

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen speaks during a news conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Monday, April 11, 2011. Fogh Rasmussen said on Monday that military action alone will not solve the crisis in Libya and that any cease-fire in the north African country must be credible and verifiable. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)

## **NATO leader says military action alone will not solve Libyan crisis; political solution needed**

Don Melvin, The Associated Press *Apr 11, 2011 17:13:38 PM*

BRUSSELS - Military action alone will not solve the crisis in Libya, NATO's top official said Monday, adding that he hoped for a political solution soon to prevent terrorists from taking advantage of the country's instability.

Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, however, that any cease-fire in the north African country must be credible and verifiable.

"I want to be clear. There can be no solely military solution to the crisis in Libya," he said. "NATO welcomes all contributions to the broad international effort to stop the violence against the civilian population."

Leaders from the African Union have been in Libya trying to negotiate a cease-fire between the regime of Moammar Gadhafi and rebels trying to oust him. Fogh Rasmussen said he had taken note of the effort but noted that cease-fires have been declared before in Libya without being implemented. He said NATO had been in touch constantly with the African Union and other regional and international organizations.

He said, though, that NATO would not cut back its operations to give space to the diplomatic initiative, but would base its operations solely on the need to protect civilians from attack.

Since Saturday morning, NATO aircraft have flown nearly 300 missions, destroying 49 tanks, nine armoured personnel carriers, three anti-aircraft guns and four large ammunition bunkers. The vast majority of the strikes were near the Libyan cities of Misrata and Ajdabiya.

NATO, which took over command of the Libya operation from the U.S. on March 31, has been criticized by rebel leaders for mistakes and a perceived slowdown in the operations. But Fogh Rasmussen said that, in its 10 days commanding the operation, NATO had flown more than 1,500 sorties over Libya — more than 150 a day — and more than half of those were strike missions.

"It's a quite high operational tempo," he said.

Nevertheless, he said military operations were not enough in themselves.

"I hope to see a political solution to the problems in Libya sooner rather than later, because we know from experience that extremists and terrorists can take advantage of, and profit from, long-term instability," he said.

NATO foreign ministers will hold a meeting later this week in Berlin, and Fogh Rasmussen said that, in addition, several non-NATO countries had been invited to participate: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Morocco, Sweden and Ukraine.

He also said he hoped that the European Union, rather than NATO, would take the lead in providing humanitarian assistance in the country. The EU has said that, if asked by the United Nations, it will launch a military operation to protect aid organizations and evacuate civilians.

In addition, Mahmoud Jibril, a leading member of the rebel's National Transitional Council, has been invited for an informal coffee Tuesday in Luxembourg with European Union foreign ministers, an EU spokesman said.

NYT April 12, 2011

# Fears About Immigrants Deepen Divisions in Europe

By RACHEL DONADIO

ROME — Since the global financial crisis, the [European Union](#) has been deeply divided over economic policy. With the Libya intervention, it has split over foreign policy. But today few issues are proving more divisive within the bloc than [immigration](#).

That much was clear this week, when the fractious 27-member European Union rejected [Italy's](#) idea to make it easier for immigrants who first land in Italy to travel elsewhere in Europe. At a time when a wave of immigrants fleeing the unrest in North Africa shows no signs of abating, the rejection raised the possibility of tightened intra-European border controls for the first time since visa-free travel was introduced in the 1990s.

Frustrations have been building here for weeks, and over the weekend Prime Minister [Silvio Berlusconi](#) finally said enough was enough. Visiting the Italian island of Lampedusa, the point of entry for thousands of North African immigrants to Europe, he said: “Either Europe is something that’s real and concrete or it isn’t. And in that case, it’s better to go back to each going our own way and letting everyone follow his own policies and egotism.”

Mr. Berlusconi’s statement, echoed by other members of his government and criticized by his European counterparts, highlighted a looming showdown within Europe over how to handle the 23,000 migrants who have arrived in Italy since January.

Fears of immigrants, fanned by right-wing parties and voter discontent over economic malaise, have deepened already profound divisions within Europe. Experts say the issue is proving to be at least as problematic — and potentially as destabilizing — as Europe’s struggle to manage a succession of financial crises. And it adds a new source of friction over [NATO's](#) intervention in Libya.

The majority of Africans seeking work or refuge in Europe are Tunisians, but a growing number are sub-Saharan Africans fleeing Libya. To reduce tensions in the makeshift tent camps in Italy where officials shipped the migrants who first arrived on Lampedusa, Italian officials said they would issue temporary residence permits to qualified migrants.

Italy had asked fellow European Union member states to recognize the permits as valid for entry — essentially condoning the migrants’ passage to France and beyond. At a meeting of European Union interior ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, other member states, chief among them France and Germany, said no.

In response, Italy’s interior minister, Roberto Maroni, asked, “I wonder if it makes sense to stay in the European Union?”

While European neighbors have criticized the Italians for their poor handling of the immigration situation, the stalwarts of Mr. Maroni’s Northern League party, known for its anti-immigrant stance and fierce Euro-skepticism, have criticized the interior minister for not being tough enough.

As in the divisions over economic and fiscal policies across Europe — highlighted last week when the [European Central Bank](#) raised interest rates, staving off inflation in Germany but putting the heat on southern countries struggling with debt — the immigration squabble once again showed the seams in the European project.

Coming after the financial crisis, the Libya intervention and the subsequent influx of immigrants are “an extraordinary series of tests on very different fronts for European cohesion and European strategy, and the result is clearly very mixed,” said Ian Lesser, a senior trans-Atlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

“The migration piece of this is in some way the toughest,” he added. “There, the measures are very direct; there’s a direct connection to public opinion and daily politics.”

Individual European countries have their own policies for handling immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Under European law, the country where migrants first arrive is responsible for determining their status, a norm that Italy and Malta have asked to be waived. (So far, they have been rebuffed.)

“At the same time,” said Hugo Brady, a senior research fellow in Brussels at the Center for European Reform, “free movement, passport-free travel, which didn’t even exist inside nation-states a few years ago, are huge achievements. The question is: Are they vulnerable?”

On Monday, not only did France reject Italy’s temporary visa idea, but its interior minister said Paris would use “all legal means at our disposal” to increase patrols on the French-Italian border. In recent weeks, France has turned back more than 1,000 North Africans trying to cross the border.

Germany criticized Italian officials for undermining the Schengen Agreement, which established passport-free zones, and said Italy should handle the immigrants on its own.

“Within this European solidarity, it is necessary for each individual country to first face its responsibility,” Germany’s interior minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, said in a television interview.

In France, President [Nicolas Sarkozy](#) is contending with the rise of the hard-right National Front, known for its anti-immigrant stance, while fears about immigration are also shaping German politics. Mr. Berlusconi’s center-right coalition hinges on the Northern League.

As Europe’s divisions have widened, regional elections have taken on broader European significance, particularly in Germany. Responding to strong political pressures, Chancellor [Angela Merkel](#) recently reversed her party’s longstanding support of nuclear power — and still [lost in Baden-Württemberg](#), where her Christian Democrats had held sway since 1953. Earlier, she insisted on stringent — and, many economists said, self-defeating — terms in the bailouts of Greece and Ireland, to placate angry German voters who objected to paying for what they saw was the profligacy of others.

There are also contradictions. “In this renationalization of European countries, and the rise of xenophobia, governments are very careful toward new migration flows,” said Catherine de Wenden, the director of research at the Center for International Studies and Research at the Institut d’Études Politiques, or Sciences Po, in Paris. “At the same time, this is contradictory with liberal European models and the needs of the labor force in most European countries.”

Instead, Europe’s policy has been to hope that immigrants will not come and to try to persuade North African nations to compel their citizens to stay home. Although the collapse of governments in Tunisia and Egypt and the unrest in Libya have undone a variety of bilateral treaties with European countries, including agreements on migration, that policy is still in place.

## France and Britain criticize NATO over Libya



By News Wires the 12/04/2011 - 16:46

France and Britain criticised NATO on Monday for not doing enough in the past two weeks to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and stop Muammar Gaddafi from bombing civilians.

**REUTERS** - France and Britain, who first launched air attacks on Libya in coalition with the United States, on Tuesday criticised NATO's bombing campaign, saying it must do more to stop Muammar Gaddafi bombarding civilians.

NATO took over air operations from the three nations on March 31 but heavy government bombardment of the besieged western city of Misrata has continued unabated with hundreds of civilians reported killed.

The criticism by London and Paris followed new shelling of Misrata on Monday and the collapse of an African Union peace initiative. Echoing rebel complaints, Juppe told France Info radio, "It's not enough."

He said NATO must stop Gaddafi shelling civilians and take out heavy weapons bombarding Misrata. In a barbed reference to the alliance command of the operation, Juppe added: "NATO must play its role fully. It wanted to take the lead in operations, we accepted that."

British Foreign Secretary William Hague also said NATO must intensify attacks, calling on other alliance countries to match London's supply of extra ground attack aircraft in Libya.

NATO, is operating under a U.N. mandate to protect civilians, stepped up air strikes around Misrata and the eastern battlefield city of Ajdabiyah at the weekend. It rejected the criticism.

"NATO is conducting its military operations in Libya with vigour within the current mandate. The pace of the operations is determined by the need to protect the population," it said.

Libyan state television said on Tuesday a NATO strike on the town of Kikla, south of Tripoli, had killed civilians and members of the police force. It did not give details.

### **Peace talks fail**

The spat within the alliance came after heavy shelling and street fighting in the coastal city of Misrata on Monday where Human Rights Watch says at least 250 people, mostly civilians, have died.

Rebels on Monday rejected an African Union peace plan, saying there could be no deal unless Gaddafi was toppled. His son Saif al Islam said such an idea was ridiculous.

Rebel leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil on Tuesday thanked Western countries for the air strikes but said they could not relieve besieged cities and appealed for arms and supplies.

"NATO's air fleet cannot deliver the occupied cities where Gaddafi's forces, using the civilian populations as a human shield, have now taken cover," he said in a statement, adding that the insurgents needed time to build an army capable of toppling the Libyan leader.

Abdel Jalil pointedly named French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who the rebels hail as a hero, as the leader of the coalition supporting his forces.

Sarkozy led calls for military intervention in Libya and his warplanes were the first to attack Gaddafi's forces.

NATO is unpopular among many insurgents, both because they believe it initially reacted slowly to government attacks and because it has killed almost 20 rebels in two mistaken bombings.

Although they have recently praised the alliance after its attacks helped break a major government assault on Ajdabiyah, many of the rebels in the field still hailed Sarkozy.

Gaddafi's forces on Tuesday bombarded the western entrance to Ajdabiyah, launch point for insurgent attacks towards the oil port of Brega on the eastern front. There were eight blasts, apparently from artillery.

Rebels said earlier they were about 40 km (25 miles) west of Ajdabiyah, a strategic crossroads that has been the focus of fierce battles in the last two months.

NATO attacks outside Ajdabiyah on Sunday helped break the biggest assault by Gaddafi's forces on the eastern front for at least a week. The town is the gateway to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi 150 km (90 miles) north up the Mediterranean coast.

Amnesty International on Tuesday accused Gaddafi forces of executing prisoners, killing protesters and attacking refugees.

## **Scorn**

Rebels in Misrata, their last major bastion in western Libya and under siege for six weeks, scorned reports that Gaddafi had accepted a ceasefire, saying they were fighting house-to-house battles with his forces.

Rebels told Reuters that Gaddafi's forces had intensified the assault, for the first time firing truck-mounted, Russian-made Grad rockets into the city, where conditions for civilians are said to be desperate.

The difficulty for Western nations in maintaining momentum in Libya was revealed in a Reuters/Ipsos MORI on Tuesday that found ambiguous and uncertain support for the operation among Britons, Americans and Italians.

While they supported ousting Gaddafi, they were worried about the costs of a military campaign and uncertain about the objectives. Support was more solid in France.

Gaddafi's former foreign minister Moussa Koussa, speaking in Britain where he fled last month, said on Tuesday the war risked making Libya a failed state like Somalia.

Koussa, who will attend an international meeting on Libya's future in Doha on Wednesday, called for national unity in an interview with the BBC.

France denies its forces arrested Gbagbo



By FRANCE 24 the 12/04/2011 - 07:40

While France admits its forces played a part in the operation to unseat Laurent Gbagbo, military spokesperson Cmdr. Frederic Daguillon (pictured) denies that French troops made the arrest.

Standing shoulder to shoulder with the United Nations in Ivory Coast, French forces clearly played a key role in what was to be the final assault against Laurent Gbagbo.

However, French authorities denied Monday that they had played a direct role in Laurent Gbagbo's arrest. "This was an operation, in the end, that took place between Ivorians", French Defence Minister Gérard Longuet told the press. He did recognise however, that French forces in Ivory Coast had "supported" Alassane Ouattara's Republican Forces.

Nevertheless, Gbagbo's camp insisted that the French Army's role went even further, stating the French Forces of Ivory Coast - deployed under the name Licorne - arrested the former president.

Gbagbo's spokesman in Paris, Alain Toussaint, told FRANCE 24: "The French force Licorne did enter the residence of Laurent Gbagbo.

"The moment they got inside, the head of the military staff alerted me and when French Special Forces arrested the president of the republic, again, a member of the military staff called me and told me the French are here, the president will be arrested."

This has been denied by French authorities: "No French military forces got inside the residence of the Presidential palace," said Cmdr. Frederic Daguillon, the French forces spokesman in Abidjan.

According to Army spokesperson Thierry Burkhard, Licorne soldiers were deployed Monday along strategic routes in Abidjan, notably along the boulevard de France, "1.5 km from the Gbagbo's residency".

French Licorne soldiers number 980 men on the ground. While France has maintained a military force in Ivory Coast since the country's independence, Licorne operations began at the end of 2002, at the start of the politico-military crisis that finally came to a head this week.

# Côte d'Ivoire : François Fillon «fier» du rôle de la France

Par [Flore Galaud](#)

12/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 17:06 Réactions (195)

S'ABONNER AU FIGARO.FR - 5 €/mois



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**Les soldats quitteront le pays une fois que la démocratie y sera garantie, a expliqué mardi le premier ministre, qui, face aux critiques de l'opposition, a assuré que les forces françaises n'étaient pas impliquées dans l'arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo.**

Un premier ministre «fier» de son pays. François Fillon a souhaité faire taire les polémiques mardi en clarifiant le rôle joué par la France dans l'**arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo** survenue la veille dans sa résidence d'Abidjan. «Le comportement des forces françaises a été exemplaire (...) Pas un seul soldat français n'a mis les pieds dans la résidence», a-t-il assuré à l'occasion des questions au gouvernement à l'Assemblée nationale.

L'avenir des soldats français présents sur place est clair : ils devront quitter le pays une fois la situation stabilisée, a-t-il poursuivi. «**La force Licorne**, qui est présente en Côte d'Ivoire depuis 2002, n'a pas vocation à rester en Côte d'Ivoire maintenant que la démocratie va s'installer et que le résultat des urnes est respecté», a expliqué le premier ministre. «Les forces françaises devront quitter la Côte d'Ivoire dès que la sécurité sera suffisante, en particulier pour nos ressortissants à Abidjan».

## Un message à «tous les dictateurs»

En outre, «nous avons envoyé avec l'ONU un message symbolique extrêmement fort à tous les dictateurs, a souligné François Fillon. Nous leur avons indiqué que la légalité, la démocratie devaient être respectées et qu'il y avait des risques pour ceux qui ne le faisaient pas». La chute de Laurent Gbagbo souligne la «victoire du droit», de «la démocratie» et «des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire», a-t-il conclu devant les députés.

Un peu plus tôt dans la journée, le porte-parole du gouvernement, François Baroin, avait prévenu que la France n'accepterait «aucune leçon de morale de quiconque ni aucune leçon politique», tant son comportement, au cours de cette opération, avait été «remarquable et inattaquable». «Ce n'est pas la France qui a déposé Gbagbo, c'est le peuple ivoirien», a-t-il assuré sur **RTL**, ajoutant que la France était «intervenu dans le cadre de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, à la demande de son secrétaire général».

## Un «grossier mensonge d'État» (PS)

Depuis lundi, plusieurs voix s'élèvent pourtant pour dénoncer l'ingérence française en Côte d'Ivoire. Le conseiller à Paris de Laurent Gbagbo a ainsi assuré que le président déchu avait été enlevé dans sa résidence «par des éléments des forces spéciales françaises». Un «coup d'Etat» selon lui destiné à s'accaparer des «ressources de la Côte d'Ivoire».

Le Parti socialiste a également accusé l'Élysée de se livrer à un «grossier mensonge d'État» en niant toute «responsabilité directe» de la France. «Il est particulièrement choquant que le ministre de la Défense se serve des chefs de l'armée pour couvrir ce mensonge. L'intervention militaire française constitue un nouvel épisode caricatural de la Françafrique», a ainsi dénoncé mardi François Loncle, vice-président du groupe socialiste à l'Assemblée chargé des questions internationales. Le député PS de Paris, Jean-Marie Le Guen, a quant à lui estimé que Nicolas Sarkozy était allé «au-delà de la résolution de l'ONU».

«La vérité, elle est claire, c'est que l'armée française, sur ordre politique, a livré à son adversaire Laurent Gbagbo. Elle l'a même amené au domicile de l'adversaire, un peu comme dans les traditions d'autrefois, de l'antiquité», a pour sa part déclaré l'ancien ministre PS des Affaires étrangères Roland Dumas sur **France Inter**. «Ce qui me déplaît dans cette histoire, c'est qu'on essaie de raconter des billevesées aux Français, a ajouté l'ancien ministre. Il ne faut pas prendre les Français pour des enfants niais et idiots».

## In schlechter Gesellschaft

**Ausgerechnet die Regierung Berlusconi verlangt Solidarität der Partner - eine Regierung, die seit Jahren als seriöse Kraft in Europa ausfällt. Kann Italien wirklich nicht mit 23.000 Bootsflüchtlingen fertig werden?**

*Von Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger*

*13. April 2011*

In den neunziger Jahren kamen Hunderttausende Asylbewerber, Arbeitssuchende und Kriegsflüchtlinge nach Deutschland, Jahr für Jahr. Für das Hilfeersuchen der damaligen Bundesregierung hatte Italien nur die Mahnung übrig, den Neuankömmlingen nicht mit Nazi-Methoden zu begegnen. Das nur zur Erinnerung, weil heute der Innenminister Italiens über angeblichen Mangel an Solidarität in der EU lamentiert.

Da will der Herr Maroni, also Italien, lieber allein sein als in schlechter Gesellschaft. Vielleicht sollte er sich bei seiner Partei, der Lega, erkundigen, wie viele Migranten die im Norden aufzunehmen bereit ist. Die Antwort kennt er: nicht einen einzigen. Auch schlechte Gesellschaft?

Ausgerechnet die Regierung Berlusconi verlangt Solidarität der Partner - eine Regierung, die seit Jahren als seriöse Kraft in Europa ausfällt. Kann Italien wirklich nicht mit 23 000 Bootsflüchtlingen fertig werden? Das zu behaupten müsste eigentlich seinen Stolz verletzen. Lieber stellt man Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen aus in der Erwartung, die Leute zögen schnell weiter. Erpresser aber sollten nicht von fairer Lastenteilung reden.

Text: F.A.Z.



**12. April 2011, 13:59 Uhr**  
**Teure Währungsrettung**

## **Rechnungshof zerlegt Merkels Euro-Plan**

Von Peter Müller und *Christoph Schult*, Brüssel

**Die Euro-Rettung könnte noch teurer werden als gedacht: Laut Bundesrechnungshof ist die deutsche Bareinlage mit 22 Milliarden Euro zu knapp bemessen. Im schlimmsten Fall müsste die Regierung Kapital nachschießen - selbst wenn sie gar nicht will.**

In seinem vertraulichen Bericht an den Haushaltsausschuss des Bundestags warnt der [Rechnungshof](#) vor größeren Risiken bei der Euro-Rettung. Schon während des Aufbaus des neuen European Stability Mechanism (ESM) "kann es zu einem erhöhten Bedarf an Barkapital kommen", urteilen die Rechnungsprüfer.

Bislang sehen die Pläne der europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs vor, dass der Kapitalstock des Rettungsschirms über eine Dauer von drei Jahren ab 2013 aufgebaut wird. Sollte ein Euro-Land aber bereits in dieser Aufbauphase Hilfen aus dem Barkapitalbestand des ESM benötigen, so die Gutachter, bestehe eine "Nachschusspflicht" der Mitgliedstaaten.

Bislang hatte das Bundesfinanzministerium diesen Fall in internen Gesprächen mit dem Haushaltsausschuss des Bundestags als "unwahrscheinlich" ausgeschlossen. Aus dem Rechnungshofbericht geht nun hervor, dass das Finanzministerium die Diskussion über entsprechende Szenarien lediglich als "verfrüht" bezeichnet.

### **Verwaltungsrat des ESM kann Deutschland überstimmen**

Auf Kritik der Rechnungsprüfer stößt auch, dass der Verwaltungsrat des ESM wichtige Entscheidungen nicht im gegenseitigen Einvernehmen erlassen muss, sondern mit einfacher Mehrheit beschließen kann. Das führt dazu, dass Deutschland überstimmt werden kann, selbst bei sensiblen Entscheidungen wie der Überweisung von zusätzlichem Kapital im Falle von "Zahlungsverzug oder Ausfall eines Mitgliedstaates".

Im Extremfall, monieren die Regierungskontrolleure, wären die Euro-Mitglieder verpflichtet, Geld nachzuschießen, ohne dies verhindern zu können: "Reicht das Barkapital nicht aus, wird automatisch Kapital von den Mitgliedstaaten abgerufen, ohne dass es einer Entscheidung des Verwaltungsrats oder des Direktoriums bedarf."

Um angesichts dieses erhöhten Risikos das Budgetrecht des Bundestags zu wahren, fordert der Rechnungshof eine starke Rolle des deutschen Parlaments. "Alle Festlegungen zu Art und Höhe, insbesondere die Bestimmung von Obergrenzen der deutschen Beiträge zum ESM, sind gesetzlich zu regeln und unterliegen damit dem parlamentarischen Zustimmungserfordernis."

Zudem raten die Kontrolleure den Abgeordneten, ihre Zustimmung zum Euro-Rettungsschirm mit der Auflage zu verknüpfen, "rechtzeitig im Wege eines Konsultationsverfahrens über anstehende operative Entscheidungen des ESM informiert zu werden, die Auswirkungen auf den Bundeshaushalt haben können".

### **"Einzugsermächtigung für den Bundeshaushalt"**

Die Opposition wirft [Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel](#) (CDU) und ihrem Finanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble (ebenfalls CDU) Täuschung vor. "Dieser Bericht ist ein Debakel für die Bundeskanzlerin", sagt der SPD-Chefhaushälter Carsten Schneider. "Die Auswirkungen des ESM auf den Bundeshaushalt werden seit Monaten verschleiert."

Merkel hatte im vergangenen Oktober in einem schon damals umstrittenen Deal mit dem französischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy ihre Forderung aufgegeben, Sanktionen gegen Euro-Pleitekandidaten automatisch einzuleiten. Sarkozy unterstützte im Gegenzug die deutsche Forderung nach einer Änderung des EU-Vertrags. Dazu sagt SPD-Mann Schneider: "Frau Merkel ist vor einem Jahr mit der Forderung nach automatischen Sanktionen gestartet und hat nun mit dem ESM eine Einzugsermächtigung für den Bundeshaushalt unterschrieben."

**URL:**

- <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,756530,00.html>

## Europäische Solidarität

**Während Rom droht, die Flüchtlinge von Lampedusa einfach weiterzuschicken, denkt Berlin darüber nach, im eigentlich grenzfreien Schengenraum wieder Kontrollen einzuführen. Die Reaktion ist verständlich - in der EU nämlich gilt die Grundregel der Solidarität.**

Von Reinhard Müller



Flüchtlinge protestieren in einem Auffanglager auf Lampedusa

11. April 2011

Es stimmt schon: Auch in der Flüchtlingsfrage kann Deutschland „gesamteuropäische Verantwortung“ zeigen, wie es die Grünen verlangen. Nicht ohne Grund hat die Bundeskanzlerin Solidarität mit den Flüchtlingen eingefordert, die unter Lebensgefahr nach Europa wollen. Und genau darum geht es in der Europäischen Union bis hin zur finanziellen Rettung notleidender Nachbarn: um Solidarität, damit die Mitglieder ein gemeinsames Ziel erreichen können. Allerdings haben die einzelnen Länder höchst unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von der Reichweite des Füreinander-Einstehens. Etwas zu schnell und leichtfertig wird dabei auch in Deutschland einfach vorausgesetzt, dass das reichste Land stets und sofort mit nahezu unüberschaubarer Haftung einspringt.

Doch diese Art von „Führung“, die zu anderen Zeiten unter der Regierung Kohl noch erfolgreich war, überfordert Deutschland heute – und gefährdet deshalb die EU. Vor allem wäre eine solch umfassende Transferunion den Bürgern schlicht nicht zu vermitteln; auch darauf sollte es im demokratischen Staatenverbund ankommen. Selbstverständlich werden Griechenland und Portugal in ihrer Finanz- und Italien mit seiner Flüchtlingsnot nicht allein gelassen. Ihr Erfolg liegt schließlich im nationalen Interesse aller. Doch erst einmal sind die Mitgliedstaaten selbst gefordert. Italien ist wegen seiner Lage und der für alle zivilisierten Staaten geltenden humanitären Pflichten zur Hilfe für die Flüchtlinge gezwungen. Bisher hält sich deren Zahl in Grenzen. Sie ist weit entfernt von jener der Balkan-Flüchtlinge, die einst in Deutschland eine (vorläufige) Bleibe fanden.

Angesichts der Drohungen aus Rom, die Gestrandeten einfach weiterzuschicken, ist es verständlich, dass Berlin erwägt, im eigentlich grenzfreien Schengenraum wieder Kontrollen einzuführen und italienische Dokumente nicht anzuerkennen, um nicht noch mehr Fluchtwillige anzuziehen. Ungeschickt ist es freilich, Italien nur an seine Größe zu erinnern, dem kleinen Malta aber gleich unter die Arme zu greifen. Auf jeden muss Rücksicht genommen werden, auch solange die EU keine (neuen) Regeln zur Lastenverteilung aufstellt. „Man kann auch solidarisch sein ohne Regeln“, sagt die europäische Flüchtlingskommissarin zu Recht. Man kann nicht nur, man muss. Solidarität ist nämlich die Grundregel.

# L'Europe, l'immigration et le chacun pour soi

Le Monde | 09.04.11 | 13h44 • Mis à jour le 09.04.11 | 13h44

**C**hacun pour soi ou tout à l'Europe : c'est entre ces deux pôles qu'oscille la position des pays membres de l'Union européenne en matière d'immigration. De "politique" en tant que telle, il n'a pas été question depuis des années, mais bien d'une série de déclarations et de postures essentiellement dictées par les aléas de l'actualité, l'humeur présumée des citoyens ou les échéances électorales.

Or, ces dernières se profilent en France, en Allemagne ou en Italie, et la question migratoire s'impose à nouveau, là et ailleurs, comme l'un des thèmes majeurs du débat, l'un de ceux qui, en ces temps de crise, pourraient déterminer l'issue des scrutins.

La crise que connaît le continent a favorisé le retour des propos à l'emporte-pièce, de la course en solitaire, du renvoi de la responsabilité sur le voisin ou, comme d'habitude quand les choses s'enveniment, sur "Bruxelles".

Sur cette Commission taxée d'irréalisme quand elle continue à plaider, par exemple, pour le regroupement familial ou l'immigration de travail. Ou d'angélisme quand elle ose affirmer que la révolte tunisienne ou la guerre de Libye, toutes deux jugées bénéfiques, pourraient forcer les Vingt-Sept à ouvrir leur porte-monnaie, leur coeur et les frontières.

Il faudra faire preuve de la solidarité promise aux citoyens de ces pays et assumer sans doute un exode, tant de réfugiés économiques que de personnes en détresse ayant le droit à une protection internationale.

Le sort des premiers reste incertain, et c'est un peu tard, malheureusement, que l'Union s'est décidée à considérer qu'une véritable coopération avec leur pays d'origine serait susceptible d'améliorer leur sort et celui de tous ceux qui songent à les imiter. Quitte à prendre des risques insensés et à ajouter leur nom à la liste des quelque 4 200 candidats à l'immigration qui ont péri depuis 2003 en tentant de rejoindre ce qui ressemblait, pour eux, à un eldorado.

La récente querelle franco-italienne sur les titres de séjour et les contrôles quasi systématiques aux frontières a illustré jusqu'à la caricature l'absence d'une politique commune et d'une réelle solidarité entre les Européens. Incapables de mettre au point des règles communes pour l'asile, hostiles à tout "partage du fardeau", refusant de considérer que la pression des clandestins s'exerce sur certains beaucoup plus que sur d'autres, les Vingt-Sept offrent l'image désolante d'un pouvoir sans ligne directrice et sans réponse face aux défis de demain.

La dislocation du régime du colonel Kadhafi, avec lequel avait été conclu un programme de "voisinage" qui faisait de lui, au moins jusqu'en 2013, le gardien vigilant (et rémunéré) des flux de clandestins, place pourtant les Européens devant leurs responsabilités. Soit ils en viennent enfin à coordonner leur action et à considérer, entre autres, que l'immigration légale restera une donnée majeure de nos sociétés. Soit ils poursuivent dans la voie du chacun pour soi, et alors un autre pilier s'effondrera : l'Europe dite "sans frontières" de Schengen aura vécu, et avec elle une autre part du rêve européen.

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NYT April 11, 2011

# Italy Lashes Out at European Union Over Immigrants

By RACHEL DONADIO

ROME — Tensions rose between [Italy](#) and its [European Union](#) partners on Monday over how to handle an influx of immigrants from North Africa, prompting the Italian interior minister to question the utility of the European Union.

At a meeting in Luxembourg on Monday, European Union interior ministers said they would not recognize the temporary permits that Italy had said it planned to issue to scores of immigrants who have arrived since January. The permits were intended to allow them free travel within Europe.

But Europe is divided over whether the permits would be valid in the entire visa-free Schengen area, which covers most of Western Europe, and on Monday, France and Germany rejected Italy's plan.

"If this is the answer, it is better to be alone than in bad company," Italy's interior minister, Roberto Maroni, said. "I wonder if it makes sense to stay in the European Union."

Mr. Maroni, who is a member of the Northern League, a party known for its strong anti-immigrant stance, has been vociferously critical of the European Union, accusing it of "abandoning" Italy. But it would be highly unlikely for Italy to act on any such threat to leave the union.

On Monday, Mr. Maroni called the European Union "an institution that acted immediately to save banks and declare war, but when it comes to give solidarity to a country in difficulty like Italy, it is nowhere to be found."

Italy had been calling on its fellow European Union members to help share the burden of receiving the more than 22,000 immigrants who have arrived in Italy since January, the majority of them "economic migrants" from Tunisia seeking work in France and elsewhere in Europe.

On Monday, the French interior minister, Claude Guéant, said that France would step up controls along its border with Italy to prevent immigrants from entering unless they could prove they were economically self-sufficient. Last week, Mr. Guéant said France would help Italy patrol the Tunisian coast.

Germany has said it would take in 100 refugees who arrived recently in Malta from North Africa, but it has been reluctant to accept economic migrants seeking work and has said that Italy should handle the influx on its own.

"Italy must live up to its responsibilities," Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich of Germany said in a television interview on Monday. He said that "Italy is a large country" and that the number of immigrants was not so great.

"Last year, Germany took in more than 40,000 asylum seekers, so the ball is in Italy's court," Mr. Friedrich said, adding that "Italy must negotiate with Tunisia."

Mr. Maroni traveled to Tunisia last week to urge it to honor its [immigration](#) and repatriation accords, but that country's government is still in disarray since the ouster in January of President [Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali](#).

NYT April 11, 2011

# France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public

By [STEVEN ERLANGER](#)

VÉNISSIEUX, France — [France](#) on Monday formally banned the wearing of full veils in public places, becoming the first country in Europe to impose restrictions on a form of attire that some Muslims consider a religious obligation.

The ban, which came after a year of debate and months of preparation, is viewed by supporters as a necessary step to preserve French culture and to fight what they see as separatist tendencies among Muslims. But the ban set off protests in Paris and several other cities, and it has left many Muslims, including those in this heavily immigrant community near Lyon, worried about their rights as French citizens.

Karima, 31, who was born in France and asked to be referred to by only her first name, has worn the [niqab](#) since the age of 15 as a sign of her devotion to God. She says she feels as if France has betrayed her.

“It’s as if I was married to a man who mistreated me, but I’m still in love with him,” she said. “It’s as if he had an identity crisis, and I would still stay with him after 31 years of marriage.”

The police do not have the authority under the law to remove full veils, only to fine or require citizenship lessons for those who violate the new law. They also showed few signs of moving quickly to enforce the new rules for fear of causing unrest in big cities with Muslim communities.

“The law will be infinitely difficult to enforce, and will be infinitely rarely enforced,” Manuel Roux, a union leader for local police chiefs, told France Inter radio.

Patrice Ribeiro, general secretary of Synergie Officiers, a police union, said the law was “a source of trouble more than anything else.” In areas with large immigrant populations, he said in an interview, the law cannot be carried out strictly: “We’ll create riots.” He said the matter would need to be handled with the help of religious authorities.

The issue was set alight in April 2009 by André Gérin, then the Communist mayor of Vénissieux. Half of the town’s 60,000 residents are non-French citizens or their French-born children, and the niqab has been a relatively normal sight here. Mr. Gérin said at the time that the full facial veil, which is known in France erroneously as the burqa, should be banned in the name of the liberty and equality of women in a secular country.

On Monday, in his office, Mr. Gérin said the burqa was “just the tip of the iceberg” of the spread of Muslim radicalism and separatism that threatened the French Republic.

The law does not mention Islam or women. It bans the covering of the face in any public place, including shops and the street, as a security measure. A clause says that anyone who forces a woman to cover her face can be imprisoned for up to a year and fined up to 30,000 euros, about \$43,000.

But the law is “a point of departure,” said Mr. Gérin, who retired as mayor but remains a member of the National Assembly. Speaking of young Muslim women who refuse to participate in school sports, or Muslim men who refuse to allow a male doctor to treat their wives or who allegedly compel their wives to wear the veil, Mr. Gérin called the law “a wake-up call,” a means “to eradicate this minority of fundamentalists, ‘the gurus’ who instrumentalize Islam for political reasons.”

Polls show that the law is broadly popular in France, and it passed the lower house of Parliament with only one vote opposed. But many Muslim women say it feels like an outrage. To them, it singles out and stigmatizes one gender of one religion.

Karima, who runs a business and uses public transportation, said she would lift the veil if required for an identity check, but added, “I won’t remove it, I’ll have to be buried in it.”

Her husband supports her, she said, and she wants her daughter, 11, to respect Islam, too. She is thinking about buying a scooter so she can wear a helmet instead. But frankly, she said, the metro is much faster.

She cannot sleep with worry, she said. “From now on, I’ll be treated like an illegal worker, an outlaw, a person wanted by the police, even though the only crime I’ve committed is to show myself as I am.”

Nelly Moussaid, 28, a former national karate champion, has been wearing the niqab for two years “as a sign of faith.” She lives in Marseille with her husband and their 4-month-old boy. While Marseille is a tolerant city with many immigrants and Muslims, she said, “those who keep wearing the niqab will go crazy,” asking: “Will they manage to catch all of us, arrest us at every corner of every street?”

The mood in France is aggressive, she said. “Before, on the street, I got only stares. But now people look at us as if we had killed their mothers.”

The Interior Ministry estimates that only about 2,000 women wear the niqab in France, while Mr. Gérin, who helped write a long parliamentary report on the issue, believes that the number is higher. But with an estimated six million Muslims in France, the action taken seems large compared with the problem, critics say, and they accuse President [Nicolas Sarkozy](#) and his center-right party of playing politics with a generalized and unjustified fear of Islam and immigrants.

Mr. Sarkozy has responded that Islam is not the problem, only radical Islam, which does not respect French values and separation of church and state.

Naima Bouteldja interviewed 32 women who wear the niqab for the Open Society Foundation, a nongovernmental organization. She found none who said they had been forced to wear the veil, and 10 said they started wearing the niqab as a response to the political controversy. Eight of the 32 were French converts to Islam; a third said they did not wear the niqab all the time.

“Some were angry, and some said that many ‘niqabis’ had already left France, and many of them talked about leaving France,” she said. “Most of the women confront verbal abuse on a daily basis, with a lot of the abuse coming from Muslims.” Her report, [“Unveiling the Truth: Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in France,”](#) was released Monday.

In Paris, a protest over the ban near the Cathedral of Notre-Dame, organized by a Muslim property developer, resulted in the arrest of two men and three women for an illegal gathering, the police said — not for the women’s wearing of the full veil.

*Maïa de la Baume contributed reporting.*

# Charlemagne

## A false prophet

### Why Geert Wilders is a problem, not a solution

The Economist Oct 7th 2010 | from the print edition



HIS big bleach-blond mane was unmistakable, but this time his mouth, the biggest in Dutch politics, stayed shut. Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant Freedom Party, is on trial for incitement to hatred and discrimination against Muslims. But when he appeared before judges in Amsterdam on October 4th, this champion of free speech declined to speak.

The court heard some of Mr Wilders's greatest hits: "the Koran is the 'Mein Kampf' of a religion that intends to eliminate others" (2007); "Islam wants to control, subdue and is out for the destruction of our Western civilisation" (2008); a Koran stripped of its hateful verses, "should actually have the format of a Donald Duck [comic book]" (2007, again). The judges' questions were comically innocent. Did Mr Wilders really say such things? Was it in the heat of the moment? Had he received legal advice? Did he really need to refer to Donald Duck? Stubborn silence.

Maybe the state should not be in the business of prosecuting politicians for their offensive views. But these are highly charged times in the Netherlands. The threat of murder hangs over the traditionally tolerant country. In 2002 Pim Fortuyn, an earlier anti-immigrant politician, was killed. Two years later so was Theo van Gogh, an anti-Islamist film-maker. Mr Wilders now moves only with a posse of bodyguards, and lives at a secret location.

Even more importantly, he has become the political kingmaker. His party came third in June's general election, winning 15% of the vote, and will now prop up a minority government of the liberal VVD with the centre-right Christian Democrats. In exchange, Mr Wilders has secured the promise of tighter immigration rules, a ban on some Islamic garb and more money for care of the elderly. Newspapers are calling this the "Wilders 1" government.

Mr Wilders's party is only one of many anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups that are gaining ground in northern European countries previously known for their liberal social attitudes. The Dutch coalition deal was copied from Denmark, where the Danish People's Party has backed a minority government since 2001. In Sweden's recent election the far-right Sweden Democrats won seats for the first time, denying Fredrik Reinfeldt, the prime minister, a centre-right majority (he is now running a minority government). These parties,



all with their own special characteristics, are distinct from older far-right groups such as France's National Front and Italy's Northern League, and have still less to do with thuggish movements in eastern Europe. But a common theme is a dislike of foreigners, especially Muslims.

A big question is whether Germany, the European country most inoculated from right-wing extremism, may be next. There have been stirrings of late, such as the sacking from the board of the Bundesbank of Thilo Sarrazin, a former Social Democratic politician, who published a book saying Muslim migrants were making Germany "more stupid". Enter the inevitable Mr Wilders. He was in Berlin earlier this month to launch a new party called *Die Freiheit* ("Freedom"), founded by René Stadtkewitz, formerly a member of the Berlin branch of the Christian Democrats. To cheers, Mr Wilders declared that Germans, too, needed to defend their identity against Islamisation.

Mr Wilders should not be underestimated. By identifying the enemy as Islam and not foreigners, and by casting his rhetoric in terms of freedom rather than race, he becomes harder to label as a reactionary, racist or neo-Nazi. Mr Wilders does not want to associate with the fascist sort. He has no truck with anti-Semitism and fervently supports Israel. He is, for want of a better term, a radical liberal: he defends women's emancipation and gay rights. He is fighting to defend the West's liberties; the enemy is Islam (not Muslims, he says), which seeks, violently, to destroy them.

Such views chime with some American conservatives. The *Washington Times* this week called for Mr Wilders's acquittal. Daniel Pipes, an American scholar and prominent scourge of Islamic radicalism, has called him "the most important European alive today." Mr Wilders was invited to speak at a rally at New York's Ground Zero to mark the 2001 September 11th attacks and oppose the construction of a new Islamic centre nearby. Yet Americans (and Europeans) should be wary of embracing Mr Wilders. To expose violent Islamist ideology is legitimate, even necessary; to attack Islam and the Koran is dangerous stupidity that weakens the civilisation Mr Wilders claims to defend.

## Defanging the extremes

What should democratic parties do when lots of voters back a far-right party? At a time of recession, populism cannot just be wished away. One answer is to address legitimate grievances about the scale and nature of immigration. (In France Nicolas Sarkozy has, controversially, pinched far-right rhetoric.) Another is to use the law to curb blatant examples of hate speech.

But the temptation for many is to isolate the extremists, perhaps with an alliance of mainstream left and right. That risks intensifying voters' sense that politicians are not listening to them, further boosting the extremists, but it may be necessary against the most odious groups. Some, like Mr Reinfeldt in Sweden, may try to ignore the far right. More stable would be a Dutch-style deal to secure their backing for a minority government; some Christian Democrats hope this will tame the wilder side of Mr Wilders. The danger is that it just gives him power without responsibility—and without forcing him to recant outrageous positions.

A better, braver strategy, in some cases, might be to bring far-right leaders into the cabinet, exposing their ideas to reality and their personalities to the public gaze. It may make for tetchy government, but it could also moderate the extremes. So roll the dice and make Mr Wilders foreign minister: for how long could he keep telling the world to ban the Koran?

# Muslims in France

## On a mat and a prayer

A new debate reflects strains over the place of Islam in France

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | PARIS | from the print edition



REUTERS Wall-to-wall

carpeting

WELL before the start of Friday prayers, rolls of mats tied with string are waiting propped against the kerb. Perched on a plastic table on the pavement outside the Al-Fath mosque, a loudspeaker is ready to broadcast prayers to the street. As the faithful stream in from the Métro station in this grim stretch of Paris's 18th *arrondissement*, past shops selling Algerian football shirts and green-and-gold woven cloth from Togo, policemen guard roads that have been closed to traffic. When the prayers begin, the streets are packed with hundreds of worshippers kneeling on mats. The scene has become a symbol in a heated debate over efforts to reconcile an assertive Islam with France's secular tradition.

Of 2,000 mosques and prayer rooms in France, weekly prayers overflow on to the streets in only a dozen places, mostly in Paris and Marseille. Home to Europe's biggest Muslim minority (some 5m), France objects because of its strict secularism or *laïcité*. This doctrine bars religion from public life. In 2004 cross-party backing pushed through a law that outlaws the headscarf (and other religious symbols) in public schools. Next week a ban on the face-covering veil comes into force.

President Nicolas Sarkozy's UMP party has raised the temperature by holding a controversial debate on *laïcité*. It wants 26 measures to clarify the application of the 1905 law. These include stopping pupils from skipping classes on compulsory bits of the curriculum (such as the Holocaust) or patients refusing on religious grounds to see a male doctor. The party also wants foreign donors to declare gifts to mosques in France, and to bring in public loan guarantees or long-term leases for mosque-building, to get worshippers off the streets.

Jean-François Copé, the UMP leader, says he is responding to genuine problems, for teachers or doctors, which the snug Paris elite underestimates. He invited representatives of other religions to the debate. He wants to reaffirm secular principles to send a message to hard-line Islamists. Others, however, see the debate as an attempt to stigmatise Muslims for electoral ends, since the problems touch only Islam. Mohammed Moussaoui,

head of the French Council for the Muslim Faith, refused to join the UMP debate. Even François Fillon, the prime minister, boycotted it.

The UMP is divided over how far to press the issue. Many would prefer to talk of more urgent matters like jobs. Others say they cannot leave the field to Marine Le Pen, the far-right National Front leader, who has compared street prayers to the Nazi occupation. Several polls suggest she could beat Mr Sarkozy in the first round of next year's presidential election. Mr Sarkozy backed the debate and seems happy to keep it in the headlines. Earlier this year he said multiculturalism had "failed", that immigrants needed to "melt" into French society, and that "we do not want ostentatious prayers in the street in France."

Back in the 18th *arrondissement*, not far from the cobbled streets of Montmartre, France's secular principles seem neater in theory than in practice. Each week, policemen allow the streets to be shut for outdoor prayers. They stand by as mosque officials put up plastic tape to separate pedestrians from worshippers. Some residents see this as a provocation. Daniel Vaillant, the local Socialist mayor, calls it pragmatic. "There are worse abuses of the street here, such as prostitution or drug-dealing," he says. "I'm against prayers in the street; but I'm also against banning them without providing a solution."

The town hall sees street prayers as a temporary problem of capacity. Two local mosques draw worshippers from afar, often new arrivals to France. They come to pray and pick up supplies in the many ethnic stores, offering such wares as raw goats' feet, mobile-phone cards and Afro-hair extensions. The local government and the city are spending €22m (\$32m) to build a new Islamic cultural centre on two sites, with space for concerts and exhibitions. Muslim associations will use private finance to buy prayer rooms, for €6m.

To purists, this is an outright breach of *laïcité*. To the town hall, it is the best hope of resolving the problem peacefully, even though one mosque has yet to sign up to the plan. As in other French towns, where the authorities organise sites for ritual slaughter during Eid or create Muslim burial spaces in public cemeteries, local flexibility seems to triumph over rigid national theory. When the new Islamic centres are ready in a year or two, Mr Vaillant promises, "there won't be any more prayers in the street, and they will give the public space back to citizens."

## A special report on pensions

### Falling short

People in rich countries are living longer. Without big reforms they will not be able to retire in comfort, says Philip Coggan

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | from the print edition



WHEN GERTRUDE JANEWAY died in 2003, she was still getting a monthly cheque for \$70 from the Veterans Administration—for a military pension earned by her late husband, John, on the Union side of the American civil war that ended in 1865. The pair had married in 1927, when he was 81 and she was 18. The amount may have been modest but the entitlement spanned three centuries, illustrating just how long pension commitments can last.

A pension promise can be easy to make but expensive to keep. The employers who promised higher pensions in the past knew they would not be in their posts when the bill became due. That made it tempting for them to offer higher pensions rather than better pay. Over the past 15 years the economics of the deal have become clear, initially in the private sector, where pensions (and health-care costs after retirement) were central to the bankruptcy of General Motors and many other firms.

There are big national differences, but in most developed countries the bulk of retirement income (around 60%, according to the OECD) comes from the state. Most countries offer some kind of basic safety net for those who have no other income. In addition to this, they may have a social-insurance scheme to which workers and employers contribute. Despite the insurance label, these are essentially pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in which benefits are paid out of current taxes.

In some countries workers also have pension rights that are linked to their employment, whether it is in the public or the private sector. Such schemes can be funded (as in America, Britain and the Netherlands) or unfunded (as in much of Europe). In some cases the state has required such schemes to cover all employees. Australia, for instance, has turned itself into the world's fourth-largest market for fund management by setting up a compulsory national pension scheme for its 22m people. On top of that, people accumulate savings (sometimes called pensions and sometimes not) that they expect to draw on during their declining years.

#### The four challenges

Pension provision is higgledy-piggledy and often complex, but most rich countries are having to deal with four main underlying problems. This special report will analyse these in detail and suggest ways of tackling them. The first is that people are living longer, but they are retiring earlier than they were 40 years ago. A higher

proportion of their lives is thus spent in retirement. Second, the large generation of baby-boomers (in America, those born between 1946 and 1964) is now retiring. But the following generations are smaller, leaving the children of the boomers with a huge cost burden.

Third, some employees have been promised pensions linked to their salaries, known as defined-benefit (DB) schemes. In the 1980s and 1990s the true cost of these promises was hidden by a long bull market in equities. But the past dismal decade for stockmarkets depleted those funds and left employers on the hook for the shortfall. Private-sector employers have largely stopped making such promises to new employees; the public sector is beginning to face the same issues, particularly in Britain and America.

Fourth, private-sector employers are now providing pensions in which the payouts are linked to the investment performance of the funds concerned. These defined-contribution (DC) schemes transfer nearly all the risk to the employees. In theory, they can provide an adequate retirement income as long as enough money is paid in, but employees and employers are contributing too little. Both sorts of funded schemes, DB and DC, essentially face the same problem. "The aggregate amount of pension savings is inadequate," says Roger Urwin of Towers Watson, a consultancy.

Estimating the cost of pension provision has proved enormously difficult. People have consistently lived longer than the actuaries have expected. In 1956 a 60-year-old woman retiring from a job in Britain's National Health Service had a life expectancy of just under 20 years; by 2010 she could expect to live for another 32 years.


Key terms	
 <b>Support ratio:</b> The number of people of working age compared with the number of people beyond retirement age.	 <b>Defined benefit:</b> A pension linked to the employee's salary where the risk falls on the employer.
 <b>Participation rate:</b> The proportion of the population that is in the labour force.	 <b>Defined Contribution:</b> A pension dependent on the amount contributed, and the investment performance, where the risk falls mainly on the employee.

Paying a pension for longer is much more expensive, particularly if the payout is linked to inflation. *The Economist* asked MetLife, an insurance company, to calculate what a couple in America would have to spend on an annuity paying out the maximum level of Social Security benefit (the state pension) at age 66: \$4,692 a month now and rising in line with inflation. The answer is almost \$1.2m.

Politicians tend to underestimate the cost of financing PAYG systems. It is tempting to look simply at the ratio of cash benefits to contributions, rather than allowing for the value of the promises being made to future pensioners. But even on a cash basis, pension finances are deteriorating. In 2010 America's Social Security system ran a cash deficit for the first time since 1983 as more money was paid out in benefits than was collected in contributions. This happened about six years earlier than expected, thanks to unusually high unemployment.

The immediate cash cost is only part of the problem; the longer-term calculation also involves the value of future pension promises. In bearing that burden, the key figure is the ratio of workers to pensioners, known as the support (or dependency) ratio. This is deteriorating steadily in all rich countries (see chart). As a result, the tax burden is set to rise, at a time when many countries are still struggling to cope with the fiscal deficits left over from the financial crisis.

## Support ratios



\*Forecast



Pensions paid through a funded scheme do not necessarily work better. Many American states and cities have been underfunding the pension schemes for their employees for years, gambling on the stockmarkets to bail them out. That gamble has failed, and now taxpayers are expected to come to the rescue. Either taxes must rise or benefits must be cut.

## Total pension assets, 13 major pension markets, 2010




## A cut by another name

The most obvious “cut” is for people to work longer so that pensions are paid over a smaller proportion of their lifetime. In many countries reform attempts have accordingly concentrated on raising the minimum retirement age or increasing the number of years for which an employee has to contribute before qualifying for full benefits. In France a move to raise the minimum retirement age to 62 was accompanied by a phased increase in the minimum level of contributions from 40.5 to 41.5 years, a change that was duly attacked by left-wing commentators as being unfair to unemployed workers, part-timers and students entering the job market late. Italy has gone one stage further: from 2015 on, future changes in the retirement age will be indexed to the rise in life expectancy.

Sweden, Germany and Japan already have an automatic balancing system to deal with deteriorating pension finances, largely by making the inflation-linking of benefits less generous. The Netherlands, which has the best-funded (and widely admired) DB pension system in the world, also limits inflation-linking, but delivers pensions that are very close to average earnings. Research by Towers Watson shows that it has a higher ratio of pension assets to GDP than any other country—and it benefits from economies of scale, with pension provision dominated by the giant ABP and PGGM funds. However, contributions are high and the rules on solvency are extremely strict, requiring liabilities to be more than 100% funded.

### Participation rates of 50-64-year-olds



### Retirement age

Male	Official 2010	Actual 2004-09
	60	62.8
	65	61.1
	65	61.9
	60	59.1
	65	61.8
	65	72.2
	65	62.1
	65	64.8
	65	64.3
	65	64.4
	65	61.8
	66	65.5
	65	69.7
	65	67.1

Sir Winston Churchill became prime minister at




### Defined-benefit pension holders


American private-sector workers\* with no other plan type



### Life expectancy at 65, male, years



The first American to receive a monthly Social Security cheque was Ida May Fuller.



Pension promises involve a transfer from one generation to another, even when one of those generations is too young to vote. That is true even when schemes are funded, and the money invested in equities and bonds; future workers will have to generate the income needed to pay the dividends on those shares and the interest on that debt.

That is turning pensions into a battleground, pitting young against old and taxpayers against pensioners. The fiscal crisis has exacerbated the fight. Pension promises made by the government (either to all citizens or to public-sector workers) do not show up in the debt-to-GDP ratios that are used to analyse state finances. Adding them in makes the position look even more alarming. On conservative accounting assumptions, the combined pension deficits of the American states are equal to a quarter of the gross federal debt.

The problem is particularly acute at the level of America's states because so many of them have balanced-budget amendments. When pension shortfalls require higher contributions, the money must be found from somewhere: higher taxes, less spending on other services or higher contributions from workers (amounting to a

pay cut). A further difficulty is that pension rights have been deemed to be legally (and in some cases constitutionally) protected—though some Republican governors have tried to cut unions’ bargaining rights.

The key figure is the ratio of workers to pensioners, known as the support ratio. This is deteriorating steadily in all rich countries

Private-sector workers may be aggrieved at having to fund the generous pensions of their public-sector counterparts through their taxes. But unions are strongest in the public sector and will fight hard. Nobody seriously disputes that employees should keep the pension rights they have accrued so far, although they may receive the benefits later; the battle is over whether employees should be allowed to keep accruing the same perks in the future.

Britain’s coalition government is desperately trying to cut its deficit, so a rise in pension costs is particularly inopportune; as it is, the gap between public-sector pension benefits paid and contributions received is expected to widen from £4 billion in 2010-11 to £10.3 billion by 2015-16. A recent government-commissioned report into the cost of public-sector schemes by Lord Hutton, a former Labour minister, proposed a number of changes, including a later retirement age, higher employee contributions and a pension based on the employee’s career-average, rather than final, salary.

Since pensions are a form of deferred pay, workers view such reforms as a pay cut, albeit to pension rights they have not yet accrued. There is room for debate about whether such cuts are fair. But in some countries the raid on pensioners’ assets has been rather more brazen. Hungary, for instance, set up a mandatory pension system in 1998 to supplement the state scheme, with contributions deducted from wages and invested in a private fund. By 2010 the fund had amassed nearly \$14 billion of assets, but the cash-strapped government has in effect nationalised it by imposing stiff financial penalties on workers who want to remain in the private sector. Argentina, for its part, seized private-sector pension assets in 2008.



The most siblings to reach pension age, **7** sons and **12** daughters born to Eugene and Alice Theriault in Canada between **1920** and **1941**. They were all claiming a government pension in **2007**, with their ages ranging from **66** to **87**.



If all the burden is not to fall on the state, workers need to save more during their lifetimes. That may require a change in attitude. The old system was distinctly paternalist: either the employer or the government would provide. In America and Britain the switch from DB to DC schemes in the private sector has left the responsibility with the individual worker, but employees have yet to rise to the challenge. They are not putting enough money in, and inevitably will not get enough out. British pensioners with DC plans have accumulated an average pension pot of only £27,000, according to Aviva, an insurance company—enough to buy a pension of just £2,000 a year, with no inflation protection. That will not go far to supplement Britain’s meagre state pension.


Whether or not people can expect a comfortable retirement depends on the replacement ratio—the proportion of their lifetime average earnings that their pension will pay out. This does not have to be close to 100% because generally pensioners need less to live on than full-time workers. They avoid the expenses associated with work and dependent children, have mostly paid off the mortgage on their house and no longer need to save for their retirement.

But the ratio often falls short of expectations. The OECD reckons that the average worker in its member countries currently gets a state pension of around 42% of his average earnings. If state benefits are cut, more of



the burden will fall on private provision. A recent survey by Aviva suggested that European workers are hoping for a replacement ratio in the region of 70% but are likely to get only 35-55%, depending on the country.

The replacement ratio needs to be higher than average for the least well paid, who spend proportionately more on essentials such as food, fuel and shelter. The OECD reckons that the net replacement ratio (allowing for the effect of taxes) for the poorest workers, on half mean earnings, averages just under 83%, but there are big national differences; in Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands it is more than 100%, but in Germany, Mexico and Japan it is under 60%.



So despite the need for cutting costs, governments need to ensure that their elderly citizens have enough money to maintain a decent standard of living. In the majority of countries poverty rates among the elderly are higher than those in the general population. Women are in a worse position than men: they live longer, typically earn less and spend a shorter time in the workforce. If they are married, their pension entitlements often depend on their husbands' earnings.

Japan, which started greying earlier than other developed economies, can be viewed as an ominous precedent. Its only advantage in the pensions battle has been that its workers tend to retire later than those in other countries—around a decade after those in France. Nevertheless, the ageing of its population over the past 20 years has been accompanied by deflationary pressures, sluggish economic growth and moribund asset markets. Public spending on pensions has risen by more than 80%. In the corporate sector lax accounting standards disguised the true cost of providing pensions. When the standards were changed, the true horror was revealed: in 2003 the average plan was just 42% funded, so the government had to take over the liabilities of many companies. Even after this rescue, Japan Airlines had to slash pensions by 30% as part of a restructuring plan—a huge blow to pensioners' standard of living.

Infographic sources: J.P. Morgan; Guinness World Records; Human Mortality Database; OECD; US Social Security Administration; Towers Watson; *Wall Street Journal*

Where Japan has led, other ageing economies may follow. This special report will focus on rich countries, where most of the problems arise. The details may differ but the impact of the baby-boomers shows up everywhere; their pensions will be a huge burden on coming generations.

# Choosing new friends

## The European Union is struggling to help Arab revolutionaries

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | from the print edition



IN ITS desire to surround itself with a “ring of friends”, Europe never really asked if it was rubbing shoulders with the right sort of chums. From Algeria to Belarus, it has been encircled for the most part by police states. The Arab revolts are belatedly overturning old assumptions. Take France: the same Rafale fighter jets it tried to sell to Colonel Muammar Qaddafi are now being sent into action against him.

The European Union, too, is revising its “neighbourhood policy” in the hope that its claim to be promoting economic and political reform in return for greater integration with the EU will no longer seem such a mockery. For years European officials negotiated action plans with countries and wrote reports bemoaning their lack of democracy, yet kept paying autocrats billions of euros. Until recently the EU was negotiating “deep and comprehensive” free-trade agreements with just two neighbours: Ukraine, even though it has been backsliding on civil liberties, and Libya.

Europe’s neighbourhood policy is a sort of enlargement-lite. It offers countries on the EU’s rim the prospect of integration short of full membership—“everything but institutions” went the early slogan. It was born from a wish to reassure Ukraine that it would not be cut off after the admission of eight ex-communist states (plus Malta and Cyprus) to the EU in 2004. But it was soon expanded to include other new neighbours (Belarus and Moldova), older Mediterranean neighbours and, for good measure, the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).

It has not all been cynical. To the east, the reforming government of Moldova is being rewarded with generous aid. Meanwhile, the EU has frozen assets and restricted visas for Belarus’s leaders after they rigged elections and suppressed protests. But in the south the promotion of democracy and the rule of law has been a fiction. As one Eurocrat puts it, “they pretended to implement the human rights commitment. We pretended to open up our programmes and policies.”

Last month the European Commission rushed out a revised Mediterranean policy insisting it would not be “a passive spectator”. Next month it will publish a more comprehensive review, including eastern neighbours. For Stefan Füle, one of the commissioners in charge, the first paper tried to answer “the easy question”: how to help Tunisia and Egypt after they had got rid of their dictators. The second will try to answer the harder questions:

what to do about countries that have liberalised only partly (eg, Morocco and Jordan) or hardly at all (eg, Syria and Algeria).

The answer in both cases is to offer “more for more”: more economic benefits for more democracy. As Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, puts it, “the age of more for nothing, or even more for less is over.” The EU’s main offering involves three Ms: money, access to markets and mobility. This all sounds good, except that there is so little to it. Money? At times of austerity there is no more for foreign-policy aims. Markets? Many north African countries already enjoy free trade in industrial goods, and the southern Europeans want to restrict some agricultural products. Mobility? With anti-immigrant parties gaining ground, few governments are ready to open up to north Africans.

The Brussels machinery will eventually find a bit more. It may rob Pedro in Colombia to pay for Boulos in Egypt (ahead of the next big budget negotiation, Pierre will not surrender French farm subsidies and Piotr will not give up Polish regional funds). Governments may issue multiple-entry visas for students and businessmen. And, faced with a serious loss of revenue from tourism, Egypt and Tunisia urgently want immediate cash, not long-term project aid and loans. Egypt has just asked for a quadrupling of its €150m annual EU aid programme. Such figures are raising some worries that the neighbourhood policy, which already allocates twice as much money to southern neighbours as to eastern ones, may be further skewed.

It is tempting to draw a parallel between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Arab spring of 2011. But one big difference is that the ex-communist countries had a burning wish to “return” to Europe. Arab neighbours have no such ambition. And eastern neighbours, though eligible in theory, know the EU is not ready to expand beyond the Balkans. Without the lure of membership, the EU struggles to find effective foreign-policy tools.

### **Where does Europe’s interest lie?**

As with its past inability to shift Arab dictators, the EU will struggle to shape the outcome of the Arab spring. But it should try, not least because its actions in the south influence the east. The neighbourhood is where the EU has the greatest chance of having an impact. As a union, it may not have military power, but it has useful economic and political tools.

Some officials worry that the emphasis on promoting democracy will tie Europe’s hands. What if Arab countries do not democratise? What if the Arab spring turns to winter? Europe will still have interests to pursue in energy security, fighting terrorism, managing migration and more. Such concerns are legitimate. But the Arab spring highlights another vital interest. The old Arab allies are falling; given the stability the EU wants, democracy offers a better hope of taking radical Islam.

Even without membership, the EU could offer reformers more in areas of particular interest like energy. Southern Europeans should allow freer trade: if they keep out Tunisian oranges, they must expect more Tunisian immigrants. The Union for the Mediterranean, a failed talking shop, needs to reform. Policies should be better tailored for each neighbour. Europe cannot change geography, so it will have to deal with all the countries on its rim, democratic or autocratic. But in its circle of neighbours, it must always demonstrate that its best friends are the democrats.

## Italy's economy

# The euro's Achilles heel


### Sounder public finances, but a weaker economy: that is Italy today

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | *ROME* | from the print edition

ITALY'S public debt is the sleeping dog of the euro zone's crisis. So far the markets have mostly let it lie. Although in 2010 it rose by three points, to 119% of GDP, Silvio Berlusconi's finance minister, Giulio Tremonti, held the budget deficit to an impressive 4.6%, well below his target of 5%. His firm hand has saved Italy from being lumped with the euro-zone's PIGS: Portugal, which has just asked for a bail out (see [article](#)), Ireland, Greece and Spain. "With our feet on the ground, one step after another, the Italians and Italy are going in the right direction," Mr Tremonti has said.

He was speaking after figures showed faster-than-expected growth in 2010. Yet the revised number was not reassuring. After shrinking by 5.2% in 2009, GDP inched back to 1.3% growth last year. But the euro zone as a whole grew by 1.7%, with Germany alone growing by almost 4%. Mr Tremonti is unabashed. Speaking to the Ambrosetti financial forum on April 2nd, he conceded that Italy would grow slightly more slowly than Britain and France this year, but added that were he running as big a budget deficit as these two, it would be growing faster.

In fact the euro crisis has again laid bare the structural weaknesses in Italy's economy. When euro-zone GDP falls, Italy's falls by more; when it rises, Italy's rises by less (see chart). The country has too few big firms. It is not generating jobs for the young: more than a fifth of the country's 15- to 29-year-olds neither work nor study. Too few women have jobs (in the euro zone only Malta has a lower female-participation rate). The south remains a huge drag: in broad terms, GDP in the north may grow by as much as 3% a year, but in the south it shrinks by 2%, pulling the average down. Youth unemployment in parts of the south is 40%. And, as the Bank of Italy's governor, Mario Draghi, has noted, Italian entrepreneurs have to cope with an unusually high level of organised crime. Police operations show that the 'Ndrangheta from Calabria has burrowed deep into the economic fabric of the north.



Stefano Manzocchi, an economics professor at LUISS University in Rome, says the government is "looking at a rather flattering still photograph, instead of seeing the film. Italy is a rich country, but one which is not showing it can keep up the flow of income that feeds its wealth. What is really missing is a vision of what this country could be in ten or 15 years' time." There is little chance of such a vision emerging soon. Mr Berlusconi has just

gone on trial in the last of the cases in which he is a defendant (see [article](#)). He plans to spend a day a week in court; more time will doubtless be spent with his lawyers.

The employers' federation, Confindustria, frets that higher oil prices, rising interest rates and a strong euro could derail the recovery. Giving evidence to a parliamentary committee, its director-general, Giampaolo Galli, appealed for policies to boost competitiveness. The risk if nothing happens is that Mr Tremonti's good work on the public finances could be undone.

## Portugal

# The third bail-out

**How to make sure the latest bail-out marks the beginning of the end of the euro zone's debt crisis**

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | from the print edition



IT MAY have been inevitable, but it was a sad moment for Portugal: Europe's oldest nation state brought low. In a prime-time television address on April 6th, after months of denial, Portugal's caretaker prime minister, José Sócrates (pictured), at last admitted what had long been obvious to everyone else: his country needed a rescue loan from the European Union.

Portugal now joins Greece and Ireland in the euro zone's intensive-care ward. Its public debts are nowhere near as monumental as Greece's; its banks not as reckless as Ireland's. It has succumbed because of a humdrum failure to rein in wage increases and to modernise a bureaucracy schooled in tallying the quiet remains of the first global empire, as well as an inability to coax upstanding family companies, which for centuries have crafted textiles, ceramics and shoes, into competing with the Chinese. As a result, harsh as it may seem, a country whose collective memory is still scarred by the austerity demanded by the IMF in the early 1980s must once again subject itself to tough reforms demanded by foreigners.

However painful for its citizens, Portugal's plight will not shock financial markets. The spreads on its debt have been climbing for weeks, particularly since Mr Sócrates's government fell on March 23rd after failing to win support for yet more austerity measures (see [article](#)). By April 6th ten-year bond yields had reached almost 9%, and the government had to pay almost 6% to borrow money for just a year. No country with a stagnant economy and a big debt stock can do that for long. Mr Sócrates's decision represents a recognition of the inevitable, not a sudden deterioration of the euro-zone mess.

Three things will now determine whether this marks the beginning of the end of the crisis—or the start of even deeper distress. The biggest immediate source of uncertainty will be the Portuguese government itself. Can a caretaker administration credibly agree on far-reaching reforms with a general election due on June 5th? Barely a week ago Portuguese officials said they lacked the constitutional authority to deal with either the IMF or the EU. Tellingly, they did not ask the fund for help on April 6th: Mr Sócrates may be hoping for a bridge loan from Brussels without IMF involvement or many conditions. But the EU will surely not lend Portugal stacks of cash for long without the fund alongside or without tough reforms attached. Either Mr Sócrates must get the opposition's endorsement for a deal or the negotiations could drag on until after the election. That could be dangerous; fears of endless delay could precipitate a bank run: Portugal has huge private-sector debt, much of it raised abroad and funnelled through its banks. Eventually, the country will have to sign up to a serious reform plan: the sooner the better.

A second risk is contagion. Investors are bound to ask: "Where next?" Spain is the most likely (and alarmingly big) candidate. Although the spreads on Spanish bond yields have narrowed sharply in recent weeks, and

continued to fall on April 6th, it cannot be complacent. Its banks are heavily exposed to Portugal. Its prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, has announced that he is not standing for re-election. Freed from the need to court popularity, he should now redouble his efforts at reform.

### **What Brussels must do**

But whether Portugal's capitulation marks a turning point in the euro zone's crisis depends at least as much on decisions in Brussels as on those in the Iberian peninsula. Getting Portugal's reform package right is the priority. The country surely has some financial skeletons: countries that borrow so heavily while growing so slowly usually do. But its main problem is a lack of competitiveness—which suggests a greater need for structural reform than for austerity. So top billing should go to deregulating cosseted industries and reforming the labour market. Portugal, one of the rich world's most rigid economies, must become one of the more flexible. Greece's experience (see [article](#)) shows how hard this will be.

European politicians' responsibilities do not stop there. This newspaper has repeatedly argued that the debts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal are unpayable and must be restructured. With all three countries now being "rescued", the politicians at Europe's core should start work immediately on an orderly restructuring of their debt. That will require a boldness that Europe's policymakers have lacked. But it is a prerequisite for drawing a line under the European debt mess.

## Pensions

# 70 or bust!

### Current plans to raise the retirement age are not bold enough

The Economist Apr 7th 2011 | from the print edition



PUT aside the cruise brochures and let the garden retain that natural look for a few more years. Demography and declining investment returns are conspiring to keep you at your desk far longer than you ever expected.

This painful truth is no longer news in the rich world, and many governments have started to deal with the ageing problem. They have announced increases in the official retirement age that attempt to hold down the costs of state pensions while encouraging workers to stay in their jobs or get on their bikes and look for new ones.

Unfortunately, the boldest plans look inadequate. Older people are going to have to stay economically active longer than governments currently envisage; and that is going to require not just governments, but also employers and workers, to behave differently.

#### Trying, but not very hard

Since 1971 the life expectancy of the average 65-year-old in the rich world has improved by four to five years. By 2050, forecasts suggest, they will add a further three years on top of that. Until now, people have converted all that extra lifespan into leisure time. The average retirement age in the OECD in 2010 was 63, almost one year lower than in 1970.

Living longer, and retiring early, might not be a problem if the supply of workers were increasing. But declining fertility rates imply that by 2050 there will be just 2.6 American workers supporting each pensioner and the figures for France, Germany and Italy will be 1.9, 1.6 and 1.5 respectively. The young will be shoring up pensions systems which, as our [special report](#) this week explains, are riddled with problems.

Most governments are already planning increases in the retirement age. America is heading for 67, Britain for 68. Others are moving more slowly. Belgium allows women to retire at 60, for instance, and has no plans to change that. Under current policies the mean retirement age by 2050 will still be less than 65, barely higher than it was after the second world war.

Because life expectancy continues to rise—people in rich countries are gaining a little under a month a year—even the American and British plans are inadequate. In Europe the retirement age should be raised to 70 by 2040; America, with a younger population, can afford to keep it a smidgen lower.



Working longer has three great advantages. The employee gets more years of wages; the government receives more in taxes and pays out less in benefits; and the economy grows faster as more people work for longer. Older workers are a neglected consumer market, as our briefing on the media's ageing audiences explains (see [article](#)).

Yet too many people see longer working lives as a worry rather than an opportunity—and not just because they are going to be chained to their desks. Some fret that there will not be enough jobs to go around. This misapprehension, known to economists as the “lump of labour fallacy”, was once used to argue that women should stay at home and leave all the jobs for breadwinning males. Now lump-of-labourites say that keeping the old at work would deprive the young of employment. The idea that society can become more prosperous by paying more of its citizens to be idle is clearly nonsensical. On that reasoning, if the retirement age came down to 25 we would all be as rich as Croesus.

Raising the official retirement age is only part of the solution, for many workers retire before the official age. Martin Baily and Jacob Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute in Washington, DC, reckon that raising actual EU retirement ages to the official age would offset the impact of an ageing population over the next 20 years.

For that to happen, working practices and attitudes need to change. Western managers worry too much about the quality of older workers (see [Schumpeter](#)). In physically demanding occupations, it is true, some may be unable to work into their late 60s. The incapacitated will need disability benefits. Others will need to find a different job. But this should be less of a problem than it used to be now that economies are based on services not manufacturing. In knowledge-based jobs, age is less of a disadvantage. Although older people reason more slowly, they have more experience and, by and large, better personal skills. Even so, most people's productivity does eventually decline with age; and pay needs to reflect this falling-off. Traditional seniority systems, under which people get promoted and paid more as they age, therefore need to change.

### **The missing \$3 trillion**

The huge cost of pension schemes is being dealt with in the private sector. Final-salary schemes are hardly ever offered to new employees these days. In the public sector, however, they are still standard. In Britain the recent report by Lord Hutton made some sensible suggestions for reform (see [article](#)). The accrued rights of workers should be maintained but their future pension rights should be based on the state retirement age (many public-sector workers currently retire early) and on a career average, rather than final, salary. That would both prevent abuses and make part-time working easier.

The public-sector pension problem is sharpest in American states. The deficits in their pension funds may amount to \$3 trillion. They face legal and constitutional constraints that prevent them from following the British lead. Unlike wages, pension promises have been deemed, weirdly, to be permanent and sacrosanct. But as budget pressures bite, politicians are going to have to change laws and constitutions.

Private-sector workers face a different problem. The demise of final-salary pensions leaves them facing two big risks: that falling markets will undermine their retirement planning, and that they will outlive their savings. So governments should encourage workers to save more, nudging them into pension schemes by requiring them to opt out rather than opt in. And the basic state pension should be high enough to give those unlucky elderly with insufficient savings a decent income, without penalising those who have been thrifty. That is the least people deserve in return for toiling until they are 70.

## **Iceland Rejects Europe's Bank Bailout**

By Hannes H. Gissurarson

12 avril 2011

### **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.**

Reykjavik, Iceland -- In a national referendum Saturday, Icelanders, for the second time, voted against a government proposal to pay the big losses of some of their bankers and their foreign customers, with 60% voting "no" and 40% in favor. For those of us who welcome capitalists, but want them to operate at their own risk, this sets an example for the rest of Europe.

How Icelandic taxpayers got stuck with this bailout bill is a strange saga. When the international financial crisis hit bottom in fall of 2008, it became clear that the Icelandic Insurance Fund for Depositors could not cover all the liabilities of the foreign branches of the private Icelandic bank, Landsbanki. In order to avoid a general run on their own banks, the British and the Dutch governments decided to reimburse depositors -- not only for the principal, but also for the interest due in Landsbanki branches in their countries, up to a certain level.

These two governments then presented the bill to the Icelandic government: GBP 3.5 billion. For the tiny Nordic nation of 320,000, this was an enormous sum, half of annual GDP. It would be equivalent to a GBP 700 billion claim on the British government.

The Icelandic government protested that it was not responsible for deposits in private banks. It had fully complied with European law in setting up the Icelandic Insurance Fund for Depositors, financed by a levy on the banks. If the fund could not meet its obligations, it was a problem for those who, at their own risk and for a quick profit, had entrusted their money to Landsbanki.

But under threats from the British and the Dutch governments, supported by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund, at the end of 2009 Iceland reluctantly signed a treaty according to which it had to pay the total sum, with stiff interest rates, to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Iceland's President Olafur R. Grimsson refused to ratify the treaty, so in March 2010 Icelanders voted on the measure: 94% voted against it. The British and Dutch immediately offered Iceland a better deal. The country still had to pay the total sum, but with lower interest rates and longer repayment period. After lengthy negotiations, Iceland's government accepted this offer. But Mr. Grimsson again refused to ratify the new treaty, so another referendum had to be held.

Those who said "yes" on April 9 pointed out that proceeds from the sale of Landsbanki assets might cover most, and possibly all, of the hefty bill presented by the British and Dutch. They also contended that in order for Iceland to obtain tolerable credit terms in the future, it had to maintain good neighborly relations and honor its obligations.

Those who said "no" replied that the British and Dutch bill was not an obligation created or accepted by Icelandic taxpayers. There was no explicit or implicit government guarantee of the liabilities of the Icelandic Insurance Fund for Depositors. The British and the Dutch governments reimbursed depositors on their own initiative and for their own purposes.

The referendum is likely to have economic and political consequences. The British and Dutch will undoubtedly grumble, but their options are limited. They can hardly send in the gunboats, as the British did when Iceland extended its fisheries zone in the 1970s.

They are also not likely to take Iceland to court. The issue is sensitive whichever way an eventual judgment would go, while it is not clear which court would have jurisdiction. In the long run, the no vote will probably improve Iceland's credit ratings, because it means the country is not taking on this additional debt.

In Iceland, the referendum will further weaken the already fragile coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Left-Greens, widely regarded as insufficiently decisive in the dispute. The referendum may also make Iceland's application to join the EU more difficult, as the EU strongly supported the British and Dutch governments.

The two winners are President Grimsson, whose refusal to ratify the treaty has been resoundingly vindicated, and the former conservative prime minister (1991-2004), David Oddsson, who as editor of Iceland's leading newspaper Morgunbladid fought the treaty tooth and nail. Rivals for decades, now united in their opposition to the treaty, neither Mr. Grimsson nor Mr. Oddsson probably has seen his final battle. Only the future knows whether it will be as allies or enemies.

Mr. Gissurarson, a former member of the Board of Iceland's Central Bank, is professor of politics at the University of Iceland.

# Les forces françaises nient avoir procédé à l'arrestation de Gbagbo

LEMONDE.FR | 11.04.11 | 17h37 • Mis à jour le 12.04.11 | 07h40

**D**epuis l'arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo à Abidjan, une question se pose : à quel niveau les forces françaises sont-elles intervenues ? Mises en cause par les partisans du président sortant, les autorités françaises démentent avoir elles-mêmes procédé à l'arrestation.

Dans la matinée, les forces françaises de l'opération Licorne ont pourtant mené une opération en direction de la résidence de Laurent Gbagbo. Une trentaine de véhicules blindés, appuyés par un hélicoptère, se sont dirigés vers le palais présidentiel, refuge de Laurent Gbagbo et de ses proches. Des missiles ont été tirés, et au sol, les forces pro-Ouattara sont simultanément reparties à l'offensive contre les positions du président sortant.

Peu après 15 heures, l'agence Reuters annonce que des rebelles se sont introduits dans les jardins du palais présidentiel. Dans la foulée, le représentant en Europe de Laurent Gbagbo, Toussaint Alain, annonce son arrestation et précise : *"Le président Gbagbo a été arrêté par les forces spéciales françaises et remis à des chefs de la rébellion"*.

## "SOUTIEN DE L'OPÉRATION"

A contrario, selon une haute source diplomatique française, contactée par *Le Monde*, *"à aucun moment les forces françaises ne sont entrées dans le périmètre de la résidence. Personne n'a intérêt à ce qu'il soit attenté à la vie de M. Gbagbo ni d'en faire une victime : ni M. Ouattara, ni la France, ni l'ONU"*, précise cette source, qui ajoute : *"La France n'est pas chargée de la surveillance de M. Gbagbo. Elle est obligée de s'en remettre aux assurances données tant par M. Ouattara que par l'Onuci"*.

Peu après, l'ambassadeur de France en Côte d'Ivoire livre sa version des faits : *"Laurent Gbagbo a été arrêté par les Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire [FRCI, pro-Ouattara] et conduit à l'Hôtel du Golf [le QG de M. Ouattara] par les FRCI"*, annonce Jean-Marc Simon. A 16 heures, l'état-major des armées, depuis Paris, affirme à son tour qu'*"à aucun moment"* les forces françaises n'ont pénétré *"dans les jardins ou la résidence présidentielle"*.

En fin d'après-midi, une source au ministère français de la défense admettait toutefois que la force française Licorne et les troupes de la mission onusienne en Côte d'Ivoire (Onuci) étaient *"en soutien de l'opération"* lors de l'arrestation de l'ancien président Laurent Gbagbo lundi à Abidjan.

## "LA RESPONSABILITÉ DE CHOISIR UN CAMP CONTRE UN AUTRE"

Cette incertitude a provoqué de vives réactions chez plusieurs figures de l'opposition politique. *"En prenant la responsabilité d'engager l'armée française au côté d'Alassane Ouattara dans son offensive sur Abidjan, et cela dans un cadre juridique plus que discutable – qui va bien au-delà de la seule protection des civils – le gouvernement a pris la responsabilité de choisir un camp contre un autre, au lieu de défendre le droit"* a dénoncé Julien Dray du Parti socialiste.

*"La France doit sans attendre exiger que toute la lumière soit faite sur les événements ayant fait des victimes civiles et prendre ses distances avec M. Ouattara, dont on risque de comprendre trop tard qu'il n'est guère plus fréquentable que son prédécesseur"*, a renchéri Gaëtan Gorce, du PS.

Enfin, selon le Front national, *"l'arrestation de Laurent Gbagbo par les militaires français qui l'ont remis immédiatement aux chefs de la rébellion constitue une violation gravissime des règles les plus élémentaires du droit international, à l'heure où le Tribunal pénal international soupçonne les partisans de Ouattara de s'être livrés à des massacres et des atrocités"*.

# Islam in Europe - a real problem

11 April 2011 RZECZPOSPOLITA WARSAW



Check my photo. Muslim woman with passport during meeting with the Imam of Montreuil, near Paris. May 2010

AFP

The debate about secularism organised in France by the ruling right-wing UMP party has been decried by the Muslim community as a brutal attack on Islam, while the Left has seen it as a disguised attempt to curry favour with the supporters of the National Front. But no debate at all is a victory for extremism, argues a Polish editorialist.

**Marek Magierowski**

Abderrahmane Dahmane, President Sarkozy's former diversity adviser, has announced that Islam in France has become the "object of stigmatisation" and, to voice his protest, has started to distribute green-star badges among his fellow believers, a reminiscence of the badges that European Jews were forced to wear during World War 2

The green-star campaign is not so much a proof of the stupidity of its originator, as of his utter insolence, especially that it is rather the indigenous French that can feel uneasy in certain districts of their cities, faced with gangs of Algerian and Moroccan youth. And the claims of "stigmatisation" of Islam sound grotesque when we look at how Catholics of the Seine, and of many other West European countries, are ridiculed. It was not in the Great Mosque of Paris, but in Notre Dame Cathedral that a group of gay activists staged a homosexual "wedding ceremony" six years ago, during which words offensive to Pope Benedict XVI could be heard.

Indeed, the debate about secularism focuses on Islam. But this is also a debate over the future of Islam across Europe entire. Sarkozy's party is mulling over concrete issues that also affect Italy, Holland, and Sweden. How to deal with the Muslims who hold mass prayers in the streets of cities? Should halal meals be introduced in school canteens? How to deal with the problem of students from North Africa who protest against lessons about the Holocaust, treating it as humbug invented by Zionists. Should public swimming pools reserve separate hours for Muslim girls?

For the European Left any discussion over these issues is an expression of racism, for the Muslim radicals – of stigmatisation. But no discussion at all will lead to one thing: in a dozen or so years the majority of countries of the Old Continent will be ruled by the clones of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders.

# Burqa ban - a false move

11 April 2011 THE INDEPENDENT LONDON



The French burqa ban came into force on 11 April. Cartoon caption - I've got nothing to wear!

Plantu

**Wearing the burqa in public places is now forbidden in France. For the Independent, the new law is a piece of electioneering from an embattled Nicolas Sarkozy, and will worsen the condition of Muslims in Europe.**

When Germany's Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismark, took on the power of the Catholic Church in the newly united Germany of the 1870s, the struggle was nicknamed the kulturkampf – the struggle for culture. Predicated on the idea that no good German could be loyal to a foreign religious authority based in Rome, it was packaged as a drive to liberate rather than oppress believers. It got nowhere. Catholics scented another agenda, rallied round their Pontiff, and when forced to choose between faith and loyalty to the state, often chose the former.

Such considerations should weigh on the minds of people in France as their own kulturkampf against the wearing of the full veil gains legal teeth – and as a number of French women make it clear that they feel more, not less, determined to wear the burka, or niqab, in public now they run the risk of arrest.

British opinion has failed to take seriously the strength of feeling in France on this subject, often assuming that hostility to the veil is a shibboleth of far-right Islamophobes. This is a misunderstanding. Far more than Britain, France knows the full meaning of religious warfare. In the 1570s, Paris literally flowed with the blood of slaughtered Protestants, and the ensuing conflict tore the country apart for generations. Knowledge of how much France has suffered at the hands of religion underpins a left-right consensus on the need for laïcité to be upheld in public life.

It is unfortunate that this in many ways admirable philosophy has become tangled up in the murky calculations of an embattled president, as he prepares for re-election in 2012 against a backdrop of dismal poll ratings, some of which show him trailing behind the far right's Marine Le Pen. There are suspicions that Nicolas Sarkozy might even welcome public clashes with hard-line Muslims over the veil, seeing them as a source of votes. If so, he is playing with fire. Very few Muslim women in France wear full veils. But many French Muslims clearly dislike seeing their community singled out, and there is a danger that the new ban will prove counter-productive. It is good that no major party in Britain wants to take this country down this path.

**11. April 2011, 16:44 Uhr**  
**Sarkozys neues Gesetz**

## **Muslime machen Front gegen Schleierverbot**

**Frankreichs Präsident Sarkozy will Burka und Nikab von der Straße verbannen - und erntet den Zorn der Muslime. Nachdem jetzt ein strenger Strafkatalog gilt, demonstrieren sie gegen das Verbotsgesetz. Eine Frau will sogar bis zum Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte gehen.**

Paris - Seit Montag gilt in Frankreich das Verbot von Verschleierungen wie Burka oder Nikab - und schon droht eine Klage vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte. "Dieses Gesetz ist ein Verstoß gegen meine Rechte", sagte die 32-jährige Kenza Drider aus dem südfranzösischen Avignon, als sie - mit einer Nikab bis auf einen Augenschlitz verhüllt - am Montag mit dem Zug in Paris eintraf.

Es sei ihr Recht, sich frei zu bewegen und frei ihre Religion auszuüben. "Ich begehe kein Verbrechen, ich bin durch und durch Französin, und ich übe meine europäischen Rechte aus", sagte Drider. Wenn die Polizei ihr wegen ihres Ganzkörperschleiers einen Strafzettel aufbrummen wolle, bitteschön. Dann werde sie die Strafe zahlen - und vor den Europäischen Menschenrechtsgerichtshof ziehen, kündigte sie an.

Muslimische Frauen dürfen in Frankreich ab sofort keine Vollscheier mehr tragen. Ein entsprechendes Gesetz trat am Montag in Kraft. Wer sich dennoch in der Öffentlichkeit mit Kleidungsstücken wie Burka oder Nikab (siehe Fotostrecke unten) zeigt, muss mit einem Bußgeld von bis zu 150 Euro rechnen. Theoretisch können die Behörden den Trägerinnen der Verschleierung auch einen Schnellkurs über Rechte und Pflichten des Staatsbürgers aufbrummen. In Ämtern, in Krankenhäusern und Schulen, bei Gericht, auf der Post und im Zug sind Ganzkörperschleier ebenfalls untersagt.

Männer, die Frauen zum Tragen eines Schleiers zwingen, sollen sogar mit bis zu zwei Jahren Haft und einer Geldstrafe in Höhe von bis zu 60.000 Euro büßen. Ziel der Aktion: Die Republik mit der größten muslimischen Gemeinde Europas will keine Frauen mehr vom Scheitel bis zur Sohle verschleiert sehen, wie Staatschef Nicolas Sarkozy es seit zwei Jahren formuliert.

### **Festnahme vor Notre Dame**

Dagegen regt sich nun Widerstand. Vor der Kirche Notre Dame in der Innenstadt von Paris nahm Drider an eine Protestkundgebung gegen das Gesetz teil und bekam es prompt mit der Polizei zu tun - allerdings nicht, weil sie den Nikab trug, sondern weil die Demonstration nicht angemeldet war. Die Polizei nahm die Personalien der vierfachen Mutter und einiger Mitstreiter auf. Es sei nicht um den Schleier gegangen, sondern um die nicht angemeldete Demonstration, betonte ein Polizeisprecher. Die Beamten lösten die Kundgebung auf.

Das gibt einen Vorgeschmack auf bevorstehende Probleme bei der Umsetzung des Schleierstopps. Die Polizeigewerkschaft SCPN warnte, das Burkaverbot werde "unendlich schwierig anzuwenden" sein.

Wenn die Polizei in der Öffentlichkeit eine Muslimin mit einem Ganzkörperschleier wie der traditionellen afghanischen Burka oder dem Nikab sehe, werde sie die Frau ansprechen und "belehren", sagte SCPN-Vizechef Manuel Roux. Sollte die Frau aber auf dem Schleier beharren, werde es "richtig kompliziert". Denn die Polizei könne sie nicht zwingen, diesen abzulegen. Auch sei sie vom Innenministerium eigens angewiesen worden, "bloß keine Gewalt" anzuwenden.

Schon ein einfaches Einschreiten der Polizei werde zu Ärger führen, sagte der Gewerkschaftssprecher. "Ich mag mir gar nicht vorstellen was passiert, wenn wir eine verschleierte Frau in einem Problemviertel ansprechen."

Schätzungen zufolge betrifft das Gesetz in Frankreich rund zweitausend Frauen. Staatschef Sarkozy hatte mehrfach betont, dass Schleier wie die Burka in Frankreich "nicht willkommen" seien. Ein Ganzkörperschleier schließe Frauen aus und mache sie minderwertig, dies sei mit den Werten der Republik nicht vereinbar, argumentiert die Regierung. Das Gesetz gilt als erstes dieser Art in der westlichen Welt.

### **Auftritt vor dem Elysée**

Der Organisator der Kundgebung gegen das Verbot, Rachid Nekkaz, erschien später mit einer verschleierten Begleiterin vor dem Elyséepalast. "Wir wollten uns eine Strafe für den Nikab verpassen lassen", sagt der 39-Jährige. Tatsächlich habe die Polizei beide auf die Wache mitgenommen. "Aber einen Strafzettel wollten sie uns nicht geben."

Nekkaz will nun einen Fonds gründen und daraus die Strafzettel verschleierter Frauen zahlen. Zu diesem Zweck werde er eines seiner Häuser zur Versteigerung ins Internet stellen, kündigte der Unternehmer an. Das dürfte angesichts der zu erwartenden Probleme bei der Durchsetzung fürs Erste wohl reichen.

*ffr/kgp/dpa/AFP*

**04/11/2011 01:07 PM****Paying for the Energy Revolution**

## **German Nuclear Companies Stop Eco-Fund Contributions**

**Chancellor Angela Merkel's about-face on atomic energy policy is getting expensive. Four companies which operate nuclear reactors in Germany have ceased paying into a fund meant to promote renewable energies -- even as the eco-revolution is to be accelerated.**

Chancellor Angela Merkel's [vision of the future](#) seemed eminently attainable last autumn. In return for her government's plan of extending the lifespans of Germany's 17 nuclear reactors, the country's leading electricity utilities agreed to pay a portion of the resulting profits into a fund to promote renewable energies -- a pot which initial calculations indicated would ultimately be worth €17 billion (\$24.5 billion). In addition, a new fuel rod tax on nuclear plants was to boost the budget by an estimated €2.3 billion per year until 2016.

That, though, was before the [nuclear disaster](#) in faraway Fukushima, Japan.

Now, Merkel's sudden policy reversal on nuclear energy, involving the temporary shutdown of seven reactors and an accelerated switch to renewables, has thrown her financing plans into doubt. Not only does her government intend to dramatically increase funding for expanding the reach of renewables, but the four companies in Germany which operate nuclear power plants have ceased paying into the renewable energies fund.

According to information obtained by SPIEGEL, the four companies -- E.on, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW -- informed the Chancellery of their decision last Friday. The cessation is to go into effect this week. In addition, the shutdown of the country's seven oldest reactors, which many expect to become permanent, will significantly reduce revenues from the fuel rod tax -- a levy which was a key component of German efforts at reducing its budget deficit.

### **Shaky Legal Basis**

Merkel's government established the renewable energies fund last autumn in an effort to avoid the appearance that the nuclear lifespan extension was merely a vast economic gift to the country's power utilities. The four companies are now arguing that the temporary shutdowns -- and the possible reversal of the lifespan extensions -- remove the legal basis for payments into the renewables fund.

The move comes on the heels of RWE's decision last week to file a [legal complaint](#) against the shutdown of its Biblis A reactor. Should RWE win, which many observers think it might, it would make clear just how shaky the legal basis of Merkel's nuclear about-face is.

Many in Merkel's governing coalition, which pairs her conservatives with the business-friendly Free Democrats, have begun to publicly question her new nuclear course. Christian Lindner, general secretary of the FDP, said that "we want to shut down nuclear plants more quickly, but we shouldn't abandon rationality." He warned against any moves that would result in rapidly rising energy costs.

Volker Kauder, floor leader for Merkel's conservatives in German parliament, said "if we want a future without nuclear energy, we must realize that we won't be able to maintain our standard of living and our employment situation in Germany."



## **Even More Challenging**

Germany's Federal Statistical Office announced on Monday that the share of renewables in the country's energy consumption had quadrupled from 1990 to 2010. Seventeen percent of electricity used in Germany now comes from wind, sun and other renewable technologies. But there is still a long way to go if Berlin wants to replace nuclear energy, which accounts for 29 percent of electricity production in Germany, with renewables.

Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen (CDU) and Economics Minister Rainer Brüderle (FDP) have reportedly formulated a plan to "accelerate the energy revolution in Germany." German news agency DPA reports that the plan calls for investments of €5 billion this spring alone for offshore wind farms. A fund aimed at making buildings more energy efficient is to be more than quadrupled in size to €2 billion. And research into a modern grid infrastructure is to be funded with €500 million. The paper includes several more measures as well.

The paper neglects to indicate where funding might come from. And with the country's leading utilities having halted payments into the renewable energies fund, the search promises to become even more challenging.

*cgh*

**04/11/2011 12:21 PM****The Never-Ending Crisis**

## **Greek Debt Restructuring Looks Inevitable**

*By Peter Müller, Christian Reiermann and [Christoph Schult](#)*

**Europe's sovereign debt crisis is threatening to take on new dimensions as Portugal becomes the third euro-zone member to ask the EU for a bailout. Germany is opposed to giving Greece any more financial aid, meaning that Athens will have little choice but to restructure its debt.**

Wolfgang Schäuble hates being disturbed on Saturday afternoons. That's when Germany's finance minister, a huge soccer fan, likes to watch the games of his favorite team, Bayern Munich, on TV.

On Saturday April 2, Schäuble's job obligations spoiled his fun when he was forced to take part in a conference call. Waiting on the line were his colleagues in other important euro-zone countries, including French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde, European Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn and Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank (ECB).

The reason for the disturbance was a crisis that had already ruined many of Schäuble's weekends in recent months -- even more so than Bayern's crummy playing this season: Once again, it was about the state of the European monetary union and the issue of how financially troubled member states should be assisted.

After a year full of financial woes, cash shortages and near-bankruptcies, the situation has become anything but reassuring. In fact, in recent weeks, the euro crisis has gotten even worse.

Following months of insisting it would not need a bailout, debt-stricken Portugal has now [asked for help](#) from the European Union's euro rescue fund. In a television address last Wednesday, Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates announced that his caretaker government could no longer deal with the pressure from the financial markets by itself. Before making the announcement, yields on the country's sovereign bonds had climbed to almost 10 percent, a new record.

Indeed, on the whole, those in charge of rescuing the euro in Brussels and Europe's capitals have done a poor job. So far, almost all of their expectations have been disappointed. And things have continuously gotten only worse.

At first, people thought that the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) -- the temporary rescue fund that will be replaced by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013 -- had been equipped with enough resources to calm the markets, and that no one would actually draw on its help in any case. But, now, two countries, in the form of Ireland and Portugal, have asked for support, and no one can say for sure that they will be the last.

### **Admission of Failure**

Even worse, however, is the situation in Greece. Last year, the European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assembled a special rescue package for Greece in order to help it avoid defaulting on its loans. But, since then, things haven't gotten much better.

After a year of financial adjustments and reforms, prices for Greek sovereign bonds are lower than they were when the rescue effort was launched, and their yields have reached record highs. Indeed, the country's government has almost the same credit ratings as it did 12 months ago.

This development can be seen as a vote of no confidence by investors in the EU's rescue measures. Players on the financial markets simply don't believe that Greece will be able to stand on its own two feet any time soon. And now there is the risk that something will happen that the Europeans already tried to prevent last year, namely that Greece will be forced to restructure its debt.

Despite all the denials, there is a growing realization that a so-called haircut can no longer be avoided. SPIEGEL reported last week that the IMF is [putting pressure on Athens](#) to restructure its debt. And it's not just the IMF that is pushing for Greece to take a haircut: Among euro-zone finance ministers, too, support is growing for the radical solution, which would involve holders of Greek sovereign bonds taking losses.

Last week, during a meeting of the European Commission, European Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn told his colleagues that they shouldn't speak publicly about a Greek debt restructuring, but that a restructuring would have to be carried out in good time. If things really came to that, he said, it would be nothing less than an admission that the euro zone's approach to fighting the crisis had failed, at least in the short term.

### **Growing Deficit**

The issue of restructuring Greek debt also came up in Schäuble's conference call. He and some of his colleagues expressed their unease about developments in Greece and voiced skepticism about whether the reform measures would ultimately succeed.

Their doubts are justified. Indeed, the most recent analysis by the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB on the issue of whether Greece will be able to refinance its debts by itself came to an alarming conclusion. The study found that the country's economy is contracting more than previously feared and that one of the main causes behind the contraction was the harsh austerity measures that the government has been forced to introduce in return for receiving outside assistance. As a result, the public deficit in Greece has climbed even higher than previously assumed.

The expert report also says that Greece's program for sorting out its finances has reached a critical phase. In order for the country to be able to handle its debt burden by itself, its economy will have to pick up and there must be an increase in the country's notoriously uncertain government revenues. But, at the moment, neither of these things is happening. During the conference call, some finance ministers very gingerly suggested that, given the situation, it might make more sense to let Greece restructure its debt.

"I'm not prepared to talk about that," ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet barked into the phone. If creditors grant Greece's request for a reduction in the amount it owes, he argued, the entire euro zone could face a crisis of confidence.

### **Impact on ECB's Profits**

Trichet also warned that such a step could hit banks that hold a lot of Greek debt hard. Nevertheless, these worries did not prevent Trichet from announcing on Thursday an increase in the [interest rate in the euro zone](#), thereby worsening the financial crises in the debt-stricken countries.

This is one reason why Schäuble thinks that Trichet's worries about the markets are exaggerated and lack credibility. What's more, he knows that Trichet's actions are driven by another motive, albeit one that he never openly admits: As part of its measures to bolster Greece, the ECB bought up several billion euros worth of its sovereign debt. For that reason, it is one of Greece's creditors itself and would therefore also be affected by a Greek debt restructuring. The ensuing write-downs would noticeably reduce the ECB's profits -- something Trichet would like to avoid at all costs during his final year in office as the bank's president.

In fact, Schäuble and his colleagues are getting increasingly angry with Trichet. As they see it, if Trichet is going to be so dogmatic about rejecting a Greek debt restructuring, then he has to explain how Athens is supposed to be able to raise money on the markets by itself as early as the start of 2012, as envisioned in the plan for sorting out its finances. The finance ministers argued in the conference call that that is nothing but wishful thinking.

### **Germany Unwilling to Provide More Aid for Greece**

The only other possible alternative to a controlled default for Greece is additional financial aid for the country. But Schäuble has already made it clear to Trichet that he is highly unwilling to grant the Greeks another round of help. Schäuble justifies his refusal with the argument that he would never get additional aid for Greece through the Bundestag, the lower house of Germany's parliament.

Resistance to providing Greece with any more help is particularly pronounced among members of the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), which governs in Berlin as the junior partner in a coalition with Chancellor Angela Merkel's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). "In the interest of the German taxpayer, Greece cannot be allowed to receive even more money from its European partner countries," says Volker Wissing, an FDP politician who is head of the Bundestag's finance committee.

"If you subscribe to the faulty logic that you always have to help, then you will always have to keep making more payments," says FDP financial expert Frank Schäffler. "In doing so, the community of states opens itself up to blackmail -- not only from banks, but also from the countries it helps."

The opposition is also concerned. "In the light of the underlying economic data, Greece will not be able to survive in the medium term without restructuring its debt," says Carsten Schneider, budget spokesman for the parliamentary group of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). He adds that it is no longer justifiable to use "taxpayer money to relieve banks and other private creditors by extending public loans to Greece."

Since other donor countries are hardly more willing to come to Greece's aid, Schäuble and his foreign colleagues more or less agree on where things should go from here: Although Greece's government cannot be forced to restructure its debt, no one can stop it from entering into voluntary talks on the issue with its creditors.

### **Barroso Sent to Lisbon to Whip Up Support**

Even if the finance ministers can't force Greece to do anything, in the case of Portugal they considered a bit of pressure to be long overdue. They unanimously turned down the Portuguese request to receive a bridge loan without any conditions so that the country could survive the period until new elections in June.

Instead, the finance ministers decided that it would be much better for the Portuguese to follow the designated path of requesting assistance from the European Commission and the European rescue fund. But to receive any of this help, Portugal had to agree to certain conditions that the caretaker government of Prime Minister Socrates would

have preferred to avoid. To bring the recalcitrant Portuguese in line, the finance ministers decided to send Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, to his home country to try to whip up support for their plan. Though he wasn't thrilled about it, Barroso went to Lisbon and spoke with representatives of both the government and the opposition.

Last Tuesday, the heads of Portugal's five largest banks informed Portuguese Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos that they couldn't lend the government any more money. Bank executives told the government that things had gotten too risky, pointing out that they already had €14 billion (\$20 billion) in sovereign debt on their books. On Wednesday, Barroso reported that the proud Portuguese had finally buckled and that the plan could go forward.

### **Conditions Unclear**

Two days later, Portugal's [formal request for aid](#) arrived in Brussels. The finance ministers of EU countries, who were holding a meeting near Budapest at the time, instructed European Commission experts to evaluate the request for aid as quickly as possible.

On Friday, the finance ministers meeting in Hungary announced that Portugal would need €80 billion (\$115 billion) in aid. But it is unclear which conditions will be attached to the aid package. The Portuguese have yet to allow any IMF officials into the country. The plan is to send a group of investigators -- or "mission" -- from the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB to Lisbon in the next few days to figure out exactly what the country's financial situation is. A plan for rehabilitating the country's finances should be developed by mid-May. Only when that is ready can money start flowing to Lisbon.

While the finance ministers are happy about the decision, others worry that the elections planned for early June could lead to attempts to renegotiate the rescue package. The same thing recently happened in Ireland, where the new conservative government in Dublin is still hoping to amend some of the conditions imposed on Ireland in return for aid.

### **Fears Turned Out to Be Justified**

However, something that worries the Europeans even more is the possibility that Portugal won't be the last country to ask for a bailout. Belgium and Spain could also find themselves in dire financial straits.

On the positive side, Spanish Finance Minister Elena Salgado stressed that the risk premiums the Spanish government has to pay on its sovereign bonds have dropped 30 percent since the start of the year. And even on Wednesday, the day that Portugal threw in the towel, interest rates on Spanish bonds fell.

But, even so, many still think that Spain is at risk of falling into financial distress. Their pessimism is born out of bitter experience: So far, all of the fears during the euro crisis have turned out to be justified.

If Belgium and Spain really do run into financial trouble, it would present the other euro-zone countries with a whole new series of challenges. By then at that latest, EU finance ministers will have to deal with the issue of beefing up the rescue fund. Until now, they have been procrastinating on addressing the problem.

### **Taking the Euro Fund to Court**

As of Monday, it won't be just EU finance ministers busying themselves with the issue of financial assistance for Portugal. It will also be Germany's highest court, the Karlsruhe-based Federal Constitutional Court. Markus Kerber, a

constitutional lawyer and financial expert from Berlin, wants the court to issue a temporary injunction forbidding the government from agreeing to financially assist Portugal.

In a 37-page legal brief, Kerber says that if the court cannot bring itself to block the move, the danger will arise "that, after the Republic of Ireland has taken advantage of the 'European Stability Mechanism' and the Portuguese Republic has filed a request (for such aid), we can count on similar requests coming quickly from the Spanish, Belgian and even Italian governments."

Last year, Kerber and roughly 50 supporters filed a [constitutional complaint](#) against the euro rescue fund. He fears that the ongoing proceedings in Karlsruhe will become pointless if one country after the other seeks help from the rescue fund. "What is the Federal Constitutional Court supposed to rule on," Kerber asks, "if the majority of the money has already been paid out?"

*Translated from the German by Josh Ward*

**URL:**

- <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,756182,00.html>

**04/11/2011 02:52 PM****The World From Berlin**

## 'Italy Using Dirty Trick to Force EU to Help With Refugees'

**Italy has angered its EU neighbors by planning to issue visas to thousands of North African refugees in a move that would allow them to travel freely around large parts of Europe. German commentators say the plan amounts to blackmail, but that northern European nations have a duty to help Italy deal with the problem.**

Europe's internal dispute about what to do with the [thousands of immigrants from North Africa](#) arriving on southern Italian islands is heating up. German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich has sharply criticized the Italian government for planning to issue immigrants with temporary visas that would allow them to travel to other European nations.

"Italy must solve its refugee problem itself," Friedrich, a member of the staunchly conservative Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, told conservative newspaper *Die Welt* on Monday.

He said he would make clear at a meeting of European Union interior and justice ministers in Luxembourg on Monday that the plan was in breach of the Schengen agreement under which most EU member states have dropped border controls among each other.

Speaking on Monday in Luxembourg, Friedrich said Germany would respond by beefing up its border controls. France, Austria and Sweden have also criticized the Italian plan. The interior minister of Austria, Maria Fekter, said her country may not recognize Italian papers issued to immigrants from North Africa.

The German states of Bavaria and Hesse have already said they may introduce border checks if Italy grants the refugees visas for the Schengen area.

On Saturday, Berlusconi had called for European help in handling the "human tsunami" of refugees and illegal immigrants. "Europe cannot get out of this," he said during a visit to Lampedusa, the island located midway between Sicily and Tunisia. "Either Europe is something that's real and concrete or it isn't and in that case it's better to go back to each going our own way and letting everyone follow their own policies and egotism."

Some 25,000 people have arrived on Lampedusa in overloaded fishing boats since the start of the year. They are fleeing from political unrest in North Africa and because they see little hope of a quick improvement in their economic prospects.

German commentators say Berlusconi's threat to issue visas to the refugees amounts to blackmail -- but they add that the northern European countries must show solidarity with Italy. In the longer term, the only solution to the refugee crisis can be generous economic aid to Arab nations, to persuade people to seek their fortunes at home rather than in Europe.

Meanwhile, Germany, which angered its Western allies by abstaining in last month's UN Security Council vote on establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, has signalled that it may commit German troops to help protect international

aid shipments to Libya. The move, which effectively could bring German forces much closer to the fighting than if they had joined the air and ship crews imposing the no-fly zones, is an attempt by Germany to rejoin the ranks of its Western allies, says one commentator.

The conservative **Die Welt** writes:

"Berlin is rightly outraged that Italy is nonchalantly breaching the Schengen agreement and disposing of the refugees across Europe with temporary residence permits. After the euro Stability Pact wasn't worth the paper it was printed on, the Germans are very sensitive to any attempt to soften other European agreements."

"Italy is resorting to a dirty trick to force Europe to deal with the refugee issue. That is unacceptable blackmail. But Rome is right on one point: The refugees are a matter for the whole of Europe and not just for the Mediterranean countries directly affected. The German foreign minister was among the first to emphatically welcome the Arabian uprising. One can't applaud the freedom revolutions and then slip away when the negative impact of these upheavals appears on the northern Mediterranean coasts. Italy and Malta should not be left alone to pay the price for the pains of a transformation that is in the long-term interest of the whole of Europe."

"What should be done about the refugees that have already landed in Europe? It would be good if the north of the EU showed magnanimity here. A big problem for Italy and Malta becomes a small problem if its is distributed on 27 shoulders."

The center-left **Süddeutsche Zeitung** writes:

"You can tell when the CSU thinks it's in its element: when it finds an issue that it's supposedly expert at and has answers to: the refugee problem has always been such an issue. Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann and his CSU colleague Hans-Peter Uhl are recommending the reintroduction of border controls in order to protect Germany from refugees from North Africa."

"They should stop pretending to be far-sighted politicians, friends of the EU and promoters of democracy. Because they would be lying if they did so. People who believe they can respond to the upheaval in Arab countries with exclusion and selfishness have lost all sense of the situation and of its dimensions."

"Of course one should discuss with Italy what steps should be taken, whether these refugees are political or economic. But one mustn't give up one's solidarity because of Lampedusa. One has to argue that that the historic opportunity to promote freedom and democracy in a region of despots and dictatorship is worth some investment."

"The investment cannot consist of Europe putting up walls. What is important, even essential, is providing support in building the economy. Only if that happens will people in North Africa gradually realize that fleeing across the sea isn't the only real option."

Conservative **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung** writes that Germany's [offer of military help](#) to protect aid shipments to the Libyan people is a masked attempt to restore its credentials as a loyal Western ally, after it had [abstained](#) in the UN Security council vote on establishing a no-fly zone over Libya.

"The civil war in Libya has reached exactly the stage the German government had in mind when it decided not to take part in military intervention: a confusing stalemate with an ever-changing front line. The rebels, despite air support from NATO, are too weak to march towards Tripoli. Gadhafi, after losing air superiority, is too weak to crush the



rebellion. Now the EU, which officially is solely interested in protecting the Libyan people, is offering to provide military protection for aid shipments to them."

"The government of Chancellor Angela Merkel is at pains to avoid sending soldiers to a Libyan war. But the German participants of the EU aid mission will get much closer to the war on land than the planes and ships that Berlin refused to send. The label 'humanitarian mission' doesn't change this dangerous proximity. But Germany can use that to gloss over its return to solidarity with its alliance partners."

-- *David Crossland*

**URL:**

- <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,756254,00.html>

NYT April 9, 2011

# In Libya, an Odd-Couple Alliance

By [MARK LANDLER](#)

WASHINGTON — At home in France, he has long been called “Sarko l’Américain.” But it took an American president and the threat of a massacre in Libya to give President [Nicolas Sarkozy](#) the chance to channel his inner American. [With his call for military action against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi](#), his recognition of the rebels and his readiness to arm them, Mr. Sarkozy has looked every inch the swaggering world leader, less a latter-day Charles de Gaulle than a Gallic Ronald Reagan.

For [President Obama](#), too, Mr. Sarkozy has been an enabler, but of a different sort. By thrusting France so far out front, he has allowed Mr. Obama to claim credibly that Libya is now a model of multilateral cooperation, not merely the third Muslim country the United States has gone to war with in the last decade. Pulled reluctantly into the conflict by the urgent pleas of European and Arab leaders — none of the pleas more urgent than Mr. Sarkozy’s — Mr. Obama has managed to sound almost European.

It is an unlikely geopolitical Alphonse-and-Gaston routine, featuring two men who are outriders in their own political landscapes and who have each taken a risk by going against the conventional wisdom in Paris and Washington. But the routine also has broader implications because it augurs a world in which the United States, militarily stretched and fiscally depleted, can no longer afford to play global policeman alone.

“It would be tempting to say Sarkozy the American is encountering Obama the European, but it would be wrong,” said Dominique Moïsi, the founder of the French Institute for International Relations, who helped popularize the nickname “Sarko l’Américain.” For these two very different leaders, “this is a marriage of convenience.”

It is also a marriage rooted in well-advertised conviction. When Mr. Obama introduced himself to Europeans, [in a speech in Berlin in July 2008](#), he described himself as a “citizen of the world.” His address, given in the twilight of George W. Bush’s presidency, was most memorable for its citation of the “burdens of global citizenship.”

Tickling off the dangers of nuclear proliferation, drug cultivation in Afghanistan, violence in Somalia and genocide in Darfur, Mr. Obama said that no country, including the United States, was powerful enough to tackle them alone. It was a rejection of the unilateral policies of the Bush administration, but it was also a challenge to Europe. “If we’re honest with each other,” he said, “we know that sometimes, on both sides of the Atlantic, we have drifted apart, and forgotten our shared destiny.”

Mr. Sarkozy, for his part, has long professed admiration of the United States, going so far as to [vacation at Lake Winnepesaukee in New Hampshire in 2007](#), shortly after he took office. In 2009, he [reintegrated France into the command structure of NATO](#), a largely symbolic step that nonetheless made it easier for him to push for a NATO-led operation in Libya.

In the years before Mr. Sarkozy took office, no two countries in the Western alliance had drifted further apart than France and the United States. In 2003, on the eve of the Iraq war, the French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, declared that France’s refusal to support the American invasion was a choice between “two visions of the world” — America’s “swift and preventive” force and France’s patient diplomacy.

This time, Mr. Sarkozy was the one to issue a call for a swift military response to prevent a slaughter in Benghazi, Libya. Mr. Obama resisted, worried that it would foment an anti-American backlash in the Muslim world. With a budget battle looming and the United States trying to extricate its fighting forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, he was loath to commit troops and treasure in a country that his defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, said was not a vital interest of the United States.

It was Mr. Sarkozy’s willingness, along with that of Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain, to play a lead role in enforcing a no-fly zone that helped change the equation for Mr. Obama. That allowed him to announce a military intervention coupled with a promise that the United States would pull back within days and turn over major operations to a NATO-led coalition.

“The Europeans keep saying, ‘We’re ready to lead, we’re ready to lead, we’re ready to lead,’ ” said Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former policy planning director at the State Department who now teaches at Princeton. “Finally, we’ve found a Frenchman willing to step into the role.”

Certainly, Mr. Sarkozy has his own reasons for seizing the initiative. He is trailing in the polls and faces the prospect of being a one-term president. His opponents, particularly on the right, play to French fears of an influx of refugees from Libya and other North African countries. His government was late in reacting to the revolt in Tunisia, a former French colony, and his government was derided as being too cozy with that country’s ousted despot, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.

But Mr. Moïsi said it would be unfair to say that Mr. Sarkozy is driven only by political calculations. This president also wants to be an historic figure, he said, and has a grand view of France’s place in the world. France, like the United States, is founded on the principle of universal rights. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen offers a persuasive case for protecting Benghazi.

Such ideals are also at least partly behind [France’s intervention in another former colony](#), the Ivory Coast, where French peacekeeping troops, operating under a United Nations mandate, besieged the presidential palace to oust President Laurent Gbagbo, after he refused to vacate the office he lost in an election.

For Mr. Sarkozy, there are huge risks to all these adventures. Libya could slip into a stalemate between the rebels and Colonel Qaddafi’s forces. Having recognized the rebels early as legitimate rulers of Libya could boomerang, given how little the West knows about them. Mr. Sarkozy could face the wrath of voters if the United States is viewed as having shifted too much of the burden to France.

There are dangers for Mr. Obama, too. Critics in Congress say he has thrown the United States into a mission with an ill-defined goal. For all his talk about partners and burden-sharing, the American military still constitutes the bulk of NATO’s fighting force, and as such, is essential in the operation. Without Mr. Obama as his wingman, Mr. Sarkozy would lose much of his swagger. Then, too, the idea of a military operation not led by the United States does not sit well with some Republicans.

Above all, these two men are a contrarian’s delight: Europeans marvel at an American president who needs to be dragged into a foreign conflict; Americans with vivid memories of Iraq do not know what to make of a French warrior.

Could it be, then, that French fries deserve to be called “freedom fries” after all?

# Manifestation pour l'arrêt de la centrale de Fessenheim

Par [lefigaro.fr](#)

10/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 19:00 Réactions (58)

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Les rangs de la manifestations comptaient des antinucléaires venus de France mais aussi d'Allemagne et de Suisse. Crédits photo : SEBASTIEN BOZON/AFP

**Quelque 3800 manifestants, français mais aussi allemands et suisses, se sont réunis dimanche dans le Haut-Rhin devant l'installation dont ils dénoncent la vétusté.**

Environ 3800 personnes, selon les gendarmes, étaient réunies dimanche après-midi sur une île au milieu du Rhin en face de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim (Haut-Rhin), pour demander l'arrêt immédiat de la doyenne des centrales françaises.

Sous un chaud soleil et dans une ambiance bon enfant, les manifestants, dont beaucoup venaient d'Allemagne, ont écouté plusieurs discours de militants écologistes.



Parmi les nombreuses banderoles, certaines demandaient «un débat sur le nucléaire, pas sur l'islam». «Sortons de l'air du nucléaire» ou «Fukusheim non merci», proclamaient d'autres, alors que les slogans en allemand étaient également légion.

Les manifestants, dont certains continuaient à arriver sur les lieux, semblaient toutefois moins nombreux que lors du dernier rassemblement. La dernière manifestation de ce type organisée par l'Association trinationale de protection nucléaire (ATPN), qui réunit des associations écologistes et des collectivités locales de France, d'Allemagne et de Suisse, avait rassemblé environ 10.000 personnes le 20 mars. Une autre manifestation d'ampleur est prévue le 25 avril.

La centrale de Fessenheim est située à 1,5 km du territoire allemand et à une quarantaine de kilomètres de la Suisse.

Un mois après le séisme et le tsunami au Japon, qui ont créé de gros problèmes à la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima, les antinucléaires s'inquiètent de la vétusté de la centrale de Fessenheim, construite en 1977, arguant qu'elle est en outre située sur une zone sismique et sujette à d'éventuelles inondations du Rhin.

Le parlement du canton de Bâle-Ville, en Suisse, a demandé mercredi l'arrêt de la centrale de Fessenheim en raison des risques d'accident. Les élus verts du Parlement européen ont quant à eux proposé de faire de Fessenheim «un site pilote» pour le démantèlement des installations nucléaires.

(Avec AFP)

# Voile, signes religieux : ce qui est interdit en France

Par [Pauline Fréour](#)

08/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 19:21 Réactions (61)

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De gauche à droite : un niqab, interdit dans l'espace public, un hidjab, une kippa et un dastaar, interdits dans les écoles publiques.

**FOCUS La loi sur le voile intégral qui entre en vigueur ce lundi vient s'ajouter à celle déjà existante sur les signes religieux dans les écoles. Récapitulatif des pratiques non-autorisées.**

• La loi du 15 mars 2004 interdit le port de tenues et de signes religieux « ostensibles » à l'école. Elle s'applique depuis la rentrée scolaire 2004/2005.

## Ce qu'il est interdit de porter :

- le voile, plus ou moins couvrant (hidjab, tchador, khimâr)
- la kippa
- les grandes croix chrétiennes (catholique, orthodoxe)
- le dastaar, turban avec lequel les Sikhs cachent leurs cheveux
- le bandana s'il est revendiqué comme signe religieux et couvre la tête

## Qui est concerné ?

Les élèves des établissements scolaires publics, même majeurs, tout le personnel scolaire, enseignants compris, et les parents accompagnant les sorties scolaires.

## Où s'applique l'interdiction ?

Les écoles, collèges et lycées publics (classes préparatoires et BTS compris), et tous les lieux extérieurs accueillant des activités scolaires (gymnases...). Les universités ne sont pas concernées.

En France et dans les territoires d'outremer suivant : France, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Nouvelle-Calédonie, Wallis-et-Futuna, et Mayotte. La loi ne s'applique pas en Polynésie.

**Les risques encourus :** une sanction disciplinaire pouvant aller jusqu'à l'exclusion si l'élève persiste dans son refus d'enlever le signe religieux après un dialogue prolongé avec le chef d'établissement.

» [Le texte de loi en intégralité](#)

- La loi du 12 octobre 2010 interdit le port du voile intégrale dans l'espace public. Elle s'applique à compter du 11 avril 2011.

#### **Ce qu'il est interdit de porter :**

Tout ce qui dissimule le visage :

-le niqab

-la burqa

-les cagoules

-les masques

Exception : en cas de pratiques sportives, de fêtes ou de manifestations artistiques ou traditionnelles, processions religieuses notamment.

#### **Qui est concerné ?**

Tout le monde, y compris les touristes musulmanes.

#### **Où s'applique l'interdiction ?**

Dans l'espace public, à savoir la rue, les transports en commun (mais pas les voitures particulières), la plage, les jardins publics, les commerces, cafés et restaurants, magasins, banques, gares, aéroports, administrations, mairies, tribunaux, préfectures, hôpitaux, musées, bibliothèques.

La loi s'applique sur l'ensemble du territoire de la République, en métropole comme en outre-mer.

La circulaire d'application de la loi préconise aux forces de l'ordre **une certaine souplesse à proximité des lieux de culte.**

#### **Les risques encourus :**

Un stage de citoyenneté et/ou une amende maximale de 150 euros.

» [Le texte de loi en intégralité](#)

## Nei in Gödöllö

**Keine Haftung der Isländer für ihre Bank, keine Umschuldung Griechenlands. Die Europäer werden im Gegensatz zu den Isländern nicht nach ihrer Meinung gefragt. Herr Rösler meint, der Euro interessiere die Deutschen mehr als Steuersenkungen.**

Von Holger Steltzner



Die Finanzminister haben entschieden: Keine Umschuldung Griechenlands

10. April 2011

Hoch oben im Norden zeigt das kleine Inselvolk der Isländer den Europäern, was sie davon halten, die Zeche für die Pleitebank Icesave zu zahlen: nichts. Zum zweiten Mal lehnt die Mehrheit der Isländer ab, für die Einlagen der Online-Bank zu haften, die in Großbritannien und den Niederlanden mehr Kunden hatte als Island Einwohner. Was wohl die anderen europäischen Steuerzahler sagen würden, wenn man sie fragte, ob sie nach Griechenland und Irland nun auch noch für Portugals Staatsschulden haften wollen, nachdem portugiesische Banken ihrem Staat kein Geld mehr leihen?

Wie passt das „Nei“ der Isländer zum Beschluss der EU-Rettungspolitiker von Gödöllö, eine Umschuldung Griechenlands auszuschließen, aus Rücksicht auf wacklige Banken. Es ist weder solidarisch noch marktwirtschaftlich, Gläubiger zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers zu schonen. Das ist der europäischen Einigung auf Dauer ebenso wenig zuträglich wie die von Brüssel erzwungenen Spar- und Reformauflagen, so notwendig sie sein mögen. Vielleicht gibt das neue Bild vom Steuerzahler des neuen Vorsitzenden der FDP neue Antworten. Philipp Rösler meint, die Leute interessiere der Euro mehr als niedrige Steuern.

Text: F.A.Z.

## Heftiger Streit über Flüchtlinge aus Nordafrika

**Vor dem Treffen der EU-Innenminister in Luxemburg hat sich der Streit über den Umgang mit den Flüchtlingen aus Nordafrika innerhalb der Europäischen Union verschärft. Während Bundesinnenminister Friedrich die Flüchtlingswelle für ein italienisches Problem hält, fordert Berlusconi Solidarität.**

10. April 2011

In Deutschland wird die Kritik an der Flüchtlingspolitik Italiens lauter. Bundesinnenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) sagte vor einem EU-Innenministertreffen in Luxemburg an diesem Montag der Zeitung „Die Welt“: „Italien muss sein Flüchtlingsproblem selbst regeln“. Bayern und Hessen wollen die Einwanderung tunesischer Flüchtlinge notfalls mit der Wiedereinführung von Kontrollen an den deutschen Grenzen verhindern.

Mindestens 22.000 Flüchtlinge sind seit Beginn der politischen Unruhen in Nordafrika im Januar allein auf der italienischen Mittelmeerinsel Lampedusa angekommen. Die meisten von ihnen stammen aus Tunesien. Die Regierung in Rom hatte angekündigt, Flüchtlingen befristete Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zu geben, mit denen sie auch in andere EU-Staaten einreisen könnten.



© dpa

Immer wieder erreichen Flüchtlingsboote Lampedusa

Der Flüchtlingsstrom nach Italien sorgt in der Europäischen Union für Streit. Die EU-Innenminister wollen sich an diesem Montag in Luxemburg mit der Flüchtlingsfrage befassen. Nach EU-Recht ist das Land, in dem Flüchtlinge EU-Boden betreten, für die Prüfung von Asylanträgen und Aufenthaltsbegehren zuständig. Strittig ist zwischen Rom und anderen EU-Ländern vor allem, ob Italien die Flüchtlinge aus Nordafrika innerhalb der EU weiterreisen lassen darf oder nicht.

Friedrich sagte, er wolle bei dem EU-Ministertreffen in Luxemburg deutlich machen, dass Italiens Vorhaben gegen den Geist des Schengen-Abkommens verstoße, mit dem die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen abgeschafft hatten. Der Vorsitzende der deutschen Innenministerkonferenz (IMK), Hessens Innenminister Boris Rhein



(CDU), hält sogar die Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen für vorstellbar, sollte Italien die Flüchtlinge in andere EU-Länder weiterreisen lassen.

Sein bayerischer Amtskollege Joachim Herrmann (CSU) hatte zuvor in der „Welt am Sonntag“ gesagt: „Die Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen ist das letzte Mittel. Wir werden es nicht hinnehmen, dass die italienische Regierung die Tunesier einfach zu Touristen erklärt und sie auf diese Weise in andere Länder schiebt.“

Nach dem Abtransport der meisten Flüchtlinge von der italienischen Mittelmeerinsel Lampedusa sind dort schon wieder neue Migranten eingetroffen. In der Nacht zum Samstag erreichte ein aus Libyen kommendes Schiff mit mehr als 500 Menschen die Insel, wie Medien berichteten. Im Tagesverlauf kamen etwa 250 weitere Migranten aus Nordafrika an.

Ministerpräsident Berlusconi forderte bei einem Besuch der Insel Lampedusa die anderen EU-Länder in ultimativer Form auf, die auf der Insel angekommenen Bootsflüchtlinge aufzunehmen. Nur so könne Italien den „menschlichen Tsunami“ bewältigen. „Entweder ist Europa etwas Wahres und Konkretes oder nicht“, sagte Berlusconi am Wochenende. „Wenn nicht, ist es besser, wenn wir uns wieder aufteilen und jeder seinen eigenen Ängsten und seinem Egoismus folgt.“ Politiker der mit Berlusconi in der Koalition verbündeten Lega Nord forderten für den Fall eines Neins der europäischen Nachbarn zur Übernahme der Flüchtlinge ein Ausscheiden Italiens aus der EU.

In den vergangenen Wochen hatten sich zeitweise bis zu 6000 Immigranten unter unerträglichen Bedingungen auf der kleinen Insel aufhalten müssen. Vor wenigen Tagen waren beim Kentern eines Flüchtlingsbootes vor Lampedusa vermutlich etwa 250 Menschen ertrunken. Rom hat mit der neuen Regierung in Tunis mittlerweile vereinbart, dass die dortigen Küsten verstärkt kontrolliert und Neuankömmlinge in Italien künftig direkt zurückgebracht werden.

Ganz besonders Frankreich fürchtet einen Flüchtlingsstrom - die meisten Migranten aus Nordafrika sprechen Französisch oder haben bereits Verwandte oder Freunde in dem Land. Frankreich pocht auf eine Regelung, nach der auch innerhalb der grenzkontrollfreien Schengen-Zone die Einreise in ein anderes Land nur erlaubt ist, wenn Reisende Aseispapiere und Geld haben. Diese Auffassung wurde auch von der EU-Kommission bestätigt.



© REUTERS

Berlusconi kam zum zweiten Mal nach Lampedusa

Text: FAZ.NET

# Libye : l'Otan compte ses options militaires

Par [Isabelle Lasserre](#)

08/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 22:30 Réactions (11)

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Des milliers de personnes se sont rassemblées vendredi à Benghazi, pour les funérailles des victimes des frappes aériennes de jeudi. Un homme montre la photo d'un combattant décédé. Crédits photo : Ben Curtis/AP

## Les frappes aériennes atteignent leurs limites dans un conflit où les cibles sont difficiles à identifier.

L'intervention des chasseurs alliés en Libye n'a pas dérogé à la règle militaire: on ne gagne pas une guerre seulement avec des bombardements aériens. Trois semaines après le début des frappes, force est de constater que la campagne militaire lancée contre Kadhafi montre ses limites. Sur le terrain, les rebelles n'ont pas vraiment progressé. Le «massacre» évité à Benghazi par le déclenchement des bombardements pourrait finalement avoir lieu à Misrata, où la population **est pilonnée quotidiennement** par les forces de Kadhafi. Depuis plusieurs jours, l'intensité des frappes a baissé au-dessus de la Libye. Les règles d'engagement de l'Otan, qui chapeaute désormais l'opération, sont plus limitées que celles prônées par Paris et Londres et entraînent une réduction des sorties de l'aviation alliée.

Depuis que les combattants de Kadhafi circulent en pick-up et en véhicules civils, il est devenu très difficile aux pilotes de les différencier, depuis les airs, des rebelles. Enfin, le fait que les forces loyales au régime aient déplacé leurs chars et leurs soldats au milieu des villes empêche souvent les avions de chasse de l'Otan, qui redoute plus que tout des dégâts collatéraux, de frapper. En retirant leurs avions de combat de la mission, au début de la semaine, les Américains auraient aussi emporté avec eux une partie de leurs systèmes de renseignements et d'observation, qui permettaient aux pilotes français et britanniques d'atteindre une plus grande précision.

Pour la première fois cette semaine, les rebelles **ont critiqué la manière dont l'Otan conduisait les opérations**, réclamant davantage de frappes et l'entrée en action, de manière urgente, d'hélicoptères de combat, seuls à même de détruire les tanks cachés dans les villes. Mais cette dernière option a été jugée trop risquée par les responsables militaires de la coalition, qui rappellent qu'en l'absence de troupes au sol, le déploiement d'hélicoptères, cibles faciles pour les RPG, lance-grenades antichars portatifs, est trop risqué.

## Des troupes au sol ?

Le général américain Carter Ham, commandant des forces américaines pour l'Afrique, a jugé «peu probable» que les rebelles puissent un jour donner l'assaut à Tripoli et renverser Kadhafi seuls. L'Otan a démenti vendredi qu'il y ait une «impasse» en Libye. Mais, à Washington et dans les capitales européennes, la question de savoir que faire est désormais ouvertement posée. Laisser mourir les habitants de Misrata, comme la communauté internationale avait laissé les musulmans de Srebrenica se faire massacrer par les troupes des Serbes de Bosnie en juillet 1995 ? Pourquoi, alors, être intervenus pour sauver Benghazi ?

Écartée au début de l'intervention aérienne, la question d'un déploiement de troupes au sol ne peut manquer de se poser. «Il est possible qu'une telle éventualité soit envisagée», a reconnu le général Ham, même si personne n'en veut vraiment. Deuxième option, armer et encadrer les rebelles libyens. Quelques dizaines de forces spéciales britanniques et françaises ainsi que des militaires des pays de la région sont déjà sur le terrain. Mais les résultats sont pour l'instant insuffisants et les armes, redoutent les Américains, pourraient ainsi tomber entre les mains des islamistes. Reste la solution politique, qui pousserait les alliés à trouver une porte de sortie à un régime dont on avait pourtant juré la perte...

# Côte d'Ivoire : des preuves de massacres par les deux camps

Par [lefigaro.fr](#)

09/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 14:16 Réactions (23)

S'ABONNER AU FIGARO.FR - 5 €/mois



Selon HRW, des centaines de personnes ont été tuées à Duékoué lors de la prise de la ville le 29 mars. Crédits photo : ZOOM DOSSO/AFP

**L'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme Human Rights Watch affirme détenir de nouveaux éléments prouvant que les forces pro-Ouattara et pro-Gbagbo ont commis des atrocités dans l'ouest du pays.**

Depuis une semaine, les accusations sont lourdes contre les deux camps qui **s'affrontent en Côte d'Ivoire**. Selon l'ONU et plusieurs ONG, les forces pro-Ouattara et les forces pro-Gbagbo se sont livrées depuis le déclenchement des hostilités à des massacres dans l'Ouest ivoirien. Samedi l'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme Human Rights Watch a affirmé détenir de nouvelles preuves de ces atrocités.

Selon l'ONG, les forces de Laurent Gbagbo, le président ivoirien sortant, ont notamment commis un massacre à Bolequin le 28 mars. Plus de cent hommes, femmes et enfants originaires du nord de la Côte d'Ivoire et de pays voisins ont été exécutés. Le 29, dix autres de même origine ont été tués à Guiglo et huit Togolais dans un village près de Bolequin, ajoute HRW dans un rapport publié à New York.

Le document est tout aussi accablant pour les forces loyales à Alassane Ouattara, président ivoirien internationalement reconnu. Celles-ci ont tué ou violé des centaines de personnes et brûlé des villages, fin mars dans l'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire, accuse HRW. Après avoir interviewé plus de 120 témoins de massacres et de proches de victimes, HRW affirme détenir de nouvelles preuves d'exécutions arbitraires de partisans de Laurent Gbagbo lorsque les forces d'Alassane Ouattara se sont emparées des fiefs du président sortant dans l'Ouest. Selon l'ONG, des centaines de personnes ont été tuées à **Duékoué** lors de la prise de la ville le 29 mars. «Des combattants des Forces républicaines (FRCI) - accompagnés de deux groupes de miliciens pro-Ouattara - se sont rendus dans le quartier de Carrefour, détenu par les troupes de Gbagbo», affirme HRW. «Huit femmes ont affirmé (...) que les forces pro-Ouattara ont fait sortir les hommes, jeunes et vieux, de chez eux et les ont exécutés dans la rue avec des machettes et des fusils, parfois en tirant plusieurs fois par rafales».

## Informations «absolument horribles»

L'organisation accuse aussi les Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), contrôlées par Guillaume Soro, premier ministre d'Alassane Ouattara, d'avoir tué des opposants entre le 6 et le 30 mars, lors de leur progression dans l'Ouest. Beaucoup de victimes étaient de l'ethnie guéré, qui soutenait Gbagbo lors de la présidentielle. Beaucoup de vieillards, qui n'avaient pu fuir au Liberia voisin, ont été tués. Des dizaines de femmes ont été violées, affirme HRW dans son rapport. Une femme de Bakoubli, près de Toulepleu, a affirmé avoir été violée en présence de ses enfants, ajoutant que son mari qui tentait d'intervenir a été exécuté par les combattants pro-Ouattara. Le rapport de HRW cite également une femme de 47 ans qui dit avoir été contrainte d'assister à l'exécution de son père, de son mari et de son fils de 10 ans près de l'exploitation familiale de cacao à Doke. Un homme de 32 ans a décrit l'entrée des pro-Ouattara dans la ville de Diboke et affirmé qu'ils avaient ouvert le feu sur les civils qui couraient dans les rues.

Jeudi, lors de son **allocution télévisée aux Ivoiriens**, Alassane Ouattara - qui **rejette depuis une semaine les accusations de massacres** portées contre son camp - a assuré que «la lumière sera faite sur tous les massacres et tous les crimes», qu'il a condamnés «avec la plus grande fermeté». Le président élu a en outre annoncé la mise en place d'une commission d'enquête sur le sujet, promettant la coopération de la Côte d'Ivoire avec les institutions internationales et les ONG.

Vendredi, le Haut commissaire aux droits de l'homme, Navi Pillay, avait déjà qualifié d'«absolument horribles» les informations que les enquêteurs de l'ONU sur les droits de l'homme envoient sur la situation dans l'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ceux-ci «découvrent de nouveaux corps tous les jours», a-t-elle indiqué, mentionnant en particulier le corps d'une femme portant un bébé attaché sur son dos, «Au cours de la seule journée d'hier, ils ont trouvé 118 corps dans les trois villes de Duékoué, Bloléquin et Guiglo, dans l'ouest du pays», a-t-elle précisé. Selon elle, «la situation à Abidjan est également épouvantable et en raison des combats incessants et de l'extrême insécurité, nous avons été incapables d'évaluer toute l'étendue des

4/08/2011 05:14 PM

## Mass Immigration from Tunisia

### Italy Seeks to Pass Problem on to EU Partners

*By Hans-Jürgen Schlamp in Massa Marittima*

**Europe is celebrating the emergence of new democracies in North Africa, but the recent upheaval has caused a massive wave of immigration, with thousands landing on the Italian island of Lampedusa in recent months. The government in Rome wants to move the immigrants on to other EU member states.**

It is one in the morning, but the leaders of the small tourist town of Massa Marittima in southern Tuscany are out in force despite the late hour. The mayor, the heads of the police, fire department, civil protection agency, and even the finance police and forest police are waiting for a bus with 44 young men who will be housed in the Sant'Anna church hostel. The men are from Tunisia; illegal immigrants.

For days they traveled in tiny, fragile boats across the open sea, before spending more days out in the open on the barren island of [Lampedusa](#). Then they were put on a ship headed to the port of Livorno, before finally being sent to Massa Marittima. Here at the Sant'Anna -- home to "a new culture of travel," the advertising promises -- they will be registered and fed.

Four of the Tunisians make a run for it. By the time they reach the outskirts of the town, they are at a loss for where to go. They ask a passer-by how to get to Rome, before the Carabinieri arrive and take them back to Sant'Anna. Their fellow immigrants are unhappy -- they fear the escape attempt will cost the whole group its chance to stay in Italy. But their fears are unfounded.

For what the Italian government says are "humanitarian reasons," all of the roughly 23,000 illegal immigrants from North Africa who have made their way across the Mediterranean since the start of the year will be given six-month residence permits. Only those who have been deported before, or who have committed crimes in Italy, will be sent back immediately. As will all those who arrive from now on.

#### **A Policy with Many Flaws**

Tunisia, as Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni proudly announced after tough negotiations with the new leadership in Tunis this week, is now ready to readmit its citizens without complaint if the Italians ship them back. The agreement "ends the flow of illegal immigrants" according to the minister, from the traditionally conservative and anti-immigration Lega Nord (Northern League). His party is part of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's conservative government in Rome.

Maroni's certainty, however, might be misplaced. The new Italian policy on immigration is clearly flawed. What should be done with the immigrants arriving on the boats who are not from Tunisia but from Egypt, Libya or other countries? What about the Tunisians who discard their passports and claim to be from another country? And what about those already in "Bella Italia" on six month visas? Should they be sent home once their visas expire? Or will they be extended for "humanitarian reasons?"

The truth is that the authorities in Rome have something completely different in mind. They want the immigrants to move on -- and head north.

It may sound far-fetched, but for Italians it could provide an elegant way out of their dilemma. The strategy may result in the immigration problem solving itself -- as has happened once before. When tens of thousands of refugees flooded across the Adriatic from the Balkans at the end of the 1990s, they were briefly kept in camps before being given residence permits and turned out onto the streets. Within a few days, many had left Italy. Most did not return east across the sea, but traveled by train and car north, to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Italian authorities simply watched.

### **Passing the Problem on**

The interior minister likely envisions a similar result this time around. Indeed, experts estimate that about 80 percent of today's immigrants do not want to stay in Italy. Their preferred destinations are France and Germany.

An Italian residence permit, Maroni says, gives the Tunisians the right to travel to other countries in the border-free Schengen zone and stay there for three months, including France and Germany. But the other Schengen countries see things rather differently, as do most EU legal experts. It would be necessary, they say, for Brussels to issue a corresponding order. In order to issue such a decree, European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström would need the green light from a majority of EU interior ministers. That, though, looks unlikely.

Because just as the Italians want to pass the problem along by sending the immigrants abroad, other countries don't want them either. Concern over the fate of the boat refugees -- which periodically arises as a result of deadly accidents like the one this week -- usually dissipates quickly.

Exacerbating the problem is the fact that Europe still has not reached consensus on how to deal with those who have been arriving on its shores in such great numbers in recent years. Each country has sought to protect its own borders as best it can. This week, for example, the French -- in potential violation of EU law -- carried out checks at the border with Italy at Ventimiglia, checks which were supposedly abolished under the Schengen Agreement. The aim was to intercept Tunisians on their way into France and send them back.

Even the well-meaning hosts of the 44 young Tunisians in Sant'Anna would seem to realize that the problem will not be solved any time soon. They have come up with an "integration program," which involves playing soccer with the locals as well as learning to speak and write Italian. There are even plans for a course on the history of the site and its surroundings.

But the operators of the hostel have made it clear to town officials that the North African guests cannot stay beyond the end of May. Then the space is needed again for "a new culture of travel."

# Libya: Making something out of nothing

The entire Western narrative on Libya is misleading, framed by an Orientalist discourse, scholar argues.

Najla Abdurrahman Last Modified: 07 Apr 2011 12:06



**Not only do Libyans have to deal with Gaddafi, but they must also combat Orientalist critiques of their revolution [AP]**

As the Gaddafi regime continues to wage war on the Libyan people and the coalition-backed uprising risks falling into a stalemate, many pundits have speculated about what might happen next, not only with regard to the potential problems facing Libya if and when it enters its post-Gaddafi phase, but also with respect to the fitness of Libyans, as well as the rest of the Arab world, for representative democracy.

While several observers have pontificated endlessly about tribalism, political vacuums and civil war, others have raised the spectre of Islamic extremists gaining a foothold in Libya and in other Arab countries where people continue to demand political reform and democratic governments.

Shortly after the Libyan uprising began, Bernard Lewis, a Middle East historian and Princeton's Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, weighed in on the wave of pro-democracy movements that have swept the region.

## Reductio ad Hitlerum

According to an interview published in the [Jerusalem Post](#):

Lewis regards a dash toward Western-style elections, far from representing a solution to the region's difficulties, as constituting 'a dangerous aggravation' of the problem, and fears that radical Islamic movements would be best placed to exploit so misguided a move.

Lewis recommended instead the "development of local, self-governing institutions, in accordance with the Islamic tradition of 'consultation'," though he did not make clear why radical Islamist movements would be in a position to exploit the former but not the latter, or how such local institutions would fit into the larger structure of the modern state.

In addition, he claimed that the "current unrest erupted first in Tunisia" because it is "the one Arab country where women play a significant part in public life", a supposition which is not only offensive to women throughout the region, but is simply false (though perhaps Lewis may be excused for his ignorance given that he [hasn't spent much time](#) in the Arab world).

Beyond these assertions, Lewis characterised the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a "dangerous, radical Islamic movement" which is only slightly more benign [than the Nazi party](#), and claimed that democratic elections "can only lead to one direction, as it did in [Nazi] Germany, for example".

Lewis's warnings of an Islamist threat analogous to Nazism are ironic given that he was recruited by the Monitor Group, a Boston-based consulting firm advised by Neoconservative luminary and former defence department official Richard Perle, to take part in a [campaign to](#)

enhance the international image of **Muammar Gaddafi**, a notoriously brutal autocrat who has been known to dabble in terrorism in the past.

But Lewis's position is by no means a unique one. Such hypocritical attitudes towards Arabs, Muslims and democracy, espoused by many others, represent a throwback to some of the most well known and patronising justifications for western colonialism and imperialism.

The 18th century English Orientalist Sir William Jones, writing from British colonial India, once argued that "a system of liberty, forced upon a people invincibly attached to opposite habits, would in truth be a system of tyranny".

### A state of nature

What's remarkable is how little this attitude has changed over the past two centuries. Still today, similarly hollow apologies for depriving entire groups of people of democracy and liberty persist, even as the privileged few continue to insist on these rights for themselves while benefiting from the repression of others.

It matters little that **Libyans are crying out for freedom** and democracy; for an end to four decades of brutality, suffocation, and indignity; and for the world to take their aspirations seriously – Libyans are emotional, primitive Arabs who do not understand democracy.

After all, Libya lacks political institutions which means it could descend into years of bloody civil war. And Libya is full of Muslims so Islamic extremists could take control of a new government and further destabilise the Arab world.

Besides, the West has a notorious history of imperialism in the region, not to mention an inconsistent record when it comes to humanitarian intervention, so Libyans should have been less selfish and dealt with the regime's threats to go door-to-door and cleanse the "cockroaches" on their own.

Do Libyans even realise where they're headed? Have they forgotten about Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq? Gaddafi is admittedly unpleasant, even brutal, but he has held the country together and kept extremists at bay for decades.

Surely that must be worth something: the lack of basic human rights or even a constitution; the **highest levels of unemployment in North Africa** and a **grossly inadequate infrastructure**; the pocketing of tens, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars by one family at the expense of an entire nation; even the occasional hanging of university students in public squares or the dragging of bodies through streets – a less than subtle warning to those who dare challenge the status quo.

As the benevolent dictator's daughter Aisha once lamented, the people are never satisfied.

### Shifting guilt

It's convenient to credit autocrats with maintaining stability and suppressing what are no doubt the extremist inclinations of their populations – it helps us to assuage our own guilt for profiting from our relationships with such regimes.

Of course, we often overlook the tiny fact that Gaddafi was hardly a champion of stability in the region or a bulwark against extremist elements; quite the contrary, he was for decades regarded as an instigator of mischief and a supporter of terrorism, not to mention an individual who has never had any qualms about **massacring his own people**.

Despite this he was tolerated, even dismissed as a buffoon and a punchline for years by much of the international community, particularly after his **rapprochement with the West** beginning over a decade ago.

The Libyan people, in the mean time, continued to suffer quietly while the rest of the world enjoyed a good laugh at Gaddafi's expense, followed him to his tent in pursuit of lucrative contracts, and **sold him the arms** he is now turning against his citizenry.

Besides praising the regime for supposedly containing the Islamist threat, it's quite remarkable to hear pundits who know so little about Libyan society raise the spectre of instability arising from "tribal divisions" – tensions many have naively credited the Gaddafi regime with keeping in check – even while Libyans throughout the country and the world have been scratching their heads in confusion at these concerns, and trying to assure the international community that they are **united** and committed to **democratic change**.

Indeed, the Gaddafi clan seems to relish educating the world about Libya's uncivilised, tribal society with its competing factions poised perpetually on the brink of civil strife.

### The unity question

Yet anyone who's had the misfortune of watching hours of *Jamahiriyya* state television knows that the regime, perhaps owing to its Sirtian roots and to the acute inferiority complex of its quirky leader, has deliberately sought to impose this primitive, tribal image on wider Libyan society for decades, regardless of the fact that it does not reflect the predominantly modern, urban character of the majority of its citizens today. It may come as a surprise but, unlike their leader, most Libyans who travel abroad do not pitch tents in the middle of city streets.

What's more, many observers have demonstrated a curious tendency to overlook clear indications that the Libyan national identity is in reality quite strong, and that the current struggle, nurtured by a deep sense of collective suffering over the past 41 years, has only intensified this sense of **national unity**, at least among the overwhelming majority of citizens who make up Gaddafi's opposition.

Critics also point to the general lack of institutions in Libya, the absence of political parties and organised opposition groups and the supposed

absence of leaders to help facilitate the transition to a new government.

Such concerns, while not unjustified, are often overblown. By most accounts pro-democracy Libyans, both at home and abroad, have largely rallied around the **Libyan Interim Transitional National Council** formed under the leadership of the widely respected former justice minister, Mustafa Abduljalil, and composed of professionals and representatives hailing from every corner of Libya, in an apparent show of unity that would be the envy of every American general from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Moreover, Libyans are reasonably savvy people who are well acquainted with history – they are fully aware of the considerable challenges confronting them, and quite attuned to the fact that the world is watching and carefully appraising their actions.

Yet despite these promising signs, recognition of the Transitional Council by most of the international community has been slow to materialise (only France, Qatar and now Italy have thrown their hats in the ring).

Moreover, there has been little talk of the considerable potential of Libyan society – with its relatively educated, urban and galvanised population which boasts one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world – to develop democratic institutions and fill the oft-invoked "political vacuum".

Many of these institutions, however imperfect, existed before the current regime dismantled them, and they can exist once again.

### **Where credit is due**

We have already glimpsed hopeful signs for Libya's future in Benghazi and other liberated cities, where residents and their transitional leaders have done a superb job of maintaining order, and ensuring that public services and the operations of day to day life run as smoothly as possible – miraculously all without the **Colonel's apparently indispensable guiding hand**.

Unfortunately, most commentators have chosen to ignore such achievements, preferring instead to provoke fears about al-Qaeda and a post-Gaddafi civil war.

That something will be challenging – in this case building a democratic government where only an autocrat has stood – does not mean that it should not be encouraged and supported.

While both Libyans and the international community should remain prudent and realistic about the obstacles involved, the focus must not be on nay-saying and incitement of fears that are largely baseless and often have their origins with the Gaddafi regime.

Rather, it should be on providing support for the Libyan people as they struggle to rid themselves of an illegitimate, repressive regime, work to form a transitional government, draft a constitution, hold free and transparent elections, build stable government institutions, resurrect civil society, fight corruption, repair their economy and rebuild their country.

Make no mistake: Libyans are not naive about their future and the formidable task of state-building that lies ahead of them.

They recognise that there is much work to be done, and that the challenges are enormous and complex, first and foremost among them finding a way out of the current stalemate.

But Libyans are not the first people to be faced with such a task, and they are by all accounts committed to unity, and to working together to rebuild their country.

They display few signs of the divisiveness and extremism that the Gaddafi clan has been **claiming** they suffer from, and that many Western observers are in turn parroting – why not give them a little more credit?

***Najla Abdurrahman, a Libyan-American writer and activist, is a doctoral student in Columbia University's Department of Middle Eastern, South, Asian, and African Studies.***

***The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.***



# Portugal gets offer it can't refuse

8 April 2011 THE GUARDIAN LONDON



We're here to help. Still from The Sopranos (HBO, 1999-2007).

**Irish and Greek and now Portuguese citizens can testify that falling into the clutches of the European commission for a bailout is a mobster's embrace, argues a Guardian columnist.**

**Michael Burke**

In the excellent TV series [The Sopranos](#) there is an episode where mobster Tony Soprano tells a small-time gambler why he let him play and lose in the big stakes game. "I knew you could never afford it, but your wife had the sports goods store," he explains after stripping the store of its assets and bankrupting it.

The Sopranos is available in Portuguese. Viewers will find out more about their fate than from most media coverage now Portugal is the latest economy to fall into the clutches of the European commission and, possibly the IMF. It is a mobster's embrace, as Irish and Greek citizens can testify.

The Portuguese government is reportedly requesting an [emergency loan of €80bn](#), following an auction of government bonds where interest rates reached exorbitant levels. However, judging by the experience elsewhere in Europe the interest rate charged by the EU will be no lower than the unsustainable rate demanded by the bond markets.

The Irish and Greek bailouts were billed as an extreme but necessary step to support the solvency of the state. They have failed. Both economies have suffered further downgrades by the international credit ratings' agencies since the bailouts were announced, and financial markets are still pricing in a likely default. The Lisbon government, like those in Dublin and Athens, is likely to find it has exchanged the uncertain and costly financial market debt for the certainty of exorbitant debt from the EU and the IMF. As a result, the state will be less able to repay the debt over the long run, and more immediately it will be less able to sustain the debt servicing costs. [Read full article in the Guardian...](#)

## OPINION

### A bailout behind closed doors

In a farewell [blog post for the EUobserver](#), the Daily Telegraph's Brussels correspondent Bruno Waterfield signs off with an attack on the EU-IMF's impending €80 billion bailout and austerity programme for Portugal. "One of the bureaucratic mantras that you hear here in Brussels," he writes, "is that the EU deals 'with states not governments'".

"This axiom gives the EU's game away as a Union of state bureaucracies (civil servants, regulators, police officers, officials and diplomats) not peoples.

"It's *pacta sunt servanda* or the process of locking important areas of political decision-making, from the economy to justice and security (policing our civil liberties), inside a bureaucratic, public-free zone of EU governance without government."

Following the collapse of José Sócrates' Socialist administration after parliament rejected his EU driven austerity programme, "the Portuguese 'authorities', the unelected officialdom of the state, will negotiate with their 'colleagues' in Brussels."

"The deal – just think how unpopular and unjust the Irish austerity diktat is – will be stitched up, copper bottomed and binding before the Portuguese people have the chance to vote on June 5."

04/08/2011 02:30 PM

The World from Berlin

## 'Euro-Zone Leaders Need the Courage to Tell the Truth'

**A day after Portugal formally requested aid from the European Union to help ease ongoing debt problems, Madrid on Friday insisted that it was "out of the question" that Spain would be next. German commentators aren't so sure, and say that it's time for European leaders to reveal the true extent of the problems.**

Late last month, Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates resigned after parliament in Lisbon rejected a series of new austerity measures his government had proposed to meet his country's 2011 deficit reduction targets. But now, with Portugal having formally requested aid from the European Commission to help it weather the debt crisis storm, the belt-tightening measures requested by the EU might be even more radical than those called for by Socrates.

"The package must be really strict because otherwise it does not make sense to guarantee anybody's loan," Finnish Finance Minister Jyrki Katainen said at a euro-zone finance ministers meeting in Gödöllő, Hungary on Friday. "The package must be harder and more comprehensive than the one which parliament voted against."

A spokesman for European Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn also said that the reforms currently in place in Portugal were only a starting point and that the full program agreed to with the EU in exchange for aid would have to go much further.

### **Only One Program**

Negotiations, though, promise to be complicated. Portugal is thought to need some €80 billion (\$114 billion) to cover expected costs over the next three years. But Socrates and Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos are only acting in a caretaker capacity until general elections scheduled for June. Portugal's main opposition party, the Social Democrats, are in favor of a temporary deal until a final agreement can be hammered out once the new government takes office. But Rehn on Friday said there will only be "one fully fledged program."

Following Greece and Ireland, Portugal is the third euro-zone country to make use of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the temporary aid vehicle which will be replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013. Finance ministers who gathered in Hungary on Friday said they were confident that Portugal's aid request would finally put an end to the euro debt crisis.

Spanish Finance Minister Elena Salgado said on Friday that it was "completely out of the question" that Spain would be the next euro-zone country to need EFSF assistance. "Our economy is much bigger, we have a much more diversified economy, we have a much better track record," she said. For the moment, markets seem to agree. Yields on Spanish bonds hardly budged on the news of Portugal's aid request. And the euro on Friday rose to a 15-month high against the dollar.

German commentators on Friday took a closer look at Portugal's debt problems and request for aid.

The center-left **Süddeutsche Zeitung** writes:

"For years, the Portuguese gave vent to their frustrations primarily by not participating in elections. But these days, hardly a week goes by without a public sector strike. Just a few weeks ago, major Portuguese cities experienced the

biggest demonstrations since the end of the Salazar dictatorship in 1974. Portugal has stagnated for the last 10 years, and it is now facing yet another lost decade. By 2020, there will be an entire generation of young adults who have experienced nothing but one crisis after another. Portugal is wallowing in debt and the rigid austerity programs designed to reduce the budget deficit will only plunge the country deeper into misery. The tax hikes that are sure to come and the slashes in public expenditures, pensions and salaries will further undermine Portuguese purchasing power. It will also choke off demand and, with it, what little prospects of growth the country had left."

"The good news of the day was: Portugal's neighbor Spain was not penalized by the markets. But the question remains as to whether that will remain true in the mid- and long-term. Investors, currency funds and European partners, to be sure, have praised Spain for the rapid structural reforms it has introduced. But the international ratings agencies, which have become the new sovereign ruler over Europe's periphery, are already asking questions about the ability of Spain's banks to survive a new crisis situation. The dark game of dominoes, which began with Greece and has now taken its third victim, is not yet over."

The financial daily **Handelsblatt** writes:

"It is impossible for the political leadership of Europe's common currency union to end the debt crisis with a single move. Such expectations are unrealistic. But they could certainly do more to withdraw some of the uncertainty from the financial markets. For that, one thing is necessary above all: the courage to tell the truth. First and foremost, euro-zone countries must bring themselves to reveal the true losses their banks have experienced as a result of the euro crisis and the losses that could still be pending. Indeed, the new round of stress tests would be a perfect way to shed light on such questions. But euro-zone decision makers lack the courage. Once again, the stress tests are not testing which banks would be hit hardest in the case of a state bankruptcy in the euro zone."

"One has to assume that political interests are the reason rather than economic logic. A stress test which includes the sovereign bonds held by a bank would almost certainly reveal even larger capital shortages than are already to be expected. In Germany, it would likely be primarily the state-owned institutions, particularly the Landesbanken (*eds. note: banks owned primarily by German states*), which would be affected. And that is bad news for taxpayers. After they have already paid billions to prop up the banks, they would have to cough up even more. That, though, is something that Chancellor Merkel would rather not tell German citizens."

The conservative daily **Die Welt** writes:

"It is preposterous that the EU is providing aid to a country whose own political parties were not prepared, despite the seriousness of the difficulties they faced, to agree on the necessary austerity measures. Before begging for help from taxpayers from other European countries, they should first do their own homework. One can already imagine how Portugal's political parties, once the aid package is agreed to, will blame the EU for the resulting austerity package. That is not good news for euro-zone solidarity."

"Despite the EU aid, Portugal's problems are far from solved... Greece and Portugal need to restructure their debt -- as soon as possible, and not only in 2013 as Chancellor Angela Merkel keeps promising to the financial markets. It is time that private investors bear the risk for their investments -- rather than making taxpayers exclusively responsible for euro-zone problems."

-- Charles Hawley

## **European Central Bank Faces Interest-Rate Dilemma** An Analysis by [H. Müller](#)

**The European Central Bank wants to show toughness. On the day Portugal requested a multi-billion euro bailout package, the European Central Bank moved to raise interest rates for the first time in nearly three years. But the interest rate increase remains far too small, and success is highly questionable.**

When the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its prime interest rates on Thursday, the message was clear. The euro zone is not yet down and out. The ECB is taking a stance against inflation. And the euro remains a currency to be reckoned with.

That, at least, is the message that Europe's central bankers hoped to send out. Still, it is anything but certain that the Frankfurt institution can succeed in slowing the trend of rising prices. Even after the interest rate hike, after all, the prime interest rate still remains at an extremely low 1.25 percent.

Three factors currently inhibit the kind of decisive measures needed to successfully fight inflation:

- a sovereign debt crisis that continues to build
- internal ECB structures
- the global inflationary pressures

Let's start with the debt crisis. Ironically, the decision to increase interest rates came on precisely the same day that Portugal became the third euro-zone country -- after Greece and Ireland -- to [seek an EU bailout](#) because it is unable to float bonds on financial markets under reasonable conditions. Now market players are speculating as to whether Spain will have to follow suit.

### **Fears of a Euro Zone Wildfire**

Were that to happen, the situation would become critical for the euro zone. Although it might just be possible to prop up Spain with the funds remaining in the current bailout fund, there wouldn't be enough for any additional countries. Should the debt virus spread to highly indebted countries like Italy or Belgium, the euro-zone wildfire would become all but impossible to contain.

It is precisely this scenario that has European central bankers concerned. If they raise the prime interest rate too high, it would choke the fragile economic recovery in debt-ridden countries thus exacerbating their budget problems.

Indeed, European central bankers are faced with a dilemma. If they go too far in increasing interest rates, they could damage the ECB's independence in the longer term. Should the budgetary problems worsen in Athens, Dublin and Lisbon -- and possibly elsewhere -- worsen, the European Central Bank could be forced to once again step in and buy up government bonds from the stricken countries.

It's the kind of intervention that the central bankers do not want to undertake. Such moves put the central bank's independence at risk and they make fighting inflation that much harder. But they might be left with no other choice -- because no other institutions in the euro zone are capable of doing so. (The recently agreed to European Stability Mechanism will only go into effect in 2013 and, funded with only €500 billion euros, will also have limited means at its disposal.)

### **Bad News for Germany**

In the face of that dilemma, the ECB is only able to raise interest prices slowly and piecemeal. For stronger euro-zone economies, that's bad news. Especially for Germany, which from a domestic perspective would like to see much higher interest rates.

In a calculation produced for the business monthly *manager magazin*, the Kiel Economics Institute in the northern German port city concluded that if the ECB's monetary policies took only Germany into account, the prime interest rate would currently be at 3 percent and could even rise further. Because separate interest rates are impossible in the currency union, however, the low interest rates are ensuring fervent growth -- the result of which is rising prices.

The difficulties created by the economic divergence is further complicated by a second factor: internal ECB structures.

The ECB is a highly complex organism that is equally difficult to lead. No other central bank in the world has as large a governing council. With 23 members, the ECB Governing Council bears a greater resemblance to a parliament than to a lean top executive body. And no other central bank forces a relatively lightweight six-member executive board to answer to the central bank chiefs of 17 member states. And those bank chiefs are guided by the political and economic situations back home. "As a result, the common interest sometimes slips into the background," one insider told the business monthly *manager magazin* in a comprehensive profile of the inner workings of the ECB in the current issue.

The fact that the ECB is able to function relatively well is attributable to President Jean-Claude Trichet of France and Chief Economist Jürgen Stark of Germany, two men who are persuasive and unbending. They have largely been successful in setting the agenda behind the scenes and forging common positions within the the heterogeneous ECB Governing Council. Thus far, they have nearly always succeeded in forging consensus backed by both the ECB and the euro zone member states. Inevitably, though, these consensus are built on compromises.

### **Consensus Could Get Tougher**

With the increasing economic divergence and a growing debt crisis, it will become even harder to build this consensus, especially after Trichet's planned departure this fall.

It is questionable whether his successor will be as adept as Trichet at managing the euro-divide between the different goals of the ECB (price stability and financial stability), between the interests of the euro zone as a whole and its member states, and among its individual members. It is possible that the ECB Governing Council in the future will only be able to come to agreements on the lowest common denominator, a development that would effectively preclude a clear-cut streamlining of monetary policy.

The third factor creating problems in Europe is the dynamic of growing global inflation. The central banks of the United States, Japan, Great Britain and the largest emerging countries are still pumping gigantic amounts of liquidity into the markets. This flood of money has been reflected for some time now in rising commodities prices. And wages could start rising again soon, too, as is already happening in China.

It will hardly be possible for the ECB to fully shield the euro zone against this wave of inflation. During the 1970s Germany was unable to do it -- despite having its own currency, the deutsche mark, an independent central bank and being comparatively less interwoven with the international economy. Back then, the average inflation rate in Germany over a 10-year period was 5 percent. That was a low number in comparison with other Western nations such as Italy, Great Britain, and the US, but high by German standards.

The ECB is proud of having kept inflation rates low in the first 12 years of the euro era. On average, the rate has been 1.97 percent, and 1.5 percent in Germany. How will things progress? Doubts are appropriate. Measured against future challenges, the euro era to date has been calm.

## French interior minister calls for less immigration



Interior Minister Claude Guéant (pictured) has asked the government to reduce the number of people entering France through work, family reunification and other visas.

By [Joseph BAMAT](#) (text)

French Interior Minister Claude Guéant says the government intends to reduce the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country legally, in statements evoking a divisive and little-understood aspect of contemporary French society.

“I have asked that we reduce the number of people admitted under work immigration visas,” Guéant told the conservative Figaro Magazine in an interview to be published on Friday.

“We also continue to reduce the number of foreigners coming to France for family reunification,” he said.

Some 20,000 people are allowed to enter France on work visas and another 15,000 for family reasons each year, according to the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for immigration.

Guéant also said he would not exclude changes to France’s policy on asylum seekers, suggesting a cap on asylum visas was also on the table.

The opposition Socialist Party and the organization SOS Racism have already condemned Guéant’s statement as a “provocation”.

Socialist MP Sandrine Mazetier said cutbacks to family reunification visas violated “fundamental rights” and accused the government of exploiting the issue of immigration to divert attention away from the country’s unemployment.

Guéant had already enraged rights groups earlier in the week by saying that the “increase in the number” of Muslims in France posed “a problem”.

His statements come amid [widening divisions within President Nicolas Sarkozy's ruling UMP party](#), where conservatives embrace a hard line against immigration that party centrists reject.

### **Missing statistics**

According to Mirna Safi, a sociologist and research director with the Paris Institute of Political Studies, France's policy of restricting immigration has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years.

The only exception has been the so called "competences and talents" visa, proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2003 when he was interior minister.

"It was a small and isolated recognition of a need for immigrant workers," Safi says.

Sarkozy said at the time that the new visa would allow immigrants chosen for their professional capacities to enter France and reverse what he said was a trend of unskilled immigrants leeching on the state's social programmes.

But the competences and talents visa did not produce a significant increase in legal and professional immigrant workers after 2003, says Xavier Thierry, who tracked immigration flows for France's National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) until 2008.

"A stable figure of five percent of immigration for professional reasons may have increased to eight to 10 percent," Thierry says, adding that a pronounced change in immigration flows could not be determined immediately by annual statistics.

Thierry admits that he was the only researcher at INED to study immigration flows and asked to be taken off the subject after feeling "discouraged". No one has taken over from him, and data relative to immigration in France, legal or not, is scarce after 2008.

As to the contradiction between France's intense interest in the subject of immigration and the lack of information to encourage or oppose further immigration, Thierry is reluctant to answer.

"There is a problem," he awkwardly offers.




# European bail-outs

## Pay pals

The Economist Apr 7th 2011, 17:38 by The Economist online

### Who's paying for the euro-area bail-out?

PORTUGAL'S bail-out means another stage in Europe's debt crisis and another call on non-European coffers. The total €865 billion (\$1.2 trillion) pot available for euro-area rescues looks enormous, more than enough to cope with Greece, Ireland and Portugal's anticipated needs besides. Almost half of that comes from the European Financial Stability Facility, a €440 billion euro-zone fund whose major contributors are Germany, France and Italy. But the EFSF's effective lending capacity is only €250 billion, because only six of its 17 members have a AAA credit rating. European leaders have pledged to bring the fund's actual firepower up to €440 billion by the summer but in the meantime the IMF has more cash on hand, at €280 billion. If all that money were used (a very big if), America would end up lending indebted euro-zone nations €50 billion.



04/07/2011 06:02 PM

## Opinion

# Why German Nuclear Worries Are Both Wrong and Harmful

*By Robert Peter Gale*

**An increasing number of Germans are convinced that nuclear energy is more dangerous than the alternatives. Their fears are understandable -- but wrong. What's worse, their emotional and over-politicized reaction at home is sowing more fear and distrust in Japan.**

Is Germany overly sensitive to nuclear issues? I think so. Let me explain why: About 25 years ago -- when I addressed several ministries in the then West German capital of Bonn after the Chernobyl accident -- I pointed out that, although there might be important health consequence from radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, fewer lives would be lost from it each year than from our reliance on fossil fuels. At the time, very few Germans were sympathetic to my argument. Now the reactor accident in Fukushima has pushed the German public back into [turmoil](#). And, again, the question arises: How should we weigh the risks of nuclear power against its benefits?

How dangerous is Fukushima really? Last week, I was able to get an idea of the situation in the area. I was at the so-called "J-Village," the place where experts gather to deal with the problems of the Fukushima reactors. The J-Village is in the middle of the area that was evacuated. It's strange, actually: In a disaster zone, one would expect destruction -- burned cities, collapsed houses. But, here, everything is very peaceful, just empty, deserted.

By going to the catastrophe zone, I wanted to send a signal and show the Japanese that they haven't been completely abandoned. Had I worried about my health, I wouldn't have traveled to Japan. But the radioactivity released is so low that you're safe 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) from Fukushima. The amounts of plutonium that have been detected are low. It's possible that this plutonium was released in the 1950s and 1960s, when nuclear weapons were tested in the Pacific Ocean near the area.

### Very Different from Chernobyl

I don't want to play down what's happened here. In principle, any radioactivity is dangerous, and it has been a very serious accident. It will have far-reaching consequences -- but mainly for Japan's economy, its politics and for the psychological well-being of the Japanese people. I do not expect that there will be many deaths.

Chernobyl was different. Thirty-one people were killed by the explosion or from the consequences of acute high-dose radiation exposure. The explosion released huge amounts of radioactive iodine-131 and cesium-134 and -137, which contaminated about 195,000 square kilometers (ca. 75,000 square miles). The radioactive plume was ejected up to the lower troposphere, dispersed by high-altitude winds and brought back down to earth by rains. One of the several reasons why so much radioactivity could escape was that, owing to its size and shape, the core of the Soviet reactor had no containment structure. In Fukushima, the reactor cores are considerably smaller and -- similar to German nuclear power stations -- housed within two containment structures.

At the time, I traveled to Kiev as the head of the international medical team (along with my three young children, by the way). Health-related consequences were most easily detected in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. About 6,000 excess cases of thyroid cancer were detected, mostly among the young. These cases of thyroid cancer were caused by 131-iodine in milk and dairy products.

However, it is important to state that the effects of radiation on human health weren't nearly as bad as many people all over the world still think they were. Even a quarter of a century after Chernobyl, there has been no convincingly documented increase in leukemia or other cancers. Although this is an adequate observation period for leukemia, it is too short for other cancers. If we use cancer-risk data derived predominately from the survivors of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we would estimate 2,000-15,000 excess cancer deaths over the 50-year period following the Chernobyl explosion.

However, since we can already expect 80 million non-Chernobyl-related deaths from cancer in the EU and the former Soviet Union in this same period of time, it is hard to detect an increase of this magnitude. Other concerns, such as genetic abnormalities and birth defects, have fortunately not materialized. And the observation that cases of leukemia have not been increasing is also reassuring.

### **Statistically Hard to Detect**

Turning to Fukushima, we can use these data to make some estimates of likely health consequences. No one can say for sure how much radioactivity will be released in the coming weeks. But we can estimate the damage based on how much has already been leaked.

The Fukushima Daiichi accident has released about 10 percent as much 131-iodine and 137-cesium as the Chernobyl accident, and the dispersion of the release is much more limited than it was in the case of Chernobyl. Finally, in contrast to the Ukrainian disaster, Japan has succeeded in restricting consumption of contaminated milk and dairy products and in distributing iodine tablets.

Based on these considerations, over the next 50 years, we might expect few, if any, cases of thyroid cancer and about 200-1,500 cases of leukemia and other types of cancer. During this interval, about 18 million Japanese will die from cancers unrelated to Fukushima. Thus, the number of cancer cases that can be attributed to Fukushima should be less than one per 10,000 -- or well below our level of detection in epidemiological studies. Raising the price of a pack of cigarettes by 10-20 percent would result in a much greater reduction in cancer risk.

There is, however, an important caveat to the above discussion: the spent fuel assemblies stored atop each reactor at the Fukushima site. These fuel rods still contain radioactive materials, and there is no containment structure surrounding these pools. Consequently, loss of water or a rupture in one of these pools could release radioactive materials and substantially alter these risk calculations.

### **The Costly Alternatives**

The majority of Germans apparently want to get out of nuclear energy now. But both they and others should keep the alternatives in mind -- which are unfortunately not too inviting.

We all know that global warming is the cost of using fossil fuels, such as coal and oil. What's more, there are also some other frightening costs of oil-dependency, such as the involvement of the United States and Europe in wars in Iraq and Libya. Likewise, as the Deepwater Horizon accident makes clear, oil also carries its own accident risks.

But we also have to consider some less obvious costs. In coal mining, more than 10,000 people die each year, 2,000 of them in China alone. Added to this are lives lost transporting and burning coal. And, under some circumstances, burning coal releases more radiation into the environment than a nuclear power station under normal operating conditions. A country like Japan doesn't have coal or oil in the first place, so what is it supposed to do without nuclear energy?

And don't forget that there are risks with other forms of energy production as well. Even solar power releases radioactivity: Solar power stations need large amounts of copper for pipes, and their production releases uranium. Another unexpected consequence of seemingly "green" energy sources is the explosion of so-called "river blindness" in Egypt that can be attributed to infections spawned by the building of the Aswan Dam. The dammed-up water has caused a massive increase in the number of mosquitoes who transmit the disease, and over a million people have paid for it with their sight.

### **Harm from Far Away**

All this has to be taken into account when discussing such issues. Nuclear power is naturally a very emotional issue. Many people have already formed solid opinions and only take into account what supports their views. But many of these beliefs are irrational and only fed by the many figures, measurements and limits being made public, which hardly anyone can make sense of.

This can be seen very clearly in the current situation in Fukushima. The Americans have recommended that all citizens evacuate the area within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the stricken power plant. The Germans have moved their embassy to Osaka. Even people who are really well informed have left Tokyo in the belief that you can never be careful enough.

Though I can understand this reasoning, it's wrong. What's more, it sends a devastating message to the Japanese who have to stay. They have started to distrust their own government, and fear is spreading. This is a terrible side effect of this excessive concern -- and the [panicked reaction](#) -- in Germany.

Indeed, it is clear that the major long-term issues with an accident at a nuclear power station are not medical; instead, they are political, psychological and economic. Given these circumstances, the German response to the Fukushima accident needs to be thoughtful and considered, instead of emotional and political. It should be based on a consideration of energy needs for the next several decades and a careful assessment of benefits and risks of alternative energy sources. If such an analysis is done, I suspect nuclear energy will come out in a favorable light.

# Le "printemps arabe" et les Européens

Le Monde | 07.04.11 | 13h19 • Mis à jour le 07.04.11 | 14h37

## **C**omment les Français voient-ils les révolutions arabes ?

**Edouard Lecerf, directeur général de TNS-Sofres :** Le premier élément de réponse, c'est de voir que cette opinion est très volatile. Avant que la France ne décide de participer à l'intervention en Libye, les Français étaient majoritairement contre. Quelques semaines plus tard, la France intervient, et les Français se rangent derrière ce choix. Cette oscillation, on la retrouve par ailleurs dans d'autres éléments : la crainte et l'espoir. Oui, les Français, lorsqu'ils sont interrogés, se disent enthousiastes sur ce qui se passe actuellement. Et pour autant, lorsqu'on introduit l'idée d'écho qu'il pourrait y avoir au niveau français, que ce soit d'un point de vue économique avec les craintes liées au pétrole, ou d'un problème migratoire, aussitôt, il y a une rétractation.

## **Quels sont les scénarios les plus probables pour la Libye ?**

**Elyès Jouini :** L'intervention européenne et américaine avec des forces arabes en Libye a permis d'équilibrer, en tout cas pour l'instant, les forces. C'est vrai qu'on ne sait pas trop ce qui se passe en Libye, on voit des coups d'accordéon avec des opposants qui gagnent du terrain, qui en perdent. On a une armée structurée qui continue à avoir des forces importantes, des révolutionnaires en face qui ont tout le feu et l'énergie des révolutionnaires. La situation est inquiétante parce qu'il ne faudrait pas qu'elle s'enlise. On soutient les révolutionnaires libyens parce qu'ils sont porteurs d'un discours de démocratie, de renouveau, mais en même temps on ne les connaît pas !

## **Pensez-vous que l'opinion arabe puisse se retourner contre les Européens ou les Américains ?**

**Fatiha Héni-Dazi :** C'est un risque. C'est vrai que l'habillage arabe de cette intervention est très réduit. On a le Qatar et les Emirats arabes. Ces deux pays arabes sont-ils les plus représentatifs de la Ligue arabe et de l'opinion arabe ? C'est très loin d'être le cas. La France a beaucoup insisté pour que les pays arabes soutiennent cette intervention. Cette dernière risque d'avoir des conséquences hors de Libye.

Les régimes autoritaires arabes ont été plus décomplexés après cette intervention. Au Yémen, par exemple, du jour au lendemain, on est passé de 3 ou 4 morts par jour à 55 morts. L'intervention du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) dominée par l'Arabie saoudite à Bahreïn est intervenue à peu près au même moment. En même temps, cette intervention a pu permettre aux manifestants et aux contestataires syriens de dépasser leur peur.

## **Si l'on n'avait rien fait, c'était aussi la porte ouverte à une répression impitoyable.**

**Ghassan Salamé :** Nous sommes dans une situation dramatique pour un mouvement populaire au moins partiellement démocratique qui traverse la région et qui risque d'être freiné, ensanglanté, par les affaires libyennes. Quels sont les scénarios aujourd'hui ? Le scénario ivoirien : vous avez d'un côté Benghazi, un gouvernement qui est de plus en plus reconnu par la communauté internationale, jugé légitime pour de bonnes et de mauvaises raisons, et vous avez de l'autre côté quelqu'un qui s'accroche au pouvoir, qui n'est plus reconnu mais qui a les moyens de tenir.

Ce scénario est ultra-dangereux, parce que si cette situation s'installe, les extrémistes vont avoir le dessus dans les deux camps : à Tripoli et à Benghazi. Le deuxième scénario, c'est une interprétation large, peut-être contestable, de la résolution 1973 des Nations unies qui fait qu'on ne protège pas uniquement les civils mais que l'on va un peu plus loin, et qu'on se dit que la meilleure protection des civils c'est de virer le monsieur qui donne l'ordre de les attaquer. On va là dans une logique de changement de régime, honteuse, hypocrite, sans le dire vraiment. C'est plutôt un scénario irakien.

Et il y a le troisième, qui se dessine depuis quelques jours et est un scénario à la kényane : celui d'une médiation. On se dit qu'après tout, Kadhafi n'est pas "bien", mais que ceux de Benghazi, on ne les connaît pas bien non plus.

## **Avez-vous un regard pessimiste sur la situation actuelle en Libye ?**

**Yves Aubin de La Messuzière :** Oui, dans la mesure où l'on a sous-estimé les appuis dont pouvait disposer Kadhafi en dehors donc de ces solidarités tribales qui sont assez fortes. La Libye est un pays assez urbanisé mais il y a les solidarités, les allégeances tribales. Il y a aussi les classes moyennes de Tripoli qui ont plus profité que de l'autre côté de la Cyrénaïque des prébendes et aussi de la manne pétrolière. Je crains le scénario de l'enlisement de la coalition internationale. Mais il y en a un autre qu'on pourrait peut-être affiner : à l'intérieur même du clan familial de Kadhafi, des fils, Saïf Al-Islam et Saadi, seraient prêts à une négociation et à une discussion.

**Vous étiez partisan d'une intervention pour protéger les populations civiles. Restez-vous sur cette position ?**

**Hubert Védrine :** A partir de cet immense mouvement qui a démarré en Tunisie, nous sommes entrés dans une période qui va s'étaler sur des années, qui ne va pas concerner que le monde arabe, qui ne va pas concerner que le monde musulman, qui met sur la défensive de nombreux régimes autoritaires partout dans le monde. Cela va passer par des moments encourageants, positifs, et de nombreuses tragédies. C'est inévitable. C'est une remarque qui englobe la tragédie libyenne, il y aura malheureusement d'autres tragédies à d'autres moments. Deuxièmement, on n'a pas tellement d'influence. C'est un peu vexant à dire, mais en même temps c'est un hommage que je rends aux Arabes qui, les uns après les autres, sont en train de redevenir les acteurs de leur propre histoire.

A présent, je suis étonné qu'on ne mesure pas l'importance dans l'histoire du droit international du vote par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de la résolution 1973. C'est rare qu'il se trouve dans ce Conseil plus de 9 voix - il faut 9 voix pour que ça passe - sans qu'il y ait veto. Je continue à penser que le choix de la non-intervention aurait été insupportable, qu'il aurait eu des conséquences politiques graves. Pour l'avenir de la Libye, je pense que ça va plutôt tourner autour du troisième scénario de Ghassan Salamé. Pas de victoire militaire nette dans un sens ou dans l'autre, puisque le massacre de Benghazi a été évité. Ma conviction est que Kadhafi est cuit de toute façon.

**Que doit être la politique de l'Union européenne face à un tel mouvement de révoltes ?**

**Hubert Védrine :** Quand on fait de l'ingénierie de la démocratisation, on s'aperçoit que c'est compliqué. Une des difficultés, c'est que nous n'avons pas de spécialiste de la démocratisation. Que fait-on concrètement quand on n'est pas encore un pays démocratique pour franchir les étapes ? Que met-on dans la Constitution ? Quelles sont les conditions que l'on pose aux partis politiques pour qu'ils puissent concourir ? Que fait-on de la référence à l'islam ? On n'a pas d'expérience là-dessus.

Deuxièmement, il y a un risque paternaliste évident pour l'Europe puisqu'elle passe son temps, comme ce n'est pas une puissance qui se pense comme une entité politique ou stratégique, à tout ramener à des questions d'aides. On n'échappera pas à une sorte de cogestion, les Européens, les Maghrébins, les Africains, de la question du mouvement migratoire, qui est un vrai sujet sérieux que l'on doit gérer.

Il faut être positif parce que des peuples se révoltent, ils sont courageux, ils veulent se démocratiser, c'est formidable !

**Tout est parti de la Tunisie, quasiment une révolte modèle.**

**Elyès Jouini :** En Tunisie, on l'a appelée la "révolution de la dignité". Ce que le peuple tunisien a souhaité dire, c'est qu'il y avait un ras-le-bol et qu'il était capable de prendre son destin en main. Cela a servi d'exemple à l'Egypte, à d'autres pays, et puis le contre-exemple est arrivé quelques semaines après, quand Kadhafi montre que l'on peut réprimer, bombarder les insurgés, rétablir l'ordre de cette manière pour garder son siège. C'est pour cette raison que l'intervention occidentale était importante. Elle permettait de neutraliser ce contre-exemple. De montrer qu'il ne suffit pas de réprimer pour repartir sur vingt ans ou quarante ans de pouvoir sans partage.

**Le Golfe est relativement épargné par le mouvement de la rébellion, mais que se passe-t-il à Bahreïn ?**

**Fatiha Héni-Dazi :** L'Arabie saoudite, en tête, est intervenue au nom du Conseil de coopération du Golfe, avec un millier de soldats de la Garde nationale pour dire stop à un processus démocratique qui aurait pu aboutir à une monarchie constitutionnelle parlementaire, laquelle aurait été dominée par cette communauté qui est majoritaire. Le fait, pour l'Arabie saoudite, de dire "c'est notre ligne rouge, on n'a pas à demander leur avis aux Américains", a été, pour moi, un tournant. A

Bahreïn, les choses sont très dures. Il est très difficile de trouver une issue négociée, pacifique. Nous avons un prince héritier qui négociait avec l'opposition chiïte et on y a mis un terme avec cette intervention.

### **Le mouvement paraît irrépressible et semble s'inscrire dans une longue durée. Comment le voyez-vous évoluer ?**

**Ghassan Salamé :** Tous les dirigeants arabes, sans exception, se sont dit après Moubarak "Est-ce que je vais être le troisième ?" Il y a eu ce que j'appelle des concessions préventives. Faisons quelque chose pour ne pas tomber. Mais il y aura un troisième, un quatrième, même un cinquième, parce que le mouvement traverse l'ensemble de la région. Il y a eu Ben Ali en janvier, Moubarak en février, le Libyen en mars... En avril, il va y en avoir au moins un, je vous le garantis. Et je suis heureux, cela fait vingt ans qu'on attend ça !

**Yves Aubin de La Messuzière :** Le mot-clé, c'est la dignité, "*karama*". Partout, c'est le slogan dominant. C'est-à-dire le souci de passer de sujet à citoyen. Disons aussi que la laïcité, même si elle n'est pas exprimée explicitement, est aussi présente et au coeur du débat. Et c'est très important. La crainte, c'est de voir une mouvance islamiste forte face à ce qui ressemblera à une nouvelle formation incarnant l'ordre. Il y a balancement entre la rupture et la continuité. En Tunisie, on est davantage dans un processus de rupture par rapport au passé. En Egypte, on est beaucoup plus dans la continuité. On ne peut pas dire que le système a changé puisque l'armée est là.

### **L'Europe va être la voisine d'un monde arabe nouveau. Quelle doit être l'attitude de ce grand voisin qu'est l'Europe ?**

**Fatiha Héni-Dazi :** L'Europe politique n'existe pas. Elle a volé en éclats lors du vote de cette résolution. L'Allemagne n'a pas suivi. C'est quand même le couple franco-britannique qui a mené la danse.

**Elyès Jouini :** Il faut un plan Marshall, un investissement massif de la part de l'Europe, des Etats-Unis, de l'ensemble des pays qui veulent soutenir la démocratie. Tant que l'on sera sur des réponses au cas par cas, finalement, cet énorme élan démocratique risque de s'enliser, voire de sombrer dans les difficultés inhérentes à toute transition démocratique, liées au fait que si l'amélioration de la situation économique n'accompagne pas la démarche démocratique, on risque de revenir en arrière.

**Yves Aubin de La Messuzière :** En Europe, il a manqué un discours d'appui à la transition. Malheureusement, du côté français, on s'est contenté de prendre acte de la transition démocratique en Tunisie - c'est ce qui reste dans la conscience des Tunisiens et ailleurs. Prendre acte veut dire qu'on aurait peut-être espéré autre chose. Dans un premier temps, on avait l'impression que l'Europe se satisfaisait de ces régimes parce qu'ils pouvaient assurer à la fois la stabilité et la sécurité. Les aides économique et financière à travers les différents instruments européens doivent bien entendu jouer.

**Ghassan Salamé :** Il ne faut pas donner l'impression à la jeunesse arabe qu'on pleure le départ de Ben Ali ou qu'on a peur que Kadhafi se retrouve en Ouganda. Je dois dire que l'Europe a été frileuse. L'Europe n'a pas perçu l'ampleur du mouvement, son efficacité et cette extraordinaire irruption d'un troisième acteur que les experts patentés ne voulaient pas voir. Cet acteur est là devant vous, il est comme vous, il a les mêmes soucis. Et c'est avec lui que vous avez intérêt, Européens, à travailler à l'avenir. Il faut sentir ses espoirs et il faut l'encourager.

Ensuite, il y a la lucidité. Il ne faut pas que l'arbre libyen cache ce mouvement qui va durer des années. Et il ne faut pas non plus réduire cette affaire à la formule : "Il faut que le pétrole passe la Méditerranée et que les émigrés ne passent pas." Si vous réduisez la relation entre l'Europe et sa rive sud à cela, vous allez avoir les émigrés, vous risquez de ne pas avoir le pétrole.

Gilles Paris (Les grands débats du "Monde")

Article paru dans l'édition du 08.04.11

## Gbagbos letzte Trumpfkarte: als Märtyrer sterben

Ein militärischer Sieg des anerkannten ivoirischen Präsidenten Ouattara könnte schnell in eine politische Niederlage umschlagen. Sein Widersacher Gbagbo wird schon als Held gefeiert, der gegen einen vermeintlichen französischen Neokolonialismus kämpft.

Von Thomas Scheen, Johannesburg  
07. April 2011

Der seit fast einer Woche in seiner Residenz im Abidjaner Stadtteil Cocody von Truppen seines Widersachers Alassana Ouattara belagerte ivoirische Machthaber Laurent Gbagbo ist dabei, zu einem Held für die afrikanische Öffentlichkeit zu werden. Je länger sein Widerstand dauert, umso lauter werden überall auf dem Kontinent Stimmen, die ihn als aufrechten Kämpfer gegen einen vermeintlichen französischen Neokolonialismus feiern. Hintergrund waren die Luftangriffe von Hubschraubern der französischen „Operation Einhorn“ als auch Hubschraubern der UN-Mission im Land (Onuc) gegen Stellungen der Präsidentengarde in Abidjan vom vergangenen Montag.

Ob diese Luftschläge durch das Mandat der Vereinten Nationen gedeckt waren und – wie Onuci und Frankreich behaupten – dem Schutz von Zivilisten dienten, indem schwere Waffen vernichtet wurden, spielt in der öffentlichen Meinung, wie sie in Zeitungen und zahllosen Internetforen Ausdruck findet, kaum eine Rolle. Was vielmehr wahrgenommen wird, ist, dass die ehemalige Kolonialmacht wieder einmal zu Gewalt greift, um in einer ehemaligen Kolonie einen genehmen Präsidenten zu installieren – in diesem Fall Ouattara. Dafür gibt es einen bösen Begriff: „La Francafrique“.



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Protest für Gbagbo und gegen Sarkozy in Paris

Vermutlich ist das einer der Gründe, warum der von den Ouattara-Truppen als „finaler Angriff“ angekündigte Sturm auf die Residenz von Gbagbo am Mittwoch nach zwei Stunden wieder abgebrochen wurde. Gbagbo als Held im Bunker ist für Ouattara schon schlimm genug. Ein toter Gbagbo aber wäre für den von der internationalen Gemeinschaft anerkannten Präsidenten Ouattara eine Katastrophe. Ouattara muss als Staatsoberhaupt einen großen Teil des Gbagbo-Lagers ins Boot holen, will er halbwegs ungestört regieren. Ein getöteter Gbagbo aber würde angesichts der jüngsten Geschichte der Elfenbeinküste wohl zu einem westafrikanischen Patrice Lumumba werden – jenem kongolesischen Ministerpräsidenten, der auf Geheiß Belgien und Amerikas 1961 ermordet worden war und trotz seiner politischen Unzulänglichkeit seither Märtyrerstatus genießt.

### Rücktritt gegen Geld?

Aus seinem Bunker heraus spielt Gbagbo dieses Instrument inzwischen perfekt. Er hat im Gegenzug für die von UN, Frankreich und Ouattara geforderte schriftliche Rücktrittserklärung offenbar hohe finanzielle Forderungen erhoben. So sollen die Bankguthaben seiner Frau Simone in Amerika wieder freigegeben werden. Die ehemalige Gewerkschaftlerin Simone Gbagbo gilt nicht nur als politische Extremistin, sondern auch als dem Geld zugetan. Ihr Vermögen wird auf mehrere Dutzend Millionen Dollar geschätzt.



Der zweite Grund für das Unvermögen der Ouattara-Truppe, die Residenz von Gbagbo einzunehmen, ist allerdings handfester Natur und spricht portugiesisch. Nach Informationen der für gewöhnlich gut informierten Zeitschrift „Jeune Afrique“ wird Gbagbo zwar nur von 200 Sldaten beschützt. Darunter sollen sich 92 angolische Elitesoldaten befinden, die zur „Unidada da Guarda Presidencial“, der Prätorianergarde des angolischen Präsidenten Eduardo Dos Santos, gehören. Das ist eine für urbane Kriegsführung trainierte Sondereinheit, die mutmaßlich das Residenzgelände vermint hat.

Dos Santos hatte am Mittwoch noch einmal deutlich gemacht, dass er Gbagbo als einzig legitimen Präsidenten der Elfenbeinküste betrachtet. Angola und die Elfenbeinküste unterhielten exzellente Beziehungen, seit Gbagbo die Rebellen der angolischen Unita im Jahr 2000 aus Abidjan hinauswarf, wo sie das Geld aus dem Verkauf von Blutdiamanten wuschen. Im März 2009 unterzeichneten beide Staaten ein Verteidigungsabkommen, das sowohl die Ausbildung der ivoirischen Präsidentengarde durch angolische Spezialisten vorsah als auch militärische Hilfe im Falle eines Konfliktes.

### **Dramatischen Rettungsaktion**

Solange Gbagbo sich hält, gerät die Lage in Abidjan immer mehr außer Kontrolle. In einer dramatischen Rettungsaktion haben französische Soldaten in der Nacht zum Donnerstag den japanischen Botschafter sowie ein knappes Dutzend seiner Mitarbeiter in Sicherheit gebracht. Gbagbo-Kämpfer hatten seine Residenz als vorgeschobenen Gefechtsstand missbraucht und von dort die französische Botschaft beschossen.

Bei der Rettungsaktion nahmen französische Hubschrauber abermals Stellungen Gbagbo-treuer Kämpfer im Stadtteil Cocody unter Feuer. Daraufhin versuchten Gbagbo-Soldaten, sich gewaltsam Zutritt zur Residenz des französischen Botschafters zu verschaffen, die unmittelbar an die ivoirische Residenz angrenzt; sie wurden erschossen. Indien und Israel haben Frankreich am Donnerstag ersucht, ihr Botschaftspersonal ebenfalls aus dem umkämpften Cocody heraus zu eskortieren. Im zentral gelegenen Hotel Novotel im Geschäftsviertel von Abidjan baten 20 ausländische Journalisten darum, von der „Operation Einhorn“ aus einer zusehends gefährlicher werdenden Situation gerettet zu werden.

### **Es droht eine Katastrophe**

Solche Privilegien genießen die fünf Millionen ivoirischen Einwohner der Stadt nicht. Sie schlittert vielmehr jeden Tag ein bisschen mehr in das hinein, was mit „humanitärer Katastrophe“ nur unzureichend beschrieben ist: kaum Wasser, kein Strom, nichts zu essen, keine Medikamente, und draußen auf den Straßen ziehen bewaffnete Plünderer umher. Die Regierung Ouattara rief am Mittwochmorgen alle Polizisten und Gendarmen auf, sich unverzüglich zum Dienst zu melden und ihre Arbeit wieder aufzunehmen. Nachgekommen ist der Aufforderung aber niemand. Zu gefährlich, hieß es.

Der Bunker, in dem sich Gbagbo aufhält, ist übrigens ein Relikt aus Tagen der „Francafrique“. Dass ausgerechnet jener ivoirische Präsident, der den Einfluss Frankreichs beschneiden wollte, sich darin verschanzt, ist nicht ohne Ironie. Dieser Bunker mündet nämlich in einen Tunnel, der die Residenz des ivoirischen Präsidenten mit der unmittelbar daran grenzenden Residenz des französischen Botschafters verbindet. Die Anlage diente dem Vorgänger Gbagbos, Henry Konan-Bédié, als Rückversicherung gegen unfreundliche politische Entwicklungen. Mit dem Amtsantritt Gbagbos, so versicherte einst ein französischer Botschafter dieser Zeitung, sei der Tunnel zugeschüttet worden.

Text: F.A.Z.

# Première hausse des taux depuis trois ans en zone euro

Par [Guillaume Guichard](#)

07/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 16:37 Réactions (14)

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Le président de la Banque centrale européenne, Jean-Claude Trichet. Crédits photo : KAI PFAFFENBACH/REUTERS

**Le taux d'intérêt directeur de la zone euro a été augmenté de 0,25 point, à 1,25%. La Banque centrale européenne veut ainsi contrer la remontée de l'inflation. Mais va pénaliser les pays fortement endettés.**

Le taux d'intérêt directeur de la Banque centrale européenne, qui conditionne le loyer de l'argent dans toute la zone euro, des banques aux particuliers, **a été relevé de 0,25 point**, à 1,25%. Il s'agit de la première remontée du loyer de l'argent depuis 3 ans. Cette décision **avait été annoncée entre les lignes** il y a plusieurs semaines lors des précédentes allocutions du président de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE), Jean-Claude Trichet.

La BCE réagit ainsi à l'accélération de l'inflation, qui a atteint +2,6% en mars, **surprenant les analystes à la hausse**. Une évolution due notamment à «l'augmentation des prix énergétiques», a indiqué Jean-Claude Trichet lors d'une conférence de presse ce jeudi après-midi.

Dans ce contexte, il a réitéré ses avertissements contre «les effets de second tour», c'est-à-dire des hausses de salaires qui alimenteraient la hausse des prix. «Nous sommes particulièrement attentifs sur ce sujet», a-t-il prévenu. Les partenaires sociaux ne doivent pas prendre pour référence l'inflation actuelle, mais l'objectif de 2% visé par la BCE, lors des négociations sur les salaires, a plaidé Jean-Claude Trichet.

## La première d'une longue série?

La conférence de presse de la BCE était scrutée par les analystes dans l'attente de signes de futures hausses des taux. La plupart d'entre eux estime que la hausse de ce jeudi n'est que la première d'une série qui aura lieu courant 2011. «La BCE n'a pas décidé que cette hausse était la première d'une série», a tempéré Jean-Claude Trichet.

Dans le même temps, il n'a pas indiqué dans sa déclaration préliminaire que les taux étaient à un niveau appropriés, sous-entendant de futurs ajustements. Chez Société générale, les analystes s'attendent à une hausse de 25 point de base (0,25%) chaque trimestre pour atteindre un taux d'intérêt de 2% fin 2011.

## «Route risquée»

Cette perspective inquiète toutefois certains observateurs. La BCE prend «une route risquée vers la reprise», commente James Nixon, économiste chez Société générale CIB. Certes, la croissance en zone euro est repartie. Mais elle demeure très inégale en fonction des pays. **L'Allemagne connaît une reprise vigoureuse** alors que les pays périphériques, soumis à des programmes de rigueur, sont encore en récession.

«La hausse des taux d'intérêt va alourdir considérablement le coût de la dette des pays périphériques, craint James Nixon. Et il reste encore à prouver qu'augmenter les taux dans un contexte de flambée des prix du pétrole, déjà à même d'amputer la consommation, ne provoque pas de retour en récession et ne relance la crise bancaire en Europe.»

Avec un taux à 1,25%, «la politique monétaire de la CE reste très accommodante, s'est défendu Jean-Claude Trichet. Notre décision sert à ancrer les attentes d'inflation des acteurs économiques à un niveau correspondant à l'objectif de la BCE de 2%.»

## The Battle against Gadhafi

# NATO Fears War without End in Libya

By *Carsten Volkery*

**The front in Libya is barely moving as the country remains split between rebels and Gadhafi's troops. The rebels are complaining of not receiving enough air support, but NATO is hardly in a position to ramp it up after the withdrawal of US fighter jets. The resulting stalemate underscores the lack of a clear strategy for the allies in Libya.**

American warplanes had hardly left the skies over Libya when the remonstrations began. "NATO has let us down," said rebel military chief Abdul Fattah Younis. As the rebels retreated in the town of Brega in the face of a heavy onslaught by Gadhafi's troops, there were no NATO planes in sight.

The withdrawal of the American planes, which flew more than half of the sorties in the first two weeks of the air strikes, has weakened NATO's potential force. With the organization having taken control of the operation, American planes are now only in standby mode, leaving the much smaller air forces of France and the United Kingdom to take on most of the workload. Appeals from the NATO leadership to member countries to send more aircraft have so far been met with little success. Only the British have beefed up their presence, increasing the number of its Tornado contingent from eight to 12. The French, meanwhile, are having to split their military resources between two fronts now, with the opening of the conflict in the Ivory Coast.

But the Libyan rebels are not alone in their complaints: Within NATO, there is also increasing frustration at the slow progress on the ground. The seemingly rudderless attacking and fleeing of the untrained fighters in the face of government soldiers is causing the Western allies to despair, albeit not in public, because it looks more and more likely that the undeclared aim of the international intervention -- the removal of [dictator Moammar Gadhafi](#) -- will probably never be achieved.

And this mutual disillusionment suggests that the second phase of the civil war is now beginning. The situation which critics had feared from the start has now seemingly occurred: a stalemate. The rebels are strong enough, with the support of NATO, to maintain their control of Benghazi, but are too weak to drive on in the direction of Tripoli. The front is moving a few miles back and forth, but the split between the Gadhafi-controlled west of the country and the rebel zone in the east seems to be solidifying.

### "Sliding into a Prolonged Conflict"

"Libya appears to be sliding into a prolonged conflict with no light at the end of the tunnel," Fawaz Gerges, a Middle East expert at the London School of Economics (LSE), wrote in a [commentary](#) posted on CNN's website. The tenacious resistance of the Gadhafi regime is not surprising, he added, "given the tribal structure of Libyan society and Gadhafi's manipulation and co-opting of tribal divisions and allies."

NATO can always point to the fact that it is simply implementing the aims agreed upon by the United Nations -- a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians. But in reality, it is hardly a secret that the true goals of the operation are more than that. Every day that Gadhafi remains in power, pressure is growing on Western politicians and military leaders. The question of how long the intervention will last is increasingly being asked out loud. The British Royal Air Force

chief estimated this week that it would take six months. Politicians, on the other hand, have had the foresight not to mention any deadlines.

The discussion in the West has been running in circles for quite some time now, although the question of whether to arm the rebels has been answered: The first deliveries of light weapons from abroad have arrived, rebel leader Younis said. The British government has also sent communications equipment to enable rebel leaders to better command their fighters. The international community appears to have agreed, however, that heavy artillery and complex high-tech weapons should not be given to Gadhafi's opponents.

As for the government, Gadhafi and his followers are being tackled with a further mixture of threats and promises. The dictator has been given the message that he would not be prevented from going into exile. At the same time, those around him are being encouraged to defect. And there does seem to be some movement: The flight of Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa last week was hailed as a breakthrough, while rumors that two of Gadhafi's sons, Saif al-Islam and Al-Saadi, are planning a future without their father can be interpreted as a sign of nervousness.

On Wednesday evening it was revealed that Gadhafi had written a letter to [US President Barack Obama](#) asking him to end the air strikes. It met with little success: Hilary Clinton immediately rejected the appeal out of hand and countered by demanding that the dictator go into exile.

### **Military Escalation a Backwards Step**

But what will happen if all this fails to change the status quo? How long can the no-fly zone be maintained? Could the West come to terms with a divided country? How serious is the West about its repeated assertion that a future for Libya which involves Gadhafi and his sons is unthinkable? A divided country is regarded as unacceptable in the long run, but a ground invasion involving Western troops to resolve this split has been ruled out by all sides. An occupation of Libya was explicitly prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, and no Western or Arabic government wants to be drawn so far into the war. Nor would it be advisable, LSE Professor Gerges wrote. A military escalation could only be a backwards step -- one that would weaken the democratic movement in Libya.

No one has so far come up with an effective formula for ending the Libyan stalemate. The Western-Arab alliance is hoping steadfastly for one of two outcomes: Either the rebels win the military conflict against all escalations, or Gadhafi voluntarily steps down. Either event would come as a surprise.

In the US, where skeptics have dominated the discussion from the start, there have already been demands for the operation, which seems to lack any strategy, to be ended immediately.

"Hoping to get lucky is no basis for US foreign policy," Doug Bandow of the libertarian Cato Institute [wrote](#) on the Huffington Post website. "The administration should begin a speedy exit from Libya. Washington doesn't need another disaster in the Middle East."

That would mean a loss of face, which no Western government wants. The crucial question is: Who has more patience, NATO or Gadhafi?

### **URL:**

- <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,755616,00.html>

## GREECE

# Toward debt restructuring

6 April 2011



Financial Times Deutschland, 6 April 2011

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What *Süddeutsche Zeitung* calls "the subject that is discussed in whispers at the EU" — the likely restructuring of Greece's sovereign debt — dominates the [front page of \*Financial Times Deutschland\*](#). According to the German business daily, "the EU has lost faith in Greece" and international market confidence in the country has declined to the point where it will no longer be able to independently seek financing to service its debt in 2012 — a situation that was not part of the plan. On 5 April, the rate of interest on Greek 10-year bonds reached 12.7 percent, which is twice the rate that the country pays on its loans from the EU and the IMF.

Two outstanding problems remain. The first of these is that speculation in the wake of a restructuring of Greek debt could destabilise other member states in difficulty — i.e. Ireland and Portugal. The second is that the EU has yet to establish a procedure for restructuring. "Greece will have to negotiate on its own behalf and will depend on the good will" of the banks and insurance companies that are its creditors, remarks *FTD*.

## IMMIGRATION


# Lampedusa: mirror of European impotence

5 April 2011

A famous line by Italian writer Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa: "Everything must change so that everything can stay the same", has proved wrong at Lampedusa, [writes \*Gazeta Wyborcza\*](#). With revolutions raging in Tunisia and Libya, "the nightmarish wave of unhappy immigrant families" has hit the Italian island with the force of tsunami and its situation has become "tragic". "Lampedusa has become a gauge of the limited possibilities open to Europe in terms of illegal immigration and asylum policy," notes the daily stressing that Frontex agency which controls EU borders has no means on its own, and instead must ask member states to supply police force and funds. As far as these issues are concerned, European solidarity is very limited to say the least. Meanwhile Brussels' bureaucracy has more than once proved "helpless" or dependent on good will of member states. "One Italian dignitary has recently said that immigrants should be sent back to their home countries. What for? To "welcome" them again the next day? Why not drown them on the way?", asks *GW* ironically.

## EZB startet Zinswende

Erstmals seit Beginn der Finanzkrise erhöht die Europäische Zentralbank den Leitzins. Damit sollen Inflationsgefahren bekämpft werden. Die europäischen Währungshüter leiten die Zinswende schneller ein als ihre Kollegen in Amerika, Japan und Großbritannien.



07. April 2011

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat erstmals seit Beginn der Finanzkrise die Zinsen erhöht. Im Kampf gegen die anziehende Inflation hob der EZB-Rat am Donnerstag den Schlüsselzins um einen viertel Prozentpunkt auf 1,25 Prozent an. Damit wagt die EZB die geldpolitische Wende, nachdem sie den Zielsatz für Zentralbankgeld seit Mai 2009 auf dem Rekordtief von 1,0 Prozent belassen hatte.

Die EZB will mit dem Zinsschritt Inflationsgefahren bekämpfen. Vor allem wegen immer teurerer Nahrungsmittel und Energie war die Inflation im Euroraum zuletzt auf 2,6 Prozent geklettert. Damit liegt sie über dem von der EZB formulierten Stabilitätsziel von knapp zwei Prozent.

Volkswirte erwarten, dass die Notenbank den Leitzins in den kommenden Monaten in kleinen Schritten auf 2,0 Prozent anheben wird. Damit soll der Preisdruck gesenkt und die Kaufkraft erhalten werden. Für die schwächelnde Konjunktur in hoch verschuldeten Ländern am Rand der Euro-Zone wie Irland, Griechenland und Portugal könnte die Zinserhöhung negativ sein. Höhere Zinsen können den Preisauftrieb bremsen, sie verteuern aber auch Kredite.

### „Zinserhöhung war überfällig“

Oberstes Ziel der EZB ist allerdings die Preisstabilität, die sie bei einer Teuerungsrate von knapp unter zwei Prozent gewährleistet sieht. Im März betrug die jährliche Teuerungsrate im Euroraum 2,6 Prozent.

„Diese Zinserhöhung war überfällig“, sagte Commerzbank-Chefökonom Jörg Krämer. Die EZB stemmt sich gegen die anziehende Teuerung in der Euro-Zone, an deren Rändern die Schuldenkrise immer neue Opfer fordert: Nach Griechenland und Irland soll nun auch Portugal mit Finanzhilfen von EU und IWF vor einer Staatspleite bewahrt werden. Die Refinanzierung Portugals hatte sich zuletzt drastisch verteuert. Durch die Zinserhöhung wird auch das südwesteuropäische Land Mehrkosten tragen müssen, wenn es bei der Sanierung der Staatsfinanzen auf Kredite von außen angewiesen ist. Die Bundesregierung begrüßte Portugals Hilfsersuchen an den Euro-Rettungsschirm EFSF, das zugleich zu einer Beruhigung der Finanzmärkte beitrug.

Auch die Währungshüter dürften dies bei ihrem Zinsentscheid mitberücksichtigt haben. Ihnen sitzt vor allem die Furcht im Nacken, dass der Inflationsdruck in wirtschaftlich prosperierenden Ländern wie Deutschland eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale auslösen könnte. Diese Gefahr sehen auch die führenden deutschen Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute, die in ihrem Frühjahrsgutachten eine „geringe Anhebung des Leitzinses“ für sinnvoll erachten. Die Teuerungsrate in der Euro-Zone war zuletzt auf 2,6 Prozent gestiegen und damit der Stabilitätsmarke der EZB von knapp zwei Prozent weit enteilt. „Angesichts des Inflationsdrucks ist die heutige Zinsentscheidung der EZB nachvollziehbar“, sagte der Präsident des Deutschen Industrie- und Handelskammertages (DIHK), Hans Heinrich Driftmann, zu Reuters. „Sie trägt zur Stabilisierung der Preise bei und erhöht damit auch die Planungssicherheit für Unternehmen.“ Scharfe Kritik kam dagegen vom Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). „Mit der Erhöhung des Leitzinssatzes befindet sich die EZB erneut auf einem geldpolitischen Holzweg“, sagte Bundesvorstand Claus Matecki.

### **Keine Zinserhöhung in Großbritannien**

Trichet hatte die Märkte vor Wochen behutsam auf den Zinsschritt vorbereitet, indem er eine Erhöhung im April als „möglich, aber nicht sicher“ bezeichnete. Auch wenn er keine Serie von Zinserhöhungen signalisiert hat, wird am Markt doch mit einer Reihe von geldpolitischen Trippelschritten gerechnet. Nach einer jüngst veröffentlichten Umfrage von Reuters könnten die Anleger, die in Erwartung von Zinserhöhungen den Euro gekauft haben, richtig liegen: Die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine weitere Zinserhöhung Ende Juni wird bei 90 Prozent gesehen. Im Schnitt gehen die Experten davon aus, dass die EZB je Quartal die Zinsen für ein Jahr in kleinen Schritten erneut anheben wird. Nach einer kurzen Pause würden die Zinsen im dritten und vierten Quartal 2012 weiter steigen. Ende nächsten Jahres stünden sie dann bei 2,5 Prozent.

In Großbritannien lassen sich die Währungshüter trotz des noch höheren Inflationsdrucks jedoch noch Zeit mit einer Zinswende. Die Bank von England (BoE) beließ den Leitzins wie von Experten erwartet bei 0,5 Prozent, obwohl die Teuerungsrate mittlerweile auf 4,4 Prozent angewachsen ist. Experten zufolge zögert die BoE wegen der steigenden Konjunkturrisiken, es der EZB gleichzutun. Auch in den von großen Arbeitsmarktproblemen geplagten Vereinigten Staaten hält die Notenbank Fed noch still: Dort könnte es erst Ende des Jahres, oder gar erst 2012 zu einer Abkehr von der Nullzinspolitik kommen.

### **Höchster Leitzins zuvor im Oktober 2000**

Der EZB-Leitzins, zu dem sich die Geschäftsbanken bei den Zentralbanken mit flüssigen Mitteln versorgen, startete mit der Einführung des Euro als Buchgeld am 1. Januar 1999 in einer Höhe von 3,0 Prozent. Bis Oktober 2000 stieg er in mehreren Schritten auf den bisherigen Höchststand von 4,75 Prozent.

Ab Mai 2001 sank der von der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) festgesetzte Hauptrefinanzierungssatz für den Euroraum wieder. Zum Zeitpunkt der Einführung des Euro als Bargeld am 1. Januar 2002 lag der Leitzins bei 3,25 Prozent. Bis Juni 2003 sank er auf den Satz von 2,0 Prozent, wo er zweieinhalb Jahre lang verharrte.

Im Dezember 2005 begann ein neuer Zyklus, der bis auf 4,25 Prozent ab Juli 2008 führte. Die Wirtschaftskrise veranlasste die EZB zu einer schnellen Senkung ab Oktober 2008; einmal - im Dezember 2008 - sogar um den unter Experten als dramatisch eingeschätzten Schritt von 0,75 Prozentpunkten, von 3,25 Prozent auf 2,5 Prozent, binnen nur eines Monats. In vier weiteren Schritten erreichte der Leitzins am 13. Mai 2009 sein bisheriges historisches Tief von 1,0 Prozent.

## Changing Libyan Tactics Pose Problems for NATO

By STEVEN ERLANGER; Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya.  
1316 mots  
7 avril 2011

The New York Times

PARIS -- Angry charges by Libyan rebels that NATO has failed to come to their aid point up a question that has haunted the Western air campaign from the start: how to avoid a stalemate and defeat the Libyan leader without putting foreign troops on the ground.

NATO officials and the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, rejected the opposition criticism on Wednesday, saying that bad weather and evolving tactics by forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi were limiting the air war, which is supposed to be protecting Libyan civilians and driving the colonel's troops to retreat to their barracks. In recent days, Qaddafi forces have stepped up their shelling of Misurata, in the west, and pushed rebels back from some eastern oil towns.

The rebels, of course, are a largely untrained, disorganized fighting force. But the nature of the battle has also changed since a United Nations resolution authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.

In the early stages of the air campaign, allied warplanes blistered Qaddafi tanks, artillery and transport trucks in the desert outside the rebel capital, Benghazi. But American intelligence reports from Libya say that the Qaddafi forces are now hiding their troops and weaponry among urban populations and traveling in pickup trucks and S.U.V.'s rather than military vehicles, making them extremely difficult targets.

"The military capabilities available to Qaddafi remain quite substantial," said a senior Pentagon official who watches Libya. "What this shows is that you cannot guarantee tipping the balance of ground operations only with bombs and missiles from the air."

NATO officials, who just took over responsibility for the air campaign from the United States, deny that their bureaucracy is somehow limiting the campaign. "No country is vetoing this target or that one; it's not like Kosovo," where in 1999 some countries objected to certain bombing targets, said a senior NATO official, asking anonymity in accordance with diplomatic practice.

"The military command is doing what it wants to do," he said.

NATO officials said on Wednesday that NATO was flying more missions every day, and that defending Misurata was a priority. Carmen Romero, a NATO spokeswoman, said that the alliance flew 137 missions on Monday and 186 on Tuesday, and planned 198 on Wednesday. "We have a clear mandate, and we will do everything to protect the citizens of Misurata."

A rebel spokesman in Misurata said Wednesday that NATO had delivered two airstrikes that pushed the Qaddafi forces away from the port, opening it for vital supply ships. "We have renewed momentum, and our friends are helping us big time," said Mohamed, a rebel spokesman whose name was withheld for the protection of his family.

"NATO is not the problem," the senior NATO official said. "The Qaddafi forces have learned and have adapted. They're using human shields, so it's difficult to attack them from the air." While many Western officials have accused the Qaddafi forces of using human shields, they have yet to produce explicit evidence. But they generally mean that the troops take shelter, with their armor, in civilian areas.

The harder question is how NATO will respond to the changed tactics of the Qaddafi forces, which now seem to have achieved a stalemate against the combination of Western air power and the ragtag opposition army.

First, there is a question of whether without the participation of the United States, the rest of the coalition -- France, Britain, Italy, Spain, Norway, Qatar and a few others -- have the right mix of weapons or enough of them. In particular, the United States uses a jet called the A-10, or Warthog -- which flies lower and slower than other airplanes but has cannon that can destroy armored vehicles -- as well as the AC-130, both of which are effective in more built-up areas. The Europeans have nothing similar.

The United States has had C.I.A. agents on the ground with the rebels in eastern Libya for some time, and there are unconfirmed reports that they may be helping to train the rebel army's raw recruits. Even so, forming a real army that can oust Colonel Qaddafi may take many months, and the coalition is unlikely to be that patient.

That is one reason that allied governments, including the United States and Britain, are urging defections from the Qaddafi circle and hoping that he will be removed from inside. No official, of course, is willing to talk about any covert mission to remove the colonel, except to say that "regime change" is not authorized by the United Nations.



And that is why Britain, Turkey and the United States are all exploring the possibilities of a negotiated solution to the conflict, provided Colonel Qaddafi and his sons relinquish power.

Francois Heisbourg, a military policy expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, said, "Given where we are, any deal that removes Colonel Qaddafi from the scene is a deal we should take."

As for the current air war, NATO is especially sensitive to the criticism that came most scathingly from the leader of the Libyan opposition forces, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes. He said in Benghazi late Tuesday that "NATO blesses us every now and then with a bombardment here and there, and is letting the people of Misurata die every day."

Mr. Juppe, whose country has been the most aggressive in defense of the Libyan opposition, said on Wednesday that the situation in Misurata was difficult, but it was complicated by the need to protect civilian lives.

"Misurata is in a situation that cannot carry on," Mr. Juppe told France Info radio. "But I want to make clear that we categorically asked that there is no collateral damage on the civilian population, so it makes the military interventions more difficult, because Qaddafi's troops understood it very well and are getting closer to the civilian population."

He said he would bring up the difficulties of Misurata to the NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Rebel leaders have rejected the idea that the Qaddafi forces in Misurata cannot be attacked from the air, saying that the neighborhoods where the troops are concentrated were long ago abandoned by civilians.

Another option is to increase the pressure on Colonel Qaddafi and his sons, although openly changing the objective in Libya from protecting civilians to ousting the Qaddafi family from power would probably shatter the international coalition that is enforcing the United Nations resolution, said Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"Nevertheless," he added, "the U.S. and its allies need to make hard -- if somewhat covert -- choices, and make them quickly," he said in an e-mailed commentary. "The last thing anyone needs at a time when there is near-turmoil from Pakistan to Morocco is a long-lasting open wound of political division and extended conflict in Libya as the worst-of-the-worst authoritarian leaders elsewhere in the region struggle to survive."

NATO needs to take the rebels' side more forcefully, he said, despite the neutrality of the United Nations resolution. That could take several forms, he said, among them "killing Qaddafi forces the moment they move or concentrate, rather than waiting for them to attack; striking Qaddafi's military and security facilities; and finding excuses to strike his compound."

For Libya, Mr. Cordesman wrote, "a long political and economic crisis and an extended low-level conflict that devastates populated areas" would represent a "net humanitarian cost" that would be "higher than fully backing the rebels, with air power and covert arms and training."

PHOTO: East of Brega, Libya, rebels fired rockets on Wednesday. The rebels have criticized NATO's Libya campaign. (PHOTOGRAPH BY BRYAN DENTON FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES)

## The language of war in Libya

George F. Will

7 avril 2011

# The Washington Post

Several weeks ago, when President Obama reportedly assured congressional leaders that America's intervention in Libya would involve "days, not weeks," skeptics mistakenly worried about mission creep. They should have feared mission gallop.

Or perhaps mission meander. At about this point in foreign policy misadventures, the usual question is: What is Plan B? Today's question is: What was Plan A? When Obama inserted America into what was, and ostensibly still is, a preemptive war to protect Libyan civilians from Libya's government, he neglected to clarify a few things, such as: Do the armed rebels trying to overthrow that government still count as civilians?

That is, however, irrelevant if the assumption is that no Libyan is safe as long as Moammar Gaddafi is in power. If so, regime change is a logical imperative of humanitarian imperialism.

Have you noticed how many of the U.S. armed services' recruiting appeals, on television and in advertisements in airports and elsewhere, show this or that service engaged in humanitarian relief operations, distributing food and medicine? These present the U.S. military as the Red Cross with, for reasons that are unclear, weapons. Given that some of the services sometimes seem reluctant to recruit for their primary mission - maintaining a credible capability for war - it is not so odd that the Obama administration flinches from the word "war."

The administration has retired the short-lived and redundant obfuscation "kinetic military action," which supposedly described what all those warships and war aircraft were doing with all those munitions. It validated George Orwell's axiom (in his 1946 essay "Politics and the English Language") that "the great enemy of clear language is insincerity."

Now the administration must decide how to characterize those on whose behalf we have gone to war. They are rebels, and America, born in rebellion and culturally disposed to skepticism about authority, is inclined to think kindly of rebels. This was particularly so during the 1960s, especially on college campuses. On one of them, Antioch, the students, full of idealism and empty of information, gathered to watch "To Die in Madrid," a documentary about the Spanish Civil War. When the narrator intoned about a column of soldiers, "The rebels advanced on Madrid," the students cheered, unaware that the rebels were Gen. Franco's fascists.

Not all rebels are admirable, so when the administration said there would be no American boots on the ground in Libya, it left room for American shoes worn by CIA operatives. Evidently some are now among the insurgents, humming a Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein tune:

"Getting to know you, getting to know all about you.

Getting to like you, getting to hope you like me."

Perhaps the CIA operatives should have stayed home and talked to some senators who seem to know what's what. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) refers to the Libyan rebels as part of a "pro-democracy movement." Perhaps they are. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) must think so. Serving, as usual, as Sancho Panza to Sen. John McCain's Don Quixote, Graham said last Sunday (on "Face the Nation"), "We should be taking the fight to Tripoli."

But not (yet) to Yamoussoukro, capital of Ivory Coast. Members of the Congressional Libyan Liberation Caucus - it does not formally exist (yet) - presumably subscribe to the doctrine "R2P." That is the accepted shorthand for "responsibility to protect." This notion is central to humanitarian imperialism, a project that certainly promises to provide steady work. The Libyan venture is coinciding with a humanitarian disaster in Ivory Coast, where corpses are piling up by the hundreds and the fighting is producing displaced persons by the hundreds of thousands. They will have to make do with U.N. and French interveners until America's humanitarian imperialists can get around to them.

Obama's inability, or reluctance, to say clearly why we are involved in Libya or under what conditions the mission might be said to have been accomplished has occasioned comparisons with Iraq. A more apposite comparison is to Jimmy Carter's invasion of Iran - a nation twice as large as France - with eight helicopters. This became emblematic of a floundering president out of his depth.

As Calvin Coolidge, who knew his depth, was leaving the presidency in March 1929, he said, "Perhaps one of the most important accomplishments of my administration has been minding my own business." Before an administration can do that, it must define its responsibilities and competence with sufficient modesty to acknowledge that some things are not its business.

04/07/2011 08:38 AM

'A Grave Moment for Our Country'

## Portugal Forced to Request EU Bailout

**Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates has been insisting for months that he would not ask the EU for help. But on Wednesday he announced he was doing just that, after bond yields reached an unsustainable level. The bailout could amount to as much as 80 billion euros.**

Portugal has asked the European Union for a bailout, following in the footsteps of Greece and Ireland to become the third euro-zone member to request help from Brussels.

The country's caretaker prime minister, Jose Socrates, announced on national television Wednesday that Portugal needs international assistance in order to save its struggling economy. Socrates said his caretaker government had asked "for financial help, to ensure financing for our country, for our financial system and for our economy."

"I tried everything, but in conscience we have reached a moment when not taking this decision would imply risks that the country should not take," Socrates said. "This is an especially grave moment for our country. And things will only get worse if nothing's done." It was the first time that the prime minister had admitted that the country needed external help, after months of denying he would ask the EU for a bailout. "It's in the national interest," he added.

Socrates did not give details about how much money Portugal would ask for, but analysts expect the sum to be up to €80 billion (\$114 billion). Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos had earlier said that the government would ask Brussels for help "immediately."

In a statement, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said that Socrates had informed the EU on Wednesday about the request for assistance. Portugal's request would be processed "in the swiftest possible manner, according to the rules applicable," he said, and spoke of his "confidence in Portugal's capacity to overcome the present difficulties, with the solidarity of its partners."

### IMF 'Ready to Assist'

The International Monetary Fund said Wednesday night that it had not yet received a request for help from Lisbon. "We stand ready to assist Portugal," the organization said in a statement. Germany, the biggest economy in the euro zone and as such the largest contributor to bailouts, insists on IMF involvement as a precondition for rescues.

The EU's Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn told the news agency Reuters that the request for help was "a responsible move by the Portuguese government for the sake of economic stability in the country and in Europe." He said the exact amount of aid would be determined shortly. The bailout is expected to be discussed at a previously scheduled meeting of European finance ministers in Budapest on Thursday.

Prime Minister Socrates [resigned on March 23](#) following the opposition's decision not to support his minority government in getting its latest package of austerity measures -- the fourth in under a year -- through parliament. He is staying on as caretaker prime minister until elections in early June.

There had been doubts as to whether the country's constitution would allow an interim prime minister to apply for a bailout, but Socrates said on Wednesday he hoped the opposition would support him in the move. Pedro Passos Coelho, the leader of the main opposition party, the center-right Social Democrats (PSD), said he supported the aid

request. "This needs to be seen as the first step in not hiding the truth," he said Wednesday, reacting to Socrates' announcement.

### **Downgraded Debt**

Portugal had little choice but to ask for outside help after the yields it was forced to offer on its sovereign bonds in order to attract investors reached increasingly untenable levels in recent weeks. The yield on Portugal's 10-year bond rose to over 8.5 percent in a bond issue on Wednesday, which managed to raise around €1 billion. Finance Minister Teixeira dos Santos said in November that the country would barely be able to service its debts if bond yields rose to 7 percent.

Additionally, two credit ratings agencies had recently downgraded Portuguese debt to just one notch above junk status, which helped to push up yields. Portugal's biggest banks had also warned this week they might no longer be able to buy government debt.

Lisbon has a total of €5 billion in sovereign bond and interest payments due on April 15. Although analysts had been confident that the Portuguese government would be able to make those payments, there were growing worries about its ability to make a further €7 billion in payments that are due in mid-June, especially given the country's political crisis.

Analysts believe a Portuguese default would threaten the existence of the whole euro zone, as banks in several European countries, including Spain and Germany, are heavily exposed to Portuguese debt. Other euro-zone countries have been urging Lisbon for months to seek EU help, in an attempt to stop the sovereign debt crisis from getting any worse. There are fears that the contagion could spread to Spain, which, as the fourth largest economy in the currency zone, could be too large to rescue.

Although Portugal's debt problems have not been as great as those of Greece or Ireland, poor growth in recent years made it vulnerable to contagion from the euro zone's debt crisis. Its budget deficit hit 9.3 percent of gross domestic product in 2009, way over the 3 percent threshold dictated under euro-zone rules. Lisbon introduced a series of austerity measures in a bid to bring the deficit down to 4.6 percent of GDP, its target for 2011. Unemployment is at a record high of 11.2 percent, and the Bank of Portugal has said it expects a double-dip recession in 2011.

*dgs - with wire reports*

## **Petraeus Misfires on Quran Burning**

By Dorothy Rabinowitz

814 mots

7 avril 2011

It must have come as a disappointment to the mullahs of Mazar-e-Sharif -- who sent the faithful out on Friday with instructions to avenge the recent insult to the Quran -- and to the mobs who consequently went forth to slaughter 12 people at U.N. headquarters, nine more in Kandahar the next day, and two more the next, that their bloody enterprise had counted for so little in the eyes of Western military leaders.

So it would appear at least from the response by Gen. David Petraeus, who delivered an impassioned rebuke of a publicity-hungry Florida pastor who had presided over the mock trial and burning of a Quran on March 20. This act was, the general declared in a video statement over the weekend, "hateful, extremely disrespectful, and enormously intolerant." It had endangered American troops. He wanted, he announced, to condemn it in the strongest possible terms.

No one listening could doubt it. The general would go on to say more, but nowhere in any of that condemnation was it possible to find a mention of the merciless savagery that had taken place in the name of devotion to God and the Quran. Mark Sedwill, the NATO senior civilian representative who joined Gen. Petraeus in the statement, did manage to find a moment to murmur in passing that, of course, condolences were due to "everyone who has been hurt in the demonstrations."

It's hard to conceive of a pronouncement richer in evasions of brutal reality than this one, with its references to people "hurt" in "demonstrations." The participants in these "demonstrations" -- a nice touch, that, suggestive of marchers, perhaps carrying placards -- had in fact hunted down and killed, by shooting, stabbing and beating to death a total of 22 people by the end of the third day's expression of religious devotion.

In an interview Sunday in this newspaper, Gen. Petraeus reflected further on the problems caused by burning the Quran and how mobs could be influenced by those who might have an interest in hijacking passions -- "in this case, perhaps, understandable passions."

To this the only sane response is no. They are not understandable, these passions that so invariably find voice in mass murder, the butchery of imagined enemies like the people hunted down in the U.N. office Friday, and of everyone else the mobs encountered who might fit the bill. We will not prevail over terrorism and the related bloodlust of this fundamentalist fanaticism as long as our leading representatives, the military included, are inclined to pronounce its motivations as "understandable."

It should be said that President Obama, to his credit, went on to declare, after denouncing the Quran burning, that to kill innocent people in response is "outrageous and an offense to human decency and dignity." It should be said, too, that it's a bleak commentary on the prevailing political atmosphere that the president's public recognition of the horrors committed by those rampaging soldiers of Islam should seem noteworthy.

Still, it was. And it came as a relief, after so much handwringing, all of it focused on the Florida pastor and the likelihood that he may have endangered American troops. (The same was said about the danger to American troops when Newsweek published a false report, in 2005, that American interrogators had flushed a Quran down the toilet -- an event which set off days of rioting and bloodshed in Afghanistan and elsewhere.)

By making no mention of the perpetrators of the current massacres -- while managing to suggest they were understandably driven to their action -- Gen. Petraeus doubtless believed he was taking the appropriate politic path. It's a path that's unquestionably familiar -- called appeasement -- and one whose usual outcome is also familiar.

Displays of cringing deference to the forces loosed on the streets of Afghanistan over the weekend will not strengthen the American mission. They will stiffen the spines of the jihadists. Such displays count as victories, reassuring indicators that the threat of terrorism -- mob terrorism, in this case -- continues to work its wonders as a weapon of war. The sort that could send the commanding general of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and a NATO official into swoons of apology while denouncing the pastor's act. For a moment there during their joint statement it seemed altogether possible that one or another of them might begin rending his garments.

That none of these emotional proclamations included any judgment, moral or otherwise, about the criminality of the zealots who had just taken so many lives, speaks volumes to those at war with us -- all of it encouraging to them. Something to consider adding to the list of things that might endanger the lives of American troops.

Ms. Rabinowitz is a member of the Journal's editorial board.


# Public opinion on capitalism

## Market troubles

The Economist Apr 6th 2011, 15:25 by The Economist online

### Which countries are most in favour of the free market?

FAITH in the free market is at a low in the world's biggest free-market economy. In 2010, 59% of Americans asked by GlobeScan, a polling firm, agreed "strongly" or "somewhat" that the free market was the best system for the world's future. This has fallen sharply from 80% when the question was first asked in 2002. And among poorer Americans under \$20,000, faith in capitalism fell from 76% to 44% in just one year. Of the 25 countries polled, support for the free market is now greatest in Germany, just ahead of Brazil and communist China, both of which have seen strong growth in recent years. Indians are less enthusiastic despite recent gains in growth. Italy shows a surprising fondness for markets for a place that is uncompetitive in many sectors. In France under a third of people believe that the free market is the best option, down from 42% in 2002.



## Europe's debt crisis

# Down goes another one

The Economist Apr 7th 2011, 0:24 by The Economist online | LISBON



ANOTHER domino has fallen in the eurozone debt crisis. After Greece and Ireland, Portugal has become the third debt-laden economy on Europe's periphery to request a financial rescue.

European Union leaders have breathed a sigh of relief. Olli Rehn, the EU's top economic official, said it was a "responsible step for securing the financial stability of the euro zone". José Manuel Barroso, a former Portuguese prime minister who is now president of the European Commission, said the request would be "processed in the swiftest possible manner".

But Portugal, facing years of austerity and low growth, may not be inclined to join in the general rejoicing. Spain, lacking the firewall that Portugal had previously provided, could be feeling distinctly uneasy.

Markets have so far given Spain the benefit of the doubt, appreciating decisive deficit-cutting measures implemented by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the country's Socialist prime minister. But investors may grow more sceptical when they begin to examine Spain's troubled savings banks more carefully, noting that the government also runs a bigger budget deficit than Portugal.

José Sócrates, Portugal's outgoing prime minister, who belligerently resisted a bail-out for almost a year, blamed his eventual capitulation on the centre-right Social Democrats (PSD), the main opposition party. By refusing to support the minority Socialist government's fourth austerity package, he said, the PSD had precipitated a political crisis that forced him to resign on March 23rd, triggering an early election on June 5th.

Portugal and its banks had since seen their credit ratings downgraded to "dangerous" levels, Mr Sócrates said. The country's borrowing costs soared to successive euro-era highs for 11 consecutive days. Shortly before he announced in a brief televised address on Wednesday night that he had asked the EU for help, Portugal had been forced to pay what analysts said was a "prohibitive" interest rate of 5.9% to raise €1 billion (\$1.43 billion) in one-year debt.

Pedro Passos Coelho, the PSD leader and favourite in the polls to become the next prime minister, said the request for aid had come too late, but that he would support it nevertheless.

The outgoing government has not specified how much or what type of aid it has requested. But it is unlikely, yet, to be a full Greek- or Irish-style bail-out agreement supported by the European Financial Stability Facility and the IMF.

Only the new government chosen in the election will have the authority to negotiate a “more substantial” aid package of that nature, according to Mr Passos Coelho. In the meantime, Mr Sócrates is expected to negotiate some form of interim aid that will see Portugal past two big financing hurdles on April 15th and June 15th, when it has to pay a total of €12 billion in bond redemptions and interest payments.

Mr Sócrates has thrown in the towel, but Portugal knows from the example of Greece and Ireland that its problems are far from over. João Leite, head of investment at Portugal’s Banco Carregosa, said the request for aid was unlikely to lead to any significant reduction in the country’s long-term debt yields.

More importantly for voters, the austerity measures that Europe’s fiscally conservative governments will demand as a condition for aid can be expected to bite much harder than those Mr Sócrates pushed through. On top of all this, the Portuguese will have to endure two months of election campaigning by politicians whose credibility with many voters has fallen as low as the country’s credit standing in bond markets.



# «Le soutien des troupes françaises était nécessaire»

Par [Alain Barluet](#)

06/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 13:57 Réactions (24)

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Ban Ki-moon a demandé le renfort de la force «Licorne». Le secrétaire général de l'ONU a eu Nicolas Sarkozy au téléphone pour lui demander ce renfort. Le président français a donné son feu vert. Crédits photo : Jane Hahn/ASSOCIATED PRESS

**Secrétaire général adjoint de l'ONU, chargé des opérations de maintien de la paix, Alain Le Roy revient sur les modalités de l'appui des militaires français de «Licorne» aux forces des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire.**

**LE FIGARO. - Les Forces des Nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire (Onuci) ont sollicité l'appui des militaires français déployés dans le cadre de la force «Licorne». Comment cela s'est-il passé ?**

**Alain LE ROY.** - La résolution 1962 du 21 décembre 2010 donne clairement mandat aux forces françaises en Côte d'Ivoire d'intervenir à la demande l'Onuci. Le 30 mars dernier, la résolution 1975, votée à l'unanimité des membres du Conseil de sécurité a autorisé «toutes les mesures nécessaires» pour mettre hors d'état de nuire les «armes lourdes» menaçant les civils en Côte d'Ivoire. Or, depuis plusieurs jours, l'usage des armes lourdes par les partisans de Laurent Gbagbo s'était fortement intensifié contre la population civile ainsi que contre les Casques bleus. Dimanche, Ban Ki-moon a donc demandé à l'Onuci de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour neutraliser ces armes lourdes. Compte tenu de leur nombre, il a demandé le renfort de **la force «Licorne»**, conformément à la résolution 1962. Le secrétaire général de l'ONU a eu Nicolas Sarkozy au téléphone pour lui demander ce renfort. Le président français a donné son feu vert et l'accord a été confirmé par échange de lettres.

La mise au point du plan d'intervention n'aura pris au total que quelques heures. L'Onuci ne disposant que de trois hélicoptères d'attaque, le soutien des troupes françaises était nécessaire pour mener des frappes simultanées contre les armes lourdes, chars, véhicules blindés, mitrailleuses et RPG en tout genre. Faute de pouvoir frapper simultanément, nous nous serions inévitablement exposés à des tirs en retour.

**En Côte d'Ivoire, c'est donc la première fois que «Licorne» prête main-forte aux Casques bleus de l'Onuci ?**

Oui, de façon aussi intense, mais il y a eu de nombreuses collaborations préalablement, toujours en vertu de la résolution 1962. Il y a aussi eu des précédents ailleurs. Ainsi, en 2003 en Ituri, province orientale de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), la force de l'ONU dans ce pays, la Monuc, a obtenu le soutien de l'opération «Artemis», mise en œuvre par l'Union européenne, dans un moment critique pour nos troupes. De même, l'UE a apporté son soutien à la Monuc, en 2006, pour les élections générales en RDC.

**Quel est aujourd'hui le rôle de l'Onuci ?**

Les armes lourdes menaçant les populations civiles ont été pour l'essentiel mises hors d'état de nuire. Laurent Gbagbo a demandé un cessez-le-feu et négocie les conditions de la transition. L'Onuci est là pour offrir ses bons offices. Par ailleurs, elle doit intensifier encore ses patrouilles pour protéger les populations civiles, ce qui reste le cœur de son mandat. Cela peut désormais être fait dans de meilleures conditions de sécurité puisque les armes lourdes se sont tues.

# Le «coup de main» des soldats français à la démocratie

Par [Isabelle Lasserre](#)

05/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 22:11 Réactions (48)

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Des hommes de la force «Licorne» le 3 avril à l'aéroport d'Abidjan. Crédits photo : SCH BLANCHET/AFP

**Les 900 soldats aguerris de «Licorne» étaient les seuls capables, parmi les 10.000 hommes de l'Onuci, d'agir de façon aussi radicale contre les forces de Laurent Gbagbo.**

Militairement, l'affaire était largement à la portée des forces françaises. Diplomatiquement, c'était comme marcher sur une ligne de crête. «Licorne» a donc frappé fort, avec **quatre hélicoptères lancés à l'assaut des pièces d'artillerie**, des blindés et des camps militaires de Laurent Gbagbo. Avant de relâcher la pression pour voir l'effet obtenu.

Les frappes menées lundi soir par la force de réaction rapide à la demande de l'ONU ont été interrompues mardi, en tout cas provisoirement. Un coup unique mais acéré, censé aider suffisamment les hommes d'Alassane Ouattara pour leur permettre de prendre le pouvoir, gagné en novembre dans les urnes et confisqué depuis par le président sortant. Une espèce de coup de main donné à la démocratie. L'ancienne puissance coloniale, si souvent critiquée pour s'être portée militairement au secours des régimes africains, même les moins fréquentables, lorsqu'ils étaient menacés par des rébellions, **avait pourtant tenté de rester à l'écart des combats, ne voulant surtout pas être impliquée une nouvelle fois dans la crise ivoirienne**. Mais les 900 soldats aguerris de «Licorne», portés à 1650 ces derniers jours, étaient les seuls capables, parmi les 10.000 hommes de l'Onuci, la force des Nations unies, à agir de façon aussi radicale contre les forces de Laurent Gbagbo.

Vu de Paris, la neutralité africaine défendue par la nouvelle politique africaine de Nicolas Sarkozy n'était plus tenable. Le chaos qui s'était emparé d'Abidjan prenait des allures de guerre civile. Les tueries perpétrées par les deux camps faisaient ressurgir deux des pires cauchemars de la communauté internationale, restée passive face aux massacres de Srebrenica en Bosnie en 1995 et face au génocide rwandais en 1994.

## Une coordination directe

Mais engager l'armée française trop tôt, trop fortement ou de manière trop visible, fût-ce sous parapluie onusien, aurait comporté d'autres risques. Les 12.000 expatriés français de Côte d'Ivoire sont autant de cibles potentielles pour les Jeunes Patriotes de Laurent Gbagbo. En 2004, une véritable chasse aux Français avait contraint Paris à évacuer d'urgence ses ressortissants. Une intervention française d'envergure aurait également pu gêner les premiers pas au pouvoir d'Alassane Ouattara, s'il avait dû son entrée dans le palais présidentiel à des étrangers.

Si les exactions commises par ses forces dans l'ouest du pays sont confirmées, il aurait été mal venu que Paris apparaisse trop engagé auprès de ses forces. Le chemin d'une intervention française, même pavé par la résolution 1975 des Nations unies adoptée mercredi, qui autorise «toutes les mesures nécessaires» pour mettre hors d'état de nuire les «armes lourdes» menaçant les civils, était donc étroit.

Le reste des actions françaises s'est fait plus discrètement, dans des clairières ombragées, à l'abri des médias. Après avoir fait tonner les canons et les missiles de ses hélicoptères, la France a été la première à entamer, dans la nuit et secrètement, des négociations avec le président déchu. Elle a aussi agi en amont. Diplomatiquement en poussant très fort son projet de résolution sur les armes lourdes à l'ONU. Militairement en encadrant, au minimum, les rebelles de Ouattara avant qu'ils ne passent à l'offensive. Les contacts téléphoniques établis lundi soir entre Nicolas Sarkozy et Alassane Ouattara prouvent, s'il en était besoin, l'existence d'une coordination directe et au plus haut niveau, entre l'Élysée et le président vainqueur des urnes. La France n'est pas la seule à avoir aidé les rebelles à organiser leur offensive. Depuis les élections, de nouvelles armes, notamment des mitrailleuses quadruples, ont fait leur apparition sur les pick-up des Forces nouvelles. Une partie de l'équipement proviendrait du Nigeria. Mais le coup décisif pourrait bien avoir été porté par la France.

## Ein Störfall nahe der Grenze

Nur zwölf Kilometer vom Saarland entfernt liegt in Lothringen das Atomkraftwerk Cattenom. Auf der deutschen Seite wächst der Unmut über den „Problemreaktor“. Ministerpräsident Müller fordert Sarkozy nun zur Abschaltung auf - ohne diplomatische Floskeln.

Von Thomas Holl



Seit Inbetriebnahme 1986 rund 750 „Zwischen- und Störfälle“: das französische Kernkraftwerk Cattenom

05. April 2011

Schon lange vor den meisten seiner Parteifreunde hat Peter Müller im Herbst 2009 seinen persönlichen Atomausstieg vollzogen. Vier Wochen nach der Landtagswahl am 30. August ging der saarländische CDU-Ministerpräsident erstmals auf Distanz zum damaligen Plan der Parteispitze um Angela Merkel, zusammen mit der FDP längere Laufzeiten für Kernkraftwerke durchzusetzen. Auf Distanz ging Müller damit jedoch auch zu seinem eigenen Ja für längere Laufzeiten, die er 2006 noch vehement gefordert hatte. „Ich halte es für falsch, an den Vereinbarungen zum Atomausstieg festzuhalten“, hatte er damals gesagt.

Ende September 2009, nach einer verlorenen Landtagswahl und mit den Grünen sowie der FDP als einziger Machtoption, vollzog der Neu-„Jamaikaner“ Müller die Kehrtwende: „Für mich ist die Frage einer Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der Kernkraftwerke nicht prioritär“, hieß es nun. Statt den von Rot-Grün beschlossenen Atomausstieg wieder rückgängig zu machen, sei es sinnvoller, eine „sichere, kostengünstige und nachhaltige Energieversorgung zu erreichen“. Weitere anderthalb Jahre später, nach dem Reaktorunglück in Fukushima, ist Müllers Salto rückwärts nun perfekt.

### Ohne diplomatische Floskeln



Gegen französische Atomkraft: der saarländische Ministerpräsident Peter Müller

In einem Brief an die Kanzlerin, den französischen Staatspräsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy und den Präsidenten der Großregion „Saar-Lor-Lux“, Jean-Pierre Masseret, forderte Müller am 22. März den „schnellstmöglichen Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie in Deutschland und Frankreich“. In dem Brief an Sarkozy wies Müller besonders auf „die Sorge der saarländischen Bevölkerung“ vor dem französischen Atomkraftwerk Cattenom hin. In dem rund zwölf Kilometer von der saarländischen Grenze entfernten Kernkraftwerk in Lothringen mit seinen vier Reaktoren und einer Leistung von 5200 Megawatt hat es nach Zählung der saarländischen Umweltministerin Simone Peter (Grüne) seit Inbetriebnahme 1986 rund 750 „Zwischen- und Störfälle“ der Kategorie 0 bis 1 gegeben, die „regelmäßig“ aufträten. Eine Zahl, die die Menschen in der Region „sehr“ beunruhige, wie Müller an Sarkozy schrieb.

Neben einer umfassenden Sicherheitsüberprüfung des Kraftwerks forderte der Saarländer den französischen Präsidenten ohne diplomatische Floskeln auf, „die Abschaltung Cattenoms in Angriff zu nehmen“. Darüber hinaus wünscht sich der bald aus dem Amt scheidende und

womöglich künftige Bundesverfassungsrichter Müller von Frau Merkel und Sarkozy, das beide die „Sicherheit europäischer Kernkraftwerke“ auf die Tagesordnung des nächsten deutsch-französischen Ministerrates setzen. Auch wenn Müller weder aus Berlin noch Paris Antwort erhalten hat, ist man sich in der Saarbrücker Staatskanzlei sicher, dass zumindest Angela Merkel Müllers Ball aufnimmt. „Für das Saarland ist Cattenom mindestens ebenso wichtig wie die Kernkraftwerke in Deutschland“, begründete Müller seine Intervention auf höchster Ebene. Auf regionaler Ebene wird es am 20. April in Metz einen „Sondergipfel“ zu Cattenom geben, an dem auch Müller teilnimmt. Unterstützung in seinem scharfen Anti-AKW-Kurs erhielt Müller von allen fünf Fraktionen des Landtags - CDU, SPD, Linkspartei, FDP und Grüne. In einem von der Linkspartei Oskar Lafontaines formulierten Entschließungsantrag wurde Müllers Landesregierung aufgefordert, mit Frankreich „Verhandlungen über die Abschaltung bzw. Laufzeitbegrenzung des AKW Cattenom aufzunehmen“.

### **„Jedes Atomkraftwerk ein Sicherheitsrisiko“**

Für die Anti-Atomkraft-Bewegung im Saarland, aber auch in Rheinland-Pfalz geht von dem siebtgrößten Kernkraftwerk der Welt an der Mosel seit Jahrzehnten die größte Gefahr für das Dreiländereck aus. Am 18. September 2010 demonstrierten die rheinland-pfälzischen Grünen mit ihrer Spitzenkandidatin Eveline Lemke in der saarländischen Grenzstadt Perl unweit des Kraftwerks unter dem Motto „Cattenom non merci“. An der Kundgebung mit rund 1000 Teilnehmern beteiligten sich neben Bürgerinitiativen auch die SPD mit ihrer Umweltministerin Margit Conrad.

Die Mainzer SPD-Ministerin hatte zuletzt im Februar nach mehreren Zwischenfällen in Cattenom „jedes Atomkraftwerk“ als „ein Sicherheitsrisiko“ bezeichnet. Bei mehreren Arbeitern, die im Reaktorblock Drei gearbeitet hatten, war eine radioaktive Kontamination festgestellt worden, die mit 1 Millisievert allerdings unter dem Jahresgrenzwert von 20 Millisievert lag. „Es ist dringend notwendig, der Ursache für diesen Vorfall so nachzugehen, dass eine Wiederholung ausgeschlossen ist“, forderte Frau Conrad vom Kraftwerksbetreiber, dem staatlichen französischen Stromkonzern EDF.

### **Die Todeszentrale vor dem Haus**

Der rot-grüne Schulterschluss in Rheinland-Pfalz gegen Cattenom wurde in beiden Parteien auch als Signal für ein Regierungsbündnis nach der Wahl verstanden. Anders als im Saarland ist in der rheinland-pfälzischen CDU erst nach dem Unglück in Japan der Widerstand gegen das französische Kernkraftwerk vor der Haustür erwacht. So forderte die CDU-Spitzenkandidatin Julia Klöckner Ministerpräsident Kurt Beck (SPD) wenige Tage vor der Landtagswahl auf, gemeinsam gegen den „Problemreaktor Cattenom“ vorzugehen.

Am 12. April will Frau Conrads saarländische Amtskollegin Peter das Kraftwerk in Cattenom besuchen, um sich selbst ein Bild zu machen. Ihr Parteivorsitzender Hubert Ulrich hatte Cattenom schon in einer Stufe mit Fukushima und Tschernobyl als „unsere Todeszentrale vor dem Haus“ bezeichnet. Am Ostermontag will ein Bündnis aus Atomkraftgegnern in und um Cattenom für die rasche Abschaltung des Kraftwerks demonstrieren. Dass Cattenom schnell vom Netz geht, dürfte trotz der massiven Proteste von CDU bis Linkspartei Wunschdenken bleiben. Im Oktober hatte der Betreiber EdF angekündigt, in den nächsten 20 Jahren rund 2,4 Milliarden Euro in sein Kernkraftwerk zu investieren, eines von 58 französischen Atommeilern.

Damit soll die Verlängerung der Laufzeit auf mehr als 40 Jahre gesichert werden. Das Kraftwerk habe rund 20 Jahre nach der Fertigstellung des vierten Reaktorblocks 1991 einen „guten Sicherheitsstandard“, lobte Kraftwerksleiter Stéphane Dupré-la-Tour. Mit den Investitionen sollen unter anderem der Kontrollsaal des Kraftwerks und die Dampfgeneratoren modernisiert werden. Keinen Erneuerungsbedarf sahen die Franzosen zumindest vor sechs Monaten bei dem Abklingbecken für die hochradioaktiven Brennstäbe, die Reaktorgebäude und die Betonhüllen. Sie seien in „perfektem Zustand“.

Text: F.A.Z.

## Eingriff

**Die militärische Intervention der UN und Frankreichs war richtig und gerechtfertigt. Denn vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung in der Elfenbeinküste hat unter dem brutalen Machtkampf gelitten. Unter diesen Umständen wäre „Neutralität“ einer Verletzung des eigenen Mandats gleichgekommen.**

*Von Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger*

*05. April 2011*

Der Machtkampf in der Elfenbeinküste scheint zu Gunsten des von der Staatengemeinschaft anerkannten Präsidenten Ouattara entschieden zu sein. Offenkundig hat dazu das militärische Eingreifen von UN-Friedenstruppen und französischen Soldaten beigetragen. Vielleicht wird der bedrängte alte Machthaber Gbagbo versuchen, aus dieser Intervention Propagandakapital zu schlagen und so seine Anhänger ein letztes Mal zu mobilisieren. Vermutlich ist es dafür aber zu spät, worüber man froh sein muss.

Vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung hat unter dem brutalen Machtkampf gelitten. Die UN und Frankreich, das binnen kurzem nun auf dem zweiten afrikanischen Konfliktschauplatz militärisch eingreift, können dem Vorwurf der Verletzung ivoirischer Souveränität gelassen begegnen. Die UN-Truppen waren befugt, alle notwendigen Mittel zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung einzusetzen. Unter diesen Umständen wäre „Neutralität“, also Zusehen, wie Zivilisten massakriert werden, einer Verletzung des eigenen Mandats gleichgekommen. Dieses Eingreifen war richtig und gerechtfertigt.

# Libye: l'Otan "laisse mourir" Misrata

AFP

05/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 21:14 [Réagir](#)

Le chef militaire de la rébellion libyenne, le général Abdel Fattah Younés, a accusé aujourd'hui l'Otan de "laisser mourir les habitants de Misrata", une ville à l'est de Tripoli soumise à des bombardements des forces de Mouammar Kadhafi depuis plus d'un mois.

"La presse internationale doit soutenir avec force le peuple de Misrata et appeler (à l'aide) l'Otan qui laisse les habitants de Misrata mourir tous les jours", a-t-il dit lors d'une conférence de presse à Benghazi, bastion de la rébellion dans l'est de la Libye. "Si l'Otan attend encore une semaine de plus, il n'y aura plus rien à Misrata", a-t-il ajouté. "Que fait l'Otan? Ils bombardent ici et là" alors que les habitants de Misrata sont menacés "d'extermination" selon lui. Ces accusations interviennent quelques heures après que l'Alliance atlantique a annoncé qu'elle avait fait de la défense de Misrata sa "priorité numéro un".

## **Al-Qaida greift nach Gaddafis Waffen** Von Markus Becker, Yassin Musharbash und Ulrike Putz

**Experten warnen seit Wochen, nun scheint der Ernstfall eingetreten: Waffen aus geplünderten libyschen Depots sind womöglich bei Qaida-Gruppen in Mali gelandet. Schmuggler sollen den Terroristen auch Luftabwehrraketen gebracht haben - sie eignen sich zum Abschuss von Kampf- und Passagierjets.**

Seit dem Ausbruch der [libyschen Revolution](#) Mitte Februar hatten internationale Waffenexperten dringlich davor gewarnt: Angesichts der Plünderung von in Rebellenhand gefallene Kasernen und Waffendepots der libyschen Armee bestehe die Gefahr, dass auch komplexe Waffensysteme auf den Schwarzmarkt und dadurch in die Hand von Terroristen gelangen könnten. Dies scheint sich nun bewahrheitet zu haben: Vor einigen Tagen sei ein [Konvoi von acht mit Waffen beladenen Kleinlastern aus Ost-Libyen über den Tschad und Niger nach Nord-Mali](#) gefahren, berichtete die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters unter Berufung auf eine Quelle in algerischen Sicherheitskreisen. Dort seien die Waffen mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit in die Hände islamistischer Terrorgruppen geraten.

Es sei undenkbar, dass die Vertreter der nordafrikanischen Qaida-Gruppe AQIM (al-Qaida im [Maghreb](#)) in Mali "diese Gelegenheit nicht genutzt haben", so der algerische Beamte. Die Gruppe verfüge über exzellente Verbindungen zu den örtlichen Schmugglern. Diese überquerten nach Belieben die südlibysche Grenze. Laut dem Informanten soll AQIM bei den Schmugglern regelrechte Bestellungen von Waffen aus geplünderten libyschen Kasernen und Waffenlagern aufgegeben haben. "Und wir wissen, dass das nicht der erste Konvoi ist und die Sache weitergeht", sagte der Beamte.

Unter der gefährlichen Fracht der Pick-Ups seien unter anderem panzerbrechende Granaten, schwere Maschinengewehre, Sturmgewehre, Sprengstoff und Munition gewesen, hieß es. Doch auch russische Flugabwehrraketen des Typs "Strela-2" (Nato-Bezeichnung: SA-7 "Grail") seien auf den Lastern geortet worden: Experten warnen bereits seit Jahren davor, dass Terroristen versuchen könnten, mit tragbaren Flugabwehrraketen Militärflugzeuge und Passagiermaschinen vom Himmel zu holen. In Libyen wären in den kommenden Wochen und Monaten in erster Linie die Transportflugzeuge und Hubschrauber der Alliierten durch mobile Raketen bedroht - denn sie sind vor allem für langsam und niedrig fliegende Flugzeuge eine Gefahr.

Wie tödlich die "Strela-2" sein kann, zeigt auch in Blick ins Geschichtsbuch: In der Endphase des Vietnamkriegs etwa soll sie von 1972 bis 1975 knapp 600 Mal gegen US-Flugzeuge eingesetzt worden sein und 204 Mal getroffen haben. Eine ähnliche Quote ist aus dem Nahen Osten überliefert: Die ägyptische Armee soll mit 99 Raketen 36 Treffer gegen israelische Flugzeuge gelandet haben.

### **Libyen wurde vom russischen Waffenhersteller beliefert**

Im ersten Golfkrieg gelang es einem irakischen Soldaten, mit einer "Strela-2" ein US-Kampfflugzeug vom Typ AC-130H "Spectre" abzuschießen. Alle 14 Besatzungsmitglieder kamen ums Leben. Die "Spectre" ist gut mit einem Passagierjet bei Start oder Landung zu vergleichen: Sie ist ähnlich groß und fliegt tief und langsam. Allerdings besitzt die "Spectre" im Unterschied zu zivilen Flugzeugen Schutzmaßnahmen gegen Flugabwehrraketen, darunter Hitzetäuschkörper. Doch selbst die konnten die im Januar 1991 abgeschossen Maschine nicht schützen.

[Im November 2002 dann wurde eine Boeing 757 der israelischen Arkia Airlines mit 271 Passagieren an Bord über der kenianischen Hafenstadt Mombasa beschossen.](#) Die beiden "Strela-2" verfehlten ihr Ziel nur um wenige Meter. Der Anschlag wurde später al-Qaida zugeschrieben.

Als noch gefährlicher als die "Strela" gilt die russische "Igla-S", von der Nato als SA-24 "Grinch" bezeichnet. Ende März entdeckte ein Experte die auf einem Lkw montierte Rakete auf Bildern des US-Nachrichtensenders CNN aus Libyen. Tagelang wurde gerätselt, wie die hochmodernen Waffen in das Arsenal von Diktator [Muammar al-Gaddafi](#) gelangen konnten. Ende März bestätigte dann der russische Hersteller KBM die Lieferung von "Igla-S" in das nordafrikanische Land. Ein Sprecher spielte die Gefahr allerdings herunter: Die Raketen könnten lediglich auf Lkw montiert werden. Um die "Igla-S" von der Schulter abzufeuern, sei ein anderer Auslösemechanismus notwendig - und der sei nicht nach Libyen gelangt.

### **Die USA machen die Rebellen auf die Gefahr aufmerksam**

Die "Igla-S" soll Flugzeuge aus einer Entfernung von sechs Kilometern angreifen und in einer Flughöhe von bis zu 3500 Metern treffen können. Ihr Ziel findet die mehr als 2000 km/h schnelle Rakete mit einem Infrarot-Wärmesensor und per Bilderkennung. Unklar ist, wie viele "Igla-S" Libyen in seinen Arsenalen hat. Auch ist ungeklärt, ob wie die "Strela-2" auch die "Igla-S" aus den Depots der Militärs in die Hände von Rebellen und weiter in die von Terroristen gelangt ist.

Das US-Außenministerium reagierte besorgt auf den Bericht, algerische Sicherheitskreise hätten libysche Waffen in [Mali](#) geortet. Die USA hätten die Rebellen in Ostlibyen auf das Problem aufmerksam gemacht, sagte Außenamtssprecher Mark Toner am Montag. "Wir haben unsere Sorgen sehr deutlich gemacht, und sie haben versprochen, sich darum zu kümmern."

In Algerien haben die jüngsten Ereignisse im Nachbarland größte Sorge ausgelöst, dass Libyen zur neuen Terroristenhochburg in Nordafrika werden könnte. "Es ist sehr leicht, Libyen in ein neues [Somalia](#) zu verwandeln", schrieb Samer Riad, Redakteur bei der algerischen "El-Khabar" Zeitung. Die in Libyen kämpfende Koalition müsse die Aktivitäten von AQIM in Libyen genauestens beobachten.

### **Erste Qaida-Führer nach Libyen eingesickert**

Einige Nordafrika-Experten warnen jedoch vor Hysterie: Es sei zumindest vorstellbar, dass Algerien aus eigenem Interesse heraus die Gefahren in Nordafrika übertreibe, so der [Nordafrika-Experte Andrew Lebovich in einem aktuellen Blog-Eintrag](#). Algerien kämpft seit fast zwei Jahrzehnten gegen radikale Islamisten. Die Sicherheitskräfte des Landes überwachen auch die Aktivitäten extremistischer Muslime außerhalb Algeriens.

Libyen ist für al-Qaida aus mehreren Gründen interessant: Angesichts der chaotischen Verhältnisse dort ist es ein ideales Operationsgebiet für Terrorgruppen. Zudem floriert der Schwarzmarkt mit Waffen, und Libyen kann als strategisches Sprungbrett für Operationen in [Ägypten](#) dienen. Es ist deshalb naheliegend, dass al-Qaida versuchen wird, sich in Libyen festzusetzen.

Bislang hatte AQIM nicht in Libyen operiert. Zwar tauchten immer wieder libysche Dschihadisten an Kriegsschauplätzen in Irak oder Afghanistan auf. Doch habe al-Qaida "wenige, wenn überhaupt" aktive Kader in Gaddafis Reich, so der Londoner Analyst und Ex-Dschihadist Noman Benothman in einem aktuellen Papier. Dies könnte sich ändern: Am 15. Januar, so Benothman, seien erstmals zwei AQIM-Führer von Mali aus nach Libyen eingesickert, um die Situation auszukundschaften. Jetzt, wo Gaddafi so gut wie aus dem Weg geräumt sei, werde die die Qaida-Zentrale versuchen, eine libysche Dependence zu errichten, schreibt Benothman. So wolle al-Qaida sich durch die Hintertür den Zugang nach Ägypten erschließen.



# EU in trouble

5 April 2011 EL PAÍS MADRID



Marlène Pöhle

**The Libyan crisis has brought to light the contradictions that mark the European Union: in industrial policy, international relations and immigration, national interest and its corollary, lack of solidarity, prevail.**

**Jean-Marie Colombani**

Three elements that could damage relations between France and Italy give food for thought on the difficulties the European Union is going through.

Economic discord: Italy is drawing up a decree to ensure that French interests do not take control of what Italy regards as a flagship of the Italian agri-food industry – namely, the milk giant Parmalat.

Conflicting policy over Libya: together with Britain, the French would like to see Gaddafi gone, whereas Italy, because of Berlusconi's good relations with Gaddafi, is exploring every avenue for a negotiated and honourable exit for the dictator.

Finally, a squabble that touches on immigration: the Italians, whose island of Lampedusa is the entry point for those exploiting the Tunisian revolution to get into Europe, resent the attitude of the French, who at the Franco-Italian border are halting Tunisians trying to get into France to find work.

The first point of friction is totally inconsistent with the rules that make a single market work well. The Italian position is hard to accept, but we must recognise that it is part of a strategy that governments have been increasingly using. That strategy is economic patriotism, erected as a barrier to market forces. Both the Germans, in the Opel affair, and the French as well, gladly made use of the very argument which Italy is today bouncing back against France. These are sterile wars, most often to the detriment of European consumers, even if the trend towards mergers do pose undeniable social problems. But it is for Europe to propose and dispose.

The second problem relates to European defence. Rome's attitude, which is closer to that of Moscow than to those of Paris and London, is at bottom hard to accept as well. There are special ties between Berlusconi and Gaddafi and between Gaddafi and Putin that, to some extent, explain the benevolence shown to Colonel Gaddafi by these two leaders. Above all, though, the attitude of Italy — and even more so that of Germany — takes us back to 2003. It is as if we are living through a sort of 2003 in reverse. That was the year the war in Iraq split Europe and pitted Rome, London and Madrid, standing with George Bush, against Berlin and Paris, which together with Moscow had formed an axis opposed to the war. The EU, we must recall, had a hard time wiping out the traces of that.

And so we are living through a new paradox. The reconciliation, in terms of military operations justified by the duty to intervene — indeed by the values we cherish — and organised around a London-Paris axis, is perhaps an indication that Britain can be rallied to the embryonic idea of common European defence. This is made all the more necessary given that American leadership is not what it once was and a distinction will therefore be drawn between those Europeans who will continue to appeal to American leadership and those who, as has happened in France and Britain, believe that the relative decline of US leadership makes possible a different distribution of roles, one that will devolve more initiative to Europe.

In terms of what could be the European objectives, Italy can be criticised for its attitude both to Libya and to migration, and one cannot help but feel shocked by the lack of solidarity that attitude is getting. The situation in Lampedusa illustrates yet again a very serious deficiency in Europe. Everyone knows that migration flows can only be controlled through an increasingly coordinated and coherent approach among European countries. What do we see in reality? The unbearable spectacle of an Italian government letting the situation in Lampedusa drag on, all the better to justify more radical measures in the eyes of the public; and, at the same time, European leaders who all seem to have been modelled after Pontius Pilate. This situation is unacceptable.

These episodes, which all too unusually are bringing Italy and France into conflict, make it clear that each passing day should convince us to get back somehow onto the lost path towards European integration

# Guéant : la hausse du nombre de musulmans pose problème

Par [Charlotte Menegaux](#)

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Le ministre de l'Intérieur, Claude Guéant. Crédits photo : Remy de la Mauviniere/AP

**Le ministre de l'Intérieur a reçu mardi le soutien de François Fillon après avoir créé la polémique, la veille en déclarant qu'«un certain nombre de comportements» de fidèles musulmans «posent problème».**

Au lendemain du tollé provoqué par ses propos sur l'accroissement du nombre de musulmans en France, Claude Guéant a reçu mardi le soutien de François Fillon. «Je demande à tout le monde de ne pas tomber dans les pièges. Chaque semaine, il y a une phrase déformée, coupée. Claude Guéant a tout mon soutien», a demandé le premier ministre, selon des participants à la réunion hebdomadaire du groupe UMP à l'Assemblée nationale. Selon lui, le ministre de l'Intérieur est victime d'un «véritable procès».

Lundi, à la veille de **la convention de l'UMP sur la laïcité**, Claude Guéant a provoqué de vives réactions dans la classe politique. En marge d'un déplacement à Nantes lundi, le ministre de l'Intérieur a lancé : «Le problème est très important : tous les représentants des grandes religions estiment que la laïcité est un principe protecteur de la liberté de conscience. La question interpelle nos concitoyens : nombreux sont ceux qui pensent qu'il y a des entorses à la laïcité».

En référence à la loi de 1905 sur la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat, Claude Guéant a ensuite ajouté : «En 1905, il y avait très peu de musulmans en France, aujourd'hui il y en a entre 5 et 6 millions. Cet accroissement du nombre de fidèles et un certain nombre de comportements posent problème. Il est clair que les prières dans les rues choquent un certain nombre de concitoyens. Et les responsables des grandes religions ont bien conscience que ce type de pratiques leur porte préjudice».

## Action en justice ?

Cette déclaration «confirme le pire», a immédiatement réagi **Eva Joly** (Europe Ecologie-Les Verts), dans un communiqué. «Pour la présidentielle, la droite a décidé de mener une campagne islamophobe», selon la candidate à l'investiture d'EELV. **Noël Mamère** a de son côté estimé que Claude Guéant parlait «le Le Pen comme M. Jourdain faisait de la prose», jugeant que le ministre de l'Intérieur n'était «pas à sa place» au gouvernement, avec ses dernières déclarations.

Après la condamnation en première instance de **Brice Hortefeux pour injure raciale**, et plusieurs **propos controversés de Claude Guéant ces dernières semaines** sur le thème de l'immigration, **le Mouvement des jeunes socialistes** a pour sa part estimé que c'était «l'accroissement du nombre de ministres racistes qui pose problème». Dans un communiqué, le MJS exige la démission de Claude Guéant.

**Harlem Désir**, a ensuite dénoncé les «guéanteries contre la République». Le ministre «doit cesser ces provocations à répétition jamais sanctionnées par le président de la République», a jugé le numéro deux du Parti socialiste dans un communiqué.

«A chaque fois que Claude Guéant s'exprime depuis qu'il est ministre de l'Intérieur, il y a polémique. Son obsession, c'est de parler des musulmans», a renchéri **François Hollande**.

**L'Union des organisations islamiques de France** a qualifié d'«irresponsables» les propos incriminés. «Ils sont Français en premier lieu et musulmans en second lieu et ne revendiquent pas les lois de l'islam pour pratiquer leur religion», a insisté Lhaj Thami Breze, responsable du Conseil régional du culte musulman pour l'Ile-de-France.

Enfin, **SOS Racisme** s'est dit «scandalisé» par les paroles du ministre de l'Intérieur, jugeant qu'il avait «franchi un cap indigne». L'association dit «étudier la possibilité d'une action en justice» face à ces propos «terrifiants».

*(avec agences)*

## **Europeans Call for Release of Chinese Artist**

**German and French ministers have called for the release of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, who was detained Sunday in Beijing. A groundswell of international support has grown, but nobody knows where he is. Last week he announced plans to build a new studio in Berlin.**

The German and French governments are calling for the immediate release of Ai Weiwei, the Chinese artist who was arrested without charge over the weekend at an airport in Beijing. "I appeal to the Chinese government to urgently provide clarification, and I expect Ai Weiwei to be released immediately," said German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, in a statement on Monday.

Ai made headlines last week with an announcement that he wanted to build a major new Berlin studio. On Sunday he was detained at the airport while trying to board a plane to Hong Kong. Police raided his home and studio in Beijing, according to his wife, Lu Qing, and she herself was interrogated. She said Chinese authorities have still not told her where the artist is being held.

"They took the computer, computer disks and other materials," she told Agence France-Presse. "They refused to say why the search warrant was issued or why Ai Weiwei was taken away."

A spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, Bernard Valero, joined Westerwelle's appeal on Monday, saying, "we are very concerned about the fate of the artist Ai Weiwei and we are following his situation and that of his family very closely. We hope he will be released as soon as possible."

The 53-year-old is famous for designing the "bird's nest" national stadium that became a centerpiece of the Beijing Olympics in 2008. His installation "Sunflower Seeds" -- featuring thousands of tiny, painted ceramic imitation seeds -- is a current hit at the Tate Gallery in London. He's considered one of China's most successful living artists, and he's known for criticizing Communist Party leaders in Beijing.

### **'His Whereabouts Are Unknown'**

A groundswell of support rose Tuesday from international art figures from London to Hong Kong. Sir Nicholas Serota, who heads the Tate Gallery, along with the Danish-Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson, a friend of Ai's with a studio of his own in Berlin, joined a number of other artists and protestors in calling for Ai's freedom.

"The artist remains un-contactable and his whereabouts are unknown," said Serota on Monday night, according to *The Independent* in London. "We are dismayed by developments that again threaten Weiwei's right to speak freely as an artist and hope that he will be released immediately."

In January, the Chinese government raided and destroyed Ai's new studio in Shanghai, and last week the artist announced plans to open a large studio in Berlin. He told the German news agency DPA that he preferred to spend "as little time as possible" in Europe, but "there will be no choice if my work and life are somehow threatened."

During a 2009 trip to Germany he checked into a Munich hospital for emergency cranial surgery, which he [told SPIEGEL](#) was the result of a recent beating by police in China. Doctors said at the time that they had to relieve a cerebral hemorrhage on one side of his skull.

Ai's disappearance comes during a general crackdown on dissidents by Beijing. The so-called Jasmine Revolution in the Arab world -- the popular uprisings from Tunisia to Jordan since January -- have inspired [a flurry of online activism in China](#). Over the last six weeks more than 100 activists, lawyers and writers have been detained or have simply disappeared, according to Amnesty International -- some of them just for using the words "Jasmine Revolution" in a Twitter feed.

"We've already seen the chilling effect the 'Jasmine Revolution'-related arrests have had on Chinese activists and 'netizens' over the past month," said Donna Guest, Amnesty's deputy director for the Asia-Pacific region. "Holding Ai Weiwei takes this to another level."

*msm -- with wire reports*

## Germany's political upset

# A Green revolution

**Power may change the Greens. That would be a good thing**

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | from the print edition



FROM their birth in 1979 as a protest group formed by a bunch of bearded ideologues, Germany's Greens have come a long way. On March 27th they ousted Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats from the government of Baden-Württemberg, a state that the CDU had run for almost 60 years. This is bad news not just for Germany's other political parties, but also possibly for Germany itself—unless power makes the Greens a little more pragmatic.

For Mrs Merkel, the defeat in Baden-Württemberg is a painful blow, but not a terminal one. Although she is running into some criticism inside the CDU, she faces no serious challengers to her leadership. She will surely stay as chancellor until the next federal election, which is due by September 2013, and she may well remain even after that. But a weaker Mrs Merkel will probably be a worse chancellor. She is likely to be even more cautious and readier to pander to the voters' whims than ever, despite the evidence that this has not been helping her to win in recent polls. The defensiveness will cement her sudden conversion into a fierce opponent of nuclear power. It may also make her more cussedly difficult in Germany's often messy diplomacy, ranging from the euro crisis to Libya. This vacillating chancellor needs to recover some of the quiet resolution that once made her Europe's most powerful politician.

Yet Mrs Merkel can draw some comfort from Germany's recent state elections. The Greens' triumph hit her coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP), and her main opponent, the Social Democrats (SPD) at least as hard as it did the CDU (see [article](#)). The Left party also did badly. It is the FDP's head, Guido Westerwelle, whose leadership is now most under threat. As it happens, Mr Westerwelle has also been a disastrous foreign minister (culminating in his foolish decision to join Russia and China in abstaining from the vote over the UN Security Council resolution on Libya), and his early departure would be no loss.

**Red, Black and Green all over**

The Greens deserve some success, in part because of the way they have transformed themselves from hecklers standing on the sidelines of mainstream politics into a machine for representing Germany's clean-shaven middle class. The party can also claim credit for the relative effectiveness of Gerhard Schröder's SPD-led federal government from 1998 to 2005, when the Greens' Joschka Fischer proved a far better foreign minister than either of his successors has been. And Winfried Kretschmann, who will run Baden-Württemberg, comes from the party's "realist" wing.

Yet there are still reasons to worry about the party's rise. The Greens' visceral hostility to nuclear power is irrational (the state of Baden-Württemberg is hardly prone to Japanese-style tsunamis); closing plants makes electricity costlier and Germany's (and Europe's) ambitious targets for reducing carbon emissions harder to meet. The Greens are keen on higher taxes, more regulation and dirigiste industrial policy. Some of them still talk as if economic growth were a problem in itself—which is one reason they opposed the huge infrastructure project at Stuttgart's railway station. Support for free trade and free markets tends to come very far down the agenda, if it features at all.

Much of this is just the normal talk of protest and opposition. Like all parties, the Greens tend to change their tune when they get closer to power, just as they did when they went into coalition with the SPD in the federal government of 1998. In this sense, indeed, Baden-Württemberg should now offer a test of how responsible the Greens are when they actually lead a government. The state has a highly successful economy and boasts the country's lowest unemployment. It also hosts some of Germany's biggest exporters, including several large carmakers. Mr Kretschmann will surely not want to threaten any of this.

Further in the future looms another big challenge for his party, one that could have a bearing on Mrs Merkel's future. At present the Greens naturally seek to form coalitions with the SPD, as they will once again do in Baden-Württemberg, just as the FDP tends to look towards joining up with the CDU. But the success of the FDP, at least until recently, was based largely on its readiness to go into government with either of the two big parties. The Greens should follow suit. A first attempt at a Black-Green coalition in the city-state of Hamburg fell apart last November. The ultimate test of how serious a party the Greens have become will be how soon they are prepared to try once again to work with the CDU, in a state or even, after 2013, at the federal level.



## European monetary policy

# Trigger-happy

### The European Central Bank is planning to raise rates too soon

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | from the print edition

THE formal decision has yet to be made. But the surprise now will be if the European Central Bank (ECB) does not raise its policy rate at its next meeting on April 7th. After the ECB's governing council met in early March, Jean-Claude Trichet, the bank's president, could scarcely have semaphored an imminent rate rise more clearly. Despite the tsunami in Japan and the conflict in Libya there has been no hint of second thoughts among the 23 members of the council. A rise, expected to push the rate up from an historic low of 1% to 1.25%, would put the ECB well ahead of the Federal Reserve and probably beat the Bank of England (whose rate-setters meet on the same day) to the draw as well.

The increase may be small but it would mark the turn in the interest-rate cycle. And the case for early tightening looks flimsy. True, euro-wide inflation has risen in recent months above the ECB's target of "below but close to 2%". But the overshoot, to 2.6% in March, has been primarily driven by higher energy costs, reflecting the jump in world oil prices. Measures of "core" inflation, which exclude more volatile things like energy and food, have remained at around 1%.

Mr Trichet argues that monetary tightening is needed to ward off "second-round" effects of rising commodity prices, whereby wages and prices respond to an initial upward jolt by spiralling higher. Yet wages are placid in the euro area, rising by just 1.4% in the year to the final quarter of 2010. Inflation expectations, whether measured through surveys or from the gap between conventional and inflation-linked bonds, show no sign of taking flight.

That is hardly surprising. The German economy sprinted ahead last year, growing by 3.6%, but euro-wide GDP rose by only 1.7%. Even though the recession was the most wrenching of four downturns in euro-area countries since the 1970s, the recovery has been among the weakest. That has left the economy operating 3.5% below its potential, according to the OECD. This hefty spare capacity should bear down on inflationary pressures.



Business surveys point to rapid growth in early 2011, but this follows a weak patch in the second half of last year in which GDP rose by only 0.3% a quarter. Moreover, there are some signs of a loss of momentum—hardly surprising as higher oil prices fuel worries about the global economy. A composite measure of confidence among businesses and consumers in the euro area compiled by the European Commission, which tends to track GDP growth, has come off a recent high (see chart).

The ECB uses a “monetary cross-check” when setting interest rates. But even the most neurotic monetarist would find it hard to get worked up about the latest figures, which show broad-money supply rising by just 2% in the year to February and lending growth still muted by historical standards. As for the argument that a rise in rates is overdue because the current stance is exceptionally loose, the economy has taken an exceptional blow.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that there is more to the ECB’s eagerness to raise rates than a straightforward appraisal of economic prospects. The central bank is painfully aware that it has been dragged into fiscally muddy waters by buying government bonds from debt-afflicted countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal. That makes the ECB all the keener to reaffirm its credentials as a doughty inflation-fighter by brooking no delay in raising rates now that its target is being exceeded.

Internal politics are also at play. Mr Trichet is due to step down at the end of October. A succession battle is under way in which the views of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, will be crucial. That makes it sensible for candidates on the governing council like Italy’s Mario Draghi to take a Germanic line on anything that smacks of inflationary excesses.

Whatever the precise rationale, the ECB move will exacerbate the emerging divide between core euro-zone members with sturdier public finances and peripheral economies that have run up too much debt. In Germany, a small rise in interest rates will barely scratch the economy. In Spain, whose prospects are crucial if the debt crisis is to be contained (see [article](#)), it will hurt households with mortgages, most of which are variable-rate. And in Greece and Ireland, as they push through austerity programmes, it will feel as if **Pelion is being piled on Ossa**.


(When the giants Otus and Ephialtes attempted to storm Olympus, they piled Mount Pelion upon Mount Ossa, which became a proverbial allusion for any huge but fruitless attempt)

## The euro zone's periphery

# They're bust. Admit it.

### Greece, Ireland and Portugal should restructure their debts now

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | from the print edition



IT IS a measure of European politicians' capacity for self-delusion that Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, called the euro-zone summit on March 24th-25th a "big step forward" in solving the region's debt crisis. Something between a fudge and a failure would be more accurate. The leaders fell short on almost every task they set themselves. They agreed on a "permanent" rescue mechanism to be introduced in 2013, but couldn't fund it properly, because Mrs Merkel refused to put up money her finance minister had pledged. The Brussels gathering did little to help Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the zone's most troubled economies. Their situation is getting worse—and Europe's leaders bear much of the blame.

Portugal's prime minister resigned on March 23rd after failing to win support for the fourth austerity package in a year. The country's credit rating was slashed to near-junk status on March 29th, while ten-year bond yields have risen above 8% as investors fear Portugal will have to turn to the European Union and the IMF for loans. The economies of both Greece and Ireland, Europe's two "rescued" countries, are shrinking faster than expected, and bond yields, at almost 13% for Greece and over 10% for Ireland, remain stubbornly high. Investors plainly don't believe the rescues will work.

They are right. These economies are on an unsustainable course, but not for lack of effort by their governments. Greece and Ireland have made heroic budget cuts. Greece is trying hard to free up its rigid economy. Portugal has lagged in scrapping stifling rules, but its fiscal tightening is bold. In all three places the outlook is darkening in large part because of mistakes made in Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin.

At the EU's insistence, the peripherals' priority is to slash their budget deficits regardless of the consequences on growth. But as austerity drags down output, their enormous debts—expected to peak at 160% of GDP for Greece, 125% for Ireland and 100% for Portugal—look ever more unpayable, so bond yields stay high. The result is a downward spiral.

As if that were not enough, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt seems set on raising interest rates on April 7th, which will strengthen the euro and further undermine the peripherals' efforts to become more competitive (see [article](#)). Some politicians are still pushing daft demands, such as forcing Ireland to raise its corporate tax rate, which would block its best route to growth. Most pernicious, though, is the perverse logic of the euro zone's rescue mechanisms. Europe's leaders won't hear of debt reduction now, but insist that any country requiring help from 2013 may then need to have its debt restructured and that new official lending will take priority over bondholders. The risk that investors could face a haircut in two years' time keeps yields high today, which in turn blights the rescue plans.

## Home truths from Washington

This newspaper has argued that Greece, Ireland and Portugal need their debt burdens cut sooner rather than later. That case is stronger than ever, not only because today's approach is failing but because the risks of restructuring are falling. The spectre of contagion is receding. Spain, whose bond yields have fallen and whose spreads with Germany have tightened, has distanced itself from Portugal. Behind the scenes, sovereign-debt specialists are devising ways to minimise the impact of an "orderly restructuring" on banks. Most banks in the core of the euro zone can withstand a hit from the three small peripherals.

The big obstacle is not technical but political. Since many at Europe's core, particularly the ECB, remain implacably opposed to debt restructuring, the pressure has to come from elsewhere—not least from the peripheral economies themselves. Ireland's new government is talking about forcing the senior bondholders of its bust banks to take a hit. Greece should stop pretending that it can bear its current debt burden and push for restructuring. But the best hope lies with the IMF. Its economists have the most experience of debt crises. Some privately acknowledge that debt restructuring is ultimately inevitable. It is time the Fund's top brass said so publicly and, by refusing to lend more without a deal on debt, pushed Europe's pusillanimous politicians into doing the right thing.

## The battle for Libya

### The colonel is not beaten yet

Fortunes on the battlefield have been see-sawing, as the coalition against Muammar Qaddafi talks of arming the Libyan rebels

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | *BENGHAZI AND LONDON* | from the print edition



AFTER rebel forces retook Ajdabiya and the oil-refining towns of Ras Lanuf and Brega, it seemed that Muammar Qaddafi's troops might crumble fast in the face of Western air attacks. But that hope was fleeting. At a hastily assembled conference in London on March 29th, attended by nearly 40 delegations representing the international coalition that is enforcing UN Security Resolution 1973, the turn of events on the ground saw Libyan government forces dramatically regain the initiative. And that prompted a more sober assessment of the rebels' progress.

A day earlier General Carter Ham, the American officer who was running operations in Libya until NATO assumed command, had presciently warned: "The regime still vastly overmatches opposition forces militarily. The regime possesses the capability to roll them back very quickly. Coalition air power is the major reason that has not happened." The general added that apart from some "localised wavering" there had so far been only a few cases of military or government officials defecting to the opposition.

For a time, it looked as if a pattern had been established. Allied air power would take out the government's tanks, artillery and other heavy weapons, shell-shocked loyalist soldiers would flee and the ragtag army of rebels toting AK-47s and captured RPGs would surge forward into the vacuum, driving hell-for-leather to the next town along the coast road in a motley cavalcade of elderly cars and pickup trucks.

In fact, the only emerging pattern is one of wildly see-sawing fortunes, as coastal towns change hands with almost metronomic regularity. On March 28th the advancing rebels ground to a halt at Bin Jawad, a small town some 160km (100 miles) to the east of Colonel Qaddafi's birthplace, Sirte, and halfway between Benghazi and Tripoli. Control of Bin Jawad had already switched three times in the past month and the town is now largely deserted.

There is still no sign that the rebels have a proper chain of command. Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, a former general who has returned from exile in the United States, is their commander-in-chief, with Colonel Qaddafi's former interior minister, Abdel Fatah Younis, as his chief of staff. But the units of the regular army that defected seem to have stayed largely out of the fray, leaving the fighting to untrained youths. Time after time, they have rushed frantically along the main roads, only to run into ambushes laid by the colonel's snipers dug into the roadside. Inexperienced rebels have shot up their own cars with anti-aircraft fire. Full of bravado, young

farmers in straw hats vow to defy Colonel Qaddafi's Grad rockets, but as soon as any start landing nearby they flee.

Rebel supply-lines of food and fuel are badly stretched. The colonel's forces sabotaged petrol stations and power lines when they retreated west. Many shopkeepers have fled. Taxi drivers smuggle ammunition and AK-47s from Egypt beneath punnets of strawberries. But the rebels know they are heavily outgunned.

Their attempt on March 29th to push on past Bin Jawad towards Sirte ended abruptly when their vehicles came under heavy rocket and artillery fire from loyalist forces moving up the road from the politically important city. Fleeing eastward, abandoning Bin Jawad, Ras Lanuf and Brega in quick succession, the rebels were said to be mystified as to why their advance had not been supported by coalition air strikes and why the planes had still not shown up to attack Colonel Qaddafi's advancing tanks at their most vulnerable.

One theory was that the decision, reached on March 27th after a week of wrangling, to hand full control of the military operation to NATO had led to a less aggressive targeting by the coalition. Cloudy weather may also have cut the tempo of attacks on ground targets.

But coalition commanders insist that their targeting policy and the rules of engagement are unchanged and that the sortie rate has been maintained. It is most likely that as NATO took over it was caught on the hop by the speed of the loyalist advance and by a change of tactics, in which the loyalists left behind their tanks and mounted rocket-launchers on pickup trucks. That made them hard to distinguish from rebels. On March 30th the coalition resumed hitting government forces on the ground. David Cameron, the British prime minister, telephoned Admiral James Stavridis, NATO's supreme commander, to express his hope that the deteriorating situation could be swiftly reversed.

But the uncomfortable truth is that, despite big losses of tanks and artillery and the battering of his command-and-control centres, the 10,000 or so men in the tribally based militias loyal to Colonel Qaddafi are proving tenacious. The rebels, for their part, are still far from turning themselves into a force sufficiently disciplined or well-armed to engage loyalist soldiers with much prospect of success.

Sirte also looks as if it is becoming a military and political problem for the coalition. As long as the town remains loyal to Colonel Qaddafi, it both blocks the road to Misrata, the rebels' western redoubt some 220km to the west, and provides a springboard for rolling back the rebels in the east. The plight of Misrata, Libya's third-biggest city, grows more desperate by the day. Government tanks close to the centre are continuing to shell buildings and residents indiscriminately, and food and water are said to be running low. On March 30th coalition aircraft sank five government ships blocking the supply of humanitarian aid to the city.

### **Digging in at home**

Sirte is of unique importance to the regime, both as a garrison and for what it represents. Once a poor village, it is now a city of 130,000 people, showered with money and privileges during most of Colonel Qaddafi's 42-year rule. In 1988 he moved many government departments and the country's rubber-stamp parliament there from Tripoli, the capital. In 1999 he proposed it as the administrative centre of a "United States of Africa". Western reporters in Sirte say its people's declarations of devotion to the colonel and their willingness to fight for what they have are sincere.

That makes things tricky for the coalition. It cannot claim to be protecting local civilians when attacking government forces defending Sirte. But its commanders argue that the colonel's troops remain a legitimate target in Sirte since they still threaten civilians elsewhere.

Such operational dilemmas were blurred at the London conference. And there was little sign of any desire by the participants to lessen the pressure on the regime. Indeed, for all the previous insistence that regime change is not on the agenda, the leaders attending the conference could not have been clearer that the military campaign will continue until Colonel Qaddafi has gone.

In the conference corridors there was some talk of whether or how to offer the colonel an exit if it would end the violence rather than demand that he be dragged before the International Criminal Court. But the main concern of the coalition was to hasten a resolution to the conflict and avoid a stalemate.

To that end, Hillary Clinton, the American secretary of state, raised the possibility that the coalition could provide arms for the opposition without needing the cover of a new UN resolution. In her view, Security Council resolution 1973 trumps the previous resolution 1970 with enough latitude to allow the supply of defensive weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, if they would save civilian lives.

The idea was given tentative support by Britain's foreign secretary, William Hague who, with Mrs Clinton, had earlier met the Libyan opposition leader, Mahmoud Jibril. In a series of interviews on American television aimed at winning support for his Libyan policy from a sceptical public, Barack Obama added that he was neither ruling out arming the rebels nor ruling it in (see [Lexington](#)). But a leak on March 30th suggested that the president had signed a secret "finding" that would authorise covert support for the rebels.

Apart from possible legal obstacles, arming the rebels is fraught with difficulty. The coalition leadership would almost certainly want Egypt to be the conduit for any weapons supplies, but that would trouble its transitional government in Cairo. And unless more officers and troops defect from the Libyan army, there is no guarantee that the rebel side would be capable of using sophisticated weapons—nor that they could easily be prevented from falling into the wrong hands.

Moreover, the coalition has nagging doubts about who exactly it might be arming. Despite a magnificently politically correct declaration of principle published by the self-styled Interim National Council to coincide with the London conference, worries persist that the most ardent rebel fighters have strongly Islamist credentials.


An even more delicate question, raised by the rebels' poor military performance, is whether there would be any circumstance in which coalition (though not American) ground forces might go in. That is not something that anyone wants to talk about, but it will not go away.

The priorities just now are to halt the advance of loyalist troops, bring some relief to the civilians in Misrata and encourage members of the regime to start looking for a way out. On March 30th Colonel Qaddafi's foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, a former longtime head of intelligence, ran away to London. The addition to the coalition's armoury this week of American A-10 Thunderbolts and AC-130 gunships, lumbering aircraft equipped with fearsome cannon that can hit targets in built-up areas with less risk than fast jets of killing civilians, could tilt the balance in Misrata and elsewhere. But any Western belief that Colonel Qaddafi would be quickly clobbered on the battlefield has, for the moment, been shaken.

# The handicapped union

## How the weakness of national leaders is paralysing decision-making in the European Union

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | from the print edition



WHEN Enda Kenny, the new Irish prime minister, pleaded at a European Union summit last month for more lenient bail-out terms, his fellow leaders derided one of his arguments: that he had been overwhelmingly elected on a promise to get a better deal for his country. So what? We all have elections, they said.

In a club of 27 democracies, with an endless succession of national and regional ballots, electoral calculations inevitably colour decision-making. Yet domestic politics is now proving particularly debilitating to governments, whether conservative or socialist, northern or southern, creditor or debtor.

A fortnight after Mr Kenny's appeal, another EU summit was overshadowed by the resignation of José Sócrates, Portugal's Socialist prime minister, who had failed to get his latest austerity plan through parliament. Two days later Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, so powerful in bending Europe to her will over the euro crisis, was weakened by two state elections. Her main European ally, Nicolas Sarkozy of France, was humbled in local elections on the same day.

Several others are weak as well. In the Mediterranean the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, has just appeared in court for the first of several legal cases that threaten to undermine his leadership. Spain's José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is hugely unpopular at home. In northern Europe, Danish, Dutch and Swedish anti-immigrant parties have new political clout. In Finland the True Finns party may do well in the April 17th election. And in Brussels a caretaker prime minister has run Belgium desultorily since an election in June 2010—beating all records for government paralysis. These days, in short, summits are like a mad hospital ward, filled with the broken-limbed, straitjacketed and terminally ill. No wonder EU leaders are struggling to cure the sovereign-debt crisis.

Take the summit on March 24th-25th, billed as the moment when the EU would finalise its "comprehensive" response to the woes of the euro zone. Domestic upheavals once again prevented united and convincing action. One reason was the political meltdown in Portugal. Many are urging Mr Sócrates to apply for a bail-out, but he



prefers to limp on to the election, in May or June. He is keen to avoid a return to the IMF-imposed strictures in the 1970s and 1980s, still remembered in a famous protest song. “There is no power that can bend the IMF,” it goes.

But a second difficulty was Mrs Merkel’s decision to reopen the deal struck just days earlier by finance ministers on how to fund a permanent rescue mechanism for the euro zone. Worried that Germany would have to pay in too much capital in 2013, a federal election year, Mrs Merkel secured a deal to build up the fund more gradually, over five years instead of two. What if the fund lacks the money to save a country in need? Never mind, said the leaders, we’ll think of some way of making up the money.

The third obstacle was placed by Finland, which is blocking any agreement on boosting today’s underpowered temporary fund. Helsinki does not want to take on any additional burden before April 17th. A change would require a recall of parliament, now in recess, and boost the True Finns, who are riding a wave of anger over the euro-zone bail-outs.

Conflicting national interests have always dogged the EU. Even so, Euro-optimists say, it has been able to take far-reaching, even unpopular, decisions in times of need. It has gone further in toughening budgetary rules and integrating economic policies than anyone thought possible a year ago. True enough. Yet despite all that, the EU has not done enough to quell the markets.

So why are Europe’s leaders so debilitated? To some extent, political fatigue has set in. Mr Berlusconi is in his third stint as prime minister; Mr Sócrates and Mrs Merkel have been in office for six years. The economic crisis has also battered both those who are having to take harsh austerity measures and those having to lend them money. But deeper forces are also at work. Traditional parties have weakened with the decline of class-based politics. On the left, changing economic and social structures have shrunk the old working class. On the right, typically dominated by Christian Democrats, religious influence has waned and the anti-communist rationale disappeared with the Berlin Wall. Some voters sense the powerlessness of national leaders before problems like climate change and the financial crisis. Others demand protection from global economic forces and immigration. Fragmentation and disillusion create space for narrower groups, be they Greens, regional parties or a ragbag of anti-immigrant, anti-EU and far-right parties.

In short, stable majorities are harder to establish (a coalition even runs Britain, where the first-past-the-post system is designed for single-party government). And once in power, notes Peter Mair of the European University Institute in Florence, governments lose popularity more quickly, not least because they are constrained by decisions taken in Brussels. “The mass party is dead, and parties no longer command the loyalty of their followers,” he says. “This leads to what Italians call *immobilismo*.”

### **Real leaders, please**

The answer is not to bemoan national politics, but to enhance democracy. In Europe the Brussels institutions could be made more relevant to voters, for instance by strengthening the influence of national parliaments over EU decisions. At home leaders must learn that voters are less tribal, more critical and better able to sniff out hypocrisy. That is a good thing, and places a bigger premium on sound leadership, credibility, conviction and serious argument. If Mr Sarkozy were less mercurial, Mrs Merkel less prone to panic, Mr Zapatero more convincing and Mr Berlusconi less of a buffoon, Europe would be less handicapped.

## The uprisings

### Islam and the Arab revolutions

**Religion is a growing force in the Arab awakening. Westerners should hold their nerve and trust democracy**

The Economist Mar 31st 2011 | from the print edition



THE sight of corrupt old Arab tyrants being toppled at the behest of a new generation of young idealists, inspired by democracy, united by Facebook and excited by the notion of opening up to a wider world, has thrilled observers everywhere. Those revolutions are still in full swing, albeit at different points in the cycle. In Tunisia and Egypt they are going the right way, with a hopeful new mood prevailing and free elections in the offing. In Libya, Syria and Yemen dictators are clinging on to power, with varying degrees of success. And in the Gulf monarchs are struggling to fend off demands for democracy with oil-funded largesse topped by modest and grudging political concessions.

So far these revolts have appeared to be largely secular in character. Westerners have been quietly relieved by that. Not that they are all against religion. Many—Americans in particular—are devout. But by and large, they prefer their own variety to anybody else's, and since September 11th 2001, they have been especially nervous about Islam.

Now, however, there are signs that Islam is a growing force in the Arab revolutions (see [article](#)). That makes secular-minded and liberal people, both Arabs and Westerners, queasy. They fear that the Arab awakening might be hijacked by the sort of Islamists who reject a pluralist version of democracy, oppress women and fly the flag of *jihad* against Christians and Jews. They worry that the murderous militancy that has killed 30,000 over the past four years in Pakistan (see [article](#)) may emerge in the Arab world too.

#### Islam on the rise

In Libya the transitional national council, slowly gaining recognition as a government-in-waiting, is a medley of secular liberals and Islamists. There are Libyan jihadist veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan among the rebels, though not in big numbers. An American general detects “flickers of al-Qaeda” among the colonel's foes being helped by the West, raising uncomfortable memories of America's alliance against the Russians with Afghanistan's mujahideen, before they turned into al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which has branches all over the region, is the best-run opposition movement in Libya and Egypt; and last week's constitutional referendum in Egypt went the way the Brothers wanted it to. Its members have long suffered at the hands both of Western-backed regimes, such as Hosni Mubarak's in Egypt, and of anti-Western secular ones, such as Bashar Assad's, now under extreme pressure in Syria. In Tunisia, too, the Islamists, previously banned, look well-placed. On the whole, these Brothers have gone out of their way to

reassure the West that they nowadays disavow violence in pursuit of their aims, believe in multiparty democracy, endorse women's rights and would refrain from imposing sharia law wholesale, were they to form a government in any of the countries where they are re-emerging as legal parties.

All the same, the Brothers make many people nervous. At one extreme of the wide ideological spectrum that they cover they are not so far from the jihadists, many of whom started off in the Brothers' ranks. The leading Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, has been delighted by Mr Mubarak's fall. It has in the past carried out suicide-bombings in the heart of Israel and refuses to recognise the Jewish state. Some liberals say that more extreme Islamist groups are riding on the more moderate Brothers' coat-tails. In the flush of prisoner releases, hundreds if not thousands of Egyptian jihadists are once again at large.

### **Don't despair**

Islam is bound to play a larger role in government in the Arab world than elsewhere. Most Muslims do not believe in the separation of religion and state, as America and France do, and have not lost their enthusiasm for religion, as many "Christian Democrats" in Europe have. Muslim democracies such as Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia all have big Islamic parties.

But Islamic does not mean Islamist. Al-Qaeda in the past few years has lost ground in Arab hearts and minds. The jihadists are a small minority, widely hated by their milder co-religionists, not least for giving Islam a bad name across the world. Ideological battles between moderates and extremists within Islam are just as fierce as the animosity pitting Muslim, Christian and Jewish fundamentalists against each other. Younger Arabs, largely responsible for the upheavals, are better connected and attuned to the rest of the modern world than their conservative predecessors were.

Moreover, some Muslim countries are on the road to democracy, or already there. Some are doing well. Among Arab countries, Lebanon, with its profusion of religions and sects, has long had a democracy of a kind, albeit hobbled by sectarian quotas and an armed militia, Hizbullah. Iraq has at least elected a genuine multiparty parliament.

Outside the Arab world, in Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia, Islam and democracy are cohabiting fairly comfortably. Many devout Muslims among the Arab protesters, including members of the Brotherhood, cite Turkey as a model. Its mildly Islamist government is showing worrying signs of authoritarianism these days, but it serves its people far better than the generals did. Iran, which once held so much sway, is not talked of as a model: theocracy does not appeal to the youngsters on the Arab street.

Still, Muslim countries may well make choices with which the West is not comfortable. But those inclined to worry should remember that no alternative would serve their interests, let alone the Arabs', in the long run. The old autocrats deprived their people of freedom and opportunity; and the stability they promised, it is now clear, could not endure. Algeria's civil war in the 1990s remains a horrible warning against depriving Islamists of power they have rightfully won.

Islam will never find an accommodation with the modern democratic world until Muslims can take responsibility for their own lives. Millions more have a chance of doing just that. It is a reason more for celebration than for worry.

## Existe-t-il encore un modèle français ?

Yves Kerdrel

5 avril 2011

**LE FIGARO**

Poser cette question, c'est déjà y répondre. Peut-on encore parler de modèle français lorsque 8 millions de nos concitoyens vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté ; lorsque l'on dénombre 2,7 millions de sans-emploi, et surtout quand cela fait maintenant trente-quatre ans que le taux de chômage n'est pas repassé sous la barre des 7 % ? Peut-on encore évoquer cette expression curieuse de « modèle français », lorsque l'on recense plus de 750 ghettos urbains qui rassemblent 6 millions de personnes vivant de l'assistanat ? Peut-on se réclamer d'un modèle français, qu'il faudrait vénérer comme une relique, alors que l'ascenseur social est en panne, que la machine à intégrer est cassée, que le service public de l'éducation est en déroute et que les caisses de l'État-providence sont vides ?

Il ne s'agit pas ici de replonger les lecteurs dans le noir, au moment même où les meilleurs économistes de France publient des odes à l'optimisme, comme les grands prêtres romains en appelaient jadis aux mânes sacrés. À un an d'un rendez-vous électoral majeur, il s'agit simplement de se demander quelle France nous voulons pour la décennie à venir, quel lien social nous sommes prêts à reconstruire, quelle solidarité nationale nous sommes disposés à payer et si, oui ou non, nous sommes prêts à accepter, enfin, l'idée que l'État, loin d'être la solution, est au contraire le problème, pour paraphraser Ronald Reagan.

Le dernier scrutin, celui des cantonales, même s'il n'a concerné qu'une partie des Français, et même s'il n'a mobilisé qu'une faible proportion d'électeurs, a montré à quel point la France était désormais coupée en trois : non pas la droite, la gauche et les partis protestataires. Mais d'un côté une France qui vit dans la mondialisation, qui accepte l'économie de marché et qui a confiance dans l'avenir. Toutes les enquêtes d'opinion se recoupent pour estimer que cela représente environ un tiers des Français. D'un autre côté, il y a une France qui vit protégée par l'État, à l'ombre de statuts particuliers, de subventions et d'allocations diverses. Ce qui ne représente pas moins de 20 millions de nos concitoyens. Enfin, il y a la France des exclus de tout, et de tous les exclus.

Cette France-là, qui compte désormais 25 millions de personnes, est la honte de ce « modèle-social-que-le-monde-entier-envie », comme François Mitterrand et Jacques Chirac l'ont seriné pendant des années dans un même aveuglement coupable. Comment se peut-il que la cinquième puissance économique mondiale, qui consacre chaque année 700 milliards d'euros à des dépenses sociales (un tiers de la richesse du pays) ait pu laisser grossir une telle cohorte d'exclus ? Exclus du système éducatif - la base de tout. Exclus du monde du travail. Exclus des aides sociales. Qu'ils soient français de souche ou d'adoption, qu'ils vivent dans des banlieues ou des campagnes, leur vie se joue chaque mois à une vingtaine d'euros près. Le pire, c'est que ce sont souvent eux qui se donnent le plus de mal, qui cherchent à se doter d'un toit, à vivre dans la sécurité, à construire un avenir pour leurs enfants, mais qui gagnent trop pour être aidés, et trop peu pour ne pas se sentir déclassés.

Chaque mois qui passe creuse un peu plus le fossé entre ces trois France. C'est ce qu'a souligné le vote protestataire des élections cantonales, et cette forme d'« insurrection citoyenne » qui s'est produite dans les urnes. Tout cela échappe naturellement à la gauche caviar, qu'il s'agisse des tendances « beluga » - façon DSK - ou « sévruga » - modèle Aubry -, qui se distinguent par l'importance des taux d'imposition auxquels elles veulent soumettre les Français qui travaillent plus de 35 heures par semaine.

Tout cela échappe aussi à une certaine droite qui se dit « sociale », parce qu'elle pense qu'en déversant de l'argent public sur les quartiers difficiles, tous leurs problèmes s'en trouveront réglés.

C'est pourquoi le candidat qui sera le plus écouté, et le plus entendu, dans un an, ne sera pas celui qui fera rêver les Français avec des chèques en bois qu'il ne pourra pas faire, ou avec un « rêve mondialiste » qui échappe à deux tiers des Français. Ce sera celui qui leur proposera de reconstruire un lien social grâce à la croissance économique.


Car jusqu'ici personne n'a trouvé de moyen plus efficace d'assurer le progrès de tous autrement que par la création de richesses collectives. Mais comme le montrent la Grande-Bretagne et l'Allemagne, après le Canada ou la Suède, le retour de la croissance ne peut se faire sans une restructuration de l'État, un désendettement massif et une baisse des dépenses publiques.

Le candidat qui l'emportera dans un an ne sera ni l'apôtre de la mondialisation, ni le chantre du souverainisme. Il sera celui capable d'expliquer que le seul moyen de recréer un modèle français, c'est d'assurer la bonne marche des entreprises et d'organiser le recul de l'État, là où il n'a rien à faire, pour le renforcer là où il doit être.

ydekerdrel@lefigaro.fr

# Immaculate Intervention: The Wars of Humanitarianism

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**By George Friedman**

There are wars in pursuit of interest. In these wars, nations pursue economic or strategic ends to protect the nation or expand its power. There are also wars of ideology, designed to spread some idea of “the good,” whether this good is religious or secular. The two obviously can be intertwined, such that a war designed to spread an ideology also strengthens the interests of the nation spreading the ideology.

Since World War II, a new class of war has emerged that we might call humanitarian wars — wars in which the combatants claim to be fighting neither for their national interest nor to impose any ideology, but rather to prevent inordinate human suffering. In Kosovo and now in [Libya](#), this has been defined as stopping a government from committing mass murder. But it is not confined to that. In the 1990s, the U.S. intervention in Somalia was intended to alleviate a famine while the invasion of Haiti was designed to remove a corrupt and oppressive regime causing grievous suffering.

It is important to distinguish these interventions from peacekeeping missions. In a peacekeeping mission, third-party forces are sent to oversee some agreement reached by combatants. Peacekeeping operations are not conducted to impose a settlement by force of arms; rather, they are conducted to oversee a settlement by a neutral force. In the event the agreement collapses and war resumes, the peacekeepers either withdraw or take cover. They are soldiers, but they are not there to fight beyond protecting themselves.

## **Concept vs. Practice**

In humanitarian wars, the intervention is designed both to be neutral and to protect potential victims on one side. It is at this point that the concept and practice of a humanitarian war become more complex. There is an ideology undergirding humanitarian wars, one derived from both the U.N. Charter and from the lessons drawn from the Holocaust, genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia and a range of other circumstances where large-scale slaughter — crimes against humanity — took place. That no one intervened to prevent or stop these atrocities was seen as a moral failure. According to this ideology, the international community has an obligation to prevent such slaughter.

This ideology must, of course, confront other principles of the U.N. Charter, such as the right of nations to self-determination. In international wars, where the aggressor is trying to both kill large numbers of civilians and destroy the enemy’s right to national self-determination, this does not pose a significant intellectual problem. In internal unrest and civil war, however, the challenge of the intervention is to protect human rights without undermining national sovereignty or the right of national self-determination.

The doctrine becomes less coherent in a civil war in which one side is winning and promising to slaughter its enemies, [Libya](#) being the obvious example. Those intervening can claim to be carrying out a neutral humanitarian action, but in reality, they are intervening on one side’s behalf. If the intervention is successful — as it likely will be given that interventions are invariably by powerful countries against weaker ones — the

practical result is to turn the victims into victors. By doing that, the humanitarian warriors are doing more than simply protecting the weak. They are also defining a nation's history.

There is thus a deep tension between the principle of national self-determination and the obligation to intervene to prevent slaughter. Consider a case such as [Sudan](#), where it can be argued that the regime is guilty of crimes against humanity but also represents the will of the majority of the people in terms of its religious and political program. It can be argued reasonably that a people who would support such a regime have lost the right to national self-determination, and that it is proper that a regime be imposed on it from the outside. But that is rarely the argument made in favor of humanitarian intervention. I call humanitarian wars immaculate intervention, because most advocates want to see the outcome limited to preventing war crimes, not extended to include regime change or the imposition of alien values. They want a war of immaculate intentions surgically limited to a singular end without other consequences. And this is where the doctrine of humanitarian war unravels.

Regardless of intention, any intervention favors the weaker side. If the side were not weak, it would not be facing mass murder; it could protect itself. Given that the intervention must be military, there must be an enemy. Wars by military forces are fought against enemies, not for abstract concepts. The enemy will always be the stronger side. The question is why that side is stronger. Frequently, this is because a great many people in the country, most likely a majority, support that side. Therefore, a humanitarian war designed to prevent the slaughter of the minority must many times undermine the will of the majority. Thus, the intervention may begin with limited goals but almost immediately becomes an attack on what was, up to that point, the legitimate government of a country.

### **A Slow Escalation**

The solution is to intervene gently. In the case of Libya, this began with a [no-fly zone](#) that no reasonable person expected to have any significant impact. It proceeded to [airstrikes against Gadhafi's forces](#), which continued to hold their own against these strikes. It now has been followed by the dispatching of Royal Marines, whose mission is unclear, but whose normal duties are fighting wars. What we are seeing in Libya is a classic slow escalation motivated by two factors. The first is the hope that the leader of the country responsible for the bloodshed will capitulate. The second is a genuine reluctance of intervening nations to spend excessive wealth or blood on a project they view in effect as charitable. Both of these need to be examined.

The expectation of capitulation in the case of Libya is made unlikely by another aspect of humanitarian war fighting, namely the International Criminal Court (ICC). Modeled in principle on the Nuremberg trials and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the ICC is intended to try war criminals. Trying to induce Moammar Gadhafi to leave Libya knowing that what awaits him is trial and the certain equivalent of a life sentence will not work. Others in his regime would not resign for the same reason. When his [foreign minister appeared to defect to London](#), the demand for his trial over Lockerbie and other affairs was immediate. Nothing could have strengthened Gadhafi's position more. His regime is filled with people guilty of the most heinous crimes. There is no clear mechanism for a plea bargain guaranteeing their immunity. While a logical extension of humanitarian warfare — having intervened against atrocities, the perpetrators ought to be brought to justice — the effect is a prolongation of the war. The example of Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, who ended the Kosovo War with what he thought was a promise that he would not be prosecuted, undoubtedly is on Gadhafi's mind.

But the war is also prolonged by the unwillingness of the intervening forces to inflict civilian casualties. This is reasonable, given that their motivation is to prevent civilian casualties. But the result is that instead of a swift and direct invasion designed to crush the regime in the shortest amount of time, the regime remains intact and civilians and others continue to die. This is not simply a matter of moral squeamishness. It also reflects the fact that the nations involved are unwilling — and frequently blocked by political opposition at home — from the commitment of massive and overwhelming force. The application of minimal and insufficient force, combined with the unwillingness of people like Gadhafi and his equally guilty supporters to face The Hague, creates the

framework for a long and inconclusive war in which the intervention in favor of humanitarian considerations turns into an intervention in a civil war on the side that opposes the regime.

This, then, turns into the problem that the virtue of the weaker side may consist only of its weakness. In other words, strengthened by foreign intervention that clears their way to power, they might well turn out just as brutal as the regime they were fighting. It should be remembered that many of Libya's opposition leaders are former senior officials of the Gadhafi government. They did not survive as long as they did in that regime without having themselves committed crimes, and without being prepared to commit more.

In that case, the intervention — less and less immaculate — becomes an exercise in nation-building. Having destroyed the Gadhafi government and created a vacuum in Libya and being unwilling to hand power to Gadhafi's former aides and now enemies, the intervention — now turning into an occupation— must now invent a new government. An invented government is rarely welcome, as the United States discovered in Iraq. At least some of the people resent being occupied regardless of the occupier's original intentions, leading to insurgency. At some point, the interveners have the choice of walking away and leaving chaos, as the United States did in Somalia, or staying for a long time and fighting, as they did in [Iraq](#).

Iraq is an interesting example. The United States posed a series of justifications for its invasion of Iraq, including simply that Saddam Hussein was an amoral monster who had killed hundreds of thousands and would kill more. It is difficult to choose between Hussein and Gadhafi. Regardless of the United States' other motivations in both conflicts, it would seem that those who favor humanitarian intervention would have favored the Iraq war. That they generally opposed the Iraq war from the beginning requires a return to the concept of immaculate intervention.

Hussein was a war criminal and a danger to his people. However, the American justification for intervention was not immaculate. It had multiple reasons, only one of which was humanitarian. Others explicitly had to do with national interest, the claims of nuclear weapons in Iraq and the desire to reshape Iraq. That it also had a humanitarian outcome — the destruction of the Hussein regime — made the American intervention inappropriate in the view of those who favor immaculate interventions for two reasons. First, the humanitarian outcome was intended as part of a broader war. Second, regardless of the fact that humanitarian interventions almost always result in regime change, the explicit intention to usurp Iraq's national self-determination openly undermined in principle what the humanitarian interveners wanted to undermine only in practice.

## Other Considerations

The point here is not simply that humanitarian interventions tend to devolve into occupations of countries, albeit more slowly and with more complex rhetoric. It is also that for the humanitarian warrior, there are other political considerations. In the case of the French, the contrast between their absolute opposition to Iraq and their [aggressive desire to intervene in Libya](#) needs to be explained. I suspect it will not be.

There has been much speculation that the intervention in Libya was about oil. All such interventions, such as those in Kosovo and Haiti, are examined for hidden purposes. Perhaps it was about oil in this case, but [Gadhafi was happily shipping oil to Europe](#), so intervening to ensure that it continues makes no sense. Some say France's Total and Britain's BP engineered the war to displace Italy's ENI in running the oil fields. While possible, these oil companies are no more popular at home than oil companies are anywhere in the world. The blowback in France or Britain if this were shown to be the real reason would almost certainly cost French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron their jobs, and they are much too fond of those to risk them for oil companies. I am reminded that people kept asserting that the 2003 Iraq invasion was designed to seize Iraq's oil for Texas oilmen. If so, it is taking a long time to pay off. Sometimes the lack of a persuasive reason for a war generates theories to fill the vacuum. In all humanitarian wars, there is a belief that the war could not be about humanitarian matters.

Therein lays the dilemma of humanitarian wars. They have a tendency to go far beyond the original intent behind them, as the interveners, trapped in the logic of humanitarian war, are drawn further in. Over time, the

ideological zeal frays and the lack of national interest saps the intervener's will. It is interesting that some of the interventions that brought with them the most good were carried out without any concern for the local population and with ruthless self-interest. I think of Rome and Britain. They were in it for themselves. They did some good incidentally.

My unease with humanitarian intervention is not that I don't think the intent is good and the end moral. It is that the intent frequently gets lost and the moral end is not achieved. Ideology, like passion, fades. But interest has a certain enduring quality. A doctrine of humanitarian warfare that demands an immaculate intervention will fail because the desire to do good is an insufficient basis for war. It does not provide a rigorous military strategy to what is, after all, a war. Neither does it bind a nation's public to the burdens of the intervention. In the end, the ultimate dishonesties of humanitarian war are the claims that "this won't hurt much" and "it will be over fast." In my view, their outcome is usually either a withdrawal without having done much good or a long occupation in which the occupied people are singularly ungrateful.

North Africa is no place for casual war plans and good intentions. It is an old, tough place. If you must go in, go in heavy, go in hard and get out fast. Humanitarian warfare says that you go in light, you go in soft and you stay there long. I have no quarrel with humanitarianism. It is the way the doctrine wages war that concerns me. Getting rid of Gadhafi is something we can all feel good about and which Europe and America can afford. It is the aftermath — the place beyond the immaculate intervention — that concerns me.



## Libyan Rebels Complain of Deadly Delays Under NATO's Command

By C. J. CHIVERS and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK; C. J. Chivers reported from Brega, Libya, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya. Rachel Donadio contributed reporting from Rome, and Thom Shanker from Washington.

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5 avril 2011

### **The New York Times**

BREGA, Libya -- A senior Libyan rebel leader sharply criticized NATO on Monday for bureaucratic delays that he said were putting civilians' lives at risk and complicating rebel efforts to fight the Qaddafi forces on the ground.

The official, Ali al-Essawi, the foreign policy director of the Transitional National Council, made his remarks as the rebels' disorganized and quixotic fight again stalled under fire in the eastern oil town of Brega, where loyalist forces have fought off repeated rebel attacks, and as more people were reported to have been killed in the siege at the beleaguered city of Misrata.

In Brega, after forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi ceded their presence in a residential quarter of the town, a rebel attack in the evening against loyalists at a university campus and oil infrastructure was met by ferocious heavy machine gun fire and an artillery or mortar barrage.

The loyalists' firepower, coordinated and accurate, killed at least several rebel fighters and wounded many more, and sent others scrambling north in retreat.

Throughout the day, no air power was visible overhead. A Pentagon spokesman, Capt. Darryn James, said that American air power had played a smaller role in the war since Sunday, and with command and control of the air campaign officially shifted to NATO, by midnight on Monday in Washington the United States had no strike sorties planned.

American aircraft, Captain James said, would now be on a so-called standby mode and would fly only when requested by NATO and approved by the Pentagon. The withdrawal of American assets means, among other things, that the rebels will have less support from two classes of aircraft that made several successful attacks against the Qaddafi forces in eastern Libya -- the AC-130 gunship and A-10 -- than when the loyalist forces were turned back just short of Benghazi, the rebel capital, two weeks ago.

The quiet in the eastern skies on Monday seemed to underscore Mr. Essawi's sentiment that the international military campaign, after initially turning back Colonel Qaddafi's army and militias as they swept eastern Libya, had lost momentum, leaving adrift the ground war, waged by rebels with virtually no military experience or structure.

"There's a delay in reacting and lack of response to what's going on on the ground, and many civilians have died, and they couldn't react to protect them," Mr. Essawi said in Rome.

Mr. Essawi said the problems began after NATO took charge of the air campaign from the United States, Britain and France, and that he now foresaw a drawn-out battle. "They took the command, they will make it long," he said at the Community of Sant'Egidio, a liberal Catholic group active in diplomacy.

A sustained campaign could be especially hard on civilians in Misrata, a city in the west in which rebels have been battling the Qaddafi forces in a long siege. A resident of the city, Mohamed, said by telephone that five people had been killed and 24 wounded in continued shelling on Monday. His last name was withheld for his protection.

Any long-lasting campaign raises questions as well about the prospects for rebel success in the east, where a small, ill-trained rebel column had been stalled for days along the two-lane highway to Brega.

Early on Monday, the forces loyal to Colonel Qaddafi, which had been patrolling one of the town's residential areas, known as New Brega, slipped away, allowing rebel forces to advance. The rebels who were strung north along the highway urged anyone with a car or pickup truck to rush into the neighborhood and retrieve civilians. For a few hours, civilians streamed out of the area, which by evening became a ghost town.

But residents interviewed in New Brega said that the Qaddafi forces had never viewed New Brega as a priority. They had swept it house to house, looking for weapons and rebel fighters, but had not dug in and occupied the area. The main body of the Qaddafi forces, they said, were in defensive positions at the university and near the oil infrastructure.

Rebels fired ground-to-ground rockets at the suspected loyalist positions for hours. Smoke rose from the city, and at one point a rocket seemed to ignite a much larger explosion, sending a mushroom cloud billowing over the desert.

Late in the afternoon the rebels tried to advance down the road to the university, but were met by withering machine gun fire. And when many of the rebels began to pull back with their wounded and their dead, the loyalists shelled the nearest rebel checkpoint with an artillery or heavy mortar barrage, wounding at least six rebel fighters and triggering a panicked withdrawal that did not stop for several miles.

The fighting fit into a recent pattern of inconclusive skirmishes, as the seesaw battle up and down the Mediterranean coast has seemed to settle into a stalemate.

In another development on Monday, Italy and Kuwait joined France and Qatar in recognizing the rebels' coordinating group, the Transitional National Council, as the legitimate government of Libya. "We have decided to recognize the council as the only political, legitimate interlocutor to represent Libya," said Foreign Minister Franco Frattini of Italy, which plans to send an envoy to Benghazi within days.

That followed a proposed resolution to the Libyan conflict from at least two of Colonel Qaddafi's sons. Under their plan, Colonel Qaddafi would step aside to make way for a transition to a constitutional democracy under the direction of his son Seif al-Islam, according to a diplomat and a Libyan official briefed on the plan.

The rebels, as well as the American and European nations supporting them, have so far insisted on a more radical break with Colonel Qaddafi's 40 years of rule. Mr. Essawi said the proposal was unacceptable. "There's no way to replace Qaddafi with a small Qaddafi," he said in an interview.

But a diplomat familiar with the proposal said that discussions were still in the initial stages, and that "the bargaining has yet to commence."

Noting that the United Nations resolution authorizing the airstrikes also precludes "a foreign occupation force of any form" in Libya, the diplomat said he wondered how the fighting could end without a negotiated solution.

Proposals and counterproposals even for a cease-fire appeared deadlocked thus far. "For Qaddafi a cease-fire means everyone should cease firing, but the Qaddafi forces should stay where they are," the diplomat said. "But for the rebels it means that the Qaddafi forces should withdraw."

"They will continue until the ammunition is finished, this stupid fighting along the highway," the diplomat said.

PHOTO: Rebels kept watch Monday over Brega, Libya, where forces loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi left the city's residential quarter but dug in near its oil infrastructure. (PHOTOGRAPH BY BRYAN DENTON FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES)

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## U.N. strikes at leader's forces in Ivory Coast

Colum Lynch

5 avril 2011

# The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS - U.N. peacekeepers and French troops launched military operations against loyalists of Ivory Coast's longtime strongman Monday, a significant escalation of force that effectively placed peacekeepers on one side of the West African country's deepening civil war.

The United Nations and France authorized helicopter gunships to target key installations and heavy-weapons sites after days of attacks by loyalists of incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo on peacekeepers and civilians, according to U.N. officials.

Two U.N. Mi-24 helicopters, piloted by Ukrainian peacekeepers, attacked two military bases controlled by Gbagbo's forces. U.N. officials said French forces targeted heavy weaponry near the presidential palace and residence in Abidjan, as well as other installations under Gbagbo's control.

The attacks marked a dramatic development in the international community's efforts to force Gbagbo from power and provided a boost to Ivorian forces backing Gbagbo's political rival, Alassane Ouattara, who is widely recognized as the winner of the country's Nov. 28 presidential election. The attacks also represented a rare instance in which the United Nations has used force against a conventional army.

In a statement, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said the United Nations was engaging in a limited military operation taken "in self defense and to protect" civilians. The operation, he said, did not constitute a decision by the United Nations to become "a party to the conflict" in Ivory Coast.

Nonetheless, the use of the 9,000-member U.N. peacekeeping mission for offensive operations raised the possibility that it could get drawn deeper into a civil war, particularly if the Ivorian conflict is protracted. Hundreds of people have already been killed and up to 1 million have fled the violence. On Monday, a coalition of fighters loyal to Ouattara was massing on the edge of the commercial capital, Abidjan, suggesting the worst fighting might be yet to come.

Ban requested French support for a military operation Sunday, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy informed Ban that he had "authorized French force . . . to participate in these joint operations."

"I, like you, believe that protecting civilians threatened in Cote d'Ivoire is an urgent necessity," Sarkozy said in a letter released Monday.

France, the former colonial power in Ivory Coast, seized control of the country's key airport, near Abidjan, on Sunday and has reinforced its military presence in the country with 400 additional troops, bringing its total number to nearly 1,500.

The military offensive marked a rare show of lethal force by the United Nations. In the past decade, the United Nations has carried out what it calls "robust peacekeeping" - essentially offensive military operations - in Sierra Leone, Congo and Haiti.

In Ivory Coast, the U.N. mandate gives peacekeepers broad authority to use force to protect civilians and support the peace process, but it does not authorize them to take sides in the country's conflict.

Aides to Gbagbo condemned the escalation of force Monday.

"I'm personally shocked by the U.N.'s behavior in Cote d'Ivoire. It is not part of their mandate to carry out offensive attacks against Ivorian institutions," said Zakaria Fellah, a foreign policy adviser to Gbagbo. "The U.N. has not been an impartial player, but rather a party taking sides with Ouattara's people."

Fellah conceded that Gbagbo would be unlikely to withstand the combined attacks against his forces, saying that Gbagbo has never "been as isolated as today." But he praised his "heroic resistance," citing his refusal to yield to Ouattara's forces.

"I would say the French will take a more aggressive stand in the next hours and day to dislodge Mr. Gbagbo from power. He is not a coward; he is a man of conviction. I believe he will fight till the end," he said.

U.N. officials have described Gbagbo as anything but heroic, saying his forces have blindly fired mortar rounds into Abidjan neighborhoods and at U.N. personnel. Eleven U.N. peacekeepers have been injured over the past 72 hours, including four U.N. "blue helmets" who were wounded when Gbagbo's forces fired a rocket-propelled grenade into a U.N. armored personnel vehicle. On Sunday, the United Nations ordered the temporary relocation of about 200 civilian staff members to the northern town of Dueke.

"The security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past days with fighting having escalated between forces loyal to President Ouattara and those forces remaining loyal to Mr. Gbagbo," Ban said. "This is a direct consequence of Mr. Gbagbo's refusal to relinquish power and allow a peaceful transition to President Ouattara."

Ivory Coast emerged from a civil war in 2003. The latest violence comes more than four months after the United Nations certified the election of Ouattara, a move that triggered broad international support, but Gbagbo has refused to cede power. Several months of high-level diplomatic efforts, combined with financial sanctions, have failed to budge him.

U.N. officials and human rights groups say that in an effort to consolidate power, Gbagbo's forces have perpetrated serious human rights abuses against civilians suspected of supporting Ouattara. But Ouattara's forces have also been accused of carrying out reprisal killings and extrajudicial executions of prisoners during their march to the capital.

On Sunday, Ban voiced concern about reports by the U.N. mission that Ouattara's forces killed 230 people in the western town of Duekoue. Ouattara has denied the allegations and agreed to cooperate with an independent investigation into the killings.

"All of a sudden the U.N. decides there is a bad guy in this movie and the bad guy is Mr. Gbagbo," Fella said. "The angel on the other side is Mr. Ouattara."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com>

# Leviathan is here, in Brussels

25 March 2011 FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG FRANKFURT



The new Empire? Berlaymont, seat of European Commission, Brussels.

**Brussels is the lair of a bureaucratic monster, writes the German essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger. It's up to the Europeans themselves now to take up their pitchforks.**

**Hubert Spiegel**

While the people of the Arab world are rising up and calling for self-determination and democracy, Europe is sinking into despotism. Its democratic traditions are being eroded and destroyed, its citizens harassed and patronised. The power that the people have delegated to their representatives has clandestinely moved on, has withdrawn to an inaccessible place that no human eye has ever seen. Who is really in charge? Where do all the strings come together, and who is gripping them in their hands, and for what purpose?

No one really knows. Laws and regulations are passed, but the inhabitants of the old world no longer understand their wording. One might almost think that a race of aliens had landed quietly on earth and taken over Europe first, perhaps because its members thrive there. It is the land of the technocrats.

This is no dystopian novel sketching out a plot for the subjugation of Europe by an anonymous power, but an essay. Not fiction then, but a text that takes its subject matter from reality in order to describe it and to analyse it. Its author is not a Hercules who has set himself the task of cleaning out Europe's Augean stables. He merely wants to awaken the cattle that tarry there. Their number, however, is huge: about five hundred million.

## The unquestionable blessings from European integration

That's how many people currently live in the European Union. Each of them should take the time to read the nearly seventy pages that have just been [published by Hans Magnus Enzensberger](#) under the title *Brussels, the Gentle Monster*. Or: *The Disenfranchisement of Europe*. The publication is the German equivalent of Stéphane Hessel's call to arms, *Indignez-vous!* (Get Angry!), which has sold a million copies in the French homeland of its 93-year-old author. Enzensberger also aims to outrage and to galvanise. To do so, however, he wheels out not the excited grand gesture but the sober, quiet argument.

Enzensberger has done his homework. Patiently he lists the facts and builds his case up with items of evidence, like in a criminal prosecution. Merely to engage in polemics against the EU is not what he's after; he wants, rather, to unmask the lust for power in his inexorably onwards-rolling monster. This monster has a history. But hardly anyone knows it.

Enzensberger begins with reflections on the unquestionable blessings from European integration. Six decades, almost a whole lifetime, without war, travel made easy, freedom of movement, and steps taken to break up "cartels, monopolies and protectionist trickery" – all this is lauded. From there he looks into the "language guides" of a "history-deaf" EU, whose highest officials are described as "commissioners" – as if European history had known neither Soviet commissars nor the Volkskommissare (People's Commissioners) of the Nazi Reich.

Enzensberger then describes the structure and procedure of the commissions, which for example set threshold limits for "hand, arm and whole-body vibration" when working with pneumatic hammers; which establish the minimum length of European condoms; and which want us in future to use a combination of between thirty-three to forty-two digits for each simple bank transfer. From 2013, BIC and IBAN are to be mandatory even for domestic transfers. On the small island of Malta, the IBAN consists of 31 digits. That means "3,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 possible account numbers, which are to be further refined and made more precise yet by an additional ten billion BIC numbers". This for a population of about 400,000 Maltese.

## The precariousness of democracy in the Union

It's easy to make fun of the rampant mischief being hatched in the name of Europe by hordes of mostly extremely well-paid civil servants. But it is almost impossible to navigate the jungle of committees, secretariats, Directorates-General and countless other institutions and entities that have settled and burgeoned in Brussels and Luxembourg in the best "Kakanien" tradition (a reference to the 'liberal-clerical' Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary from the novel *Man Without Qualities* by Robert Musil). Who knows anything about the EU-OSHA, whose duties lie in the field of health and safety at work? This EU body has 64 employees, whose activities are controlled by 84 directors sitting on boards. Any more questions?

It's fun at first to scroll through the excesses of a runaway bureaucracy in Brussels, but it soon becomes wearying. Not a lot has been gained. And so this little publication digs a little deeper. For Enzensberger, it's about the lack of legitimacy of a power apparatus that, on behalf of European citizens and in their name, enacts laws and regulations that by now probably fill about 150,000 pages – and yet that unscrupulously ignores the basic rules of its own constitution, which is revealed again in its approach to the Stability and Growth Pact.

Enzensberger's core thesis focuses on the precariousness of democracy as we understand it in the Union, which in the intoxication of rule-mongering is showing increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Together with Robert Menasse, Enzensberger concludes with posing the question of whether the traditional understanding of democracy is something Brussels remains committed to, or whether democracy is not seen rather as an obstacle that Brussels will work assiduously towards shifting aside. The European Union is on the way to disenfranchising its citizens. Only we Europeans can stop them.

*Translated from the German by Anton Baer*

*Hans-Magnus Enzensberger's essay will be published in English by Sea Gull.*

## Sanftes Monster Brüssel

**Die Entmündigung Europas: Eines der bekanntesten Bücher des Essayisten, Dichters und Schriftstellers Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 81, ist der Reisebericht "Ach Europa!" aus dem Jahr 1987. Enzensberger hatte damals sieben europäische Länder besucht und in Reportagen die bewahrenswerte kulturelle Vielfalt Europas beschrieben. Fast 24 Jahre später hat er sich erneut auf die Suche gemacht nach dem europäischen Geist. Er fand ihn in Brüssel, der Hauptstadt des vereinten Europas, wo er Bürokraten und Politiker traf. In seinem Buch "Sanftes Monster Brüssel oder Die Entmündigung Europas" beschreibt er nun, wie eine bürokratische Diktatur jene Unterschiede immer mehr verschwinden lässt (Suhrkamp, 72 Seiten, ab 15. März im Buchhandel). Der SPIEGEL druckt vorab einen Auszug.**

*Von Enzensberger, Hans Magnus*

### Von Hans Magnus Enzensberger

Gute Nachrichten sind selten; deshalb empfiehlt es sich, mit ihnen anzufangen, auch wenn jeder ordentliche Reporter natürlich die schlechten bevorzugt.

Das Wichtigste zuerst: Es gibt nur wenige Jahrzehnte in der Geschichte unseres Erdteils, in denen der Friede geherrscht hat. Zwischen den Staaten, die der Europäischen Union angehören, ist es seit 1945 zu keinem einzigen bewaffneten Konflikt mehr gekommen. Fast ein ganzes Menschenalter ohne Krieg! Das ist eine Anomalie, auf die dieser Kontinent stolz sein kann.

Aber auch über eine Reihe von Annehmlichkeiten, bei denen es nicht um Leben oder Tod geht, können wir uns freuen. Sie sind inzwischen so selbstverständlich geworden, dass sie uns kaum noch auffallen. Personen, die jünger als sechzig sind, können sich nicht daran erinnern, wie mühsam es nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war, ein benachbartes Land zu betreten. Ohne einen langwierigen bürokratischen Kampf war an eine Auslandsreise nicht zu denken. Wer eine Grenze überschreiten wollte, hatte beglaubigte Einladungsschreiben vorzulegen, Visumanträge in dreifacher Ausfertigung auszufüllen, um Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zu ersuchen, komplizierte Devisenbestimmungen und ein Dutzend anderer Hürden zu überwinden. Wollte man ein Buch aus dem Ausland beziehen, so war dazu eine umständliche Prozedur beim Hauptzollamt nötig. Erwartete man eine Überweisung aus Frankreich oder wollte man eine Rechnung in Spanien bezahlen, so kam dies einem Hoheitsakt gleich, der ohne eine Ansammlung von amtlichen Stempeln nicht vollzogen werden konnte.

Kurzum, der Prozess der europäischen Einigung hat unseren Alltag zum Besseren verändert. Ökonomisch war er lange Zeit derart erfolgreich, dass bis heute alle möglichen und unmöglichen Beitrittskandidaten an seinen Pforten um Einlass bitten.

Ferner muss man es unseren Brüsseler Beschützern danken, dass sie nicht selten wacker vorgegangen sind gegen Kartelle, Oligopole, protektionistische Tricksereien und unerlaubte Subventionen. Die Telefentarife! Die kleingedruckten Vertragsklauseln, mit denen arglose Konsumenten getäuscht werden sollen! Der Schutz der Nichtraucher! Die Abzocke am Geldautomaten!

Trotzdem: Nur noch 49 Prozent der Europäer sehen die Mitgliedschaft ihres Landes positiv, und nur noch 42 Prozent der Bürger schenken den EU-Institutionen ihr Vertrauen. Vom Rat bis zur Kommission, vom Europäischen Gerichtshof bis zum allerletzten Referenten der Besoldungsgruppe AST 1 lässt das Ansehen unserer Brüsseler Stellvertreter zu wünschen übrig. Aber woher mag dieser Undank rühren? Woher kommt dieser Widerwille? Warum nur tun die meisten Mitbewohner des Kontinents alles, um ihren Treuhändern das Leben schwerzumachen? Die Zahl dieser Spielverderber dürfte bei mehreren hundert Millionen liegen. Verwundert fasst man sich in Brüssel an den Kopf und findet keine Antwort.

Immer wieder wird bedauert, dass die Bürger der Union nur ein verhaltenes Interesse für die Einrichtungen an den Tag legen, mit denen sie aufwartet; ja dass sie nicht einmal das Spitzenpersonal kennen, das sich in Brüssel, Straßburg und Luxemburg um ihre Belange kümmert. Niemand scheint die zahlreichen Präsidenten, Vizepräsidenten, Kommissare und Ausschussvorsitzenden zu kennen. Hier tut Aufklärung not!

An erster Stelle ist dabei der Präsident des Europäischen Rats zu nennen. Es wäre fatal, wenn das Publikum ihn mit dem Präsidenten des Rats der Europäischen Union verwechseln würde. Es ist nämlich jener, nicht dieser Rat, der sich aus den Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedstaaten zusammensetzt. Während sein Präsident auf jeweils zweieinhalb Jahre gewählt wird, bleibt dem Präsidenten des Rates der Europäischen Union nur eine Amtszeit von einem halben Jahr. Aber aufgepasst! Er kann unter keinen Umständen sämtlichen Sitzungen, denen er grundsätzlich

vorsitzt, beiwohnen, denn der Rat tagt ziemlich häufig, und zwar in zehn verschiedenen Formationen, als da vor allem sind:

FAC, ECOFIN, JHA, COMP, ENVI, EXC, TTE und CAP; mit Rücksicht auf das deutsche Publikum sind auch Bezeichnungen wie JI, BeSoGeKo, WBF und BJKS im Schwange, während die Franzosen JAI, EPSCO, EJC und PAC bevorzugen. Die Koordination übernimmt der GAC, auch CAG oder RAA genannt, das ist der Rat Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, in dem die Außen- und Europaminister der Mitgliedsstaaten vertreten sind, die sich allerdings auch im RAB beziehungsweise FAC oder CRE treffen. Dort findet sich noch ein weiteres Mitglied ein, nämlich der Hohe Vertreter der Union für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, der dort zwar den Vorsitz inne-, jedoch bedauerlicherweise kein Stimmrecht hat.

Die Europäische Kommission, die aus 27 Kommissaren besteht - einem aus jedem Mitgliedsland -, verfügt natürlich ebenfalls über einen Präsidenten, der unter seinen vielen anderen Pflichten auch die sieben Vizepräsidenten zu ernennen hat, von denen einer zugleich Vorsitzender des GAC ist. Um den Präsidenten der Kommission kümmert sich ein eigenes Generalsekretariat. Unterstellt sind ihm zahlreiche Generaldirektionen, von denen hier nur eine kleine Auswahl geboten werden kann, zum Beispiel die EAC, die RTD, die TAXUD, die MOVE, die ECFIN, die ECHO, die BEPA, die SANCO, die DGT, die Ener, die Elang, die Budg, die Just, die Home, die Info, die Agri und die SCIC. Es versteht sich, dass jede Generaldirektion in Direktionen und Referate untergliedert ist; denn sonst wäre der Generaldirektor ja ein bloßer Direktor.

Der Schriftsteller Robert Menasse hat das System Brüssel und seinen "aufgeklärten Beamtenapparat" als "josephinische Bürokratie" bezeichnet. Andere Beobachter bevorzugen andere Vergleiche. Statt auf die Zeit des aufgeklärten Absolutismus zu rekurrieren, sprechen sie von jakobinischen Traditionen oder, noch ungehaltener, von einer Nomenklatura nach sowjetischem Muster. Menasses Schlussfolgerung ist die, dass es sich bei der Demokratie um ein Modell des 19. Jahrhunderts handelt, das auf die supranationalen Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr umgelegt werden kann.

Damit ist das Kernproblem der Union beim Namen genannt. Offiziell trägt es eine euphemistische Bezeichnung. Das sogenannte "demokratische Defizit" gilt als eine chronische und offenbar schwer zu behandelnde Mangelkrankheit, die zugleich beklagt und verharmlost wird. Dabei kann von einem medizinischen Rätsel keine Rede sein; es handelt sich vielmehr um eine durchaus beabsichtigte Grundsatzentscheidung. Als hätte es die Verfassungskämpfe des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts nie gegeben, haben sich Ministerrat und Kommission schon bei der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft darauf geeinigt, dass die Bevölkerung bei ihren Beschlüssen nichts mitzureden hat. Dass dieser Rückfall in vorkonstitutionelle Zustände durch kosmetische Korrekturen zu heilen wäre, glaubt inzwischen niemand mehr. Jenes Defizit ist also nichts weiter als ein vornehmer Ausdruck für die politische Entmündigung der Bürger.

Damit befinden sich die Akteure in einer äußerst komfortablen Situation. Anders als in einem klassischen Rechtsstaat gibt es im Regime der Europäischen Union keine richtige Gewaltenteilung; wie Menasse richtig feststellt, hat die Kommission praktisch ein Monopol für die Gesetzesinitiative. Sie verhandelt und entwirft ihre Richtlinien hinter geschlossenen Türen. Dass die Lobbyisten, die in Brüssel tätig sind, mehr Einfluss auf die Entscheidungen der Kommission haben als alle Abgeordneten, kann man vermuten, aber nicht beweisen.

Das Europaparlament kann nur mit Zustimmung des Rates über das Budget entscheiden. Die klassische Regel "No taxation without representation" ist damit außer Kraft gesetzt. Zum ersten Mal ist das Haus im Jahre 1979 direkt gewählt worden. Seitdem ist die Wahlbeteiligung kontinuierlich zurückgegangen; zuletzt lag sie bei 43 Prozent. Die Rätselfrage, woran das wohl liegen mag, wird gelegentlich aufgeworfen. Sollten etwa die Verfahrensregeln daran schuld sein? Das Prinzip der degressiven Proportionalität? Die Sitzverteilung nach dem Sainte-Laguë-, dem D'Hondt-, dem Hare-Niemeyer-Verfahren mit abgerundeter Hare-Quote oder ohne sie? Das Quotenverfahren mit Droop-Quote oder ganz einfach das Präferenzwahlssystem?

Es fällt schwer, das zu glauben. Näher liegt die Vermutung, dass kaum jemand die diversen Parteigruppierungen kennt, die in diesem Parlament sitzen. Sie verbergen sich, ganz im Brüsseler Stil, unter Akronymen wie AECP, ECPM, EDP, EFA, EGP, EL, ELDR, EUD, EVP oder SPE, die kaum ein Wähler entziffern kann.

Man hat nicht den Eindruck, dass die Wahlmüdigkeit der Unionsbürger die Verantwortlichen bekümmert. Ungerührt sehen sie dem Schwinden ihrer Legitimationsgrundlage zu. Die Vermutung ist nicht weit hergeholt, dass ihnen das sogar ins Konzept passt; denn für jede machtbewusste Exekutive ist die Passivität der Bürger ein paradiesischer Zustand. Auch die beteiligten nationalen Regierungen haben daran wenig auszusetzen. Zu Hause behaupten sie achselzuckend, gegen die Brüsseler Beschlüsse hätten sie sich leider nicht durchsetzen können. Umgekehrt kann sich die Kommission darauf berufen, dass sie nur den Absichten der Mitgliedstaaten folgt. Auf diese Weise ist am Ende niemand mehr für die Ergebnisse haftbar zu machen.

Was aus diesem Verfahren resultiert, ist zu dem sogenannten Acquis communautaire geronnen, einer monströsen Normensammlung, die kein Mensch je gelesen hat. Anno 2004 umfasste sie bereits 85 000 Seiten; heute werden es weit über 150 000 sein. Bereits 2005 wog das Amtsblatt der Union insgesamt mehr als eine Tonne, so viel wie ein



junges Nashorn. Die französische Fassung hat es unlängst auf 62 Millionen Worte gebracht. Der Acquis ist für alle Mitgliedsländer rechtsverbindlich. Man schätzt, dass über 80 Prozent aller Gesetze nicht mehr von den Parlamenten, sondern von den Brüsseler Behörden initiiert werden. Genau weiß das niemand. Streng genommen handelt es sich dabei nicht, wie im klassischen Rechtsstaat, um Gesetze, sondern um Direktiven, Richtlinien und Vorschriften. Das entspricht durchaus dem autoritären Duktus, den die Brüsseler Behörden bevorzugen.

Nicht nur nach innen zeigt sich, dass die europäischen Institutionen an einem Größenwahn leiden, der keine Grenzen kennt. Ihr ungebremsster Erweiterungsdrang ist notorisch. Länder, die allen Beitrittskriterien hohnsprechen, wurden umstandslos und regelwidrig eingemeindet. Nach wie vor streben unsere kleinen Geopolitiker danach, ihr Europa immer weiter auszudehnen. Warum nicht bis in den Kaukasus und bis in den Maghreb vordringen? Es wäre doch so schön, Weltmacht zu sein! Dass die Europäer von solchen Plänen wenig begeistert sind, darauf kann man keine Rücksicht nehmen.

Ihren Widerstand kann man sich in Brüssel nur dadurch erklären, dass man es mit einer ignoranten, aber rebellischen Bevölkerung zu tun hat, die nicht weiß, was zu ihrem Besten ist. Deshalb tut man gut daran, sie gar nicht erst zu befragen. Der bloße Gedanke an ein Referendum löst bei der Eurokratie sofort Panik aus. Die Spuren von insgesamt neun gescheiterten Volksbefragungen schrecken alle Verantwortlichen. Immer wieder haben die Norweger, die Dänen, die Schweden, die Niederländer, die Iren und die Franzosen nein gesagt. Wenn es nach den Managern der Union geht, darf so etwas nie wieder vorkommen. Störend wirkt sich auch aus, dass den Völkern, die die europäische Demokratie erfunden haben, wie den Briten und den Schweizern, der Abschied von dieser Regierungsform offenbar schwerfällt.

Deshalb haben sich die Wortführer in Brüssel, Straßburg und Luxemburg eine Strategie ausgedacht, die sie gegen jede Kritik immunisieren soll. Wer ihren Plänen widerspricht, wird als Antieuropäer denunziert. Dieses Kidnapping der Begriffe erinnert von ferne an die Rhetorik des Senators Joseph McCarthy und des Politbüros der KPdSU. Was diesen nicht passte, pflegten sie zu verleumden. Die einen sprachen von "un-american activities", die andern von "antisowjetischen Umtrieben". Ein deutscher Politiker, der seinen Gegnern mit dem Argument beikommen möchte, sie verhielten sich "undeutsch", würde sich unmöglich machen. Dagegen kann es sich ein luxemburgischer Premierminister offenbar erlauben, der Kanzlerin eines Nachbarlandes ihre "uneuropäische Art" vorzuwerfen, wenn ihm ihre Entscheidungen missfallen; und noch vor nicht allzu langer Zeit hat José Manuel Barroso, der Präsident der Kommission, behauptet, Mitgliedsländer, die sich seinen Plänen widersetzen, handelten "nicht in einem europäischen Geist". (Er wollte eine neue EU-Steuer erzwingen und bei den Verhandlungen über den EU-Haushalt durch die Hintertür in das Budgetrecht der nationalen Parlamente eingreifen.) Dass der Geist, von dem hier die Rede geht, ausgerechnet auf das Haupt eines nichtgewählten Statthalters gekommen sein sollte, fällt schwer zu glauben. Es ist eine ziemlich abstruse Vorstellung, dass das Personal der Union darüber zu entscheiden hätte, wer ein guter Europäer ist und wer nicht.

Immerhin kann sich die Europäische Union aber einer Herrschaftsform rühmen, für die es kein historisches Vorbild gibt. Ihre Originalität besteht darin, dass sie gewaltlos vorgeht. Sie bewegt sich auf leisen Sohlen. Sie gibt sich erbarmungslos menschenfreundlich. Sie will nur unser Bestes. Wie ein gütiger Vormund ist sie besorgt um unsere Gesundheit, unsere Umgangsformen und unsere Moral. Auf keinen Fall rechnet sie damit, dass wir selber wissen, was gut für uns ist; dazu sind wir in ihren Augen viel zu hilflos und zu unmündig. Deshalb müssen wir gründlich betreut und umerzogen werden.

Wir rauchen, wir essen zu viel Fett und Zucker, wir hängen Kruzifixe in Schulzimmern auf, wir hamstern illegale Glühbirnen, wir trocknen unsere Wäsche im Freien, wo sie nicht hingehört. Wo kämen wir hin, wenn wir selbst entscheiden könnten, wem wir unsere Wohnung vermieten wollen! Kann es angehen, dass es Abweichler gibt, die ihre Betriebsrenten auszahlen, wie es ihnen beliebt, und dass jemand in Madrid oder Helsinki ein Tempolimit einführen will, das der Euronorm widerspricht? Müssen nicht überall, ganz ohne Rücksicht auf Klima und Erfahrung, genau dieselben Baustoffe verwendet werden? Kann es jedem Land überlassen bleiben, wie es in seinen Universitäten und Schulen zugeht? Wer sonst als die Kommission soll darüber befinden, wie der europäische Zahnersatz oder die europäische Kloschüssel auszusehen haben? Wäre nicht ein heilloses Durcheinander zu befürchten, wenn über solche Fragen in Stockholm oder London statt in Brüssel entschieden würde? Wo kämen wir hin, wenn sich am Ende irgendein Magistrat darüber Gedanken machte, nach welchen Vorgaben in seiner Gemeinde Busse und U-Bahnen fahren? Solche Extratouren dürfen auf keinen Fall geduldet werden. Die Europäische Union weiß alles besser als wir.

Sie herrscht nicht durch Befehl, sondern durch Verfahren. Zum Glück verfügt sie weder über eine Armee noch über eine eigene Polizei; soweit wir wissen, unterhält sie bisher nicht einmal einen Geheimdienst, der CIA, BND und FSB das Wasser reichen könnte. Schon deshalb verbietet sich der Vergleich mit autoritären Regimes. Die Union sieht ihre Aufgabe nicht darin, ihre Bürger zu unterdrücken, sondern darin, alle Lebensverhältnisse auf dem Kontinent möglichst lautlos zu homogenisieren. Hier wird nicht an einem neuen Völkergefängnis gebaut, sondern an einer Besserungsanstalt, der die gütige, aber strenge Aufsicht über ihre Schutzbefohlenen obliegt. Im Idealfall soll das Leben ihrer Zöglinge von einer paragrafenreichen Hausordnung, die von der Festlegung des Wohngeldes bis zum gesunden Speiseplan reicht, zentral geregelt und normiert werden. Allerdings ist die Umerziehung von fünfhundert Millionen Menschen eine herkulische Aufgabe, an der schon ganze andere Regimes sich verhoßen haben. Man darf bezweifeln, dass unsere Vormünder ihr gewachsen sind.

Mit der weichen Form der Herrschaft, die sie ausübt, hat die Union tatsächlich Neuland betreten. Sie ist, im doppelten Sinn des Wortes, eine Chimäre: ein utopisches Projekt und zugleich ein Mischwesen, das seine menschenfreundlichen Absichten, die es mit List und Geduld verfolgt, mit unbedingter Autorität und erzieherischem Druck durchsetzen möchte.

In einem klassischen Text der politischen Theorie, der vor über 400 Jahren erschienen ist, hat Étienne de La Boétie, ein Freund Montaignes, sich gefragt, wie es möglich ist, dass Menschen sich mit ihrer eigenen Entmündigung abfinden. "Die Völker", behauptet er, "sind es selbst, die sich quälen lassen, oder vielmehr, die sich selber quälen, denn würden sie Schluss machen mit dem Dienen, so wären sie frei davon. Das Volk gibt seine Unabhängigkeit auf und beugt sich unter das Joch, es willigt in sein Elend ein und jagt ihm vielmehr nach. Wenn es das Volk etwas kostete, seine Freiheit wiederzuerlangen, so würde ich es nicht bedrängen, obwohl es nichts Kostlicheres für den Menschen gibt, als sich wieder in den Stand seiner natürlichen Rechte zu setzen."

Er hat dabei allerdings nicht die gewaltlose Vormundschaft einer aufgeklärten Bürokratie im Sinn, sondern die unverhüllte Herrschaft der Diktatoren. "Je mehr man ihnen gibt und dient, umso stärker befestigen sie ihre Stellung und werden mächtiger und dreister; gibt man ihnen aber nichts und verweigert den Gehorsam, so braucht es weder Kampf noch Schlag, und sie stehen bloß und kraftlos da und sind nichts mehr."

Das Pathos dieses genialen Achtzehnjährigen aus der Renaissance ist uns fremd geworden, ebenso wie die Verhältnisse, auf die der Autor sich bezieht. Schließlich haben wir es bei unseren Vormündern nicht mit Bösewichtern, sondern mit Menschenfreunden zu tun. Doch war es La Boétie, der als Erster erkannt hat, dass die erste Ursache der "freiwilligen Knechtschaft" die Gewohnheit ist, und das gilt unter den Bedingungen der postdemokratischen Politik vielleicht sogar in höherem Maß als in der Vergangenheit; denn sie unterwirft uns der unerträglichen Leichtigkeit einer Aufsicht, die in alle Ritzen unseres Daseins eindringt.

Dazu hat eine Philosophin des 20. Jahrhunderts, die helllichtige Hannah Arendt, anno 1975 bereits das Nötige gesagt. Sie sprach damals in Kopenhagen vom "Druck einer sich abzeichnenden Veränderung aller Staatsformen, die sich zu Bürokratien entwickeln, das heißt, zu einer Herrschaft weder von Gesetzen noch von Menschen, sondern von anonymen Büros oder Computern, deren völlig entpersönlichte Übermacht für die Freiheit und für jenes Minimum an Zivilität, ohne das ein gemeinschaftliches Leben nicht vorstellbar ist, bedrohlicher sein mag als die empörendste Willkür von Tyrannen in der Vergangenheit".

Wenig spricht bisher dafür, dass die Europäer dazu neigen, sich gegen ihre politische Enteignung zur Wehr zu setzen. Zwar fehlt es nicht an Äußerungen des Unmuts, an stiller oder offener Sabotage, aber insgesamt führt das berühmte demokratische Defizit bisher nicht zum Aufstand, sondern eher zu Teilnahmslosigkeit und Zynismus, zur Verachtung der politischen Klasse oder zur kollektiven Depression.

Schlechte Aussichten also, aber, wie der Ingenieur im "Untergang der Titanic" sagt: "Salzwasser in der Tennishalle! Ja, das ist ärgerlich, aber nasse Füße sind noch lang nicht das Ende der Welt. Die Leute freuen sich immer zu früh auf den Untergang, wie Selbstmörder, die ein Alibi suchen, und dabei verlieren sie dann die Übersicht und die Nerven."

Europa hat schon ganz andere Versuche überstanden, den Kontinent zu uniformieren. Allen gemeinsam war die Hybris, und keinem von ihnen war ein dauerhafter Erfolg beschieden. Auch der gewaltlosen Version eines solchen Projekts kann man keine günstige Prognose stellen. Allen Imperien der Geschichte blühte nur eine begrenzte Halbwertszeit, bis sie an ihrer Überdehnung und an ihren inneren Widersprüchen gescheitert sind. ◆

# France and Italy's refugee ping-pong

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Hundreds of North African refugees are continuing to land on the Italian island of Lampedusa off the Tunisian coast, provoking a humanitarian and political crisis. At the same time, hundreds of others are attempting, usually without success, to cross the border between Italy and France, which is their final destination.

[Giuseppe Salvaggiulo](#)

"Italy does not interest us. It's just a stop-over. We want to go to France, but they don't want us there." Camped out at the station by low walls that serve as urinals, taking afternoon naps in public parks or sleeping out on the banks of the Roia: most are illegal, some are refugees, and all of them are clearly desperate. Welcome to the world of the migrants.

Having passed through the bottleneck of Lampedusa, they face the reality of their own containment in Ventimiglia — a town populated by a potentially explosive admixture of young men in transit with no more baggage than a pair of jeans, trainers and a mobile phone, and worried locals who keep asking mayor Gaetano Scullino, "When are you going to get rid of them?"

Ventimiglia station is the third Italian stage in the journey for migrants leaving Tunisia. After landing on Lampedusa, they are transferred to provisional accommodation centres on the continent — in Bari, Foggia, and Crotona — from which they can easily escape. Then comes the train ride to Italy's northern border.

## A fax to the Italian police is enough to send them back

Italy is only a transit destination. Usually their goal is to reach France, where they can count on the possibility of help from relatives, and jobs that are easier to find on the *Côte d'Azur*. But negotiating the meager ten kilometres that separate Ventimiglia from the French border town of Menton can prove to be more treacherous than crossing the Strait of Sicily.

For the migrants the French-Italian border is a virtually unbreachable wall. Attempts to cross it are hampered by the possibility of nightmarish encounters with border police, who are increasingly flagging down cars with dark skinned passengers, and mounting patrols in trains.

Anyone who is caught without the right documents is immediately sent back to Ventimiglia, without any questions about their status or their health. A simple fax to the Italian police is all that is required. We take them back without objecting.

Official attitudes in Italy are in stark contrast to those in France: there are no controls, and no one asks for ID. Our accommodation centres are overflowing, and no one knows where to send asylum seekers. And we wonder why should we bother detaining people who do not even want to live here?

## Local people remain tolerant for the moment

Ventimiglia has become a small-scale northern Lampedusa. Every day, around 50 migrants arrive here from the south of Italy, and a similar number attempt to cross the French border. However, relatively few of them succeed: about 30 come back to camp in Ventimiglia before trying again.

And the numbers are steadily increasing. Today there are more than a hundred: usually Tunisian men aged under 30 with a scattering of Libyans, all of them armed with a few sandwiches and money for the train.

Until now there have been no public order problems. The residents of Ventimiglia, which was invaded by Kurds in 1998, prefer to suffer in silence. But if you listen to the talk in cafés and at institutional meetings, which are now held almost daily, everyone is warning that "if it does not change soon, the situation will be explosive."

At night, the migrants camp in the railway station underpass, where there is a plug for their phones. In response to protests from the mayor, the rail company has agreed to leave the waiting room and the toilets open. During the day they spend their time in the town centre, wondering about a risk free route to France.

In a few weeks, Samir will be celebrating his 24th birthday. He was a child when he arrived Italy, and when he left school he got a job in a shipping company which subsequently closed down. Thereafter, he followed a girlfriend to Nice, where he now works as a carpenter. He shows me his French *carte de séjour* which entitles him to travel everywhere in Europe.

Throughout the day, he remains on his guard: "I have come to pick up my brother, who is 20 years old. He paid 1,800 euros for a passage from Sfax to Lampedusa, and then he was transferred to Puglia. When he phoned me, I told him, I'll come and get you in Ventimiglia. So here I am. Yesterday, I travelled back and forth to Nice four times to see how the patrols are operating. Driving over the border is too risky: if we're caught I'll be arrested."

### **People smuggling on the increase**

People smugglers, who had largely disappeared when border checkpoints were closed down, are now increasingly common. They seek out the migrants at the station, show them a car and offer to take them to France: 50 euros for a ride to Menton, 100 for Nice, 150 for Marseille. They usually take three passengers per car, and leave at nightfall. Ten of them have already been arrested by police.

Then there are the rock climbers who offer to take the migrants across the border on foot, like in the old days before Maastricht. Samir is worried about being trapped: "The train is the best. At least that way, we can travel in separate compartments. And I won't run the risk of being arrested."

Everything has been decided, at 8:17 PM, he and his brother will board the train for Grasse. It is time to go. Samir calls his brother and gives him a ticket, holding it like it was a winning lottery coupon. Then they hug each other and set off for opposite ends of the train.

Night falls. At the station they are spreading out cardboard to sleep on. Police are discreetly patrolling the deserted town centre. A new batch of migrants arrives on the train from Rome and prepares to bed down for the night. One of the phones beeps, it is a text message from Samir. It says "Goodbye Italy!"

# Paris and London torpedo EU foreign policy

31 March 2011 LA STAMPA TURIN



Loading a bomb onto a French Air Force Rafale aircraft, aboard the aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle, March 25.

**The initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom — two countries which occupy key posts in the European External Action Service — has fragmented the emerging structure of European diplomacy to the point where some commentators have remarked that the EU's foreign policy should be directly entrusted to Paris and London.**

**Marta Dassù**

In the wake of the euro crisis and in the context of the ongoing war in Libya, what has become of the European Union? Whereas developments in the economic sphere have been largely positive, virtually nothing has happened in the field of foreign policy. Jean Monnet remarked that crises were the driving force in the construction of Europe — an observation that has in part been confirmed by the new pact for the euro, which Europe has finally adopted in response to the debt crisis.

However, the same cannot be said for European intervention in Libya, which for the moment has done nothing to advance the agenda for a common foreign policy. On the contrary, it has demonstrated that the organisation outlined by the Lisbon Treaty — a kind of foreign ministry with an attached diplomatic service — is completely pointless or simply does not work. Some have argued that Catherine Ashton, who has increasingly been the target of all kinds of criticism, is to blame for this situation. However, the reality is that national governments deliberately chose Mrs Ashton for a reason: they specifically wanted the High Representative for Foreign Affairs to be a "non-entity" — a stipulation that Baroness Ashton has fulfilled to the letter.

So why is it so difficult to establish a common foreign policy that actually works? Because member states have divergent geopolitical interests — or at least they think they do. Because politicians use international relations as a medium for their own personal PR, and because there is no diplomatic equivalent of economic phenomena like the single currency or the common institutions linked to the single market.

That is not to say that there is no conflict between national economic interests, but that European initiatives benefit from the conviction that the advantages of belonging to an integrated economic zone outweigh the disadvantages, which for the moment continues to hold sway. This is not the case in the field of foreign policy, and the war in Libya is a case in point. France, which stumbled in its handling of events in Tunisia, is now eager to establish a new basis for its influence in the Mediterranean region — a position not shared by Germany, whose sphere of political influence is mainly focused on Eastern and Central Europe and whose trading interests are mainly in India and China. As a result, Berlin views the war as a pointless and costly venture.

The failure to see eye-to-eye on the issue has resulted in a paradox: for the first time ever, two European countries (France and the United Kingdom) have led the way in taking the initiative in an international crisis, but at the same time, Europe's common foreign and security policy has been completely blown apart.

Naturally, Paris and London do not see it that way: they believe they are acting "on behalf" of Europe, because they are the two European countries with the fire power to do so. However, the perception in other European countries is that France and the UK have "taken over" from Europe, and that amounts to quite a difference — especially in the context of last November's Franco-British agreement on military cooperation, which has not advanced the agenda for European defence. France and the UK account for close to 50% of European military spending and they are the only EU member states to have nuclear weapons and permanent seats on the UN Security Council, but they have no intention of allowing their bilateral cooperation to be watered down by a European "institution" that would not be under their control, and the European Defence Agency, which recently appointed a French woman as its chief executive, has never really taken off. Finally, the conflict in Libya has also revealed the limitations of Europe's existing military capacity: to intervene France and Britain have been obliged to use US-made Tomahawk missiles, and to launch missions from Italian airbases.

Notwithstanding questions about their commitment to European policies in foreign affairs and defence, France and the United Kingdom have succeeded in monopolising most of the key jobs in the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is increasingly aligned with positions adopted in London and Paris. In this context, if we want a European foreign policy that works, we might as well follow the advice voiced by the director of the [Centre for European Reform](#) think tank in London, Charles Grant, who recommends that it should be subcontracted to Paris and London, in accordance with the principle of "decentralisation" as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty.

When ideas like this begin to circulate, there is every reason for concern. There are number of precedents — notably Suez, Algeria and Ben Ali — that are there to remind us of this fact.

# Saving Private Ashton

1 April 2011 EL PAÍS MADRID



Ashton reviewing EUFOR troops in Sarajevo in February 2010.

Commission européenne

**While the Libyan crisis unfolds before gates of Europe, the High Representative for EU foreign policy is totally absent from the scene. "One wonders if the post still makes sense," writes analyst Jose Ignacio Torreblanca.**

**José Ignacio Torreblanca**

First Tunisia, then Egypt — Libya a little later. The European Union misjudged the stability of the regimes, came late and off-balance to the protests, and worse, came to the revolutions without a shred of unity. It has already admitted the first truth. In fairness, the national capitals are more responsible than Brussels for a Mediterranean policy that has proved mistaken, but they have not been held accountable. The second charge, of slow reflexes, is understandable, since prudence is a natural reflection of the diplomat — something even Obama has had to suffer despite having a huge foreign policy machinery at his disposal and the leadership to steer it. On the third charge, divisions within Europe are to some extent inevitable, since each EU member state has its own history and interests, and they are not always shared. Often forgotten, this is important. After all, if unity were the starting point, there would be no need of either leaders or institutions to draw up a common foreign policy, only bureaucrats who would obediently carry it out.

But that is just what the leaders and the European institutions are there for, to create common policies that balance the different interests. The paradox we now confront is therefore readily apparent. For ten years we have been complaining that Europe lacks foreign policy institutions. The High Representative at the time, Javier Solana, had great dedication but few resources and feeble institutions, which obliged him to leap from crisis to crisis, cadging aircraft and carrying out delicate manoeuvres with a midget staff and an operating budget lower than what the European Commission was spending on cleaning its official buildings.

Now, it seems, we are in the opposite situation. We have at last created a foreign ministry for Europe in all but name. We have bestowed upon it a huge budget, its own diplomatic service, and, best of all, all the power that was previously fragmented among three institutions (the Council, the Commission and the rotating presidency) which previously overlapped and were continuously squaring off against each other. With the Lisbon treaty in hand, Europe has its trinity in place, and the High Representative is all-powerful.

All the same, its policy has yet to get off the ground. We may finally have the institutions, but seem to be missing a personality who can lead vigorously from the front.

The Arab revolutions have put Europe's foreign policy severely to the test. After a year and a half on the job, criticisms of Ashton's performance (some more fair than others, and there's a bit of everything) are widespread. The media accuse her of being allergic to the spotlight, of shunning the press and preferring to blend into the wallpaper. Nor does she inspire any enthusiasm in national capitals, rumour has it. At the Extraordinary European Council on Libya, Sarkozy publicly tore strips off Ashton for her passivity — and remarkably, no one stepped up to defend her, not even her compatriot David Cameron. Her defenders argue that Ashton was saddled with Mission Impossible: to do the work previously done by three people and to rule over 27 national egos who all consider themselves more capable than her.

They have a point. And because of that, they all share the blame: Ashton does not want to thump the table — and Sarkozy enjoys doing it. In view of the crackdown that Assad has just launched in Syria and the precedents of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Private Ashton is clearly in serious danger of being trapped behind enemy lines.

Hence the urgent need to organise a rescue mission to salvage the remainder of her term, which still has three and a half years to run. Ideally, the team should be made up of the foreign ministers of the 27, who will step forward as volunteers to the rescue and inject some energy into European foreign policy. But are they really willing to step forward? Are they themselves, through their own actions and their own omissions, not the main culprits in the current quandary? Just how far they are willing to go with the Syria of Assad, that other great darling of many European diplomats, will soon give us the answer to these questions.

# Hour of the hypocrites

4 April 2011 SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG MUNICH



Can we reconcile a Western lifestyle with respecting the environment? Hardly, says the "Sueddeutsche Zeitung". Voting for Green parties is not enough to resolve the contradictions faced by a growing number of Europeans, as evidenced by the Green surge in Germany.

**Johan Schloemann**

A Porsche Cayenne is good enough, for sure, to haul old bottles to the recycling depot. But in order to get there, a Porsche Cayenne runs the environment into the ground. The standard model comes with 290 horsepower. This is pure madness. And yet this lunacy, manufactured by Porsche AG based in Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen, provides about 7,500 full-time workers in Germany with a secure job. Will the new Green Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg, who called for a greener auto industry during the campaign, now go and shut down the Porsche? That would at least be consistent.

If the Greens win over the hearts of the bourgeoisie in southwestern Germany, as has just happened — in the small towns it gets over twenty percent and in the big cities and university towns forty percent of the vote — then the green of the countryside has definitively become an expression of the contradictions in which the reasonably enlightened strata of the Western world find themselves today. One could even say it's party hour for hypocrites.

The global spread of the urban lifestyle is deeply at odds with our ecology: the mobility that comes with education, commuting and air travel, the sheer welter of stuff churned out by capitalism, heated dwellings and hot showers — all this is at risk, or would have to be severely cut back, if society were actually to take a radical new approach to sustainability.

All those who have figured this out to some degree but, at the same time, aren't too eager to give up the best of modern Western lifestyles vote green. This historic upheaval in the political landscape is not just about the controversial rail project through Stuttgart or an arrogant CDU; it's not even just about nuclear energy. It's about the mendacity built into the very political structure when an "organically correct" lifestyle within the existing social system is sold as a tipping point for general change. When the more affluent, more educated, more liberal circles seek in a small way to make everything a little cleaner and more proper — and at the same time, to unburden their consciences — they delegate the major structural issues to the Green Party. The Greens are not anarchists and dropouts anymore. Today, we're all Greens together.

In Baden-Württemberg the dilemma is more apparent than ever. Many want the dangerous dynamic of modernity to be held back by the Greens, and their motives are decent enough. But they are the same people who, while they do indeed want to take to heart the limits to growth in their daily lives, are extremely relieved that the financial crisis is slowly giving way to economic recovery. Baden-Württemberg owes its remarkable prosperity to its industries. Its chemical industry alone — not exactly a friend to the environment — employs nearly 100,000 and brings in 28 billion euros in annual sales.

If the Greens become a majority party, the exemplary lifestyle is this: the husband, who works at Bosch, makes a few things that are harmful to the climate (Bosch is, for example, the world's largest manufacturer of packaging machinery for consumer goods) while his wife, who opposes [Stuttgart 21](#) (the rail project), shops in the organic grocery for delicious organic cheese from the local area and full-bodied organic wine from Apulia in Italy, avoiding as much packaging as possible.

Just how much sustainable lifestyles are grounded in the gains in freedom afforded by prosperity can be observed at any organic market in the Western world, but especially prettily in [the Vauban district of Freiburg](#). The neighbourhood is named after a French marshal, and after the French troops left in 1992 their barracks were converted into a kind of model settlement for ecologically minded townspeople. In the regional elections on Sunday the Greens in Vauban won 72.2 per cent of the vote. These are all very nice, friendly people in Jack Wolfskin jackets; but anyone who has ever strolled through Vauban knows what the gentle "virtue terrorism" of our time looks like.

Now, one could say, "Wouldn't it just be wonderful if everywhere else was just like Vauban?" Well, this won't happen — not even if the Greens get an absolute majority. The "good ecological life" fulfils for society as a whole the same function as journalists' forays into "Six months of a climate-friendly lifestyle" experiments, or actions like switching off the lights for an hour — and then back on again.

Of course, one can speak benevolently about all this. Democracy consists of compromises, after all, and inconsistent Greens can nevertheless serve as a corrective to the capitalist land grab. Besides, enduring contradictions are well and truly the sign of our times. That may be true — so far, the expansion of the party has been wholly contemporary. But no-one is saying that the new green bourgeoisie is the triumph of a new sincerity.



Time for a Haircut?

## **IMF Pressures Greece to Restructure Debt**

**The International Monetary Fund has been pushing Athens behind the scenes to restructure its debt. The organization no longer believes that the current austerity measures and EU bailout will be enough to extract Greece from its fiscal mire.**

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) doubts that current measures to rescue cash-strapped Greece will be successful and is now privately pushing the country to swiftly restructure its debts, SPIEGEL has learned. High-level representatives from the IMF pushed for a restructuring during recent discussions with delegates from European governments, according to information obtained by the magazine.

**The demands represent a change of course for the IMF, which had previously opposed the idea of debt restructuring for Greece. The organization clearly no longer believes that the current measures will be enough to sort out the debt-stricken country's finances.**

IMF representatives told the European delegates that it was necessary to reduce Athens' debt burden, which is currently equivalent to around 150 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Among the options that the IMF suggested are that holders of Greek debt could take a so-called haircut, maturities could be extended or interest rates on Greek sovereign debt could be reduced. All three alternatives would involve owners of Greek sovereign bonds giving up a portion of their returns.

Under the IMF plan, the Greek government is supposed to begin discussions with its creditors within the near future and inform them about the proposed debt restructuring. The IMF is currently reluctant to make its position public, however, out of fears that it could increase pressure on Portugal, which is already facing [huge fiscal and political problems](#). Yields on Portuguese debt have soared in recent weeks as a result of concerns that Lisbon could be next in line for a European Union bailout after Greece and Ireland.

**'No Chance'**

**On Saturday, the IMF denied the SPIEGEL report. "As we have said consistently, the IMF supports the Greek government's position of no debt restructuring and its determination to fully service its debt obligations," an IMF spokeswoman told the news agency Reuters. "Any reports claiming otherwise are wrong."**

The Greek government and the European Commission also played down the news story. "There is absolutely no chance of a restructuring of the Greek debt," Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou told Reuters on the sidelines of a conference in Italy on Saturday. European Commission spokesman Jens Mester also told the news agency that "all support measures are in place, and there is no reason now to start thinking of this possibility of restructuring Greece's debt."

Many market observers now feel that a Greek debt restructuring is just a matter of time, however. "As soon as the other countries are out of danger, the Greek government debt will have to be restructured," former European Central Bank chief economist **Otmar Issing** told SPIEGEL in a [recent interview](#). "This can be done by cutting that debt or by extending the terms of the loans, but there is no getting around a debt restructuring, no matter how you calculate it."

## 'Fukushima Has Made Me Start to Doubt'

**Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger used to be a firm supporter of nuclear energy. But now he's not so sure. SPIEGEL spoke with Oettinger about Chancellor Angela Merkel's about-face on nuclear energy, what it means for the European energy supply and whether other EU countries will follow suit.**

**SPIEGEL:** Mr. Oettinger, can you tell us who said: "It has to be possible to build a new generation of nuclear power plants"?

**Günther Oettinger:** That could have been me.

**SPIEGEL:** That's right. At the time, you were floor leader for the center-right Christian Democrats in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Would you like to amend that statement now?

**Oettinger:** Absolutely not. It's very well possible that new nuclear power plants will be built -- not in Germany, but in other countries. I accept the moratorium and the probable phase-out in Germany. But I also observe other countries -- both outside of Europe and within the European Union -- investing in R&D for atomic energy. Look at France and Great Britain: These major member states are working hard to build the next generation of nuclear power plants.

**SPIEGEL:** Two years ago, when you were still the governor of Baden-Württemberg, you fought to revoke what you called the "ideologically-driven lifespan limit" passed in 2002 by Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. But was it not German conservatives who pursued an ideological path -- one in favor of atomic energy?

**Oettinger:** In general, energy policies in Germany are too driven by ideology. I don't know of any other country in the EU where debates about power generation are so contentious. With the exception of the Greens, all parties long defended the use of nuclear energy. The consequence of injecting ideology into the debate has been that we in the CDU have seen atomic energy in too positive a light. That I'll admit.

**SPIEGEL:** Following the initial reports from Japan, you said the situation was "in God's hands." How much has the unfolding disaster at the Fukushima nuclear facility shaken your faith in the safety of atomic energy?

**Oettinger:** When Chernobyl happened, we in the West were comforted by the fact that it was the result of outdated Soviet technology and human error. But I have nothing but respect for Japan's abilities when it comes to industry and technology. That's why Fukushima has been such a turning point for me. It has made me start to doubt. If the Japanese cannot master this technology, then nuclear energy conceals risks that I didn't see before.

**SPIEGEL:** The Fukushima disaster has led to plutonium seeping into the earth, radioactivity in the ocean and the potential evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people. How big is the threat to Europe?

**Oettinger:** We feel that the Japanese government is doing everything it can to limit the damage. Each day, there are one or two positive reports -- and then more setbacks. There is some hope that the effects can be limited to the region, as bad as that is for the people living near the stricken plant. But you can't rule out the possibility that the radius will expand.

**SPIEGEL:** Given the severity, shouldn't all of Europe bid adieu to atomic energy as soon as possible?

**Oettinger:** Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty gives the European Union extensive powers to set energy-related laws. But there is one exception: Member states are responsible for determining their own energy mix. We in the Commission are focused on the issue of safety. So I have high expectations for the stress tests mandated by the member states in the European Council.

**SPIEGEL:** The agreement reached at the recent European Union summit didn't go beyond a memorandum of understanding. The crucial issue, though, is whether EU member states can agree on the highest uniform safety standards.

**Oettinger:** I'm very satisfied with the result, and the same incidentally holds true for the chancellor. When she arrived at the summit, it still was still far from certain that there would be common stress tests. All member states -- both those with and without nuclear energy -- accept that we will apply the highest standards in defining the safety criteria. We are currently negotiating the criteria with the atomic supervision authorities of individual member states.

**SPIEGEL:** What exactly will these tests look for?

**Oettinger:** We want to design the stress tests based on the concrete causes of the Fukushima catastrophe. The cooling systems failed because the power supply and the emergency back-up power units gave out. We want to test how safe the cooling system is and how staggered the various emergency electrical circuits are in the event of an earthquake or flood. We will also run simulations of a terrorist attack with an airplane and of a cyber attack on the computer system.

**SPIEGEL:** If the stress tests are carried out by the nuclear supervisory authorities of the individual states, their governments may be able to influence the results.

**Oettinger:** We want multinational teams to conduct the stress tests. We are also fighting for the European Commission to have significant influence because the results only attain their full authority when they can be compared.

**SPIEGEL:** Still, it's not enough to have the governments of the EU's 27 member states agree on uniform criteria for the stress tests. Afterwards, a government could still say, for example, that it isn't going to fortify the outer hull of a power plant enough to withstand a plane crash because it considers the risk too small.

**Oettinger:** In the end, there always remains [a degree of risk](#) that you can reduce through retrofitting and investments. But you can never completely eliminate it. Either you accept this residual risk -- or you shut it down.

**SPIEGEL:** How likely do you think it is that any nuclear power plants will be taken off-line if they fail the stress tests?

**Oettinger:** If we can't imagine shutting down certain nuclear power plants, we can just forget about the stress test right now. With 143 nuclear power plants in the EU, I wouldn't venture to predict that all will pass. If we apply the highest safety standards, no country can rule out from the get-go that it may have to retrofit or shut down its power plants.

**SPIEGEL:** If Germany permanently shuts down the seven oldest nuclear power plants it has taken off-line pending the results of the stress tests, will it lead to bottlenecks in Europe's energy supply?

**Oettinger:** At the moment, there are some concerns in Belgium because [turning off the seven German power plants](#) has made it hard to control the grid. But when it comes to the greater European energy supply, these seven nuclear

power plants aren't crucial. They make up about 8 percent of Germany's energy market and just under 2 percent of Europe's. Still, the German moratorium will place a greater burden on coal and natural gas for some time.

**SPIEGEL:** In the Environment Ministry in Berlin, which also handles nuclear safety, there are plans to take the rest of Germany's nuclear power plants off-line by 2017. How would that affect Europe's energy supply?

### 'You Only Have to Throw 17 Switches'

**Oettinger:** In Europe, Germany is both the largest submarket for energy and the largest economy. How Germany reorients its energy policies is also relevant to the rest of Europe because of its geographical location. But we should wait for the findings of the commission appointed by the government.

**SPIEGEL:** Still, 2017 is a very ambitious goal for the phase-out.

**Oettinger:** Everything is possible -- because you only have to throw 17 switches. But doing so raises many issues: How do things look in terms of securing the energy supply? How many jobs are in danger? Will energy get more expensive? Can we still reduce CO2 emissions as much as we'd planned? The government has to think about all these issues.

**SPIEGEL:** Energy prices are already approaching the limit of what society will accept.

**Oettinger:** That's right. We can no longer afford price increases like the ones we've seen in recent months as a result of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG). There also has to be an end to politicians' inventiveness when it comes to the financing the budget.

**SPIEGEL:** Where are the funds for the expansion of a new energy system supposed to come from? You've put the figure at €1 trillion (\$1.42 trillion).

**Oettinger:** Indeed, our calculations -- which include production, storage capacities and transport networks -- indicate that we will need to invest a trillion euros over the next 10 to 20 years. Though this is an exceedingly large amount, it's still not much when measured in terms of Europe's potential.

**SPIEGEL:** Nevertheless, that money has to come from somewhere. Who will foot the bill?

**Oettinger:** I'm thinking primarily of private investments. Still, this is a major undertaking. Part of Europe's grid infrastructure -- a part which accounts for €200 billion of that trillion in total costs -- will also probably have to be financed via the energy costs of tomorrow. An assessment of about one cent per kilowatt hour that consumers will have to shoulder for this enormous undertaking is under consideration.

**SPIEGEL:** Since Germany's moratorium was announced, the stock market values of RWE and E.on, two of Germany's major energy providers, have fallen significantly. Do you think the two companies are now candidates for takeovers by other European energy suppliers, such as France's EDF?

**Oettinger:** In Germany, we have companies in all sectors that are world leaders. In auto manufacturing, we have VW, Daimler and BMW; in electrical engineering, we have Siemens; in chemistry, we have BASF and Bayer. It should also be one of our industrial policy goals to keep some German energy companies in the Champions League.

**SPIEGEL:** When you were the parliamentary floor leader of the CDU in Baden-Württemberg, you once said that it was "wrong for the Greens to wage such massive battles against atomic energy." From today's perspective, don't you now have to admit [the Greens were right](#)?

**Oettinger:** I've been around since the Greens were founded. They first made it into Baden-Württemberg's state parliament in 1980. Over the course of their history, the Greens have ditched most of their founding ideals: They have voted to remain part of NATO, to keep the German military strong and even to participate in wars. But the issue of atomic energy has remained. They have seen the risks more clearly than others. And now they're reaping the rewards.

**SPIEGEL:** The debate over nuclear energy has brought the left and the right closer together in Germany. Do you think that improves the chances of future coalitions made up of the CDU and the Greens?

**Oettinger:** I prefer to see the CDU in coalitions with the (business-friendly) Free Democrats rather than with the Greens. But I'd prefer to see the latter over a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens. And it's not just for reasons related to political influence that the CDU should keep the option open to form coalitions with the Greens. There's an expectation in society that the CDU and the Greens reach a consensus on important issues such as the economy, the environment, family and society, prosperity, wealth and redistribution.

**SPIEGEL:** Do you think this is also possible at the federal level? Chancellor Angela Merkel has said she views the idea of a coalition between the CDU and the Greens in Berlin as a "pipe dream."

**Oettinger:** After the end of the CDU-Green coalition in Hamburg, and with the recent results from state elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg, a CDU-Green coalition this year is not an option. But I hope that things don't stay this way until the next general elections (in 2013). We could still see successful types of collaboration in this decade between the CDU and the Greens -- at every level.

**SPIEGEL:** Mr. Oettinger, thank you for taking the time for this interview.

*Translated from the German by Josh Ward*

*Interview conducted by Frank Dohmen and Christoph Schult in Brussels*

## Ausstieg mit Folgen

Von Holger Steltzner

Die Atomkatastrophe in Japan hat den jahrzehntealten Atomstreit in Deutschland schlagartig beendet. Der neue deutsche Energiekonsens wird von jeder Partei getragen, er lässt sich so zusammenfassen: Schnell raus aus der Kernenergie. Nicht das Ob, sondern nur das Wie darf die von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel berufene "Ethikkommission" diskutieren. Doch auch über die Folgen für den Klimaschutz und die Versorgungslage kann leidenschaftlich gestritten werden.

Seit dem Abschalten sieben älterer Reaktoren heißt es oft, Deutschland könne ohne weiteres auf Kernkraft verzichten, nach dem Moratorium sei der Strompreis nicht gestiegen, es habe keine Stromausfälle gegeben, die Wirtschaft produziere weiter. Aber nur, weil die Industrie seitdem mehr Strom aus Frankreich und Tschechien einführt und deutsche Produzenten weniger Strom als zuvor ins Ausland verkaufen. Zusammen entspricht das in etwa der Strommenge der abgeschalteten Kernkraftwerke. Können sich die Deutschen wohl fühlen, wenn sie aussteigen und den fehlenden Strom aus dem Ausland holen, wo er oft an der Grenze mit Kernkraft erzeugt wird oder mitunter aus alten, dreckigen Kohlekraftwerken kommt? Was heißt das für die Klimapolitik? Kann die Vision einer ökologischen, kohlenstofffreien Musterwirtschaft aufrechterhalten werden? Eine atomkraftfreie Zone wird Deutschland jedenfalls nicht werden, da nach dem Energiekonzept der Regierung künftig ein Drittel des heimischen Strombedarfs aus dem Ausland bezogen werden muss und man Strom an der Grenze nicht kontrollieren kann.

Die romantische Vorstellung, mit einem Windrad im Garten und Solarzellen auf dem Dach unabhängig von den gesellschaftlich geächteten vier großen Energieversorgern zu leben, passt zum Landwirt, der als Energiewirt die Subventionen für Bioenergie auch noch mitnimmt. In einer industrialisierten Welt mit vielen energieintensiven Unternehmen, in denen die Energiekosten bereits höher als die Personalkosten sind, funktioniert das jedoch nicht. Die deutschen Strompreise gelten schon als die höchsten in Europa. Steigen sie weiter, fällt das Land im Wettbewerb zurück und verliert Arbeitsplätze. So verändert die deutsche Energiewende mehr als nur das politische Klima. Sie wirft auch die soziale Frage nach der Bezahlbarkeit von Strom auf - vom Hartz-IV-Empfänger bis zur Industrie.

## Germany May Be Importing Nuclear Power to Meet Energy Needs

**Germany may have begun importing atomic energy from France and the Czech Republic since it shut down seven of its own nuclear power stations pending a three-month safety check following the Fukushima accident. Chancellor Angela Merkel had stressed last month that she wanted to avoid such imports.**

Germany has been importing nuclear power from France and the Czech Republic since it [switched off its seven oldest nuclear power stations](#) last month in the wake of the Fukushima accident, power company RWE said on Monday.

A spokesman for RWE confirmed a report in *Bild* newspaper that Germany had become a net importer of power since March 16. Previously, Germany had been a net electricity exporter because of its rising output of power from renewable energy sources.

RWE said the country's power imports from France and Czech have been amounting up to 3,000 megawatts and up to 2,000 megawatts respectively. Three quarters of France's power supply comes from nuclear energy while the Czech Republic relies on reactors for 34 percent of its energy needs.

Hildegard Müller, head of the German Association of Energy and Water Industries also said on Monday that power imports were up. "Since March 17, there has been an increase in imports. Flows from France and the Czech Republic have doubled," she said.

Within days of the Fukushima accident in Japan, Chancellor Angela Merkel closed the seven oldest of Germany's 17 nuclear power stations pending a three-month safety review of all the reactors. She also imposed a moratorium on her plan to prolong the lifetimes of the plants by an average of 12 years beyond the dates called for by a 2002 plan passed by Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schröder. In addition, she has pledged to speed up the exit from nuclear power. Her about-face was in response to intense public fears of the technology after Fukushima.

### Safety May Not Be Better

Merkel had emphasized last month that the reactor closure must not lead to Germany importing nuclear power from neighboring countries, where safety standards might not be better.

Government spokesman Steffen Seibert said on Monday: "The government is checking what impact the moratorium is having on the German power market." A spokeswoman for Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen contradicted RWE and said: "We remain a net exporter of power."

Merkel's nuclear U-turn was widely regarded as a ploy designed to avert defeat for her Christian Democratic Union in a key election in the southern state of Baden-Württemberg on March 27. But the CDU and its junior allies, the Free Democratic Party, were voted out of power in the state.

Electricity supplies in the south of Germany have been particularly affected by the reactor switch-off because four nuclear plants have been taken off the grid there. Germany has a shortage of power lines for transporting electricity down south from northern and western parts of the country, and the south has had to buy in power from across the border in France and the Czech Republic instead.

## 'Ethics Commission' on Nuclear Power Meets

Merkel has said that a new road map for Germany's [nuclear-free energy future](#) would be finished by mid-June. She last month set up two commissions to inspect German nuclear power plants from a technical and ethical point of view.

The Nuclear Safety Commission will be responsible for technical inspections for all the plants in Germany. The so-called "Ethics Commission" to study the future of nuclear power, headed by former Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer and Matthias Kleiner, president of the German Research Foundation (DFG), met for the first time on Monday.

Kleiner said on Monday that Germany must not speed up its reactor shutdowns if it has to import nuclear power to make up the shortfall.

"One can't sweep in front of one's own front door and throw the rubbish into one's neighbor's garden," Matthias Kleiner told the *Financial Times Deutschland*. "We wouldn't be gaining anything if we shut down our nuclear plants more quickly but import nuclear power from abroad in return."

*cro -- with wire reports*



# Les trois gauches

**Le Monde** | 02.04.11 | 14h54 • Mis à jour le 04.04.11 | 10h14

En France, il existe trois gauches : la gauche libérale, la gauche antilibérale, la gauche libertaire. On connaît les deux premières parce qu'elles disposent d'une visibilité médiatique ; on ignore la troisième qui, pourtant, produit plus d'effets qu'on ne l'imagine. La première est dans l'éthique de responsabilité, sans grand souci de l'éthique de conviction une fois au pouvoir ; la deuxième est dans l'éthique de conviction, totalement insoucieuse de l'éthique de responsabilité ; la troisième est une nébuleuse travaillée inégalement par les deux éthiques. Précisons.

La première est bien connue : c'est la gauche libérale. Dans la configuration de la V<sup>e</sup> République bipartite, elle est l'alternative à la droite. Son "grand homme" fut François Mitterrand. Venu de la droite réelle et parvenu par la gauche, tout en restant secrètement l'homme de droite qu'il fut dans sa jeunesse, l'avocat de métier a si bien parlé à gauche pendant ses années d'opposition qu'il est arrivé au pouvoir en mai 1981. Dès lors, le monarque qui n'a eu dans la vie qu'une conviction, sa haine du général de Gaulle, qui fut son antipode en tout, a endossé les habits de l'homme du 18-Juin. L'auteur du *Coup d'Etat permanent* (Plon, 1964) fut un excellent putschiste pendant deux septennats. On lui en aurait moins tenu rigueur si ce coup d'Etat avait été l'occasion d'installer la gauche au pouvoir et non d'asseoir durablement sur son trône un ambitieux qui utilisa la gauche à des fins personnelles.

Car, après 1983, les socialistes ont géré la crise pendant plus de dix ans. Le chômage a augmenté, le racisme aussi, non sans volonté de casser la droite en deux pour assurer des réélections sinon compromises. Le Parti socialiste a épousé les revirements d'un homme qui contraignait les militants à parler à gauche tout en soutenant une gestion de droite - donc la plupart du temps, en faveur du capital. Avec la gauche libérale, l'éthique de conviction disparaît sous le rouleau compresseur de l'éthique de responsabilité.

La deuxième gauche est aussi connue, c'est la gauche antilibérale. Elle est à l'inverse de la première : tout à ses convictions, sans aucun souci des responsabilités. Chez elle, on parle d'autant plus haut et fort qu'on sait le pouvoir inaccessible autrement que par un jeu d'alliances qui fait d'elle un supplétif vite vidé de son sang. Certains jouent ce jeu ; d'autres non.

Pour ceux qui le jouent, l'arrivée de ministres communistes au second gouvernement Mauroy fut emblématique : ceux-ci pèsent modestement sur la politique concrète, mais le strapontin obtenu bâillonne le Parti. Jeu de dupes. Le PCF, défenseur alors de l'URSS totalitaire, renforce en même temps une politique libérale. Cette tension finira par une déchirure. L'éthique de responsabilité a dévoré l'éthique de conviction.

Dans cette deuxième gauche, il existe un courant qui ne joue pas le jeu sous prétexte de préférer la carte dite "révolutionnaire" : Lutte ouvrière avant-hier, hier, aujourd'hui, demain et après-demain, la Ligue communiste révolutionnaire jadis, puis sa formule nouvelle, le Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste. Cette gauche verbeuse souffre du tropisme sectaire. Plutôt première dans son hameau sectaire que seconde dans une Rome unitaire. Insoucieuse du réel, et surtout méprisante à l'endroit de la misère populaire qu'elle n'abolit pas, elle est doctrinaire et idéologique. Le réel compte moins que les idées, le rapport de force moins que les textes canoniques, l'efficacité pragmatique moins que la pureté idéologique.

Le fait que le NPA, porteur dans son projet inaugural d'une grande fédération de mouvements syndicalistes, anarcho-syndicalistes, tiers-mondistes, écologistes, féministes, alternatifs, ait choisi pour drapeau un mégaphone sur fond rouge exprime bien son dessein : parler haut et fort sur fond de révolution... Mais ceux qui souffrent de la brutalité du capitalisme libéral ont envie d'autre chose que de paroles ou de piquets de grève, de tracts ou de banderoles. A vouloir la révolution sinon rien, on n'a rien et surtout pas la révolution... Ici, l'éthique de conviction se fait fort d'ignorer l'éthique de responsabilité.

La troisième gauche est méconnue : il s'agit de la gauche libertaire française. Cette gauche-là est ancienne et a produit des effets : Proudhon et le pragmatisme révolutionnaire, Sébastien Faure et la pédagogie libertaire de la Ruche, Louise Michel et l'action militante, Emile Armand et l'individualisme hédoniste, Emile Pouget, le journaliste truculent, fondateur de la CGT, Georges Deherme, créateur des Universités populaires - et tant d'autres.

J'écris "la gauche libertaire française", car il existe une gauche libertaire... autoritaire, celle de Bakounine par exemple, qui diffère de Marx sur les moyens mais partage les fins messianiques de l'auteur du *Capital*. Ce courant domine dans cette gauche minoritaire...

Cette gauche libertaire modeste, discrète, a donné les "milieux libres" à la Belle Epoque, les communautés après 1968 : elle est éthique de conviction responsable et éthique de responsabilité convaincue. Elle veut ici et maintenant produire des effets libertaires. Son souci n'est pas de gérer le capitalisme, comme la gauche libérale, ni de briller dans le ressentiment et les mots sans pouvoir sur les choses, comme la gauche antilibérale, mais de changer la vie dans l'instant, là où l'on est.

Je songe à l'aventure autogestionnaire des "Lip" en 1973. Benny Lévy, de la Gauche prolétarienne, avait dit alors : *"Je vois dans l'événement Lip l'agonie de notre discours révolutionnaire."* Dont acte. Mais tout le monde n'eut pas cette lucidité. Pour ma part, je vois dans l'événement Lip la généalogie d'un nouveau discours révolutionnaire. Celui qui permet d'envisager de faire la révolution sans prendre le pouvoir. A quelques mois de la présidentielle, on peut préférer cette gauche-là...

**Michel Onfray** Article paru dans l'édition du 03.04.11

# Un débat français

Le Monde | 04.04.11 | 13h00

**M**ettons de côté le débat qui ne va pas manquer - et c'est tant mieux - d'agiter le landerneau politico-médiatique à propos du programme présidentiel du PS ; mettons également de côté les quelques questions importantes qui, de temps à autre, font encore irruption dans l'espace public (l'intervention militaire en Libye, l'après-Fukushima et l'éventuelle sortie du tout-nucléaire, etc.) ; détournons un instant les yeux de la partie de poker menteur qui s'engage entre candidats potentiels, socialistes et écologistes, pour 2012 ; et ne gardons que l'essentiel, la question fondamentale qui préoccupe les esprits : les électeurs du Front national sont-ils des cons ? Pour celles et ceux qui auraient raté les épisodes précédents, rappelons que tout a commencé le 23 mars, lorsque la chroniqueuse de France Inter, Sophia Aram, avait qualifié ainsi les électeurs de Marine Le Pen. Regrettant leur grand nombre, elle avait ajouté : *"Avec les gros cons, quand y en a un, ça va ; c'est quand y en a plusieurs que ça pose problème."*

Emoi de certains sites d'extrême droite, réplique d'un autre chroniqueur, d'Europe 1 cette fois, Guy Carlier, qui qualifia sa consœur d'Inter de *"petite conne"*, et *"rappel à l'ordre"* du CSA. Dans une lettre adressée au PDG de Radio France, Jean-Luc Hees, les "sages" de l'audiovisuel rappelaient la règle commune : les *"comptes rendus"* et *"commentaires"* doivent être exposés *"dans un souci constant de mesure"*.

On en était là de cette affaire considérable quand François Morel décida à son tour, vendredi dernier, de lui consacrer sa chronique de France Inter. Un petit chef-d'oeuvre d'humour, fort heureusement pas très CSA compatible. *"Je rappelle les questions de la semaine : A-t-on le droit de traiter les électeurs du FN de gros cons ? La chroniqueuse qui traite les électeurs du FN de gros cons est-elle une petite conne ? Celui qui traite de petite conne la chroniqueuse qui a traité les électeurs du FN de gros cons est-il lui-même un gros con ? Celui qui traiterait de gros con celui qui traita de petite conne la chroniqueuse qui a traité les électeurs de FN de gros cons est-il un sale con ?..."* Avant de conclure : *"Les plus connes au FN, ce sont ses positions, qui rendraient encore plus difficile la vie de ceux qui pensent trouver en lui une solution à leurs problèmes. Gros cons, sales cons, pauvres cons, ses avis sur les femmes, sur les jeunes, sur les autres. Ne pas se situer sur le terrain des idées en préférant insulter ou victimiser l'électorat du FN, franchement, Sophia, Guy, ce serait pas un peu jouer au con ?"*

Ne vous croyez pas, chers lecteurs, sortis d'affaire. Est attendue dans les prochains jours une nouvelle querelle tout aussi intellectuellement ébouriffante à propos d'un livre à paraître du chroniqueur de RTL et iTélé, Robert Ménard. Son titre ? *Vive Le Pen !* (Editions Mordicus). Le *Nouvel Obs* de cette semaine ne lui consacre pas moins de trois pages...

Franck Nouchi (Chronique)

Article paru dans l'édition du 05.04.11

# Euro : une faute partagée

LE MONDE ECONOMIE | 04.04.11 | 15h20

**L**es dirigeants européens en ont-ils fait assez jusqu'à présent pour faire repartir la zone euro d'un bon pied ? Des avancées ont certes été enregistrées. Mais d'autres seront nécessaires, tant sur le plan intellectuel qu'au niveau institutionnel.

Je suis persuadé que de nouvelles crises accéléreront ces réformes. Mais cela n'est en rien une certitude.

Il faut de la solidarité et de la discipline pour que des Etats souverains partagent une même monnaie. Plus différentes sont les économies impliquées et plus divergentes leurs performances, plus le besoin de solidarité est fort, et moins celle-ci est susceptible de se manifester. On en a eu la preuve.

Je pensais qu'une union politique plus étroite et une plus grande flexibilité économique seraient nécessaires pour que la zone euro survive sur le long terme. Et que ce ne serait qu'en période de crise que l'on verrait si les conditions de sa survie sont réunies. La crise actuelle constitue donc un test.

*"L'Europe, remarquait dans un discours récent Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, membre du directoire de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE), évolue, s'élargit, progresse sur la voie de l'intégration. Toutefois, cela ne se déroule pas selon un plan prédéfini et convenu, mais en réponse aux défis qu'elle rencontre, lesquels sont dans certains cas susceptibles de mettre en péril l'existence même de l'Union."*

## DANGERS ET AVANTAGES

La réponse apportée à la crise est un magnifique exemple des dangers et des avantages à attendre de cette approche. La crise a pris l'Europe au dépourvu. Certains avaient conscience des risques qu'entraînaient les énormes déséquilibres internes et les prêts irresponsables aux pays périphériques.

Rares, en revanche, furent ceux qui comprirent que ces éléments risquaient d'interagir avec un désastre financier mondial et de générer des crises conjuguées du système bancaire, de la dette souveraine et de la compétitivité au sein de la zone euro.

Face à ces périls, les dirigeants ont innové de manière spectaculaire.

En moins d'un an, ils ont approuvé, en collaboration avec le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), un plan de sauvetage de la Grèce de 110 milliards d'euros, créé un Fonds européen de stabilité financière (FESF) doté de 440 milliards d'euros, décidé d'amender le traité de Lisbonne pour pouvoir mettre en place un mécanisme permanent de sauvetage, amendé le pacte de stabilité et de croissance afin de renforcer la discipline financière et créé un nouveau système de surveillance macroéconomique.

L'Allemagne a accepté des idées que ses citoyens abhorrent. Les pays en difficulté ont accepté une austérité que leurs citoyens abhorrent. Tout cela a suscité maints remous et déclenché force hurlements. Mais le spectacle continue.

## TROIS DÉFIS

Pourtant, même si elle a beaucoup progressé, la zone euro n'est pas encore allée suffisamment loin. Trois défis se posent à elle.

Tout d'abord, ses dirigeants n'ont pas créé un régime capable d'éviter et, éventuellement, de gérer les crises potentielles. Certes, des accords ont été dégagés dans des domaines importants. L'un concerne la volonté de contrôler et de promouvoir la compétitivité, en particulier sur les marchés de la main-d'oeuvre. Sans flexibilité de ces marchés, une monnaie commune ne peut fonctionner.

Un autre accord concerne l'attention portée à la durabilité budgétaire à long terme. Un autre est la décision de légiférer en matière de résolution bancaire. Un autre encore devrait accoucher d'un projet de surveillance de l'endettement des banques, des ménages et des entreprises non financières.

Toutefois, de larges failles subsistent. La principale d'entre elles est le refus de reconnaître le lien entre les excédents extérieurs des pays du centre et la fragilité financière de la périphérie. On accorde une attention excessive au manque de discipline budgétaire, qui n'a pourtant pas été la cause des crises espagnole et irlandaise.

Par ailleurs, le plus gros défaut du projet de mécanisme permanent de stabilité européenne est que ses ressources - 500 milliards d'euros au total - seraient insuffisantes pour gérer des crises de liquidités dans les principaux pays. De surcroît, comme l'a également fait remarquer Wolfgang Münchau, éditorialiste au *Financial Times*, cette réserve est tributaire de pays qui pourraient eux-mêmes devoir être sauvés.

En deuxième lieu, personne ne sait si les pays aujourd'hui en difficulté seront en mesure de surmonter leur crise à un coût politique acceptable. Ils ont à peine amorcé ce qui promet d'être un long et douloureux processus d'ajustement.

## COÛTS PROHIBITIFS

Aujourd'hui, la Grèce, l'Irlande et le Portugal constatent que leurs possibilités d'accès aux marchés financiers sont d'un coût prohibitif. Nul ne sait quand ni comment ils pourront à nouveau y accéder. Pourtant, il n'existe aucune alternative facile aux épreuves qui les attendent. Les pays en difficulté enregistrent de gros déficits budgétaires primaires (avant paiement des intérêts). Aussi, la seule restructuration de la dette n'est pas la panacée.

La question se pose aussi de savoir si les pays en difficulté peuvent recouvrer leur compétitivité sans rendre encore plus ingérable leur dette libellée en euros. Pour l'instant, les deux pays susceptibles de parvenir à s'ajuster et à sortir du bourbier semblent être l'Espagne et l'Irlande. Mais de nouvelles crises politiques et économiques ont toutes les chances de se produire.

En troisième lieu, la zone euro n'a pas réussi à trancher le noeud gordien liant la crise budgétaire à la crise financière. L'opinion dominante, aujourd'hui, est que les principaux créanciers des banques devraient être indemnisés, tandis que les gouvernements doivent éviter de restructurer leurs dettes. Cette combinaison est le plus sûr moyen de faire supporter le coût des prêts irresponsables du passé aux contribuables des pays dont les secteurs privés ont inconsidérément emprunté.

L'Union est aussi, hélas, une "union de transferts". Or ces transferts ont eu lieu il y a des années, à l'époque où les prêts en question ont été accordés.

Il serait utile - et honnête - de la part du gouvernement allemand et de ceux des autres pays créanciers d'expliquer à leurs citoyens que, en venant à la rescousse des pays périphériques, ils sauvegardent leur propre épargne.

La seule alternative serait de passer leurs prêts par pertes et profits, et de recapitaliser directement leurs banques. Le reconnaître serait admettre que leur politique passée a été erronée. Cela serait sans aucun doute utile.

Allons plus loin, en admettant que les erreurs commises tant par les vertueux que par les pécheurs pourraient être une condition nécessaire pour accroître la volonté politique de renforcer le système. D'immenses défis se profilent encore à l'horizon. Il serait plus facile de croire qu'ils seront surmontés si chacun reconnaissait sa part de responsabilité dans le désordre actuel. Aussi bien ceux qui ont prêté de manière stupide que ceux qui ont stupidement emprunté.

Comme l'a remarqué Christine Lagarde, la ministre des finances française, *"il faut être deux pour danser le tango"*. Le tango européen est diaboliquement complexe, mais le bal continue. Et il continuera tant que les danseurs continueront à vouloir rester enlacés (cette chronique est publiée en partenariat exclusif avec le "Financial Times" © "FT". Traduit de l'anglais par Gilles Berton).

# La France de nouveau prise dans l'engrenage ivoirien

Par [Cyrille Louis](#)

04/04/2011 | Mise à jour : 22:22 Réactions (5)

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**Paris se retrouve dans une position délicate tandis qu'environ 12.000 ressortissants français assistent, inquiets et impuissants, aux combats entre les deux camps.**

Jusqu'au bout, les deux parties qui se disputent le pouvoir à Abidjan tentent d'aspirer Paris dans la crise ivoirienne. Dimanche, alors que l'«assaut final» était, selon les forces pro-Ouattara, sur le point d'être lancé contre la capitale économique, le camp Gbagbo attisait encore le sentiment antifrançais parmi ses Jeunes Patriotes. «Le génocide rwandais se prépare en Côte d'Ivoire par les hommes de Sarkozy. Ivoiriens, Ivoiriennes, sortons massivement et occupons les rues», exhortait ainsi la télévision d'État toujours aux mains du président sortant. Au même moment, les représentants d'Alassane Ouattara invitaient Paris à «s'impliquer davantage» dans le dénouement militaire imminent. «Il y a des accords de défense entre la Côte d'Ivoire et la France. Alassane Ouattara pourrait demander que la France intervienne plus massivement», plaidait l'ambassadeur de Côte d'Ivoire à Paris, Ali Coulibaly, tandis que les combattants du président élu semblaient surpris par la résistance de leurs adversaires.

## Violences antifrançaises

Échaudée par les violences antifrançaises qui furent perpétrées en novembre 2004 par les partisans de Laurent Gbagbo, Paris est bien décidé à ne plus se laisser piéger dans le jeu politique ivoirien. Peu avant le premier tour de la présidentielle, le secrétaire général de l'Élysée, Claude Guéant, s'était d'ailleurs rendu à Abidjan afin de proclamer la neutralité française dans le processus électoral. «Il s'agissait de bien faire comprendre aux deux camps que la France n'avait pas choisi son candidat et qu'elle était prête à travailler avec le vainqueur, quel qu'il soit», raconte un diplomate.

Début décembre, le contentieux autour des résultats du second tour a cependant propulsé l'ancienne puissance coloniale plusieurs années en arrière. Lorsque le président de la commission électorale indépendante se rend à l'hôtel du Golf, QG d'Alassane Ouattara, pour y proclamer sa victoire, le camp de Laurent Gbagbo accuse, en effet, l'ambassadeur de France, Jean-Marc Simon, d'ourdir un «complot» destiné à lui voler sa «victoire». Débute alors une campagne de propagande contre la France, accusée de vouloir porter Alassane Ouattara au pouvoir. Chaque soir ou presque, la Radio Télévision ivoirienne accuse la force «Licorne», dont le mandat principal se borne pourtant à la protection des ressortissants français, de tuer des patriotes ivoiriens. Paris, explique la presse pro-Gbagbo, serait engagé dans une entreprise néocoloniale destinée à s'approprier les ressources naturelles ivoiriennes. Dans les rues survoltées de Yopougon, bastion du président sortant, les protestations de neutralité réitérées par la France sont devenues inaudibles.

## Inquiets et impuissants

La semaine dernière, alors que les forces pro-Ouattara fondaient sur Abidjan, la pression est encore montée d'un cran sur la France. Fulgurants, les succès militaires enregistrés par les rebelles ont conduit de nombreux observateurs à se demander s'ils n'ont pas été conseillés, voire encadrés, par certains pays occidentaux. «Compte tenu de leur connaissance du terrain, il n'est pas inenvisageable que les militaires français aient aidé les Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire à planifier leur offensive», avance Antoine Glaser, ex-directeur de La Lettre du Continent et spécialiste de l'Afrique - alors que Paris, de son côté, réfute toute participation à l'opération.

Quoi qu'il en soit, Paris se retrouve, en pleine bataille d'Abidjan, une fois de plus, dans une position délicate tandis qu'**environ 12.000 ressortissants français assistent, inquiets et impuissants, aux combats entre les deux camps**. Si la mise en sécurité d'un bon millier de Français a pu être menée à bien ce week-end, la force «Licorne» est privée d'accès au quartier de Cocody, où vivent un grand nombre d'expatriés. Depuis samedi, les deux ponts permettant de s'y rendre sont, en effet, contrôlés par des centaines de Jeunes Patriotes bien décidés à protéger Laurent Gbagbo. Les militaires français ne pourront donc vraisemblablement pas les franchir sans recourir à la force, comme ils furent contraints de le faire en 2004 en engageant plusieurs hélicoptères de combat au-dessus du pont Charles-de-Gaulle, faisant plus de cinquante morts parmi les manifestants.

Impatients, sans doute, de voir Paris se laisser entraîner une énième fois dans le piège ivoirien, les partisans de Laurent Gbagbo ont fait savoir lundi que l'armée régulière «assurera la protection des ressortissants étrangers». Au même moment, des Français étaient enlevés par des militaires fidèles au chef de l'État sortant dans le quartier d'affaires du Plateau, à deux pas du palais présidentiel.

**INFO LE FIGARO - Jusqu'à présent Bercy travaillait sur une prévision de croissance de 2,5%.**

Bercy, qui doit envoyer mi-avril aux parlementaires puis à Bruxelles ses prévisions économiques actualisées dans le cadre du programme de stabilité, va revoir légèrement à la baisse sa prévision de croissance pour 2012. Elle ne serait plus affichée à 2,5 %, mais à 2 % - comme pour 2011. « Il ne faut pas que nous soyons trop éloigné du consensus des prévisionnistes », explique-t-on au ministère.

Un peu de prudence sur la croissance permet également de jouer la sécurité sur les finances publiques et les recettes budgétaires, surtout en année électorale.

En revanche, Bercy devrait afficher une trajectoire de déficit améliorée par rapport à ses prévisions d'aujourd'hui (6 % en 2011, 4,6 % en 2012). L'objectif est d'afficher un déficit sous la barre des 3 % en 2013.

# Und nächste Woche Bomben auf Damaskus?

Die Intervention in Libyen schafft falsche Erwartungen, desavouiert die UN und beschädigt das Völkerrecht.

- VON: Reinhard Merkel
- DATUM: 3.4.2011 - 17:49 Uhr

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Französische Kampffjets starten von der Insel Kreta Richtung Libyen.

Die öffentliche Debatte über die militärische Intervention in Libyen hat eine Reihe von Fragen bislang ohne Antwort gelassen. Ihre Bedeutung reicht über den gegenwärtigen Anlass weit hinaus. Was sind Grund und Grenzen der Legitimation eines Krieges zu humanitären Zwecken? Gab es vor dem Ausbruch der Kämpfe eine Rechtfertigung für die libysche Opposition, ihren Widerstand gegen Gadhafi zum offenen Bürgerkrieg auszuweiten? Hängt hiervon etwas ab für das mögliche Recht externer Mächte, gewaltsam zu intervenieren? Senkt der jetzige Krieg die Schwelle für die Ausnahmen vom Gewaltverbot, und welche Bedeutung hätte das für die normative Weltordnung?

*Responsibility to protect?* Ja, eine solche Pflicht der internationalen Gemeinschaft zur Hilfe für die Opfer innerstaatlichen Terrors gibt es. Als Rechtspflicht hat sie freilich wenig Gewicht. *Responsibility to protect* ist, was im Völkerrecht *soft law* heißt: eine Norm im Entstehen, mit unklarer Verpflichtungskraft und mit notwendig unbestimmtem Inhalt. Hilfe ist, je nach Art ihres Anlasses, in vielerlei Formen und nur in Grenzen möglich. Der im Libyen-Konflikt populäre Hinweis auf die *responsibility to protect* bezeichnet das Problem, nicht dessen Lösung: Wann darf man, um bedrängten Menschen zu helfen, Krieg führen? Die Antwort darauf kann ersichtlich nicht lauten, es gebe eine Pflicht, bedrängten Menschen zu helfen.

Wie sie wirklich lautet und welche Lösung sie für Libyen beglaubigt hätte, wird noch lange zu erörtern sein. Ich selbst halte die Legitimität dieses Krieges für zweifelhaft. Die Gründe habe ich anderswo dargelegt. Über ihre Triftigkeit wird sich besser rechten lassen, wenn der Despot verschwunden ist und die noch dunklen Zeugnisse seiner Herrschaft ans Licht gelangen.

Vernachlässigt hat die bisherige Debatte die Frage nach der Legitimität der Rebellion. Außer Zweifel steht, dass der libysche Widerstand gegen Gadhafis Diktatur legitim, ja von moralisch hohem Rang gewesen ist. Aber durften die Rebellen deshalb auch zum Mittel des bewaffneten Bürgerkriegs greifen? Der Völkerrechtler Christian Tomuschat hat die Frage in der FAZ umstandslos bejaht. Für eine unterdrückte Volksgruppe, die ihren Despoten nicht anders loswerden könne als mit Gewalt, sei es stets legitim, zu diesem Mittel zu greifen. Das ist eine befremdliche These.



Wohl dürfen der Tyrann und sein Apparat gewaltsam bekämpft werden. Das rechtfertigt sich aus dem Prinzip der Notwehr. Aber dem Nachbarn, der vielleicht nur wegen seiner fünf Kinder den Bürgerkrieg ablehnt, darf eine flächendeckend organisierte, für ihn unausweichliche und lebensbedrohliche Gewalt ganz gewiss nicht ohne Weiteres aufgezwungen werden. Das fordert das Prinzip des Notstands, nach dessen Kriterien die Zwangsverstrickung anderer in einen vieltausendfach tödlichen Bürgerkrieg beurteilt werden muss. Grundsätzlich ist aber niemand verpflichtet, sein Leben für fremde Ziele opfern zu lassen, die er selbst verwirft. Und offensichtlich gibt es in Libyen nicht nur Rebellen, sondern auch Millionen anderer, die den Aufstand missbilligen.

Das ist eine der wichtigsten Fragen, die uns dieser Aufstand und seine Eskalation hinterlassen: Wann ist über den zivilen Widerstand hinaus ein blutiger Bürgerkrieg legitim? Und was bedeutet es für ein mögliches Recht externer Mächte, gewaltsam zu intervenieren, wenn diese Legitimation im einzelnen Fall zu verneinen wäre? Nirgendwo gibt es derzeit konsensfähige Antworten auf diese Fragen.

Man mag versuchen, über eine »Sonderethik« der Politik das Zwangsoffer des Lebens anderer unter das kalte Kalkül einer utilitaristischen Verrechnung kollektiver Vor- und Nachteile zu stellen. Gewiss muss die politische Sphäre, in der sich die Fragen von Krieg und Frieden entscheiden, ein gewichtiges utilitaristisches Element enthalten. Dennoch hat derzeit niemand eine überzeugende Antwort darauf, wie sich moralische Prinzipien kollektiven Handelns sollten begründen lassen, die wir im Nahbereich zwischenmenschlichen Umgangs inakzeptabel fänden.

Die Fragen werden bleiben. Wer kann wissen, wie sich die Lage in Syrien entwickelt, in Bahrain, in Saudi-Arabien, vielleicht in Iran. Wird die libysche Intervention für die syrische Protestbewegung zum Anreiz, die Fortsetzung ihres Kampfes im Modus des Bürgerkriegs zu suchen? Und hätten die jetzigen Intervenienten als Urheber dieses Anreizes nicht eine moralische Pflicht zum Eingreifen, sollte die aufflammende Gewalt dann militärisch niedergeschlagen werden?

Man kennt den populären Einwand: Solle denn, weil man nicht überall eingreifen könne, nirgendwo eingegriffen werden? Das liegt neben der Sache: Was geschieht eigentlich mit der legitimierenden Norm selbst, auf die der Kriegseinsatz gestützt wird, wenn man sie schon Wochen später einfach ignoriert? *Responsibility to protect* bezeichnet eine grundsätzliche Pflicht zur Hilfe und nicht bloß ein Recht, sie je nach Opportunität zu gewähren. Wer die politisch-moralische Pflicht, der er sein behauptetes Recht zur Mobilisierung der Menschheitsgeißel Krieg entnimmt, bei nächster Gelegenheit nicht mehr kennen will, desavouiert die Norm, mit der er das Gewaltmittel legitimiert hat. Und da diese Norm eine Ausnahme vom völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbot statuiert, diskreditiert er dieses selbst. Das dürfte einer der größten und unbekanntesten Kollateralschäden sein, die Kriege wie der gegenwärtige anrichten.

Geläufig ist der Irrtum, es gehe in Libyen allein um die Lösung eines einzelnen Konflikts, der zudem Gut und Böse klar zu unterscheiden erlaube. Auch wenn der Einsatz nach Rechtsprinzipien fragwürdig sei, einem Schurken wie Gadhafi geschehe kein Unrecht, wenn man ihn mit einem Krieg in die Knie zwingt. Nun, ihm nicht. Aber vielleicht uns allen. Denn ein materiell illegitimer Krieg tastet das Fundament an, auf dem alles Recht zwischen den Staaten beruht: das Gewaltverbot. Das ist nicht irgendeine positive Norm neben anderen des Völkerrechts. Es ist, mit Kant zu sprechen, die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Recht überhaupt. Gewaltförmige und rechtsförmige Konfliktlösungen schließen einander aus. Jedes Recht beginnt daher allererst mit der Garantie des Gewaltverbots. Die Schwelle, die vor jede Erlaubnis zum Krieg zwischen den Staaten gesetzt sein muss, darf deshalb nicht schleichend und mit dem Blick allein auf den Einzelfall gesenkt werden.

Ja, diesmal gibt es, anders als im Kosovo und im Irak, ein Mandat des Sicherheitsrats. Doch ein solches Mandat ist keine genuine Quelle der Legitimität. Der Rat wendet die Norm zur Kriegserlaubnis an; erzeugen kann er sie nicht. Gewiss hat er dabei einen Spielraum zur Konkretisierung. Aber die Vorstellung, die Zweidrittelmehrheit eines Gremiums, in dem fünf Mitglieder ein freies Vetorecht besitzen, habe die Rechtsmacht, die Grundnorm des Völkerrechts fallweise außer Kraft zu setzen, hat etwas Atemberaubendes. Es wäre das Absurde einer Rechtsmacht zur Aufhebung des Rechts. Selbstverständlich kann der Rat mit der Mandatierung eines Kriegseinsatzes irren. Und ebenso selbstverständlich ist ein solcher Krieg dann illegitim.

Das deutet auf die letzte unerfreuliche Folge der Libyen-Intervention: die Desavouierung des Sicherheitsrats. Die Resolution 1973 hat immerhin die unabdingbaren Grenzen legitimer Gewaltanwendung gezogen: deren Beschränkung auf den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung. In ungewöhnlicher Schnelligkeit hat man diese Grenzen überschritten. Bewaffnete Rebellen sind keine Zivilisten. Ihr Weg nach Tripolis wird nun freigebombt, um den Diktator zu stürzen. Das ist, so erfreulich das Resultat sein mag, weder vom materiellen Völkerrecht noch vom Beschluss des Sicherheitsrats gedeckt. Nähme man die humanitäre Beschränkung des Kriegsgrundes ernst, dann hätte man nach der militärischen Ausschaltung der Gadhafi-Truppen jetzt auch den gewaltsamen Vormarsch der Rebellen zu stoppen. Das wird nicht geschehen, im Gegenteil. Der Libyen-Krieg wird nicht als Sternstunde des Völkerrechts in dessen Geschichte eingehen.

- QUELLE: DIE ZEIT, 31.3.2011 Nr. 14

## Deutschland muss Atomstrom importieren

**Nach dem Abschalten der sieben ältesten Atomkraftwerke ist Deutschland verstärkt auf Strom aus Frankreich angewiesen. Seit Mitte März haben sich die Stromflüsse aus dem Nachbarland sowie aus Tschechien verdoppelt. Die Exporte haben sich halbiert.**



Statt aus Biblis kommt der Strom jetzt häufiger zum Beispiel aus Frankreich

04. April 2011

Nach dem Abschalten von sieben alten deutschen Atomkraftwerken nach der Katastrophe von Fukushima hat die Energiewirtschaft die fehlenden Strommengen vor allem durch zusätzliche Importe ersetzt. In der ersten Märzhälfte habe Deutschland noch wie saisonal üblich mehr Strom exportiert als importiert, sagte die Vorsitzende der Hauptgeschäftsführung des Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW), Hildegard Müller, am Montag auf der Hannover Messe. „Seit dem 17. März gibt es einen Einfuhrüberschuss. Die Stromflüsse aus Frankreich und Tschechien haben sich verdoppelt, die Stromflüsse in die Niederlande und in die Schweiz haben sich etwa halbiert.“

Kritiker des Atom-Moratoriums der Bundesregierung hatten darauf verwiesen, dass es keinen Sinn mache, in Deutschland AKW abzuschalten, um dann fehlende Menge durch Atomstrom oder klimaschädliche Kohlestrom aus dem Ausland zu decken. Frankreich erzeugt etwa 80 Prozent seines Stroms durch Atomkraftwerke. Tschechien greift vor allem auf Kohlekraftwerke zurück und zu etwa einem Viertel auf AKW. Dem Branchenverband zufolge entspricht die seit der Abschaltung der alten Meiler importierte Strommenge schätzungsweise der Hälfte dessen, was die deutschen Versorger im Vorjahreszeitraum exportiert hatten.

### Strompreis im Großhandel um 10 Prozent gestiegen

Die weitere Entwicklung lasse sich noch nicht abschätzen, sagte Müller. „Mittelfristig könnten sich auch andere Strategien zeigen, etwa das stärkere Ausfahren der bestehenden konventionellen Kraftwerke im Inland.“ Dies hänge davon ab, inwieweit sich der Betrieb dieser Anlagen lohne. Vor allem ältere Anlagen galten bislang als wenig profitabel. Dies könnte sich aber ändern, da der Großhandelspreis für Strom seit dem Atom-Moratorium deutlich gestiegen ist. Müller nannte Steigerungsraten von zehn bis zwölf Prozent. AKW-Betreiber wie Eon und RWE prüfen derzeit, welche Kohle- oder Gaskraftwerke sie hochfahren können.

„Es muss auch über konventionelle Kraftwerke gesprochen werden“, sagte Müller. Die Diskussion um die richtige Energiepolitik dürfe nicht auf Atomkraft und Ökostrom verengt werden. Die Bundesregierung müsse sich während des Moratoriums mit der Energiewirtschaft, darunter die Stadtwerke, beraten. „Die Lösungen, die dort besprochen werden müssen, gehen weit über Fragen der Kernenergie hinaus. Es geht auch nicht nur um gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz“, sagte Müller.

Es müsse auch geprüft werden, ob die diskutierten Maßnahmen überhaupt in der Praxis überhaupt etwas taugten. Die Versorger benötigten für neue Kraftwerke Investitionssicherheit. Die Unternehmen kalkulierten in Zeiträumen von 30 bis 50 Jahren. „Das sollte die Politik wieder mehr berücksichtigen“, sagte Müller.

Trotz der Unsicherheit wolle die Branche investieren. Bis 2019 sei der Bau von 51 Kraftwerken mit einer Leistung von rund 30.000 Megawatt geplant. Zudem gebe es Überlegungen, weitere 15 Anlagen mit etwa 8000 Megawatt in Betrieb zu nehmen. Der BDEW schätzt das gesamte Investitionsvolumen auf rund 50 Milliarden Euro. Zeitgleich gehen aber zahlreiche alte Kraftwerke vom Netz. Allein die sieben ältesten deutschen AKW haben eine Leistung von etwa 7000 Megawatt.

Die Bundesregierung prüft nach Angaben ihres Sprechers Steffen Seibert derzeit die Auswirkungen des Moratoriums auf den deutschen Strommarkt. Eine Sprecherin des Bundesumweltministeriums erklärte, schon vor dem Moratorium sei Strom aus Frankreich importiert worden. Sie widersprach aber der Darstellung, Deutschland sei insgesamt ein Netto-Stromimporteur geworden: „Wir bleiben Netto-Stromexporteur.“

# Verleugnete Aufklärer

Islam und Mädchenbeschneidung / Von Georg Brunold

In Deutschland hat die sogenannte Islam-Debatte schon vor einiger Zeit den Stand erreicht, der sich in Anlehnung an ein Wort Hans Magnus Enzensbergers beschreiben lässt: Was immer man zur Malaise noch sagen mag, kann sie nur größer machen. So soll es hier bei einem Aspekt bleiben, der an und für sich mitnichten als ein Detail zu betrachten wäre, andererseits jedoch mit dem Islam eigentlich nichts zu tun zu haben brauchte: nämlich die Mädchenbeschneidung, wissenschaftlich "female genital mutilation" oder deutsch Verstümmelung weiblicher Geschlechtssteile genannt.

Fraglos handelt sich um eine vorislamische Tradition. Der aggressivste Eingriff ist die Infibulation, bei der mit dem Ziel der Verhinderung von Koitus und Masturbation die Klitoris sowie die kleine und große Schamlippe entfernt werden, wonach die Wundränder so vernäht werden, dass zum Abfluss des Menstruationsbluts nur eine kleine Öffnung bleibt. Die Infibulation wird auch pharaonische Beschneidung genannt. Praktiziert wird sie bis heute vor allem in Somalia und Dschibuti, aber auch immer noch in Teilen Sudans und in Ägypten. Auf einer Tempelwand in Luxor ist die Seereise der Pharaonin Hatschepsut zu verfolgen, die Puntland besucht, die Nordoststecke des heutigen Somalia. Aus dem pharaonischen Ägypten ist uns überliefert, dass Männer erst ihres weiblichen Geschlechtsteils - nämlich der Vorhaut - ledig zu ganzen Männern werden und erst Frauen ohne Klitoris zu ganzen Frauen. Weniger massiv eingreifende Formen der Mädchenbeschneidung mit partieller oder vollständiger Kliteridektomie - Beschneidung oder Exzision der Klitoris - werden noch immer in weiten Teilen Afrikas, auf der Arabischen Halbinsel und im Indischen Ozean praktiziert, bis nach Indonesien.

Aber es geht hier nicht um einen historischen Abriss über das Brauchtum und seine Verbreitung. Zur Vergangenheit ist nur anzumerken, dass die Materie unter Schriftgelehrten und Priesterschaften kontrovers war, in der islamischen Welt wie anderswo. Vom Propheten Mohammed gibt es einen umstrittenen Hadith, eine mündliche Überlieferung, der zufolge er eine Beschneiderin zur Mäßigung anhält. Und heute? Mohammed Sayyid al Tantawi, der letztes Jahr verstorbene Großscheich der Kairoer Azhar-Universität, der höchsten Autorität im sunnitischen Islam, ist in seinen letzten zehn Amtsjahren nicht müde geworden, seine ägyptische Nation darüber aufzuklären, dass seine Töchter nicht beschnitten seien. Laut einer Studie von Unicef sind 96 Prozent der verheirateten Frauen Ägyptens zwischen 15 und 49 Jahren beschnitten oder genitalverstümmelt, so dass sich schwerlich behaupten lässt, der Großscheich, vormals Mufti und Ägyptens höchster religiöser Richter, vertrete in dieser Angelegenheit eine konservative Linie oder auch nur den Mainstream. Ganz im Gegenteil. Ansonsten erklärte er gerne, der Brauch falle nicht in seine Zuständigkeit, da er keine Basis in der Religion habe. Dasselbe sagte Tantawi zur Ganzkörperverschleierung, und er billigte ausdrücklich das französische Kopftuchverbot.

2006 sprach sich das führende Gremium der Azhar unzweideutig gegen die Mädchenbeschneidung aus und verurteilte diese. 2009 hat aus Doha, Qatar, der radikalislamische sunnitische Lebensratgeber Yusuf al Qaradawi namens seiner der Muslimbruderschaft nahestehenden Fatwa-Rates mit einem Erlass nachgedoppelt, der die Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien ebenfalls als mit dem Islam unverträglichen Brauch untersagt.

Darüber haben auch deutsche und andere westliche Medien seinerzeit berichtet. Aber es hilft nichts. Die Legende, es gebe keine Verurteilung des Brauchs durch muslimische Autoritäten, lebt. Matthias Matussek nennt es makaber, einer "Frau wie Ayaan Hirsi Ali mit ihrer Leidensgeschichte die leidenschaftliche Absage an jene Religion vorzuwerfen, die sie verkrüppelt hat" - als hätte jemals jemand das getan. Aber auch CNN, durch den Mund der sich ganz als Aufklärerin gebenden Christiane Amanpour, posaunte noch unlängst in die Welt hinaus: "die islamische Tradition der Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien! . . . - die islamische Tradition der Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien! . . . - die islamische Tradition der Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien!" Und was ist da zu machen?

Georg Brunold, ehemaliger Afrika-Korrespondent der "Neuen Zürcher Zeitung", veröffentlichte zuletzt das Buch "Nichts als die Welt - Reportagen und Augenzeugenberichte aus 2500 Jahren". Er lebt in Nairobi.

# Stimmen der Anderen

## Spannungen mit Frankreich?

Die französische Tageszeitung "Le Monde" kommentiert die Wende in der deutschen Atompolitik:

"Im Unterschied zu Frankreich glaubt kaum ein Deutscher, dass ein Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie unmöglich ist. Die Hauptfrage ist eher, wie schnell der Übergang sein soll und wie viel er kosten dürfte. Eine Abkehr von der Atomkraft sollte beträchtliche Einsparungen ermöglichen und dementsprechend viele Investitionen für die Isolierung von Häusern, den Bau von Windrädern und von Hochspannungsleitungen erlauben. Kraftwerksbetreiber versuchen zwar, diesen Prozess zu bremsen, doch Unternehmen wie Siemens machen erneuerbare Energien zu einer wirklichen Priorität. Im Bereich der Energie hat Deutschland eine entscheidende Wende eingeleitet, die schnell zu Spannungen mit Frankreich führen könnte, das eine diametral entgegengesetzte Strategie verfolgt."

Gegen den Zeitgeist

Die "Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag" schreibt über den zukünftigen grünen Ministerpräsidenten Winfried Kretschmann:

"Längst gilt Kretschmann als Musterbeispiel für einen grünen Konservativen oder konservativen Grünen. Er hat keine Probleme damit, freundlich über Konkurrenten wie etwa den früheren CDU-Ministerpräsidenten Erwin Teufel zu reden. Noch vor einem Jahr wurde ein schwarz-grünes Bündnis in Stuttgart für möglich gehalten. Kretschmann war dafür. Doch dann beendeten der Streit um 'Stuttgart 21' und der massive Polizeieinsatz gegen die Demonstranten am Hauptbahnhof alle Gedankenspiele. Seine Partei wird es nicht leicht haben mit Kretschmann. Er hat sich auch schon dem grünen Zeitgeist verweigert, sich gegen eine Mehrheit gestellt und dafür Karriereknicke in Kauf genommen."

Schweigen über die Elfenbeinküste

Die britische Zeitung "Independent" kommentiert die Interventionspolitik des Westens:

"Bei westlichen Militärinterventionen wird immer wieder kritisiert, dass humanitäre Gründe als Vorwand dienen, um wirtschaftliche Interessen zu verbergen. In Libyen ist dies nicht der Fall. Wäre das Öl der Grund gewesen, hätte der Westen Gaddafis Regime unterstützen können. Doch mit der frenetischen Aktivität in Libyen und dem Schweigen über die Elfenbeinküste gibt der Westen tatsächlich den Eindruck, eine Doppelmoral zu vertreten. Gewiss wählen die mächtigen Staaten aus, wo sie in der Welt eingreifen und welche humanitären Bedrohungen sie als vorrangig betrachten, doch dies schürt das Misstrauen gegenüber westlicher Motivation. Wenn das Prinzip humanitärer Intervention internationale Gültigkeit erlangen soll, erfordert es einige allgemeingültige Prinzipien."

Harter Schlag für die Vereinten Nationen

Zur Ermordung von UN-Mitarbeitern bei einer Demonstration in der afghanischen Stadt Masar-i-Scharif schreibt die norwegische Tageszeitung "Aftenposten" (Oslo):

"Der Angriff auf das UN-Büro in Masar-i-Scharif war ein feiger und völlig inakzeptabler Gewaltakt gegen Menschen, die nun ihr Leben für die Bestrebungen zur Schaffung eines sicheren Afghanistan gegeben haben. Er ist auch ein harter Schlag für die Vereinten Nationen als Organisation, für die humanitäre Hilfe und den gesamten internationalen Einsatz in dem von Krieg heimgesuchten Land . . . Wenn Hilfsorganisationen jetzt ihren Einsatz aus Sicherheitsgründen zurückfahren, ist es die afghanische Zivilbevölkerung, die den Preis bezahlen muss . . . Die Gewalttäter haben auch nicht das Recht, sich hinter der Koranverbrennung eines obskuren Pastoren in Florida zu verstecken."

Lackmustest für Obama

Die Zeitung "Il Messaggero" (Rom) meint zu dem blutigen Überfall in Afghanistan:

"Das Massaker kann nur dazu beitragen, die Position des amerikanischen Präsidenten Barack Obama noch schwieriger zu machen, hat er doch gerade erst erfahren, dass weitere sechs Soldaten bei Kämpfen mit den Taliban getötet worden sind. Der Beginn des Frühlings in Afghanistan mit der Schneeschmelze und der Wiederaufnahme der 'Kriegs-Saison' wird im Weißen Haus in Washington als Lackmustest angesehen: Es muss sich zeigen, ob die Bemühungen des vergangenen Jahres die erhofften Früchte tragen oder ob der Krieg dort unvermindert auf vollen Touren läuft. Das ist auch vor dem Hintergrund einer jüngsten Umfrage zu sehen, wonach bereits drei Viertel der Amerikaner glauben, der Krieg sei es nicht mehr wert, geführt zu werden."

Am Rand des Abgrunds

Die französische Regionalzeitung "Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace" (Straßburg) äußert zum anhaltenden Machtkampf in der Elfenbeinküste:

"Nun steht das Land doch am Rand des Abgrunds, über das wahrscheinliche politische Ende von Laurent Gbagbo hinaus, belastet durch die Massaker der Sieger. Die mutmaßlichen Gewalttaten der Anhänger Ouattaras sind ebenso entsetzlich wie der Terror der Schlägertrupps von Gbagbo. Wie soll man auf einer derartigen Katastrophe ein Land aufbauen? Der Westen beschwichtigt und sagt, dass ein Status quo, also das missachtete Wahlergebnis zu einer ständigen Einrichtung zu machen, für die demokratische Zukunft Afrikas weit schlimmer wäre. Das mag sein, doch der Preis dafür sind getötete Zivilisten, Männer, Frauen und Kinder. Die Sonne ist noch nicht über Abidjan aufgegangen."

Das Ende der Krise

Zu dem Machtkampf in der Elfenbeinküste bemerkt die Pariser Zeitung "Le Figaro":

"Die Schlacht in Abidjan, so gewalttätig sie auch sein mag, ist das logische Ende der Krise der Elfenbeinküste. Nichts konnte Gbagbo und seinen Clan zur Vernunft bringen. Im Lauf der Jahre ist dieser Politiker dem despotischen Wahn eines Nero oder Caligula verfallen. Diese letzte bewaffnete Episode zeigt jedoch, dass der so gefürchtete Bürgerkrieg vermieden wurde. Da kann man dem ivoirischen Volk nur gratulieren. Die Gegnerschaft der verschiedenen Seiten ist politisch geblieben, und ethnische und religiöse Provokationen, die durch Führer der diversen Fraktionen geschürt wurden, haben nicht verfangen. Die Bevölkerung will nichts als Frieden und einen Neustart der Wirtschaft in einem Land, das seit fast 20 Jahren in der Krise steckt."

## Sie nennen es Hysterie

**Jodtabletten sind hierzulande nicht ausverkauft, und auch von Auswanderungen ist nichts bekannt. Wohl aber will eine Mehrheit der Deutschen die Atomkraftwerke abschalten - aus gutem Grund. Über Fukushima und die Deutschen, die sich gerade wie sehr vernünftige Menschen verhalten.**

Von Frank Schirrmacher  
04. April 2011

Die Deutschen seien „hysterisch“, soll Rainer Brüderle vor dem BDI gesagt haben, und ungezählte andere sagen es auch. Nicht Fukushima, so die These, die Seele der Nation ist im Ausnahmezustand. Die heimwerkelnenden Seelenklemmer borgen sich vom Atomkraftwerk sogar die Metaphern: Von „überhitzten“ Köpfen ist die Rede und von versagenden „Kühlungssystemen“ des Verstandes. „Hysterie“ ist das Argument der Stunde.

Als 1986 Tschernobyl explodierte, verschob sich die Debatte sofort, und vor allem dank Franz Josef Strauß, in eine Debatte zwischen links und rechts. Dort der Sowjetkommunismus mit seiner maroden Ideologie und Schrotttechnik, hier der Westen mit seiner technologisch-ökonomischen Intelligenz. Jetzt verschiebt sie sich zu einer Art Nationalpsychologie: Dort die Japaner mit ihrer angeblichen Gelassenheit, hier die Deutschen mit ihrem exaltierten Seelenleben.



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Abschalten.

Aus der Artikulation eines politischen Willens eine Krankheit des Kopfes zu machen: Da setzt ein fast mittelalterliches Verfahren zur Abwehr eines Weltbildwandels ein. Nach Tschernobyl wurde jeder, der anderer Meinung war, sofort einem politischen Interessen-Lager zugerechnet. Selbst aufrechte Konservative sahen sich plötzlich bei denen, die, einer damals beliebten Wendung zufolge, „eine andere Republik“ wollten. Das war immerhin noch politisch. Und es war der Augenblick, wo sich eben deshalb die Grünen zur partiell bürgerlichen Partei transformierten. Es war auch die endgültige Abkehr vom Psychologismus und der Esoterik der früheren Antizivilisationsbewegungen. Denn damals bewiesen die Ökologen, dass sie imstande waren, mit der Wissenschaft gegen die Wissenschaft anzudenken. Sie hatten ihre eigenen Physiker, Chemiker und Genetiker. Niemals wieder konnte man sie seither des romantischen Irrationalismus zeihen. Das gut dialektische Gefühl der meisten Menschen, die sich nicht auf eine Seite schlagen wollten, sagte ihnen, dass sich aus dem Konflikt der beiden Welten die Synthese ergebe. Wenn man sich fragt, warum Fukushima die Handlungsanweisung bei so vielen gab, die noch die Castor-Transporte gleichgültig zur Kenntnis nahmen, dann aus diesem Grund: Sie hatten längst mit der Atomkraft abgeschlossen, aber glaubten an die revolutionäre Geduld, an den evolutionären Prozess.

### Berichterstattung zwischen den Varianten des Schlimmsten

Man hätte geglaubt, dass man aus Tschernobyl politisch lernt. In der Tat: Jetzt redet man nicht mehr von rechts und links, sondern lieber gleich von ganz verdrehten Geistern. Doch jemandem die momentane Zurechnungsfähigkeit abzusprechen, wie es heute geschieht, hat eine neue Qualität. Die Quittung des so angesprochenen Bürgers folgt sogleich: Er verliert das Vertrauen - was durch Handlungen, Ankündigungen und Versprechungen faktisch gar nicht mehr zu heilen ist. Politische Statements müssen ihm zwangsläufig wie Drogen vorkommen - schließlich hält man ihn ja für überspannt. Wer sich politisch als Kranker wahrgenommen sieht, hält aus guten Gründen jede politische Maßnahme für ein Einlullen und Sedieren. Wie im Gassenhauer setzt das „Heile, heile Gänschen“, mit dem der Kopf beruhigt werden soll, auf die Zeit: In hundert Jahren ist alles weg. Vulgo: In einem Monat wird eine andere Sau durchs Dorf getrieben.

Die Diagnose der Hysterie ist so erkennbar unwahr und unfair, dass sie interessant wird. Niemand hat sich eine Arche gebaut, keine Hamsterkäufe fanden statt, Jodtabletten sind in Deutschland nicht ausverkauft, und auch von Auswanderungen und Fluchtbewegungen ist nichts bekannt. Die Deutschen haben im Gegenteil auf das Ereignis so rational reagiert, wie es in einer Demokratie überhaupt nur möglich

ist: Sie haben ihre Stimme abgegeben. Übrigens auch keineswegs einer hysterischen oder populistischen Partei, die plötzlich, die Affektlage nutzend, auf der Bildfläche erscheint: Man mag den Grünen, zum Beispiel in ihrer Schulpolitik, vorhalten, was man will. In der Frage der Energiewirtschaft haben sie seit dreißig Jahren genau das vorhergesagt, was nun geschieht. Wieso also stellt man das Land wie eine Bande durchgeknallter Teenager dar, die einander bei einer DSDS-Autogrammstunde fast zu Tode trampeln? Und mit welchem Recht macht man es zum Bestandteil eines Nationalcharakters, wie es im Augenblick geschieht? Die Deutschen wurden nicht nach 9/11 hysterisch, und sie wurden es nicht, als im Laufe der Finanzkrise Josef Ackermann von einer „drohenden Kernschmelze“ sprach, obwohl mit der Angst um das Geld eine der tiefsten Traumatisierungen ihrer Geschichte angesprochen wurde.

Der Grund liegt - neben der üblichen politischen Demagogie - in einer Verwechslung von Öffentlichkeit und der neuen Echtzeitmedienwelt. Der Eindruck der Hysterie entstand nicht etwa deshalb, weil die Bevölkerung hysterisch handelte, sondern weil die Erregungspotentiale der neuen Medien so funktionierten, wie sie funktionierten. Die Echtzeitkatastrophe, verstärkt durch Tepcos fatale Informationspolitik, wird in der Echtzeitkommunikation fast so etwas wie ein kollektives Atmen. „Es ist passiert.“ - „Es ist noch nicht passiert.“ - „Es wird passieren.“ Zwischen diesen Varianten des Schlimmsten changierte die Berichterstattung. Es waren dann zuweilen die gleichen Medien, die tiefsinnige Analysen über die „German Angst“ und den deutschen Hang zum Weltuntergang veröffentlichten. Aber die neue Wirklichkeit war nicht dieses gigantische Hintergrundrauschen, sondern die Tatsache, dass trotzdem (und gerade deshalb) die Menschen wissen wollten. Das ist der Grund, warum sie, quer durch alle Lager, so begeistert auf einen nüchternen und glaubwürdigen Kopf wie den Wissenschaftsjournalisten Ranga Yogeshwar reagierten. Yogeshwar war so etwas wie der menschliche Filter der Nachrichtenflut.

### **Die Hiobsmaschinen unserer säkularen Welt**

Es ist der Kern der Hysterie-Diagnose, den Deutschen vorzuwerfen, sie hätten nur auf Nachrichten reagiert, aber so getan, als sei bei ihnen selbst ein Atomkraftwerk in die Luft geflogen. In der Tat: Wir sind nicht Hiob. Wir sind nicht der fromme Mann aus dem Land Uz, dem ein Unglück nach dem anderen widerfährt, weil Gott mit dem Teufel wettet, dass Hiob auch dann fromm bleibt, wenn er einen Schicksalsschlag nach dem anderen erlebt.

Unser Vieh lebt noch, und wir haben keinen Aussatz wie der arme Hiob. In unseren Taschen aber tragen wir kleine Hiob-Maschinen mit uns herum. Sie melden uns in Echtzeit eine Hiobbotschaft nach der anderen. Viele vergessen wir gleich wieder, andere sind eine andere Form von Entertainment, manche überfordern uns, und einige führen uns zu den gleichen Fragen, zu denen Hiob kam. Er fragte: Wie kann Gott gut sein, wenn er das Böse zulässt? Worauf Gott, wie bekannt, Hiob in einer großen Rede einschüchtert: Er habe Gewalt über jedes Atom und die Blitze und die Natur, wer sei Hiob, ihn zu beurteilen.

Die Hiobsmaschinen unserer säkularen Welt erlauben uns natürlich nicht mehr, Gott die Verantwortung in die Schuhe zu schieben. Deshalb sind die Menschen auch keine Dulder mehr. Wir brauchen nicht selber eine Kernschmelze zu erleben, um die Frage zu stellen, ob wir was falsch gemacht haben. Wir brauchen keine Experten, die uns sagen, dass wir ihre Arbeit nicht beurteilen können und sie immerhin die Atome beherrschen. Hiobbotschaften erzwingen Rechtfertigung - selbst ein Gott, so lesen wir in den Jahrhunderten, die sich mit dem biblischen Buch befassten, muss sich für sein Handeln rechtfertigen.

### **Wer nennt das hysterisch?**

Diese Rechtfertigung muss keine Schuldzuweisung sein. Die Atomphysiker, die die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie möglich machten, wollten niemandem schaden. Für ein paar historische Augenblicke glaubten sie sogar, so etwas wie den Stein der Weisen entdeckt zu haben. Aber statt darüber zu weinen, dass die Atomkraft nicht hielt, was sie versprach, statt die Erkenntnis eines Systemfehlers als Hysterie zu stigmatisieren, könnte man loben, dass und wie eine Gesellschaft kollektiv lernt. Man könnte die deutsche Rezeptionsgeschichte von Fukushima ganz anders erzählen. Es ist nur eine Frage des Autors. Nicht passiv, als etwas Erlittenes, sondern aktiv, als etwas zu Tuendes. Endlich beginnt man damit, um Peter Sloterdijk zu zitieren, nicht mehr nur aus Katastrophen zu lernen, wie wir es bisher taten. Denn dieser Lernprozess endet fast immer nur bei dem Gedanken an technische Nachrüstung, zusätzliche Sicherheitssysteme und Notstromaggregate - in einer Übertragung vergangener, unvorhersehbarer Katastrophen, auf künftige, ebenso unvorhersehbare. Erkennbar will sich ein großer Teil der Deutschen von dieser Art des Lernens nach der Katastrophe verabschieden, erkennbar machen sie deshalb Fukushima zu ihrer Sache. Das ist nicht die Geschichte eines biedermeierlich, neurotisch fixierten Volkes, sondern eine neue Prometheus-Geschichte, die Geschichte, wie der Name sagt, eines Vorausdenkenden - man muss nur erkennen, dass sie es ist.

Denn Menschen schalten Atomkraftwerke ab, nicht weil sie im Dunkeln sitzen wollen, sondern weil sie wissen, dass nur das den notwendigen ökonomischen Handlungsdruck erzeugt, technologische Alternativen zu entwickeln. Man könnte erzählen, dass ein Land, aufgerüttelt durch den Schock, alles daransetzt, neue Erfindungen zu machen, die besten Köpfe zu gewinnen, Visionen zu verwirklichen, eine neue Gründerzeit zu befördern. Man könnte so erzählen, wie es das frühe zwanzigste Jahrhundert im stolzen und ungebrochenen Rückblick auf die Erfinderverleistungen der Vergangenheit der Edison, Siemens und Benz tat: Sie alle hatten Geistesblitze, weil sie, zumindest meistens, der Welt etwas Gutes tun wollten. Viele Entdeckungen wurden nicht primär gemacht, weil Menschen Geld verdienen wollten, sondern weil sie ein

Problem lösen wollten. Wer weiß, ob nicht irgendwo in irgendeinem Kinderkopf, der mitbekommt, dass die Gesellschaft nach Alternativen sucht, jetzt die Grundlagen dafür gelegt werden? Niemand weiß, ob diese Geschichte eines neuen Anfangs in allem gut endet, ob wir uns auf Risiken zubewegen, die heute keiner kennt. Doch dass die Kollateraleffekte größer sein könnten als die der Atomenergie, einschließlich des Endlagerproblems, ist bis zum Gegenbeweis höchst unglaubwürdig. Wer nennt das hysterisch? Nur die, die entmutigen wollen. In Wahrheit ist es genau das, was sehr vernünftige Leute tun würden.

Text: F.A.S.



THE SATURDAY PROFILE

Foreign Desk; SECTA

**By His Own Reckoning, One Man Made Libya a French Cause**

By STEVEN ERLANGER

2 avril 2011

[The New York Times](#)

PARIS

BERNARD-HENRI LEVY, 62, is such an inescapable figure in France -- of mockery, admiration, amusement, envy -- that he is by now unembarrassable. Making his mark young as a philosopher, he was satirized neatly by a critic with the words: "God is dead, but my hair is perfect."

But in the space of roughly two weeks, Mr. Levy managed to get a fledgling Libyan opposition group a hearing from the president of France and the American secretary of state, a process that has led both countries and NATO into waging war against the forces of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

It was Mr. Levy, by his own still undisputed account, who brought top members of the Libyan opposition -- the Interim Transitional National Council -- from Benghazi to Paris to meet President Nicolas Sarkozy on March 10, who suggested the unprecedented French recognition of the council as the legitimate government of **Libya** and who warned Mr. Sarkozy that unless he acted, "there will be a massacre in Benghazi, a bloodbath, and the blood of the people of Benghazi will stain the flag of France."

Mr. Levy, a celebrated philosopher, journalist and public intellectual, gives Mr. Sarkozy sole credit for persuading London, Washington and others to support intervention in **Libya**.

"I'm proud of my country, which I haven't felt for many years," Mr. Levy said in an interview. "When I compare **Libya** to the long time we had to scream in the desert about Bosnia, I must agree that despite all our disagreements, Sarkozy did a very good job."

He is known simply as B.H.L., a man of inherited wealth, a socialist whose trademarks -- flowing hair, black suits, unbuttoned white shirts, thin blond women -- can undercut his passionate campaigning on public causes, including stopping genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, strong support for Israel and an early critique of France's unthinking fascination with Communism, revolution and the Soviet Union.

His flamboyant advocacy has annoyed many in the past, including the current foreign minister, Alain Juppe, who seemed largely excluded from Mr. Levy's Libyan initiative. Mr. Levy negotiated directly with Mr. Sarkozy, with whom Mr. Levy has an extremely complicated relationship going back to 1983.

While they were friends and once vacationed together, Mr. Levy openly supported Mr. Sarkozy's Socialist opponent in the 2007 presidential election; Mr. Sarkozy then married Carla Bruni, who had broken up the marriage of Mr. Levy's daughter, Justine, who wrote a novel about it.

Still, Mr. Levy also had close ties with Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, using his media and family connections -- the industrialist Francois Pinault is his godfather -- to push for action on the most pressing human rights issues of the day.

BUT he has outdone himself on **Libya**, playing to Mr. Sarkozy's vanity and need for success as well as gratifying his own, and it is hard to say who used the other more.

It is an extraordinary tale, about which neither the Elysee Palace nor the Foreign Ministry wished to comment, other than quietly urging a grain of salt. Mr. Levy was in Egypt at the tail end of the Tahrir Square uprising, went to the Libyan border but had pressing business in Paris. But on Feb. 27, before returning to North Africa, he called Mr. Sarkozy, asking if he was interested in making contact with the rebels. He was, so Mr. Levy rented a plane and flew to Marsa Matrouh, the Egyptian airport closest to **Libya**.

Accompanied by his oldest friend and longtime collaborator, Gilles Hertzog, and, of course, a photographer, Marc Roussel, Mr. Levy walked across the border past hundreds of yards of refugees and foreign workers and flagged down a car, which was delivering vegetables every 20 miles on the way to Tobruk, the first Libyan city inside the border. He then went to Bayda, where he found Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, the former Libyan minister of justice and leader of the Interim Transitional National Council.

On March 3, Mr. Levy attended an early meeting of the council with Mr. Jalil in Benghazi in a colonial villa by the sea. He made a little speech about liberty and justice, said that Mr. Sarkozy was a political descendant of Charles de Gaulle, and asked if they would like him to call Mr. Sarkozy and try to arrange a meeting.

Unsurprisingly, they said yes, but first insisted that France "make a gesture." Mr. Levy called Mr. Sarkozy on an old satellite phone and Mr. Sarkozy agreed. On Saturday, March 5, France issued a press release, largely unnoticed everywhere except in Benghazi, greeting the formation of the transitional council.

OVERNIGHT, Mr. Levy said, French flags festooned Benghazi, with a huge tricolor on the court building serving as opposition headquarters. On Sunday, Mr. Levy drove the 10 hours back to the airport and flew back to Paris, and on Monday morning called Mr. Sarkozy on a better phone line and went to meet him. They agreed, he said, to keep the initiative a secret, even from the Foreign Ministry, though Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain was informed Wednesday evening.

On Thursday morning, a Libyan delegation, headed by Mahmoud Jibril, the de facto foreign minister, sat with Mr. Levy in Mr. Sarkozy's office. There Mr. Sarkozy agreed to recognize the opposition as the legitimate government of **Libya**, which shocked other European capitals and the French Foreign Ministry alike. He agreed to exchange ambassadors and to bomb three airports when he could.

According to Mr. Levy, Mr. Sarkozy said he would work on getting international support and a United Nations Security Council resolution, but if he failed, he and Mr. Cameron might go ahead anyway with the mandate of the European Union, the Arab League and the African Union. Mr. Sarkozy swore them to secrecy on this "Plan B," but told them to speak of everything else as they liked, Mr. Levy said. He said Mr. Sarkozy told them, "My resolution is total."

Convincing Washington was crucial. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was coming to Paris for a Group of 8 foreign ministers' meeting on Monday, March 14, and wanted to meet Mr. Jibril. The Qatar Embassy facilitated his travel from Doha, Mr. Levy said, and he went to Bourget airport to pick him up for a scheduled 4 p.m. meeting with Mrs. Clinton. But the Elysee had not been informed, and Mr. Jibril was held for two hours, until 5 p.m., before he was allowed into France. The meeting was rescheduled for 10 p.m. at Mrs. Clinton's hotel after a Group of 8 dinner at the Elysee.

Mr. Levy brought Mr. Jibril, who was staying with him, to the hotel, spent a few minutes with him and Mrs. Clinton, then left the room as the two spoke for nearly an hour. Afterward, Mr. Jibril was disconsolate, believing that he had failed to sway Mrs. Clinton. He insisted on leaving the hotel through a back entrance, to avoid waiting journalists.

At Mr. Levy's apartment he, Mr. Hertzog and Mr. Levy, all of them depressed, stayed up until 2 a.m. on March 15 writing an appeal to the world, what Mr. Levy called "our last card." But they did not issue it, and at 3 p.m., Mr. Sarkozy called Mr. Levy to say that "the American position is shifting."

Mr. Sarkozy then hit the phones, Mr. Juppe flew to New York and by the time of the Security Council vote, on Thursday, March 17, Washington voted along with France and Britain for a resolution authorizing the use of force in **Libya** to protect the civilian population, while Russia and China abstained. That night, Mr. Sarkozy called Mr. Levy to tell him, "We've won."

On Saturday, March 19, as Mr. Sarkozy hosted a luncheon summit on **Libya**, the opposition called frantically for help. Qaddafi forces had reached the suburbs of Benghazi. That afternoon, France began the bombing, to general political applause at home, even from the Socialists. Mr. Levy feels that he has helped to save lives and that Mr. Sarkozy has done the right thing, leading a diplomatic effort to intervene to save the entire "Arab spring" and "all the hopes it has raised."

He claims to be indifferent to those who mock him. "What happened is more important than all the criticism," Mr. Levy said. "We avoided a bloodbath in Benghazi."

# Special report: The West's unwanted war in Libya



REUTERS, Fri, Apr 1 2011

By [Paul Taylor](#)

PARIS (Reuters) - It is a war that Barack Obama didn't want, David Cameron didn't need, Angela Merkel couldn't cope with and Silvio Berlusconi dreaded.

Only Nicolas Sarkozy saw the popular revolt that began in Libya on February 15 as an opportunity for political and diplomatic redemption. Whether the French president's energetic leadership of an international coalition to protect the Libyan people from Muammar Gaddafi will be enough to revive his sagging domestic fortunes in next year's election is highly uncertain.

But by pushing for military strikes that he hopes might repair France's reputation in the Arab world, Sarkozy helped shape what type of war it would be. The road to Western military intervention was paved with mutual suspicion, fears of another quagmire in a Muslim country and doubts about the largely unknown ragtag Libyan opposition with which the West has thrown in its lot.

That will make it harder to hold together an uneasy coalition of Americans, Europeans and Arabs, the longer Gaddafi holds out. Almost two weeks into the air campaign, Western policymakers fret about the risk of a stray bomb hitting a hospital or an orphanage, or of the conflict sliding into a prolonged stalemate.

There is no doubt the outcome in Tripoli will have a bearing on the fate of the popular movement for change across the Arab world. But because this war was born in Paris it will also have consequences for Europe.

"It's high time that Europeans stopped exporting their own responsibilities to Washington," says Nick Witney, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. "If the West fails in Libya, it will be primarily a European failure."

## A FRENCH FIASCO

When the first Arab pro-democracy uprisings shook the thrones of aging autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt in January, France had got itself on the wrong side of history.

Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie had enjoyed a winter holiday in Tunisia, a former French colony, oblivious to the rising revolt. She and her family had taken free flights on the private jet of a businessman close to President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, and then publicly offered the government French assistance with riot control just a few days before Ben Ali was ousted by popular protests.

Worse was to come. It turned out that French Prime Minister Francois Fillon had spent his Christmas vacation up the Nile as the guest of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the next autocrat in the Arab democracy movement's firing line, while Sarkozy and his wife Carla had soaked up the winter

sunshine in Morocco, another former French territory ruled by a barely more liberal divine-right monarch.

Television stations were re-running embarrassing footage of the president giving Gaddafi a red-carpet welcome in Paris in 2007, when Libya's "brother leader" planted his tent in the grounds of the Hotel de Marigny state guest house across the road from the Elysee presidential palace.

On February 27, a few days after Libyan rebels hoisted the pre-Gaddafi tricolor flag defiantly in Benghazi, Sarkozy fired his foreign minister. In a speech announcing the appointment of Alain Juppe as her successor, Sarkozy cited the need to adapt France's foreign and security policy to the new situation created by the Arab uprisings. "This is an historic change," he said. "We must not be afraid of it. We must have one sole aim: to accompany, support and help the people who have chosen freedom."

## MAN IN THE WHITE SHIRT

Yet the international air campaign against Gaddafi's forces might never have happened without the self-appointed activism of French public intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy, a left-leaning philosopher and talk-show groupie, who lobbied Sarkozy to take up the cause of Libya's pro-democracy rebels.

Libya was the latest of a string of international causes that the libertarian icon with his unbuttoned white designer shirts and flowing mane of greying hair has championed over the last two decades after Bosnian Muslims, Algerian secularists, Afghan rebels and Georgia's side in the conflict with Russia. Levy went to meet the Libyan rebels and telephoned Sarkozy from Benghazi in early March.

"I'd like to bring you the Libyan Massouds," Levy says he told the president, comparing the anti-Gaddafi opposition with former Afghan warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, who fought against the Islamist Taliban before being assassinated. "As Gaddafi only clings on through violence, I think he'll collapse," the philosopher told Reuters in an interview.

On March 10, Levy accompanied two envoys of the Libyan Transitional Council to Sarkozy's office. To their surprise and to the consternation of France's allies, the president recognized the council as the "legitimate representative of the Libyan people" and told them he favored not only establishing a no-fly zone to protect them but also carrying out "limited targeted strikes" against Gaddafi's forces. In doing so without consultation on the eve of a European Union summit called to discuss Libya, Sarkozy upstaged Washington, which was still debating what to do, embarrassed London, which wanted broad support for a no-fly zone, and infuriated Berlin, France's closest European partner. He also stunned his own foreign minister, who learned about the decision to recognize the opposition from a news agency dispatch, aides said, while in Brussels trying to coax the EU into backing a no-fly zone.

"Quite a lot of members of the European Council were irritated to discover that France had recognized the Libyan opposition council and the Elysee was talking of targeted strikes," a senior European diplomat said. Across the Channel, British Prime Minister David Cameron, aware of the deep unpopularity of the Iraq war, had turned his back on Tony Blair's doctrine of liberal interventionism when he took office in 2010. But after facing criticism over the slow evacuation of British nationals from Libya and a trade-promotion trip to the Gulf in the midst of the Arab uprisings, he overruled cabinet skeptics, military doubters and critics among his own Conservative lawmakers to join Sarkozy in campaigning for military action. However, Cameron sought to reassure parliament that he was not entering an Iraq-style open-ended military commitment.

"This is different to Iraq. This is not going into a country, knocking over its government and then owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently," he said. In Britain, as in France, the government won bipartisan support for intervention.

## GERMANY MISSING IN ACTION

In Germany, on the other hand, the Libyan uprising was an unwelcome distraction from domestic politics. It played directly into the campaign for regional elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, a southwestern state which Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats had governed since 1953.

Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, leader of the Free Democrats, the liberal junior partners in Merkel's coalition, tried to surf on pacifist public opinion by opposing military action. Polls showed two-thirds of voters opposed German involvement in Libya, a country where Nazi Germany's Afrika Korps had suffered desert defeats in World War Two. Present-day Germany's armed forces were already overstretched in Afghanistan, where some 5,000 soldiers are engaged in an unpopular long-term mission. Westerwelle made it impossible for Merkel to support a no-fly zone, even without participating. He publicly criticized the Franco-British proposal for a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to prevent Gaddafi using his air force against Libyan civilians. Merkel said she was skeptical. The Germans prevented a March 11 EU summit from making any call for a no-fly zone, much to the frustration of the French and British.

Relations between France's Juppe and Westerwelle deteriorated further the following week when Germany prevented foreign ministers from the Group of Eight industrialized powers from calling for a no-fly zone in Libya. Westerwelle told reporters: "Military intervention is not the solution. From our point of view, it is very difficult and dangerous. We do not want to get sucked into a war in North Africa. We would not like to step on a slippery slope where we all are at the end in a war."

That argument angered allies. As the meeting broke up, a senior European diplomat tells Reuters, Juppe turned to Westerwelle and said: "Now that you have achieved everything you wanted, Gaddafi can go ahead and massacre his people."

When the issue came to the U.N. Security Council on March 17, 10 days before the Baden-Wuerttemberg election, Germany abstained, along with Russia, China, India and Brazil, and said it would take no part in military operations.

Ironically, that stance seems to have been politically counterproductive. The center-right coalition lost the regional election anyway, and both leaders were severely criticized by German media for having isolated Germany from its western partners, including the United States. The main political beneficiaries were the ecologist Greens, seen as both anti-nuclear and anti-war.

## U.S. TAKES ITS TIME

In Washington, meanwhile, President Barack Obama was, as usual, taking his time to make up his mind. Military action in Libya was the last thing the U.S. president needed, just when he was trying to extricate American troops from two unpopular wars in Muslim countries launched by his predecessor, George W. Bush.

Obama had sought to rebuild damaged relations with the Muslim world, seen as a key driver of radicalization and terrorism against the United States. The president trod a fine line in embracing pro-democracy and reform movements in the Arab world and Iran while trying to avoid undermining vital U.S. interests in the absolute monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf states. Compared to those challenges, Libya was a sideshow.

The United States had no big economic or political interests in the North African oil and gas producing state and instinctively saw it as part of Europe's backyard. Obama had also sought to encourage allies, notably in Europe, to take more responsibility for their own security issues. Spelling out the administration's deep reluctance to get dragged into another potential Arab quagmire, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in a farewell speech to officer cadets at the West Point military

academy on March 4: "In my opinion, any future Defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined', as General (Douglas) MacArthur so delicately put it."

Prominent U.S. foreign policy lawmakers, including Democratic Senator John Kerry and Republican Senator John McCain pressed the Obama administration in early March to impose a "no-fly" zone over Libya and explore other military options, such as bombing runways. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said after talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva on February 28 that a "no-fly" zone was "an option which we are actively considering".

But the White House pushed back against pressure from lawmakers. "It would be premature to send a bunch of weapons to a post office box in eastern Libya," White House spokesman Jay Carney said on March 7. "We need to not get ahead of ourselves in terms of the options we're pursuing."

While Carney said a no-fly zone was a serious option, other U.S. civilian and military officials cautioned that it would be difficult to enforce.

On March 10, U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper forecast in Congress that Gaddafi's better-equipped forces would prevail in the long term, saying Gaddafi appeared to be "hunkering down for the duration". If there was to be intervention, it had become clear, it would have to come quickly.

## ARAB SPINE

U.S. officials say the key event that helped Clinton and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, persuade Obama of the need for intervention was a March 12 decision by the Arab League to ask the U.N. Security Council to declare a no-fly zone to protect the Libyan population. The Arab League's unprecedented resolve -- the organization has long been plagued by chronic divisions and a lack of spine -- reflected the degree to which Gaddafi had alienated his peers, especially Saudi Arabia. When the quixotic colonel bothered to attend Arab summits, it was usually to insult the Saudi king and other veteran rulers.

The Arab League decision gave a regional seal of approval that Western nations regarded as vital for military action.

Moreover, two Arab states - Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - soon said they would participate in enforcing a no-fly zone, and a third, Lebanon, co-sponsored a United Nations resolution to authorize the use of force. Arab diplomats said Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister with presidential ambitions, played the key role in squeezing an agreement out of the closed-door meeting.

Syria, Sudan, Algeria and Yemen were all against any move to invite foreign intervention in an Arab state. But diplomats said that by couching the resolution as an appeal to the U.N. Security Council, Moussa maneuvered his way around Article VI of the Arab League's statutes requiring that such decisions be taken unanimously. It was he who announced the outcome, saying Gaddafi's government had lost legitimacy because of its "crimes against the Libyan people".

The African Union, in which Gaddafi played an active but idiosyncratic role, condemned the Libyan leader's crackdown but rejected foreign military intervention and created a panel of leaders to try to resolve the conflict through dialogue.

However, all three African states on the Security Council - South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon - voted for the resolution. France acted as if it had AU support anyway. Sarkozy invited the organization's

secretary-general, Jean Ping, to the Elysee palace for a showcase summit of coalition countries on the day military action began, and he attended, providing African political cover for the operation.

## OBAMA DECIDES

Having failed to win either EU or G8 backing for a no-fly zone, and with the United States internally divided and holding back, France and Britain were in trouble in their quest for a U.N. resolution despite the Arab League support. Gaddafi's forces had regrouped and recaptured a swathe of the western and central coastal plain, including some key oil terminals, and were advancing fast on Benghazi, a city of 700,000 and the rebels' stronghold. If international intervention did not come within days, it would be too late. Gaddafi's troops would be in the population centers, making surgical air strikes impossible without inflicting civilian casualties.

In the nick of time, Obama came off the fence on March 15 at a two-part meeting of his National Security Council. Hillary Clinton participated by telephone from Paris, Susan Rice by secure video link from New York. Both were deeply aware of the events of the 1990s, when Bill Clinton's administration, in which Rice was an adviser on Africa, had failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda, and only intervened in Bosnia after the worst massacre in Europe since World War Two.

They reviewed what was at stake now. There were credible reports that Gaddafi forces were preparing to massacre the rebels. What signal would it send to Arab democrats if the West let him get away with that, and if Mubarak and Ben Ali, whose armies refused to turn their guns on the people, were overthrown while Gaddafi, who had used his airforce, tanks and artillery against civilian protesters, survived in office?

The president overruled doubters among his military and national security advisers and decided the United States would support an ambitious U.N. resolution going beyond just a no-fly zone, on the strict condition that Washington would quickly hand over leadership of the military action to its allies. "Within days, not weeks," one participant quoted him as saying.

A senior administration official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said the key concern was to avoid any impression that the United States was once again unilaterally bombing an Arab country. Asked what had swung Washington toward agreeing to join military action in Libya, he said: "It's more that events were evolving and so positions had to address the change of events."

"The key elements were the Arab League statement, the Lebanese support, co-sponsorship of the actual resolution as the Arab representative on the Security Council, a series of conversations with Arab leaders over the course of that week, leading up to the resolution. All of that convinced us that the Arab countries were fully supportive of the broad resolution that would provide the authorization necessary to protect civilians and to provide humanitarian relief, and then the (March 19) gathering in Paris, confirmed that there was support for the means necessary to carry out the resolution, namely the use of military force," the official said.

When Rice told her French and British counterparts at the United Nations that Washington now favored a far more aggressive Security Council resolution, including air and sea strikes, they first feared a trap. Was Obama deliberately trying to provoke a Russian veto, a French official mused privately.

"I had a phone call from Susan Rice, Tuesday 8 p.m., and a phone call from Susan Rice at 11 p.m., and everything had changed in three hours," a senior Western envoy told Reuters. "On Wednesday morning, at the (Security) Council, in a sort of totally awed silence, Susan Rice said: 'We want to be allowed to strike Libyan forces on the ground.' There was a sort of a bit surprised silence."

## THE VOTE

Right up to the day of the vote, when Juppe took a plane to New York to swing vital votes behind the resolution, Moscow's attitude was uncertain. So too were the three African votes. British and French diplomats tried desperately to contact the Nigerian, South African and Gabonese ambassadors but kept being told they were in a meeting.

"There was drama right up to the last minute," another U.N. diplomat said. That day, March 17, Clinton had just come out of a television studio in Tunis, epicenter of the first Arab democratic revolution, when she spoke to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on a secure cellphone. Lavrov, who had strongly opposed a no-fly zone when they met in Geneva on February 28 and remained skeptical when they talked again in Paris on March 14, told her Moscow would not block the resolution. The senior U.S. official denied that Washington had offered Russia trade and diplomatic benefits in return for acquiescence, as suggested by a senior non-American diplomat. However, Obama telephoned President Dimitry Medvedev the following week and reaffirmed his support for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization, which U.S. ally Georgia is blocking.

China too abstained, allowing the resolution to pass with 10 votes in favor, five abstentions and none against. It authorized the use of "all necessary measures" - code for military action -- to protect the civilian population but expressly ruled out a foreign occupation force in any part of Libya. The United States construes it to allow arms sales to the rebels. Most others do not.

Reuters reported exclusively on March 29 that Obama had signed a secret order authorizing covert U.S. government support for rebel forces. The White House and the Central Intelligence Agency declined comment. Clinton said no decision had been taken on whether to arm the rebels.

## ARAB JITTERS, COLD TURKEY

No sooner had the first cruise missiles been fired than the Arab League's Moussa complained that the Western powers had gone beyond the U.N. resolution and caused civilian casualties. His outburst appeared mainly aimed at assuaging Arab public opinion, particularly in Egypt, and he muted his criticism after telephone calls from Paris, London and Washington.

Turkey, the leading Muslim power in NATO with big economic interests in Libya, bitterly criticized the military action in an Islamic country. The Turks were exasperated to see France, the most vociferous adversary of its EU membership bid, leading the coalition. Sarkozy, who alternated on a brief maiden visit to Ankara on February 25 between trying to sell Turkish leaders French nuclear power plants and telling them bluntly to drop their EU ambitions, further angered Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan by failing to invite Turkey to the Paris conference on Libya.

Italy, the former colonial power which had Europe's biggest trade and investment ties with Libya, had publicly opposed military action until the last minute, but opened its air bases to coalition forces as soon as the U.N. resolution passed. However, Rome quickly demanded that NATO, in which it had a seat at the decision-making table, should take over command of the whole operation. Foreign Minister Franco Frattini threatened to take back control of the vital Italian bases unless the mission was placed under NATO.

But Turkey and France were fighting diplomatic dogfights at NATO headquarters. Ankara wanted to use its NATO veto put the handcuffs on the coalition to stop offensive operations. France wanted to keep political leadership away from the U.S.-led military alliance to avoid a hostile reaction in the Arab world.

The United States signaled its determination to hand over operational command within days, not weeks, as Obama had promised, and wanted tried-and-trusted NATO at the wheel.



It took a week of wrangling before agreement was reached for NATO to take charge of the entire military campaign. In return, France won agreement to create a "contact group" including Arab and African partners, to coordinate political efforts on Libya's future. Turkey was assuaged by being invited to a London international conference that launched that process.

That enabled the United States to lower its profile and Obama to declare that Washington would not act alone as the world's policeman "wherever repression occurs". While the president promised to scale back U.S. involvement to a "supporting role", the military statistics tell a different tale. As of March 29, the United States had fired all but 7 of the 214 cruise missiles used in the conflict and flown 1,103 sorties compared to 669 for all other allies combined. It also dropped 455 of the first 600 bombs, according to the Pentagon.

For all the showcasing of Arab involvement, only six military aircraft from Qatar had arrived in theater by March 30. They joined French air patrols but did not fly combat missions, a military source said. Sarkozy announced that the United Arab Emirates would send 12 F16 fighters, but NATO and UAE officials refused to say when they would arrive. Britain's Cameron spoke of unspecified logistical contributions from Kuwait and Jordan. The main Arab contribution is clearly political cover rather than military assets.

## CASUALTY LIST

While the duration and the outcome of the war remain uncertain, some political casualties are already visible.

Unless the conflict ends in disaster, Germany and its chancellor and foreign minister - particularly the latter - are set to emerge as losers. "I can tell you there are people in London and Paris who are asking themselves whether this Germany is the kind of country we would like to have as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. That's a legitimate question which wasn't posed before," a senior European diplomat told Reuters. German officials brush aside such talk, saying Berlin would have the backing of its western partners and needs support from developing and emerging countries more in tune with its abstention on the Libya resolution.

Merkel has moved quickly to try to limit the damage. She attended the Paris conference and went along with an EU summit statement on March 25 welcoming the U.N. resolution on which her own government had abstained a week earlier. She also offered NATO extra help in aerial surveillance in Afghanistan to free up Western resources for the Libya campaign.

A second conspicuous casualty has been the European Union's attempt to build a common foreign, security and Defense policy, and the official meant to personify that ambition, High Representative Catherine Ashton. Many in Paris, London, Brussels and Washington have drawn the conclusion that European Defense is an illusion, given Germany's visceral reticence about military action. Future serious operations are more likely to be left to NATO, or to coalitions of the willing around Britain and France. By general agreement, Ashton has so far had a bad war. Despite having been among the first European officials to embrace the Arab uprisings and urge the EU to engage with democracy movements in North Africa, she angered both the British and French by airing her doubts about a no-fly zone and the Germans by subsequently welcoming the U.N. resolution. Unable to please everyone, she managed to please no one.

As for Sarkozy, whether he emerges as a hero or a reckless adventurer may depend on events beyond his control in the sands of Libya. Justin Vaisse, a Frenchman who heads the Center for the Study of the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution think-tank in Washington, detected an undertone of "Francophobia and Sarkophobia" among U.S. policy elites as the war began. "Either the war will go well, and he will look like a far-sighted, decisive leader, or it will go badly and reinforce the image of a showboating cowboy driving the world into war," Vaisse said. The jury is still out.

## The Weekend Interview with Bernard Lewis: 'The Tyrannies Are Doomed'

By Bari Weiss

2 avril 2011

[The Wall Street Journal](#)

Princeton, N.J. -- "What Went Wrong?" That was the explosive title of a December 2001 book by historian Bernard Lewis about the decline of the Muslim world. Already at the printer when 9/11 struck, the book rocketed the professor to widespread public attention, and its central question gripped Americans for a decade.

Now, all of a sudden, there's a new question on American minds: What Might Go Right?

To find out, I made a pilgrimage to the professor's bungalow in Princeton, N.J., where he's lived since 1974 when he joined Princeton's faculty from London's School of Oriental and African Studies.

Two months shy of his 95th birthday, Mr. Lewis has been writing history books since before World War II. By 1950, he was already a leading scholar of the Arab world, and after 9/11, the vice president and the Pentagon's top brass summoned him to Washington for his wisdom.

"I think that the tyrannies are doomed," Mr. Lewis says as we sit by the windows in his library, teeming with thousands of books in the dozen or so languages he's mastered. "The real question is what will come instead."

For Americans who have watched protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Bahrain and now Syria stand up against their regimes, it has been difficult not to be intoxicated by this revolutionary moment. Mr. Lewis is "delighted" by the popular movements and believes that the U.S. should do all it can to bolster them. But he cautions strongly against insisting on Western-style elections in Muslim lands.

"We have a much better chance of establishing -- I hesitate to use the word democracy -- but some sort of open, tolerant society, if it's done within their systems, according to their traditions. Why should we expect them to adopt a Western system? And why should we expect it to work?" he asks.

Mr. Lewis brings up Germany circa 1918. "After World War I, the victorious Allies tried to impose the parliamentary system on Germany, where they had a rather different political tradition. And the result was that Hitler came to power. Hitler came to power by the manipulation of free and fair elections," recounts Mr. Lewis, who fought the Nazis in the British Army. For a more recent example, consider the 2006 electoral triumph of Hamas in Gaza.

Elections, he argues, should be the culmination -- not the beginning -- of a gradual political process. Thus "to lay the stress all the time on elections, parliamentary Western-style elections, is a dangerous delusion."

Not because Muslims' cultural DNA is predisposed against it -- quite the contrary. "The whole Islamic tradition is very clearly against autocratic and irresponsible rule," says Mr. Lewis. "There is a very strong tradition -- both historical and legal, both practical and theoretical -- of limited, controlled government."

But Western-style elections have had mixed success even in the West. "Even in France, where they claim to have invented freedom, they're on their fifth republic and who knows how many more there will be before they get settled down," Mr. Lewis laughs. "I don't think we can assume that the Anglo-American system of democracy is a sort of world rule, a world ideal," he says. Instead, Muslims should be "allowed -- and indeed helped and encouraged -- to develop their own ways of doing things."

In other words: To figure out how to build freer, better societies, Muslims need not look across the ocean. They need only look back into their own history.

Mr. Lewis points me to a letter written by France's ambassador in Istanbul shortly before the French revolution. The French government was frustrated by how long the ambassador was taking to move ahead with some negotiations. So he pushed back: "Here, it is not like it is in France, where the king is sole master and does as he pleases. Here, the sultan has to consult."

In Middle Eastern history "consultation is the magic word. It occurs again and again in classical Islamic texts. It goes back to the time of the Prophet himself," says Mr. Lewis.

What it meant practically was that political leaders had to cut deals with various others -- the leaders of the merchant guild, the craft guild, the scribes, the land owners and the like. Each guild chose its own leaders from within. "The rulers," says Mr. Lewis, "even the great Ottoman sultans, had to consult with these different groups in order to get things done."

It's not that Ottoman-era societies were models of Madisonian political wisdom. But power was shared such that rulers at the top were checked, so the Arab and Muslim communities of the vast Ottoman Empire came to include certain practices and expectations of limited government.

Americans often think of limited government in terms of "freedom," but Mr. Lewis says that word doesn't have a precise equivalent in Arabic. "Liberty, freedom, it means not being a slave. . . . Freedom was a legal term and a social term -- it was not a political term. And it was not used as a metaphor for political status," he says. The closest Arabic word to our concept of liberty is "justice," or 'adl. "In the Muslim tradition, justice is the standard" of good government. (Yet judging from the crowds gathered at Syria's central Umayyad mosque last week chanting "Freedom, freedom!," the word, if not our precise meaning, has certainly caught on.)

The traditional consultation process was a main casualty of modernization, which helps explain modernization's dubious reputation in parts of the Arab and Muslim world. "Modernization . . . enormously increased the power of the state," Mr. Lewis says. "And it tended to undermine, or even destroy, those various intermediate powers which had previously limited the power of the state." This was enabled by the cunning of the Mubaraks and the Assads, paired with "modern communication, modern weapons and the modern apparatus of surveillance and repression." The result: These autocrats amassed "greater power than even the mightiest of the sultans ever had."

So can today's Middle East recover this tradition and adapt it appropriately? He reminds me that he is a historian: Predictions are not his forte. But the reluctant sage offers some thoughts.

First, Tunisia has real potential for democracy, largely because of the role of women there. "Tunisia, as far as I know, is the only Muslim country that has compulsory education for girls from the beginning right through. And in which women are to be found in all the professions," says Mr. Lewis.

"My own feeling is that the greatest defect of Islam and the main reason they fell behind the West is the treatment of women," he says. He makes the powerful point that repressive homes pave the way for repressive governments. "Think of a child that grows up in a Muslim household where the mother has no rights, where she is downtrodden and subservient. That's preparation for a life of despotism and subservience. It prepares the way for an authoritarian society," he says.

Egypt is a more complicated case, Mr. Lewis says. Already the young, liberal protesters who led the revolution in Tahrir Square are being pushed aside by the military-Muslim Brotherhood complex. Hasty elections, which could come as soon as September, might sweep the Muslim Brotherhood into power. That would be "a very dangerous situation," he warns. "We should have no illusions about the Muslim Brotherhood, who they are and what they want."

And yet Western commentators seem determined to harbor such illusions. Take their treatment of Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi. The highly popular, charismatic cleric has said that Hitler "managed to put [the Jews] in their place" and that the Holocaust "was divine punishment for them."

Yet following a sermon Sheikh Qaradawi delivered to more than a million in Cairo following Mubarak's ouster, New York Times reporter David D. Kirkpatrick wrote that the cleric "struck themes of democracy and pluralism, long hallmarks of his writing and preaching." Mr. Kirkpatrick added: "Scholars who have studied his work say Sheikh Qaradawi has long argued that Islamic law supports the idea of a pluralistic, multiparty, civil democracy."

Professor Lewis has been here before. As the Iranian revolution was beginning in the late 1970s, the name of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was starting to appear in the Western press. "I was at Princeton and I must confess I never heard of Khomeini. Who had? So I did what one normally does in this world of mine: I went to the university library and looked up Khomeini and, sure enough, it was there."

"It" was a short book called "Islamic Government" -- now known as Khomeini's *Mein Kampf* -- available in Persian and Arabic. Mr. Lewis checked out both copies and began reading. "It became perfectly clear who he was and what his aims were. And that all of this talk at the time about [him] being a step forward and a move toward greater freedom was absolute nonsense," recalls Mr. Lewis.

"I tried to bring this to the attention of people here. The New York Times wouldn't touch it. They said 'We don't think this would interest our readers.' But we got the Washington Post to publish an article quoting this. And they were immediately summoned by the CIA," he says. "Eventually the message got through -- thanks to Khomeini."

Now, thanks to Tehran's enduring Khomeinism, the regime is unpopular and under threat. "There is strong opposition to the regime -- two oppositions -- the opposition within the regime and the opposition against the regime. And I think that sooner or later the regime in Iran will be overthrown and something more open, more democratic, will emerge," Mr. Lewis says. "Most Iranian patriots are against the regime. They feel it is defaming and dishonoring their country. And they're right of course."

Iranians' disdain for the ruling mullahs is the reason Mr. Lewis thinks the U.S. shouldn't take military action there. "It would give the regime a gift that they don't at present enjoy -- namely Iranian patriotism," he warns.

By his lights, the correct policy is to elevate the democratic Green movement, and to distinguish the regime from the people. "When President Obama assumed office, he sent a message of greeting to the regime. That is polite and courteous," Mr. Lewis deadpans, "but it would have been much better to send a message to the people of Iran."

Let's hope the Green movement is effective. Because -- and this may be hard to square with his policy prescription -- Mr. Lewis doesn't think that Iran can be contained if it does go nuclear.

"During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States had nuclear weapons but both knew that the other was very unlikely to use them. Because of what was known at the time as MAD -- mutually assured destruction. MAD meant that each side knew that if it used a nuclear weapon the other would retaliate and both sides would be devastated. And that's why the whole time during the Cold War, even at the worst times, there was not much danger of anyone using a nuclear weapon," says Mr. Lewis.

But the mullahs "are religious fanatics with an apocalyptic mindset. In Islam, as in Christianity and Judaism, there is an end-of-times scenario -- and they think it's beginning or has already begun." So "mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent -- it's an inducement."

Another key variable in the regional dynamic is Turkey, Mr. Lewis's particular expertise. He was the first Westerner granted access to the Ottoman archives in Istanbul in 1950. Recent developments there alarm him. "In Turkey, the movement is getting more and more toward re-Islamization. The government has that as its intention -- and it has been taking over, very skillfully, one part after another of Turkish society. The economy, the business community, the academic community, the media. And now they're taking over the judiciary, which in the past has been the stronghold of the republican regime." Ten years from now, Mr. Lewis thinks, Turkey and Iran could switch places.

So even as he watches young Middle Eastern activists rise up against the tyrannies that have oppressed them, he keeps a wary eye on the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. It is particularly challenging because it has "no political center, no ethnic identity. . . . It's both Arab and Persian and Turkish and everything else. It is religiously defined. And it can command support among people of every nationality once they are convinced. That marks the important difference," he says.

"I think the struggle will continue until they either obtain their objective or renounce it," Mr. Lewis says. "At the moment, both seem equally improbable."

**Radicals' Turn To Democracy Alarms Egypt**

By NEIL MacFARQUHAR; Amr Emam and Lara El Gibaly contributed reporting.

2 April 2011

[The New York Times](#)

NAHIA, Egypt -- Abboud al-Zomor -- the former intelligence officer who supplied the bullets that killed President Anwar el-Sadat and is Egypt's most notorious newly released prisoner -- waxes enthusiastic about ending the violent jihad he once led.

"The ballot boxes will decide who will win at the end of the day," Mr. Zomor said during an interview in his large family compound in this hamlet on Cairo's western edge. "There is no longer any need for me to use violence against those who gave us our freedom and allowed us to be part of political life."

In its drive to create a perfect Islamic state, his Islamic Group and other groups like it were once synonymous with some of the bloodiest terrorist attacks in Egypt. But they are now leaping aboard the democracy bandwagon, alarming those who believe that religious radicals are seeking to put in place strict Islamic law through ballots.

The public approval of the constitutional amendments on March 19 provided an early example of Islamist political muscle, the victory achieved in no small part by framing the yes vote as a religious duty. But perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Islamist campaign was the energy invested by religious organizations that once damned the democratic process as a Western, infidel innovation masterminded to undermine God's laws.

Mr. Zomor, 64, with his bushy gray beard and nearly 30 years in prison, has emerged as a high-profile spokesman for that sea change since he was released on March 12.

He and other Salafis, or Islamic fundamentalists, rhapsodize about founding political parties and forging alliances with the more mainstream Muslim Brotherhood to maximize the religious vote.

Several reasons lie behind this remarkable turnabout, according to senior religious sheiks, junior members and experts.

Foremost is the desire to protect, if not strengthen, the second amendment of Egypt's Constitution, which enshrines Shariah, or Islamic law, as the main source of Egyptian law. The parliament to be elected in September will guide the drafting of a new constitution.

"If the constitution is a liberal one this will be catastrophic," said Sheik Abdel Moneim el-Shahat, scoffing at new demands for minority rights during a night class he teaches at a recently reopened Salafi mosque in Alexandria. "I think next they will tell us that Christians must lead Muslims in the prayers!"

Second, the Salafis arrived late to the revolution, with many clerics emphatically supporting President Hosni Mubarak and condemning the protesters.

Young Salafis rebelled -- extremely rare for a group that reveres tradition and hierarchy.

"The majority of the Salafi youth were the people who actually said, 'No, this is impossible, we have to be part of this, it is a just cause,' " said Sherif Abdel Naser, a 24-year-old Egyptian-American who now attends political classes three nights a week at Sheik Shahat's cramped mosque.

The Salafi movement is inspired by the puritan Wahhabi school of Islam that dominates Saudi Arabia, whose grand mufti churned out a fatwa condemning the Arab uprisings as a Western conspiracy to destroy the Islamic world. But an array of philosophies exists under the Salafi umbrella, ranging from apolitical groups that merely proselytize on the benefits of being a good Muslim to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda's No. 2, is an Egyptian Salafist.

Some Egyptians are convinced that the government released the likes of Mr. Zomor as a kind of bogeyman -- to frighten the country about the possible downside of democracy. Mr. Zomor said Salafist violence was only a reaction to the repression of the Mubarak government, but he shocked many Egyptians by advocating punishments like amputating thieves' hands.

In an example of fundamentalists now emerging into public light, the sons of Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind sheik who is serving a life sentence in the United States, convicted in a conspiracy to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993, recently addressed a conference at a five-star Cairo hotel, demanding that the United States release their ailing father.

"Somebody wants to give the impression that democracy will bring about the worst in Egypt," said Hossam Tammam, an expert on Salafi groups.

He finds the threat exaggerated, but noted that the Salafis would be hampered in political participation because they did not accept the idea that all Egyptian citizens should enjoy equal rights. The Salafi model is based on medieval Islamic caliphates where minorities were protected but had to pay a tax for the privilege, and were barred from the military and many government positions, he said.

Some famous Salafi clerics have been preaching national unity and have said they would preserve the peace treaty with Israel. But more exclusionary thinking also emerges in sharp relief.

Sheik Mohamed Hussein Yacoub, a prominent Cairo cleric, generated outrage by labeling the referendum results as a "gazwa al-sanadiq," or "conquest of the ballot boxes," using a freighted Arabic word for conquest associated with Islam's early wars. Egypt belongs to the observant, he said, and those who object could emigrate to North America.

He later claimed he was joking, but such attitudes are easy to find among Salafi foot soldiers. At the University of Alexandria, within sight of the sparkling Mediterranean, five bearded Salafi students set up a small table at the Faculty of Commerce on Tuesday to advocate the benefits of an Islamic state.

When a Christian student objected, one fundamentalist argued, "When we launch wars, we do it to strengthen our religion," he said. "Will you fight alongside us to spread our religion?"

"I will be angry," replied the other student.

"We cannot put God's orders to a referendum," said Ibrahim Mohamed, 21, one of the Salafi students. "Islam says adulterers must be stoned."

Various Salafi groups have been taking the law on social issues into their own hands, including severing a teacher's ear about 10 days ago in upper Egypt after accusing him of renting an apartment to prostitutes. And the army intervened on Monday to calm violence in the oasis of Fayoum that broke out after Salafists destroyed places selling beer and the owners shot a Salafi dead. Critics say the Salafi program is too religious to have broad appeal; while the Muslim Brotherhood frames its arguments in policy terms, the Salafis emphasize spiritual benefits that play well among the poor.

Alarmed by the violence, Ali Gomaa, Egypt's grand mufti, is planning a conference of spiritual leaders in mid-April to try to establish consensual guidelines for separating religious and political discourse -- for both Muslims and Christians.

Some experts hope the emergence of the Salafis will create a healthy attempt to reconcile Islam with democracy.

"The Salafis have realized that the only way for them to survive is to be politically engaged," said Mr. Tammam, the expert. "If the Salafis are absorbed into the political system here, they can be reformed, but this will not eliminate radical thinking for good."

PHOTOS: Prayers at the family mosque of the newly free Abboud al-Zomor, who says he has no need for violence now. A video of fundamentalists: [video.nytimes.com](http://video.nytimes.com).; Islamist groups like that of Mr. Zomor, left, once called the democratic process an infidel innovation. At right, villagers outside a cafe burned for selling beer. (PHOTOGRAPHS BY ANDREA BRUCE FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES) (A8)

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OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Editorial Desk; SECTA

**In Egypt's Democracy, Room for Islam**

By ALI GOMAA

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19

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Cairo

LAST month, Egyptians approved a referendum on constitutional amendments that will pave the way for free elections. The vote was a milestone in Egypt's emerging democracy after a revolution that swept away decades of authoritarian rule. But it also highlighted an issue that Egyptians will grapple with as they consolidate their democracy: the role of religion in political life.

The vote was preceded by the widespread use of religious slogans by supporters and opponents of the amendments, a debate over the place of religion in Egypt's future Constitution and a resurgence in political activity by Islamist groups. Egypt is a deeply religious society, and it is inevitable that Islam will have a place in our democratic political order. This, however, should not be a cause for alarm for Egyptians, or for the West.

Egypt's religious tradition is anchored in a moderate, tolerant view of Islam. We believe that Islamic law guarantees freedom of conscience and expression (within the bounds of common decency) and equal rights for women. And as head of Egypt's agency of Islamic jurisprudence, I can assure you that the religious establishment is committed to the belief that government must be based on popular sovereignty.

While religion cannot be completely separated from politics, we can ensure that it is not abused for political gain.

Much of the debate around the referendum focused on Article 2 of the Constitution -- which, in 1971, established Islam as the religion of the state and, a few years later, the principles of Islamic law as the basis of legislation -- even though the article was not up for a vote. But many religious groups feared that if the referendum failed, Egypt would eventually end up with an entirely new Constitution with no such article.

On the other side, secularists feared that Article 2, if left unchanged, could become the foundation for an Islamist state that discriminates against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities.

But acknowledgment of a nation's religious heritage is an issue of national identity, and need not interfere with the civil nature of its political processes. There is no contradiction between Article 2 and Article 7 of Egypt's interim Constitution, which guarantees equal citizenship before the law regardless of religion, race or creed. After all, Denmark, England and Norway have state churches, and Islam is the national religion of politically secular countries like Tunisia and Jordan. The rights of Egypt's Christians to absolute equality, including their right to seek election to the presidency, is sacrosanct.

Similarly, long-suppressed Islamist groups can no longer be excluded from political life. All Egyptians have the right to participate in the creation of a new Egypt, provided that they respect the basic tenets of religious freedom and the equality of all citizens. To protect our democracy, we must be vigilant against any party whose platform or political rhetoric threatens to incite sectarianism, a prohibition that is enshrined in law and in the Constitution.

Islamists must understand that, in a country with such diverse movements as the Muslim Brotherhood; the Wasat party, which offers a progressive interpretation of Islam; and the conservative Salafi movements, no one group speaks for Islam.

At the same time, we should not be afraid that such groups in politics will do away with our newfound freedoms. Indeed, democracy will put Islamist movements to the test; they must now put forward programs and a political message that appeal to the Egyptian mainstream. Any drift toward radicalism will not only run contrary to the law, but will also guarantee their political marginalization.

Having overthrown the heavy hand of authoritarianism, Egyptians will not accept its return under the guise of religion. Islam will have a place in Egypt's democracy. But it will be as a pillar of freedom and tolerance, never as a means of oppression.

Ali Gomaa is the grand mufti of Egypt.

# Libye : la coalition redoute l'infiltration par al-Qaida

Par [Georges Malbrunot](#)

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**L'amiral James Stavridis, commandant des Forces de l'Otan en Europe, soupçonne la présence de djihadistes parmi les insurgés.**

À l'heure où les Occidentaux s'interrogent **sur l'opportunité d'armer les rebelles libyens**, les principales agences de renseignement manquent d'informations sur l'infiltration, par des membres d'al-Qaida, **de l'insurrection anti-Kadhafi**. Devant le Sénat américain, l'amiral James Stavridis, commandant des Forces de l'Otan en Europe, vient d'évoquer «des soupçons» de présence djihadiste parmi les insurgés. «Nous devons être très vigilants quand on parle d'armer les rebelles», affirme au *Figaro* Mike Shereur, ancien haut responsable de la CIA en charge de la traque d'Oussama Ben Laden. Les Libyens ont été parmi les premiers à établir leur propre camp d'entraînement en Afghanistan au milieu des années 1980. Et, aujourd'hui, ils jouent un rôle important autour de Ben Laden, qu'il s'agisse d'Abou Yaya, le numéro 3 d'al-Qaida, ou d'Abou Laith, l'un des plus importants chefs militaires de l'organisation terroriste.»

Les Américains n'ignorent pas que la Libye a été l'un des principaux pourvoyeurs de moudjahidin étrangers en Irak. En décembre 2007, à Sinjar (nord de Bagdad), le Pentagone mit en effet la main sur 700 fiches décrivant les pays d'origine, motivations et itinéraires empruntés par chacun des djihadistes étrangers infiltrés dans le pays via la Syrie. Les conclusions du rapport Sinjar ne peuvent que nourrir l'inquiétude.

À l'époque, les Libyens constituaient le deuxième contingent djihadiste derrière les Saoudiens, avec 112 Libyens, soit près de 20 % des moudjahidins étrangers entrés en Irak au pic de la violence en 2006 et 2007. Loin devant les Algériens, les Syriens et les Yéménites.

Autre donnée alarmante: Darnah, un des fiefs de la rébellion contre Kadhafi, est la ville qui fournit le plus de djihadistes, devant Riyadh, la capitale saoudienne. Sur les 112 Libyens infiltrés dans l'ancienne Mésopotamie, 53 venaient de Darnah et 21 de Benghazi, la capitale de l'insurrection contre Tripoli. Enfin, les moudjahidins libyens étaient les plus déterminés à se transformer en kamikazes. 85% d'entre eux avaient délibérément choisi de mourir en martyr.

## Vétérans afghans

Abou Abbas, Abou al-Walid ou Abou Bakar - leurs noms de guerre - s'étaient répertoriés comme «employé», «étudiant» ou «enseignant»: bref, ils étaient issus de toutes les strates de la société, comme ceux qui combattent aujourd'hui pour se libérer du joug de Kadhafi.

Opposés de longue date au régime de Tripoli, Darnah et Benghazi sont en fait des bastions de l'islamisme radical. Au milieu des années 1990, les deux villes ont été le théâtre de soulèvements intégristes extrêmement violents contre Kadhafi, qui dut recourir aux hélicoptères de combat pour soumettre les «barbus». Ces dernières années, la montée en puissance des Libyens dans le djihad mondial fut le résultat direct de l'adoubement donné par Ben Laden en novembre 2007 à la succursale libyenne d'al-Qaida: jama'ah al-libiyah al-muqatilah.

Beaucoup de Libyens ont très certainement péri en Irak, mais pas tous. L'un d'entre eux a encore été arrêté en fin d'année dernière lors du démantèlement d'une cellule d'al-Qaida à Bagdad. Les retours en Libye sont actuellement scrutés par les espions occidentaux, qui cherchent également à savoir combien de vétérans afghans combattent aujourd'hui avec la rébellion. L'un d'entre eux, Abdul Hakim al-Hasadi, s'est livré récemment à un journal italien. «Les membres d'al-Qaida sont de bons musulmans et luttent contre l'envahisseur», a déclaré ce moudjahidin de Darnah, rentré d'Afghanistan en 2002. Selon *Il Sole/24 Ore*, une radio de la ville diffuserait le message suivant: «Frères qui avez combattu en Irak et en Afghanistan, il est temps maintenant de défendre votre terre.»

«Il ne s'agit pas de commettre la même erreur qu'en Afghanistan», prévient un diplomate français, qui rappelle les livraisons d'armes américaines consenties aux djihadistes avant que ces derniers ne les utilisent contre leurs ex-alliés. En Libye, les sympathisants d'al-Qaida ont aujourd'hui tout intérêt à masquer leurs amitiés. Ils ont besoin des Occidentaux pour se débarrasser de Kadhafi et asseoir leurs positions. Un peu comme les rebelles chiïtes d'Irak, qui avaient accueilli à bras ouverts les soldats américains en 2003 afin que la démocratie leur donne le pouvoir. Avant de retourner ensuite leurs armes contre leurs libérateurs.



## Mehr als 800 Tote an einem Tag

Der Machtkampf in der Elfenbeinküste wird immer brutaler: Im Westen des Landes sind nach Angaben des Roten Kreuzes mehr als 800 Menschen ermordet worden. Das Massaker ereignete sich demnach in der von Anhängern des international anerkannten Präsidenten Ouattara eingenommenen Stadt Duékoué.

Von Thomas Scheen, Johannesburg



02. April 2011

Im Westen der seit einer Woche schwer umkämpften Elfenbeinküste sind nach Angaben des Internationalen Komitees des Roten Kreuzes (IKRK) mehr als 800 Menschen ermordet worden. Das IKRK sagte am Samstag an seinem Sitz in Genf, internationale und lokale Mitarbeiter hätten „zahlreiche Leichen“ in der Ortschaft Duékoué vorgefunden und zeigte sich bestürzt über das „Ausmaß dieser Brutalität“.

Duékoué liegt an einer wichtigen Straßenkreuzung im Westen der Côte d'Ivoire und war am vergangenen Mittwoch von Kämpfern des international anerkannten ivoirischen Präsidenten Alassane Ouattara erobert worden. Das Massaker soll sich den Angaben des IKRK zufolge am Donnerstag zugetragen haben, wobei einiges darauf hindeute, dass ethnische Rivalitäten der Anlass waren, die in dem Moment ausbrachen, als die Truppen des abgewählten Präsidenten Laurent Gbagbo aus der Ortschaft vertrieben worden waren.

Das Ouattara-Lager ließ am Samstag mitteilen, man habe „zahlreiche Massengräber“ in der Region gefunden und machte das Gbagbo-Lager dafür verantwortlich. Ein Sprecher der Vereinten Nationen hingegen äußerte den Verdacht, dass die Ouattara-Truppen, die seit dem Bürgerkrieg von 2002 bis 2007 den Norden des Landes kontrollieren, sich bei ihrem Vormarsch auf die Wirtschaftsmetropole Abidjan schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen schuldig gemacht hätten.

### In Abidjan herrscht Anarchie

In Abidjan gingen unterdessen die Kämpfe zwischen Ouattara-Truppen und denen seines Widersachers Gbagbo um die Kontrolle der Stadt am Samstag weiter, wenngleich mit weniger Intensität als noch am Tag zuvor. Die „Forces républicaines“ genannten ehemaligen Rebellen hatten am vergangenen Montag eine Großoffensive gegen Gbagbo gestartet und dabei innerhalb von vier Tagen nahezu das ganze Land überrannt.

Gbagbo, der nur noch auf seine rund 2000 Mann starke Präsidentengarde sowie eine unbekannte Anzahl bewaffneter Zivilisten zählen kann, hält sich angeblich in seiner heftig umkämpften Residenz in Abidjan verschanzt. In der Stadt ist Anarchie ausgebrochen, weil die bewaffneten Gbagbo-Milizen der „Jeunes Patriotes“ raubend und mordend durch die Straßen ziehen. Nach Einschätzung des französischen Generalstabes ist Abidjan inzwischen „offen für Plünderer“. Französische Soldaten patrouillieren zwar in einigen Stadtteilen der Wirtschaftsmetropole,

konnten der Plünderungen aber auch nicht Einhalt gebieten. Am Freitag war bekannt geworden, dass bei einem Feuergefecht zwischen Soldaten der UN-Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, Onuci, und der Präsidentengarde fünf ivoirische Soldaten getötet worden waren.

Der Machtkampf um das Präsidentenamt in der Elfenbeinküste war unmittelbar nach den Präsidentschaftswahlen im November vergangenen Jahres ausgebrochen. Sowohl Ouattara als auch Gbagbo reklamieren seither den Sieg für sich. Die internationale Gemeinschaft erkennt hingegen nur Ouattara als Sieger an und fordert Gbagbo seither vergeblich auf, die Macht abzugeben.

Text: FAZ.NET

NYT April 1, 2011

# Editing Their Role in History

By ALAN COWELL

PARIS — As battles surged and ebbed, Col. [Muammar el-Qaddafi](#) once again displayed the resolve that has kept him in power since 1969 and inscribed his name bloodily in the annals of survival.

But in this drama of dictatorship and promised democracy, there were other, more distant players in Europe whose destiny seemed increasingly intertwined with Colonel Qaddafi's as the stakes rose ever higher.

Militarily, there were times this past week when [Libya's](#) struggle for the lofty goals of a new society seemed to veer toward battlefield farce — ragtag rebels squealing their tires in 180-degree turns to escape the advance of Colonel Qaddafi's forces when no allied airstrikes came to shield them.

And European leaders who had drafted a putative script for his downfall suddenly found their own parts veering into riskier domains, too, not just in the Libyan desert but in terms of their domestic constituencies.

At first blush, President [Nicolas Sarkozy](#) of France and Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain, the leading European figures who pressed for military action in Libya, seemed to have secured the approval — or at least the tolerance — of their own people as they committed their air forces to the enforcement of a no-flight zone. In their initial script, the Libyan leader should have been shaken, perhaps terminally, by this display of aerial resolve.

But, as the military intervention ended a second week, their involvement seemed far more nuanced — part shadow-play, part covert operation, part gamble that the rebellion they were backing in the east of the country was not some chimera of the Sahara or, worse yet, a cover for [Al Qaeda](#).

In the wings was Chancellor [Angela Merkel](#) of Germany, whose country abstained from the [U.N. Security Council](#) vote two weeks ago authorizing military intervention. That gesture set her against and apart from her principal European allies and left her in ambiguous middle ground: only events beyond her control will determine whether her choice was a smart move or what Sascha Lehnartz, a columnist in *Die Welt*, called “the biggest foreign policy failure of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949.”

The motives propelling Europe's leaders were mixed. If it is true that nations have permanent interests, but no permanent friends, then the most cynical European interest was clear: oil deals with a friendly post-Qaddafi government ready to erect a barrier against illegal immigrants already crossing the Mediterranean in ever greater numbers.

But leaders do not act solely in terms of their nation's interest. They seek their own glory, to offer themselves for comparison with their nation's heroes and heroines. They seek to banish the specters of their pasts and conjure new images for their own posterity. Perhaps in less absolute terms than Colonel Qaddafi, they yearn for survival.

When the calls for change began to stir in the Arab world more than three months ago, France in particular seemed to be on the wrong side of history, slow to recognize the implications of the nascent unrest in Tunisia, even offering to help out President [Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's](#) hated police with supplies of tear gas.

But Mr. Sarkozy reversed that perception with an abrupt coup de théâtre, not only leading the effort to secure U.S. and [U.N.](#) backing for a no-flight zone but unilaterally sending his own planes to bomb loyalist forces poised at the gates of Benghazi, the de facto rebel capital.

France has “decided to assume its role, its role before history,” Mr. Sarkozy declared at the time, provoking cynicism in some quarters.

As the columnist David Cronin wrote in the weekly *New Europe*: **“Sarkozy's primary motivation in any major decision he takes is how it meshes with his plan to stay in office for as long as possible.”**

In London, Mr. Cameron also seemed to espy a moment to don the Churchillian — or perhaps the Thatcherite — mantle, finally laying to rest the ghost of [Tony Blair](#)'s deeply unpopular embroilment in Iraq, which still haunts the nation's political debate. Frequently, Mr. Cameron seeks to convince his followers that, whatever else is at stake in Libya, it is “not another Iraq.”

But neither is it another Falklands, the 1982 campaign that showed Britain was still able to project military power across thousands of miles to the South Atlantic.

Just before Mr. Cameron convened an international conference on Libya in London this week, the full effect of austerity cuts in defense spending ordered by his government came into sharp focus. The Ark Royal, Britain's only serving aircraft carrier, decommissioned a few weeks earlier, was put up for sale on the Internet, illuminating **a paradox of the conflict in Libya: While Europeans have taken a diplomatic lead, it is the United States that has provided the bulk of the military muscle in the onslaught against Colonel Qaddafi's forces, launching most of the 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles and around three-quarters of the ordnance dropped on Libya in the first 10 days of operations.**

Those attacks did not dislodge their foe, while the rebels opposing the Libyan leader showed themselves to be untrained, outgunned and outnumbered, dependent on allied air power and clamoring for more weapons from the allies.

Not only that, no one in high office seemed to know who, exactly, the rebels were. Of 31 members on the insurgents' transitional council, only nine have been publicly identified, according to its Web site, in order to protect the safety of the others in areas under Colonel Qaddafi's control.

Yet, already, The New York Times reported, the United States and Britain have deployed covert forces in support of the air campaign, raising questions about possible mission creep at a time when some analysts are questioning the likely limits of allied power to mold Libya's future.

“We know what we want to happen: that freedom, democracy and prosperity should flourish throughout the Arab world,” the historian Sir Max Hastings wrote in The Daily Mail, a conservative newspaper in London. “But there is dismayingly little we can do to advance these fine goals, as I fear we shall discover in the boundless Libyan sands.”

## Irish Banks Fail Stress Tests By Carsten Volkery

**Ireland's banks performed so badly in the latest EU stress tests that the country's last remaining major independent financial institutions will likely be nationalized. The entire banking sector is set to radically shrink, but that might carry significant risks for Ireland's European partners.**

Many had thought that Dublin's banks had already hit bottom. But, after the release Thursday of the results of the latest European Union banking stress tests in Ireland, Dublin's financial industry looks more like it has fallen into a bottomless pit.

Three years after the start of the financial crisis, the last of what were once six major Irish banks is now to be taken under the government's wing with the expected nationalization of Irish Life and Permanent (IL&P). The results of the stress tests show that the company needs to raise €4 billion (\$5.67 billion) to meet new capital strength requirements. The only path left for the bank is a bailout funded by Irish taxpayers.

Even the Bank of Ireland, of which the government already owns 35 percent, needs an additional €5.2 billion in capital and will likely soon be majority-owned by the state. During the presentation of the stress test's results in Dublin, Irish Central Bank chief Patrick Honohan said it was likely that both IL&P and the Bank of Ireland will be nationalized.

In total, Irish banks require an additional €24 billion (\$34 billion) in fresh capital if they are to meet the minimum capital limits needed to withstand a crisis scenario. Together with the €46 billion the Irish state has already pumped into its banks, the preliminary total expense of bailing them out will be a whopping €70 billion, or roughly half of Ireland's GDP.

### A Fall Foretold

The stress tests covered four institutions: the Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Banks (AIB), the Educational Building Society (EBS) and Irish Life and Permanent (IL&P). Last November, the EU had made the stress tests a precondition for approving Ireland's €85 billion rescue package. As part of the tests, the Central Bank of Ireland and the American financial services company BlackRock played out a number of scenarios testing how hypothetical crisis situations would hurt the banks' balance sheets. Banca d'Italia, Italy's central bank, and the Commission Bancaire, France's banking regulator, oversaw the exercise.

For the first time ever, losses stemming from private mortgages were also figured into the calculations, thus triggering the collapse of IL&P, the only bank that had thus far been spared from the Irish financial earthquake. The bank, which is the country's leading issuer of loans for private homebuilders, will now be forced to seek state support. The bank now has only €19 billion in deposits versus €38 billion in mortgages, making it the worst-capitalized banking institution in Ireland.

For days, the stress tests had already been expected to return negative results. As a precautionary measure, IL&P had suspended trading of its shares on Wednesday, a day after they had dropped to 40 cents a share. Thursday morning saw a 24-hour suspension of trading of shares in the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks as well. The precautionary measures turned out to be prudent.

## Hopes for Restructuring Success

The reverberations of the fifth round of bank bailouts in Ireland are also likely to be palpable in the euro zone. With Irish banks unable to secure capital from the markets, the only things left to keep the sector afloat are emergency loans from the European Central Bank (ECB). Still, it is unlikely that the latest development will arouse a whole lot of irritation among other euro-zone member countries, because the EU rescue package already earmarked €35 billion to refinance Ireland's banking sector, which will be more than enough to plug the new €24 billion hole. What's more, Klaus Regling, who heads the EU's temporary rescue package, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), said there was no cause for concern because sufficient funds had already been bookmarked to deal with the latest Irish developments.

Nevertheless, critics are already predicting that this will not be the end of the Irish banking saga. Brian Caplan, editor in chief of the magazine *The Banker*, told the BBC that the €24 billion was fairly low on the spectrum of market estimates, adding that there were even some experts who calculated that the capital injection would have to be somewhere closer to €55 billion.

Even without any additional surprises, the disastrous state of the banks' balance sheets means that the ECB and the rest of the euro-zone states will have to deal with the Irish banking problem longer than they expected to. The Europeans can only hope that the restructuring plan proposed by the Irish government on Thursday will prove effective.

## Efforts to Spread the Pain

The central element in Dublin's plan is the consolidation of the Irish banking sector. The plan foresees having only two banks that offer the full range of services: the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (AIB). EBS would be folded into AIB. Meanwhile, IL&P would spin off its profitable insurance unit and take it public, but nothing has been said about what would happen with its ailing banking unit. Indeed, only one thing is clear: The state will have to deal with the mess. The other two banks, Anglo-Irish and Irish Nationwide, are already being liquidated.

The plan also calls for the banks to be forced to sell off a large portion of the loans on their books. In order to allow them to avoid having to sell them off at fire sale prices, they will be given several years to do so. Toxic assets that can't be sold will be transferred into special funds. All of these measures are meant to clean up their balance sheets -- and keep them that way. As Finance Minister Michael Noonan says, the point is to cut off all ties to the country's "toxic banking past."

At the same time, in its negotiations with the holders of Europe's purse strings, the Irish government is fighting to have euro-zone members share a greater part of the costs for Ireland's banking losses. Their argument is that the real-estate-crazy Irish shouldn't have to shoulder all the blame for the debacle. Partial responsibility, they argue, should be placed on foreign banks -- particularly German ones -- who helped fuel the disaster by allegedly throwing all prudence to the wind during the boom. Based on this line of argumentation, the Irish government is demanding that the private creditors of its banks, of which large foreign banks are the biggest, should share in the losses.

So far, however, Dublin's argument has run up against a brick wall. The greatest resistance has come from the ECB and Germany's federal government, which has represented the interest of the country's banks. The only things the two are willing to discuss are lowering the interest rate on the EU loans and extending their maturity dates. The ECB and the finance ministers of EU states are already negotiating these matters with Irish government officials. But many economists are convinced that Ireland will crumble under the weight of its debts if at least some of the debts aren't forgiven.

EDITORIAL

Editorial Desk; SECTA

**Chancellor Merkel's Shellacking**

362 words

1 April 2011

[The New York Times](#)

Even after pandering to voters' fears about nuclear power, the euro and NATO operations in Libya, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany got a shellacking in her Christian Democratic party's traditional bastion of Baden-Wurttemberg. We hope Mrs. Merkel, whose term runs until 2013, draws the right lessons and hews more closely to her own principles and Germany's larger interests.

Sunday's election took place in the shadow of Japan's unfolding nuclear power-plant disaster. The future of Germany's 17 nuclear reactors (four of which are in Baden-Wurttemberg) was the biggest issue, and the antinuclear Green Party was the biggest winner.

Mrs. Merkel was vulnerable after she pushed through a law extending the legal life of Germany's reactors from 30 years to more than 40. Then, just ahead of the election, she ordered an immediate 90-day shutdown of the seven reactors built before 1980. It was the right thing to do, but it cast doubt on the earlier extension and left voters wondering what she would do when the 90 days ran out.

Mrs. Merkel's flailing efforts to have it both ways on Europe's endangered currency also left voters wondering where she really stood. She portrayed her decision to stretch out Germany's contributions and her demands for growth-killing austerity as shielding German taxpayers from the extravagance of slothful European neighbors. Voters punished her for pledging any bailout money at all. Prolonging the crisis and impeding growth in the euro-zone will hurt German banks and exporters.

Mrs. Merkel has also been disappointing on Libya. Although NATO has long been the linchpin of Germany's defense plans, she ostentatiously removed German ships in the Mediterranean from NATO command to keep them clear of operations in Libya. Germany also abstained in the United Nations Security Council's vote authorizing action, joining Russia, China, Brazil and India.

Most of Mrs. Merkel's postwar predecessors rightly believed that Germany's economic prosperity was firmly tied to the European Union and its military security tied to NATO. It is becoming increasingly hard to figure out what Mrs. Merkel believes.

# L'Europe de la défense, morte et enterrée en Libye

Le Monde | 31.03.11 | 13h03 • Mis à jour le 31.03.11 | 13h09

**L**e moment était unique. La crise libyenne offrait à l'Europe l'opportunité de tester sa "politique de sécurité et de défense commune". La Méditerranée fait partie des "intérêts vitaux" de l'Union européenne (UE). L'Europe doit être aux côtés de ceux qui réclament la démocratie. Elle ne pouvait laisser massacrer les jeunes révoltés de Benghazi. Elle était d'autant plus sollicitée que les Etats-Unis n'entendent pas être au premier rang : leurs priorités arabes sont dans le golfe Persique, pas le long du golfe de Syrte.

C'était l'occasion de dresser le bilan d'un an de traité de Lisbonne, qui régit les règles de fonctionnement de l'Union. Entré en vigueur en décembre 2009, il déploie une impressionnante panoplie d'instruments au service de la politique étrangère de l'Europe. Le traité a créé un Service européen d'action extérieure, riche de 5 000 fonctionnaires ; il est placé sous l'autorité d'une haute représentante pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, Catherine Ashton, qui dispose aussi d'un embryon d'état-major militaire et d'une cellule de gestion de crise...

Si on décidait une intervention militaire, il fallait s'efforcer d'agir en dehors du cadre de l'OTAN, le bras armé de la "famille occidentale". Affaire de sensibilités : on est dans le monde arabe ; l'OTAN, c'est les Etats-Unis, qui sont les plus proches alliés d'Israël... Le raisonnement vaut ce qu'il vaut, mais il y avait là un argument de plus pour une opération européenne (avec des pays arabes et africains).

En somme, le cas libyen se présentait comme la situation "idéale" pour que l'UE manifeste un début d'identité forte en politique étrangère. Un test à ne pas rater, un rendez-vous à tenir.

Résultat ? Ce sont bien deux pays européens, la Grande-Bretagne et la France, qui ont mené le bal dans l'affaire libyenne. Belle performance politique et diplomatique, où le savoir-faire du Foreign Office et du Quai d'Orsay n'a pas peu compté ! Nicolas Sarkozy et David Cameron ont été les premiers à comprendre ce qui se jouait en Libye. Logiques avec le soutien politique apporté aux rebelles anti-Kadhafi, assez vieux pour avoir la mémoire encore meurtrie par l'attentisme européen dans les Balkans, au début des années 1990, ils ont été à l'origine de la résolution de l'ONU autorisant l'intervention armée. La Royal Air Force et l'armée de l'air française vont fournir la moitié de la force de frappe déployée au-dessus des côtes libyennes ; le reste le sera par les Etats-Unis sans lesquels ni les Britanniques ni les Français ne seraient vraisemblablement intervenus.

Mais l'Union européenne, elle, a misérablement failli. L'Europe "instituée" n'a pas franchi l'épreuve. Dans cette histoire, elle n'existe pas. Elle a été incapable de s'entendre sur la conduite à tenir, la représentativité à accorder à l'opposition libyenne et, plus encore, sur la légitimité de l'emploi de la force. La désunion a été totale et particulièrement marquante quand il s'est agi de décider de la guerre - c'est-à-dire quand l'histoire se fait tragique et qu'il faut sortir de l'habituelle crème fouettée rhétorique sur le respect des droits de l'homme.

L'Allemagne a adopté la position de repli neutraliste que l'on sait, empêchant que se forme le trio Berlin-Londres-Paris, seul à même d'emporter l'adhésion des autres. L'Europe de l'Est a fait part de ses inquiétudes propres : elle craint que le volume des fonds européens dont elle bénéficie ne pâtisse de l'assistance que l'UE apportera aux peuples arabes...

La haute représentante a été hautement inaudible, mais n'incriminons pas Lady Ashton : son service a un an à peine, il est en voie de constitution, en quête d'argent et de locaux.

Même si elle avait voulu assurer la coordination des opérations, l'UE n'en aurait pas eu les moyens. L'embryon d'état-major communautaire placé auprès de la baronne Ashton n'est pas à la hauteur. Plus ou moins affiché, le recours à la logistique de l'OTAN était inévitable. *"La crise libyenne a manifesté avec éclat l'absence de politique européenne de défense : pas de vision politique commune et pas de capacité de conduite d'une opération de ce genre"*, dit Bruno Tertrais, de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique.

Cet état risque de perdurer. Tous les budgets européens de la défense - cette capacité à projeter sa force et l'image de sa force, sans laquelle il n'y a pas de politique étrangère - sont en baisse. Ils sont les premiers visés par les coupes budgétaires qu'entraîne le sauvetage de l'euro, au moment où tous les pays émergents augmentent, eux, massivement leurs dépenses militaires.



Nicolas Sarkozy assène volontiers le théorème de l'inexistence de l'Europe de la défense hors du tandem franco-britannique : quand l'action extérieure implique l'emploi de la force, la France et la Grande-Bretagne sont les seuls sérieux en Europe. Faut-il le suivre ? A moitié. L'Europe de la politique extérieure, c'est aussi le respect des procédures de concertation prévues par le traité de Lisbonne et sur lesquelles Paris s'assoit allégrement pour leur préférer les coups médiatiques de la "diplomatie du perron".

En 2007, le président avait expliqué que le retour de la France dans l'OTAN allait favoriser l'Europe de la défense, chère à Paris. Les Français ne pourraient plus être suspectés d'être contre l'organisation atlantique ; cela leur permettrait de pousser plus avant le dossier d'une défense européenne propre. Ils n'en ont strictement rien fait.

Voilà comment la France, chantre de "*l'Europe puissance*", se retrouve à mener l'opération libyenne avec la Grande-Bretagne, contemptrice de "*l'Europe puissance*". L'histoire retiendra de cette aventure qu'elle a été conduite par deux pays européens, pas par l'Europe unie. Ce qui n'est pas la même chose.

### **Post-scriptum**

Deux excellents documents : "Rapport Schuman sur l'Europe 2011" (Lignes de repères, 224 p., 19,50 euros). "European Foreign Policy Scorecard", par The European Council on Foreign Relations ([Ecfre.eu](http://ecfr.eu)).

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[frachon@lemonde.fr](mailto:frachon@lemonde.fr)

# L'EPR de Flamanville pourrait être mis en suspens

Par [Guillaume Errard](#)

31/03/2011 | Mise à jour : 12:11 [Réactions \(43\)](#)

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Le chantier de l'EPR de Flamanville (Normandie) Crédits photo : © Stéphane Mahe / Reuters/REUTERS

**Le président de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire, André Pierre Lacoste, n'exclut pas un moratoire sur l'EPR de Flamanville mené par EDF. L'ASN s'interroge également sur le projet d'EPR à Penly.**

**Après la catastrophe de Fukushima**, la France souhaite prendre toutes les garanties en matière de nucléaire. Alors que la crise qui frappe actuellement le Japon suscite des inquiétudes autour des centrales françaises, le président de l'Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN), André-Claude Lacoste n'exclut pas un moratoire sur le chantier de Flamanville (Manche) mené par EDF qu'il juge «très compromis». Un véritable coup dur pour EDF. «C'est un questionnement, une réflexion. On n'est pas sûr. Ca fait partie du champ des hypothèses», indique ce jeudi à l'AFP Thomas Houdré, le directeur à la direction des centrales de l'ASN, et chef jusqu'en mars de la division de Caen qui couvre notamment la Normandie. L'ASN a même mis en place de **nouvelles règles de sécurité** sur ce chantier après un accident mortel en janvier et son arrêt partiel va être levé.

Quant à l'EPR de Penly (Seine-Maritime), qui n'est pas encore acté, Thomas Houdré a mis en doute sa réalisation. «La réaction de l'ASN n'a rien d'extraordinaire», réagit Areva. Il n'empêche que cette annonce jette un froid à la suite des **déclarations de la présidente d'Areva**, Anne Lauvergeon, qui avait déclaré que «s'il y avait des EPR à Fukushima, il n'y aurait pas de fuites possibles dans l'environnement, quelle que soit la situation».

Les investisseurs à la Bourse de Paris se montrent prudents : le titre EDF recule de 1% vers 11 heures, alors que le Cac 40 s'affiche proche de l'équilibre, à -0,14%. Leur réaction sur Areva n'est pas connue, puisque le titre a été suspendu de cotation avant l'ouverture du marché ce matin, à la demande de la société, qui doit publier un communiqué relatif à son projet de cotation ordinaire.

# The Washington Post

Editorial-Opinion

## **Do we really want to own Libya?**

Fareed Zakaria

31 mars 2011

[The Washington Post](#)

President Obama launched America's military intervention into Libya promising two distinctive features. First, this would be a genuinely international effort, with the United States as the lead player initially but then quickly moving into a supporting role (in "days and not weeks"). Second, the direct American operation would be carefully restricted, "time-limited and scope-limited" in the words of White House spokesman Jay Carney. But two weeks in, one can already see the pressures - mostly in Washington - pushing the president to abandon both courses. He is now taking broad ownership of Libya, and the U.S. military is engaging in a broader air campaign. This is mission creep, and it is a bad idea.

Notice the shift in rhetoric, from the president's circumspect words at the start of the operation to his much more expansive speech on Monday, emphasizing America's lead role, even when the facts didn't quite warrant it. Notice that air attacks on Moammar Gaddafi's forces now go well beyond protecting civilians and are clearly escalating in the hope of getting some kind of quick victory. If the administration is not careful, it will end up in a very different place than it initially intended.

The president made a powerful, well-reasoned case Monday night for America's intervention in Libya, marshaling the best humanitarian, strategic and political arguments as to why the United States could not have stood by and done nothing while Gaddafi's forces massacred Libyan rebels. Besides, America's closest allies were pleading for our help. But Obama did little to address the central strategic gap in his policy on Libya between its expansive goals - chiefly the ouster of Gaddafi - and its tightly defined military means. There are only two ways to close the gap - escalate the means or scale back your goals.

American statesmen have always experimented with the use of limited military means to support foreign policy interests that are important, and worth engaging American power, but not vital. From the Barbary wars (fought against the Barbary States, which included parts of modern Libya) to gunboat diplomacy in Asia to the many military interventions over the past few decades (Grenada, Lebanon, Somalia, the no-fly zone over Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo), the United States has often tried to find ways to use its military yet not engage in all-out war. Some were more successful than others, but in all cases, the central task was to find the balance between the goals we sought and the means we were willing to deploy. The time we didn't ask questions about the costs and simply escalated the means, we ended up in Vietnam.

The tendency for a president is to be pushed to achieve a decisive victory, no matter the costs, no matter whether the interests at stake are vital or secondary. Presidents want to be leaders of great causes, and the Libyan mission is certainly a good cause. But the more grandiose the rhetoric and the goals, the broader the military mission. And then the United States takes responsibility for the fate of Libya - a country riven with tribes, lacking strong institutions and a civil society, and destroyed by four decades of Gaddafi's madness. Do we really want to own this, and largely alone? Is it such a bad idea that others should be involved? One liberal commentator noted ruefully that crowds in Benghazi were chanting "Sarkozy!" and not "Obama!" Apparently it is not enough that Libya is rescued; we must be the rescuers because ultimately this is about us, not them.

Washington is now hoping that a bit more military power will dislodge Gaddafi's regime. My fingers are crossed. But it would be far more sensible, while hoping for the best, to plan for other likely outcomes. The military operation averted a massacre. Gaddafi can continue to be

pressured, quarantined and contained by many means, including helping the Libyan opposition. The Clinton administration recognized in the Balkans that it was unwilling to pay the price that regime change in Serbia would have required. As a result, Slobodan Milosevic survived the actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were still regarded as successes, and was later dislodged by his own people. Limited interventions might have limited successes, but they can also avoid catastrophic failures.

This is not macho enough for some. "If you go to take Vienna, take Vienna," thundered Post columnist Charles Krauthammer. The words are those of Napoleon, an egomaniacal dictator who invaded most of his neighbors and whose thirst for total victory led him to overreach, sacrifice hundreds of thousands of his soldiers, suffer ignominious defeat and end up in exile on an island. If I were Obama, I'd pass on that model.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com>

# The Washington Post

Editorial-Opinion

## Doing the right thing in Libya?

250 mots

31 mars 2011

[The Washington Post](#)

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Anglais

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Those who are hoping for an Obama doctrine to deal with brutal dictators killing civilians will not find their holy grail in Richard Cohen's reminder of the 1938 conference at Evian-les-Bains, France ["No more indifference," op-ed, March 29].

What we are seeing in **Libya** is business as usual for dictatorial regimes ranging from the mildly repressive to the fanatically murderous. The fact is, we do indeed stand idle while Iran, North Korea, Syria, China, Burma, Zimbabwe, Russia and others routinely murder opponents of the government. These regimes are engaged in self-perpetuation, not genocide. Occasionally it is useful to the regimes if their actions take on the character of genocide, but race hatred is not the motivating factor - power is all that matters. That is why it was simply wrong to invoke the memory of the Evian conference.

Painful as it is to watch what dictators do, we are under no moral obligation to sacrifice American lives and fortune to take up the gun against every murderous regime. The unspoken reality at the core of Mr. Cohen's earnest call to military action is that we act only against regimes that are incapable of hurting us when we strike. Now there is some American exceptionalism that we can sink our teeth into. We are overwhelmingly stronger than you.

OP-ED COLUMNIST

Editorial Desk; SECTA

**Looking For Luck In Libya**

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

30 mars 2011

[The New York Times](#)

There is an old saying in the Middle East that a camel is a horse that was designed by a committee. That thought came to my mind as I listened to President Obama trying to explain the intervention of America and its allies in **Libya** -- and I don't say that as criticism. I say it with empathy. This is really hard stuff, and it's just the beginning.

When an entire region that has been living outside the biggest global trends of free politics and free markets for half a century suddenly, from the bottom up, decides to join history -- and each one of these states has a different ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political orientation and a loose coalition of Western and Arab states with mixed motives trying to figure out how to help them -- well, folks, you're going to end up with some very strange-looking policy animals. And **Libya** is just the first of many hard choices we're going to face in the "new" Middle East.

How could it not be? In **Libya**, we have to figure out whether to help rebels we do not know topple a terrible dictator we do not like, while at the same time we turn a blind eye to a monarch whom we do like in Bahrain, who has violently suppressed people we also like -- Bahraini democrats -- because these people we like have in their ranks people we don't like: pro-Iranian Shiite hard-liners. All the while in Saudi Arabia, leaders we like are telling us we never should have let go of the leader who was so disliked by his own people -- Hosni Mubarak -- and, while we would like to tell the Saudi leaders to take a hike on this subject, we can't because they have so much oil and money that we like. And this is a lot like our dilemma in Syria where a regime we don't like -- and which probably killed the prime minister of Lebanon whom it disliked -- could be toppled by people who say what we like, but we're not sure they all really believe what we like because among them could be Sunni fundamentalists, who, if they seize power, could suppress all those minorities in Syria whom they don't like.

The last time the Sunni fundamentalists in Syria tried to take over in 1982, then-President Hafez al-Assad, one of those minorities, definitely did not like it, and he had 20,000 of those Sunnis killed in one city called Hama, which they certainly didn't like, so there is a lot of bad blood between all of them that could very likely come to the surface again, although some experts say this time it's not like that because this time, and they could be right, the Syrian people want freedom for all. But, for now, we are being cautious. We're not trying nearly as hard to get rid of the Syrian dictator as we are the Libyan one because the situation in Syria is just not as clear as we'd like and because Syria is a real game-changer. **Libya** implodes. Syria explodes.

Welcome to the Middle East of 2011! You want the truth about it? You can't handle the truth. The truth is that it's a dangerous, violent, hope-filled and potentially hugely positive or explosive mess -- fraught with moral and political ambiguities. We have to build democracy in the Middle East we've got, not the one we want -- and this is the one we've got.

That's why I am proud of my president, really worried about him, and just praying that he's lucky.

Unlike all of us in the armchairs, the president had to choose, and I found the way he spelled out his core argument on Monday sincere: "Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And, as president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action."

I am glad we have a president who sees America that way. That argument cannot just be shrugged off, especially when confronting a dictator like Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. But, at the same time, I believe that it is naive to think that we can be humanitarians only from the air -- and now we just hand the situation off to NATO, as if it were Asean and we were not the backbone of the NATO military alliance, and we're done.

I don't know **Libya**, but my gut tells me that any kind of decent outcome there will require boots on the ground -- either as military help for the rebels to oust Qaddafi as we want, or as post-Qaddafi peacekeepers and referees between tribes and factions to help with any transition to democracy. Those boots cannot be ours. We absolutely cannot afford it -- whether in terms of money, manpower, energy or attention. But I am deeply dubious that our allies can or will handle it without us, either. And if the fight there turns ugly, or stalemates, people will be calling for our humanitarian help again. You bomb it, you own it.

Which is why, most of all, I hope President Obama is lucky. I hope Qaddafi's regime collapses like a sand castle, that the Libyan opposition turns out to be decent and united and that they require just a bare minimum of international help to get on their feet. Then U.S. prestige will be enhanced and this humanitarian mission will have both saved lives and helped to lock another Arab state into the democratic camp.

Dear Lord, please make President Obama lucky.

# Débats sur l'envoi d'armes aux rebelles

Par [Alain Barluet](#)

30/03/2011 | Mise à jour : 22:27 Réactions (72)

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«Les résolutions ne le prévoient pas, mais nous sommes prêts à en discuter avec nos partenaires», a estimé Alain Juppé, mardi à Londres. Crédits photo : Geoff Caddick/AFP

## L'insurrection marquant le pas, Washington, Paris et Londres évoquent cette hypothèse controversée.

Faut-il fournir des armes à la rébellion qui mène le combat contre le régime de Tripoli? Soulevé mardi **lors de la conférence du «groupe de contact»** à Londres, ce débat s'est poursuivi mercredi et risque de durer si les opérations militaires se prolongent sur le terrain. Avec un risque prévisible, celui de fragiliser la coalition anti-Kadhafi, à la cohésion précaire. Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Alain Juppé n'ont pas exclu l'éventualité **d'envoyer de l'armement aux rebelles** qui, malgré les bombardements de la coalition, ont la plus grande peine à progresser **vers la ville stratégique de Syrte**. «Les résolutions ne le prévoient pas, mais nous sommes prêts à en discuter avec nos partenaires», a dit le chef de la diplomatie française mardi. Son homologue américaine fait une interprétation différente en estimant que les résolutions 1970 et 1973 du Conseil de sécurité sur la Libye n'empêcheraient pas de donner des armes aux rebelles, l'embargo qu'elles proclament ne s'appliquant qu'au régime de Kadhafi. En revanche, hostiles à cette perspective, l'Italie et l'Otan ont immédiatement réagi en affirmant qu'elle nécessiterait le vote d'une nouvelle résolution. Hors du cercle de la coalition, la Russie est montée au créneau mercredi pour dénoncer un éventuel projet dans lequel elle voit une «ingérence».

## Pas de troupes au sol

Les arguments ne manquent pas en faveur de la fourniture d'armes aux rebelles, sous réserve d'inventaire concernant la nature précise de ces matériels. À Londres, la coalition a réaffirmé qu'elle n'enverrait pas de troupes au sol, **ses frappes aériennes ont des résultats mitigés**, la tournure du conflit rend impératif un armement terrestre permettant à l'insurrection de créer enfin la percée dans le désert mais aussi de s'adapter au combat dans les villes. Dans les années 1980, déjà, la fourniture par la France de missiles antichars Milan à l'armée tchadienne avait stoppé les blindés de Kadhafi.

A contrario, les experts pointent les gros risques que prendrait la coalition en mettant des armes dans les mains de la rébellion. Risques politiques, on l'a vu, avec la mise à l'épreuve de la cohésion de la coalition. D'autant que, qui dit armes dit instructeurs et conseillers militaires. Même s'ils demeurent en nombre réduit, ces hommes peuvent se trouver impliqués dans les combats, mettant à mal la coalition aux yeux de l'opinion internationale. Au pire, c'est l'engrenage et, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, le spectre d'une situation à la vietnamienne.

Les risques sont aussi militaires. Parmi les ambassadeurs de l'UE, certains craignent que la rébellion commette, elle aussi, des exactions parmi les civils du «camp» adverse. Surtout, les armes de la coalition pourraient tomber in fine dans l'escarcelle terroriste. Une hypothèse qui n'a rien d'extravagant. Selon les renseignements américains, les rangs rebelles sont infiltrés par les activistes d'al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (AQMI). Ces derniers auraient d'ailleurs déjà fait main basse sur plusieurs armureries. Si la Libye devait devenir un bastion d'Aqmi, la pression terroriste pourrait monter en flèche dans la région, notamment sur l'Algérie. La durée du conflit et la capacité des rebelles à sortir de l'ornière seront déterminantes.

## Obama hält an Atomkraft fest

**Ungeachtet des Reaktorunglücks in Japan weist Barack Obama der Atomkraft in Amerika eine wichtige Rolle zu. In einer Grundsatzrede bekannte sich Obama zum Bau neuer Atomkraftwerke. Kernpunkt von Obamas Energiestrategie ist die Verringerung der Ölabhängigkeit Amerikas. Er will die Ölimporte um ein Drittel reduzieren.**

Von Patrick Welter, Washington  
30. März 2011

Präsident Barack Obama setzt den Vereinigten Staaten ein ambitioniertes Ziel zur Erhöhung der Energiesicherheit. Bis zum Jahr 2025 solle die Einfuhr von Erdöl um ein Drittel gesenkt werden, erklärte Obama in einer Rede in Washington.

Er will die heimische Öl- und Gasförderung ausweiten sowie sparsamere und klimafreundlichere Fahrzeuge und die Entwicklung alternativer Biokraftstoffe fördern.



© AFP  
Barack Obama bei seiner Rede in der Georgetown Universität in Washington DC

Das neue Energieziel ergänzt die Bemühungen der Regierung um klimafreundlichere Energie. Danach soll der Anteil klimafreundlich erzeugter Energie bis 2035 von derzeit 40 auf rund 80 Prozent steigen.

### Obama setzt auf mehr finanzielle Anreize

Der amerikanische Präsident setzt dazu auf mehr finanzielle Anreize für Gas- und Elektrofahrzeuge und Forschung. In den kommenden zwei Jahren sollen mindestens vier kommerzielle Biospritraffinerien in Betrieb gehen. Schärfere Verbrauchsstandards auch für schwere Lastwagen sollen den Energieverbrauch reduzieren.

Obama will an der Kernenergie festhalten und diese ausbauen. Nuklearenergie sei ein wichtiges Potential, um ohne Kohlendioxid ausstoß Strom zu erzeugen, sagte der Präsident. Die Regierung hat nach dem Unfall im japanischen Fukushima eine Sicherheitsüberprüfung der 104 Kernkraftwerke in Amerika angestoßen. Obama hat Bürgschaften von 36 Milliarden Dollar (25,5 Milliarden Euro) vorgeschlagen, um neue Kernkraftwerke zu bauen. 20 Anträge liegen vor.

### Unmut über steigenden Ölpreis

Mit der Rede reagierte er auf den Unmut über den steigenden Ölpreis, der die Amerikaner vor allem an der Zapfsäule trifft. Eine Gallone Benzin zu 3,8 Litern kostet im Landesdurchschnitt nun 3,6 Dollar (umgerechnet 0,67 Euro je Liter). Zuletzt war Benzin 2008 mit mehr als 4 Dollar je Gallone teurer. Gegenüber dem Vorjahr hat sich die Gallone um 0,80 Dollar verteuert.

Die oppositionellen Republikaner wollen die Klimaschutzregulierungen der Umweltbehörde EPA begrenzen, um so steigende Energiepreise einzudämmen. Der Präsident beklagte dagegen die geringe Ausnutzung schon erteilter Öl- und Gas-Förderlizenzen. Nach einer Studie des Innenministeriums werden im Volumen 70 Prozent der Lizenzen für Öl- und Gas-Förderung vor der Küste und 57 Prozent der Lizenzen im Inland nicht genutzt. Das umfasst geschätzte 11,6 Milliarden Barrel Öl (zu 159 Litern) und 59,2 Billionen Kubikmeter Gas im Golf von Mexiko. Obama will nun neue Anreize setzen, damit die Ölunternehmen die Lizenzen schneller nutzen. Der Präsident des Industrieverbands Business Roundtable, John Engler, klagte am Mittwoch, Lizenzen seien nicht genug, es müssten auch Bohrgenehmigungen erteilt werden.

Im vergangenen Jahr führten die Vereinigten Staaten 4,29 Milliarden Barrel Öl ein. Erstmals seit mehr als zehn Jahren habe der Import weniger als die Hälfte des Verbrauchs ausgemacht, sagte Obama. Er hatte vor fast einem Jahr angekündigt, die Ölförderung auch vor der Ostküste zuzulassen. Nach dem Untergang der Ölbohrplattform Deepwater Horizon im Golf von Mexiko erließ die Regierung aber ein Moratorium für Tiefwasserbohrungen, das im Oktober endete. Seither wurden erst sieben neue Tiefseebohrlizenzen erteilt.



## Entfremdung im Bündnis

**Die Operation in Libyen ist ein Einschnitt für die Nato. Zum ersten Mal ist die westliche Allianz in einen Krieg gezogen, ohne dass eine unmittelbare Gefährdung für das Bündnisgebiet oder einen Mitgliedstaat vorlag. Dass Deutschland aus der Reihe tanzt, kommt nicht wirklich überraschend. Eine Analyse von *Nikolas Busse*.**

30. März 2011

Militärische Interventionen sind schon oft mit dem Schutz der Bevölkerung begründet worden. Deshalb ist der Luftkrieg gegen Gaddafi nicht der Anbruch eines neuen Zeitalters, wie der französische Präsident jetzt sagt. Gerade die teilnehmenden europäischen Länder sind nicht aus Selbstlosigkeit in diesen Konflikt gezogen, sondern weil sie den demokratischen Umbruch in der arabischen Welt am Leben erhalten wollen. Das ist handfeste Ordnungspolitik, auch wenn davon nichts in der UN-Resolution 1973 steht.

Ein wirklicher Einschnitt ist die Operation allerdings für die Nato. Zum ersten Mal ist die westliche Allianz in einen Krieg gezogen, ohne dass eine unmittelbare Gefährdung für das Bündnisgebiet oder einen Mitgliedstaat vorlag. In Bosnien, im Kosovo und in Afghanistan, den drei Schauplätzen, auf denen das Bündnis bisher Kriege geführt hat, ging es stets um die Wahrung direkter Sicherheitsinteressen des Westens: Auf dem Balkan sollten Konfliktherde in der Kernregion der Allianz ausgetreten werden; am Hindukusch ging es gegen eine Terrorgruppe, deren Umtriebe bis nach Amerika reichten. Nichts Vergleichbares findet sich in Libyen. Nato-Generalsekretär Rasmussen hat selbst festgehalten, dass von dem Bürgerkrieg in dem nordafrikanischen Land keine direkte Bedrohung für die Allianz ausgegangen sei.



© dapd

Außer Deutschland bleiben vor allem osteuropäische Staaten der Operation „Unified Protector“ fern

Gemessen an dieser Tragweite, haben sich die Verbündeten erstaunlich schnell darauf verständigt, die Operation in Libyen an sich zu ziehen. Der Streit, der darüber eine Woche lang im Nato-Rat ausgetragen wurde, dürfte ohnehin mehr mit dem Prestigebedürfnis einiger Regierungen zu tun gehabt haben als mit der Sache selbst. Offenbar gibt es in der Nato nun einen Konsens, dass das Bündnis unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen als (potentiell weltweiter) Krisenmanager zur Verfügung steht. Aus ihrem neuen strategischen Konzept, das gerade einmal vier Monate alt ist, geht das nicht so eindeutig hervor.

### **Deutschlands Selbstbild vom treuen Verbündeten stimmt schon lange nicht mehr**

Bemerkenswert ist, dass die Bündnisvormacht sich mit diesem Schritt wesentlich schwerer getan hat als manche Europäer. Der Weltmacht ist die politische Bürde bewusst, die mit einer abermaligen Intervention in einem muslimischen Land einhergeht. Dass die Vereinigten Staaten die Führung des Einsatzes so schnell an die Nato abgeben wollten, zeigt, wie geschwächt die Führungsmacht des Westens nach zwei großen, wenig erfolgreichen Kriegen immer noch ist. Der Allianz selbst geht es nicht besser: Aus Rücksicht auf die Empfindlichkeit der arabischen Straße darf sie den Diktator nicht stürzen, obwohl das eigentlich alle Verbündeten wollen.

Dass Deutschland aus der Reihe tanzt, kommt nicht wirklich überraschend. In Brüssel ist seit Jahren zu beobachten, wie sehr sich unsere politische Klasse der Nato entfremdet hat. Das Selbstbild vom treuen Verbündeten, das offenbar noch etliche Unionspolitiker vor Augen haben, hat mit der Wirklichkeit nicht viel zu tun. Alle Bundesregierungen der jüngeren Zeit sind in der Nato als Neinsager, Abwiegler, Aussitzer und Bedenkenträger aufgefallen. Im libyschen Fall war der Zeitdruck so groß, dass Deutschland - anders als sonst - keinen gesichtswahrenden Ausweg mehr fand, sondern nur noch passen konnte. Die Bundesregierung hatte sachliche Einwände gegen die Intervention, die bedenkenswert waren. Aber am Ende reduzierte sich doch alles auf den ebenso verzweifelten wie ehrlichen Satz des Außenministers, dass Deutschland nicht in einen Krieg hineingezogen werden wolle.

### **In den Gründerstaaten werden andere historische Erfahrungen abgerufen**

An der Gesellschaft, in die sich die Bundesregierung mit dieser Absage begeben hat, ist abzulesen, wie sehr die mentale Bündnisfähigkeit des Landes gelitten hat. Außer Deutschland bleiben vor allem osteuropäische Staaten der Operation „Unified Protector“ fern. Diese Völker tun sich

mit der großen Weltpolitik genauso schwer wie die Deutschen. Auch sie würden die Nato am liebsten auf die Landesverteidigung nach Artikel 5 beschränken, sich auf den heimischen Kontinent zurückziehen.

In Deutschland hat man darauf vertraut, dass nach der Erfahrung in Afghanistan alle Verbündeten genug haben von internationaler Verantwortung, wenn die auf langwierige Expeditionskriege hinauslaufen kann. Das war ein Irrtum. In den Gründerstaaten der Allianz, die den Einsatz jetzt tragen, werden bei Bildern wie denen aus Libyen andere historische Erfahrungen abgerufen als bei uns. Dort hieß es nach 1945 nicht: nie wieder Krieg, sondern: nie wieder Beschwichtigung! Auch wenn sich das oft mit profanen innenpolitischen Zwecken mischt, so wirkt diese Lehre bis heute im öffentlichen Diskurs vieler westlicher Nato-Länder nach.

Dieses Auseinanderfallen der Weltanschauungen wird ein gehöriger Bremsklotz für jeden sein, der die Nato weiter vom Verteidigungs- zum Interventionsbündnis umbauen will. Weitere Testfälle könnten schnell eintreten, wenn die Lage in anderen arabischen Ländern eskaliert. In der Vergangenheit hat die Nato die Frage, ob sie zum Weltpolizisten taugt, stets mit Nein beantwortet. Es gibt keinen Hinweis darauf, dass das der Sicherheit ihrer Bürger abträglich war.

## Chaos and Uncertainty in Libya's Revolutionary Leadership

*By Juliane von Mittelstaedt and Volkhard Windfuhr*

**The international community is using air strikes and missiles to defend freedom, human rights and democratic ideals in Libya. But are those also the values the rebels themselves are fighting for?**

The chief of staff of the Libyan revolution receives guests in a villa not far from Benghazi's airport. When the uprising began, Abdul Fattah Younis was celebrated in the streets for having his soldiers raid the city's military base, thereby stripping Moammar Gadhafi of control over the eastern part of the country.

Now, Younis has found shelter in a living room outfitted with brocade curtains and plush carpeting. When the general wants to know what's happening outside, he watches the BBC's Arab-language TV channel and calls his associates on a satellite telephone. It is his connection to the outside world -- a connection he uses to support American and French air strikes, which he keeps track of on a map along with the new front lines.

Tomorrow, Younis will sleep in yet another house together with his wife and daughter, who sit next to him in silence. These days, Benghazi is home to hit squads of both rebels and Gadhafi loyalists. Shots pierce the nighttime silence. By sunrise, the morgues and emergency rooms are full.

Formerly Libya's interior minister, Younis has been leading the fight against Gadhafi since February 22. To that point, the brawny 66 year old with silver hair had spent almost his entire life serving the dictator. And for that reason, his defection marked a major turning point in this revolution. Now wearing green fatigues, he refers to himself as the chief of staff. This is not his first revolution, and he therefore knows that events now depend on military leaders rather than on politicians.

### Posing for Photographs

Younis' special forces have vanished, having either deserted or rushed to the front. Now, he's assembling an army to liberate Libya. His associates, he says, have trained 15,000 men in recent weeks. In the Benghazi stadium, they learn how to shoot, to fire rockets and to drive tanks. They are taught to avoid the mistakes of the early days of the revolution, when the young fighters -- known as the Shabab -- accidentally killed each other up, ruined captured tanks and shot down their own airplanes. Younis, though, has been talking about these troops for weeks, and there is still little difference from the chaos seen at the beginning. Even with the backing of the air strikes, advances have been halting and temporary. They seem to prefer posing for photographs on wrecked tanks.

Since the air strikes began, the revolution has become a war with foreign support legitimized by a United Nations resolution and, as of this week, led by NATO. Western planes -- whether American, French, Spanish or Canadian -- have flown hundreds of sorties, bombing Gadhafi's supply convoys, military bases, tank columns and primary residence in Tripoli.

It was a moral decision, meant to help people rising up against one of the most brutal dictators in the Arab world. But there is no turning back. If the West intends to liberate the country from its dictator, it really has only three options: annihilate Gadhafi's forces in a massive bombing campaign; send in ground forces; or equip the rebels with heavy weapons. The rebels have ruled out peace negotiations with Gadhafi.

For the international community, the intervention in the Libyan conflict is about defending the fundamental values of freedom, human rights and self-determination. But the question is: Are all those who have a say in Benghazi just as interested in freedom, human rights and self-determination?

### **An Opportunist?**

The first time that General Younis participated in a revolution was in 1969, in an uprising against the king. He was a 24-year-old army officer at the time, and he successfully took control of Benghazi's radio station. The revolution ushered Colonel Gadhafi into power, a man who calls himself "king of the traditional kings of Africa."

Younis rose to the rank of general. For 41 years, he headed Libya's special forces, from the end of one revolution to the beginning of the next. He was a rare constant in a country ruled by a paranoid leader, one who saw enemies everywhere. For the last three and a half years, Younis was also the interior minister, and many saw him as the country's second most powerful man behind Gadhafi. He says, however, that he was never a politician and that for four and a half months, he refused to assume the post. He only gave in, he says, on the condition that he would never fire upon his own people.

Still, there are many who do not trust Younis, particularly younger Libyans, who view him as an opportunist who waited six days before switching sides. But maybe Younis did indeed have too much of Gadhafi. Maybe he really does want to become a hero in this war of liberation?

Younis recounts how he sent a letter to Gadhafi in January warning him about unrest in the country and about the anger triggered by sharp rises in food prices. He says Gadhafi sent the letter back to him with the text crossed out in red pen. A warning letter -- that was Younis' form of protest.

Now Younis is a revolutionary for the second time -- but, this time, he says he's fighting for democracy. When asked the kind of democracy he envisions, Younis says: "I dream of a genuine democracy in which we Libyans can lead a five-star life. Libya earns \$150 million (€106 million) with its oil -- in a single day. And just look around at the condition Benghazi is in!"

### **Fighting Could Drag On for Months**

Younis believes that establishing a democracy in Libya won't be all that difficult. "We have no political parties, no diverse ethnicities or different religious beliefs," he says, "so it will be entirely unproblematic." Once his dream has been achieved, he adds, he intends to withdraw from public life and spend his time reading books.

It could be some time before Younis can make a dent in his reading list, however. The stakes are infinitely high for Gadhafi. He's not going to give up any time soon and fighting could drag on for months.

For the time being, it seems unlikely that Gadhafi's troops will be able to capture Benghazi, the rebel stronghold. But it's just as unlikely that the rebels will take Tripoli. Indeed, if the capital's inhabitants do not rise up, this will be a long war.

Still, Younis is optimistic. "In two or three weeks," he says, "the balance of power will tip in our favor." He speaks of reinforcement lines, positions and snipers -- all while trying to emit that calming aura of military professionalism. He fears nothing more than a sudden halt to the air attacks because he believes it would cause the resistance to crumble.

But, as long as they continue, he claims that Gadhafi's hometown of Sirte will be captured in at most 10 days, and that Tripoli will follow soon thereafter. Younis only believes the fighting will end once Gadhafi has either died or fled, perhaps to northern Chad. He puts the chances of the latter occurring at about 75 percent.

What happens after that is anyone's guess. Libya is a political no man's land. There are no parties or unions, and the highest form of political organization are soccer clubs. The only thing this country can draw on is the ruling elite in the leadership circle surrounding Gadhafi and his children.

### **A Growing Climate of Fear in Benghazi**

Indeed, after six weeks of revolution, the tone is no longer being set by the youths, lawyers and professors that were there at the beginning, but also an increasing number of defectors from the old regime. Most of these men, in their ironed shirts and ties, were ministers, ambassadors, military officers or businessmen, and many of them had ties to Saif al-Islam, one of Gadhafi's sons. They all had good lives under the Gadhafi regime, and now that want to salvage what's left. Since the air strikes began, it's been clear that the end is coming for Gadhafi. So they are pushing their way to the forefront.

The National Libyan Transitional Council established in the revolution's early days is supposed to be replaced by a government. For now, there are people who refer to themselves as ministers without being able to explain who actually appointed them. The rebels have press spokesmen, who in turn have their own deputies. In the media center in Benghazi, one man runs around wearing his father's military decoration on his chest; another hands out business cards with gold filigree. The revolution has spawned a seemingly endless network of both real and imagined functionaries, and few know what they do or whether they wield any actual influence.

"The new ministers should take on tasks according to their abilities, but I'm not currently in a position to say exactly what that should look like," says Ahmed Khalifa, a rebel spokesman with light hair and a gold-buttoned blazer. Each day at the media center in Benghazi, Khalifa reads out the numbers of dead, wounded and captured, along with the names of the places that have been taken.

These ministers, Khalifa says, are to be experts -- professors, lawyers and business people -- from across the country, but will also include Libyans from abroad, who are now returning home. The names, though, remain secret: "It would be suicide to publicize them now," Khalifa explains. He has no answer, though, when asked what exactly a secret government should do. As to the qualitative difference between a self-appointed national council and a self-appointed government, he says, "the National Council had more general qualifications, while the government is more specialized."

### **Straight from the Soviet Revolutionaries**

Not long later, however, it is said that there won't be a government after all. Instead, the National Council will be transformed into a "crisis management council."

Meanwhile, a quasi-president and quasi-prime minister are in place, both jockeying for position. The new prime minister is Mahmoud Jibril, whose job it is to lead the new government that may or may not exist. Jibril has spent much time traveling abroad, having met Bernard-Henri Lévy and Nicolas Sarkozy in France and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa and Egyptian military leaders in Cairo. The other man, the one people call "our new president" is Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, chairman of the National Council.

The one thing that unites these two men is that both were long-time supporters of the regime -- Jibril as an economic functionary and Abdel-Jalil as justice minister.

Abdel-Jalil wears a red wool cap and the lapels of his woolen coat bears pins in the colors of the revolution. The soldiers guarding his door wear cobbled-together uniforms and cartridge belts. A prayer rug is folded on the table and the prayer bump on Abdel-Jalil's forehead identifies him as a devout Muslim. He is unshaven, his eyes narrowed in exhaustion, and is currently giving interviews at 10-minute intervals. The sentences he speaks could have been lifted directly from a Soviet revolutionary handbook. "The National Council is legitimized by the local committees made up of revolutionaries in the liberated cities and villages," he declares.

To hear Abdel-Jalil talk, it sounds like the rebels gaining full control of the country is only a matter of technical details. He met with a UN special envoy and, Abdel-Jalil says, nearly every country in the world has established contact with him. He believes his forces will take Tripoli within a matter of weeks, and says leaders are in the process of getting an idea where immediate action must be taken -- in terms of health care, infrastructure and the reconstruction of destroyed buildings. So far they've achieved little, and city administration, schools, universities and oil production have all ground to a halt.

Asked when elections will be held, the president replies, "We're not concerned with these details."

### **Great Contacts with the WHO**

Next to Abdel-Jalil sits a man in a chocolate-colored suit named Ali al-Essawi, 44, a former economic minister and most recently ambassador to India. He now calls himself foreign minister, although it's not entirely clear why -- perhaps because he's the only one here who speaks English. He says he's in excellent contact with the World Health Organization.

Most of those now calling the shots here are sons of the former regime and it's worth asking what kind of state they want to create. Is it possible for democracy to prevail after 41 years where politics were forbidden? Or will the revolution fail in the end, even if it succeeds in toppling Gadhafi? And perhaps the greatest danger of all: Could this country, cobbled together by force under Gadhafi, end up disintegrating back into its component parts, into tribes, criminal gangs, warlords and Jihad groups, well-armed with Western weapons?

Ahmed Khalifa, the revolution's spokesman, says all 30 of Libya's tribes have pledged their support to the National Council, with the exception of Gadhafi's tribe. "The Libyan people are united," he says. "We have as many supporters in Tripoli as we do here. There won't be a split between east and west, definitely not!" When it comes to the country's unity, Khalifa seems to speak in exclamation points. And it's impossible to find anyone who sees things differently.

Across the liberated east, rebel radio broadcasts spread both imagined victories and horror stories. First they said Khamis al-Gadhafi had been killed by a kamikaze pilot and that Ras Lanuf and Misrata were "80 percent" recaptured. Another broadcast reported 2,000 foreign workers from Egypt tied up and thrown into the harbor, while a conflicting report said the same people were used as human shields. A video currently in circulation claims to show members of the Khamis Brigade forcing African mercenary soldiers to eat meat from a dead dog. None of it can be verified.

### **On the Verge of Collapse**

Six weeks after the revolution began, Benghazi, capital of free Libya, is descending into mistrust and fear. More stores have closed and most people no longer dare to give out their phone numbers. No one wants to say anything anymore beyond the revolution's set phrases -- nothing against the rebels and nothing against the government in Tripoli. One

of many rumors says Gadhafi has spies within the National Council -- why else would it be the youth who are now being cut down?

A cartoonist and an actor who parodied Gadhafi at a demonstration are now dead. Mohammed Nabbous, who ran the rebels' television station, was shot by a sniper on March 19 in the middle of Benghazi, as he filmed the crash site where one of Gadhafi's fighter jets was shot down. Fathi Turbel, the lawyer whose arrest touched off the revolution as young people demonstrated for his release, has disappeared.

No one dares to go out at night, as rounds of machine gun fire thunder through the empty streets. National Council members are no longer seen in public and they're hard to reach for interviews. "There are death squads on both sides," says Nasser Buisier, who fled to the US when he was 17, but has returned for the revolution. Buisier's father is a former information minister, but was also a critic of Gadhafi, and his son doesn't have much that's positive to say about the new leadership. "Most of them never had to make sacrifices, they were part of the regime and I don't believe they want elections," Buisier says. He believes the National Council is on the verge of collapse and once that happens, he'd rather not be in Benghazi.

Buisier is heading back to the US, but is reluctant to say precisely when. He's afraid he's been blacklisted. He recently attended four funerals in a single day, for both rebels and regime supporters. Benghazi's central hospital admits five, sometimes 10, patients each day with gunshot wounds. Two pick-up trucks outfitted with machine guns guard the hospital entrance and photos of missing people adorn the walls.

### **'We Know Where They Are'**

It is said that 8,000 people in Benghazi were government spies -- the rebels found their names in files kept by the secret police. Armed young men roam the streets at night, arresting regime supporters, but private acts of revenge take place as well.

Salah Sharif, a former prison guard, was found dead with half his head blown off. Officially, it was labeled suicide. "Of course he was killed," says a man who spent seven years in prison and suffered at Sharif's hands. "He specialized in torturing and interrogating people. Especially Islamists."

Around 100 regime loyalists have recently been imprisoned. Armed young men are searching houses and also arresting sub-Saharan Africans, anyone they assume to be mercenaries and all those they simply refer to as spies, locking them up in the same prisons once used to hold opposition members. They are then shown off to busloads of journalists. The prisoners sit in dark cells that stink of feces and urine. They say they're from Mali, Chad, Sudan, that they're construction workers and were dragged out of their houses.

The rebels' mood, exuberant and lighthearted in the beginning, has shifted. Their rhetoric is becoming increasingly tense and they dismiss any criticism as propaganda. One former air force commander -- now "spokesman for the revolutionary armed forces" -- says, "anyone who fights against our revolutionary army is fighting against the people and will be treated accordingly."

Another man, also a member of the National Council, talks about "enemies of the revolution" and declares that anyone who doesn't join the rebel side will get a taste of revolutionary justice: "We know where they are and we will find them."

These are the same threats, word for word, that Gadhafi uses to scare his opponents.

