xi called for a ["a new type of marriage and childbearing culture,"](#) in which the party seeks to influence younger Chinese people to have babies. Last year, for the [first time since 1997](#), not a single woman was among the 24 members appointed to the party's new Politburo.

But Mr. Xi's regressive policies are up against the stark reality of what a traditional role means for women in China. Besides having to surrender personal and career freedoms, marriage can be downright dangerous for Chinese women. Many face [domestic violence](#) and an [uphill battle in pursuing a divorce in court](#). In 2021 the government made it even harder for women to seek divorce, imposing a mandatory [cooling-off period](#) for feuding couples.

Mr. Xi's government has waged a broad crackdown on civil society organizations, making overt feminism dangerous. Huang Xueqin, a leading feminist activist and journalist who helped start China's #MeToo movement by creating a social media platform for reporting sexual harassment in 2018, [was put on trial in September on vague charges of subversion](#), after two years in detention. No verdict has been announced.

A clash over control of reproduction now looms, one with great implications for women's rights and the country's demographic future. The Communist Party has dug in, identifying [Western feminism](#) as an [unpatriotic](#) threat to its population-planning objectives and an example of hostile foreign

ideological infiltration. [Censorship of feminist topics online](#) has intensified, as has misogynistic state propaganda.

But as [record-high numbers](#) of Chinese women attend college, interest in [feminist issues](#) and asserting one's [reproductive rights](#) has intensified. Women [continue](#) to [go online](#) to challenge sexism and unequal treatment and exchange ideas. With China's publishing industry heavily censored, the translated works of feminists like the Japanese scholar Chizuko Ueno have become [best-sellers](#) in China.

As this struggle over who controls reproduction escalates, the government may expand financial or other incentives to encourage childbirth. But given Mr. Xi's mentality, the government is just as likely to ratchet up pressure on feminism and women's rights in general. It is already becoming more difficult [to get vasectomies](#).

But the Communist Party's options are limited. It can't force women to marry or get pregnant and is unlikely to relax its tight immigration policies to make up for a shrinking work force. Placing even more pressure on women or drastic actions like imposing nationwide bans on abortion or contraception could harden women's attitudes or even trigger an uprising. Young, educated [women were conspicuously on the](#) front lines of protests in several cities in late 2022 against the government's oppressive pandemic-control policies.

The Communist Party has faced many opponents and dissenters in its decades of rule, quickly silencing and consigning them to oblivion. In the nation's young women, the party's male leaders may now be facing their most implacable challengers yet.

Leta Hong Fincher ([@LetaHong](#)) is the author of "Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China." Yi Liu helped with research for this essay.

27 novembre (FAZ)

[Liveticker zum Krieg in Nahost: Menschenrechtler: Raketenfehlschuss wohl Ursache für Krankenhaus-Explosion | FAZ](#)

Traduit par ChatGPT :

L'organisation des droits de l'homme Human Rights Watch (HRW) dispose d'indications selon lesquelles une roquette défectueuse serait la cause probable de l'explosion survenue dans un hôpital de la bande de Gaza le 17 octobre. "L'explosion qui a tué et blessé de nombreux civils à l'hôpital Al-Ahli à Gaza le 17 octobre 2023 a été apparemment déclenchée par un projectile propulsé par une roquette, comme cela est couramment utilisé par les groupes armés palestiniens", indique HRW. Les résultats de l'enquête sur l'explosion reposent sur l'analyse de photos et de vidéos, d'images satellites ainsi que sur des entretiens avec des témoins et des experts. L'explosion à l'hôpital Al-Ahli a suscité l'indignation dans le monde arabe. Les Palestiniens ont accusé une frappe aérienne israélienne. Israël a, quant à lui, affirmé que l'explosion était due à un tir de roquette palestinien dévié.



KATHARINA MOSER

Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) hat Hinweise darauf, dass eine fehlgezündete Rakete die wahrscheinliche Ursache für die Explosion in einem Krankenhaus im Gazastreifen am 17. Oktober gewesen ist. „Die Explosion, die am 17. Oktober 2023 im Al-Ahli-Krankenhaus in Gaza-Stadt zahlreiche Zivilisten tötete und verletzte, wurde offensichtlich durch eine raketengetriebene Munition ausgelöst, wie sie üblicherweise von bewaffneten palästinensischen Gruppen eingesetzt wird“, teilt HRW mit. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung der Explosion basierten auf der Auswertung von Fotos und Videos, Satellitenbildern sowie Interviews mit Zeugen und Experten. Die Explosion im Al-Ahli Krankenhaus löste in der gesamten arabischen Welt Empörung aus. Die Palästinenser machten einen israelischen Luftangriff dafür verantwortlich. Israel erklärte dagegen, die Explosion sei durch einen fehlgeleiteten palästinensischen Raketenabschuss verursacht worden.



27 novembre (FAZ)

Molkereichef: „Mit Haferdrinks sind die Margen höher“ (faz.net)

ZUKUNFT DER MILCH:

„Haferdrinks können dressierte Affen machen“

VON SEBASTIAN BALZTER

-AKTUALISIERT AM 27.11.2023-06:44



Bernhard Pointner, 47, ist seit 2012 Geschäftsführer der Milchwerke Berchtesgadener Land-Chiemgau, die gerade mit dem Deutschen Nachhaltigkeitspreis ausgezeichnet wurden. Bild: Maria Irl

Er verkauft Milch aus den Alpen bis nach Berlin und Hamburg: Molkereichef Bernhard Pointner über teuren Milchersatz, rülpssende Kühe und die grüne Bio-Utopie.

Herr Pointner, die Kuh ist als Klimakiller in Verruf geraten, vegane Ernährung liegt im Trend. Wann reagieren Sie darauf und nehmen Hafermilch ins Sortiment?

Ich nenn's Haferdrink, weil es ja keine Milch ist. Technisch wäre das für uns ein Kinderspiel, in zwei Monaten könnten wir soweit sein. Unseren Abfüllanlagen ist es ja egal, ob wir Milch durchlaufen lassen oder einen Haferdrink. Die Herstellung ist simpel. Man pumpt Wasser in einen Tank und rührt ein Pulver rein, fertig. Haferdrinks können dressierte Affen machen. Wir haben derzeit aber nicht vor, es zu tun.

Was sagen Sie den vielen Leuten, die sich ums Tierwohl und den Klimawandel sorgen und deshalb lieber keine Milch mehr trinken wollen?

Erstmal ist die Zahl überschaubar. Da kann man als Molkereichef noch ruhig schlafen. Und zweitens können wir alle Argumente widerlegen, die gewöhnlich gegen die Milch vorgebracht werden.

Fangen Sie mit dem Klima an.

Unsere Milch kommt aus dem Grünlandgürtel der Alpen. Hier gibt es keine Anbauflächen für Hafer. Hier gibt es Wiesen, und nur die Kuh mit ihrem Verdauungstrakt kann Gras in Lebensmittel umwandeln. Gleichzeitig speichert dieses Grünland große Mengen an CO₂. Deshalb ist unsere Art der Milchwirtschaft fast klimaneutral.

Wir verbrauchen dafür auch nicht Unmengen an Wasser, um das gleich dazuzusagen. Bei uns regnet es viel, ob die Kuh auf der Weide steht oder nicht. Wir können den Regen ungenutzt ins Schwarze Meer abfließen lassen, dann wird Salzwasser draus. Oder wir produzieren Lebensmittel. Wie sollen wir in ein paar Jahren zehn Milliarden Menschen auf der Welt ernähren, wenn wir eine solche Gunstlage nicht nutzen?

In Irland und in den Niederlanden soll es aus Umweltgründen eine Art Abwrackprämie geben, damit Landwirte rausgehen aus der Viehhaltung. Was halten Sie davon?

Dort ist die Not groß, weil man in der Vergangenheit eine verfehlte Landwirtschaft betrieben hat – steril abgetrennt, intensiv bewirtschaftet. Ich nenne das Sagrotan-Landwirtschaft. Da hat man Nitrat im Trinkwasser, da musst du als Land reagieren. Bei uns gibt es das nicht. Die 1800 Landwirte, deren Milch wir verarbeiten, haben im Durchschnitt 27 Kühe. Die zehn größten kommen vielleicht auf 150 Kühe. Wenn pauschal die Landwirtschaft kritisiert wird, fühlen wir uns also gar nicht gemeint.

Kühe rülpsen Methan, ob intensiv gehalten oder nicht. Es gibt inzwischen Futterzusätze dagegen. Wie finden Sie solche Experimente?

Da sollten wir die Kirche im Dorf lassen. Ich halte nichts davon, den Kühen einen Katalysator um den Hals zu hängen. Laut Umweltbundesamt entfallen 3,4 Prozent der deutschen Treibhausgasemissionen auf die Rinderhaltung. Und hier geht es um die Produktion von Grundnahrungsmitteln. Die sollten wir in Deutschland erhalten und uns nicht auch noch bei der Ernährung vom Ausland abhängig machen wie bei den Arzneimitteln oder bei der Verteidigung.

Sie verkaufen Milch aus den Alpen bis nach Berlin und Hamburg. Wie gut ist deren Klimabilanz noch?

Wir setzen für den Transport nur Lkw mit modernster Technik ein, die sehr wenig Diesel verbrauchen. Ein Vierzigtonner kommt mit durchschnittlich 27 Litern auf 100 Kilometern aus. Deshalb kann man unsere Milch auch in Berlin mit gutem Gewissen trinken. Ich bin überzeugt, dass sie fürs Klima besser ist als eine Milch aus Brandenburg, für die Soja aus Brasilien verfüttert worden ist. Das ist bei uns nämlich verboten. Genauso wie Futter von Flächen, auf denen Glyphosat versprüht worden ist.

Bundesumweltministerin Lemke will, dass Milch künftig häufiger in Glasflaschen verkauft wird, um Müll zu vermeiden. Ist das eine gute Idee?

Wir haben gerade die modernste Abfüllanlage für Glasflaschen in ganz Europa in Betrieb genommen, ich halte Glas für eine tolle Verpackung. Aber das ist nur in einer Nische sinnvoll. Stellen Sie sich eine einzige Lkw-Ladung mit Milchkartons vor und dazu die Milch, die da hineinpasst. Wenn ich die gleiche Menge Milch in Glasflaschen abfüllen soll, müssen erstmal 30 Lastwagen mit leeren Flaschen bei uns auf den Hof kommen. So viele Fahrer gibt es gar nicht, vom Dieserverbrauch ganz zu schweigen. Wir haben dazu im Sommer in Berlin an einem parlamentarischen Frühstück teilgenommen. Eingeladen waren dazu rund fünfzig Abgeordnete. Geantwortet haben zwölf, gekommen sind vier, übrigens kein einziger von den Grünen.



Der Wallnerhof bei Inzell ist einer von 1800 Höfen zwischen Watzmann und Zugspitze, deren Milch die Berchtesgadener Molkerei verarbeitet. :Bild: Maria Irl

Genug vom Klima. Was sagen Sie zu gesundheitlichen Milch-Vorbehalten?

Ich appelliere da an den gesunden Menschenverstand. Wer fährt denn bei uns mit dem E-Bike am Sonntag auf den Berg, setzt sich vor die Hütte und trinkt ein Weißbier? Das sind immer öfter Achtzigjährige, die in ihrem Leben Fleisch und Eier gegessen und Milch getrunken haben. Ob einer, der als Zehnjähriger zum Veganer geworden ist, das mit 80 Jahren auch noch macht, wissen wir jetzt noch nicht.

Dagegen stehen einige wissenschaftliche Studien, in denen die Milch schlecht wegkommt.

So viele Studien wie die großen internationalen Lebensmittelkonzerne können wir uns nicht leisten. Aber denen passt es auch ganz gut ins Kalkül, wenn die Milch darin nicht gut abschneidet. Haferdrinks und andere Ersatzprodukte sind viel günstiger herzustellen. Da spart man sich die abenteuerlichen Touren im Winter durch die Berge und muss nicht auf die Kühlkette achten, verlangt im Supermarkt aber höhere Preise als wir für unsere Milch. Das heißt: Mit Haferdrinks sind die Margen höher.

Ein dritter Kritikpunkt neben den Klima- und Gesundheitsbedenken ist das Tierwohl. Wie steht es damit auf den Höfen Ihrer Milchbauern?

Viele sind in den beiden höchsten Haltungsstufen, jeder Dritte ist Biobauer. Und bei uns ist es so: Je schöner es die Kuh hat, desto mehr Milchgeld. Weil wir wissen, dass unsere Kunden dafür bereit sind, einen Aufpreis zu bezahlen.

Aber nicht alle Betriebe sind schön, auch nicht alle kleinen. Hier und da gibt es noch Anbindehaltung. Was machen Sie mit der Milch von dort?

Wir sind eine Genossenschaft, die Molkerei gehört den 1800 Milchbauern. Da können wir keinen rauswerfen, der seit eh und je dazugehört. Aber die Anbindehaltung wird immer weniger, schon weil sie keine schöne Wirtschaftsweise ist. Mit dem Melkschemel im Stall von Kuh zu Kuh zu gehen, dafür findet sich heute kein Hofnachfolger mehr. Wir erfassen die wenige Milch, die noch von solchen Höfen kommt, getrennt von der anderen Milch und verkaufen sie auch nicht unter unserer eigenen Marke. Daraus wird dann zum Beispiel Käse oder H-Milch für den italienischen Markt, wo Tierwohl für die Verbraucher noch keine so große Rolle spielt. Das ist für uns ein kleiner, aber hilfreicher Absatzkanal.

Ihre Molkerei hat vor 50 Jahren die erste Biomilch auf den Markt gebracht, damals eine Pioniertat. Die Bundesregierung will den Bioanteil nun insgesamt bis 2030 auf 30 Prozent steigern. Was halten Sie davon?

Das ist völlig utopisch. Die Nachfrage ist dafür nicht groß genug. Viele Verbraucher wollen und können sich das nicht leisten. Wenn die Quote trotzdem per Verordnung käme, dann würde der Biomarkt völlig kollabieren. Dann wäre Biomilch im Supermarkt auf einmal billiger als konventionelle Milch, weil das Angebot viel zu groß wäre.

Noch ein Wort zu den Preisen. Im Kühlregal sind Milch und Butter, die vergangenes Jahr sehr teuer waren, plötzlich wieder günstig. Wie kam es zu diesem rasanten Auf und Ab?

Dahinter stand, dass China auf dem Spotmarkt eine Weile alles aufgekauft hat, um seine Lager vollzumachen. Dadurch hat es sich verrückterweise gelohnt, die Preise so hoch zu setzen, dass damit in Deutschland weniger verkauft wurde und mehr für den Spotmarkt blieb. Damit haben viele andere Molkereien viel Geld verdient. Wir haben da nicht mitgemacht. Inzwischen kauft China nicht mehr. Der Milchpreis hat sich halbiert, viele Molkereien sind mit den Lebensmittelketten im Clinch. Wir nicht. Unsere Strategie ist aufgegangen.

Ihren Biobauern zahlen Sie jetzt rund 50 Cent je Liter. Die Bioverbände sagen: 10 Cent mehr sind überlebensnotwendig. Wann geben Sie nach?

Ich sehe da keine großen Sprünge, übrigens auch nicht für die Preise im Supermarkt. Für die Milchbauern gilt dasselbe wie für andere Branchen: Es kommt immer darauf an, wie du deinen Betrieb managst. Einige haben ihre Prozesse im Griff, für die reicht es auf jeden Fall; für andere vielleicht nicht. Aber du kannst nicht mit einem Milchpreis an den Start gehen, mit dem der Schlechteste auch noch Gewinn macht.

27 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/11/26/pour-la-premiere-fois-toute-l-union-europeenne-a-enclenche-la-marche-arriere-sur-l-environnement_6202428_3232.html

« Pour la première fois, toute l’Union européenne a enclenché la marche arrière sur l’environnement »

[Chronique](#) de [Stéphane Foucart](#)

La plupart des textes-clés du Pacte vert européen, annoncé par Bruxelles en 2019, ont été reportés, rejetés ou vidés de leur substance. Longtemps garantes du verdissement des Etats membres, les institutions communautaires opèrent un recul général sur la question environnementale, estime Stéphane Foucart, journaliste au « Monde », dans sa chronique.

Publié hier à 06h00

Le patient détricotage, puis [le rejet surprise par le Parlement de Strasbourg du règlement européen sur les pesticides](#) (SUR) marquent probablement la fin d’une époque, la conclusion de ce qui a constitué, au cours des trois dernières décennies, une sorte d’évidence. Tout au long de cette période qui prend fin, l’Union européenne a généralement été garante d’une amélioration à peu près constante de la préservation de l’environnement et de la santé, à travers la construction de normes communautaires et l’introduction dans les droits nationaux de nombreux instruments de protection de la nature et de la santé publique.

Les esprits chagrins peuvent estimer que certains dossiers restent encalminés, que ce mouvement a été lent, pusillanime et parfois chaotique, qu’il a été contradictoire avec d’autres politiques mises en œuvre par l’Union (que l’on songe à la politique agricole commune ou aux accords de libre-échange) : il n’en reste pas moins que le cap a jusqu’ici été globalement fixé par l’état de la connaissance scientifique et la recherche de l’intérêt général. Il est aussi remarquable de constater qu’en dépit des luttes internes à la technocratie bruxelloise, de la volonté souvent vacillante des Etats et de la couleur politique changeante du Parlement, l’objectif de protection de l’environnement a toujours plus ou moins prévalu.

Ce temps est révolu. Le torpillage du projet sur la restauration de la nature, le report sine die de la réforme [de la réglementation sur les produits chimiques](#), la réautorisation [pour une décennie du glyphosate](#), le vote [d’un règlement sur les emballages perclus d’exemptions](#) et, enfin, le rejet du règlement SUR sont d’autant plus significatifs qu’ils surviennent au terme d’une législature dont le Green Deal (le Pacte vert) devait être le pilier, comme l’avait promis en 2019 la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.

Bataille d’amendements

Les planètes se sont alignées suivant un autre axe : au sein de la Commission, les directions générales les plus hostiles à l’environnement ont pris la main, la majorité des Etats-membres ont freiné des quatre fers et le Parlement s’est laissé dominer par les droites extrêmes. Pour la première fois, toute l’Union européenne – institutions et Etats membres – a enclenché la marche arrière sur l’environnement.

Le destin du projet de règlement SUR le montre de manière éclatante. Le texte, qui visait notamment à réduire de moitié l’usage des pesticides d’ici à 2030, a d’emblée été rendu caduc par un choix technique de la Commission. Le principal indicateur d’évolution du recours aux pesticides choisi par Bruxelles n’était autre qu’un trucage grossier – au point que l’Agence fédérale allemande de l’environnement (UBA) a jugé nécessaire d’alerter, par voie de communiqué, de ce que le mode de calcul en question était « *trompeur* », susceptible d’indiquer « *une baisse qui ne se produirait pas dans les champs* ».

La bataille d’amendements menée par la droite et l’extrême droite s’est ensuite chargée d’ôter au projet tout ce qu’il pouvait avoir de contraignant, avant que, par dépit et hostilité, une majorité d’eurodéputés ne le rejettent. Environ 6 000 scientifiques (biologistes, écologues, toxicologues, agronomes, etc.) s’étaient engagés cet été,

[dans un texte fort](#), en faveur du règlement SUR et du projet de loi sur la restauration de la nature : ils n'ont pesé pour rien.

Même constat sur le glyphosate : remis en selle pour cinq ans seulement en 2017, l'herbicide controversé a été réautorisé pour une décennie le 16 novembre, malgré une accumulation de données scientifiques nouvelles et la mobilisation de nombreux chercheurs des communautés compétentes. Là encore, la Commission a pris le parti de l'agro-industrie, avec une réautorisation longue et très peu de restrictions d'usage. Les Etats membres ont fait le reste.

Droitisation des opinions

Comble de l'ironie : la semaine précédente, Bayer était coup sur coup condamné par des juridictions américaines à verser respectivement 175 millions et 332 millions de dollars (158 millions et 303 millions d'euros) à deux utilisateurs de glyphosate touchés par un lymphome. Et la semaine suivant la réautorisation, l'agrochimiste allemand était à nouveau condamné à verser un total de 1,56 milliard de dollars à trois autres Américains, pour de semblables raisons.

Est-ce vraiment la fin d'un cycle ? Les plus optimistes assurent que ce n'est que partie remise et que les textes-clés du Green Deal seront sans doute adoptés au cours de la prochaine législature. C'est en réalité bien peu probable. Le revirement de l'Union européenne sur les questions de santé et d'environnement n'est autre que l'un des stigmates de la droitisation des opinions sur le Vieux Continent, aiguillonnées par des droites populistes qui ont fait de la lutte contre les politiques environnementales l'un des pivots de leurs discours.

Bien plus qu'une simple évolution des choix politiques, il y a sans doute là quelque chose qui relève d'une révolution anthropologique, la victoire d'un individualisme radical qui va de pair avec une lente altération de ce que George Orwell appelait notre « *décence commune* » (*common decency*).

Il y a un peu plus de cinquante ans, le 22 avril 1970, 20 millions d'Américains manifestaient pour le premier Jour de la Terre. Il n'y avait alors aucun signe tangible du réchauffement, ni même aucun discours public sur son existence, mais les nations occidentales s'inquiétaient de l'anthropisation galopante du monde, de la pollution des sols et de l'air, de la contamination de l'eau, de la disparition des oiseaux. Tout cela a fini par se produire et continue de se produire, fortement aggravé par la crise climatique. Rien, pourtant, qui puisse remettre demain dans la rue 20 millions d'Américains – ou d'Européens.

27 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2023/11/27/le-prestigieux-booker-prize-britannique-decerne-a-l-ecrivain-irlandais-paul-lynch_6202495_3260.html

Le Booker Prize britannique décerné à l'écrivain irlandais Paul Lynch

Dans « Prophet Song », son cinquième roman, l'auteur narre l'histoire d'une Irlande qui sombre dans le totalitarisme d'extrême droite et la violence.

Le Monde avec AFP

Publié aujourd'hui à 00h04, modifié à 06h53



Paul Lynch au dîner de remise du Booker Prize, à Londres, le 26 novembre 2023. ALBERTO PEZZALI / AP

Le prestigieux prix littéraire britannique Booker Prize a été décerné à l'auteur irlandais Paul Lynch pour son roman dystopique *Prophet Song* lors d'une cérémonie dimanche soir à Londres. Le romancier, qui était sélectionné pour la première fois, a été récompensé pour son cinquième roman, récit sombre et angoissant de la vie d'une mère de famille dans une Irlande qui bascule dans la tyrannie.

« Ce livre n'a pas été facile à écrire. Une part de moi pensait que j'allais mettre ma carrière en péril en l'écrivant, mais je devais quand même aller au bout », a déclaré Paul Lynch après sa victoire, faisant part de son « immense plaisir de ramener le Booker en Irlande ».

Le Booker Prize, une des récompenses littéraires les plus prestigieuses au monde, qui récompense des œuvres de fiction en anglais, a contribué au succès d'écrivains comme Salman Rushdie, Margaret Atwood ou Arundhati Roy. Son vainqueur remporte une récompense de 50 000 livres (environ 57 000 euros) et l'assurance de rencontrer un succès international.

Paul Lynch a en partie écrit *Prophet Song*, roman à l'ambiance claustrophobe, avec des blocs de texte courant sur des pages entières, pendant les confinements de la pandémie de Covid-19. Cet écrivain, né à Limerick en 1977 et qui vit à Dublin, avait déjà écrit quatre romans, dont les remarquables *Beyond the Sea* et *Grace*.

Tous les romanciers sélectionnés pour cette édition – deux Américains, une Canadienne, deux Irlandais et une Kényane – faisaient partie de la sélection finale pour la première fois. Les œuvres finalistes de cette édition ont fait vivre « terreurs, plaisirs, joies et consolation » aux membres du jury, avait déclaré sa présidente, la romancière canadienne Esi Edugyan. Ces romans « offrent une gamme complète d'expériences humaines » et transportent le lecteur « non seulement en dehors de la réalité, mais aussi en dehors du langage courant de la vie quotidienne », avait-elle décrit.

Chetna Maroo, Paul Murray, Jonathan Escoffery, Paul Harding et Sarah Bernstein en sélection finale

Au total, 158 livres publiés au Royaume-Uni ou en Irlande entre le 1^{er} octobre 2022 et le 30 septembre 2023 ont été soumis à la fondation Booker Prize, et 13 d'entre eux avaient été sélectionnés lors d'un premier tour. Parmi les autres romans sélectionnés figuraient l'émouvant premier ouvrage de l'écrivaine kényane Chetna Maroo, *Western Lane*, récit d'une adolescente passionnée de squash qui s'oublie dans le sport pendant qu'elle vit un deuil.

La saga tragi-comique *The Bee Sting*, de l'Irlandais Paul Murray – le seul qui avait déjà été sélectionné au premier tour du Booker Prize en 2010 – étudie l'influence du destin dans les difficultés économiques et existentielles rencontrées par une famille de l'Irlande rurale. *If I Survive You*, de l'écrivain américain Jonathan Escoffery raconte aussi l'histoire d'une famille, jamaïcaine cette fois, qui quitte Kingston en catastrophe et doit rebâtir sa vie dans le Miami des années 1970.

L'ouvrage du deuxième Américain en lice, Paul Harding, *This Other Eden*, s'inspire d'événements historiques et relate la vie de marginaux sur Apple Island, enclave au large de la côte américaine, sous l'œil méfiant et la contrainte croissante des autorités. Le perturbant *Study for Obedience*, de la Canadienne Sarah Bernstein, est un questionnement sur le pouvoir et la culpabilité, autour de l'histoire d'une jeune femme qui quitte son lieu de naissance pour s'occuper de son frère, et déclenche des événements inquiétants.

L'an dernier, l'écrivain sri-lankais Shehan Karunatilaka, 47 ans, avait remporté le Booker Prize pour son roman *The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida*. Cette histoire de meurtre à l'humour noir se déroule dans les années 1990 dans la capitale du Sri Lanka, Colombo, après la guerre civile ayant meurtri le pays.

27 novembre (Le Figaro)

[Énergie: malgré les engagements, la consommation de charbon bat des records \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr/energie/2023/11/27/energie-malgre-les-engagements-la-consommation-de-charbon-bat-des-records)

Énergie: malgré les engagements, la consommation de charbon bat des records

Par [Armelle Bohineust](#)

Publié hier à 16:56, mis à jour hier à 16:56



Une centrale à charbon à Hanovre en Allemagne. En 2022, Pour sortir de sa dépendance au gaz russe, Berlin a réactivé une quinzaine de centrales à charbon. *Julian Stratenschulte/dpa via Reuters Connect*

DÉCRYPTAGE - Même si la coalition souhaitée par la France entend inciter les pays riches à aider les nations plus démunies à sortir de leur dépendance au charbon, l'accès aux financements nécessaires pour verdir les systèmes énergétiques est souvent difficile.

La production d'électricité à partir du charbon «doit être éliminée en priorité et le plus rapidement possible», réclament les ministres de quinze pays dans une lettre adressée à [Ahmed al-Jaber, le président de la COP28, qui s'ouvre à Dubaï, jeudi](#). C'est encore la principale source d'émissions de CO₂, déplorent dans ce courrier, dévoilé par le *Financial Times*, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, l'Allemagne et douze autres pays, soucieux d'intensifier les efforts pour mettre un terme à la construction de nouvelles centrales électriques au charbon et de lutter contre la pollution des centrales existantes.

Le sujet mobilise très largement. Emmanuel Macron, qui sera présent à l'ouverture de ce sommet annuel sur le changement climatique, entend lui aussi accélérer la sortie du combustible le plus polluant de la planète. **Mais les débats prévus pendant cette COP, qui se tiendra jusqu'au 12 décembre, promettent d'être houleux. Deux années se sont écoulées depuis la signature, en 2021, à Glasgow, d'un pacte des Nations unies sur la réduction du charbon. Et les progrès sont légers. Voire nuls, si l'on s'en tient au bilan global.** Car selon l'Agence internationale de l'énergie (AIE), la consommation de charbon, qui représente encore près de 27% de la consommation mondiale d'énergie, a atteint des niveaux records en 2022 et 2023. Ceci principalement en raison de la croissance de la demande énergétique en Chine, en Inde et en Asie du Sud-Est.

Des avancées sont, bien sûr, en cours. Lors d'une réunion du **G20** (qui regroupe les vingt pays parmi les plus riches), à Rome, il y a deux ans, **ses membres ont promis de stopper les financements publics de centrales à charbon à l'international, un engagement que la Chine a reconfirmé récemment. En mai, les pays du G7 se sont par ailleurs engagés à ne plus construire de centrale à charbon sur leur propre territoire.**

Désintérêt des investisseurs

Près de 50 milliards de dollars ont été investis dans les «Partenariats pour la transition énergétique juste» (JETP en anglais), qui entendent aider l'Indonésie, le Vietnam, le Sénégal et surtout **l'Afrique du Sud, gros producteur de charbon**, à sortir de leur forte dépendance. Les premiers résultats sont là, pointe l'ONG Global Energy Monitor: **si l'on excepte la Chine (qui reste le premier consommateur de charbon au monde et un grand bâtisseur de centrales thermiques)**, les mises en chantier sont sur le point d'atteindre leur plus bas niveau depuis neuf ans, indique le dernier rapport de l'ONG.

Il est plus facile d'investir dans le charbon que dans le solaire et l'éolien ou dans le nucléaire pour des questions de rentabilité, alors que peu d'investisseurs s'intéressent à la conversion des centrales à charbon

Un expert

Les règles du jeu changent toutefois assez lentement. Même si une banque comme BNP Paribas a annoncé mercredi qu'elle refuserait désormais de financer tout le charbon, qu'il soit thermique ou destiné à la métallurgie, **les financements privés de centrales continuent.** **«Il est plus facile d'investir dans le charbon que dans le solaire et l'éolien ou dans le nucléaire pour des questions de rentabilité, alors que peu d'investisseurs s'intéressent à la conversion des centrales à charbon»**, note un expert. **En Pologne, environ 70% de l'électricité proviennent actuellement du charbon.** Et la promesse de la coalition qui prendra le pouvoir en cette fin d'année à Varsovie, celle d'une transition radicale vers l'éolien et le solaire d'ici la fin de la décennie, ne sera pas facile à tenir.

Black Friday de l'énergie

Certains pays sont même revenus au charbon, parfois à cause de la guerre en Ukraine et de la crise énergétique qu'elle a entraînée. **C'est le cas de l'Allemagne, privée du gaz russe, ou du Royaume-Uni, qui a récemment approuvé sa première nouvelle mine de charbon en trente ans. Le gouvernement australien continue de son côté d'autoriser l'ouverture de nouvelles mines.** Et certains producteurs assument sans complexe leur participation à la pollution.

En Pologne, la plus grande société minière, le groupe PGG, a lancé une sorte de Black Friday en proposant une réduction de 15% à 18% pour chaque tonne de charbon vendue en ligne. L'Association mondiale du charbon (World Coal Association) vient d'annoncer sa transformation en Alliance mondiale pour un charbon durable (FutureCoal: The Global Alliance for Sustainable Coal): elle affirme que *«la contribution globale du charbon à notre société moderne et à la croissance de la population mondiale ne doit être ni écartée ni ignorée»*.

Malgré ces efforts, et même si la coalition souhaitée par la France entend inciter les pays riches à aider les nations plus démunies à sortir de leur dépendance au charbon, **l'accent mis sur le charbon lors de la COP28 risque d'incommoder de nombreux pays en développement.** Beaucoup, comme **l'Indonésie, sont en effet tributaires du charbon pour une grande part de leur électricité.** Et l'accès aux financements nécessaires pour verdir leurs systèmes énergétiques est souvent difficile. **L'Inde a ainsi critiqué l'accent mis par les pays développés sur l'élimination du charbon plutôt que celle de l'ensemble des combustibles fossiles.**


27 novembre (Le Figaro)

[En Cisjordanie, la jeunesse rêve de «résistance»: le récit de l'envoyé spécial du Figaro \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr)

En Cisjordanie, la jeunesse rêve de «résistance»: le récit de l'envoyé spécial du Figaro

Par [Stanislas Poyet](#)

Publié hier à 16:47, mis à jour hier à 16:47



Des hommes armés palestiniens lors d'une attaque des forces israéliennes dans le camp de réfugiés de Jénine, le 9 novembre 2023. *SOPA Images/Nasser Ishtayeh / SOPA Images/Si*

REPORTAGE - Des «héros» tués par l'armée israélienne sont des exemples pour toute une jeunesse désœuvrée, qui a grandi entre la violence de l'occupation et celle des groupes armés.

Ahmed et Mahmoud se faufilent entre les pierres tombales. Avec leurs habits noirs, ils semblent s'être habillés pour la visite, il n'en est rien, disent-ils. Le noir est leur couleur. Devant les tombes, Ahmed et Mahmoud se prennent en photo, le doigt en l'air. Un symbole de l'«unicité de dieu», souvent affiché par les combattants se réclamant du djihad. Les deux amis de 17 ans viennent souvent ici. Ils passent le temps en compagnie de leur camarade, tué au combat l'année passée, lors d'un raid de l'armée israélienne sur le camp de réfugiés.

Ahmed et Mahmoud vivent dans un village voisin. Pour eux, le centre du monde est ici, au cœur du camp de réfugiés de Jénine, l'épicentre de la «résistance», comme ils disent. Les deux adolescents sont fils d'agriculteur. Ni l'un, ni l'autre n'entendent cependant suivre les pas de leurs parents. «*On veut devenir martyr. Mourir pour al-Aqsa* (la mosquée de Jérusalem, NDLR)», fanfaronne Ahmed.

Partout dans le quartier, les visages des jeunes combattants, morts tués par l'armée israélienne, tapissent les murs. Des «héros», des «martyrs», des exemples, pour toute une jeunesse désœuvrée, qui a grandi entre la violence de l'occupation et celle des groupes armés. La veille, Ahmed et Mahmoud ont défilé dans les rues de la ville aux côtés des groupes armés et des habitants, lors des funérailles de dix combattants, tués lors d'une énième incursion de Tsahal dans le camp. Leurs voix se sont mêlées à celles de la jeunesse de Jénine pour chanter les louanges des morts, et jurer leur détermination à combattre Israël «*jusqu'à la mort*». Ce jour-là, Mohammad a déchargé plusieurs chargeurs en tirant en l'air pour honorer ses jeunes camarades. Mohammad a 26 ans, a rejoint la Brigade de Jénine il y a plus d'un an. «*Que peut-on faire d'autre aujourd'hui? Il n'y a pas de futur sans liberté, pas de liberté sans indépendance de la Palestine*», jure-t-il. Mohammad est très tôt devenu familier de ces manifestations. «*J'avais 5 ans lors de la seconde Intifada* (en 2002). *Les cortèges doivent être mes premiers souvenirs*», dit-il.

«Ils nous ont rendu notre fierté»

En Cisjordanie, l'horizon de la jeunesse semble s'arrêter au premier check-point. *«Quel avenir existe-t-il pour ces gosses, qui ne peuvent pas sortir de chez eux sans se faire contrôler par une armée étrangère, qui ne peuvent pas voyager, pour qui il n'y a aucune perspective économique?»*, s'interroge Mustafa Sheta, qui dirige le Freedom Theatre, dans le camp de Jénine. Âgé de 45 ans, il a vu passer nombre de combattants sur les planches de son établissement. Lui-même ne se revendique d'aucun groupe armé. Au-dessus de son bureau trône un portrait de Che Guevara. *«La gauche révolutionnaire n'existe plus*, observe-t-il cependant. *Aujourd'hui, ce sont les groupes religieux qui sont à la pointe du combat. La religion donne un sens quand il n'y en a plus. Elle donne une espérance, quand tout semble perdu»*, remarque-t-il.

Dans le reste du pays, où les groupes armés ont bien moins d'influence, leur popularité a largement augmenté depuis le début de la guerre. Dans les cafés branchés de Ramallah, la capitale de l'Autorité palestinienne, la jeunesse dorée rêve, elle aussi, de «résistance». *«On ne souhaite pas que le Hamas dirige la Palestine, on sait très bien quelles conséquences cela aurait pour le droit des femmes*, explique Dania, une jeune palestinienne de 23 ans, dont la crinière noir de jais, tombe en cascade sur les épaules. *Mais le 7 octobre, ils nous ont rendu notre fierté»*, ajoute-t-elle. La jeune femme laisse échapper une volute de fumée de son narghilé, et se reprend: *«Je suis contre les attaques qui visent les civiles. Mais notre libération passera forcément par de la résistance armée»*, précise-t-elle.

Pour Dania, ses amies, et beaucoup de jeunes de Ramallah, le Hamas a été «diabolisé» par la presse étrangère. Elle juge que, dans la bulle de désinformation inhérente à toute guerre, les violences du 7 octobre ont été exagérées, et valent bien les 70 années d'occupation que leur peuple subit.

Dans un autre café de la capitale palestinienne, Bachir, Nadim et Ahmad n'ont que 16 ans, mais énumèrent déjà les humiliations intrinsèques à la condition de Palestinien. *«Impossible de sortir de la ville sans se faire arrêter, contrôler, fouiller»*, liste Nadim, qui rêve d'étudier la physique quantique au MIT. À côté de lui, Bachir, un jeune chrétien, se souvient de l'armée israélienne défonçant la porte du foyer familial, arrêtant son père et son grand-père sous ses yeux d'enfant. *«Et ce n'est rien à côté de ceux qui sont emprisonnés par l'armée ou tués par les colons»*, ajoute-t-il. Lui compte bien rester à Ramallah. *«C'est chez nous ici, on n'a pas d'autre maison»*, sourit-il.

Avec les réseaux sociaux, l'horreur est devenue un spectacle quotidien auquel les jeunes s'habituent

Mustafa Sheta, directeur du Freedom Theatre dans le camp de Jénine

Pour Samah Jabr, psychiatre et directrice de l'unité de santé mentale du ministère palestinien de la Santé, les conséquences sur l'évolution de la jeunesse palestinienne sont irréversibles. *«Quand vous êtes exposés à la mort, à la violence dès votre plus jeune âge, pas étonnant que votre propre rapport à la mort, au monde, à l'avenir, soit bouleversé»*, explique-t-elle. Une étude de l'université de Cambridge publiée en 2020 estimait à 35% le nombre d'enfants souffrant de stress post-traumatique en Cisjordanie. Une autre étude de la Public Library of Science américaine et publiée en 2020 identifie des symptômes élevés de détresse générale (45,7%) et de dépression (55,2%) parmi les jeunes Palestiniens. *«La singularité de l'expérience des jeunes palestiniens est qu'il n'existe pas de sécurité post-traumatique*, ajoute le Pr Jabr. *En Cisjordanie, la menace reste permanente et persistante. À tout moment, l'arrestation est possible»*, dit-elle.

Sur leur smartphone, Bachir, Nadim et Ahmad font défiler les mêmes images qu'Ahmed et Mahmoud regardaient à Jénine sur leurs téléphones. Vidéos après vidéo, les images d'enfants sans vie, retirés des décombres de Gaza s'enchaînent. Leurs yeux passent d'une vidéo à l'autre, habitués. *«C'est peut-être ce qui a le plus changé depuis la dernière Intifada*, remarque Mustafa Sheta. *Avec les réseaux sociaux, l'horreur est devenue un spectacle quotidien auquel les jeunes s'habituent»*, soupire-t-il.

27 novembre (Le Figaro)

[La vice-présidente de SOS Racisme démissionne pour désaccord sur le «droit d’Israël à se défendre» \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr)

La vice-présidente de SOS Racisme démissionne pour désaccord sur le «droit d’Israël à se défendre»

Par E.P



Publié hier à 19:33, mis à jour il y a 3 minutes

Saphia Ait Ouarabi a expliqué sa décision sur les réseaux sociaux en déclarant refuser de «représenter une association qui piétine» ses espoirs.

Démission de la vice-présidence de SOS Racisme : ma génération mérite d’être entendue.

Le vendredi 17 novembre 2023, j’ai démissionné de la vice-présidence de SOS Racisme, une fonction que j’exerçais depuis mes 18 ans. Je quitte cette association dans laquelle j’ai milité depuis plus de 5 ans.

J’estime que la direction de SOS Racisme a connu une dérive idéologique grave ces dernières semaines à l’image du communiqué publié le 2 novembre dans lequel est affirmé : “Israël a le droit de se défendre”. Le 2 novembre, jour où près de 10 000 morts étaient décomptés à Gaza, dont un tiers d’enfants. Un jour où des experts de l’ONU évoquaient un “risque de génocide”. Des prises de positions scandaleuses et symptomatiques du silence assourdissant depuis 1 mois et demi de l’association sur la situation à Gaza et en Cisjordanie.

Malgré les nombreuses tentatives de discussions, les alertes, les remarques, et alors que les désaccords explosaient au sein de l’association, la direction m’a répondu par ce qui me semble être des humiliations en réunion pendant plusieurs heures d’affilées, des pressions, l’interdiction d’utiliser mes réseaux sociaux pour parler du conflit israélo-palestinien, l’élaboration et la circulation de rumeurs (jusqu’à contacter un de mes proche), ainsi qu’une mise au placard progressive. Ces procédés rendent compte de l’ambiance inadmissible dans laquelle j’ai été plongée pendant plusieurs semaines.

Dans une publication sur X dimanche matin, la vice-présidence de SOS Racisme, Saphia Ait Ouarabi, annonce avoir démissionné de ses fonctions. La militante explique sa décision, actée le 17 novembre, par ce qu’elle considère une «*dérive idéologique grave*» de l’association dont elle a été membre pendant cinq ans. La cause ? Un communiqué publié le 2 novembre, dans lequel SOS Racisme affirme qu’ «*Israël a le droit de se défendre*».

Ces déclarations, faites «*le 2 novembre, jour où près de 10.000 morts étaient décomptés à Gaza, dont un tiers d'enfants*» et «*jour où des experts de l'ONU évoquaient un risque de génocide*», paraissent aux yeux de Saphia Ait Ouarabi «*scandaleuses*» et «*symptomatiques du silence assourdissant*» observé depuis l'attaque du Hamas le 7 octobre «*sur la situation à Gaza et en Cisjordanie*».

«*Malgré les nombreuses tentatives de discussions, les alertes, les remarques, et alors que les désaccords explosaient au sein de l'association, la direction m'a répondu par ce qui me semble être des humiliations (...), des pressions, l'interdiction d'utiliser mes réseaux sociaux pour parler du conflit israélo-palestinien*», détaille la jeune militante de 22 ans dans son communiqué.

L'étudiante en sociologie à l'université de Nanterre estime que SOS Racisme ne répond plus aux attentes des nouvelles générations, et n'est «*plus à la hauteur*» des enjeux actuels. «*Elle ne l'a pas été suite au meurtre policier de Nahel, elle ne l'a pas été suite à l'interdiction des abayas et elle ne l'est pas face aux enjeux antiracistes contemporains à savoir le racisme d'État, les causes internationales et anti-colonialistes*», accuse-t-elle, déclarant refuser de «*représenter une association qui piétine mes espoirs et ceux de beaucoup d'autres jeunes qui me ressemblent*».

26 novembre (NYT)

[Phil Klay's Search for a Moral Center in This Era of War - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com)

Talk Nov. 22, 2023

Finding a Moral Center in This Era of War



By David Marchese Photograph by Mamadi Doumbouya

Phil Klay, as both a participant and a writer, has been thinking deeply about war for a long time. In his two acclaimed works of fiction, the book of short stories “Redeployment,” which won a 2014 National Book Award, and the novel “Missionaries” (2020), and in the nonfiction collection “Uncertain Ground: Citizenship in an Age of Endless, Invisible War” (2022), Klay has interrogated, to profound effect and with a deeply humane and moral sensibility, what war does to our hearts and minds, individually and collectively, here and abroad. “I’m interested in the kinds of stories that we tell ourselves about war,” says Klay, who is a 40-year-old veteran of the Iraq war. “I’m interested in the uncomfortable ones, but also in the ones that feel too comfortable and need to be told alongside other types of stories that make it more troubling.”

War, understandably and probably necessarily in some ways, flattens thinking. But trying to hold on to a morally expansive perspective on war, one in which multiple things could be true at the same time — that the Hamas attack on Oct. 7 was an undeniable atrocity and also that Israel’s military response has been cruelly disproportionate — also seems necessary. Can you talk about that moral tension? There are people who feel like you cannot acknowledge, or shouldn’t acknowledge too much, horrors that are not ideologically convenient. This is why you’ll have the Palestinian National Initiative on CNN, speaking thoughtfully about the suffering of Palestinians but then denying that Hamas targets civilians,¹

1

This is a reference to an interview that aired on CNN on Oct. 8. Responding to a question from the network’s Fareed Zakaria, Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian legislator and the general secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative political party, said it was “not true” that Hamas targets Israeli civilians, which it clearly has.

which is an insane thing to say. There was a debate in Dissent, the left-wing publication, about whether Israeli casualties should be considered “pregrievd” because their deaths will be used as a justification for whatever actions the I.D.F.²

2

The Israel Defense Forces.

takes. At the same time, if you listen to more neoconservative commentators, they feel aggrieved that the mainstream media is covering the widespread deaths of Palestinian civilians — as if that’s not a valid news story. People urgently want you to feel the moral horror of what is happening, but within a circumscribed circle. I think that is morally blinkered.

Why? The father searching for his children under rubble that had been his home in Gaza; a parent and child who were bound together and burned to death by Hamas³

3

This is a reference to reporting that appeared in The Media Line on Nov. 6 and has not been verified by The New York Times.

— to think about the horror of that in a serious way means not immediately transmuting it into ideological fodder. You can make strong moral and political arguments, but if in making those you feel like you must obscure or ignore atrocity and horror, that's corrupt intellectually and morally. It prevents you from actually understanding the complexity of the situation which you're attempting to speak to and in the long term will make you less effective in whatever you want to do. Out of basic humanist principles, the idea that we must close our eyes to suffering that is not ideologically useful is morally degrading to ourselves. It's repugnant.

This is maybe overly cynical, but why do you think that having a less ideologically rigid point of view is more effective in the long term than the opposite? In the long term, if you blinker yourself to reality, it limits your ability to formulate positions that are based in reality and therefore formulate positions that will achieve something lasting and moral. You need to be open to complexity because whatever narrow thing that you want to achieve in the real world will, if it gets put into practice, be put into practice in the real world. Not in the ideologically antiseptic world that you've created in your head.

What might crack open in someone that they're able to see the suffering of civilian others as just as grave a human concern as the suffering of civilians on the side they support ideologically? In war, there's a primary experience: a terrified father in Gaza as bombs are falling, unsure of whether he can protect his family; or the Israeli soldier trying to deal with Hamas's tunnel network. There is a responsibility when you're thinking these things through to sit with some of those primary experiences to the extent that you can, and think about them without immediately seeking to churn them into something politically useful. Because they mean more than whatever policy cash-out we get from them.



Phil Klay (center, with camera) in Iraq in 2007.

From Phil Klay

We've entered this awful period, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and then the conflict between Israel and Hamas, when war is present in many people's minds in a way that, perhaps, it hasn't been before. But has this moment changed anything fundamental in how we think about war? I think that Ukraine represents not a good war — because the closer you get to war, the more obvious it is that a phrase like “a good war” has no valid meaning — but rather a necessary war. The clear moral case for Ukraine is about as straightforward a case of a just defense against a vicious aggressor as you could find. There is a certain appeal for that, especially for Americans accustomed to interminable, murky operations where military activities were ranging from trying to strengthen host nations to counterterrorism as well as more straightforward combat. Here is a war with a clear front line with a clear moral imperative. That, I think, has shifted people's perceptions.

How? Because Ukraine's ability to resist Russia is dependent upon support from the broader international community, of which America is the leader. After the fall of Kabul,⁴

4

The Taliban capture of Afghanistan's capital in August 2021. It followed President Biden's announcement, in April of that same year, of plans for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Trump administration had negotiated a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in February 2020.

the betrayal of Afghans who relied on us and whom we didn't do enough to bring to safety, there was much more cynicism toward that American role around the world, especially when it came to warfare. Ukraine offered a counterexample which suggests that America's ability to provide allies with not just material support but also intelligence and targeting could be put in service for a cause which seems more morally clear. That was a shift. Then, in terms of Israel and Palestine, there's a circumstance that has some parallels with 9/11. You had this horrific attack that seemed to demand a military response. If you're an Israeli and you're looking across the border at Hamas, which has been trying to kill Israeli civilians for a long time, what is new is a sense of they actually do have the capacity, if the circumstances are right, to kill, torture and rape people in large numbers; they have no intention of stopping, and they're right there across the border, and that is an intolerable situation about which we don't see a diplomatic situation. At the same time, that political license to take military action is being afforded to a leader for whom there can only be the gravest questions about competence, foresight and the basic morality of his government. America, when it had a similar urgency for action that was translated into policy by a leader⁵

5

Former President George W. Bush.

not up to the task in terms of foresight, competence or morals — the torture program was the exemplar of the moral corruption that came from that. That is a very dry way of mentioning that I don't think the Netanyahu government puts enough value on Palestinian life. Which is a problem if you're waging a campaign that will lead to mass slaughter.

In one of your essays, you write, "I'm not antiwar." Are you pro-peace? What does it mean to say you're not "antiwar"? I think that there are necessary wars and that there are places where U.S. military presence can do good. Where, if there isn't a U.S. presence, that doesn't necessarily mean that you have peace in that region — it means another actor moves in. That's the reality. A straightforward pacifist line is insufficient. To go back to the war on Ukraine: America arming Ukraine with the support of European allies — the result of that was Ukraine being able to hold Russians off from further territorial gains, and that is a way of saying there are a lot less cities totally obliterated. There were a lot less civilian casualties. There were a lot less people who faced the possibility of suffering the things that people in Bucha⁶

6

A Russian military unit killed dozens of civilians — some found with their hands bound and gunshot wounds to their heads — in Bucha, Ukraine, in March 2022.

suffered. When there's a force like that, you need to respond to it with force, or, in many cases, the result is horror.

You've written about the need for soldiers to be able to connect their missions to the broader values of their society. How might that apply to American soldiers today, given that there seems to be less and less consensus about our shared values? The debate over what America means is nothing new. To me, the crucial aspect of American identity is a certain embrace of change. I think of American identity as being like Heraclitus' river that you can never step in twice. It doesn't mean that there are no riverbanks. It's not an amorphous pool of water spilling out in all directions. Nevertheless, a certain degree of turbulence is important for growth and allows for necessary changes to come about.

But my question is more about whether that widespread contention over our values has bearing on how the military might operate. I had the opportunity of asking Donald Trump a question.⁷

7

Klay asked this question at a September 2016 event that was hosted by Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America and held at the U.S.S. Intrepid in New York City. This event was attended by the presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.

He said he had a plan to defeat ISIS. I said, What is your plan for after you defeat ISIS? He gave an incoherent answer where he said we should have taken the oil. The answer was bad in terms of, is it a coherent policy that makes any sense? No. It was also bad because there was no moral value to it. To say that we should have taken the oil is purely transactional. If you're talking about military action, where you're asking young people to sacrifice, possibly, their lives, evacuating that of any moral content other than narrow self-interest is pathetic. So, yeah, there are aspects of the public discussion where instead of articulating a different moral vision for America, it's an immoral vision of America, and when it comes to the military, it's not worth dying for.

I ask this next question knowing it's clichéd, but that doesn't diminish my sincere interest in your answer. You didn't walk away from a belief in God⁸

8

Klay is Catholic.

— or a just God — after seeing and experiencing the things you saw and experienced during your time in Iraq.⁹

9

Klay is a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps. He served as a public affairs officer in the Iraq war and has written about witnessing, among other horrors, children injured in war.

How do you see God in a war zone? How do you not see God in a war zone? The God I believe in was tortured and died in agony on the cross. God is there when I see another human being and see something of infinite worth and value. God is there in this infinite horror and majesty of the world. The idea to me that all of this beauty and all of this horror is nothing but mere matter seems ridiculous, and I can't disentangle my sense of horror from my sense of the beauty and value of what is being destroyed in war. I spoke with a veteran who talked about how when he came back from Afghanistan, he said: "I stopped believing in God because it made it easier. It meant that there were questions I didn't have to ask." I feel that very acutely. You have God's answer to Job,¹⁰

10

Job 38-41, in which God answers Job's demand for an explanation of his suffering with a series of questions of his own. E.g., "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the Earth?"; "Have you entered into the springs of the sea, Or walked in the recesses of the deep?"

which is the majesty of the world — a world which is complex and beautiful and blood-soaked and infinitely generative. I feel the power of that vision. I'm also deeply convicted by the sense that there's a God whose ultimate experience was to suffer and die, and yet that's not the totality of the story: That is a central image in the idea of forgiveness and unearned redemption. It is deeply, deeply important to me. I don't know what other option there is.

You mean as far as belief? I don't know what other option there is then on a personal level to get on one's knees and beg for forgiveness. We're so unequal to responding to the challenges of the world that we nevertheless have a responsibility to. I mean, we've been talking about the current conflict, and don't you just feel stupefied by the horror of it?

It's completely shattering. It is.

This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity from two conversations.

26 novembre (NYT)

[Opinion | Who Was the Real 'Shaved Woman of Chartres'? - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/opinion/who-was-the-real-shaved-woman-of-chartres.html)

Who Was the Real ‘Shaved Woman of Chartres’?

Nov. 25, 2023



“The Shaved Woman of Chartres.” Credit...Robert Capa/International Center of Photography, via Magnum Photos

By Valentine Faure

Ms. Faure is a contributing writer to *Le Monde*. She wrote from Paris.

In August 1944, in a city near Paris, Robert Capa took a photograph of a woman cradling a baby in the middle of a jeering crowd, her head shaved and her forehead marked with a swastika.

The woman, **Simone Touseau**, would become **infamous** — **first as a symbol of the brutality of post-occupation France and later, through painstaking scholarship, as an example of the Nazi sympathies among some of the French during World War II.**

A novel released in France this summer has reinvented her once again, this time as a woman scorned. It’s a reinvention that is a disservice to the complicated truth about Ms. Touseau and her and other Frenchwomen’s deliberate collaboration with the Nazis. **Women collaborated out of cowardice, self-interest and a whole range of ideological fervor.** A reality we should contemplate frankly if we’re to have a proper accounting of the history of the war in France.

The photograph, “The Shaved Woman of Chartres,” with the young Ms. Touseau at its center, was understood for a long time as a document of the brutal purges that took place during the liberation of France at the end of World War II. Extrajudicial punishments were carried out all over the country, including shaving the heads of women suspected of sleeping with the enemy.

The truth was more complex. Historians were slow to take an interest in the wartime collaboration and resistance of women, but **in the early 2000s, a groundbreaking work** by Fabrice Virgili described how many women who were shaved in the purges were being punished not for their intimate relationships with Germans but for denunciations or working for the Germans.

Eventually we got **a clearer picture of Ms. Touseau**, too. In 2011 two historians, Gérard Leray and Philippe Frétygné, **established** that **she was a Nazi sympathizer before the war started.** **She scribbled swastikas in the pages of notebooks she kept as early as the mid-1930s, admired National Socialism and claimed that France “needs someone like Hitler.”** Fluent in German, she

worked as a **translator** for the occupying forces and became **a member of the nationalist Parti Populaire Français**. **She was accused of denouncing four neighbors who were deported to the Mauthausen concentration camp, two of whom never returned.** The crime, which would have been punishable by death, was not proved, but Mr. Leray told me that he is adamant that she played at least some part in it.

When the Allied forces were in the process of freeing France, **Ms. Touseau wrote to the German father of her child that if she was killed, he should raise their daughter “in hatred of the British.”**

The infamous martyr of the purges was a committed collaborator. Mr. Capa’s image of the shorn woman was one of victimization but also accountability.



Credit...Robert Capa/International Center of Photography, via Magnum Photos

This was an important moment in our understanding of history. **Memory of World War II in France is still mutable and fragile and underpins debates that we as a country are still having.** (As recently as 2019, **Eric Zemmour**, a far-right pundit who [ran for president](#), was still trying to spread the long-disproved idea that Maréchal Pétain [saved French Jews](#) rather than volunteered to send more to the death camps.) Understanding women’s role correctly is essential to an honest inspection of that history.

This August **a new, fictionalized portrait of Ms. Touseau** was published in France, in the shape of a novel, **“Vous Ne Connaissez Rien de Moi”** (“You Know Nothing About Me”), by **Julie Héraclès**, which renders Ms. Touseau, renamed Grivise, as a woman scorned.

In the novel Simone falls in love with Pierre, who is young and handsome and from a bourgeois family. He sexually assaults Simone, and when she falls pregnant, he abandons her to join the Resistance, leaving her to have an illegal abortion on her own.

Simone’s desire for revenge drives her to start working as a translator for the Nazis. She begins a relationship with a German officer, Otto, then falls in love with him. After he is injured on the Eastern Front, she joins the Parti Populaire Français to get a transfer to Germany to be with him, with little consideration for the political implications.

The Simone of the novel has a Jewish friend, lies to the Gestapo to help a member of the Resistance, is “revulsed” by the practice of reporting neighbors and gives food to a little Jewish girl — all “highly implausible facts,” Mr. Leray told me.

It makes for gripping reading, and the novel was on numerous award lists and won the Stanislas Prize for best first novel. Critics praised it as impressive and audacious, and readers [shared](#) their enthusiasm for it — “a beautiful love story,” a “real immersion in Simone’s life,” a story “that shows us that people are never angels or demons but a tangle of good and bad,” several wrote in online reviews.

But the book has also been the subject of criticism on the question of what fiction can allow itself when it comes to this part of history.

Ms. Héraclès told me in a phone interview that she was surprised by the debate. Her agenda was not to redeem Ms. Touseau, she said, but “to explore the human condition” by trying to imagine “how a young woman can commit criminal acts.”

The novel has an epigraph: “I’ve never seen a saint or a bastard. Nothing is all black and white; it’s the gray that wins. Men and their souls, it’s all the same.” **But relegating Ms. Touseau to the role of a sentimental being buffeted by history does not enrich our understanding of her.** It strips her of agency and impoverishes our sense of history at the same time.

The shaved woman of Chartres was a driven, ideological woman whom painstaking historical scholarship had liberated from our simplistic understanding of her. At any given time, people are a tangle of good and bad, and it is the prerogative of fiction to mold bare facts for artistic ends. But **now fiction has put her back in the limited, familiar role of sacrificial mother that she inhabited in Capa’s photo and the world’s imagination.**

Perhaps we prefer her there, rather than contemplating her and others’ complicity in evil.

Valentine Faure is a contributing writer to Le Monde.

26 novembre (The Economist)

[Euphemism and exaggeration are both dangers to language \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

Johnson

Euphemism and exaggeration are both dangers to language

But verbal extremism is now the bigger threat



image: nick lowndes

Nov 23rd 2023

George Orwell's essay "*Politics and the English Language*", published in 1946, took aim at the bureaucrats, academics and hacks who obfuscated their misdeeds in vague, jargon-packed writing. **Abstractions, euphemisms and clichés all served as "the defence of the indefensible"**. Orwell lamented how "Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*."

If Orwell were writing today, he would find plenty of euphemisms to complain about. On October 7th an open letter from a clutch of student groups at Harvard University vaguely described the "unfolding violence" **in Israel** without ascribing blame to Hamas. Abstract brutality "unfolding" shocks rather less than a clearer description of Hamas slaughtering 1,200 Israelis, nearly all civilians, including many children.

As a onetime contributor to the BBC, it is easy to imagine Orwell defying the broadcaster's refusal to use the word "terrorism". Orwell had no trouble doling out his medicine to both sides; he would have also had harsh words for those describing the "collateral damage" buried in Gazan rubble, another abstraction designed to prevent readers picturing dead children. **Around 13,000** Palestinians have died since October 7th.

Orwell's famous essay had a long lead time: he was paid in December, and it appeared in print the next April. Today, however, billions of people can publish their thoughts instantaneously. The desire to grab attention seems to incentivise stylistic sin. The social-mediafication of writing has steered the tone from the offence of euphemism to its twin offence of exaggeration.

Taking what they no doubt believe to be an Orwellian starting point—the danger of being too soft in their language—**keyboard warriors cannot resist the temptation to reach for the most inflammatory words available. What used to be called chauvinism, then sexism, is now "misogyny", a word once reserved for actual hatred of women. Those who do not ascribe to left-wing views on race are**

accused not of bias, prejudice or even racism, but of “white supremacy”, a phrase that just a decade ago was reserved for neo-Nazis.

Call it the “dysphemism treadmill”. In its opposite, the “**euphemism treadmill**” (a term coined by Steven Pinker, a professor at Harvard), people run from one polite banality to another. **They referred to people as “idiotic” until that became pejorative; then they opted for “retarded”, which became unsayable; and then they devised “special”, which is now a taunt too.** The dysphemism treadmill works the other way round: “prejudiced” seems too mild so is replaced with “racist”, which then suffers the same fate and must be swapped out for “white supremacist”.

As is true of many modern trends, the most extreme words have radiated from America, where “communist” and “fascist” have nothing to do with sickles or swastikas and are sometimes applied to anyone you disagree with. **Social media, the “great awokening” on the left and the magafication of the right have contributed to a verbal crescendo.**

Countries in west and central Africa have seen seven of the classic storming-the-presidential-palace sort of “coup” in less than four years. Yet the same word has been used recently to describe an iffy deal to stay in power, struck by Spain’s Pedro Sánchez with Catalan separatists, in exchange for a few votes in a freely elected parliament. Spain is not so much witnessing a coup as a political zoo.

The worst crime imaginable—“genocide”—is also being bandied about more often. The word is used correctly when describing the Arab militias in Sudan who are rounding up black African tribes, such as the Masalit, murdering men and boys, raping women and saying “the baby will be an Arab”. **But those using the term “genocide” to characterise Israeli attacks on civilians in Gaza are not hewing strictly to what [the word’s definition](#) is, which is the intentional destruction of people for the mere fact of their ethnicity.**

So here is a suggestion for writers. **You cannot outshout the crowds. So distinguish yourselves by choosing accurate, vivid words between the evasions of euphemism and the temptations of exaggeration. Crimes against language, in the long run, make it harder to describe crimes against humanity.**

26 novembre (NZZ)

[Altbundesrat Kaspar Villiger über die Selbstverantwortung \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

Die Selbstverantwortung ist ein zentrales Gut in der liberalen Gesellschaft – man muss sie wahrnehmen dürfen, können und wollen

Wenn die Menschen selbstverantwortlich handeln, hat das für die Gesellschaft viele Vorteile. Wer für sich selbst sorgt, fällt andern und der Gesellschaft nicht zur Last.

Kaspar Villiger

26.11.2023, 05.30 Uhr



Das Individuum ist stets auch eingebettet in ein Gemeinwesen. Darum entwickelt sich der Einzelne im Wechselspiel und im Austausch mit der Gesellschaft. Annick Ramp / NZZ

Selbstverantwortung ist ein Standardbestandteil des liberalen Werkzeugkastens. Sie bedeutet im weitesten Sinne, für das eigene Handeln oder Unterlassen Verantwortung zu übernehmen und für dessen Folgen geradezustehen. Im engeren Sinne geht es darum, das eigene Leben in möglichst weitgehender Unabhängigkeit selber zu gestalten und durch eigene Leistung für dessen Kosten aufzukommen. Dabei ist zunächst zu bedenken, dass es absolute Selbstverantwortung nicht geben kann. Wir sind als Menschen nicht nur Individuen, sondern auch Teil von Gemeinschaften aller Art. Das führt zu einer wichtigen, aber verletzlichen **Gegenseitigkeit**: Das Individuum ist auf Leistungen der Gemeinschaft angewiesen, die Gemeinschaft aber auch auf die Leistungen von Individuen.

Wenn die Menschen selbstverantwortlich handeln, hat das für die Gesellschaft viele Vorteile. Wer für sich selbst sorgt, fällt andern und der Gesellschaft nicht zur Last. Damit ist sie ein wichtiger Akt der Solidarität. Wer gleichzeitig das Element Verantwortung in der Selbstverantwortung beherzigt, indem er die Folgen seines Handelns für Gesellschaft und Umwelt bedenkt, reduziert den staatlichen Regulierungsbedarf. Der Philosoph Otfried Höffe schreibt, dass sich die staatlichen Institutionen dort zurückhalten könnten, wo Bürgertugenden blühten.

Damit Selbstverantwortung überhaupt möglich ist, braucht es dreierlei: **Man muss sie wahrnehmen dürfen, können und wollen**. Alle drei sind nicht selbstverständlich. Das Dürfen bedarf eines **freiheitlichen politischen Systems**, und das kann nur die **Demokratie** sein. Für das Können braucht es einen hinreichenden **Wohlstand**. Erst dieser ermöglicht es, ohne soziale Zuschüsse ein Leben in Würde zu führen und beispielsweise Versicherungen zu bezahlen und

Ersparnisse zu bilden. Die Erarbeitung von Wohlstand aber hängt von verschiedenen Faktoren wie etwa **Wirtschaftsfreiheit, Bildung, Talent, Chancengleichheit oder Gesundheit** ab.

Die Frage des Wollens ist komplexer, als es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. **Freiheit ist eben nicht immer nur Wohltat**. Sie ermöglicht auch die falsche Wahl, was zu Enttäuschung und Frust führt. Deshalb scheuen viele Menschen das Risiko der Freiheit. **Forschungen der Verhaltenspsychologin Karen Stenner zur «autoritären Disposition» von Menschen haben ergeben, dass für etwa einen Drittel der Menschen Zusammenhalt, Sicherheit, Gewissheit und Konformität im Kollektiv wichtiger als individuelle Unabhängigkeit und Suche nach Freiheit sind. Sie suchen Anleitung und Betreuung, etwas, was ihnen die moderne paternalistische Politik noch so gerne anbietet. Das führt dazu, dass vielen Menschen, denen die Fähigkeit zum Können gegeben wäre, das Wollen abgeht.**

Aber es gibt noch **eine weitere Quelle des Nichtwollens**, die nicht zuletzt mit dem Wohlstand zusammenhängt: **Genügsamkeit, Ausruhen im Sozialnetz, Trittbrettfahren** und dergleichen. Das **banalste Beispiel** ist das aus steuerlichen Gründen unverheiratete Paar, das sich auch nur mit Teilzeitarbeit ein schönes und geruhames Leben leistet, im Wissen darum, dass Väterchen Staat schon Beistand leistet, sollten im Alter Ersparnisse fehlen.

III

Staaten sind äusserst komplexe Gebilde. Sie sind im Wesentlichen dann erfolgreich, wenn sie den Menschen Freiheit, Wohlstand und Stabilität ermöglichen. In welchem Ausmass das der Fall ist, hängt von einer ganzen Reihe von Einflussfaktoren ab. Es sollen im Folgenden einige besonders wichtige skizziert werden. **Freiheit ist dann möglich, wenn ein Grossteil der Menschen Selbstverantwortung wahrnimmt sowie die Freiheit der Mitmenschen respektiert und wenn sich die staatliche Regulierung auf das Wesentliche beschränkt. Wohlstand kann von den Menschen dann erarbeitet werden, wenn Freiheit möglichst viele kreative Optionen zulässt, wenn sich Leistung für Individuen und Gruppen lohnt und wenn die Menschen kooperieren.**

Die Bedingungen für Stabilität sind komplexer. Grundsätzlich müssen die Menschen zunächst das politische System und die Wirtschaftsordnung als hinreichend gerecht wahrnehmen. Weil ein grosser Teil der Menschen **eine starke und angeborene Ungleichheitsaversion** hat, braucht eine Gesellschaft eine hinreichende **soziale Ausgeglichenheit**, damit sie stabil ist, und sie braucht einen hinreichenden Grundstock gemeinsamer Werte und Überzeugungen, der ihr Verhalten prägt. Eine wichtige Voraussetzung von Stabilität ist auch ein **Grundgefühl von Sicherheit, Geborgenheit und Solidarität**. Wer dieses komplexe Geflecht von Einflussfaktoren betrachtet, wird sofort feststellen, dass **vieles gegenläufig und nicht gleichzeitig maximal erreichbar ist. Dazu nur wenige einfache Beispiele: In einer erfolgreichen wettbewerblichen Wirtschaft ist Ungleichheit unvermeidlich. Das kann die Stabilität gefährden. Deshalb ist eine hinreichende Umverteilung zur Sicherung der Stabilität notwendig. Geht diese aber zu weit, lohnt sich Leistung nicht mehr, was wiederum den Wohlstand gefährdet.**

Wenn Freiheit über ein sozialverträgliches Mass hinaus missbraucht wird, steigt der politische Druck zur Regulierung, was die Freiheit wieder beeinträchtigt. Wenn jene, die vom zur Sicherung von Stabilität notwendigen Sozialsystem profitieren, dieses übernutzen, können die Leistungsanreize jener, die es durch Umverteilung finanzieren müssen, um so viel kleiner werden, dass die Umverteilungsquellen zu versiegen drohen. **Der moderne, mit explodierenden Kosten verbundene**

Leistungs- und Sozialstaat kann es sich aber nicht leisten, potenzielle Leistungsträger als Beitrags- und Steuerzahler zu verlieren.

IV

Weil also Selbstverantwortung ein wichtiger Pfeiler einer erfolgreichen und demokratischen Gesellschaft ist, **müssen die institutionellen politischen Anreize so gesetzt werden, dass möglichst viele Menschen zum Wollen motiviert bleiben.** Dazu gehören geschickte steuerliche und **sozialrechtliche Anreizstrukturen, die die Selbstverantwortung begünstigen und Arbeit lohnend belassen.**

Hier kommt **das Meritokratie-Prinzip** ins Spiel: **Ausschliesslich Leistung soll das Kriterium für die Auswahl von Amtsträgern und Wirtschaftsführern sowie für die Entlohnung sein und nicht Herkunft, Beziehungsnetz oder Bestechung. Wir wissen heute, dass soziale Ungleichheit das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden weniger verletzt, wenn sie auf sicht- und messbarer Leistung beruht.**

Nun hängt allerdings die Fähigkeit zur Leistung auch von recht vielen beeinflussbaren und nicht beeinflussbaren Faktoren ab, beispielsweise vom **Zugang zur Bildung. Deshalb ist die Schaffung von Chancengleichheit ein zentrales Erfordernis einer als gerecht perzipierten Gesellschaftsordnung.** Chancengleichheit erweitert auch das **Humankapital**, das der Wirtschaft zur Verfügung steht. Sie fördert damit den Wohlstand.

Die Meritokratie hat allerdings zwei Pferdefüsse. Auch hochqualifizierte und leistungswillige Menschen können zum Beispiel dann arbeitslos werden, wenn ihr Können wegen technologischer Umbrüche plötzlich nicht mehr gefragt ist. Das kann bei Betroffenen zu schweren psychischen Problemen führen. Das einzige, aber auch nicht absolut sichere Mittel dagegen ist **lebenslanges Lernen und die Bereitschaft, Neues anzupacken. Das ist das erste Problem.**

Das zweite: **Die Erfolgreichen betrachten ihren überdurchschnittlichen Wohlstand, und sei er auch nur durch zufällige günstige Umstände entstanden, als durch Leistung verdient und damit gerechtfertigt, und sie neigen dazu, die weniger Begünstigten als für ihre misslichere Situation selber verantwortlich zu betrachten. Diese wiederum empfinden diese Haltung als demütigend. Fehlende soziale Wertschätzung aber ist Gift für den Zusammenhalt einer Gesellschaft.**

V

Mit steigendem Wohlstand und ausgebautem Sozialstaat scheint das Wollen bei vielen Menschen abzunehmen. Auch Teilzeitarbeit mag für ein gutes Leben ausreichen, Steuern lassen sich so sparen, und vielleicht lässt sich so die eine oder andere Sozialleistung finden, von der man profitieren kann. **Die Work-Life-Balance wird wichtiger als die Arbeit. Und zur Arbeit zwingen lässt sich in einem freiheitlichen Staat niemand.**

Es ist denn auch nicht verwunderlich, dass sich bei den diesjährigen Wahlen drei klassische Werbekonzepte als besonders erfolgreich erwiesen haben: die Benennung von Sündenböcken, denen man die Schuld an allem Ungemach in die Schuhe schieben kann – diesmal den Einwanderern –, das Versprechen von Segnungen unter geschickter Verschleierung der Kosten sowie das Versprechen von

Leistungen an die eigene Klientel auf Kosten anderer, insbesondere der vielgescholtenen Reichen. Damit werden aber Erwartungen geweckt, die der Staat nicht erfüllen kann, was das Vertrauen in diesen schmälert. Der Politikwissenschaftler Manfred Schmidt spricht von der strukturellen Überforderung der Demokratie.

Bleibt das Problem jener, die zwar wollen, aber nicht können. Auch sie sollen, so wollen es die Gerechtigkeit und die Rücksichtnahme auf die Ungleichheitsaversion, ein Auskommen haben und ohne das Gefühl mangelnder Wertschätzung ein Leben in Würde führen können. **Hier ist der Sozialstaat gefordert. Aber das kostet.**

Es vergeht kein Tag, ohne dass irgendwo das dringende Bedürfnis nach einer neuen Sozialleistung auftaucht. Und wer die politischen Diskussionen verfolgt, wird leicht feststellen, dass die Gruppe jener Politiker, die ausgabenträchtige Ideen entwickeln, zahlenmässig die Gruppe jener, die sich um die Erarbeitung des zu verteilenden Kuchens sorgen, übertrifft. **Es droht auf der Welt nicht nur die Übernutzung der Wasserquellen, sondern auch der Wertschöpfungsquellen.**

VI

Das Problem der fehlenden sozialen Wertschätzung der Erfolglosen und des fehlenden Respekts gegenüber weniger Gebildeten mag bei uns nicht so ausgeprägt sein wie in anderen Ländern, aber es ist ernst zu nehmen. Es gibt wohl kein Patentrezept zur Überwindung dieser Kluft. Initiative Menschen werden vielleicht durch Freiwilligenarbeit in Vereinen oder anderen Bereichen der Zivilgesellschaft oder als Milizpolitiker die soziale Wertschätzung finden, die ihnen aus ihrer Sicht ein einfacher Beruf nicht gewährt.

Unternehmen können mit einer kooperativen Kultur wichtige Beiträge leisten. **Ein grundlegendes Bedürfnis der Menschen ist das Gebrauchtwerden.** In einer kooperativen Unternehmenskultur werden alle Mitarbeitenden, vom Reinigungspersonal bis zur Generaldirektion, das Gefühl haben, einen wichtigen Beitrag für das Unternehmen zu leisten. **Der Respekt gegenüber allen Mitarbeitenden ist ein Pfeiler einer guten Unternehmenskultur.**

VII

Selbstverantwortung ist mithin ein wichtiger zivilisatorischer Wegweiser. **Er darf in einer freiheitlichen demokratischen Gesellschaft nicht verblasen, weil sonst Freiheit wie Wohlstand gefährdet sind. Er darf aber auch nicht uminterpretiert werden, indem er nur noch egoistisch oder als Forderungs- und Anspruchsrecht ohne Leistungsverpflichtung verstanden wird.**

Deshalb muss dieser Wegweiser von Zeit zu Zeit frisch gestrichen werden. Ein solcher frischer Anstrich braucht nicht nur sorgfältig austarierte institutionelle Massnahmen, sondern auch **die Förderung des Bewusstseins für die Bedeutung der Selbstverantwortung** etwa in Familie, Schule, Militär, Unternehmen oder anderen Teilen der Zivilgesellschaft.

Kaspar Villiger ist Altbundesrat. Er gehörte von 1989 bis 2003 der Schweizer Regierung an. Der vorliegende Text ist ein Vortrag, gehalten am 23. November am Econnect Event der Econ Alumni, Universität Zürich.

26 novembre (The Economist)

[As a pause in fighting begins, Husam Zomlot calls for a comprehensive ceasefire \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The war in Gaza

As a pause in fighting begins, Husam Zomlot calls for a comprehensive ceasefire

Peace can only be achieved by inverting the Oslo process, says the Palestinian ambassador to Britain



image: dan williams

Nov 24th 2023

Husam Zomlot is the Palestinian ambassador to Britain.

This is a defining moment, not only for Palestine, Israel and the broader Middle East, but for the international order and the world.

The idea voiced in a [recent *Economist* editorial](#) that “a ceasefire is the enemy of peace” and would benefit Hamas is shocking and betrays an alarming lack of policy foresight and moral clarity. A comprehensive ceasefire—lasting in nature, unlike the pause for hostage releases that began today—would benefit peace. It would first benefit Palestinian civilians, who have endured unimaginable suffering in recent weeks. It would stop the spread of hostilities in the region. And it would open up a historic opportunity to treat the root cause of the conflict.

Israel has allowed into Gaza only a tiny fraction of the water, food and fuel needed by its 2.3m people, prompting warnings from humanitarian organisations and the UN of starvation, thirst and infectious disease. An estimated 14,000 Palestinians have been killed so far, most of them women and children. There are tens of thousands of injuries. But there is nowhere to treat them. Israel has devastated Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, leaving just ten of its 36 hospitals functioning.

Three out of every four Palestinians in Gaza have been forcibly displaced from their homes in the north of the territory and are crowding into UN facilities, schools and private houses in the south, where they have continued to be targeted by Israel’s bombardment and from where they are being pushed ever farther south. Whole neighbourhoods have been destroyed along with schools, universities, mosques, churches and UN facilities.

The collective punishment of Palestinians is incomparable to any conflict in recent memory. More children were killed in three weeks in Gaza than the number of children killed in global conflict zones every year since 2019. More UN workers have been killed than in any similar period in the organisation’s 78-year history. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, an NGO, the war in Gaza has been the

deadliest for journalists covering conflict—in terms of the number of deaths over a given period—since it began tracking data in 1992.

The violence is not confined to Gaza. In the West Bank more than 200 Palestinians have been killed since October 7th and extremist settlers, armed and empowered by Israel's Jewish-supremacist public-security minister, are running amok, depopulating villages and terrorising local populations.

Add to this the genocidal language from the highest leadership in Israel, where officials are openly discussing plans for the ethnic cleansing of the entire population of Gaza. Members of the Knesset have called for the use of nuclear weapons against Gaza, the defence minister dehumanised Palestinians as "human animals", the president said there are no innocent civilians in Gaza and the prime minister invoked a biblical reference, calling for a "holy war of annihilation". These are not only war crimes, but a blueprint for ethnic cleansing that is designed to make Gaza unliveable.

Is a ceasefire really the enemy of peace?

Over more than seven decades Israel has not been held to account for its many transgressions of international law: not for its illegal settlement-building, its indiscriminate violence, the 16-year blockade of Gaza, the targeting of journalists; not for its use of deeply repressive measures such as detention without charge or trial, or collective punishments such as home demolitions; not for its system of racial domination, or apartheid, as documented by international, Israeli and Palestinian human-rights organisations; and not for its illegal annexation of East Jerusalem—nor, indeed, its refusal to allow Palestinian refugees their right of return after 75 years.

Attempts by the State of Palestine to refer these crimes to the relevant international bodies, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, have been opposed by countries like America and Britain, further consolidating the sense that Israel is above international law and norms.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation long ago took the strategic decision to pursue diplomacy to reach our aims of Palestinian statehood, freedom from occupation and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. But this strategy has so far proven a dead end. Even though the world outside Israel supports a two-state outcome, pressure on Israel to get there has been almost entirely absent over the 30 years since the Oslo accords.

The Economist rejected calls for an immediate ceasefire but did point out that "Palestinians deserve a state, too." It is not about "deserving". This is our inalienable and an internationally sanctioned right, equal to all other peoples in the world, to live free and with self-determination on our own land.

The idea that Hamas can be eradicated by military force is also misguided. Hamas is not just its military wing; it is an ideology. You can only challenge an idea by offering a different idea.

The path to peace is clear. Recognise the State of Palestine on 1967 borders and end the occupation. That would leave two sovereign states to implement the new reality. The State of Palestine, with the help of the international community, would oversee the massive humanitarian and reconstruction efforts now necessary, provide protection and services to its citizens and convene national elections.

This path is not easy. It does not require a lengthy process with interim agreements, but it does require a paradigm shift: an inversion of the Oslo process, establishing the end goal at the outset. It necessitates courage, statesmanship and the implementation of international law and resolutions.

Soon we will be faced with a choice: we either wait for the next tragedy or we seize this moment to reach a lasting peace.

Husam Zomlot is the Palestinian ambassador to Britain.

26 novembre (Le Figaro)

[En Israël, la guerre cruciale de la démographie derrière le conflit à Gaza \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr)

En Israël, la guerre cruciale de la démographie derrière le conflit à Gaza

Par [Mayeul Aldebert](#) et [Service Infographie](#)

Publié il y a 50 minutes



En 2022, la femme israélienne avait presque deux fois plus d'enfants en moyenne que dans tous les autres pays occidentaux. *JACK GUEZ / AFP*

DÉCRYPTAGE - La population palestinienne connaît une forte poussée démographique depuis la création de l'État d'Israël. La population juive résiste néanmoins mieux que prévu face à cette dynamique.

La démographie dicte-t-elle le destin des peuples, comme l'affirmait Samuel Huntington ? Le célèbre politologue américain, dans *Le Choc des civilisations*, ajoutait ensuite que les mouvements de population étaient le moteur de ce destin. C'est ainsi que l'État d'Israël s'est bâti, au fil des migrations successives, sur le souvenir enraciné de la Terre promise, et dans l'espérance biblique de «*croître et se multiplier*» sur *Eretz Israël*, territoire compris entre la Méditerranée et le Jourdain.

Mais depuis les premières implantations dans la région ottomane de la Palestine à la fin du XIX^{ème} siècle, qui rejoignaient une minorité historique de Juifs, jusqu'à aujourd'hui, la question démographique a toujours été une véritable hantise pour Israël. «*Depuis les premiers mouvements sionistes très ténus, aux effectifs squelettiques, jusqu'à aujourd'hui, Israël a toujours craint la démographie palestinienne ainsi que celle des États arabes voisins*», rappelle Frédéric Encel, docteur en géopolitique et maître de conférences à Sciences Po Paris.

Aujourd'hui, dans les 470 millions d'habitants que compte le Moyen-Orient, Israël en recense 9,7 millions en 2023 dont 21% d'Arabes israéliens en majorité musulmans et 74% de Juifs, selon le Bureau central des statistiques israélien. Mais si l'on inclut la population des territoires de Cisjordanie et Gaza qui représente 5,4 millions d'habitants, la proportion de Juifs tombe à la moitié environ de la région de la mer au Jourdain. Dès lors, Israël peut-elle conserver ses conquêtes de 1967 sans perdre son caractère juif ? Et que prévoient les projections qui prennent en compte la fécondité galopante de la région ? Voilà l'équation.


Territoire qui a vu s'épanouir les grands royaumes juifs à l'époque antique, la région de Palestine s'est vidée de sa population juive, à l'époque de l'occupation romaine et très significativement après la destruction du Temple de Jérusalem en 70 par l'empereur Titus aux termes de la sanglante répression de la grande révolte juive. Ce n'est qu'après des siècles d'exil que les populations juives, d'abord en provenance d'Europe de l'Est et de Russie, rallièrent la Palestine sous l'impulsion des pionniers sionistes qui fuyaient l'antisémitisme de leur terre d'adoption, et nourrissaient l'espoir d'un État juif, dans le sillon des aspirations nationales nées en Europe au XIX^{ème} siècle.

La région de Palestine

Grand théoricien du sionisme au XIXème siècle, Theodor Herzl avait fixé comme objectif principal, en plus de la création d'un État souverain, le rassemblement de tous les Juifs du monde en Palestine. C'est à cette époque qu'une confrontation démographique commence véritablement, en premier lieu sur l'ensemble de la région du sud de la Syrie dans l'Empire ottoman que les sionistes et Européens appellent communément à l'époque Palestine. En 1880, quand les premiers juifs en provenance d'Europe s'installent, cette région, peu peuplée, abrite seulement 450.000 âmes environ. Les musulmans représentent 87% de cette population après la minorité chrétienne qui en compose 9%.


La population dans la région de Palestine avant 1948

Répartition de la population par religion dans la région de Palestine, en %



Source: McCarthy 1990, Mandat britannique sur la Palestine

POPULATION JUIVE DANS LES PAYS ARABES



Infographie **LE FIGARO**

Au fil des migrations successives, et cette fois-ci après la création de l'État d'Israël au sein même de la région de Palestine en 1948, la démographie juive est confortée dans la région par l'arrivée des populations fuyant les persécutions au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, puis plus tardivement en provenance des pays musulmans du Moyen-Orient et du Maghreb, en particulier du Maroc, ou encore en provenance de l'ex-URSS après la chute du bloc soviétique.

Mais avec la création de l'État en 1948, est-il encore judicieux de comparer la population juive et la population musulmane de la mer au Jourdain, dès lors qu'Israël accueille en son sein une minorité dite d'Arabes israéliens selon la typologie de l'État hébreu, composée principalement de musulmans, puis de druzes et de chrétiens parfois très bien intégrés en Israël ?

Néanmoins, certains démographes ont continué à élaborer des statistiques sur l'ensemble de la région, en alertant notamment sur le fait que les résidents juifs pourraient redevenir minoritaires, principalement à cause du taux de fécondité plus élevé des femmes palestiniennes. Le géographe Arnon Soffer à l'université de Haïfa, qualifié parfois d'alarmiste, a même affirmé en 2022 que la population juive

représentait désormais 47% de ceux qui vivent à l'ouest du Jourdain si l'on prend en compte les résidents en Israël qui n'ont pas la citoyenneté.


Cette «*menace démographique*», selon les termes du géographe, a des incidences fatales car elle confronte l'État juif et démocratique d'Israël à un choix terrible en dehors d'une solution à deux États : «*perdre son caractère juif ou instaurer un système d'apartheid n'offrant pas les mêmes droits aux Palestiniens. Un choix perdant-perdant*», analysait récemment l'ancien correspondant du Figaro à Jérusalem Patrick Saint-Paul. «*La gauche israélienne constate donc que les Juifs ne pourront être majoritaires en Judée-Samarie et accepte l'idée de partage, comme l'avait fait Ben Gourion, explique Frédéric Encel. La droite, et en particulier la partie orthodoxe, considère que dans tous les cas la force de l'armée et Dieu pourvoient à la souveraineté juive*».

Le match se resserre

Cette tendance à moyen terme, mérite tout de même d'être nuancée. D'abord, au sein même de l'État d'Israël, les femmes musulmanes de la minorité arabe, tout comme par ailleurs les femmes palestiniennes de territoires de Cisjordanie et de Gaza ont entamé une transition démographique, certes tardive, mais abrupte. Cette transition s'est observée seulement à partir des années 1980. Les femmes musulmanes israéliennes sont passées de 6 enfants par femme en 1980 à un peu plus de 3 enfants sur les dernières décennies rejoignant le taux de fécondité des femmes juives.

Un taux de fertilité élevé

NOMBRE MOYEN D'ENFANTS PAR FEMME EN ISRAËL



Source : German Institute for International and Security Affairs / SWP Research Paper, décembre 2020



Les femmes palestiniennes des territoires sont passées quant à elles de 8 enfants par femmes à 3,5 aujourd'hui, un taux de fécondité qui pourrait encore diminuer au regard des taux des autres pays arabes les plus avancés comme le Liban, le Maroc ou la Tunisie un peu supérieur à 2. «*Ce décalage s'explique en grande partie par la 'fécondité politique', une tendance à faire plus d'enfants qu'en temps de paix et ce, dans une pulsion nationaliste*», expliquait à ce propos le démographe Youssef Courbage, spécialiste du monde arabe et de la question israélo-palestinienne. Yasser Arafat, dit-on, parlait lui-même du ventre des femmes arabes comme la meilleure des armes. Il faut noter néanmoins la dynamique encore très forte de la société palestinienne conservatrice à Gaza, dont la croissance de 2% par an selon les données du Bureau des Nations unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires pourrait faire doubler la population, actuellement de 2,2 millions d'habitants, d'ici à 2040.

En parallèle, la natalité juive connaît un regain au tournant des années 2000. Cette vigueur démographique juive est notamment la conséquence d'un match dans le match : celui de la croissance de la population *haredim* ou ultraorthodoxe dont les femmes ont en moyenne chacune sept enfants. «*Il faut noter que les Juifs haredim et orthodoxes sont d'abord dans une démarche religieuse, de*

suivre le grand commandement de la procréation et non le combat de démographie», détaille Frédéric Encel.


Le taux de fécondité des femmes juives dépasse donc 3 en 2023, un record dans les pays de l'OCDE dont la moyenne se situait à 1,6 en 2021. *«En Israël, les courbes se croisent, on observe un effet ciseau»,* commente le géopolitologue. Et selon une récente étude du Conseil économique national d'Israël, la proportion des ultraorthodoxes dans la population d'Israël pourrait par ailleurs atteindre 25% en 2050. Avec ce dynamisme, l'immigration en provenance de la diaspora juive dans le monde continue, facilitée depuis la création de l'État d'Israël par des lois d'intégration efficaces. L'aboutissement du projet initial de réunir en Israël tous les Juifs du monde se rapproche d'ailleurs. *«Vers 2025, la majorité absolue des Juifs y vivra, fait sans précédent depuis au moins la chute de Jérusalem en l'an 70 et le grand exode qui s'ensuivit»,* explique le politologue Frédéric Encel dans son *Atlas géopolitique d'Israël*. À moyen terme, le match démographique est un des arguments qui pourrait conforter Israël à se séparer des Palestiniens par la création d'un État souverain. *«C'est ce qui avait en partie motivé le nationaliste Sharon à se retirer de la bande de Gaza en 2004-2005 qui comptait au maximum 8000 colons israéliens»,* rappelle Frédéric Encel. Si Netanyahu risque de quitter le pouvoir, il faudra alors que ses successeurs à la tête de l'État d'Israël choisissent *«la logique nationaliste en pleine cohérence avec ses principes sionistes originels»,* indique Frédéric Encel, plutôt que de pousser une logique impériale, en maintenant les implantations (plus de 710.000 personnes incluant Jérusalem Est) et en pariant sur le plus long terme qui pourrait être démographiquement, avec la baisse du taux de natalité des femmes arabes et l'émigration palestinienne, plus favorable à Israël. *«Je commencerai par ce qui va se passer entre nous, pas avec les Palestiniens»,* a récemment déclaré l'ancien premier ministre et chef de l'opposition actuelle Yaïr Lapid questionné sur l'avenir à court terme dans un entretien au *Point*. Le peuple juif, dont l'identité *«n'est pas un bloc unitaire et uniforme»,* comme le rappelait le grand démographe israélien Sergio Della Pergola, souffre de grandes fractures entre *«les très religieux et les très sécularisés, les très activistes et les très idéalistes»*. Exemple en est des Juifs ultra-orthodoxes qui acceptent, comme certains Arabes d'Israël, l'existence de l'État hébreu mais rejettent l'idéologie sioniste. Ils ne font pas leur service militaire, ne chantent pas l'hymne national. *«La question finale et décisive»* pourrait donc bien être alors celle que posait Sergio Della Pergola sur le fondement de l'État hébreu : *«Qu'y a-t-il au centre de cette configuration identitaire ? Est-ce qu'il existe une variable de contenu juif qui puisse nous aider à surmonter les conflits et les différences entre les diverses options identitaires ?»*.

25 novembre (Haaretz)

[Why This Top Expert on Ethnic Conflicts Has Hope for Israelis and Palestinians - Israel News - Haaretz.com](#)

Why This Top Expert on Ethnic Conflicts Has Hope for Israelis and Palestinians

The way to win a war is to vanquish the foe, but the way to end a conflict is to allow the rival side to share positions of power, according to sociologist and political philosopher Andreas Wimmer, a world authority on ethno-political conflicts



Andreas Wimmer. "Even if it seems impossible to imagine an end to the cycle of bloodshed right now, it will eventually happen." Credit: Aishia Sampson

[Netta Ahituv](#)

Nov 24, 2023 5:26 pm IST

"It's a wonder I haven't abandoned all my ideals, they seem so absurd and impractical. Yet I cling to them because I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are truly good at heart. It's utterly impossible for me to build my life on a foundation of chaos, suffering and death. I see the world being slowly transformed into a wilderness, I hear the approaching thunder that, one day, will destroy us too, I feel the suffering of millions. And yet, when I look up at the sky, I somehow feel that everything will change for the better, that this cruelty too shall end, that peace and tranquility will return once more."

– Anne Frank, "The Diary of a Young Girl"

It's best to start this article from the end: This war too will reach its conclusion, however remote and uncertain that prospect may seem at present. Andreas Wimmer, one of the most prominent and prolific scholars in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflicts, even hints – cautiously – at a [possible peace](#) after the guns fall silent in [Israel and the Gaza Strip](#).

"I am optimistic about you. Even if it seems impossible to imagine an end to the cycle of bloodshed right now, it will eventually happen one way or another," Prof. Wimmer says. "The big question is whether the solution will be one that we can support politically and morally. It is indeed difficult under the current conditions look through [the fog of war](#) for a path that leads to the end of the conflict. But the research literature shows that it is possible to establish a stable peace even between parties that have been fighting each other for a long time."

One of the graphs in Wimmer's 2012 book, "Waves of War," subtitled "Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World," shows that wars are more likely to break out in the period beginning two decades before the establishment of a new nation-state – typically, those are wars fought for nationalist or anti-imperialist reasons – and ending some four decades after a nation-state's founding – taking the form of ethno-political conflicts or wars between states. On this timeline, Israel is on a downward trajectory, being in the middle of its eighth decade of existence – from which point the probability of war supposedly declines even

further, until the 17th decade after the establishment of a new state, when the likelihood of a violent conflict stands at close to zero, on average.

“The literature points to several ways of how violent conflicts end,” Swiss-born Wimmer, the Lieber Professor of Sociology and Political Philosophy at Columbia University, explains in one of the video conversations we held earlier this month. “One of them is through external intervention, as in the case of NATO’s entry into the Balkan wars of the 1990s.”

However, he notes, “This is a rare possibility, if only because few countries are willing to risk the lives of their soldiers for a conflict that is not theirs. Another rare possibility is the slow fading away of the conflict, despite the lack of an agreement or a solution to the underlying problems that caused it.

“Another option,” the 61-year-old scholar continues, “is that the warring parties continue to cause harm to each other, where both suffer ongoing loss of life and economic destruction, with no victory in sight. When such a ‘mutually hurting stalemate,’ as scholars call it, is reached, outside mediators may help to find an agreement, ensuring both parties that its terms will be implemented. Twenty percent of the world’s conflicts ended this way. Guatemala is one example, where a United Nations-sponsored peace agreement was signed in 1996 between the government and the guerrilla forces.



Ethnic Armenians flee Nagorno-Karabakh, on their way Kornidzor, Armenia in September. Credit: Stepan Poghosyan/AP

“But the most common way to durably end a war is through victory by one side,” Wimmer notes, “for example, when the Sri Lankan army won the battles against the Tamil separatists in the early 2000s. Another recent example is Azerbaijan’s victory in September this year over the separatists in the Nagorno Karabakh enclave, which caused thousands of people to leave their homes, most likely forever.”

However, for peace to be lasting and to effectively end recurring rounds of hostilities, it is essential to address the roots of the conflict. “The main underlying reason for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the lack of political power of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. They are a minority deprived of citizenship rights,” he elaborates. “This situation represents an extreme form of political discrimination that is extraordinarily rare in today’s world. The probability that such a situation will lead to violence of one form or another is very high, as comparative research shows.”

What are the possible solutions to the present round of fighting?

“From a purely military point of view, Israel’s idea of [eliminating a terrorist organization like Hamas](#) is certainly possible. There are many examples in history where a state won decisively against an armed insurgency. In Sri Lanka, to return to this example, the government crushed the Tamil Tigers completely, but with steep costs in terms of civilian deaths. The same goes for Russia’s brutal wars against Chechen separatists and jihadists. In the case of Israel and the Gaza Strip, the whole world is watching, however. The operation the Israel Defense Forces is carrying out now is under a global magnifying glass, so to speak, and for every Gazan child killed, Israel loses thousands of friends around the world. I see it in the United States, where I live – every

day that passes there is an erosion of support for Israel, which was very high after the horrific massacre of that Saturday (October 7).

I would characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle against an extreme form of political discrimination, which arises from a quasi-colonial situation.

Andreas Wimmer

“It is important to remember that a complete victory by one side leads to a sustainable peace only if it is accompanied by sharing government power with representatives of the other side. Yes, even if the population supported the uprising. After the Tamil Tigers were defeated, political parties representing the Tamil population arose, and they began to take part in the regional government in the northern provinces.”

Is it realistic that Fatah will control the Gaza Strip after the war, assuming that Hamas is indeed eliminated?

“The problem with Fatah is that it suffers from a very severe legitimacy problem among the Palestinians themselves. One can only hope that a revolution will occur within the organization, that a new generation will take the reins and that it will be less corrupt and more democratic than the current leadership. On the Israeli side, as well, the government has a serious legitimacy problem in the eyes of the Israeli citizens. In order to reach a sustainable solution to the conflict through a negotiated settlement, both negotiating parties must receive enough support from the populations they represent, in order to convince them to accept the necessary concessions and to keep radical and violent extremists under control who will likely want to torpedo a long-term solution.”



Civilians fleeing an area in Sri Lanka held by Tamil Tiger separatists, in 2009. “The government crushed the Tamil completely, but with steep costs in terms of civilian deaths.” Credit: Reuters/Sri Lankan Government

What about long-term solutions?

“I do not think that the vision of a ‘whole Land of Israel’ and the [forced removal of the Palestinians](#) is achievable, nor will it lead to sustainable peace. The ethnic cleansing that some people in Israel openly talk about – some of them members of the current government – is unfeasible today. It might have been possible, or even received international support, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when such ideas were ‘acceptable,’ but not in the 21st century.

“From a comparative point of view, it is necessary to empower the Palestinians so that the root of the conflict is addressed. Therefore, I think the two-state solution, with all the difficulty and complexity with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, is the least difficult solution to achieve and the most promising for prolonged peace. In the language of scholars, this is called ‘partition.’ When two or more nations compete over the same territory or over who controls the state, partition is, historically speaking, the most common solution. It creates two or more new states, each ruled in the name of a different ethnic nationality.”

* * *

But let's go back to the basics. Wars, too, have their science. As horrific and shocking as they may be, and no matter where they take place, wars have recurring patterns that can be researched, quantified, measured and analyzed – as long as one leaves emotional and moral considerations out of the discussion, and “deals only with the facts, with minimum moral judgement.”

That's not an easy task, but it produces interesting results. Thanks to an interdisciplinary field known as “conflict research,” it's possible today to make statements like the following: “Until World War II, the partition of empires into a series of nation-states, combined with ethnic cleansing, was the most common way to achieve peace after ethno-nationalist wars.”

Wimmer and his students have been collecting data that dates back as far as the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1816, and covering most of the countries in the world, to discover patterns relating to where, when and why wars break out. From the vast quantity of data they have analyzed, it is possible to see, for example, how the reasons for going to war have shifted over time. Since World War II, the share of wars fought with the aim to conquer and permanently absorb new territories beyond the borders of a state has dropped to almost zero. By contrast, from the end of the 20th century until the present, about 75 percent of the wars in the world have involved struggles over political power between ethno-nationalist movements, whether separatist or not. Moreover, 25 percent of the countries that exist today have experienced at least one such ethno-political war since their establishment (most have experienced more), including Burma, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Sudan, Thailand and Israel.

“One of the main factors driving these wars is the lack of political representation of ethnic minorities,” the scholar argues, “which contradicts the basic principle of self-rule that is now widely accepted. When, in a hypothetical country, the share of minorities that are not represented in the national government increases from 6 percent to 32 percent, the prospect of an armed conflict rises by 25 percent.”

And so on. Thanks to his research and his book, “Waves of War,” Wimmer has become somewhat of an oracle in this field of knowledge – that is, the comparative study of armed violence and war. In 2018, he published another book that made waves in academia and beyond, titled “Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart.”

“Andreas is a legend in this area. He has no equal when it comes to the breadth of his comparative knowledge, in terms of the types of conflicts he studies, the geographic scope and the historical depth,” says Ronit Levine-Schnur, a law professor at Reichman University, Herzliya. She is also the cofounder, with Prof. Daphna Joel, a neuroscientist from Tel Aviv University, of the new Day After the War Forum, which they established to discuss the legal and geopolitical goals of the current war in Gaza. A few weeks ago, Wimmer delivered a fascinating talk within the framework of the forum's weekly lecture.

“We invited him to speak to a broad Israeli public, because he offers research-based, comparative analysis of the conflict in which we are all immersed,” Dr. Levine-Schnur explains. “What I learned from Wimmer is that, unfortunately, our conflict checks off all the most problematic items on the list: It's a conflict over territory and also over independence, it involves religion on both sides, including jihadist-Islamist terrorism, and it also reflects a global conflict between the U.S.-West axis and the Russia-Iran axis.”

According to Wimmer's research, one of the simplest predictors of whether a conflict will erupt in a certain place is whether that place has experienced conflict in the past. That is, violent conflicts have a tendency to recur over time – for several reasons. One is that violence leads to the spatial and social distancing between the groups in conflict; there is thus less exposure to the rival group, which enhances mutual stereotyping.

For every Gazan child killed, Israel loses thousands of friends around the world. I see it in the United States, where I live – every day that passes there is an erosion of support for Israel, which was very high after the horrific massacre of that Saturday.

Violence also dehumanizes, demonizes and denigrates the Other, augmenting the possibility of future conflict by lowering the threshold when it comes to killing the Other. A third factor, very relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian war, is that in a protracted conflict, the belligerent parties may often perceive their own attacks as a

preventive action, which leads to endless cycles of violence, in which offense is considered defense and vice versa.

However, despite such tragic spirals of bloodshed throughout history, no conflict lasts forever, Wimmer observes, adding: “During the last 200 years, there have been three patterns according to which ethno-political conflicts come to an end. They all achieve, in one way or another, the national aspiration for self-governance for the majority of people, and bring about an end to political exclusion on ethno-political grounds.

“The first way is to share positions of government power – that is, to build an inclusive governing coalition that includes both the majority and minorities. The second way is through the division of territory; namely, to give each group its own state, in which it represents the dominant majority. The third way is through violent or nonviolent ethnic cleansing (or, more subtly, through cultural assimilation), which create clear patterns of demographic dominance. Usually the population of deportees or refugees is assimilated into the population of a neighboring country, where they form the majority. Historically, we see a combination of the three ways and especially the combination of partition and ethnic cleansing.”

Ethnic cleansing sounds terrible. Even in the language of social science, it’s difficult to use that term.

“It’s important to distinguish between explanation and justification; these are separate ways of using our brain. In the case at hand, analyzing the causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing does not mean in any way that we justify it. If I say that many conflicts in history ended through partition and ethnic cleansing, it doesn’t mean that I think it’s a good thing in any way, it’s just a historical fact. When scientists explain a certain disease, that doesn’t mean they encourage it.”

Following that clarification, Wimmer explains that the concept of ethnic cleansing does not refer to genocide, but rather to the transfer of a population, usually from one state to another, with or without violence. For example, during the Balkan wars Serbs were forced to move to Serbia, Croats to Croatia and so on. In the war between Turkey and Greece (1919-1922), each population moved to the country where they formed the majority, as was also the case during the war between India and Pakistan (1947-1949). According to this understanding, the term ethnic cleansing can be applied to the war of 1947-1949, when Palestinians were forced to leave their homes, and also to the case when Jews were forced to leave various Muslim-majority Arab countries for the nascent State of Israel or voluntarily immigrated there.



Serb tanks move towards the city of Pec west of Pristina in 1998. External intervention, as in the case of NATO’s entry into the Balkan wars, is one way to end a violent conflict. Credit: JOEL ROBINE / AFP

Although the practice of ethnic cleansing is no longer legally or morally “accepted,” he says, it is still occurring across the world, such as in Nagorno Karabakh, Sudan or Timor, and to a lesser degree in the West Bank as well: In the past month alone, approximately 800 Palestinians left their homes due to harassment by settlers.

Wimmer: “There are currently two ideas of ethnic cleansing in the Middle East. There are those in Israel who fantasize about the ‘whole Land of Israel’ and whose project is to cleanse the West Bank of Palestinians and annex it to the State of Israel. Such a solution will create a massive legitimacy problem for Israel; Israel will lose the support of many countries, including the United States, which may no longer be willing to deter Iran

and Hezbollah. It will also inflame tensions with neighboring Arab states, leading to new rounds of war. Therefore, I think this is a disastrous idea for Israel and a major obstacle to sustainable peace .

“On the other side, there is the vision of radical Palestinian terrorist organizations to get rid not only of the Israeli occupation, but of Israel as a state. This is also a radical ideology of ethnic cleansing. It is unacceptable from a moral point of view and inconceivable from a military and political point of view, in light of Israel’s military power and its alliances with Europe and the United States.”

Consequently, Wimmer continues, “the two visions of ethnic cleansing are not feasible, which leaves us with two other possible solutions for sustainable peace in your region: either the two-state solution (partition), or one state in which Palestinians will share power. For either of these two solutions to be realized, Israeli politics would have to change, because Israel is currently ruled by a government that is not interested in such solutions and even actively works against them. And on the Palestinian side, it will be necessary to find representatives with more legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public that are at the same time committed to a peaceful future.”

Asked how he personally categorizes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, Wimmer shifts uncomfortably but addresses the question (and all our other ones) despite the fact that it is emotionally charged and politically complex. He divides his response into several parts, starting with the Arab citizens of Israel. “There are many countries with ethnic-national minorities that are comparable to Israel,” he says. “I would not define them as discriminated against, but as powerless. In such cases, there is a higher probability of violence compared to groups that are part of the ruling coalition. To reduce the probability of violence, the solution here is both clear and easy: to share power and give them a seat at the table of government.”

As for the situation in the West Bank, he says, “If I have to place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in some kind of comparative framework, I would say that it is closest to a colonial situation. The Palestinians who are under Israeli occupation are not citizens of Israel and therefore cannot be characterized as an ethno-national minority of Israel. They have no sovereignty in matters of security, they have no control over the land, they don’t have citizenship – and are all the while subject to the authority of Israel. This is a quasi-colonial situation, something akin to indirect rule in a colony, which represents an extreme form of political discrimination. It is very rare today in the world.

There are currently two ideas of ethnic cleansing. There are those in Israel whose project is to cleanse the West Bank of Palestinians and annex it. And there’s the vision of radical Palestinian terrorist organizations to get rid not only of the Israeli occupation, but of Israel as a state.

Andreas Wimmer

Comparatively speaking, political discrimination, including its less severe forms, doubles the probability of violence either in the form of armed conflict or terrorism.”

Wimmer continues with the historical analogy: “Are the occupied territories in the West Bank a case of ‘settler colonialism’? Yes, in the sense that the Palestinians in the territories are displaced and dispossessed to make room for settlers, who hail from the dominant group and are protected by the state. But also no, because Israeli settlers think about their own project as a ‘return to the homeland’ and not as the conquest of new territory. In light of these facts, I would characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a struggle against an extreme form of political discrimination, which arises from a quasi-colonial situation.”

But when Hamas enters the picture, a clarification is needed: “It’s important to emphasize that the analogy to anti-colonial struggles is only meaningful as long as it is assumed that Israel’s right to exist is accepted by the Palestinians, and that their struggle refers only to the liberation of the occupied territories – as the Algerians, for example, struggled against French rule over Algeria (1954-1962). But if the struggle is not only against the occupation but also against the very existence of the State of Israel, as the Hamas charter makes clear, then the conflict takes the form of a threat of ethnic cleansing or even genocide, since the Israelis have nowhere to go. They have no ‘mother’ state, as in the case of the French settlers who left Algeria and returned to France.”



Algerians demonstrating against French President Charles de Gaulle's self-determination policy for their country, in 1960. Credit: AP

And as if this predicament isn't complicated enough, there are other elements that distinguish the Israeli-Palestinian case from other conflicts, Wimmer notes. The first: "Unlike any other cases I know of in the history of ethnic cleansing, the one in 1948, when Palestinians were forcibly expelled from the future territory of the State of Israel, did not lead to their integration in the receiving countries with a similar population. When Greeks left Turkey for Greece, they integrated into the general population of Greece, and today it is difficult to distinguish between Greek-Turks and 'original' Greeks. What's more, the Greeks who left Turkey have no ambition to return and occupy the lands they left. The same goes for Muslims who fled from India to Pakistan and Hindus who fled from Pakistan to India. In the case of the Palestinian refugees, the Arab countries housed them in refugee camps, where their will to return to their home was nourished."

The second distinguishing feature, he says, is that "Israel is surrounded by hostile countries, and this is one of the reasons the latter did not naturalize and assimilate the Palestinian refugees. The hostility of neighboring countries is unique and massively heightens Israel's security problems. Why are these countries hostile? Well, this is related to the third singularity. When the project of establishing the State of Israel started, after World War I, only 10 percent of the people who would eventually become citizens of the country lived in Israel. In all other nation-states that emerged over the last 200 years, the majority of the nation had already lived for many generations in the territory on which its state was founded."

And fourth: "Israelis are at the heart of regional and global power struggles, between Iran, Arab countries, the United States and Europe. These global and regional forces complicate any solution, because there are so many actors and interests that can destroy possible long-term solutions. It doesn't help that all these forces are so intimately tied to your conflict. There are also regional forces operating in other conflicted places, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad or Sudan, but in Israel these regional actors are also joined by global forces."

I asked Wimmer about another prominent factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the major role religion plays in it. On one hand, there is Judaism and the belief that Jews have been "promised" ownership of this land. On the other hand, there is radical Islam, which revealed its most brutal side on that infernal Saturday. Wimmer says the religious aspects of the conflict do not make it unique or fundamentally different from conflicts between linguistically defined groups. But he notes that religion adds an additional element here that is important to acknowledge.

"There are recurring characteristics of Islamist radicalism around the world, such as that of Hamas, Daesh [Islamic State], Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al-Qaida in the Maghreb. These groups are connected on a global level and maintain relations with each other, both actual and ideological. This is not the case with other ethno-national movements," he says. "The Tamils in Sri Lanka, for example, were not connected to the Chechens of Russia, to go back to two of the examples. But Islamist organizations do share resources and often receive funds from the same sources. In addition, they share a jihadist ideology that legitimizes or even glorifies violence against civilians."

Wimmer, as noted, was born in Switzerland – a country that is a historical amalgamation of four nationalities that are maintaining one of the longest-lasting and impressive partnerships in world history. Each minority speaks a separate language – French, German, Italian or Romansh – has its own culture and practices its own customs. Concurrently, Switzerland maintains a highly decentralized governing system that is combined with direct democracy. It's not by chance that the Swiss army is known primarily for inventing the pocketknife and less for its combat history. Since 1848 the Swiss have not fought against anyone or even among themselves.

Your homeland arouses envy, I tell Wimmer – just before an air-raid siren sends me scurrying to the safe space and severs our video conversation.

“The Swiss case is successful because from the beginning there was an informal agreement between all the language groups in Switzerland to share power and to each occupy a seat at the government table,” he observes. “As a result, the differences between these groups never became politicized, let alone escalated into a violent conflict.”

Coming soon to this part of the world, too? If only we could harbor such hope.

25 novembre (The Economist)

[The obesity pay gap is worse than previously thought \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

Economies of scales

The obesity pay gap is worse than previously thought

It affects men as well as women, and is wider for the well-educated



image: getty images

Nov 23rd 2023

Obese people experience discrimination in many parts of their lives, and the workplace is no exception. Studies have long shown that obese workers, defined as those with a body-mass index (bmi) of 30 or more, earn significantly less than their slimmer counterparts. In America, several state and local governments are contemplating laws against this treatment. On November 22nd, one such ban came into force in New York City.

Yet the costs of weight discrimination may be even greater than previously thought. “The overwhelming evidence,” wrote the Institute for Employment Studies, a British think-tank, in a recent report, “is that it is only women living with obesity who experience the obesity wage penalty.” They were expressing a view that is widely aired in academic papers. To test it, *The Economist* has analysed data concerning 23,000 workers from the American Time Use Survey, conducted by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. Our number-crunching suggests that, in fact, being obese hurts the earnings of both women and men.




image: the economist


The data we analysed cover men and women aged between 25 and 54 and in full-time employment. At an aggregate level, it is true that men's BMIs are unrelated to their wages. But that changes for men with university degrees. For them, obesity is associated with a wage penalty of nearly 8%, even after accounting for the separate effects of age, race, graduate education and marital status. When we re-ran our analysis, using a different dataset that covers nearly 90,000 people, from the Department of Health and Human Services, we got similar results.

The conclusion—that well-educated workers in particular are penalised for their weight—holds for both sexes (see chart 1). Moreover, the higher your level of education, the greater the penalty. We found that obese men with a bachelor's degree earn 5% less than their thinner colleagues, while those with a graduate degree earn 14% less. Obese women, it is true, still have it worse: for them, the equivalent figures are 12% and 19%, respectively.

Weight loss

2

United States, estimated wage gap* between obese† and non-obese workers, 2006-22, %



*Full-time workers aged 25-54, controlling for sex, age, race, education and marital status †BMI of 30 and over

Sources: BLS; *The Economist*

image: the economist

Your line of work makes a difference, too (see chart 2). When we crunched the numbers for individual occupations and industries, we found the greatest disparities in high-skilled jobs. Obese workers in health care, for example, make 11% less than their slimmer colleagues; those in management roles make roughly 9% less, on average. In sectors such as construction and agriculture, meanwhile, obesity is actually associated with higher wages.

These results suggest that the aggregate costs of wage discrimination borne by overweight workers in America are hefty. Suppose you assume that obese women, but not men, face a wage penalty of 7% (the average across all such women in our sample) and that this is the same regardless of their level of education. Then a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that they bear a total cost of some \$30bn a year. But if you account for both the discrimination faced by men, and for the higher wage penalty experienced by the more educated (who also tend to earn more), the total cost to this enlarged group more than doubles, to \$70bn per year.

What can be done? Several cities, such as San Francisco and Washington, dc, already ban discrimination on the basis of appearance. A handful of states—including Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and Vermont—are considering similar bills. The ban New York City began to enforce on November 22nd prohibits weight-based discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodation such as hotels and restaurants. Alas, it is unlikely to accomplish much. When we restricted our analysis to workers in Michigan, where a similar ban has been in place for nearly 50 years, we found the obesity wage penalty to be no lower than for America as a whole. Outlawing prejudice is one thing. Ironing it out of society is quite another.

25 novembre (The Economist)

[The man who escaped genocide, twice \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The man who escaped genocide, twice

Refugees from Sudan are furious with the world for ignoring their plight



Nov 23rd 2023

By Kinley Salmon

In a sweltering shack in a refugee camp in eastern Chad, Abdelaziz listened calmly as people told him about the horrors they had witnessed. Cold-blooded killings at roadblocks, beheadings, swollen bodies lying on the road. They had fled from Darfur, a region of western [Sudan](#), where Arab militias were intent on slaughtering anyone who belonged to the Masalit, a black African ethnic group.

Occasionally Abdelaziz would interject, offering words of comfort to a woman who wiped her tears on her hijab, or a more precise translation for the medical staff at the camp. But unlike the other humanitarian workers, Abdelaziz, 34, hadn't flown in from another crisis. He had fled [from Darfur](#) himself – the second time in his life he had escaped [genocide](#).

More than 450,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Chad since April, when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (saf), the regular army, and the Rapid Support Forces (rsf), a paramilitary group. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the saf, and Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, head of the rsf, had been running the country since late 2021, when they ousted the civilian prime minister in a coup.

One morning when Abdelaziz was 14 he heard gunshots. He ran to the outskirts of the village to find armed men on camels and horseback riding towards him

All three men had been part of a transitional government, formed after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's long-standing dictator, in 2019. They were meant to guide Sudan towards democratic elections. But neither al-Burhan or Hemedti ever had the slightest intention of surrendering power. Instead they are fighting over it, and destroying the country in the process.

The heaviest fighting this year has been in the capital, Khartoum. In West Darfur, one of the region's five states, the rsf appears to have the upper hand. Eagerly abetted by Arab militias, it has been killing Masalit civilians, firing rockets into homes and mowing people down at roadblocks. The un is investigating credible reports of 13 mass graves, while satellite images show huge increases in the number of burials in city cemeteries.

The first time someone tried to kill Abdelaziz because of the colour of his skin was 20 years ago. In 2003 armed groups from some black African tribes in Darfur rebelled against the Arab-dominated government. Al-Bashir responded by sending Arab militias to attack not only the rebels, but also countless villages where black Africans lived. By 2005, when the fighting had subsided, about 170,000 people had died, most from hunger and disease. America declared what happened in Darfur a genocide.





Abdelaziz was 14 at the time. He spent his days working in the fields with his sister, Halima, who was two years younger than him. The pair were inseparable. One morning Abdelaziz heard gunshots. He ran to the outskirts of the village to find armed men on camels and horseback riding towards him. They were part of the Janjaweed (local slang for evil men on horses), an Arab militia which formed the basis of the rsf. "That day I saw 27 men killed," said Abdelaziz.

He and his family, along with other villagers, hid in the scrub but the militia hunted them down. They seized Abdelaziz and one of his friends. He said the militiamen used him as a "slave", making him fetch endless jerry cans of water for them. After 15 days Abdelaziz managed to escape, leaving his friend behind, and eventually found his family. They were alive, but his mother had been shot in the back and Halima had been raped. He never saw his friend again.


The family walked and walked until they reached eastern Chad, where they ended up in a refugee camp. They were safe, but life was grindingly difficult

The family trekked for days towards eastern Chad, where they ended up in a refugee camp. They were safe, but life was grindingly difficult. There was no way of earning a living. His mother was still in pain, and Halima, who had been severely injured during the rape, was very ill. "When she went to urinate, the urine was blood," said Abdelaziz.

Over three years Halima underwent several operations in the refugee camp and in local hospitals. Nothing made her feel better. Desperate, Abdelaziz managed to find a un officer in charge of resettling refugees and told them how ill his sister was. A month later the un asked if his family wanted to emigrate. "They asked me where," said Abdelaziz. "I can go anywhere," he told them excitedly.

Because of his sister's condition, the family was considered a high priority for resettlement. The UN told them they would be moving to America. Abdelaziz was giddy with happiness. "We were going to be in a safe place," he said.

The family's elation was short-lived. As they were preparing to emigrate, Halima died. Abdelaziz lost both his sister and his hopes for a new life: he said the UN told him that Halima's death meant he and his family would no longer be going to America.





By 2011, after some partial peace deals and the deployment of UN and African Union troops, the situation in Darfur had stabilised, though it was still tense. By then a grown man, Abdelaziz hoped finally to go to secondary school. He dreamed of getting a job defending his people's rights, and of growing crops on his family's farm back in Darfur so he could one day send money back to his relatives.

Abdelaziz returned to his village, but had a nasty shock. The same militias who had burnt the place down in 2003, he said, were now occupying the farms. Abdelaziz said they told him, "You can choose: you can go away or we can kill you."


He fled to el-Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, where he started to rebuild his life. It was a hopeful time for Sudan. The protests that preceded the fall of al-Bashir prompted more refugees to trickle back home. Ali Yagoub Idris returned in 2019. "We believed that the regime that targeted us was falling down," he said. "I was very optimistic."

The protests that preceded the fall of al-Bashir prompted more refugees to trickle back. "We believed that the regime that targeted us was falling down," said one. "I was very optimistic"

Abdelaziz finished secondary school, got married and started a family, and enrolled in university, where he was studying to become an English teacher. He founded a small English-language school to fund his course.

Then everything fell apart, again. Days after Abdelaziz's second son was born, he heard gunfire. The family lived near an army base in el-Geneina. Suddenly it seemed as though there were heavily armed fighters everywhere.

Last time, Abdelaziz said, the militia used Kalashnikovs and roamed on foot or on camels and horses. Now they drove pickups, carried more powerful weapons and fired rockets. Abdelaziz and his wife were terrified. "We wanted to get out, we tried to get out, but we didn't find a way," he said. They finally made a break for it as a surge of people ran past their house. "We left everything," said Abdelaziz.





As they fled, Abdelaziz was shot in the leg. He rolled up his trousers to show me the scar. They sheltered in another neighbourhood, farther away from the army base. But it wasn't as safe as they'd hoped. "It became very very dangerous because all the time we were being attacked from different sides," he said. "They were killing and killing. They said we don't want to see the Masalit tribe." Many bodies were thrown into the river that runs through el-Geneina, said Abdelaziz. Others were shot and drowned as they tried to swim across it. "The things that I saw, I cannot explain..." he said, trailing off.


In June Abdelaziz tried once again to head towards Chad. The roads were full of militiamen, roadblocks and dead bodies, he said. "When they find a black person, there is no question, they just shoot you." In the chaos he was separated from his wife and sons. He found out later they had made it to Chad – but only just.

Days after Abdelaziz's second son was born, he heard gunfire. Suddenly it seemed as though there were heavily armed fighters everywhere

Arab gunmen were intent on wiping out male Masalit of any age – countless babies and children have been murdered. Desperate mothers took to dressing them as girls or hiding them under their skirts. "They wanted to take my two boys. My wife refused and shouted," he said. They beat her badly, but she clung onto the boys and the three of them managed to cross the border.

Abdelaziz made it to a refugee camp in Chad, where he was reunited with his wife and children. He joined an NGO's medical team as an assistant, helping to counsel other refugees. For all the refugees who have arrived from Darfur this year there are just three psychotherapists and a single psychiatrist. Abdelaziz finds meaning in the job – "I have to help my people," he said.

Over half the refugees are children. Hana, a six-year-old in a ragged orange hijab, her thin legs dangling off a plastic seat, stared at me with enormous brown eyes. The girl's parents, explained Hana's relative, Amzouhour, had already fled from violence in 2003. They lived in a camp for displaced people in el-Geneina.





Soon after the fighting started in April, Hana's mother was killed by a rocket. "[She] died in front of her," said Amzouhour. Hana's father fled with his two tiny, terrified children towards Chad. But he didn't make it. A sniper shot him on the road in front of his children, Amzouhour told me, as Hana hid her face in her hijab.

After the events in June, there was a brief lull in violence in el-Geneina. Most Masalit fled to Chad, though some took shelter near an saf base north of the city. But in early November the rsf attacked the base. As saf soldiers fled, Arab militiamen began attacking the Masalit. Abdelaziz sent me photos of bodies in the streets and videos of men, some still breathing, being crammed into mass graves.

Sharing my helicopter to eastern Chad earlier this autumn were three people from the International Criminal Court (icc), which is investigating the latest atrocities. But the prospect that anyone will be held accountable is vanishingly small. The men who raped Abdelaziz's sister and killed many thousands in the early 2000s are still free. Although one case is moving slowly through the icc, not a single person has been brought to justice for the genocide after 20 years.

Arab gunmen were intent on wiping out male Masalit of any age. Desperate mothers took to dressing their sons as girls or hiding them under their skirts

The icc's failures are a source of dismay, disbelief and sometimes anger among Sudanese refugees. "From 2003 up until now, there is no one [convicted]...there is no accountability," said Abdelaziz, who brought up the subject when I asked him if he hoped one day to go back to Sudan.

It is the near future that worries him more. Earlier this month, after the massacres began, he went to Adre, a nearby town, to find out the whereabouts of his brother-in-law, whom they had left behind in el-Geneina. "I found many youth from Arab militias who were my friends in secondary school and university," he told me. "When they saw me, I was afraid." He doesn't feel safe in the camp. Officials have suggested he and his family move to Chad's capital, or even to Cameroon.

Abdelaziz sent me two photos of a man he used to work with, wearing a white robe, who he said is going from town to town to find and kill him. "They tried genocide in 2003. They are going to finish us."

Some of the names in this piece have been changed.

Kinley Salmon is Africa correspondent for *The Economist*

images: zohra bensemra/reuters, frederic noy/panos pictures, alvaro ybarra zavalala, getty images

25 novembre (Haaretz)

[Why Are Israelis So Averse to a Cease-fire in the War With Hamas? - Israel News - Haaretz.com](#)

Why Are Israelis So Averse to a Cease-fire in the War With Hamas?

Contrary to the prevailing view, an agreement that will halt the shooting plays a significant role that goes beyond the battlefield. No wonder the government and the army are trying to avoid it



An IDF soldier rests on the barrel of a self-propelled artillery howitzer, shortly after the start of the war. Credit: Jack Guez/AP

Nitzan Rothem

Nitzan Rothem is the military and security community head of the Israeli Sociological Society.

Nov 24, 2023 6:25 pm IST

In its various manifestations over the past 75 years, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has involved three different kinds of cease-fires: those that take place during rounds of military campaigns, those that are declared at their conclusion, and the long-term cease-fire that was laid down in 1967. The latter supplanted the 1949 armistice agreements that established what we know as the Green Line at the end of the War of Independence.

Despite the prevalence and inevitability of the cease-fire as a mechanism related to both conducting and [ending wars](#), Israel's political leadership, the army and even the public have displayed an aversion to it, both in principle and in use. [This aversion](#) has intensified in [the current war](#), in light of Israel's [determination to "destroy" Hamas](#), an aim that by definition rules out a cease-fire. But the seeds to this disfavor were sowed over the past decade – as Israeli political and military leaders emptied the concept of much of its meaning.

Israel is not unique in having undergone a plethora of cease-fires. The Zurich-based ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Cease-fire Dataset documents more than 2,000 cease-fires in armed conflicts worldwide between 1989 and 2020. Topping the list, which encompasses 66 countries and 109 armed organizations, is Sudan, with 169 cease-fires in what has now developed into a full-blown civil war. Sudan is followed by India, with 167 cease-fires; the Philippines, with 157; and Syria, with 140. Israel is in fifth place, with 103 cease-fires during this period.

The three years that have passed since the report's compilation necessitate an update of the data. A new report would likely also include the cease-fires that are implicit in [the term that has become dominant during the current war in Gaza: "pause,"](#) hafuga in Hebrew. The Israeli public might be manipulated into perceiving a pause as a mechanism different from a cease-fire, when in fact a pause signifies the same ambivalence that a cease-fire has: of a stop in the fighting and continued fighting at the same time.

Researchers draw on the ETH/PRIO dataset to investigate the influence of the cease-fire as a means to obtaining military and diplomatic outcomes. Such studies avoid using big words like “peace” and “war,” and examine a more modest goal, such as reduction of violence. But even in relation to reduction of violence, the findings are gloomy. Many of the cease-fires around the world effectively strengthen fighting forces, both militarily and politically. Cease-fires enable combatants to upgrade their military capabilities and to replenish the weapons in their possession. They also diminish the influence of civil-society organizations as peacemakers, because as noncombatants, these groups are not signatories to such agreements.

The current discussion in Israel, too, seems to take an instrumental view of the cease-fire as little more than a means to an end. Its opponents argue that any cease-fire will break the Israel Defense Forces’ fighting momentum and effectively reward Hamas. Advocates maintain that it will assist in bringing about the release of some of the captives and contribute to the legitimacy of the military campaign by providing [humanitarian relief to the people in Gaza](#).

In addition to last week’s “pauses,” [this week Israel and Hamas agreed to a four-day cease-fire](#), with an option to extend it.



Palestinians flee to northern Gaza as Israeli tanks block the Salah al-Din road in the central Gaza Strip on Friday, as the four-day cease-fire in the Israel-Hamas war begins. Credit: Mohammed Dahman /AP

In order to understand how cease-fires can be drained of significance, we need to hark back to the summer of 2014 and Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip. There were 17 cease-fires during the 50 days of combat, nine of which encompassed all of Gaza, while the other eight were limited to specific areas.

Israel launched its operation on July 8. A week later, reports began to come in about an Egyptian-initiated proposal for a cease-fire, but Israeli news reported that while Israel agreed, Hamas rejected this cease-fire. The IDF’s ground incursion into the Strip on July 18 led to heightened calls for a cease-fire on humanitarian grounds, and Israel’s security cabinet addressed this need. In the 2014 operation, the cabinet’s meetings were recorded, and Joseph Shapira, the state comptroller at the time, used the recordings in preparing a postwar report about coordination between the military and the political decision-makers with regard to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Shapira’s report affords insight into lexicon used by Israel to water down the concept of the cease-fire. (In the present war, attempts are being made to prevent such documentation of security cabinet meetings.)

The first factor that explains the development of resistance to the very idea of a cease-fire is the use of jargon that undermines its meaning and function. In 2014, cabinet members employed diversified semantics for describing it. In their meeting of July 23, 2014, for example, the defense minister, Moshe Ya’alon, spoke of a “humanitarian-diplomatic cease-fire” of 12 hours. Prime Minister Netanyahu preferred another formulation, counterpointing an “organized” cease-fire to a “tactical” one. “If there is no organized cease-fire, there needs to be a tactical cease-fire,” he said. The term “tactical” has been reprised by Netanyahu in the present war as well.

The linguistic convolutions continued in the security cabinet meeting of July 30, notably in the comments of Maj. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories: “The time-frame window is not a window of negotiations or of messages, it is a window of humanitarian need only.” Aware that

a cease-fire can be interpreted as a conciliatory signal, Mordechai insisted on formulations that would allow the IDF to continue shooting.

The current discussion here seems to take an instrumental view of the cease-fire. Opponents argue that any cease-fire will break the IDF's fighting momentum and effectively reward Hamas.

The second factor that eroded the meaning and function of a cease-fire in 2014 was the difficulty in translating the security cabinet's decisions into unequivocal actions on the ground. The need to introduce a cease-fire came up in three different meetings that were held in a single week. Still, a 12-hour cease-fire came into effect only four days after the first meeting and following an additional security cabinet meeting. An attempt to extend it by additional hours failed, exemplifying the uncertainty that is inherent in a cease-fire that is limited in time, on the one hand, and on the other is extendable.

The third factor was the fact that cease-fires during Protective Edge actually allowed fire. The media reported a cessation of fire and its renewal, but in practice neither side ever stopped shooting. The cease-fire of August 1, for example, was supposed to be in effect for 72 hours, but two hours after it was declared, Hamas killed soldiers and abducted the body of one of them, and the IDF responded with indiscriminate fire. Following that failure, another 72-hour cease-fire was declared on August 5, this time with the withdrawal of the IDF's ground forces from the Gaza Strip. Although hostilities did not abate, the cease-fire was extended for another 120 hours – five days.

A further extension lasted only 24 hours, after which the violence went on at a more intense level for another week. Each of these cease-fires could have been the “last,” but in practice each became part of the ongoing operation, exemplifying the scale of destruction and death that needed to take place before conditions were ripe for concluding the campaign.



Israeli reservists head home during one of the cease-fires during the 2014 Gaza war. Credit: Ilan Assayag

The cease-fire concept is further blurred by its multiple aims. In 2014, it was depicted as having a humanitarian purpose, aimed at alleviating the suffering of the Gazan population, and in the present conflict as a means that makes possible the return of the hostages to Israel. The humanitarian aim combines moral aims with legal ones, as it is impossible to prosecute a war without the legal recourse to humanitarian cease-fires. Last week, Israel began acceding to this need on a daily basis, this time based on its experience in 2014, by fixing daily intervals for humanitarian relief efforts. These short-term cease-fires are undertaken at the same declared time and for a few hours on each occasion.

In addition to intermingling moral and legal needs, the cease-fires intertwine temporal, humanitarian goals with far-reaching diplomatic aims. The artificial attempt to discern between humanitarian and diplomatic cease-fires encompasses the latter within the realm of an [“exit strategy”](#) and a “concluding mechanism” of the campaign. Today, foreign news agencies suggest that the impending cease-fire could lead to an end to the war.

The vagueness of the meaning and role of a cease-fires is even manifest in the 17th and final cease-fire of Operation Protective Edge, on August 26, 2014. One of its defining characteristics was that it was an “open” cease-fire. Strategic think tanks understood this openness as branching in contradictory directions: as an

opportunity to arrive at a diplomatic settlement, on the one hand, or simply to serve to delay the next round of destruction, on the other. Israeli governments went with the latter option.

* * *

In Operation Protective Edge, the Netanyahu government placed responsibility for implementation of the cease-fires on the army. Nine months after the hostilities ended, a Foreign Ministry document referred to the “unilateral cease-fires of the IDF,” thereby erasing the mutuality they embodied in practice.

However, it seems that the army itself did not live up to the challenge entailed in having this responsibility, but rather continued to empty cease-fires of a constructive role during warfare. The multiyear plans of IDF Chiefs of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and Aviv Kochavi – whose tours of duty both came after Operation Protective Edge – set forth military strategy without taking into account the existence of multiple and recurring cease-fires as a mechanism that has tactical, strategic and also moral significance.

“The IDF Strategy” for 2015-2018, produced by Eisenkot’s General Staff, did not address the issue of the cease-fire as a mechanism that operates during a campaign. This avoidance is surprising since this plan was written shortly after Operation Protective Edge, with its short-term cease-fires. The only reference in the plan to cease-fires related to them as a single and final way to attain victory and military deterrence. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon helped to obfuscate the fact that there had been multiple cease-fires, by focusing only on the last one during Protective Edge. He wrote a preface to a collection of articles dedicated to the 2015 “IDF Strategy,” in which he portrayed cease-fire as an ultimate victory: “We effectively induced the Hamas leadership to accept a cease-fire without forgoing any of our demands.” The cease-fire, Ya’alon wrote proudly, attested to “vanquishment and victory” over the enemy.

In the documents produced by Kochavi’s General Staff, Operation Protective Edge is referred to in a less flattering light, as an example of a series of “reprisal actions that went astray.” Kochavi’s plan perceived cease-fires as exposing the weakness of the Israeli side: passively being dragged into campaigns initiated by the foe. Israel, according to this conception, can declare unilateral cease-fires, but it is the rival side that decides on the first and last shot in every violent round.

Kochavi’s 2019-2022 strategy outline replaces the cease-fire with a new concept – “severance of contact” – and maintains that the IDF has a “right of veto” over both the start and the conclusion of rounds of fighting. But the notion of severance of contact does not stand up to the test of reality.

* * *

The Netanyahu of 2012 still tried to impart political significance to a cease-fire. In a statement to the Israeli public after Operation Pillar of Defense, he expressed a wish to maintain “a lengthy cease-fire.” Similarly, Yair Lapid, in his brief stint as prime minister, lent official validation to the cease-fire concept in Operation Breaking Dawn, in August 2022. He followed that with a speech to the United Nations in which he spoke about the two-state solution.

A little more than a year has passed since then, and we are again bombarded by a din of media reports about cease-fires, without the leadership imbuing them with a clear role that acknowledges their political significance. The media reports about potential cease-fires began a week after Hamas’ attack and continued after the launching of the ground offensive in the Strip. These reports continue to employ the vague language of Operation Protective Edge, thereby throwing sand in the Israeli public’s eyes about the hostages in Gaza and about our relations with the United States, which has called steadily for a cease-fire. Indeed, U.S. President Joe Biden presents a perspective that attributes to cease-fires not only tactical and strategic roles, but also diplomatic ones, reminding the Israeli public that the mechanism lets diplomacy and negotiations take the place of violence, and can thus extricate Israel from additional rounds of fighting, which are only becoming bloodier and more tragic.

But the language trap is sealed almost hermetically. Even among its advocates, a cease-fire requires accompanying adjectives so as to remove it from its connection to endless combat. On October 27, the United Nations called for an “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce,” while a November 6 joint

statement by Israeli democracy and peace organizations sought called on Israel to “strive for a stable cease-fire, within which negotiations for a political agreement will be started immediately.”

In the triangle made up of Israel’s political leadership, army and civil society, it is the third that was left to acknowledge that a cease-fire is frightening when severed from policy that is intended to end conflicts. The possibility still exists for cease-fires to stop merely demarcating rounds of violent conflict, but instead to be linked to mechanisms of conciliation: separation of forces, an armistice and a political agreement. Those who reject such possibilities risk plunging the region into a violent existence of “failed states.” A failed state is one that does not ensure the security and prosperity of its citizens, and whose government is nourished by the continuation of violence – a country in which survival and life have ceased to be values worth pursuing.

25 novembre (NYT)

[France Scoffs at an Englishman's 'Napoleon' - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com)

France Scoffs at an Englishman's 'Napoleon'

French critics considered Ridley Scott's new biopic lazy, pointless, boring, migraine-inducing, too short and historically inaccurate. And that's just to start.



Joaquin Phoenix as Napoleon Bonaparte in "Napoleon." Thierry Lentz, the head of the Napoleon Foundation, told a French newspaper that he found Phoenix's rendition of the emperor "a bit rude." Credit...Aidan Monaghan/Apple Original Films/Columbia Pictures

By [Catherine Porter](#)

Reporting from Paris

Nov. 24, 2023

The French do not like an Englishman's rendition of Napoleon.

Or at least, the French critics do not.

Looking grim and moody from under an [enormous bicorne hat](#), Joaquin Phoenix glowers from posters around Paris, promoting the film by Ridley Scott that offers the latest reincarnation of the French hero whose nose — as one reviewer [deliciously wrote](#) — still rises in the middle of French political life two centuries after his death.

Yet while [British](#) and [American](#) reviewers glowed, French critics considered it lazy, pointless, boring, migraine-inducing, too short and historically inaccurate. And that's just to start.

The critic for the left-wing daily Libération [panned the film](#) as not just ugly, but vacuous, positing nothing and "very sure of its inanity." The review in [Le Monde](#) offered that if the director's vision had one merit, it was "simplicity" — "a montage alternating between Napoleon's love life and his feats of battle."

The right-wing Le Figaro took many positions in its breathless coverage, using the moment to pump out a 132-page special-edition magazine on Napoleon, along with more than a dozen articles, including a reader poll and a Napoleon knowledge test. The newspaper's most memorable take came from Thierry Lentz, the director of the Napoleon Foundation, a charity dedicated to historical research: He considered Phoenix's version of Napoleon — compared to more than 100 other actors who have played the role — "a bit vulgar, a bit rude, with a voice from elsewhere that doesn't fit at all."

All of this was to be expected.



British and American critics praised the film, but their French counterparts panned it, to say the least. Credit...Quentin de Groeve/Hans Lucas, via Reuters

As the French writer Sylvain Tesson once famously said, “France is a paradise inhabited by people who think they’re in hell.” How else would you expect a country where the perennial response to “How are you?” is “Not bad” to respond to a historical film about itself?

But to have that film be about a French legend — even one whom many detest — played by an American actor and directed by a British filmmaker?

L’horreur.

“This very anti-French and very pro-English film is, however, not very ‘English’ in spirit,” said the historian [Patrick Gueniffey](#), in *Le Point* magazine, “because the English have never compromised their admiration for their enemy.”

“It’s hard not to see this hasty approach as the historical revenge of Ridley Scott, the Englishman,” assessed the satirical weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné*. “An Austerlitz of cinema? More like Waterloo.”

Bracing under the waterfall of negative reaction, you begin to wonder whether the criticism reveals more about the French psyche than the nation’s taste in historical cinema.

“When we talk about Napoleon, in fact we are getting at the heart of our principles and our political divisions,” explained Arthur Chevallier, a Napoleon expert who has published five books on the Corsican soldier who seized power after the French Revolution, crowned himself emperor and proceeded to conquer — and later lose — much of Western Europe.

“The common point among all French people is that Napoleon remains a subject that influences our understanding of ourselves, our identity,” Chevallier said.

Image



Phoenix and Ridley Scott, the film's director, at the premiere of the movie in Paris this month. Credit...Stephanie Lecocq/Reuters

More than 200 years after his death, the smudge of Napoleon's fingerprints still liberally decorates the country and its capital: along the streets and metro stations named after his generals and battles; from atop the Arc de Triomphe that he planned; in the gleam of the gold dome of the Invalides, under which his giant marble tomb rises.

Lawyers still follow an updated version of his civil code. Provincial regions are still overseen by prefects — or government administrators — in a system he devised. Every year, high schoolers take the baccalaureate exam that his regime introduced, and citizens are awarded [the country's top honor](#), which he invented.

Last Sunday, before the film hit theaters here, a French auction house announced that [it had sold one of Napoleon's signature bicorn hats](#) for a record 1.9 million euros, or \$2.1 million.

In recent decades, Napoleon's [record for misogyny, imperialism and racism](#) — he reimposed slavery eight years after the revolutionary government abolished it — [has come under glaring critical light](#). But that seems to have simply reinforced the weight of his legacy.

To many, Napoleon is the symbol of a [France that has come under assault from what they consider an American import of identity politics](#) and “wokeism.” The latest front page of the weekly far-right magazine Valeurs Actuelles declared him “The Anti-Woke Emperor.” (Its reviewer also panned the film: From the first scene, the viewer knows that “historical accuracy will suffer the guillotine,” wrote Laurent Dandrieu.)

In a [national poll conducted this week](#), 74 percent of respondents with an opinion on Napoleon considered his actions beneficial for France.

“You have the impression that when we talk about him, he's a living politician,” said Chevallier, who has already seen the film twice and counts himself among its few unabashed French fans.

Image



A reincarnated Napoleon and Imperial Guards welcomed viewers to a screening of the film in Ajaccio, the city in which the real Napoleon was born, on the Mediterranean island of Corsica. Credit...Pascal Pochard-Casabianca/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

What he liked, he said, was its different take on Napoleon and the revolution that birthed him and modern France. Instead of a regal leader with insatiable energy and ambition, Joaquin Phoenix portrays a regular grasping mortal who is the product of a bloodthirsty, barbaric upheaval — something that some find “very destabilizing,” Chevallier said, but that he considered interesting and instructive, “because you understand why Napoleon inspired such hate” among other European powers at the time.

He predicted that his fellow citizens who were more cinema fans than history buffs would like the film, which opened to the public on Wednesday.

Some 120,000 people went to see it across France that day — a strong opening, but not a blockbuster like “Asterix & Obelix: The Middle Kingdom,” which drew more than 460,000 on its opening day early this year, according to figures collected by C.B.O. Box Office, a firm that collates French box office data.

Moviegoers streaming out of a theater in the Latin Quarter of Paris on Thursday night were not enthused.

Augustin Ampe, 20, said he was all for demystifying Napoleon, but this was just too much. “Here he looks like a clumsy man focused only on his wife,” said the literature student, breaking for a moment from a fierce debate over the film’s failures with his friends. He preferred the mythical figure offered in the books and poems of Chateaubriand and Victor Hugo, he said.

Waiting for her movie date to finish his post-film cigarette, Charline Tartar, a librarian, assessed Phoenix’s rendition as too moany.

“It’s too bad Napoleon looks like a loser,” said Tartar, 27. She thought a French director would have paid more attention to historical accuracy.

“The French,” she added, “are very jealous of their history.”

[Catherine Porter](#) is an international reporter for The Times, covering France. She is based in Paris. **[More about Catherine Porter](#)**

25 novembre (NYT)

[Opinion | UNICEF Chief: Gaza Soon Faces a “Public Health Catastrophe” - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](#)

GUEST ESSAY

The Public Health Crisis in Gaza That Could Devastate a Generation

Nov. 22, 2023



Credit...Hatem Ali/Associated Press

By Catherine Russell

Ms. Russell is the executive director of UNICEF.

It is hard to describe what it means for someone to be “severely wasted,” but when you hold a child who is suffering from this most lethal form of acute malnutrition, you understand, and you never forget. In Afghanistan last year, I met a 3-month-old girl named Wahida who was so malnourished I could barely feel the weight of her in my arms. Her suffering has left an indelible mark on my heart.

Now the suffering in Gaza is leaving a similar mark on me. Last week, I visited the al-Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis in southern Gaza. Inside, I was met with a sea of patients, health care workers and the displaced. And there were children everywhere: girls and boys running through the corridors, resting on mattresses with their families and recovering in hospital beds. I met a 16-year-old being treated for injuries sustained when her neighborhood was bombed. Though she survived, the doctors say she will never be able to walk again.

The medical staffers were mounting truly heroic efforts to provide lifesaving care to their patients, including dozens of children. But with their supplies of fuel, medicines and water nearly depleted, it is unclear how long they can continue to provide even the most basic of interventions. In the hospital’s neonatal ward, for example, tiny babies were clinging to life in incubators, as doctors worried about how they could keep the machines running without fuel.

These children, Gaza’s youngest — as well as those in utero — are especially vulnerable to the burgeoning crisis of malnutrition and the prospect of starvation. After more than six weeks of war amid bombs and gunfire, a lack of electricity and the near-total closure of all border crossings, Gaza’s one million children are now food insecure, facing what could soon become a public health catastrophe.

Supplies of nutritious food have virtually run out. Shops are closed, and in the streets of Khan Younis I saw piles of garbage where there once were food stands. Last week, the al-Salam Mill in Deir al-Balah [was reportedly hit in an attack](#) and forced to shut down. This was Gaza’s last functional flour mill. All local flour production is now effectively halted.

The [hostage release deal outlined on](#) Tuesday would include a cease-fire of at least four days and would reportedly allow for some new shipments of basic humanitarian aid to go to the people of Gaza who desperately need it. But to save lives and ensure that Gaza's people, especially its children, remain healthy and stave off looming health issues, we as humanitarian partners must be permitted to bring quality food, essential nutrition supplies, water and fuel into Gaza, at levels that are sufficient to meet the surging needs. And we must be permitted to continue safely delivering these resources after hostilities resume.

Without sufficient quantities of nutritious food, people will quickly become malnourished and could eventually starve. The risks associated with food insecurity are compounded by the extreme scarcity of safe drinking water. According to [international humanitarian standards](#), one person [needs](#) a minimum of almost four gallons of clean water per day for drinking and to meet basic personal needs.

In Gaza, this standard is far from being met: About 96 percent of the water supply [is considered unfit for human consumption](#). Water pumping and wastewater treatment [have all ceased to function](#) because of the lack of fuel. People have resorted to accessing water from [unsafe sources that are salty or polluted](#).

These conditions, when combined with displacement and overcrowding in shelters, can quickly lead to disease outbreaks that threaten everyone, especially malnourished children. [Since mid-October](#), more than 71,000 total cases of acute respiratory infections have been reported, while over 22,000 cases of diarrheal infections have been reported in children under the age of 5. And without clean water, health care facilities cannot provide effective treatment to those in need, nor can they maintain basic infection prevention and control measures.

The consequences of this crisis extend not just to survivors of the war but also to those who will be born in its aftermath. The United Nations [estimates](#) that 50,000 pregnant women in Gaza — 5,500 of whom are expected to deliver in the next month — can no longer obtain basic antenatal health and nutrition services. Malnourished women are more likely to die and face complications during pregnancy and childbirth. They are more likely to have children born too small, too thin and vulnerable to undernutrition, illness and death. More than 105,000 breastfeeding mothers in Gaza are [now struggling to feed themselves and breastfeed their babies](#). [Our analyses](#) show that about half of all stunting in early childhood originates during pregnancy or in the first six months of life — a time when (in the absence of baby formula, which is in extremely short supply in Gaza right now) children are entirely dependent on their mothers for nutrition.

We project that over the next few months, child wasting, the most life-threatening form of malnutrition in children, could increase by nearly 30 percent in Gaza. Up to 5,000 of these children could experience severe wasting, in which [dangerous weight loss](#) and acutely [weakened immune systems](#) put them at imminent risk of death — even from illnesses like the common cold, other respiratory infections and diarrhea. These are conservative projections; the longer the conflict and siege continue, the higher these figures will rise.

Without urgent therapeutic feeding and care, severely malnourished children may not survive. Even if they do survive, their condition may [disrupt their physical growth](#) and [cognitive development](#), with irreversible long-term effects for the vast majority of them. Undernourished and stunted children are more likely to develop chronic health problems as adults, and more likely to have [lower educational achievement and economic security](#).

Even [before the current crisis](#), approximately 30,000 children under the age of 5 in Gaza were experiencing stunted growth, while more than 7,600 suffered from wasting. Now the violence has shut down lifesaving prevention, screening and treatment services for malnutrition that were [previously reaching the 340,000 children under 5 years of age](#) in Gaza. With hospitals and health centers ceasing to function and nutrition programs nonoperational, we cannot get malnourished children the critical prevention and treatment services they urgently need.

In the humanitarian community, we use the phrase “time is of the essence” a lot, perhaps to the point where it has lost its ability to convey urgency. But that is exactly the situation we are in right now in Gaza. If we cannot get proper nutrition and care services, safe water and sanitation to children and women now, they will die.

Gaza’s children have endured far too much death and suffering already. In just the last seven weeks, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry, at least 5,600 children have been killed and nearly 9,000 injured because of the ongoing conflict. We must not let this grim tally rise, especially when the solutions are so evident: sustained, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians wherever they are, to bring essential food nutrition supplements, fuel and other humanitarian supplies into Gaza. Delays will cost lives.

The parties to this conflict have the power to stop this nutrition crisis from turning into a catastrophe for Gaza’s one million children. I urge them to give us the space to do our jobs so that we can get these kids the support they need and deserve.

Catherine Russell is the eighth executive director of UNICEF. She previously served as ambassador at large for global women’s issues at the U.S. State Department.

25 novembre (The Guardian)

[‘Government is not listening’: anger over immigration spills into riot on Dublin’s streets | Ireland | The Guardian](#)

‘Government is not listening’: anger over immigration spills into riot on Dublin’s streets

Night of unrest in Irish capital an overdue reckoning for many who say their concerns are not being addressed

Fri 24 Nov 2023 17.29 CET



Police stand in front of protesters in Dublin during a riot on Thursday night that was sparked by a stabbing attack in the city. Photograph: Clodagh Kilcoyne/Reuters

The young rioter surveyed the scene. A bus and a car blazed on O’Connell Bridge while masked groups marauded across the city centre looting shops, attacking police and shooting fireworks, turning the air acrid.

A police helicopter hovered and officers with shields and batons were assembling at the far end of O’Connell Street but the heart of Dublin, for now, belonged to the young man in a black hoodie who started to dance in the glow of the flames.

Comrades cheered as he punched the air and jiggled to a soundtrack of breaking glass, shouts and sirens. He held his arms aloft like Rocky and paused, mesmerised by the mayhem. “Beautiful,” he said. “Fuck-ing beautiful.”

For other people in [Ireland](#) and elsewhere who saw images of [Thursday’s anarchy](#) it was the night Dublin went mad. For participants it was the night the city came to its senses – that here was an overdue venting of rage, a reckoning.

Ireland, according to this narrative, has opened the floodgates to foreigners with no controls or checks, leaving rapists and murderers to prowl the streets, and no one – not the government, not opposition parties, not the media, not the police – is taking it seriously.

So when social media rumours attributed a horrific stabbing attack on three children and a creche worker to a foreigner – Algerian, Moroccan, Romanian, versions varied – groups descended on Parnell Square, the scene of the crime, and decided to unleash chaos.

“People need to fight for this country,” said Samantha, a 27-year-old mother, as masked youths clashed with police attempting to retake Eden Quay along the River Liffey. “I’m not racist; I don’t mind people coming in if they respect Irish people. But the likes of the toerags coming into this country – they’re not vetted and are causing havoc.”



Workers clear a burnt-out tram after overnight violence in Dublin. Photograph: Clodagh Kilcoyne/Reuters

The unfolding scenes, in contrast, were legitimate havoc, a corrective to a political establishment impervious to [previous protests](#) over rising numbers of asylum seekers, said Samantha. “When we do things peacefully we get ignored.” She had left her five-year-old at home without dinner in order to join the revolt, she said. “I’m out here fighting for my country. We shouldn’t have to do this.”

Others echoed the refrain: to make Ireland safe, wreck the capital.

“It’s not right but it had to be done. The government is not listening,” said one man in his 20s, a bystander rather than a looter. “This isn’t against foreigners. We were the first emigrants. Immigrants are driving our buses, cleaning our hospitals – we need them. But they need to be vetted.”

Ireland’s demography has been transformed in recent decades as a booming economy reversed the historical flow of emigration. A fifth of the 5 million people now living in Ireland were born elsewhere. A recent increase in refugees from Ukraine and other countries fuelled a backlash amid concern over a housing shortage and straining public services. The number housed by the state jumped from 7,500 in 2021 to 73,000 in 2022.

Amid the destruction on Thursday night there was some linguistic nuance, with “non-national” usually preferred to “foreigner”, and “unvetted” or “unregulated” preferred to “illegal”, and an aversion to the label “far right”.

There was nothing subtle about the targeting of police. Bottles, bricks, fireworks and other missiles rained down on officers, many of whom lacked helmets and shields. The crowd cornered and attacked isolated officers, leaving several injured. Eleven police vehicles were damaged.

Journalists too were unwelcome and photographers had to conceal cameras. “He’s with the Guardian,” a man in his 60s, holding a tricolour, shouted. Younger, hooded men formed an intimidating cluster. The worst sin was to be with RTÉ, the national broadcaster, or the liberal Irish Times, which were accused of cheering the “replacement” of Irish people by new arrivals.



Violent protests break out across central Dublin after stabbing attack at school – video

Many onlookers were appalled. “It’s heartbreaking for Dublin, for Ireland, for [Europe](#),” said Matthew Butler, 28. A 53-year-old postman who gave his name only as John expressed fury. “Just a bunch of scumbags out to wreck Dublin city. The gardaí [police] should have free rein to beat the shit out of them.”

On Friday, Leo Varadkar, the taoiseach, said the rioters had shamed themselves and Ireland. “I want to say to a nation that is unsettled and afraid: this is not who we are – this is not who we want to be – and this is not who we will ever be.” The Garda commissioner, Drew Harris, [blamed the disturbances](#) on a “lunatic, hooligan faction driven by far-right ideology”.

The mob had diverse motives. Some belonged to fringe political groups and were veterans of protests against refugee centres. Some were opportunistic gangs that seized the chance to loot sportswear and alcohol. Others came for the spectacle and the chance to post dramatic footage on social media.

All, however, scorned the idea that Ireland is a safe, stable society. The economy is at full employment and the state is flush with tax revenue but their social media feeds depict a country overrun with “non-native” predators such as Jozef Puska, a Slovak man [convicted earlier this month](#) of murdering a teacher, Ashling Murphy, in 2022. As the night wore on, an unfounded rumour spread that one of the children in the Parnell Square attack had died.

It did not seem to matter that one of the people who stopped that attack was a Brazilian Deliveroo rider, Caio Benicio, and that Dublin gangs have [assaulted numerous South American couriers](#) in recent years.

Chilling threats of assaults against immigrants were made on a WhatsApp group titled “enough is enough”. “Everyone bally [balaclava] up, tool up,” said one man. “Let’s show the fucking media that we’re not a fucking pushover, that no more fucking foreigners are allowed into this poxy country.”

However, the mob targeted property and police rather than foreign and non-white bystanders, who watched in bewilderment.

As police gradually regained control James, a 33-year-old labourer, confronted a phalanx of shields on Burgh Quay, drawing cheers from others who hurled missiles. After being sprayed in the face, James staggered back to Butt Bridge where a Brazilian man, who had experience of being teargassed in his home country, offered recovery tips.

James thanked him but in an interview said “unregulated” arrivals were ruining Ireland. “We’re rammed to the gills with foreigners doing mad shit. You can’t do this to Irish people. I’m getting out of this country, I’m burning rubber. It’s not safe to walk around here.”

Mohammed Gaber, 27, an accountant who moved to Ireland from Sudan and is now an Irish citizen, came into the city centre to check on his sister, Ebba. He lauded his adopted home but worried about what the riot might augur. “Irish people are so welcoming. I’ve never experienced any discrimination. But this is crazy. This is the first time that I feel that there is something big.”

With roads sealed off and smoke pluming over Dublin, Ebba, 33, was blunter. “This is terrifying.” She was not sure of reaching her job as an emergency doctor at a police station.

25 novembre (NZZ)

[Geert Wilders' Triumph: Europas Migrationspolitik läuft schief \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

KOMMENTAR

Geert Wilders' Triumph: Die Migrationsfrage treibt Europa so lange nach rechts, bis die unkontrollierte Einwanderung eingedämmt wird

Der Wunsch der Bürger nach einer Verlangsamung der Einwanderung wird weiterhin nicht besonders ernst genommen. Das lassen sich immer weniger Wähler bieten.

Peter Rásonyi

25.11.2023, 05.59 Uhr 3 min



Der mit extremen Ideen auftretende Rechtspolitiker Geert Wilders will die neue niederländische Regierung anführen.

Remko De Waal / Imago

In den Niederlanden erringt der radikale Islam-Kritiker Geert Wilders einen von niemandem erwarteten Wahlsieg und das Mandat zur Bildung der nächsten Regierung. Auf den Strassen Dublins randalieren einige hundert Bürger eine Nacht lang mit unerhörter Zerstörungswut, nachdem ein mutmasslicher Einwanderer drei Schulkinder und eine Lehrerin vor ihrer Schule mit einem Messer teilweise schwer verletzt hat.

Die finnische Regierung schliesst mit einer Ausnahme alle Grenzübergänge nach Russland, nachdem auf einmal täglich Hunderte von Migranten aus dem Nahen Osten durch den russischen Schnee über die Grenze nach Westen gestapft sind. Das nationale Statistikamt Grossbritanniens revidiert die Rekordzahl der Netto-Einwanderung vom vorigen Jahr auf einen noch grösseren Rekord. Die britische Bevölkerung stieg laut den Angaben im Berichtsjahr 2021/22 (per Ende Juni) um sagenhafte 745 000 Einwanderer.

Überall in Europa siegen die nationalkonservativen Parteien

Das sind alles Schlagzeilen dieser Woche. Sie haben eines gemeinsam: Die Einwanderung ist in den meisten Ländern Europas ausser Rand und Band geraten. Die Folgen sind oft Wohnungsnot, Engpässe bei Schulen und im Gesundheitswesen, lokale Bildung von Einwanderer-Ghettos und kultureller Entfremdung, zunehmende Kriminalität und Spannungen. Das lässt sich immer weniger verdrängen, wachsende Teile der Bevölkerung machen ihrer Unzufriedenheit mit Protesten und der Wahl von Parteien am rechten Rand Luft.

Der Trend ist eindeutig. In der französischen Parlamentswahl 2022 erlebte das rechtsnationale Rassemblement national von Marine Le Pen einen kräftigen Schub und landete mit 18,7 Prozent der Stimmen auf dem dritten Platz. In Italien stürmte die Postfaschistin Giorgia Meloni an die Regierungsspitze. In Schweden errangen die rechtsnationalen Schwedendemokraten mit einem Traumresultat den zweithöchsten Stimmenanteil von 20,5 Prozent. In Finnland gelang im Frühjahr derselbe Coup der rechtsnationalen Finnenpartei mit 20,1 Prozent. Auch in Deutschland liegt die ausländerkritische AfD laut den jüngsten nationalen Wählerumfragen mit einem Anteil von 22 Prozent auf dem zweiten Platz – vor allen drei Regierungsparteien.

Und jetzt der grosse Durchbruch in den Niederlanden. Wie in den anderen europäischen Staaten sind auch die Niederländer nicht über Nacht zu einem wilden Haufen Rechtsextremer geworden. Vielmehr hat ein erheblicher Anteil der Bevölkerung genug von den etablierten Parteien und Politikern, welche die Einwanderungsprobleme Jahr für Jahr kleinreden und ignorieren.

Die Einsicht in den etablierten Parteien fehlt

Das ist verständlich. In Deutschland geben sich die regierenden Sozialdemokraten und Grünen machtlos gegen die Einwanderung von Asylbewerbern. Sie verwenden ihre Energien lieber auf die Verteufelung der AfD. Die Unruhen in den Banlieues von Paris riefen in diesem Sommer die Hilflosigkeit der französischen Regierung in Erinnerung. In den Niederlanden hat jüngst zwar die Regierungspartei VVD eine härtere Migrationspolitik versprochen, doch das kam nach dreizehn Regierungsjahren zu spät.

In Grossbritannien scheint die Einsicht der ebenfalls seit dreizehn Jahren regierenden Konservativen völlig zu fehlen, dass die Einwanderung das Land überfordert – auch wenn sie kurzfristig fiskalische Vorteile bringt und das Wirtschaftswachstum stützt. Im abgelaufenen Berichtsjahr war die Netto-Einwanderung mit 672 000 Personen nur wenig geringer. Und in Dublin hatten Regierung und Polizei am Freitag nichts Besseres zu tun, als die Herkunft des Messerstechers zu verheimlichen und die Randalierer als Rechtsextreme zu verunglimpfen.

So fällt die Prognose nicht schwer, dass die politischen Verschiebungen nach rechts in Europa noch eine Weile anhalten werden – bis die Regierenden die Sorgen der Bürger endlich ernst nehmen.

25 novembre (NZZ)

[Wie die radikale Rechte Europa verändert \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

DATENANALYSE

Wie die radikale Rechte Europa verändert

Der Wahlerfolg von Geert Wilders in den Niederlanden ist kein Zufall. Überall in Europa bauen Parteien am rechten Rand ihre Stimmanteile aus. Ihr Einfluss stürzt Konservative in ein Dilemma, das weit über die Migrationspolitik hinausgeht.

Julia Monn 25.11.2023, 00.37 Uhr 7 min



Noch vor wenigen Monaten sah es danach aus, als könnte sich Geert Wilders einen Sieg bei der Parlamentswahl in den Niederlanden abschminken. Nun ist der PVV-Chef der strahlende Wahlsieger und zementiert damit den Erfolg der Rechtspopulisten europaweit. Remko De Waal / Imago

Noch im Jahr 2000 löste die Regierungsbeteiligung der rechtspopulistischen Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) europaweit eine derartige Empörungswelle aus, dass die EU diplomatische Sanktionen gegen den Mitgliedsstaat ergriff, um ihn auf dem internationalen Parkett zu isolieren.

Geert Wilders sass damals noch als Abgeordneter der Rechtsliberalen im Parlament der Niederlande. Wenige Jahre später gründete der Mann mit den wasserstoffblonden Haaren die Partei für die Freiheit (PVV) und avancierte mit seinen Parolen gegen die «Islamisierung Europas», den Exit der Niederlande aus der EU («Nexit») und gegen «die Welle von Asylsuchenden» zum Poster-Boy der Rechtspopulisten in Europa.

Jetzt nach 25 Jahren als Abgeordneter ist Wilders der Veteran im niederländischen Parlament und war noch nie so nahe an der Regierungsmacht wie nach der Wahl vom Mittwoch. Die PVV holte 23,6 Prozent der Stimmen, verdoppelte ihre Sitzzahl im Parlament und ist wählerstärkste Partei. Erstmals könnte mit Wilders ein Rechtspopulist in den Niederlanden eine Regierung anführen.

Sanktionen dürften dem Land nicht drohen. Mittlerweile sind die Erfolge von Rechtsausserparteien in Europa nicht mehr überraschend. Das liegt daran, dass diese in der Gunst der Wähler in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten kontinuierlich zugelegt haben, wie ein Vergleich der Daten aller europäischen Parlamentswahlen der letzten 34 Jahre zeigt.

So erzielten Rechtsausserparteien im Jahr 1993 einen Wähleranteil von lediglich 6 Prozent. Inzwischen hat sich ihr Anteil fast verdreifacht und liegt bei rund 17 Prozent. Rund jede sechste Stimme bei einer Parlamentswahl in Europa erhält eine Partei am rechten Rand. Fast jede dritte Stimme entfällt ausserdem auf populistische Parteien. Diese können links wie rechts sein; ihr Kern ist die Spaltung der Gesellschaft in Volk und Elite, wobei sie sich als die alleinigen Vertreter des Volkes gegen eine korrupte Elite gerieren.

Die Daten wurden im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts «Populist» von einem internationalen Team von Politikwissenschaftlern europäischer Universitäten zusammengetragen. Matthijs Rooduijn, Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Amsterdam, leitete das Projekt, in dem 31 Länder untersucht und Parteien analysiert und klassifiziert wurden. Das Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, einen Überblick über extreme und populistische Parteien zu schaffen und dabei Einblicke in ihre Verbreitung und Charakteristika zu gewinnen.

Dabei gelten gemäss den Experten 112 der 234 klassifizierten Parteien als rechts aussen, wobei rechtsextreme Parteien, die die demokratische Grundordnung nötigenfalls mit Gewalt abschaffen wollen, selten sind. Der Grossteil wird als rechtspopulistisch eingestuft.

Inhaltlich unterscheiden sich diese Parteien teilweise stark. Sie sind einmal mehr, einmal weniger staatsinterventionistisch, mehr oder weniger EU-kritisch oder russlandfreundlich. Auch ihre Entstehungsgeschichten variieren: «Es gibt Parteien, die aus der extremen Rechten hervorgegangen sind, wie die schwedische SD, sowie ehemals konservative Parteien wie Fidesz in Ungarn und die Schweizer SVP», [schreibt Cas Mudde](#), ein renommierter Populismus-Forscher in seinem Buch «Rechtsausser». Während sich Fidesz in Ungarn und ebenso die PiS in Polen in ihrer Regierungszeit verändert hätten, habe sich die SVP insbesondere im Oppositionsjahr 2008 radikalisiert.

Die Europäer sind nicht zuwanderungskritischer geworden

Trotz ihren Unterschieden gibt es laut Matthijs Rooduijn einen gemeinsamen Nenner: «Die Parteien vereint die Vorstellung, dass ein Nationalstaat ausschliesslich von Einheimischen bewohnt werden sollte und dass alles Nicht-Einheimische eine Bedrohung für den Nationalstaat darstellt», erklärt der Politikwissenschaftler. Sie punkten naturgemäss bei Wählern, die gegen Zuwanderung sind und um ihre kulturelle Identität und wirtschaftliche Lage fürchten.

Bedeutet die stetig wachsenden Stimmanteile der radikalen Rechten, dass Millionen Europäer zunehmend migrationskritische Einstellungen haben?

Ganz so eindeutig ist die Entwicklung nicht. So hat sich die Haltung gegenüber Zuwanderern in den meisten europäischen Ländern im Durchschnitt nicht wesentlich verändert. Das zeigen die Resultate des European Social Survey (ESS), einer repräsentativen Umfrage, die seit 2002 in 31 europäischen Ländern durchgeführt wird. Die letzte Runde der Befragungen fand zwischen 2020 und 2022 statt.

In den meisten Ländern dominiert sogar die Ansicht, dass sich die Lebensbedingungen dank Migration leicht verbessert haben.

In den meisten Ländern hat sich die Einstellung zur Zuwanderung leicht positiv entwickelt

Durchschnittliche Bewertung, ob sich die Lebensbedingungen in ausgewählten Ländern durch Zuwanderung verbessert oder verschlechtert haben (0 = viel schlechter, 10 = viel besser)



Es wurden pro Land 1500 Personen befragt, in kleineren Ländern 800. Die Ergebnisse sind repräsentativ für die Bevölkerung ab 15 Jahren, eine Fehlermarge wird jedoch nicht angegeben. Für die Analyse auf Länderebene wurden Analysegewichte angewandt. Die Ergebnisse schliessen Antwortverweigerungen aus.

Quelle: [European Social Survey](#)

NZZ / xeo.

Besonders zuwanderungskritisch zeigen sich die Befragten in Ungarn, wo Viktor Orbans Fidesz seit 13 Jahren regiert. In dem Land hat sich der Anteil derjenigen, die angeben, dass Migranten dem kulturellen Leben im Land schaden, von etwa 30 Prozent im Jahr 2002 auf 50 Prozent im Jahr 2020 erhöht. Am verbreitetsten war die Skepsis gegenüber Migranten in Ungarn allerdings nach der Flüchtlingskrise 2015, während der sich der Budapester Ostbahnhof vorübergehend in ein Flüchtlingslager für Tausende Migranten verwandelt hatte.

Auch in Ländern wie Deutschland, Schweden, Polen oder Finnland haben die Zuwanderungskritiker zugenommen, stellen aber maximal einen Viertel der Befragten. In Italien, wo die rechtspopulistischen Fratelli D'Italia mit Giorgia Meloni an der Spitze bei den letzten Wahlen die absolute Mehrheit errangen, liegt ihr Anteil bei rund 36 Prozent. Wie in Ungarn gab es im Jahr nach der Flüchtlingskrise in vielen Ländern mehr Migrationskritiker, inzwischen ist ihr Anteil aber wieder zurückgegangen. Ausnahmen sind Deutschland und Schweden.

Die Schweiz erscheint im internationalen Vergleich als verhältnismässig migrationsfreundlich. Zuletzt befanden rund 15 Prozent der Befragten, dass Zuwanderer die heimische Kultur zerstörten. Nur rund 14 Prozent der befragten Schweizer gaben 2020 zudem an, dass Migranten der Wirtschaft schaden würden. Angesichts von Fachkräftemangel und demografischem Wandel auf dem Kontinent ist der Anteil jener, die angeben, dass Zuwanderung für die heimische Wirtschaft schlecht sei, seit 2002 in vielen Ländern Europas zurückgegangen.

Warum also gelingt es der radikalen Rechten dennoch, europaweit stetig mehr Wählerstimmen auf sich zu vereinen?

«Die radikale Rechte ist inzwischen für breitere Wählerschichten wählbar geworden», sagt Rooduijn. Das liege auch daran, dass die Parteien teilweise moderater auftreten als früher. In den Niederlanden hat Geert Wilders dank seiner Charmeoffensive gegenüber der liberal-konservativen Spitzenkandidatin im Wahlkampf den Spitznamen «Geert Milders» erhalten. Auch Italiens Giorgia Meloni zeigt sich vor allem in der Aussenpolitik kooperativer und pragmatischer als bei ihrem Amtsantritt befürchtet.

Und in Frankreich hat Marine Le Pen dem ehemaligen Front national nicht nur einen neuen Namen gegeben, sondern sich auch von rechtsextremen Mitgliedern in der Partei, allen voran von ihrem Vater, dem Parteigründer, distanziert.

Die Rechtspopulisten widmen sich neben der Migration inzwischen einer breiteren Themenpalette. Dazu gehören Klimafragen, der Kulturkampf gegen die Gender-Sprache, gegen LGBTQ-Rechte und die Abwehr von allem, was als «woke» empfunden wird. Das simple Versprechen der Rechtspopulisten lautet europaweit: Wir schützen Traditionen und Altbewährtes vor Fremden und Linken.

Die Konservativen im Dilemma

Diese Agenda verfängt in einer unsicheren Weltlage mit Kriegen in der Ukraine und im Gazastreifen, Migrationsströmen und der Angst vor Terror und Inflation. Vor allem moderate konservative Parteien werden damit unter Druck gesetzt.

Diese leiden in vielen Ländern Europas an Wählerschwund. Die Parteienbindung lässt gerade unter jüngeren Wählern nach. Die politischen Trennlinien verlaufen nicht mehr zwischen den traditionellen sozioökonomischen Milieus, sondern variieren zwischen Stadt und Land, für oder gegen die EU, Klimaschutz und die Erweiterung von LGBTQ-Rechten. Kurzum: Die Wähler sind wählerischer geworden.

Liessen sich Rechtsausenparteien früher noch ignorieren, geht diese Strategie in den zunehmend fragmentierten Parlamenten Europas nicht mehr auf. Vielmehr benötigen viele konservative Parteien für rechte Mehrheiten inzwischen die Unterstützung von Rechtsausenparteien.

Entsprechend wird das Tabu einer Zusammenarbeit mit rechts aussen, von der Politikwissenschaft auch gerne als «cordon sanitaire» oder «Brandmauer gegen rechts» betitelt, immer häufiger gebrochen. Dies zeigte sich zuletzt in Finnland und Schweden sowie in verschiedenen Regionalparlamenten in Spanien, wo konservative Parteien Koalitionen oder Unterstützungserklärungen mit den Rechtspopulisten von Vox abschlossen. Und in den Niederlanden braucht Geert Wilders ebenfalls die Unterstützung von anderen Parteien, will er die Geschicke des Landes künftig als Ministerpräsident lenken.

Die Koalitionen mögen den Rechtsrutsch der Konservativen formalisieren, die Annäherung an rechts aussen ist aber auch ohne sie spürbar. Politiker wie Rishi Sunak in Grossbritannien, Friedrich Merz in Deutschland und Alberto Nuñez Feijóo in Spanien haben insbesondere das Bedürfnis der Wähler nach einer härteren Migrationspolitik erkannt. Als Vorbild dient ihnen Dänemark, wo ausgerechnet

die Sozialdemokraten mit ihrer Null-Migrations-Politik die Wahl 2019 gewonnen und dem rechten Rand eine Niederlage zugefügt hatten.

Politikwissenschaftler bezweifeln jedoch, dass die Übernahme rechtspopulistischer Positionen die radikale Rechte mittelfristig schwächt. Eine kürzlich von der [Universität Cambridge veröffentlichte Studie](#) legt nahe, dass diese eher davon profitiert. Laut den Studienautoren werden ihre Positionen und ihre Rhetorik salonfähig und ihre Themen ständig besprochen. Dies könne dazu führen, dass ein noch breiteres Wählerspektrum in Erwägung zieht, die Stimme einer rechtspopulistischen Partei zu geben.

«Das wird dann zum Problem, wenn diese Parteien so viel Macht erlangen, dass sie beginnen, mit ihrem illiberalen Gedankengut Demokratien umbauen», meint Matthijs Rooduijn warnend.

Ungarn und Polen dienten bisher als warnende Beispiele dafür, wie Justiz, Medien und Minderheiten ins Kreuzfeuer geraten, wenn Rechtspopulisten über Jahre an der Macht sind. Seit Viktor Orban in Ungarn regiert, hat der Ministerpräsident die Verfassung geändert und die Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte eingeschränkt. Öffentlichrechtliche Medien wurden nach seinem Willen umstrukturiert und ein umstrittenes Anti-LGBTQ-Gesetz verabschiedet. Ausserdem sollen Millionen von EU-Geldern veruntreut worden sein.

In Polen baute die regierende PiS das Justizsystem ebenfalls sukzessive um und untergrub so die Gewaltenteilung. Für Aufsehen sorgte auch die Verschärfung des schon rigiden Abtreibungsrechts.

Dass die Demokratie in Polen aber durchaus widerstandsfähig ist, zeigte sich nicht zuletzt bei der vergangenen Parlamentswahl, wo eine Mehrheit der Polinnen und Polen für ein geeint auftretendes Oppositionsbündnis stimmte und der PiS damit die Regierungsmehrheit verwehrte.

25 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/11/25/jean-claude-samouiller-president-d-amnesty-international-france-la-derniere-des-violences-envers-les-femmes-afghanes-c-est-l-oubli_6202261_3232.html

Jean-Claude Samouiller, président d'Amnesty International France : « La dernière des violences envers les femmes afghanes, c'est l'oubli »

Tribune

Jean-Claude Samouiller Président d'Amnesty International France

En ce 25 novembre, Journée internationale pour l'élimination de la violence à l'égard des femmes, la situation des Afghanes, deux ans et demi après le retour des talibans au pouvoir, est tragique, y compris pour celles qui ont pu fuir dans les pays limitrophes, souligne, dans une tribune au « Monde », le président de l'organisation internationale en France.

Publié aujourd'hui à 07h00 Temps de Lecture 3 min.

Le 1^{er} novembre, la [date butoir fixée par les autorités pakistanaises](#) pour le retour forcé des réfugiés afghans en situation irrégulière dans leur pays aura donc été respectée. Environ 1,4 million de personnes seraient concernées par cette mesure inhumaine, alors qu'aucune garantie pour leur sécurité n'est assurée à leur retour. Plus de 170 000 d'entre elles ont déjà dû retourner en Afghanistan. Parmi elles, des milliers de femmes, qui vont tout perdre en rentrant, à commencer par leur liberté.

Depuis leur [retour au pouvoir, en août 2021, les talibans](#) mènent en effet une campagne de persécution organisée, généralisée et systématique, fondée sur le genre, avec pour objectif principal de contrôler et d'effacer l'existence des femmes dans l'espace public.

Interdiction d'accès aux parcs, de suivre des études secondaires, de s'inscrire à l'université, de trouver un travail dans de nombreux domaines, de marcher dans la rue sans la présence d'un tuteur masculin (*mahram*) ; obligation de porter des tenues les couvrant de la tête aux pieds ; arrestations, tortures, mauvais traitements et disparitions forcées pour toutes celles qui osent encore se révolter : selon nos critères, ce [système de persécution sexiste](#) pourrait relever du [crime contre l'humanité](#).

Précieux sésame

Certaines de ces femmes ont décidé de fuir ces violences et ces privations de liberté, de quitter ce pays plongé à nouveau dans l'obscurantisme. Elles se sont rendues – lorsqu'elles ont pu y arriver – dans les pays voisins, comme l'Iran ou le Pakistan, où elles sont la proie de nombreux harcèlements et de mauvais traitements. Terres d'exil traditionnelles pendant la guerre, ces deux pays acceptent en effet de moins en moins la présence de réfugiés afghans sur leur territoire.

Deux ans et demi plus tard, ces femmes et ces filles, en Afghanistan et dans les pays limitrophes, font désormais face à une violence tout aussi insupportable, celle de l'oubli. Celui de tous les chefs d'Etat qui, la main sur le cœur et devant les médias, avaient juré de leur venir en aide et qui semblent désormais les abandonner à leur sort. En dépit des promesses de nombre d'entre eux, les procédures d'obtention de visa sont toujours trop longues et compliquées.

Ce constat est valable pour la France. Les Afghanes doivent en effet attendre plusieurs mois à Téhéran ou à Islamabad pour espérer obtenir le précieux sésame, alors que le président Macron avait affirmé, le 16 août 2021, que « *les femmes afghanes ont le droit de vivre dans la liberté et la dignité* » et ajouté : « *Nous resterons, fraternellement, aux côtés des Afghanes et des Afghans.* »

Des propos précisés par la suite par son ministre des affaires étrangères et européennes [*Jean-Yves Le Drian*], qui, le 21 septembre 2021, lors d'une réunion en marge de l'assemblée générale des Nations unies, souhaitait « *accompagner celles qui partent, celles qui ont trouvé refuge dans un pays voisin de l'Afghanistan. Celles qui demandent l'asile, par exemple en France ou en Europe* ».

Davantage de visas

Depuis, plus rien ou presque. Si la France a délivré 14 000 visas à des personnes afghanes (hommes ou femmes) depuis la chute de Kaboul, les critères d'attribution sont très flous et ils sont maintenant délivrés au compte-gouttes. L'accueil des réfugiés et réfugiées afghanes décroît dangereusement, alors que les débats délétères sur le projet de loi liberticide « asile et immigration » prennent de l'influence en France.

Il y a urgence. Chaque semaine, chaque jour, les femmes afghanes voient leur liberté de mouvement réduite en Afghanistan. Et pour celles qui ont pu fuir dans les pays voisins, chaque heure, chaque minute supplémentaire leur fait peser le risque d'être expulsées vers leur pays d'origine.

La France a le devoir de porter haut ses principes humanistes et de leur venir en aide. Elle doit pour cela accélérer le délai d'examen des demandes de visa et en faciliter les démarches, par du recrutement d'agents supplémentaires, une limitation du nombre de rendez-vous physiques et en rendant publics ses chiffres et ses critères de délivrance.

Pour ce faire, les autorités françaises doivent sortir de leur vision de plus en plus restrictive du droit d'asile, et mettre en œuvre des voies légales et sûres pour les femmes et les filles afghanes en quête de protection. Elles ont su le faire avec humanité pour les réfugiés ukrainiens qui fuyaient la guerre d'agression menée par la Russie. Elles doivent le faire pour ces femmes et ces filles qui fuient un régime qui les persécute, en leur accordant davantage de visas, et de façon plus rapide. Faute de quoi, elles retomberont dans l'oubli.

L'Assemblée générale des Nations unies a choisi en 1999 de proclamer le 25 novembre

[Journée internationale pour l'élimination de la violence à l'égard des femmes.](#)

25 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2023/11/24/airbus-denonce-le-veto-de-berlin-a-la-vente-d-eurofighter-a-l-arabie-saoudite_6202134_3234.html

Airbus dénonce le veto de Berlin à la vente d'Eurofighter à l'Arabie saoudite

Les Verts allemands s'opposent au contrat en raison de l'assassinat du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi par les services spéciaux saoudiens en 2018 et de la guerre au Yémen.

Par [Jean-Michel Bezat](#)

Publié hier à 16h05, modifié hier à 17h18



Un avion Eurofighter de l'armée de l'air allemande, le 23 octobre 2023. KAY NIETFELD / AFP

Le ton monte chez Airbus Defence and Space, la filiale militaire et spatiale de l'avionneur européen basée à Manching, en Bavière, mais aussi chez IG Metall, le puissant syndicat de la métallurgie allemande. Objet de cette colère : le refus opposé par Berlin à la vente de 48 avions de combat Eurofighter Typhoon à l'Arabie saoudite, qui doit rapidement renouveler et renforcer sa flotte. Au sein de la coalition SPD-Verts-libéraux du chancelier Olaf Scholz, les Verts s'opposent à ce contrat en raison de l'assassinat, en 2018, du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi par les services spéciaux saoudiens et de la guerre au Yémen.

Guillaume Faury, président exécutif d'Airbus, avait jugé ce refus « *dommageable pour la réputation de l'Allemagne* ». Le directeur général d'Airbus Defence and Space, Michael Schoellhorn, revient à la charge, vendredi 24 novembre, [dans Les Echos](#). Tout en rappelant que cette position est « *inscrit[e] dans le traité de coalition* » de 2021, il juge que cela « *jette des doutes sur la fiabilité de l'Allemagne comme partenaire, pas seulement en Angleterre, mais aussi en France, en Espagne et dans d'autres pays* ». Il rappelle qu'il était prévu, lors de la signature du programme, que « *chacun devait laisser à l'autre la liberté d'exporter* ».

M. Schoellhorn souligne qu'« *une discussion de fond s'impose donc à Berlin sur les règles qui découlent de la participation à un grand programme européen* ». Car ce qui menace aujourd'hui l'Eurofighter Typhoon peut arriver au [système de combat aérien du futur \(avion, drones, cloud de combat...\)](#). Développé par Dassault Aviation, Airbus Defence and Space et l'espagnol Indra, ce dernier doit progressivement remplacer le Rafale et le Typhoon après 2040. Pour éviter tout blocage, la doctrine de l'exportation devra être fixée en amont par les pays partenaires.

Londres redoute d'être doublé par Paris

Le gouvernement britannique et BAE Systems font pression, en faisant miroiter à Riyad que l'assemblage des Typhoon saoudiens pourrait être transféré d'Allemagne vers le Royaume-Uni, selon le *Financial Times*. En cas

de blocage, l'accord sur l'Eurofighter prévoit bien que la production puisse se faire ailleurs, rappelle M. Schoellhorn, qui juge cependant l'option « *peu réaliste* ».

Londres redoute d'être doublé par Paris. Riyad a en effet demandé à Dassault Aviation de lui remettre, avant le 10 novembre, une offre chiffrée pour 54 Rafale. Certains analystes y voient un leurre des Saoudiens pour forcer la main au gouvernement allemand. Pour le patron d'Airbus Defence and Space, cette entrée dans la compétition est « *valide* », et « *tout est ouvert* ».

L'aéronef français multirôle s'est déjà vendu à quelque 170 exemplaires à trois pays du Moyen-Orient et a d'autres commandes en perspective : l'Égypte, son premier acheteur en 2015, et les Emirats arabes unis – deux alliés de l'Arabie saoudite –, et le Qatar. Le rayon d'action du Rafale, ses capacités d'emport et ses performances en attaque répondent aux besoins définis par l'armée de l'air saoudienne.

Une nouvelle doctrine française d'exportation se précise

Dassault Aviation peut assurer son client que son usine de Mérignac (Gironde) et sa chaîne de sous-traitants sont suffisamment solides pour exécuter la commande, un argument de vente et une exigence de plus en plus forte des acheteurs. De plus, une nouvelle doctrine française d'exportation se précise. Elle vise à davantage associer les pays acheteurs aux évolutions des matériels et s'applique bien au « club Rafale » (Égypte, Emirats arabes unis, Qatar, Inde...) et au développement du dernier standard F5, qui combine avions et drones. Il peut séduire le deuxième importateur mondial d'avions de chasse (derrière l'Inde), qui souhaite développer une industrie d'armement.

Les Américains, premiers fournisseurs de Riyad, ne sont pas pour autant hors course, selon M. Schoellhorn, même s'ils ont jusqu'ici refusé de lui vendre les deux fleurons de Lockheed Martin : le F-22 Raptor, qui assure la supériorité stratégique de l'US Air Force et n'est pas exportable ; et surtout le F-35, réservé aux alliés de l'OTAN, au Japon, à la Corée du Sud et à l'Australie. Il reste à savoir si la Maison Blanche et le Congrès sont disposés à lever certaines restrictions.

La question des divergences de doctrine d'exportation se pose aussi pour la Turquie. Elle veut acheter quarante Eurofighter Typhoon, à la place de quarante F-16 américains, le Congrès ayant bloqué cette opération. Ce virage européen d'Ankara serait historique, son armée de l'air dépendant des géants de l'industrie aéronautique américaine. Londres et Madrid poussent cette vente. Berlin s'y oppose, en raison des déclarations violemment anti-israéliennes du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

25 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2023/11/24/petrole-le-grand-ecart-entre-vienne-et-dubai_6202091_3234.html

Pétrole : « le grand écart » entre Vienne et Dubaï

Chronique

Philippe Escande

Jeudi 30 novembre, à Vienne, se réuniront les membres du cartel pétrolier de l'OPEP, rejoints par la Russie, pour s'accorder sur une stratégie face à la baisse des prix. Tandis qu'à Dubaï se tiendra la COP28, la conférence internationale sur le climat. Un paradoxe, constate Philippe Escande, éditorialiste économique au « Monde ».

Publié hier à 11h30



County (Californie, Etats-Unis), le 21 septembre 2023. FREDERIC J. BROWN / AFP

Jeudi 30 novembre, on parlera beaucoup pétrole dans le monde, mais pas de la même manière. A Vienne, les membres du cartel pétrolier de l'OPEP, rejoints par la Russie, tenteront de s'accorder sur une stratégie face à la baisse des prix. A Dubaï, au cœur du plus grand écosystème pétrolier mondial, la conférence sur le climat, la COP28 tentera de mettre tous les pays d'accord autour de la nécessité d'accélérer les efforts de lutte contre le changement climatique, qui passe avant tout par la sortie du charbon et des hydrocarbures. Symbole de ce grand écart, le président de la COP28, Sultan (Ahmed) Al-Jaber, qui est aussi le patron de la principale société pétrolière des Emirats arabes unis. Saura-t-il faire passer le message auprès de ses confrères ?

Ces derniers ne seront pas à ses côtés le 30 novembre puisqu'ils ont pris le chemin de Vienne pour tenter de se rabibocher. L'ambiance n'est pas bonne entre eux, comme toujours quand le prix du brut flageole. En octobre, ils s'étaient pourtant entendus pour réduire leur production afin de faire remonter les cours. Mais la tactique n'a pas fonctionné. Depuis le pic de septembre, les cours ont baissé de près de 15 %. Ils sont même brièvement repassés sous la limite basse des 80 dollars (plus de 73 euros) le baril cette semaine.

Empêtrés dans leurs querelles

Mais, hormis l'Arabie saoudite, peu d'entre eux souhaitent réduire à nouveau leur production face à l'échec de la manœuvre. Les Saoudiens fustigent les spéculateurs, mais ce sont surtout les perspectives de la demande qui poussent les prix vers le bas. Les marchés qui voient se profiler une année 2024 proche de la récession aux Etats-Unis et en Europe peinent à augmenter leurs achats. D'autant que dans le même temps, les Etats-Unis et le Brésil produisent comme jamais dans l'histoire.

Empêtrés dans leurs querelles et affaiblis par la puissance de cette concurrence américaine, les grands producteurs entendront-ils l'appel de Fatih Birol, le président de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie (AIE), le

club qui réunit leurs principaux clients occidentaux. [Celui-ci parle d'un moment de vérité pour le monde des hydrocarbures](#). Et cette vérité n'est pas satisfaisante. Pour respecter les objectifs que le monde s'est donnés en matière de réduction des gaz à effet de serre à horizon 2050, il faudrait que les émissions baissent de 60 % et que les compagnies pétrolières baissent leurs investissements dans le pétrole et le gaz de 50 %, alors qu'ils sont encore en augmentation.

Pire, leurs investissements dans les énergies propres ne représentent que 2,5 % du total de leurs dépenses. Pourtant, selon l'AIE, la rentabilité de ces investissements sur longue période, de l'ordre de 6 %, n'est pas éloignée de celle des hydrocarbures et ils ont les compétences pour gérer des grands chantiers comme l'offshore éolien ou l'hydrogène. Les compagnies européennes semblent plus sensibles à ce discours puisque leurs engagements dépassent les 20 %, voire les 30 % comme dans le cas de TotalEnergies. Pour les autres, on préférera regarder plutôt du côté de Vienne que de Dubaï.

25 novembre (The Economist)

[The agony of 24 hostages is over. The Gaza war isn't \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The war in Gaza

The agony of 24 hostages is over. The Gaza war isn't

Israel and Hamas trade captives during a four-day truce



image: getty images

Nov 24th 2023 | RAMALLAH

When [hamas](#) murdered and kidnapped 1,400 people on October 7th it triggered the biggest Middle East crisis in a decade and a brutal war in Gaza. On November 24th a small number of the roughly 240 captives tasted freedom again amid a [four-day truce](#) in the fighting. Israeli officials confirmed that 13 Israeli hostages had been handed over to the Red Cross; the authorities in Qatar said another 11 captives, ten holding Thai passports and one from the Philippines, were being released. At the Hatzetim air base in southern Israel, helicopters were standing by to whisk the released Israeli victims, all women or children, to hospitals. Their horrific ordeal may be over but at least 200 other captives remain in [Gaza](#) and Israel's war against Hamas is likely to go on.

The deal—for Hamas to free 50 Israeli hostages in exchange for the four-day truce and the release of 150 Palestinians in Israeli prisons—**was struck after weeks of negotiations through Qatari, Egyptian and American mediation. It came amid mounting domestic pressure in Israel to bring the hostages home and growing international outrage over the destruction that Israel has wrought on Gaza.** The accounts of the released hostages of the atrocities on October 7th, their abduction and their treatment are likely to dominate life in Israel in the coming days. **They will also deepen the debate about whether Israel should prioritise saving further hostages, or put more weight on destroying Hamas's capacity to terrorise Israelis, and in the process destroying more of Gaza.**

The truce between Israel and Hamas came into play at 7am, just as the sun began to rise in Gaza. An alien silence—free of airstrikes and the buzz of drones—descended across the strip's south. Palestinians, many of whom had fled Israel's advances, emerged in their thousands from crammed tents and houses in Gaza's southern cities. **Israel had asked those in the south not to return to the north over which it now has effective control, but the unbearable conditions and a desperate search for the missing saw huge crowds march northward regardless.** At least 11 Palestinians were wounded and two killed by Israeli forces as they attempted to reach their homes in northern Gaza.

One of those heading north was Sobhia Al-Najar, who had found shelter in Al-Nasser hospital in the southern city of Khan Younis. She took advantage of the pause to go to her house, only to learn it had been destroyed. "All I found was stones and sand," she said, bursting into tears. "Now I have no home, and no hope for anything." Abu Mohammed returned to search for missing relatives. **"They made a**

ceasefire as if we would return to our old lives,” he said. “But our lives have lost all meaning, so their ceasefire is useless.”

Several Palestinian ambulances at last made it to the coastal highway near Zahra to collect the bodies of nine Palestinians killed by Israeli naval fire. The Hamas-controlled authorities in Gaza say that some 7,000 Palestinians—4,700 of them women and children—are missing in the enclave. Many of them are thought to be dead and buried beneath the rubble. That is in addition to the more than 14,000 people killed since October 7th, according to the same authorities. **One Palestinian official says that now the fighting has stopped, the official death toll will increase sharply.**

The truce provides an opportunity to get aid into Gaza. Martin Griffiths, the UN’s humanitarian chief has described the humanitarian situation as “the worst ever”. **Two hundred lorries packed with food, medicine and other aid have been allowed through the Rafah crossing. Some were carrying essential fuel, though humanitarian agencies said that amount was “utterly insufficient”.**

For the first 39 of the 150 Palestinian women and children to be released from Israeli prisons as part of the deal, there were muted welcoming receptions in the West Bank. Local officials decorated the family home of Rawan Abu Ziadeh with Palestinian flags and banners of the ruling Fatah party. Yet her family, who had been informed she may be among those freed after serving nine years for the attempted stabbing of a soldier, were more subdued. “We are not in the mood for celebrating. The Palestinian people in Gaza have paid a huge price for this. They are the ones we should be thanking,” said her father, Nafes Abu Ziadeh.

If the truce holds more hostages will be released in the coming days. **Hamas will hope the deal will amplify calls in Israel for the government of Binyamin Netanyahu to prioritise saving more hostages over prosecuting the war; and draw global attention to the plight of ordinary people in Gaza, in turn putting even more international pressure on Israel to adopt a longer ceasefire. Yet Israel shows little sign of having changed its military objectives and America shows no sign of pulling the plug on its ally.** Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, has said fighting will continue “with intensity” for at least two more months after the truce. **Under the deal Hamas may gain an extra day of truce for every ten additional hostages it releases.**

Yet several uncertainties remain. One is whether, as the scale of death and destruction becomes more apparent, Gazans will direct their rage towards Hamas and its nihilistic credo, as well as towards Israel. Another is whether and how Israel will modify its tactics to reduce the number of civilians it is killing in Gaza, both to assuage global opinion and to adapt to fighting in the south, from where non-combatants have no realistic possibility of evacuation. Just before the ceasefire came into effect the Israel Defence Forces launched intense strikes on targets in Gaza, including the south. **The next phase of the fighting could involve lower-intensity raids in the south in an attempt to kill or capture Hamas’s leaders and fighters.**

The last uncertainty is whether a resumption of fighting triggers another round of escalation by Hizbullah and other Iran-backed militias across the region. By November 28th the ceasefire could be over and the Middle East’s nightmare in full swing again. .

25 novembre (Le Figaro)

[«Le crime est sous nos yeux et on ne peut rien faire» : aux abords du Champ-de-Mars à Paris, l'insécurité fait loi \(lefigaro.fr\)](#)

«Le crime est sous nos yeux et on ne peut rien faire» : aux abords du Champ-de-Mars à Paris, l'insécurité fait loi

REPORTAGE - Véritable joyau patrimonial, le quartier du Champ-de-Mars et de la tour Eiffel est méconnaissable. À la faveur de la crise sanitaire, il s'est mué en zone de non-droit où les délinquants, les trafiquants et les vendeurs illégaux imposent leur loi, aux dépens des touristes et des riverains.



Au pied de la tour Eiffel, le quartier n'est plus que l'ombre de lui-même. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

Par **Nadjet Cherigui**, pour **Le Figaro Magazine**

Publié il y a 4 heures, mis à jour il y a 29 minutes

Par Nadjet Cherigui (texte) et Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine» (photos)

Tenant la pose et le sourire face à l'objectif de leur smartphone posé sur trépied, le tee-shirt au-dessus du nombril, elles feignent d'ignorer la météo de ce mois de novembre particulièrement pluvieux à Paris. Alison et Johanna, deux jeunes touristes venues du Canada, immortalisent leur visite au pied de la tour Eiffel, dans ce petit tronçon de la rue de l'Université offrant une vue imprenable sur la magistrale Dame de fer. « *On nous a dit que c'était le meilleur endroit pour prendre des photos, explique Johanna. On va poster nos clichés sur les réseaux sociaux pour les partager avec nos amis restés à Toronto.* »

Une fois le cliché pris, les jeunes étudiantes se dépêchent de replier le trépied et ranger les téléphones dans leurs sacs. Les deux amies, qui ne disposent que d'un budget très modeste, ont cassé leur tirelire pour s'offrir ce voyage et ont pris la peine de le préparer avec soin. « *Paris est une très belle ville, mais avant de partir, mon oncle et ma tante qui y sont déjà venus, m'ont prévenue et conseillé de faire attention – particulièrement dans ce quartier. On sait qu'il y a beaucoup de vols et d'agressions.* » Un conseil bien avisé. En effet, depuis quelque temps, au pied de la tour Eiffel, le quartier du Champ-de-Mars, vitrine de la capitale, s'est transformé pour devenir, selon certains riverains, « *un véritable coupe-gorge* ».

Récemment, les plaintes de touristes victimes de viol ou d'agressions sexuelles se sont multipliées. Les pickpockets pullulent et agissent au grand jour. Les vendeurs à la sauvette ne prennent guère la peine de se cacher et les vélos-taxis clandestins, dont les conducteurs sont parfois très avinés, ont pignon sur rue.



Vendeurs à la sauvette, pickpockets, etc., les touristes sont constamment harcelés. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

Paris a perdu de sa superbe

Au milieu d'étrangers venus du monde entier pour visiter celle que l'on qualifie encore de plus belle ville du monde, de véritables mafias semblent avoir pris possession de l'espace. Au petit matin, dans les jardins, à proximité du monument, et dès les premières arrivées de visiteurs, des équipes se mettent en place pour simuler une partie de bonneteau. Les mises et les mains sont à chaque coup heureuses. Par groupe de dix, lunettes de soleil sur le nez, sacs et vêtements de marques de luxe grossièrement contrefaites, ils jouent aux touristes grisés de bonheur par leurs coups gagnants. Des liasses de billets de 50 et 100 euros passent de manière ostentatoire de main en main.

À grand renfort d'éclats de joie surjoués, ils tentent d'appâter les plus naïfs des chalands. Les discussions, mâtinées d'un fort accent d'Europe de l'Est, se font dans un anglais très approximatif. Au milieu de ce brouhaha, des individus interpellent les touristes pour vendre, à la sauvette, quelques souvenirs, des pacotilles ou des parapluies estampillés à l'effigie de la tour Eiffel. Des personnages portant déguisement à l'hygiène douteuse essayent de convaincre les enfants de se laisser prendre en photo moyennant finance aux côtés, au choix, d'un succédané de Mickey ou d'un King Kong dépenaillé dont la fermeture éclair endommagée laisse apparaître un pyjama à fleurs.



La forte fréquentation touristique du site agit comme un appel d'air pour les trafics. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

Un cloaque

Le primate à l'accent roumain se ravise lorsqu'il croise une patrouille de policiers. « *On t'a déjà dit que c'était interdit de circuler visage dissimulé sur l'espace public* », lance sans conviction et quelque peu désabusé, l'un des fonctionnaires. Le gorille s'exécute et s'éloigne en affichant un sourire narquois.

« Ce quartier est devenu impossible, confie l'un des agents. On ne prend même plus la peine de courir après les vendeurs illégaux, c'est une tâche impossible. Regardez autour de vous, les trafics sont partout. Les vendeurs de crêpes et de sandwiches planquent leur marchandise dans les bouches d'égout et la ressortent pour la proposer aux touristes. Ça fait mal au cœur car cela peut les rendre très malades. c'est sale et il y a des rats partout. On essaie de les prévenir. On veut aussi montrer notre présence pour rassurer le public, mais on ne peut intervenir que sur du flagrant délit. C'est désespérant car ces gens opèrent en toute impunité. Je suis affecté à ce secteur depuis un an et j'ai l'impression que l'on nous demande de vider l'océan à la petite cuillère. Mes collègues qui ont plus d'ancienneté me disent que la situation s'est considérablement dégradée ces dernières années, les délinquants agissent avec un véritable sentiment d'impunité. »



Aux abords du Champ-de-Mars, les agressions se sont multipliées. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

Une situation que Karine confirme. Elle a fait l'acquisition d'une magnifique demeure, construite au XIX^e siècle, au pied de la tour Eiffel. Karine a rénové avec soin cette bâtisse pour en faire notamment un lieu de formation pour les entreprises. Femme d'affaires, élégante, elle maîtrise parfaitement l'art du contrôle et du sang-froid mais lorsqu'elle évoque la situation sécuritaire du quartier, elle peine à contenir sa colère. « Nous avons la chance de vivre dans un endroit exceptionnel, insiste-t-elle. J'ai pris le soin de rénover cette maison car elle fait, comme ce quartier, partie de la richesse de notre patrimoine et en investissant ainsi, j'avais à cœur de le valoriser. Ce monument est peut-être l'un des plus visités au monde, mais ce quartier, où j'ai le privilège de vivre, n'a cessé de se dégrader durant ces quatre dernières années. Sur l'espace public, devant ma porte je dois, chaque matin avec l'aide du gardien, procéder à un nettoyage systématique et ramasser des excréments humains, des bouteilles remplies d'urine, des serviettes hygiéniques, des seringues, etc., car les espaces verts, qui ne sont pas entretenus par la Mairie de Paris, sont utilisés comme toilettes, urinoirs, ou lieux de stockage pour les marchandises ou la nourriture vendues aux touristes. Vous voyez, les jardins aux alentours sont impeccables, car pris en charge par l'administration du 7^e arrondissement, mais cette parcelle devant la maison dépend de la Mairie centrale. Ses employés refusent de venir pour des raisons de sécurité et les services m'interdisent d'intervenir. Je suis prête à payer pour débroussailler et installer un grillage, mais je n'en ai pas le droit. Mme Anne Hidalgo n'a aucun problème à claquer 60.000 euros pour son voyage en Polynésie. Mais elle nous refuse le minimum pour notre hygiène et notre sécurité. »



Les vendeurs illégaux et les trafiquants en tout genre ne prennent même pas la peine de se cacher de la police. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

Karine raconte comment elle a tenté à de nombreuses reprises d'intervenir lorsque des touristes se font escroquer ou pour dissuader les trafiquants en tout genre d'enterrer leur marchandise dans le jardin. Mais la citoyenne concernée et révoltée a décidé de se faire plus discrète depuis qu'une vingtaine d'individus ont essayé de l'intimider un soir en encerclant sa voiture dans son parking. *« Ils m'ont menacée en me disant qu'ils reviendraient en masse pour me chercher. Depuis, j'ai changé mon comportement, je suis plus vigilante et je veille à ne jamais sortir seule. Cette situation me révolte car le crime est sous nos yeux et on ne peut rien faire. C'est dramatique. L'environnement est gâché par toute cette négligence et cette délinquance. Nous avons le privilège de vivre dans un endroit où le mètre carré est le plus cher de la ville, mais ils l'ont saccagé. Je pourrais tout à fait vendre et me mettre à l'abri financièrement, mais je m'y refuse. Je veux me battre. »*

Un sentiment d'abandon

Détérioration de l'état des arbres centenaires, des espaces verts, présence délinquante de plus en plus marquée, sentiment d'abandon et d'insécurité, autant de problèmes et de plaintes que font remonter les administrés, confirmant ainsi la dégradation de la situation. Jean Laussucq, élu de la mairie du 7^e arrondissement aux côtés de Rachida Dati, connaît bien ce terrain et ses problématiques spécifiques.



Les pelouses et les espaces verts se sont considérablement dégradés. *Olivier Coret pour «Le Figaro Magazine»*

« La gestion du Champ-de-Mars est de la responsabilité exclusive de la Ville, précise l'élu, mais nous sommes les premiers interlocuteurs des habitants et aussi les premiers scandalisés par l'état du site. Les deux confinements successifs ont favorisé de nouvelles fréquentations et l'installation d'une délinquance beaucoup plus violente. Face à ce problème, nous sommes confrontés à une réticence des équipes d'Anne Hidalgo qui rejettent nos propositions par

idéologie. Par exemple, la multiplication des caméras de télésurveillance sur les points noirs sécuritaires serait une des solutions. Il y a actuellement 25 de ces dispositifs répartis sur le Champ-de-Mars et à ses abords. C'est encore insuffisant, mais la maire de Paris ne croit pas à leur utilité comme elle ne croit pas à l'armement des policiers municipaux. » Pour Anne Hidalgo, une chose, en revanche, est sûre : il y a urgence à légiférer sur l'augmentation des tarifs de parking des SUV parisiens. Le sujet de la sécurité des Parisiens et des touristes attendra.

25 novembre (Haaretz)

[Hamas Officials Abroad See Power Wane as Gazan Leaders Take Control - Palestinians - Haaretz.com](#)

Hamas Officials Abroad See Power Wane as Gazan Leaders Take Control

Arab diplomats who recently met with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other senior officials in Qatar say that every proposal or discussion about the future of the group or the hostage deal was met with the answer, 'We'll see what they say in Gaza'



IDF bombing in the Gaza Strip, on Thursday. Credit: John Macdougall / AFP

[Jack Khoury](#)

Nov 24, 2023 12:59 pm IST

The center of gravity in the Hamas leadership's decision-making process has drifted toward the Gaza Strip, Arab diplomats say.

Their assessment is based on meetings in recent days with the group's political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh, and other senior Hamas officials living abroad. Two Arab diplomats who were present at the meetings told Haaretz that every decision regarding the future of Hamas or steps with significant political or diplomatic repercussions for the Palestinians [is made in Gaza](#).

The diplomats met with Hamas' senior leadership abroad regarding talks over a deal to release Israeli hostages and implement a cease-fire. "Every proposal and every discussion about the future was met with the answer, 'We'll see what they say in Gaza,'" one of them said.

- Advertisement -

"It's clear that the center of gravity has shifted to those who are fighting, away from those sitting in Qatar. Every discussion about the day after or the presence of Hamas in Gaza will be decided in Gaza and nowhere else."

Meanwhile, the future of Hamas is also of interest to Fatah and other Palestinian factions. Sources in Ramallah told Haaretz that some officials have sent proposals to Hamas to lay down their weapons, leave Gaza and join PLO institutions. However, the sources added that Hamas isn't taking such proposals seriously, especially not the leadership in Gaza.

Although there is no earnest discussion about the future of Hamas, the proposals indicate that the Palestinian Authority is seriously contemplating a [return to the Gaza Strip](#) and the possibility of an internal Palestinian dialogue.

Still, the sources caution that the proposals are irrelevant as long as Israel intends to continue the fight and to pursue the Hamas leadership.

24 novembre (The Economist)

[Progress on climate change has not been fast enough, but it has been real \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com/news/2023/11/24/progress-on-climate-change-has-not-been-fast-enough-but-it-has-been-real)

Must try harder

Progress on climate change has not been fast enough, but it has been real

And the world needs to learn from it




image: the economist

Nov 23rd 2023

The agreement at the conference of the parties (cop) to the un **Framework Convention on Climate Change**, which took place in **Paris in 2015**, was somewhat impotent. As many pointed out at the time, **it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by fiat; it could not draw back the seas, placate the winds or dim the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent cops, decreeing that this year's should see the first "global stocktake" of what had and had not been done to bring the agreement's overarching goals closer.**

As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th cop, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the time of the Paris cop, the global warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3°C above pre-industrial levels. **If policies in place today are followed, central estimates put it around 2.5-2.9°C, though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked improvement.**

A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230 gigawatts; last year it was 1,050gw. Better policies have spread, too. In 2014 just 12% of energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions came under carbon-pricing schemes and the average price per tonne was \$7; today 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around \$32.

Those and other steps forward explain why the **International Energy Agency**, an intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris, saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says they are likely to peak within a few years. **Peaking is not enough; emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2°C. But the almost ceaseless increase in emissions has been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for a stable climate.**

To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the process it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with "sinks" which remove **it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country had such a goal in 2015. Now 101 do.**

In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack—witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in Brazil—the **cops provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent**. A recent statement by **Joe Biden, America’s president, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, helped build momentum for a cop-adjacent deal on methane emissions**. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the **tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030**, another goal for which the United Arab Emirates wants its cop remembered.

None of this means that **cops have saved the world**. **Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the investment that made it happen**. The doubling of investment levels that Bloomberg nef, a data outfit, sees as necessary for the proposed tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of coppery. **To attract funds, countries will need to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove policies that still favour fossil fuels**.

And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. **This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest August on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September**.

That pace will not continue for ever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero is to cut the amount of sunshine the planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar geoengineering” alarms many climate scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research needs an international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound cops are not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake, set for 2028, some forum must be found.

Mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortably within cop’s remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns many. **Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is not unreasonable**.

To allay such fears, countries will have to be explicit about their removal plans in the next round of “Nationally Determined Contributions”—the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. In order to guard against fudging, they should also be required to keep their targets for removals and emission reduction separate.

Not just COPy and paste

This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaptation: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far below their peak. **But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved today. Best get cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in technologies and concentrate the minds of emitters. Again, a un process cannot force the changes the world requires. But when it frames debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise progress**. That is just as well, seeing how much more is needed. ■

24 novembre (The Economist)

[Geert Wilders's election win leaves the Dutch in an awful quandary \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

Right turn

Geert Wilders's election win leaves the Dutch in an awful quandary

Will the cordon sanitaire against the far right hold?



image: reuters

Nov 23rd 2023 | SCHEVENINGEN

On november 22nd voters awarded a whopping 37 of the 150 seats in the Dutch parliament to the anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, anti-eu Party for Freedom (pvv), led by Geert Wilders. It was a bombshell, putting the pvv far ahead of any other outfit, and it leaves the Netherlands in a quandary. For years, most major parties have ruled out a coalition with Mr Wilders. But the results make it nearly impossible to form a government without him. The Netherlands, whose politicians were among the first to turn to anti-Muslim populism in the early 2000s, may now get its first populist prime minister.

The size of the pvv's victory came as a shock to everyone in Dutch politics, including Mr Wilders. In a cheering crowd of party members at a small bar in Scheveningen, a seaside neighbourhood of The Hague where his support is strong, he proclaimed that he intends to be part of the next government, whether as prime minister or otherwise. **"The Dutch people sent a very clear signal," he said. "They can't go around us." He may well be correct.** The second-biggest outfit, an alliance of the Labour and GreenLeft parties, got 25 seats. The Liberals (vvd) of the incumbent prime minister, Mark Rutte, took just 24, and New Social Contract (nsc), a brand new centre-right party, won 20. The three parties are not enthusiastic about co-operating with each other, and would need at least one smaller party to form a majority.

Mr Rutte has led the Netherlands for 13 years. When he announced his departure in July over environmental and immigration scandals, saying he would not run in the snap election he called, **it left a vacuum.** Initially the big winner seemed likely to be **the Farmer Citizen Movement, or bbb, a four-year-old party that benefited from farmers' protests in recent years.** But over the summer it lost many supporters to the nsc, founded in August by **Pieter Omtzigt, a bureaucracy-fighting mp who had been a thorn in the side of the government.**

By last week the contest seemed to have settled into a battle between four main players. The first was Mr Omtzigt, whose focus on responsive government appealed to voters exhausted by scandals. The second was Dilan Yesilgoz, the justice minister, who took over as leader of Mr Rutte's vvd. The third was Frans Timmermans, who left his job as the eu's climate commissioner to run at the head of the Labour-GreenLeft alliance. **The fourth, unexpectedly, was Mr Wilders, whose pvv surged in the polls only in the campaign's final week.**

Mr Wilders is hardly a newcomer. He rose to prominence in 2006 as one of Europe's first generation of anti-Muslim populists, quitting the vvd to found the pvv. In 2010, after winning 16% of the vote, he struck a confidence-and-supply deal to support Mr Rutte's first government, but withdrew less than two years later over proposed austerity measures. **Since then every other party has shunned him, in part because of his unreliability but mostly over his radical anti-Muslim stance. In 2016 he was convicted of inciting hatred for a speech calling for "fewer Moroccans" in the Netherlands. His platform calls for banning mosques and the Koran.**

During Mr Rutte's long tenure in power, Mr Wilders came to be seen as a somewhat marginal figure, unable to exercise much influence. That changed with Mr Rutte's departure: voters were uncertain whether Mr Omtzigt or Ms Yesilgoz might abandon the **cordon sanitaire**. Mr Omtzigt insisted he would not. Ms Yesilgoz was more equivocal. Her refusal to condemn the pvv outright may have sent a signal that a vote for it might not be wasted.

Mr Wilders moderated his tone during the campaign, saying he would put his anti-Muslim policies "in the refrigerator" in order to join government. In the final campaign debate on November 21st Mr Wilders vowed to become a prime minister "for all [citizens of the Netherlands], without classes, regardless of what you believe or what your background is".

Polling during the campaign showed that Dutch voters were most concerned with health care, integrity in government and economic security. But antipathy towards immigrants was also high on the list. Many Dutch blame immigrants for exacerbating a housing shortage. Almost no parties challenged the consensus. Few seem to have reflected that immigration is an issue which the pvv owns, and that persuading voters that it was a crisis might drive them towards Mr Wilders.

A Dutch government with the pvv as its leading member would be a blow to Europe. Mr Wilders wants the Netherlands to exit the eu and grumbles about aid to Ukraine. He is closer to hard-right Europhobes such as Hungary's Viktor Orban than to hard-right Europhiles such as Italy's Giorgia Meloni. **The country would again become a foot-dragger, as it was during the euro crisis, rather than playing its more constructive recent role.**

On election night, Mr Omtzigt declined to rule out a coalition with the pvv, despite having done so during the campaign. Ms Yesilgoz said the question was unlikely to come up since Mr Wilders could not get enough other partners for a coalition. Fleur Agema, a pvv mp, made the opposite argument: no one else can realistically form a coalition without them. "They'd have to have ten parties," Ms Agema said.

In fact a coalition of Labour-GreenLeft, vvd, nsc and one or two other parties is mathematically possible, though politically improbable. **Continuing to reject his party would be undemocratic, Mr Wilders said. "The voter has spoken. The voter has said: we've had enough. We're going to make sure Dutch people come first again."** But many of the country's citizens feel that when Mr Wilders talks about Dutch people, he is not referring to them. .

24 novembre (The Economist)

[Will Chad be the next Western ally in Africa to fall? \(economist.com\)](https://www.economist.com)

The last outpost

Will Chad be the next Western ally in Africa to fall?

Democracy v realpolitik



Should they stay or should they go?image: afp

Nov 23rd 2023 | ABEICHE

Just outside the French army base in Abeche, a dusty city in eastern Chad, Mohamed Adam waits for his two toddlers. They had spots all over their faces so he took them to the French base, he says. “If you are sick sometimes they help.” Mr Adam, a taxi driver, is grateful. But even he questions France’s role in Chad. “We are not fully independent,” he says. “It’s 50% for us, 50% for France.” But he demurs when asked if all French troops should leave. Many others in Abeche are more hostile. Last year protesters tried to break into the base and ripped down the French flag, replacing it with Chad’s.

Anti-French feeling has grown sharply in the Sahel, the arid strip south of the Sahara, after a long French military intervention failed to stem jihadist violence in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Deaths in conflict increased from about 800 in 2016 to almost 6,000 in 2021, the last full year of French operations in Mali. **A spate of coups has swept across the region since 2020, hitting Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.** Those mounting them tried to justify their actions as necessary for security; each scapegoated France to bolster their popularity on the street. French soldiers, who had been invited in, were quickly pushed out, though that has not improved security. **The headquarters for France’s operations in those countries is located in a permanent base in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, long its closest ally in the region. Large French army convoys retreating from Niger are now arriving in the city.**

Yet many worry that France may be pushed out of Chad, too. Recent polling shows support for France falling and popularity for Russia rising, says a Western official. Others fear that political tension and threats on Chad’s border could burst into civil war. **“It’s a powder keg that’s going to blow,”** says Cameron Hudson of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. **That would be a geopolitical nightmare because Chad is a firebreak between several conflagrations in the wider region:** civil war and genocide in Sudan; jihadist violence in the Sahel; and strife in the Central African Republic (car) and Libya, where the Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group are operating in both countries (see map).

Chad has been run by **Mahamat Idriss Déby** since April 2021, when his father, **Idriss Déby**, was killed on the battlefield by rebels. The older man had seized power in an armed rebellion in 1990. **That his son’s takeover was unconstitutional did not bother France.** Its president, Emmanuel Macron, promptly flew in for the funeral and publicly emphasised that France would intervene to stop future rebel attacks. **His country has long backed dictators in Chad in exchange for Chadian soldiers**

fighting alongside France in the region and for French bases in the country. That support has extended to French jets bombing rebel columns. In 2019 they pulverised one such rebel advance. It is understood that in 2021 France provided intelligence on rebel movements and made threatening overflights but was never directly asked by Chad's rulers to strike.

The younger Mr Déby at first promised an 18-month transition to elections and that he would not stand in the poll. Yet in October 2022 he extended the transition for another two years and declared that he was eligible to run after all. **Outraged opposition groups took to the streets. Chad's security forces gunned down at least 128 people in a day and locked up hundreds more.**

A constitutional referendum is now scheduled for December and elections late next year. Yet it is highly unlikely that Mr Déby would lose an election. The main opposition leader, Succès Masra, who left Chad after the bloodshed last year and was pursued by the regime with an international arrest warrant, returned in early November after signing an agreement with Mr Déby's government.

Many fear that Mr Masra, short of cash and with little backing in Washington or Paris, has been co-opted by the regime, possibly with the promise of a government post. "When Nelson Mandela signed an agreement with the apartheid regime, does this mean Mandela was co-opted?" says Mr Masra when the allegation is put to him, adding that it is a "pro-democracy agreement". **Even so, few expect a free election.**

A palace coup may be a greater threat to Mr Déby than the ballot box. The president was not the unanimous choice to take over when his father died. **The ruling clique in Chad is from the Zaghawa tribe in the east, who make up only a tiny proportion of Chad's population.** Yet Mr Déby's mother is not Zaghawa, causing some jitters. His half-brothers almost certainly have their own presidential aspirations. He has also ruffled feathers by retiring a slew of generals. **And though officially neutral in Sudan's civil war, Mr Déby has implicitly backed the Rapid Support Forces (rsf) and has reportedly allowed the United Arab Emirates (uae) to fly in weapons to the group via an airport in Amdjarass, the Déby family's home town.** At the same time the uae, which maintains that the flights carry humanitarian aid and not arms, has evidently provided loads of financial support to Mr Déby's government.

Yet many among Chad's ruling elite have close family and tribal connections to Zaghawa rebel groups in Sudan's Darfur region. In mid-November the strongest of them declared war on the rsf. This will ratchet up tensions within Zaghawa ruling circles in N'Djamena. **"This [backing the rsf] threatens to divide the family and to divide the army,"** says a Western diplomat.

"I don't think Déby's leadership will last a year," says Mr Hudson. Not everyone is so sure. **He faces many threats but is proving to be a surprisingly deft political operator,** says Enrica Picco of International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank.

A palace coup would not necessarily mean a civil war or force the French to leave, though it would raise the risk that either could occur. A military coup by non-Zaghawa officers would be more likely to lead to widespread bloodshed and the French being booted out. Some Arabs even within the ruling coalition are unhappy with Mr Déby's leadership, notes Ms Picco.

It is also possible that rebels could invade from abroad to overthrow Mr Déby. It was insurgents from Libya who killed his father in 2021, while earlier this year leaked American intelligence cables suggested that **Wagner mercenaries** were helping southern Chadian rebels in the car in yet another plot to topple Mr Déby.

Such threats may explain why Mr Déby may be looking for new ways to consolidate power. In November Hungary's parliament approved the deployment of up to 200 soldiers to Chad, supposedly to counter terrorism and illegal migration. Some analysts suspect that this deployment is actually about helping Mr Déby secure gold fields in the restive north or perhaps even to protect him from a coup.

An agreement with Khalifa Haftar, a warlord who controls eastern Libya, recently led to attacks by Mr Haftar's men on Chadian rebel bases in Libya. **Mr Déby also has warm ties with Mr Macron, whom he recently visited in Paris.** That relationship, along with Chad's status as France's last ally in a vast and volatile region, suggests that France would again use air power against rebel columns attacking from Libya. To Chad's south, despite Wagner's alleged scheming, Mr Déby seems to have fostered surprisingly good relations with Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the car's president, who agreed to let Chadian forces pursue rebels into his country.

Another worry for Mr Déby is the prospect of blowback from Sudan's civil war, which is already giving him a headache. Yet the end of the war in Sudan could bring even more problems.

Many rsf fighters have ties to Chad and axes to grind, despite Mr Déby's recent implicit support. **Should the rsf defeat Sudan's official army, some of its men could try to settle scores in Chad. They would almost certainly go after refugees or fighters who have fled across the border. Yet should the rsf lose, large numbers of armed fighters could flood into Chad. They might even head straight for N'Djamena to seize power.**

Western governments have turned a blind eye to Mr Déby's bloody authoritarianism, just as they did to his father's, because they fear that the regime's collapse could lead to civil war or a pro-Russian regime. After the debacles in Niger and Mali, France thinks pushing Mr Déby to honour his promise not to run and to hold a free election is "a luxury we cannot afford", says a Western diplomat. This attitude frustrates **Mr Masra, who says that France and America have only ever regarded Chad as useful for security. What about the expectations of our people, he demands? .**

24 novembre (Haaretz)

[Did Hamas Operate Under Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital? A Tour of the Tunnels Leaves No Room for Doubt - Israel News - Haaretz.com](#)

Did Hamas Operate Under Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital? A Tour of the Tunnels Leaves No Room for Doubt

Israeli journalists were shown a conduit under the facility stretching over 170 meters. There's no way the hospital's managers didn't know what was going on



An Israeli soldier stands at the entrance to a tunnel under Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza, yesterday. Credit: RONEN ZVULUN/Reuters

[Yaniv Kubovich](#), Al-Shifa Hospital, Gaza City

Nov 23, 2023 2:14 pm IST

AL-SHIFA HOSPITAL, GAZA CITY – When the first Israeli tanks crossed into the Gaza Strip late last month, Israel's political and military leaders were already deliberating how their forces would operate in Al-Shifa Hospital. How would they expose what Israeli intelligence had pointed out over and over: Hamas' cynical use of human shields?

It was understood that Israel's allies would have a hard time arguing Israel's case if the army wounded or killed patients or staff. The diagrams shown by the Israel Defense Forces' Spokesperson's Unit before the troops entered the compound [didn't convince people around the world](#) that they were being shown a smoking gun.

I headed to Al-Shifa in an open all-terrain vehicle of the army's transport unit – which left from the destroyed Kibbutz Be'eri. Only a few minutes later we were in Gaza and saw an extraordinary sight: an untouched sewage treatment plant amid rubble all around.



A tunnel opening found under the Al-Shifa hospital, yesterday.

[Israel realizes that the nearly 1 million displaced people evacuated to the south](#) will eventually return home, and the worse the humanitarian crisis in northern Gaza, the worse the implications for Israel.

Epidemics don't recognize the Israel-Gaza border or the new order that Israel hopes to create in Gaza, so the treatment plant was spared. Three hundred meters from there, field showers were put up for the soldiers; water tankers drove back and forth to keep the spigots supplied.

“This is Gaza's main boardwalk; this is where they hang out,” said one of the officers commanding the convoy as it headed along the dirt road between the beach and the first row of homes.



A backpack with a symbol marking the 60th anniversary of Kibbutz Be'eri, and Israeli-made 'Shoresh' sandals, found at Al-Shifa hospital.

A little imagination provided a clear look at this boardwalk before October 7. The tourist destinations had lost their signs, and most of the sites were damaged.

The high-end residential towers along the promenade had collapsed, their ruins a testament to Gaza's socioeconomic elite who lived in luxury like [anywhere else in the world – the Hamas elite](#). The luxury shops seem to have been looted.

On the other end of the boardwalk, in an area until recently packed with restaurants, gyms and an amusement park, nothing was left. The same went for the beach; only one lifeguard's shed remained unharmed.

Yaniv Kubovich's tweet from Gaza: Ammunition, maps and equipment found at Al-Shifa hospital.

[From there we turned toward Al-Shifa Hospital](#). For over a week the elite Shaldag unit had been operating there without firing a shot to allow Israeli and foreign journalists to tour the compound and see what had been uncovered.

On one of the main streets, before entering what had been the hospital's emergency room, we saw what appeared to be the fruit of quality intelligence. [A tunnel shaft showed how Hamas gunmen could enter a tunnel network](#) beneath the hospital without having to enter a ward and see a patient or staff member.

In the hospital plaza, the troops laid out dozens of rifles, explosive devices, drones, hand grenades and other munitions found there. Some will be taken to Israel for study, some will be destroyed.

“This place served as a headquarters for Hamas company and battalion commanders,” IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari said as he led journalists to a tunnel entrance located beneath one of the largest structures in the hospital. The Shaldag troops used engineering equipment to create cover positions, effectively isolating their operations from the rest of the medical center.

Yaniv Kubovich's tweet from Gaza: Back from a visit to Al-Shifa. Most of the hospitals are empty, but you can still find some civilians at Al-Shifa.

[Some civilians came out of the hospital with their hands on their heads](#) asking if they could move to another building. But most seem to have been used to the soldiers; they passed without fear and even said hello to the troops.

But the soldiers wouldn't let this new routine confuse them. Any motion by a Palestinian beyond the waving of a hand was met with an immediate response. The troops told one Palestinian he had to immediately enter one of the hospital's buildings – no one was allowed in the courtyards of this immense edifice.

“There's no room for error here,” one of the Shaldag troops said as he stood on a mound of rubble. “The goal is to end the operation without firing a single bullet, if we don't have to.”



Inside a tunnel under Al-Shifa, yesterday.

Hamas siphons electricity

The question of whether Al-Shifa's managers knew about the tunnels, the munitions and the military headquarters is answered the moment you go down into the tunnel with the IDF – one stretch is 170 meters long. There is no way the hospital administrators didn't know what was happening.

This is a long tunnel network made entirely of reinforced concrete to defend against IDF attacks, replete with power sockets, power lines and ventilation equipment. Hamas siphoned power from the hospital.

A tour of a tunnel under Al-Shifa.

The tunnels lead to well-lit, air-conditioned rooms that contain tables and beds. It's not clear if these rooms were prepared to receive hostages, but there is no doubt they were used by Hamas company, battalion and brigade commanders, and that fighting was directed from there in recent rounds, if not in the current war as well.

Throughout the tour, we could hear the Israeli troops fighting in the nearby streets, as Israeli jets occasionally bombed the Zeitoun neighborhood. The sound of gunfire didn't stop for a moment from that direction, but there was no firing at the hospital.

Across from the emergency room, the MRI building now houses Shaldag and combat engineering troops. Hundreds of land mines were brought there the morning I visited to destroy the tunnels under the hospital.



A building which used to house a gym, in the northern Gaza Strip, yesterday.

“The explosion here will be controlled,” one soldier said. “We don't want to harm the surrounding structures, but it will make a lot of noise.”

The IDF believes that Hamas has other tunnels and capabilities at Shifa. It is not believed that Israeli hostages were held there.

Still, a Kibbutz Be'eri backpack and Source Sandals were found in the compound. Now the army plans to conclude its operations at the hospital, even though the forces haven't entered many places there.

"We wanted to show the world that Hamas was using the hospital as a headquarters. This was important to us so the world would understand how cynical this organization is," Hagari said.

He said the objective wasn't to collect every last rifle, it was mainly to get the images out to the world. Now it remains to be seen what impact these images will have and how much time, if any, they can buy for the troops on the ground.

24 novembre (The Guardian)

[Like the rest of France, I couldn't wait for Ridley Scott's Napoleon. Then I actually saw it | Agnès Poirier | The Guardian](#)

Like the rest of France, I couldn't wait for Ridley Scott's Napoleon. Then I actually saw it

[Agnès Poirier](#)

I took my seat expecting a masterful take on French history. Instead, we got an industrial-grade sex-and-battles disaster

Fri 24 Nov 2023 08.00 CET

When the trailer for [Ridley Scott's Napoleon](#) was released last summer, French social networks shuddered with excitement. The trailer's promises were bountiful, and the historical inaccuracies spotted here and there (no, Napoleon didn't fire cannon at the Pyramids) did little to dent our enthusiasm; great artists are allowed some poetic licence, after all. How daring of the 85-year-old English film-maker to tackle such a momentous subject – we were in awe already. Would his Napoleon measure up to his masterful debut, [The Duellists](#), set in France during the Napoleonic wars and adapted from a short story by Joseph Conrad? Hopes were running high.

That it was an Englishman charged with this latest blockbuster interpretation of Napoleon's influence only fuelled the anticipation. Most of us welcome a foreign take on our history and cultural heritage, perhaps even more when it comes from a former best enemy. This cross-cultural experience fosters fascinating exchanges and conversations. How many musketeer, Sun King and Marie Antoinette stories has Hollywood churned out since the birth of cinema? We have lost count. How many Joan of Arcs? There was Ingrid Bergman, Hedy Lamarr, Jean Seberg, Milla Jovovich, not to mention the unforgettable Renée Falconetti in Carl Theodor Dreyer's masterpiece.

Hollywood is not alone, of course. Many film-makers have had a go at interpreting some facet of French history. The great Polish director Andrzej Wajda's take on the revolutionary Danton with Gérard Depardieu in the title role is a gem of visual elegance and rigorous intelligence. As for Egyptian master Youssef Chahine's *Adieu Bonaparte*, about Napoleon's 1798 campaign in Egypt, it certainly doesn't lack beauty or majesty. Foreigners often perceive things we cannot see, helping us to understand ourselves better. That is, of course, when they have successfully pierced our secrets and unveiled them with skill. There are also epic failures in the genre: the films whose scripts have no sense of history, no intelligence or understanding of historical characters, no point of view. Those are the works of film-makers who use French history the way others use wallpaper, as decor, and as mere anecdote.

I went to one of the first screenings of Scott's Napoleon in an arthouse cinema in Paris's Left Bank, not far from the Sorbonne. I assumed they would screen the film in their 250-seat panoramic theatre. Instead, they were timidly showing it on their smallest screen. Perhaps they were just testing the waters – it was only 10am. I did not expect, however, to find myself all alone. And fortunately so. For the next 158 minutes, I was able to huff and puff aloud without disturbing anyone else.



Joaquin Phoenix in Ridley Scott's Napoleon (2023). Photograph: Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy

Ridley Scott meeting his Waterloo on the screen is not a pretty sight. His Napoleon inspires in the French viewer a festival of emotions in quick succession: sadness to witness such a colossal missed opportunity; excruciating pain to hear such inept dialogue; bewilderment upon realising that Scott doesn't seem to have bothered to pick up one history book to check, well, historical facts; sleepiness right into the umpteenth battle scene; boredom listening to the chronological crash course of a script, which is so dire it lacks any semblance of a storyline; and gratitude when Napoleon blows out the candles, kindly sparing us another romp with Josephine.

How could so many talents behind and in front of the camera, such a rich subject and so many means lead to such debacle? Perhaps because Scott is more interested in images than words. But beautiful costumes and makeup, and even a talented director of photography, don't make a film great. You need an eye and vision behind the camera, a conductor, or what we call in [France](#) an auteur. Stanley Kubrick had a special room in his home dedicated to his research on Napoleon, a film that he pursued all his life like an unattainable goal, so complex is the title figure, so perfectionist was Kubrick.

The late film director would have got his facts right: for instance, that Napoleon never planned to invade the whole of Russia in a three-week campaign and that he was well aware of the dreadful Russian winter; he had just not anticipated an outbreak of typhus that killed 100,000 of his men.

This wouldn't be so much of a problem had he displayed an original perspective on his subject, let alone any understanding of his personality and achievements. He even seems ignorant of the fact that there are two men in Napoleon: there is Bonaparte, a hero of the French Revolution who gave France and [Europe](#) institutions of the Enlightenment era that still exist today, and who liberated Jewish communities from their European ghettos; and there is Napoleon, the hero turned weary authoritarian ruler, whose military campaigns drained a whole nation of its youth and wealth. Beyond facts, Scott's great historical deficiency is to ignore the politics; instead giving us Napoleon's tactics on the battlefield as a mirror to his sex life. It's inept, crass and boring.

Considering the roughly \$200m that was spent on the adaptation, he could have easily made a two-part film, acknowledging some of the topic's complexity. Instead, he cast a worn-out and rotund-looking 49-year-old, Joaquin Phoenix, to play a 24-year-old dashing young officer, and gave the great actor only two moods to play: brutal and grotesque. Vanessa Kirby as Josephine is the only redeeming feature in this industrial disaster of a film: she is plausible and lovable, despite the banal lines the script gives her. Alas, Josephine alone cannot save this Napoleon. Let's just hope that Scott's failure will soon be another film director's triumph. Next!

- Agnès Poirier is a political commentator, writer and critic

24 novembre (The Guardian)

[Geert Wilders' victory confirms upward trajectory of far right in Europe | The far right | The Guardian](#)

Analysis

Geert Wilders' victory confirms upward trajectory of far right in Europe

[Jon Henley](#) Europe correspondent

Dutch general election results show how populist and far-right parties are advancing into political mainstream



Geert Wilders has softened his more hardline anti-Islamic language, apparently in hopes of his PVV party entering a coalition. Photograph: Hollandse Hoogte/Shutterstock

Fri 24 Nov 2023 06.00 CET

Geert Wilders' [shock victory in the Dutch general election](#) confirms the upward trajectory of Europe's populist and far-right parties, which – with the occasional setback – are continuing their steady march into the mainstream.

There is no guarantee that Wilders, whose anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV) won 37 seats in Wednesday's ballot – more than twice its 2021 total – will be able to form a government with a majority in the Netherlands' 150-seat parliament.

Even if he can, the coalition process of endless compromise and concession by three, four or more parties means the most extreme parts of his manifesto, from banning the Qur'an to holding a Nexit referendum, are not about to become government policy.

But there is now a fair chance that a party shunned by the mainstream for more than a decade because of its radically nativist views could, some time next year, join the ranks of the far-right parties advancing across much of [Europe](#).

From Helsinki to Rome and Berlin to Brussels, far-right parties are climbing steadily up the polls, shaping the policies of the mainstream right to reflect their nativist and populist platforms, and occupying select ministerial roles in coalition governments.

Giorgia Meloni, whose party has neofascist roots, heads Italy's [farthest-right government since the second world war](#). The far right is part of the [ruling coalition in Finland](#) and, in exchange for key policy concessions, [propping up another in Sweden](#).

In Austria, the FPÖ is well ahead in the polls less than a year from the next election, while in Germany, the [far-right AfD has surged](#) from 10% to more than 21%, trailing only the centre-right CDU, and this year won its first district council elections.

If presidential elections were held today in France, polls suggest [Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Rally](#) – who scored a record 41.46% last time around – would win. Far-right Flemish nationalists are set to make big gains in the Belgian elections in June.

Little wonder that the continent’s far-right leaders, from Le Pen to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Italy’s Matteo Salvini, the AfD’s Alice Weidel and Vlaams Belang’s Tom Van Grieken, rushed on Wednesday night to proffer Wilders their congratulations.

The far right has suffered some setbacks this year: in Spain’s parliamentary election in July, [Vox saw its vote share drop](#) from the 15% it won in 2019 to 12%, slashing the number of seats it holds in parliament from 52 to 33.

In Poland, the ruling nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party finished first in October elections but – [while it is trying to form a majority](#) – has no viable path to government after a three-way opposition alliance led by Donald Tusk won an overall majority.

But in Slovakia, Robert Fico – if not far right, certainly populist, and an avowed Orbán admirer – won September’s election, fulfilled his campaign promise to halt military aid to Ukraine, and has [raised rule-of-law concerns](#) with attacks on the press.

Continental analysts also cite Britain’s Conservatives as being under populist, far-right influence, noting the extreme nationalist sloganeering of the Brexit campaign and the government’s ferocious rhetoric on immigration and the “war on woke”.

Analysts note that every far-right party is different, as are the cultures and political systems in which they operate. But across the continent, populist and far-right parties have been rising steadily – with the odd interruption – for several decades.



Giorgia Meloni, whose party has neofascist roots, heads Italy’s farthest-right government since the second world war. Photograph: snapshot/Future Image/B Elmenthaler/Shutterstock

A range of factors is driving their advance. For a long time, opposition to immigration, Islam and the EU were the far right’s core causes. More recently, culture wars, minority rights, and the climate crisis and the sacrifice needed to combat it have joined the list.

Their appeal has been further enhanced by a deep cost of living crisis flowing from pandemic recovery and Russia’s war on Ukraine, by rapid and confusing social and digital change, and – everywhere – by mounting mistrust of mainstream politicians.

Gradually, far-right parties have become normalised in a two-way process: as the centre right has adopted nativist talking points and been willing to cut coalition deals, far-right parties are moderating some of their more voter-repellent views.

Much of Europe’s centre right, for example, is now as hardline on immigration as the far right – while far-right parties are busy projecting economic discipline, dialling back on Euroscepticism and downplaying their past support for Russia.

Wilders, who surfed a wave of anti-immigration sentiment and frustration with successive mainstream coalitions to his victory, has himself softened his more hardline anti-Islam language, apparently in hopes of entering a coalition.

Whether or not he leads the Netherlands' next government, his performance on Wednesday night is a reminder that, as [the Guardian revealed in September](#), almost a third of Europeans now vote for populist, far-right or far-left parties.

Wide support for anti-establishment politics is continuing to surge across the continent – and, increasingly, challenging the mainstream.

24 novembre (FAZ)

[Israel: Reaktion von Albert Camus auf den Terror ist aktuell \(faz.net\)](#)

FRANZÖSISCHER SCHRIFTSTELLER:

Albert Camus benannte den Terror

VON CLAUD LEGGEWIE

-AKTUALISIERT AM 24.11.2023-11:11



Kritischer Zeitungsleser und Journalist: Albert Camus 1959 in Paris Bild: AFP

Im Jahr 1957 erhält der französische Schriftsteller Albert Camus den Literaturnobelpreis. In seiner Preisrede spricht er über den Krieg in Algerien. **Seine Reaktion auf den Terror ist aktuell.**

Ein Gastbeitrag.

Albert Camus' Tagebucheintrag zum **17. Oktober 1957** ist vielfach zitiert worden: „**Nobelpreis. Eigenartiges Gefühl der Niedergeschlagenheit und der Wehmut. Als ich 20 war, arm und nackt, habe ich den wahren Ruhm gekannt.**“ Zwei Tage später notiert Camus: „Erschrocken über das, was mir zustößt und was ich nicht verlangt habe. Und zur Krönung des Ganzen so gemeine Angriffe, dass es mir das Herz zuschnürt.“

Zum obligaten Rummel im Verlagshaus Gallimard und bei der Zeremonie in Stockholm macht Camus *bella figura* im geliehenen Frack. Die Nobelpreisrede wird von den Pariser Auguren als ordentlicher Auftritt abgehakt. **Camus** kommt darin eher indirekt auf das algerische Drama zu sprechen, das seit drei Jahren andauert und seine Heimat zu zerreißen droht. „**Jede Generation glaubt wohl, sie sei dazu bestimmt, die Welt neu zu gestalten; meine Generation weiß, dass sie sie nicht neu gestalten wird. Ihre Aufgabe ist größer. Sie besteht darin, zu verhindern, dass die Welt aus den Fugen gerät.**“

Von einem frischgebackenen Nobelpreisträger erwartet man wuchtige Aussagen zur Gegenwart, doch das Statement, das er eher unbeabsichtigt abgibt, provoziert einen Skandal. „**Le Monde**“ **entstellt den Wortwechsel mit einem arabischen Studenten** nach der Preisübergabe in der Schlagzeile: „**Entre ma mère et la justice je choisis ma mère**“, was hieße: meine Familie steht über der Gerechtigkeit. Camus hatte sich tatsächlich sehr viel differenzierter ausgedrückt: „**Ich habe den Terror immer verurteilt. Ich muss auch den Terrorismus verurteilen, der blindlings auf den Straßen von Algier ausgeübt wird. Zurzeit werden Bomben in die Straßenbahnen von Algier geworfen. Meine Mutter könnte sich in einer dieser Straßenbahnen befinden. Wenn das Gerechtigkeit ist, ist mir meine Mutter lieber.**“

„Kontextualisierung“ fehl am Platz

Für die antikoloniale Linke, den algerischen „Front de Libération Nationale“ und deren Unterstützer, die sogenannten Kofferträger, um Jean-Paul Sartre und Francis Jeanson **war das die Gelegenheit, dem schon lange suspekten Camus aufs Neue den Fehdehandschuh hinzuwerfen.**

Das gewollte Missverständnis wirkt heute, nach dem Massaker des 7. Oktobers 2023 in Israel, erschreckend aktuell: Wenn ein nahestehender Mensch bei einem Terroranschlag zu Tode kommt, in der Straßenbahn von Algier genau wie bei einem Festival in der israelischen Wüste, dann sind „Kontextualisierung“ und Relativierung fehl am Platze. **Der in Schweden lebende arabische Student Said Kessal**, der Camus um ein Statement zu Algerien angegangen und dabei in einen atemlosen Monolog verfallen war, **konnte wissen, dass Camus kein Verfechter der Algérie française war**. Er entstammte einer Familie armer *Pieds-Noirs*, wie man Menschen aus der Mittelmeerregion bezeichnete, die sich seit 1830 auf der anderen Seite der Mediterrane angesiedelt hatten und überwiegend mittellos geblieben waren.

Sich im Zweifel für das Leben der Mutter zu entscheiden beschönigte die Ungerechtigkeit und Brutalität des Kolonialregimes, das Camus als Reporter in den Dreißigerjahren eindringlich beschrieben hatte, nicht im Mindesten. **Camus verurteilte auch nicht den Studenten, drückte ihm vielmehr nachträglich Respekt aus.** „Er wusste wovon er sprach, und sein Gesicht war nicht von Hass gezeichnet, vielmehr von Verzweiflung und Unglück. Ich teile dieses Unglück, sein Gesicht ist das meines Landes.“

„Nur das Risiko rechtfertigt das Denken“

Camus' Position konnte allen bekannt sein: **Er verurteilte den Terror der radikalen Rechten, die Algerien als ihr Terrain betrachteten, genauso wie den der algerischen Nationalisten, die sich von der Geschichte berufen fühlten, das Land frei zu bomben.** Der letzte Tagebucheintrag vor dem Nobelpreis berichtet über ein am Ende vergebliches Ringen zwischen Ali la Pointe, dem jungen Helden des bewaffneten Widerstands in der Kasbah, und der französischen Widerstandskämpferin Germaine Tillion um eine friedliche Lösung: **„Aufhören des zivilen Terrorismus gegen Aufhören der Hinrichtungen“** – wofür Camus sich übrigens als Gegner der Todesstrafe auch hinter den Kulissen eingesetzt hatte. Am 22. Januar 1956 hatte er in Algier seinen „Appel pour une trêve civile en Algérie“ publiziert und anstelle der Unabhängigkeit eines arabischen Algeriens, das die Siedler und auch die Juden sogleich würden verlassen müssen, eine Föderation, eine Art Einstaatenlösung für Nordafrika vorgeschlagen.



Albert Camus (1913-1960), aufgenommen im Jahr 1947. :Bild: picture-alliance / Mary Evans Pi

Vier Tage zuvor notiert er: „Diese Angst, die ich in Paris mit mir herumschleppte und die Algerien betraf, ist von mir gefallen. Hier wenigstens steht man im Kampf, der hart für uns ist, da wir die öffentliche Meinung gegen uns haben. Aber letzten Endes habe ich stets im Kampf meinen Frieden gefunden. **Der Intellektuelle** von Amts wegen, was immer er sagen mag, und vor allem wenn er sich nur schriftlich mit den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten beschäftigt, **lebt wie ein Feigling**. Er kompensiert diese Ohnmacht mit verbaler Übersteigerung. **Nur das Risiko rechtfertigt das Denken**. Und zudem ist alles besser als dieses Frankreich der Abdankung und der Bosheit, dieser Sumpf, in dem ich ersticke. Ja, zum erstenmal seit Monaten war ich beim Aufstehen glücklich. Ich habe den Stern wiedergefunden.“

Camus versucht mit dieser „wenig zahlreichen, armseligen Versammlung“ zu retten, was schon nicht mehr zu retten ist. Er steigt, gegen den Rat der Freunde und der Polizei, im mondänen Hotel Saint-Georges ab, erhält dort Todesdrohungen, redigiert seine Rede und trifft sich mit Gleichgesinnten des Zirkels überwiegend europäischstämmiger Personen, die seit den Dreißigerjahren als Liberale eine „dritte Kraft“ zwischen den Ultras beider Seiten bilden wollen. **Die Versammlung trifft sich am 22. Januar in einem Haus nahe der Kasbah; sie wird von radikalen Anhängern der Algérie française, die wenig später bei der Terrororganisation OAS landen werden, verschrien, mit Steinen beworfen, des Verrats bezichtigt.**

Der tödliche Unfall von Camus

Sie muss stattfinden, beharrt Camus, der jetzt wieder als Journalist für den „Express“ arbeitet und Kreisen des gestürzten französischen Premierministers Pierre Mendès France nahesteht, „um wenigstens zu zeigen, dass nicht jede Möglichkeit eines Zwiesgesprächs ausgeschlossen ist, und um zu verhindern, dass die allgemeine Ermutigung dazu verleitet, sich mit dem Schlimmsten abzufinden“. *Camus, der eine Reihe wichtiger, aber letztlich bereits einflussloser arabischer und kabyllischer Intellektueller an seiner Seite hat, appelliert in einer Rede an beide Seiten, sich nicht dem Hass und der Gewalt hinzugeben.*

Knapp zwei Jahre später bekräftigte Camus seine Position in einem Beitrag für „Le Monde“ am 14. Dezember 1957: „Ich bin für ein gerechtes Algerien, in dem beide Bevölkerungsgruppen in Frieden und Gleichheit leben sollen. Ich habe immer wieder gesagt, dass dem algerischen Volk Gerechtigkeit widerfahren muss und ihm ein vollständig demokratisches Regime zugestanden werden muss“, doch nun sei der Hass auf beiden Seiten so groß geworden, „dass es einem Intellektuellen nicht mehr einfällt, einzugreifen; seine Äußerungen könnten die Spannungen noch verschärfen“.

Camus hatte da, bis zu **seinem tödlichen Unfall im Wagen des Verlegersohns Michel Gallimard**, noch zwei Jahre zu leben. **Weitere zwei Jahre später wurde Algerien unabhängig und deklarierte sich als arabisch-islamische Nation. Pieds-Noirs und Juden mussten gehen, die Kabylen kämpfen bis heute um Anerkennung ihrer kulturellen Eigenart, und Algerien agiert als einer der energischsten Verfechter einer palästinensischen Einstaatenlösung und antizionistischer Frontstaat.** Junge Männer, die es daheim nicht mehr aushalten, suchen den riskanten Weg übers Mittelmeer, weil das arabisch-muslimische Algerien niemals demokratisch geworden ist.

Genau wie Camus darf man die Hoffnung auch im Blick auf Palästina niemals aufgeben. Fast tagesaktuell klingt sein Vorschlag, dass „die arabische Bewegung und die französischen Behörden – ohne deswegen miteinander in Verbindung treten zu müssen und ohne jegliche andere Verpflichtung – gleichzeitig eine Erklärung abgeben, wonach während der Dauer der Unruhen die Zivilbevölkerung immer und überall in Frieden gelassen und geschützt wird . . . **Welches auch die alten und tiefen Ursprünge der algerischen Tragödie sein mögen, eine Tatsache bleibt bestehen: nichts rechtfertigt den Tod von Unschuldigen.**“

1958 schrieb er dann wider alle Evidenz, dass die „schreckliche Tragödie, in der unser gemeinsames Land versunken ist, nicht nur Anlass zur Hoffnung, sondern auch Anlass zu einem gemeinsamen Vorhaben gibt, dass wir alle, Araber und Franzosen, zur Wahrheit voranschreiten könnten“.

Claus Leggewie ist Politikwissenschaftler und Mitherausgeber der „Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik“.

24 novembre (NYT)

[Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Who Looked at History From the Bottom Up, Dies at 94 - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com)

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Who Looked at History From the Bottom Up, Dies at 94

He led a movement that rejected historiography's traditional emphasis on great events and leaders in favor of mining the "mental universe" of peasants, merchants and clergymen.



Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie in his office in Paris in 2009. He was a leading member of the Annales movement, which focused less on rulers than on the ruled. Credit...Olivier Laban-Mattei/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Jonathan Kandell

Nov. 23, 2023

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, a French historian at the forefront of a scholarly movement that sought to understand the past from the bottom up, by probing the beliefs and psychology of anonymous peasants and priests rather than the exploits of triumphant generals and rulers, died on Wednesday. He was 94.

His family confirmed the death, according to Agence France-Presse and other French news organizations. The magazine L'Obs said he died in Paris.

In a statement from the Élysée Palace, President Emmanuel Macron of France called Mr. Le Roy Ladurie "one of our greatest historians," adding, "His work truly extended history's domain — the discipline was enriched because he was able to invent new tools, new approaches, and new subjects."

A prolific and eminently readable scholar, Mr. Le Roy Ladurie was most familiar for his books "Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error" (1975) and "Carnival in Romans" (1979), both of them best sellers and instant classics on both sides of the Atlantic.

He was a leading member of the Annales movement, which rejected traditional historiography, with its emphasis on great events (the War for Independence, the Bolshevik Revolution), ideologies (capitalism vs. Marxism) and protagonists (Washington and Jefferson, Napoleon and Wellington, Lenin and Trotsky).

Before the influence of Mr. Le Roy Ladurie and other, mainly French, scholars, students were confidently assumed to have mastered the outlines of history if they could recite the dates, describe the cataclysms and memorize the names of the greats. But according to Mr. Le Roy Ladurie, they would have only scratched the surface of the human experience through the ages.

The Annales school, named after the Paris-based scholarly magazine that was launched in 1929, extended its influence throughout Western Europe and the United States even among historians who did not formally identify themselves with the movement. Its appeal is felt in histories as disparate as the accounts of peasant revolts in pre-Revolution France, slavery in the Americas, witchcraft in Renaissance England and rural bandits in 19th-century Mexico.



Mr. Le Roy Ladurie in 1987. A prolific and eminently readable scholar, he was most familiar for his books “Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error” and “Carnival in Romans,” which became instant classics on both sides of the Atlantic. Credit...Georges Bendrihem/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Mr. Le Roy Ladurie sought to explore the “mental universe” of peasants, workers, merchants and clergymen in Europe’s preindustrial era. In “Montaillou,” he focused on a medieval village in southwestern France, whose inhabitants were swept up by the 13th-century conflict between Roman Catholic orthodoxy and a local heretical group known as the Cathars. A crusade was launched by Pope Innocent III to wipe out the Cathars in Montaillou and dozens of other nearby villages. But hidden heretics persisted for another 100 years.

Mr. Le Roy Ladurie drew upon the confessions extracted from Montaillou farmers and shepherds by Inquisition officials. Besides religious beliefs, these interrogations revealed everyday work and household routines, friendships and rivalries, family relationships and sexual practices of the defendants. In one startling chapter, a heretical, womanizing village priest explains his seduction techniques in great detail and color.

“Montaillou” gained enthusiasts among scholars and popular audiences. “A wholly successful demonstration of the historian’s capacity to bring together almost every dimension of human experience into a single, satisfying whole,” the British historian Keith Thomas wrote in *The New York Review of Books* in 1978.

Mr. Le Roy Ladurie explained the book’s appeal among nonacademic readers in less august terms. “A question of *histoires de fesses*,” he told an interviewer in 1985, meaning “sex stories” in French slang.

He followed “Montaillou” with “Carnival in Romans.” Set in the southeastern French town of Romans-sur-Isère in 1580, the book investigates a bloody ambush that takes place during the annual Mardi Gras festivities, reconstructing the tensions between craftsmen and peasants on one side and merchants and aristocrats on the other.

The book implied that the class and cultural conflicts in this little known river port were part of the road to the French Revolution two centuries later.

“Le Roy Ladurie’s fascinating, social, political, anthropological and psychological approach to the revolt at Romans, sets us sure-footedly on the journey,” the British historian Olwen Hufton wrote in a 1980 critique for *History Today*.

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie was born on July 19, 1929, in Les Moutiers-en-Cinglais, a village in Normandy. His father, Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, was a former minister of agriculture in the collaborationist Vichy government who joined the resistance against the Nazi occupation of France. His mother, Léontine Dager, was the daughter of a viscount.

Emmanuel was a brilliant student who gained a Ph.D. in history at the University of Paris and went on to head the history of modern civilization department at the prestigious Collège de France. He published more than 30 books and still found time to make frequent contributions to *Le Monde*, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (now *L'Obs*) and *L'Express*.

Among his other notable works were “*Jasmin’s Witch*” (1983), about sorcery practices in a 17th-century village in Gascony; “*A History of the French Peasants From the Black Plague to the Revolution*” (2002); and “*Climate Fluctuations From the Year 1000 Until Today*” (2011).

From 1987 to 1994, he was director of the Bibliothèque Nationale, France’s national library.

His wife, Madeleine Pupponi, a physician with a strong interest in climate change, helped him research the environmental impact of retreating glaciers in climate history. They had two children. There was no immediate information on his survivors.

Mr. Le Roy Ladurie joined the French Communist Party as a teenager in 1945. Though he said he began to regret his Communist affiliation after the Red Army crushed the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, he remained in the party for seven more years. He continued to hold strongly left-wing views and often clashed with more conservative historians.

He had a particularly nasty dispute with his former mentor, Fernand Braudel, himself a leading exponent of the Annales school and a famed historian of capitalism. Mr. Le Roy Ladurie and his younger colleagues took issue with Mr. Braudel’s more global approach to history in favor of a so-called history of mentalities, which focuses on the biographies of the downtrodden. In 1972, they forced the older scholar to give up his post as editor of *Annales* magazine and to step down as director of the École Pratique des Hautes Études, the institution most identified with the movement.

Image



Mr. Le Roy Ladurie published more than 30 books and still found time to make frequent contributions to *Le Monde*, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (now *L'Obs*) and *L'Express*. Credit...Olivier Laban-Mattei/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Over the next two decades, Mr. Le Roy Ladurie’s vision for the Annales school gathered strength among his peers. In Italy, Carlo Ginzburg published “*The Cheese and the Worms*” (1976), the story of an obscure miller burned at the stake by the Inquisition for his insistence that God and the universe were created from rot.

In the United States, the Princeton scholar Robert Darnton published a 1984 best seller, “The Great Cat Massacre,” whose title essay explained why apprentices at an 18th-century Paris printer thought it was great fun to slaughter their bosses’ pets.

And “The Return of Martin Guerre” (1983) by another Princeton historian, Natalie Zemon Davis ([who died](#) last month), was made into a 1982 movie about a 16th-century French peasant (played by Gérard Depardieu) who assumed another person’s identity so successfully that he managed to fool the man’s wife, parents and friends.

But already by the mid-1980s, the pendulum had started to swing away from the historiography of Mr. Le Roy Ladurie and his Annales colleagues. Complaining that their approach was too dismissive of the drama of great events and the influence of political leaders, other scholars argued that any history of ancient Rome still left Caesar, Augustus, Pompey and Nero at center stage, or that the life of Isaac Newton mattered more than any witches burned at the stake in 17th-century England.

The Annales movement also seemed reluctant to tackle the modern era beginning with the Industrial Revolution and culminating in the two world wars.

“We have tended to fall back on the old prejudice of historians against dealing with subjects that are too close to the present,” Mr. Le Roy Ladurie conceded in the 1985 interview. “But this should not discredit the Annales method. Perhaps it is less important that the Annales method has not yet succeeded in satisfactorily explaining the last 100 years if it has helped us to illuminate the thousand years before then.”

Aurelien Breeden, in Paris, and Adam Nossiter contributed reporting.

24 novembre (NZZ)


[Edward W. Said: Der Ideologe des palästinensischen Terrors \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

Der Philosoph, der Steine warf: Im Westen wurde Edward W. Said als intellektueller Gentleman bewundert. Dass er «Arafats Mann in New York» war, kümmerte keinen

Der Orient ist eine Erfindung des Westens: Mit dieser These überraschte Edward W. Said Ende der 1970er Jahre die Welt. Sie dient der Linken bis heute dazu, palästinensischen Terror zu rechtfertigen.

Thomas Ribl

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Der Orient als imaginäres Gegenbild zum Westen: Die Thesen von Edward Said schwingen bis heute nach. Auch wenn westliche Intellektuelle den Hamas-Terror zum legitimen Widerstand erklären. Ulf Andersen / Hulton / Getty

Im Mai 2001 hätte Edward W. Said bei der Sigmund-Freud-Gesellschaft Wien einen Vortrag halten sollen. Ein Highlight im Jahresprogramm. Der palästinensisch-amerikanische Literaturwissenschaftler war ein Star. Seit dem Buch «Orientalism», in dem er sich mit dem Bild des Westens vom Orient befasste, gehörte der Columbia-Professor zu den führenden linken Intellektuellen. Kollegen und Studenten bewunderten ihn als gebildeten Gentleman, Universitäten überhäufte ihn mit akademischen Ehren. Said wurde in einem Atemzug mit Hannah Arendt und Susan Sontag genannt.

Wenige Wochen vor dem geplanten Auftritt widerrief die Freud-Gesellschaft die Einladung. In internationalen Medien war ein Bild aufgetaucht, das den Professor zeigt, wie er an der Grenze zwischen Libanon und Israel einen Stein wirft. Richtung Israel natürlich, gegen einen Kontrollposten im Westjordanland. Das Bild war im Sommer 2000 aufgenommen worden und ging um die Welt. Said wurde kritisiert, die amerikanische Anti-Defamation-League forderte die Columbia University zu einer Stellungnahme auf. Es geschah nichts.

Said gab sich empört. Das sei eine symbolische Geste gewesen, rechtfertigte er sich. Er habe auf niemanden gezielt, auch nicht auf israelische Soldaten. «Sigmund Freud wurde aus Wien verjagt, weil er Jude war, jetzt werde ich verjagt, weil ich Palästinenser bin», gab er in der «New York Times» zu Protokoll. Wenige Wochen nach dem Steinwurf brach die zweite Intifada aus, und Said befeuerte sie in einem Kommentar mit dem Titel «Die Wut und ihr Recht», in dem er seiner Hoffnung auf eine neue palästinensische «Massenbewegung gegen die israelische Apartheid» Ausdruck gab.

«Arafats Mann in New York»

Der steinewerfende Professor wurde zum Symbol. Doch die Aufregung um das Bild war heuchlerisch. Denn auch ohne den Schnappschuss wusste man längst, wo Said stand. Und hätte wissen können, dass er ein Extremist war, für den Terrorismus als legitimes Mittel galt, wenn es um das ging, was er als Kampf für die Befreiung Palästinas bezeichnete. Der dandyhafte Gelehrte war ein Ideologe der palästinensischen Widerstandsbewegung gewesen, jahrelanges Mitglied des Exilparlaments der Palästinenser und einer der engsten Berater von Yasir Arafat.

Als «Arafats Mann in New York» hatte er Ende der 1970er Jahre erste Kontakte zwischen der PLO und der US-Regierung geknüpft und die Verhandlungen im Hintergrund begleitet. Nach dem Oslo-Abkommen von 1993 wandte sich Said von Arafat ab und warf ihm Verrat vor. Arafat sei zur Marionette israelischer und amerikanischer Interessen geworden, höhnte Said. Er habe die Palästinenser an die Israeli verkauft. Der Vertrag sei eine Kapitulation, ein «palästinensisches Versailles», in dem es nicht den geringsten Hinweis darauf gebe, dass Israel seine Gewalt gegen die Palästinenser je beenden werde.

Dass die Ursache des Konflikts in der Gewaltanwendung durch Israel liegt, stand für Said unverrückbar fest. Ebenso fraglos war für ihn, dass Israel ein Apartheidstaat ist. Die Palästinenser verstand er als Volk unter fremder Besatzung, das selbstverständlich das Recht habe, mit Gewalt gegen die Unterdrücker zu kämpfen. Seit der arabischen Niederlage im Sechstagekrieg 1967 hatte er diese Ansicht vertreten und es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, das palästinensische Volk vor der Weltöffentlichkeit zu verteidigen.

Die Wut des Intellektuellen

Schon vor dem Osloer Vertrag hatte Said den Ton verschärft. Die Autonomiebehörde kritisierte er als «korrupte, polizeistaatliche Autokratie», Israel als brutale «Militärmacht». Arafats Zusicherung, künftig auf Gewalt zu verzichten, bezeichnete er in aller Offenheit als Akt der Kollaboration mit den «israelischen Okkupanten».

Dass der «Kollaboration» verdächtige Palästinenser erschossen oder gefoltert wurden, hatte er schon Ende der achtziger Jahre gerechtfertigt. In einem von Hass triefenden Essay schrieb er damals, ein Volk unter fremder Besatzung habe nicht nur das Recht zum Widerstand, sondern sei auch berechtigt, mit Kollaborateuren «hart» zu verfahren.

Die amerikanische Zeitschrift «Commentary» veröffentlichte darauf einen Beitrag, der die Rolle Suids zwischen Wissenschaft und Agitation analysierte. Unter dem Titel «Professor des Terrors» zeigte der Literaturwissenschaftler Edward Alexander, was den Ideologen der palästinensischen Gewalt mit dem Literaturwissenschaftler verbindet, der die ersten Schritte seiner akademischen Karriere mit einer Arbeit über Joseph Conrad gemacht hatte. Suids Werk, so Alexanders Fazit, sei gezeichnet von der Wut eines Intellektuellen, der die Welt beherrschen möchte und daran leide, dass er sie nur beschreiben könne.

Tatsächlich sind sie bei Edward W. Said nicht voneinander zu trennen: die wissenschaftliche Arbeit und der politische Aktivismus, die lebenslange Auseinandersetzung mit Orient und Abendland – oder mit den Vorstellungen, die sich mit den Begriffen verbinden. Und vor allem die Verbindung seiner

Arbeit mit dem, was Said als das grosse Problem der Begegnung von Ost und West erkannt zu haben glaubte: die unauflösliche Verflechtung von Kultur und Imperialismus.



«Eine symbolische Geste»: Edward W. Said wirft am 3. Juli 2000 an der Grenze von Libanon zu Israel einen Stein gegen einen Kontrollposten. Kamel Jaber / AP

Den Orient gibt es nicht

Saids Biografie erinnert auf seltsam ironische Weise an die Geschichte vom Prinzen aus dem Morgenland, der von weit her kommt und zum Liebling aller wird. Said stammt aus behüteten Verhältnissen. 1935 in einer wohlhabenden christlich-palästinensischen Familie in Jerusalem geboren, wuchs er zunächst dort und später in Kairo auf. Das Studium begann er in Princeton und schloss es in Harvard ab. Mit Bestnoten. Daneben absolvierte er eine Ausbildung zum Konzertpianisten, die er abbrach, als er spürte, dass sein Talent nicht für eine internationale Solistenkarriere reichte. Ab den 1960er Jahren lehrte er an der Columbia University New York englische Literatur und vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft. 2003 starb er in New York.

Seinen Ruhm verdankt Said einem einzigen Buch: «Orientalism», 1978 erschienen, wurde zum Bestseller, in mehr als dreissig Sprachen übersetzt und gilt heute als Standardwerk der Geisteswissenschaften. Seine These in einem Satz: Den Orient gibt es nicht. Er ist eine Erfindung des Westens, eine blosser Idee. Seit der Antike, so Said, mache sich der Westen von den Völkern im Osten und ihrer Kultur eine Vorstellung, die mit der Realität nichts zu tun habe, sondern nur ein imaginäres Gegenbild zu Europa sei.

Der Orient diene dem Westen als Folie, vor der er sich selbst positiv habe abheben können, sagt Said. Von Homer und Aischylos bis zu Flaubert, T. E. Lawrence und Henry Kissinger seien Menschen aus dem Orient negativ dargestellt worden. Man habe ihnen Eigenschaften zugesprochen, die der Westen bei sich selbst nicht anerkennen wolle: Irrationalität, Emotionalität, Unbeständigkeit und Grausamkeit. Ein Ausdruck von Überlegenheitsphantasien, so Said, die nicht zuletzt dazu dienen sollten, koloniale Ansprüche zu rechtfertigen.

Daran ist einiges richtig. Aber um die These so masslos zu überspannen, wie Said es tut, muss man alle wissenschaftlichen Skrupel beiseiteschieben. Oder politisch verblendet sein. Selbstverständlich beschreiben «Orient», «Abendland» oder «Westen» keine banalen Realitäten. Es sind gedankliche Konzepte, Abstraktionen, aus Erlebtem, Gefühltem, Gelesenem destillierte Ideen. Rassismus und Ressentiments gegenüber dem Orient sind eine Tatsache. Ebenso wenig lassen sich aber das Interesse und die Bewunderung leugnen, mit denen westliche Reisende, Schriftsteller, Künstler und Wissenschaftler seit Jahrhunderten den orientalischen Kulturen begegneten.

Die Schuld des Westens

Doch darüber wollte Said nicht schreiben. Sein Buch sollte von der Schuld handeln, die der Westen dem Orient gegenüber hat. Dafür war er bereit, Unschärfen in Kauf zu nehmen. Kaum war «Orientalism» auf dem Markt, wurde Kritik laut. Westliche Orientforscher und arabische Islamwissenschaftler kritisierten die tendenziöse Darstellung und warfen dem Autor vor, er sei unwissenschaftlich vorgegangen, verfolge eine politische Agenda. Das kümmerte allerdings niemanden. Said am allerwenigsten.

In der Kritik an seinem Buch, suggerierte er, zeige sich der westliche Überlegenheitsgestus, den er beschreibe. Er habe ein «parteiliches Buch» geschrieben, räumte er ein. Aber das sei nicht anders möglich, wenn man sich mit der Konstruktion von Identität befasse. Dass er mit seinen Thesen die arabische Theorie eines jüdisch-westlichen Kriegs gegen den Islam nährte, war ihm zunächst etwas peinlich. Später erklärte er selbst, die Palästinenser seien Opfer zionistischer Interessengruppen und Israel ein westliches Kolonisationsprojekt.

Die europäischen Juden hätten sich mit den «weissen Europäern» vereint und seien von einstigen Opfern zu Unterdrückern der palästinensischen Araber geworden, insinuierte Said später, im Buch «The Question of Palestine». Ein starkes Stück: Die Araber sind die neuen Juden, die Juden weisse Rassisten. Eine Verschwörungstheorie, nicht mehr und nicht weniger. Aber bei westlichen Universitäten finden Edward W. Suids gedankliche Kurzschlüsse nach wie vor begeisterten Zuspruch.

Linke Theoretiker feiern ihn als Vordenker der postkolonialen Theorie, die sich im Grunde nicht als Wissenschaft, sondern als Programm zur Wiedergutmachung kolonialen Unrechts versteht. Im Repertoire eines Denkens, das sich selbst als kritisch bezeichnet, sind Suids Thesen fest verankert. Unhinterfragt. Sie schwingen mit, wenn westliche Intellektuelle den islamischen Antisemitismus leugnen. Und den Hamas-Terror gegen Israel zum legitimen Widerstand erklären.

24 novembre (NZZ)

[Die Grünen stolpern in die Krise: Die Zeiten sind zu hart für Ideologen \(nzz.ch\)](https://www.nzz.ch)

DER ANDERE BLICK

Der grüne Zeitgeist hat sich zu Tode gesiegt – die Zeiten sind zu hart für Ideologen und Rechthaber

Vor kurzem schienen die Grünen noch unbezwingbar, jetzt stecken sie in der Krise. Die Bürger haben genug von moralischen Imperativen und weltfremden Ideen. Mit praktischen Lösungen tun sich die Grünen aber schwer, gerade beim Klimaschutz.

Eric Gujer, Chefredaktor der «Neuen Zürcher Zeitung».

24.11.2023, 05.00 Uhr 6 min



Es hat sich ausgegrünt: Wahlplakat der Grünen zur Landtagswahl in Bayern.

Die Grünen haben offenkundig ihren Zenit überschritten. In Deutschland kennen sie bei Wahlen nur eine Richtung: nach unten. Sie sind aus den Landesregierungen in Hessen und Berlin geflogen. In der Schweiz verloren sie bei den nationalen Wahlen deutlich Stimmen; bekannte Figuren der Partei schafften den Wiedereinzug ins Parlament nicht.

Von den Grünen lernen heisst jetzt verlieren lernen. Noch vor wenigen Monaten schien der grüne Zeitgeist übermächtig. Warum jetzt diese abrupte Wende?

Dass es die Grünen in der Schweiz und in Deutschland trifft, zeigt eines: **Es handelt sich nicht um ein nationales Phänomen.** In Deutschland akzentuiert sich die Lage der Partei nur, weil sie der Regierung angehört und so am Erreichten gemessen wird.

Es wäre zu billig, für die Wahlniederlagen nur die Themenkonjunktur verantwortlich zu machen. Natürlich wecken die Kriege in der Ukraine und im Gazastreifen das Bedürfnis nach Sicherheit, und die Inflation heizt die Abstiegsängste der Mittelschicht an. **Bei Verteidigung und Wirtschaft sprachen die Wähler den Grünen noch nie Kompetenz zu.**

Auch bei der Migration sehen die Grünen alt aus. Sie verteidigen mit Zähnen und Klauen offene Grenzen, während die anderen Parteien nach Beschränkungen rufen. Doch das genügt nicht, um den Niedergang zu erklären. Gerade in Deutschland haben die Grünen Erfahrungen mit politischen Wetterstürzen. Erstmals an der Macht, führte die pazifistische Partei die Bundesrepublik gleich in zwei Kriege. Aussenminister Fischer musste die Beteiligung an den Einsätzen in Kosovo und in Afghanistan rechtfertigen.

Die Partei war in Aufruhr (wie jetzt in der Migrationsfrage). Fischer wurde am Parteitag in Bielefeld Opfer einer Attacke (das muss Habeck in Karlsruhe nicht fürchten). **Die Grünen wuchsen an den Herausforderungen, weil sie ihre Politik den Realitäten anpassten.**

Die Grünen wollten den Menschen einreden, dass Klimaschutz gratis sei

Heute herrscht statt Kampfesmut Tristesse, und das hat einen triftigen Grund. **Der Umweltschutz bildet noch immer den Kern der Identität. Versagen die Grünen dabei, verlieren sie ihre Existenzberechtigung. Hier müssen sie beweisen, dass sie ihre Programmatik in ein zeitgemäßes Gewand kleiden können. Genau das aber misslingt den Grünen. Statt praktische Antworten zu liefern, klammern sie sich an ihre Ideologie.**

In Deutschland werden Wind und Sonne nie den Strombedarf decken können, solange es an Speichern fehlt. Jedes neue Windrad, jede zusätzliche Photovoltaikanlage verschlimmert das **Dilemma** nur. Gibt es genügend Wind und Sonne, wird zu viel Strom produziert. Ist es hingegen grau und windstill, herrscht Energiemangel. Daher muss man den überflüssigen Strom zu negativen Preisen im Ausland verschleudern, um ihn dann wieder teuer einzukaufen. **Seit die letzten Atomkraftwerke abgestellt sind, akzentuiert sich das Problem.**

Ohne Speicher und Kraftwerke für den Grundbedarf gelingt die Energiewende nicht. Daher brummen die Kohlekraftwerke und beschleunigen mit ihrem CO₂-Ausstoss den Klimawandel, den die Grünen angeblich bremsen wollen. **Die Grünen sind also Heuchler und Pharisäer, solange sie nicht als Denkmöglichkeit den Bau von Atomkraftwerken akzeptieren oder einen anderen Ausweg aus dem Dilemma skizzieren.**

Heuchler und Pharisäer – davon können auch die Schweizer Grünen ein Lied singen. Angeblich setzen sie sich für die erneuerbaren Energien ein, doch das ist nur ein Lippenbekenntnis. Sobald es konkret wird, ducken sie sich weg. Wenn in den Alpen eine Photovoltaikanlage gebaut oder eine Staumauer erhöht werden soll, stellen sich Grüne zuverlässig dagegen. **Die Schweiz steuert auf einen akuten Strommangel zu.**

Man muss kein Energieexperte sein, um zu sehen, dass die Grünen keinen Plan haben und mit ihnen nur eines gewiss ist: Deindustrialisierung und Verarmung. Sie schieben die Verantwortung einfach auf die Bürger ab: **Fliegt nicht, fährt kein Auto, esst kein Fleisch!**

Die Wähler merken, dass die Grünen Halbwahrheiten und Lebenslügen auftischen. Dazu zählt die Behauptung, dass die Energiewende gratis zu haben sei. Tatsächlich kosten CO₂-arme Kraftwerke, Pumpspeicherwerke, die Umrüstung der Industrie auf Wasserstoff sowie die nötige Netzinfrastruktur viel Geld. Allein für den Ausbau der Stromleitungen werden in Deutschland 300 Milliarden Euro veranschlagt.

In Deutschland ist die Lüge gerade aufgefliegen. Seit dem Urteil des Verfassungsgerichts zum Klimafonds fehlen 60 Milliarden Euro. **Mit verfassungswidriger Schuldenmacherei wollte die Ampelkoalition die Energiewende subventionieren. Jetzt bleibt entweder der Klimaschutz auf der**

Strecke, weil man sich nicht traut, Unternehmen und Bürger stärker zu belasten. Oder es kommt zu Verteilungskämpfen bei anderen Etatposten.

Was ist wichtiger: Klimaschutz oder mehr Sozialhilfe für Kinder oder doch ein Ende der Schuldenbremse? Auch ein weiterer Fonds, mit dem die Regierung die wahren Kosten ihrer Energiepolitik verschleiert, ist wohl verfassungswidrig. Hier geht es um 200 Milliarden, um Strom, Gas und Fernwärme künstlich zu verbilligen. **Unter dem Druck der Verfassungsrichter kommt Ehrlichkeit in die Debatte.** Für die Grünen ist das eine Katastrophe, weil nun ihr Moralismus einem Realitätscheck unterzogen wird. Moral muss man sich leisten können.

Die Grünen können sich die reine Moral nur dank den Steuermilliarden leisten, mit denen sie die Widersprüche ihrer Politik kaschieren. Das gilt nicht nur für den Klimaschutz. So sind die Gemeinden mit der Unterbringung von Asylmigranten überfordert. Das ist egal, solange sich noch ein Fördertopf findet und es irgendwie weitergeht.

Das funktioniert nicht mehr, weil im Gegensatz zur Ära Merkel die Kassen leer sind. Wie bei jeder Ebbe kommt zum Vorschein, was vorher gnädig verborgen blieb. Bei der Migration ist es die Lebenslüge, wonach man alle Einwanderer aufnehmen kann. Doch kommt Deutschland nicht nur finanziell an seine Erschöpfungsgrenze.

Die Toleranz für ideologische Übertreibungen nimmt in schwierigen Zeiten ab

Hohe moralische Ansprüche sind an sich noch kein Problem. Vor den Grünen waren es die Sozialdemokraten, die das Paradies auf Erden versprachen: Sozialismus, Pazifismus, Feminismus und Antikolonialismus – das Angebot zur Weltverbesserung war schon früher breit sortiert. Bei aller Moral vergassen die Sozialdemokraten aber nie, den Alltag ihrer Wähler zu verbessern, mit mehr Rente oder dem Abitur für Arbeiterkinder.

Wenn man die Bürger als Ausländerfeinde und Egoisten beschimpft, was die deutschen Grünen gerne tun, dann muss man ihnen konkrete irdische Verbesserungen versprechen. Der andere Köder, um Menschen Masochismus schmackhaft zu machen, nämlich die Erlösung im Jenseits, ist aus der Mode gekommen.

Die Grünen offerieren weder das eine noch das andere. **So ist die Krise der Grünen letztlich eine Auseinandersetzung um das Selbstverständnis linker Politik. Genügt die reine Lehre, oder heisst Politik, in kleinen Schritten das Leben zu verbessern? Revolution oder Reform?** Es geht um die Grundfragen, die sich Linke seit mehr als 150 Jahren stellen.

Beim Heizungsgesetz bot Wirtschaftsminister Habeck nur Ideologie, aber kein praxistaugliches und sozialverträgliches Konzept. Auch Familienministerin Paus wollte bei der Kindergrundsicherung mit dem Kopf durch die Wand. Kanzler und Finanzminister stutzen ihre Pläne zurecht. **Jetzt träumt Paus davon, für die Auszahlung der Sozialleistung eine neue Behörde mit 5000 Stellen zu schaffen.**

Selten hat sich eine Regierungspartei verbohrt und starrsinniger gezeigt. Wenn die greifbaren Resultate ausbleiben, nimmt zugleich die Toleranz der Wähler für weltanschauliche Überspanntheiten ab. Das Gendern ist nur noch albern; die obsessive Aufmerksamkeit für jede noch so kleine sexuelle Minderheit ist weit weg von der Lebensrealität der grossen Mehrheit. Der militante Antikolonialismus und die israelfeindlichen Parolen von «Fridays for Future» sind linksextrem und die Klima-Kleber schlicht asozial.

Um die grünen Parteien herum existiert ein Narrensaum an radikalen Gruppen und absonderlichen Strömungen. Die Krisen und Kriege der Gegenwart sind zu ernst, um sich mit solchen Verrücktheiten abzugeben. Vielleicht ist genau dies das Kernproblem der Grünen. Die Menschen haben gemerkt, dass die Grünen nicht die vernünftige und ökologische Mitte sind, als die sie sich in ruhigeren Zeiten ausgeben konnten. **Der grüne Kaiser ist nackt, und plötzlich sehen es alle.**

24 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/campus/article/2023/11/19/au-lycee-tous-les-eleves-qui-ne-sont-pas-originares-d-europe-occidentale-sont-qualifies-de-blédards-a-sciences-po-je-suis-devenu-etudiant-international_6201060_4401467.html

« Au lycée, tous les élèves qui ne sont pas originaires d’Europe occidentale sont qualifiés de “blédards”. A Sciences Po, je suis devenu “étudiant international” »

« Premières fois » : récits de moments charnières autour du passage à l’âge adulte. Tidiane Bah, Guinéen de 22 ans, raconte comment il a intégré une grande école après un bac techno.

Par [Eric Nunès](#)

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CLARA DUPRE

La première fois que j’entends parler de Sciences Po, c’est au début de l’année 2018. J’ai 16 ans et je suis alors en classe de seconde professionnelle « accompagnement, soins et services à la personne » (ASSP) au lycée Darius-Milhaud au Kremlin-Bicêtre (Val-de-Marne).

Je suis en France depuis seulement une année et bien décidé à poursuivre un cursus court et professionnalisant. Je n’ai aucune idée des possibilités qu’offre cette école. Mais ma professeure principale insiste pour me parler du partenariat de tutorat qui existe entre l’établissement d’enseignement supérieur et mon lycée, situé en zone d’éducation prioritaire. J’ai toute confiance en elle et cela va diamétralement changer mes horizons.

Je m’appelle Tidiane Bah, je suis né il y a 22 ans en Guinée. En 2017, je quitte le collège Saint-Jacques à Conakry, ainsi que mes parents, mes deux grandes sœurs et mon petit frère pour l’Europe. Je débarque en France seul, mais je n’ai pas le choix, j’ai 15 ans.

L’aide sociale à l’enfance de Créteil (Val-de-Marne) me prend sous son aile, puis me place en février de cette même année 2017 dans un foyer du Kremlin-Bicêtre. L’année scolaire est trop entamée pour que je sois scolarisé, mais je suis les cours du réseau de bénévoles [Enfants du monde](#). J’étudie le français, les mathématiques, l’histoire et la géographie. L’objectif est de me préparer au test d’orientation qui définit le type de lycée que je vais intégrer à la rentrée pour l’année scolaire 2017-2018. Je comprends que je dois entrer très rapidement dans une filière professionnalisante pour pouvoir, dès 18 ans, entrer sur le marché du travail – moment où l’Etat arrêtera de me prendre en charge.

« **Peur de l’échec** »

Je fais donc le choix rationnel de la filière aide-soignant ; direction la seconde pro ASSP. Ma première rentrée se passe bien. En tant qu'étranger, j'avais peur de ne pas être au niveau et de ne pas m'en sortir. Mais cette peur de l'échec devient une source de motivation qui me pousse à bosser.

J'ai de bonnes notes. Ma professeure principale m'encourage à rejoindre la filière générale. Pour ce faire, je dois redoubler la seconde. Mais je n'ai pas le temps, les mois qui me séparent de ma majorité s'égrènent rapidement et il n'est pas possible que je n'aie pas le bac le jour où j'atteins 18 ans. On trouve un compromis : je passe en première en bac sciences et technologies de la santé et du social (ST2S) et je rejoins par la même occasion le groupe de lycéens qui prépare une admissibilité à Sciences Po. Tous sont en filières générales, je suis le seul « techno ».

J'ai tout de suite vu un écart de niveau entre ces élèves et moi. Ils me semblent plus cultivés, plus sûrs d'eux. Néanmoins, chaque semaine, ensemble, nous travaillons sur des articles de presse, on débat de l'actualité, on se forge des bases de méthodologie. Pour ma part, ma peur de l'échec, encore, et la tension constante qu'elle génère en moi, décuple ma force de travail. En fin de première, j'ai 18/20 à l'oral de français, et la même note à l'écrit.

« Contrat jeune majeur »

Un nouveau marathon commence en classe de terminale. C'est l'année 2019-2020. Celle des premières périodes de confinement dues à la crise du Covid-19. Je dois avoir le baccalauréat, mais mon réel objectif est bien Sciences Po. Je fais une demande de « contrat jeune majeur », qui me permettra de prolonger l'aide sociale dont je bénéficie et de suivre des études longues. Je l'obtiens. Je ne suis plus cet élève de seconde et je réalise parfaitement le bond réalisé si je m'ouvre les portes de la rue Saint-Guillaume.

Le concours s'effectue en deux étapes : un premier oral passé (à distance) avec les enseignants, et le proviseur de mon lycée qui me donne une admissibilité. Puis un autre niveau de sélection, cette fois, avec des professeurs de Sciences Po. Je réussis la première phase sans faillir, mais il est difficile d'être sûr de l'examen final. Cette angoisse d'échouer qui me tenaille souvent est encore plus forte.

Chaque matin au réveil, comme un rituel, je checke mes mails. Ce 8 juin 2020, je trouve dans ma boîte un message en provenance de Sciences Po. Je l'ouvre : « *Félicitations, vous êtes admis...* ». C'est un moment d'apesanteur. Je réveille mon colocataire, je lui tends mon téléphone pour qu'il lise à haute voix, pour qu'il me confirme... Cette année-là, nous avons été trois lycéens de Darius-Milhaud à intégrer l'institut d'études politiques parisiens.

« J'ai tenu »

Au lycée, tous les élèves qui ne sont pas originaires d'Europe occidentale sont qualifiés de « blédards ». En entrant à Sciences Po, où près de la moitié des élèves sont étrangers, je suis devenu « étudiant international ». J'ai changé de statut.

J'ai dû aussi changer de niveau académique. Alors qu'en histoire je survolais ma classe en terminale, ma première note a été un 6. J'ai également découvert l'économie, une matière que je n'avais encore jamais étudiée, en concurrence avec des étudiants qui en maîtrisaient déjà les concepts. Cette première année s'est déroulée en grande partie confiné dans les quelques mètres carrés d'une [chambre Crous](#) [Centre régional des œuvres universitaires et scolaires]. C'était vraiment dur, entre des notes médiocres et l'isolement lié au confinement, j'ai été à deux doigts de claquer la porte. Mais j'ai tenu, c'est donc possible.

Aujourd'hui, je suis en master de droit public des affaires. Je l'assure : il y a dans les filières technologiques de très bons élèves, même s'ils ne viennent pas du même milieu, même s'ils n'ont pas été entourés des mêmes familles que la plupart des étudiants. Ces élèves doivent oser se lancer, ils peuvent réussir ce bond académique. Je ne sais pas encore ce que je ferai dans deux ans, mais si je garde la motivation qui m'a animé jusque-là, je sais que je ferai quelque chose de grand.

24 novembre (Le Monde)

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/11/24/liberation-des-otages-du-hamas-une-situation-aussi-dechirante-sur-le-plan-ethique-n-a-pas-vraiment-de-precedent_6202048_3232.html

Libération des otages du Hamas : « Une situation aussi déchirante sur le plan éthique n'a pas vraiment de précédent »

[Tribune](#)

[Frédérique Leichter-Flack, professeure de littérature et d'humanités politiques](#)

Qui sera sauvé, au risque d'exposer encore plus les autres, et selon quels critères ? Alors que doit s'accomplir une première libération d'otages détenus par le Hamas, Frédérique Leichter-Flack, professeure au Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po, détaille dans une tribune au « Monde » les vertigineux enjeux éthiques auxquels cette situation confronte l'ensemble des Israéliens.

Ce qu'on appelle, en théorie politique, le « *problème des otages* » se présente généralement sous la forme d'un arbitrage sur le prix à payer en échange de la libération désirée. On parle alors de dilemme parce que le prix consenti pour une vie sauvée expose, directement ou indirectement, d'autres vies à un danger ultérieur. La rançon financera d'autres actions hostiles, les concessions politiques encourageront d'autres prises d'otages et fragiliseront davantage celui qui s'y plie...

Ce dilemme-là, sous sa forme classique, Israël l'a surmonté, comme à plusieurs reprises dans son histoire, en assumant une priorisation morale claire, certes contestée par une petite minorité, mais très largement approuvée par la majorité : le devoir de libérer les captifs et de les ramener à la maison l'a emporté, même sur l'impératif de neutraliser au plus vite la menace que le Hamas fait peser. Le sauvetage de ces otages-là, identifiés comme « *nos enfants* » par une société israélienne qui, malgré les déchirements de ces derniers mois, se vit toujours et encore comme une grande famille, a prévalu sur la préservation des vies abstraites et non identifiées que la négociation pourrait exposer à l'avenir.

Mais c'est un autre dilemme éthique, plus terrible encore, auquel Israël a fait face, en avalisant le chiffre de 50 otages parmi 240, en attendant plus, si l'on peut, ensuite. Tous les otages ne seront pas libérés, et le gouvernement a beau rappeler qu'il n'abandonnera pas ceux qui restent, tout le monde sait que pour ceux qui ne sont pas sur cette première liste, le risque de n'être jamais récupéré vivant augmente encore.

Des femmes et des enfants d'abord

Quelques-uns maintenant plutôt que personne ? Des enfants (mais il n'y a que 30 places), des femmes (mais il n'y a que 20 places) : les parents des jeunes garçons attendront, ceux des jeunes femmes capturées en uniforme pendant leur service militaire obligatoire semble-t-il aussi – et l'on mesure le courage qu'il faut à ceux-là pour approuver l'accord et trouver la force de s'en réjouir. Mais alors qui dans les premiers échanges ? Des femmes et des enfants d'abord, certes, mais ces critères sur lesquels les négociateurs se sont mis d'accord (la vulnérabilité ? l'innocence ? le symbole de l'avenir ?) ne suffisent pas à faire le tri : il y a plus de femmes et d'enfants enlevés que de places offertes.

Bien sûr, c'est le Hamas qui a fait la première liste, en fonction de ses intérêts. Garder en otages de jeunes enfants est sans doute compliqué, les libérer, l'occasion d'un geste humanitaire stratégique vis-à-vis de l'opinion publique internationale : autant se débarrasser des otages les plus encombrants, en commençant par les plus faciles à localiser dans le chaos de Gaza. La liste de noms était sans doute à prendre ou à laisser, et d'une certaine manière, la contrainte imposée permet à Israël de n'avoir à gérer, auprès de son opinion publique, que le dilemme du « *quelques-uns plutôt que personne* », et non celui, plus déstabilisant encore, du « *quelques-uns plutôt que personne, mais lesquels ?* ».

Cependant, l'annonce d'un jour de retard supplémentaire avant la libération du premier groupe d'otages, en raison de détails sur lesquels on a buté, a remis cette question au cœur du débat : outre les détails logistiques, y

a-t-il eu aussi, tandis que les familles restaient dans l'attente et l'impuissance, d'intenses négociations sur qui serait libéré en priorité ?

Chaque nom ajouté suppose un nom biffé

En dépit de l'apparente symétrie des deux listes, le mot « libération » ne porte pas le même enjeu de vie ou de mort pour les détenus palestiniens et pour les otages israéliens échangés. Peut-on accepter de séparer des familles, quand tous les otages ne sont pas gardés ensemble ni par les mêmes groupes ? De libérer des enfants sans leurs parents, des adolescentes sans leurs frères, des grands-mères sans leurs petits-fils ? Et quid des pères d'enfants otages dont la mère a été tuée ? A quel niveau de priorité mettre les personnes âgées, pour qui la détention est sans doute la plus éprouvante mais qui, d'elles-mêmes, si on leur posait la question, n'approuveraient pas nécessairement de passer devant des jeunes de 20 ans ?

On ne sait si toutes ces questions ont été formulées, ni si, quand elles l'auraient été, la partie israélienne a eu le moyen d'y répondre. Mais dans un *numerus clausus*, chaque nom ajouté suppose un nom biffé. Et pour la petite marge de manœuvre que cette négociation dans la négociation a peut-être laissée à la partie israélienne, il faudra rendre des comptes en démocratie. Une vie plutôt qu'une autre. Quand, pour les proches qui l'attendent, chaque otage est irremplaçable.

Une situation aussi déchirante sur le plan éthique n'a pas vraiment de précédent. Mais dans la longue histoire du peuple juif, il y a eu d'autres occasions où des questionnements approchants ont été soulevés. Le Talmud ne cesse de rappeler, en de multiples occurrences, qu'il faut s'en tenir au principe qu'une vie vaut une vie ; mais il ne se dissimule pas qu'il peut y avoir des situations qui imposent de prioriser. Ainsi, si plusieurs personnes ont été enlevées par des bandits et qu'on n'a pas assez pour payer toutes les rançons, « *ton maître (c'est-à-dire ton professeur) avant ton père et ta mère avant eux* ». L'implicite : parce qu'elle a un risque d'être violée en captivité.

Une question de vie ou de mort

Pendant l'occupation nazie, de telles questions éthiques relatives à l'établissement de listes ont dû être affrontées : pour la plupart des notables juifs à la tête des conseils imposés par les nazis dans les ghettos, il n'était pas question d'accepter de participer à la composition des « *listes de transports* » vers les camps, et beaucoup s'y sont refusés au prix de leur vie, mais bien sûr, c'était aussi au risque de laisser l'arbitraire nazi seul à la manœuvre. D'autres ont assumé de tenter de préserver les plus jeunes.

Participer à l'établissement de « *listes de sauvetage* » est une mission plus valable, mais de même, chaque personne protégée ou exfiltrée en suppose d'autres qu'il faudra abandonner à leur sort. Pour une « *liste de Schindler* » qualifiée de « *bien absolu* » dans [le film de Spielberg](#), qui se garde évidemment d'attirer l'attention sur les tractations de dernière minute, d'autres ont fait l'objet de polémiques terribles. A commencer par celle du « *train de Kastner* », qui a permis l'incroyable sauvetage d'un millier et demi de Juifs hongrois en 1944 au moment même où tous les autres Juifs de Hongrie étaient envoyés vers la mort. Héros pour les descendants des sauvés, Rudolf Kastner a aussi été l'objet de haines très violentes, en particulier en Israël, pour le prix consenti pour cette exfiltration partielle et la négociation avec les nazis.

Au-delà de l'histoire des Juifs, d'autres épisodes récents, comme le pont aérien de l'évacuation de Kaboul en 2021, ont mis en lumière les choix tragiques assumés dans l'urgence et le chaos, entre établissement de critères, luttes d'influence et improvisation, quand on ne peut pas sauver tout le monde et que la priorisation devient une question de vie ou de mort.

La structuration du mouvement des familles d'otages, les spécificités de la société israélienne et la vigueur de la mobilisation démocratique, accentuent les enjeux éthiques de cet accord de libération partielle. Comme souvent, la démocratie israélienne est le laboratoire de questions morales et politiques qui vont bien au-delà d'elle et pourraient concerner d'autres sociétés démocratiques, moins préparées sans doute encore qu'elle à les affronter.

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24 novembre (Le Figaro)

[Les chefs du Hamas en sursis dans leur exil doré au Qatar \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr)

Les chefs du Hamas en sursis dans leur exil doré au Qatar

Par [Georges Malbrunot](#)

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Moussa Abou Marzouk, haut dirigeant du Hamas, le 12 février 2019. *KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP*

DÉCRYPTAGE - Alors qu'en Occident, leur présence interpelle, les autorités qatariennes ne sont pas gênées pour justifier leur hospitalité.

La rencontre avec Moussa Abou Marzouk eut lieu dans une villa à Doha, la capitale du Qatar, qui abrite les principaux chefs politiques du Hamas. Par souci de sécurité, un chauffeur de ce haut dirigeant du mouvement islamiste était venu nous chercher à l'hôtel. C'était à l'été 2019. L'entrée dans le bâtiment, sans drapeau ni affiche du Hamas, s'était faite après un contrôle sécuritaire sommaire. Les portraits des chefs intégristes assassinés par Israël trônaient aux murs: Cheikh Ahmed Yassine, instituteur tétraplégique fondateur du Hamas, Abdelaziz al-Rantissi, Ismaël Abou Shanab et bien d'autres.

Visage rond, large calvitie, Moussa Abou Marzouk a pris quelques kilos depuis notre dernière rencontre en 1997. C'était à Amman en Jordanie, où ce Palestinien originaire de la bande de Gaza venait d'être expulsé des États-Unis, après y avoir étudié à l'université du Colorado, un des rares cadres islamistes palestiniens à avoir un parcours américain. *«Notre accueil au Qatar n'a rien d'anormal, avait expliqué Moussa Abou Marzouk. Le Qatar aide financièrement la bande de Gaza, c'est une aide assumée par tout le monde, d'ailleurs un représentant du Qatar est détaché dans la bande de Gaza»*, où le Hamas règne en maître depuis 2007. Quatre ans plus tard, Moussa Abou Marzouk et plusieurs membres de la direction politique du Hamas sont toujours logés par le Qatar. Leur présence a surpris les profanes. Pourtant, depuis de longues années, la nomenklatura islamiste a quasiment table ouverte à Doha.

Liberté de mouvement

Son chef du bureau politique, Ismaël Haniyeh, s'y est réfugié en 2020, avec d'autres responsables. En compagnie de son épouse et de ses enfants, il venait de quitter le camp de réfugiés de Shati dans la bande de Gaza pour une vie de luxe dans l'émirat richissime. Son compère, Khaled Mechaal, ami de la famille régnante, y va et vient, lui, depuis plus longtemps encore.

En 2012, Mechaal et ses amis du bureau politique avaient dû quitter leur base arrière de Damas. Le Hamas soutenait les opposants à Bachar el-Assad, parmi lesquels les islamistes syriens, Frères musulmans comme eux, en pointe dans la révolte. Mechaal et ses amis s'installèrent à Doha, qui depuis des décennies - et au su de tous les diplomates étrangers en poste au Qatar - s'est fait une spécialité

d'accueillir les dirigeants islamistes, souvent proches des Frères musulmans, bannis chez eux. Il y a quinze ans, il n'était pas rare de croiser dans les couloirs de l'hôtel Sheraton l'Algérien Abbassi Madani. Non loin de là, un Français expatrié de longue date avait loué la maison des dirigeants islamistes tchétchènes, un temps repliés à Doha.

Ces dernières semaines, des vidéos montraient **Ismaël Haniyeh** s'agenouillant avec gratitude alors que la télévision diffusait les images du carnage perpétré par ses partisans, le 7 octobre en Israël. Ce jour-là, bénéficiant d'une assez large liberté de mouvement, le leader islamiste devait se rendre en Irak pour une *«visite historique»* que les premières images des massacres ont finalement annulée. Cette dernière semaine, Haniyeh est allé au Caire finaliser les négociations sur la libération des otages. Lui et ses amis font passer les messages américains et israéliens aux membres de la branche militaire, terrés dans les tunnels de Gaza.

Alors qu'en Occident, leur présence interpelle, les autorités qatariennes ne sont pas gênées pour justifier leur hospitalité. *«Accueillir la classe dirigeante du Hamas signifie que nous avons un moyen de maintenir la communication et de trouver la paix»*, expliquait en 2020 le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Mohammed Ben Abdlerhaman al-Thani. Cumulant aujourd'hui les fonctions de premier ministre, il a été le très utile agent de liaison entre les politiques du Hamas à Doha et la *«cellule»* de responsables américains qui négocia secrètement avec Israël la libération des premiers otages, devant intervenir ce vendredi.

«Qui finance, influence», renchérit un diplomate français, familier du Qatar. En les hébergeant et en abondant jusqu'au 7 octobre les comptes de l'administration de la bande de Gaza gérée par le Hamas, l'émirat peut exercer des pressions sur ses hôtes. C'est en tout cas l'argument que l'émir et ses proches opposent à tous ceux qui regardent d'un mauvais œil leur bienveillance à l'égard d'un groupe, classé terroriste par les États-Unis et l'Union européenne.

Hypocrisie

L'accusation de double langage redouble depuis les attentats du 7 octobre. Une fois que la guerre sera finie, *«on devra revoir cette question»* de l'hébergement qatarien des cadres politiques du Hamas, a affirmé le secrétaire d'État américain, Antony Blinken, lors d'une récente visite à Doha. Officiellement, le Qatar aurait accepté de revoir sa politique. Mais qu'en sera-t-il demain ou après-demain, lorsque l'émirat aura montré son efficacité en matière de libération des otages israéliens détenus par le Hamas à Gaza? Doha est un important investisseur aux États-Unis, qui disposent à quelques kilomètres des bureaux du Hamas de leur plus grande base militaire au Moyen-Orient. Las de tant d'hypocrisie, Benjamin Netanyahu aurait ordonné au Mossad de préparer la liquidation des intégristes abrités à Doha. En 2010, un commando, dirigé par un Israélien titulaire d'un faux passeport français, tua à Dubaï un cadre militaire du Hamas en lien avec l'Iran. Haniyeh et ses compères sont prévenus. Mais *«ce sera sans nous»*, confie une source sécuritaire française, alors qu'Emmanuel Macron veut renforcer le partage de renseignements avec Israël contre le Hamas. *«On ne fait pas ça sur le territoire d'amis à nous.»*