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March 20, 2016 4:15 pm

## EDF's nuclear troubles rooted in caution

Tom Burgis and Kiran Stacey in London and Michael Stothard in Paris

Building what is meant to be an ultra-safe reactor has proved extremely difficult in France and Finland

If there is a single person responsible for the troubled efforts to build the UK's first new nuclear power station in a generation at Hinkley Point, it might be Jane Fonda.

Long before [the resignation](#) of EDF's finance chief this month intensified doubts about the French utility's ability to deliver the much-delayed £18bn project in south-west England, the American actress starred in a Hollywood film as a reporter who uncovers foul play at a California atomic plant. Disaster ensues.

The idea behind *The China Syndrome*'s title — nuclear material melting all the way through to China — was science fiction. But the risks of subterranean contamination were real. Less than a fortnight after its release in 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania suffered a partial meltdown. No one died but a generation grew fearful of nuclear power. Then, seven years later, Ukraine's nuclear plant at Chernobyl exploded and fallout spread as far as Wales. The disaster became synonymous with popular nightmares about nuclear energy.

So when French and German scientists began in the mid-1990s to design a new reactor, they were also seeking to engineer public opinion. The fruit of their work, the European Pressurised Reactor, was designed to be safer than any that had gone before. “The basis of the EPR is to make sure Chernobyl could not happen in Europe,” says a French nuclear veteran, who declines to be named.

Bertrand Barré, a leading figure in the French nuclear industry, was involved in the EPR work. He says European regulators and utilities wanted a reactor so safe that “even if you had a full meltdown you would not have to evacuate people for a long period”. The two sides combined features of their previous models, the French N4 and the German Konvoi, and improved the safety features.

It is those very safety features, say critics, that are responsible for making the EPR, in the words of Greenwich University energy expert Steve Thomas, “a bastard to build”. Projects to construct EPRs in France and Finland have been fraught with difficulty, although another in China appears to be progressing better. Hinkley Point would be the fourth — and perhaps the make-or-break — EPR project.


From the start, [Areva](#), the French descendant of the Franco-German venture that came up with the EPR, struggled to get its design off the drawing board. It was finished by the late 1990s but, under President Jacques Chirac, France's commitment to new nuclear stations was unclear. Areva was forced to take the gamble of attempting the first EPR abroad — in Finland. “That,” says the French nuclear veteran, “was the beginning of the nightmare”.

Work started in 2005. Since then, delay has followed delay. One setback came with the discovery of flaws in the steel that lines the reinforced-concrete shell surrounding the reactor. This shell was among the safety elements pushed by the Germans, according to people familiar with the genesis of the EPR. Back during the

design phase, memories were fresh of Red Army Faction terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities and the alarmingly frequent crashes of the West German air force's Starfighter.

### The European Pressurised Reactor (EPR)

The European Pressurised Reactor, such as the one planned for the UK's Hinkley Point, was designed to be safer than any other nuclear facility ever built. But the desire to be ultra safe has contributed to cost overruns and delays to construction. We identify three key safety features:



### The EPR's layered safety systems

#### 1 Reactor building

Comprising three layers, two of which are 1.3m thick reinforced concrete. Together with an inner metallic layer, they shield the reactor, the control room and the area where used fuel is stored. Designed before the September 11 attacks but subsequently emphasised, this shell can withstand the crash of a commercial airliner

#### 2 'Redundant' safeguard systems

Duplicate safeguard systems are installed in four separate buildings. Each is designed to be able to keep the entire plant safe, even if the other three all fail. This is meant to ensure that the fuel can always be kept cool, preventing explosions and fire of the sort that struck Chernobyl (right)



#### 3 Core catcher

If a meltdown caused a leak from the reactor, a multi-layered base below the reactor would collect the molten material and disperse it, helping the cooling process. Once it has cooled enough water can be added to cool it further. A core leak was narrowly averted at Three Mile Island reactor (right) when it suffered a partial meltdown.



FT graphic Source: EDF/Areva Photos: Getty



Some on the French side thought the German caution excessive. "But after 9/11, we realised that the Germans were not so crazy," says Mr Barré. Indeed, following the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks in the US, Areva's marketing department made the EPR's resistance to aircraft impact a prime selling point.

Today, the Finnish plant on Olkiluoto Island is nine years behind schedule and €5.2bn over budget. The project is led by Finnish utility TVO, which has fallen out so badly over costs with main contractor Areva that the two companies have gone to court.

The protracted difficulties in Finland helped bring Areva to its knees, prompting January's plan to [sell](#) its reactor business to EDF. This has added more stress to EDF, whose finance director Thomas Piquemal [resigned](#) this month, saying Hinkley Point could sink the company.

Stuk, the Finnish nuclear regulator, next month commences a new round of inspections to check that what has been built matches what was approved. The plant is due to be producing electricity by 2018. Tapani Virolainen,

a deputy director at Stuk, says: “It’s sure that it took more time to build a plant like EPR because there are more huge structures against aircraft crash and so many safety systems.”

OLKILUOTO ISLAND		FLAMANVILLE
		
Finland	Location	France
9 years	Schedule overrun	6 years
€5.2bn	Budget overrun	€7.2bn

The sheer bulk required by the EPR’s design also caused problems once a project to build one in France finally got under way after the avidly pro-nuclear [Nicolas Sarkozy](#) replaced Mr Chirac as president in 2007.

The project at Flamanville on the Channel coast is, unlike its Finnish cousin, led by EDF. But it has fared little better. It is six years behind schedule and €7.2bn over budget. Problems reinforcing the plant’s concrete with unprecedented quantities of steel caused delays. In April the French regulator warned of “very serious anomalies” in the steel of the reactor vessel. A round of tests is due to be finished this year. If the regulator is not satisfied, it could require EDF to redo major construction work and jeopardise the 2018 deadline for the plant to be completed.

Other “third generation” reactor designs have also suffered setbacks. Costs have risen and deadlines slipped in efforts to build the AP1000, designed by Westinghouse, part of Toshiba group. And proponents of the EPR argue that many of the problems are not primarily down to its safety features. Rather, they blame the difficulty of finding suppliers in an industry that was effectively suspended in Europe for some 15 years following the end of the last wave of nuclear plant construction. In China, by contrast, a massive nuclear building programme has created abundant skilled labour. As a result, EDF’s work on two EPRs at Taishan has overtaken the Finnish and French projects.

Chris Bakken, Hinkley Point’s outgoing project manager, says EDF has “full confidence that we won’t repeat the mistakes” of the Finnish and French EPRs.

Yet the future of the EPR is uncertain, partly because the Fukushima disaster in 2011 diminished appetite for nuclear power.

EDF will only say that it plans to take the final investment decision for Hinkley Point “soon” and would aim to complete it by 2025. The company has plans for another two EPRs in the UK and more in China, but elsewhere international sales have been disappointing. In 2009 EDF lost a reactor contract in Abu Dhabi to market newcomer South Korea.

“In 18 months’ time, when the two Taishan plants are probably up and running, I will be more optimistic,” says Mr Barré. “But for now it is wait and see.”

[More video](#)

*Additional reporting by Lucy Hornby in Beijing*

Can the private sector deliver nuclear power stations?

EDF's struggles to build nuclear power stations in France and the UK are a sign that private companies are incapable of doing such work, according to industry figures.

The French utility has delayed giving final approval to the £18bn Hinkley Point project in south-west England while it seeks [additional funding](#) from the French government, which owns 85 per cent of EDF. It has a 66.5 per cent interest in the project, with the remainder held by CGN, the Chinese state-owned nuclear group.

Experts said that EDF's difficulties in financing Hinkley Point show ministers were mistaken in handing over responsibility for building Britain's next generation of nuclear power stations to the private sector.

Tony Roulstone, a [Rolls-Royce](#) veteran now lecturing in nuclear energy at Cambridge university, said: "The government is testing its concept of getting private money to pay for nuclear plants to destruction.

"You've got to fund [nuclear projects] publicly or make smaller [reactors]."

Since Tony Blair, the former UK prime minister, [announced](#) his government's plans for a new generation of nuclear power stations in 2006, ministers have remained committed to making this a reality using the private sector.

But even some nuclear industry executives said that building a reactor exclusively through the private sector was proving almost impossible. "The government is happy for our energy infrastructure to be state-owned — as long as it is French or Chinese rather than British," said one executive.

Mr Roulstone argued that [Toshiba](#) and Hitachi, which are leading plans to build nuclear power plants in the UK, will struggle to fund their projects.

Toshiba's Westinghouse unit is providing technology for a project in Cumbria, while Hitachi is responsible for reactors in Anglesey and Gloucestershire.

But developers behind these projects denied they would have problems with financing.

Horizon, the Hitachi-owned company working in Anglesey, said: "Our goal is to structure the project to make it attractive to as wide a range of investors as possible."

NuGen, which is responsible for the Cumbria project, said: "Our shareholders, Toshiba and Engie, are committed to financing the development of NuGen's [Cumbria] project to final investment decision, towards the end of 2018."

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## [Dani Rodrik](#)

Dani Rodrik is Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of [The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy](#) and, most recently, [Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science](#).

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# The Politics of Anger

**Dani Rodrik** takes mainstream politicians to task for refusing to address the causes of rising populism worldwide.

CAMBRIDGE – Perhaps the only surprising thing about the populist backlash that has overwhelmed the politics of many advanced democracies is that it has taken so long. Even two decades ago, it was easy to [predict](#) that mainstream politicians' unwillingness to offer remedies for the insecurities and inequalities of our hyper-globalized age would create political space for demagogues with easy solutions. Back then, it was Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan; today it is Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and sundry others.

History never quite repeats itself, but its lessons are important nonetheless. We should recall that the first era of globalization, which reached its peak in the decades before World War I, eventually produced an even more severe political backlash.

The historical evidence has been well summarized by my Harvard colleague Jeffrey Frieden. In the heyday of the gold standard, Frieden [argues](#), mainstream political actors had to downplay social reform and national identity because they gave priority to international economic ties. The response took one of two fatal forms in the interwar period: Socialists and communists chose social reform, while fascists chose national assertion. Both paths led away from globalization to economic closure (and far worse).

Today's backlash most likely will not go quite so far. As costly as they have been, the dislocations of the great recession and the euro crisis pale in significance compared to those of the Great Depression. Advanced democracies have built – and retain (despite recent setbacks) – extensive social safety nets in the form of unemployment insurance, retirement pensions, and family benefits. The world economy now has functional international institutions – such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that it lacked prior to the Second World War. Last but not least, extremist political movements such as fascism and communism have been largely discredited.

Still, the conflicts between a hyper-globalized economy and social cohesion are real, and mainstream political elites ignore them at their peril. As I argued in my 1997 book [Has Globalization Gone Too Far?](#), the internationalization of markets for goods, services, and capital drives a wedge between the cosmopolitan, professional, skilled groups that are able to take advantage of it and the rest of society.

Two types of political cleavage are exacerbated in the process: an identity cleavage, revolving around nationhood, ethnicity, or religion, and an income cleavage, revolving around social class. Populists derive their appeal from one or the other of these cleavages. Right-wing populists such as Trump engage in identity politics. Left-wing populists such as Bernie Sanders emphasize the gulf between the rich and the poor.

In both cases, there is a clear “other” toward which anger can be directed. You can barely make ends meet? It is the Chinese who have been stealing your jobs. Upset by crime? It is the Mexicans and other immigrants who bring their gang warfare into the country. Terrorism? Why, Muslims, of course. Political corruption? What do

you expect when the big banks are bankrolling our political system? Unlike mainstream political elites, populists can easily point to the culprits responsible for the masses' ills.

Of course, establishment politicians are compromised because they have been at the helm all this time. But they are also immobilized by their central narrative, which smacks of inaction and helplessness.

This narrative puts the blame for stagnant wages and rising inequality on technological forces beyond our control. It treats globalization and the rules that sustain it as inexorable and inevitable. The remedy it offers, investment in education and skills, promises few immediate rewards and would bear fruit years from now, at best.

In reality, today's world economy is the product of explicit decisions that governments have made in the past. It was a choice not to stop at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to build the much more ambitious – and intrusive – WTO. Similarly, it will be a choice whether to ratify future mega-trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

It was the choice of governments to loosen regulations on finance and aim for full cross-border capital mobility, just as it was a choice to maintain these policies largely intact, despite a massive global financial crisis. And, as Anthony Atkinson reminds us in his masterful [book](#) on inequality, even technological change is not immune from government agency: There is much that policymakers can do to influence the direction of technological change and ensure that it leads to higher employment and greater equity.

The appeal of populists is that they give voice to the anger of the excluded. They offer a grand narrative as well as concrete, if misleading and often dangerous, solutions. Mainstream politicians will not regain lost ground until they, too, offer serious solutions that provide room for hope. They should no longer hide behind technology or unstoppable globalization, and they must be willing to be bold and entertain large-scale reforms in the way the domestic and global economy are run.

If one lesson of history is the danger of globalization running amok, another is the [malleability of capitalism](#). It was the New Deal, the welfare state, and controlled globalization (under the Bretton Woods regime) that eventually gave market-oriented societies a new lease on life and produced the post-war boom. It was not tinkering and minor modification of existing policies that produced these achievements, but radical institutional engineering.

Moderate politicians, take note.

Read more at <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-politics-of-anger-by-dani-rodrik-2016-03#ArvTVIeMkoitbPIH.99>

### [Bernard-Henri Lévy](#)

Bernard-Henri Lévy is one of the founders of the “Nouveaux Philosophes” (New Philosophers) movement. His books include [Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism](#).

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## The World According to Trump

PARIS – The word “trump,” according to the dictionary, is an alteration of the word triumph. And because Donald Trump, the US presidential candidate, appears likely to become the nominee of the Grand Old Party of Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan, we owe it to ourselves to ask in what sense and for whom he represents a triumph.

One thinks of a segment of the American population angered by the eight years of Barack Obama’s presidency, a group that is now feeling vengeful. And one also thinks of the white supremacist, segregationist, nativist strain represented by former Ku Klux Klan leader, David Duke, whose noisy support Trump was [so hesitant to reject](#) last week and for whose constituency Trump may be a make-or-break candidate.

One easily gets the sense, when trying to take seriously what little is known about the Trump platform, of a country turning in on itself, walling itself off, and ultimately impoverishing itself by chasing away the Chinese, Muslims, Mexicans, and others who have contributed to the vast melting pot that the most globalized country on the planet has alchemized, in Silicon Valley and elsewhere, into prodigious wealth.

But, as is so often the case with the United States, there is in the Trump phenomenon an element that extends beyond the American national scene. So one is tempted to ask whether Trumpism might not also be the harbinger – or perhaps even the apotheosis – of a truly new episode in world politics.

I watch the head of this Las Vegas croupier, this kitschy carnival performer, coiffed and botoxed, drifting from one television camera to another with his fleshy mouth perpetually half-open: you never know whether those exposed teeth are signs of having drunk or eaten too much, or whether they might indicate that he means to eat you next.

I listen to his swearing, his vulgar rhetoric, his pathetic hatred of women, whom he describes, depending on his mood, as bitches, pigs, or disgusting animals. I hear his smutty jokes in which the careful language of politics has been pushed aside in favor of supposedly authentic popular speech at its most elemental – the language, apparently, of the genitals. ISIS? We’re not going to make war against it, we’re going to “kick its ass.” Marco Rubio’s remark about Trump’s small hands? The rest is not so small, “I guarantee you.”

Then there is the worship of money and the contempt for others that accompanies it. In the mouth of this serially bankrupt billionaire and con artist with possible mafia ties, they have become the bottom line of the American creed – so much mental junk food full of fatty thoughts, overwhelming the lighter cosmopolitan flavors of the myriad traditions that have formed the great American pastoral. In the sequence about small hands, even an ear untuned to the subtleties of that pastoral might have caught (though in a version perverted by the abjectly low level of the exchange) the famous line from e.e. cummings, the American Apollinaire: “Nobody, not even the rain, has such small hands.”

Confronted with this leap forward into coarseness and pettiness, one thinks of Silvio Berlusconi, Vladimir Putin, and the Le Pens, father and daughter. One thinks of a new International, not of communism, but of

vulgarity and bling, in which the political landscape shrinks to the dimensions of a television stage. The art of debate collapses into catch phrases; people's dreams become bombastic illusions; the economy takes the form of the grotesquely physical contortions of verbally deficient Scrooges who despise anyone who thinks; and striving for self-fulfillment deteriorates into the petty swindles taught in the now-defunct Trump University.

That's right: an International with a capital I: Globalized corruption in the mutual admiration society of Putin, Berlusconi, and Trump. In them we see the face of a cartoon humanity, one that has chosen the low, the elemental, the pre-linguistic in order to ensure its triumph.

Here is a universe of fakery in which one consigns to the oblivion of a now-obsolete history the precariousness of the exiles, migrants, and other voyagers who, on both sides of the Atlantic, have built the true human aristocracy. In the United States, it is that great people composed of Latinos, Eastern European Jews, Italians, Asians, Irish, and, yes, Anglos still dreaming of Oxford-Cambridge sculls now cleaving the waters of the Charles River.

Berlusconi invented this cartoon world. Putin intensified its macho element. Other European demagogues are hitching it to the foulest forms of racism. As for Trump, he gave us his tower, one of the ugliest in Manhattan, with its clunky, derivative architecture, its gigantic atrium, its 25-meter waterfall to impress the tourists – a Tower of Babel in glass and steel built by a Don Corleone from the dregs in which all of the world's languages will indeed be fused into one.

Careful, though. The new language is no longer that of the America we dreamed would be eternal, the America that has sometimes breathed life back into exhausted cultures. It is the language of a country *with balls* that has said its goodbyes to books and beauty, that confuses Michelangelo with an Italian designer brand, and that has forgotten that nobody, not even the rain, has such small hands.



## Latin Americans tire of populists as Los Yanquis fall for Trump

Geoff Dyer in Havana

**Tycoon's candidacy is taking off in the US just as other countries are seeking a different direction**

[Donald Trump](#) may want to build a wall along the southern border of the US but there are some trends from Latin America that he is not trying to keep out.

With his bullying personal style and unerring ability to articulate the grievances and insecurities of his supporters, Mr Trump's presidential campaign is echoing many of the themes of old-fashioned Latin American populism. While he may at times scorn immigrants from the region, he has embraced a political style that would be familiar to many of them.

The irony is that the populist bug is beginning to take hold in the US, at least in sections of the Republican party, just as large parts of Latin America are tiring of the idea of a charismatic leader who can bend the institutions of the country to his or her own will — something highlighted this week with Barack Obama's visit to Cuba followed by a much less high-profile meeting with Argentina's new president.

Ever since their presidential campaigns sprang to life last summer, it has become commonplace to describe the surprising success of Mr Trump and Democrat Bernie Sanders as populist upsurges because of their capacity to channel anger at stagnant wages and the sins of a donor-friendly political elite.

Yet that only captures one part of Mr Trump's appeal. He is also tapping a broader range of sentiments that have much in common with the populism that has a long tradition in Latin America on both the left and the right.

His anti-establishment rhetoric has an [authoritarian tinge](#) that demonstrates a deep impatience with the existing institutions of the country. His call to ban Muslims plays heavily on a world-is-against-us sensibility and he has mined a feeling among sections of the white population that its traditional values and certainties are being eroded.

In between the [whiff of violence](#) that hangs over his events and the taunting to which he subjects opponents, protesters and the media, Mr Trump has adopted a political method that runs through Juan Perón, the Argentine strongman whose career spanned the 1950s to the 1970s, to Hugo Chávez, the leftist Venezuelan leader who died in 2013. Just as Mr Perón and his wife Eva were pioneers in using radio to create a direct link with supporters, and Mr Chávez had a weekly TV show, Mr Trump has made skilled use of both social media and reality television to build his persona.

While Latin American populists have often played on anti-Americanism to rally their base, Mr Trump returned the compliment last year when he blasted Mexican immigrants as "rapists". At heart, though they share the same basic appeal, the idea that the only solution to complicated, messy political problems is a strong, almost messianic leader.

Yet Mr Trump's candidacy is taking off in the US just as many countries in Latin America are going in a different direction.

Whether Cuba's authoritarian system manages to survive or not, the one certainty is that the island has to prepare itself for a future beyond the shadow of the Castro brothers. In Argentina, Mauricio Macri is trying to

impose a degree of economic rationality after the mercurial Cristina Kirchner, whose radical populism had so many echoes of the Peróns.

In Venezuela, Mr Chavez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, governs an economy on the verge of collapse. And over the last week, the backlash against populism has been most apparent in Brazil — and in what could be the political demise of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, once the country's most popular politician.

In his early years in office, Mr Lula da Silva steered clear of populist temptations, lending his considerable magnetism to responsible economic policies. But the powerful revolt against him and the Workers' party government is rooted, at least in part, in a belief that Mr Lula da Silva has tried to subvert the institutions of the country to his own ends.

The Republican leaders who are bent on trying to stop Mr Trump may take some solace in these shifting tides but there is one final parallel from the region that is less comfortable for them.

Latin America's pro-business elites have a long history of dismissing aspirant populists as clowns and buffoons with little future in politics — until it is too late.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/europe/france-europe-migrant-crisis-germany.html?ref=europe&mtref=www.nytimes.com&gwh=A33FDB39CBABBCDFB40AF59CF8941CA7&gwt=pay>

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**The New York Times**

**The New York Times on the Web**

Foreign, Tuesday, March 22, 2016

LETTER FROM EUROPE

## **France Takes a Back Seat to Germany in E.U. Migrant Crisis**

The French appear to be losing ground as a voice to be reckoned with in Europe.

By CELESTINE BOHLEN

PARIS -- The French-German couple has always been assumed to be the engine of the European Union, the crucial team at the heart of a sprawling, unruly family of 28 nations.

But in recent months, if not years, the tandem has become visibly lopsided. As Germany takes the lead on crisis after crisis -- from the euro to migration -- the question keeps popping up: Where is France?

"Why has France not stepped up to make the voice of Germany's main partner heard, even as the migration crisis turns into a nightmare and threatens Europe's very existence?" asked the French newspaper *Le Monde* on March 6, just as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany began a final push to make the migration deal with Turkey, which was reached Friday.

The reasons for France's muted role on the migration issue are connected to domestic politics, said Pascale Joannin, general manager at the Robert Schuman Foundation, a think tank based in Paris that focuses on the European Union.

With one of Europe's most stubbornly high unemployment rates and a far-right anti-immigrant party gaining popularity, France is in no mood to roll out the welcome mat for the migrants trying to make a home in Europe, she said.

Nor is France a top destination for most of the refugees and economic migrants now heading to Europe -- a fact supported by the thousands who are huddling in northern France but trying against all odds to cross the English Channel to Britain.

"France and Germany do not have a common position on migration, which is one reason why Europe has been skating around the issue since last September," Ms. Joannin said.

The gap was exposed in February, when Prime Minister Manuel Valls of France, speaking in Munich, knocked back taunts from the French news media that the country needed a Merkel of its own and challenged the chancellor's open-arm policy toward the migrants, to the irritation of his German hosts.

Ms. Joannin traces the reluctance of the Socialist government to play a leading role in Brussels to a 2005 referendum on greater European integration that was defeated in France with the help of leading party members -- including Laurent Fabius, who was foreign minister until last month.

"Fabius never did anything on Europe, nothing," Ms. Joannin said. Furthermore, she added, President François Hollande, who as the Socialist leader presided over the party's division in 2005, has proved at best to be ambivalent.

"This president does not have a passion for European affairs," she said, noting the stark contrast with previous French presidents, who staked out a pivotal role in Europe with a close embrace of their German counterparts.

The French failure to take a leadership role has come at a cost for Germany, which lacks a strong ally within the European Union, but also, some argue, for the perception of the bloc within France.

"The truth is that France doesn't organize itself, and it has never organized itself, so that its voice is heard" in Brussels, Sylvie Goulard, a French deputy to the European Parliament, said in an interview with the newspaper 20 Minutes.

That Germany should emerge as the dominant player in Europe owes much to its economic strength; that was clearly the case during the euro crisis.

France has a weaker hand, particularly because its budget deficit, one of the highest in Europe, continues to exceed European standards.

Mr. Hollande's embattled political situation -- weakened by a mishandling of crucial legislative initiatives that have divided his own party and brought protesters onto the streets -- has only added to the view that France is losing ground as a voice to be reckoned with in Europe.

For that to change, Ms. Joannin said, "France has to say what it wants."

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## Central Banks Creep Toward Uncomfortable Role: Central Planners

European Central Bank and Bank of Japan are starting to break one of the tenets of the profession by funneling cash directly to what they regard as 'good' uses



The ECB, under President Mario Draghi, plans to pay banks to borrow from it for up to four years so long as they use the money to help the 'real' economy. PHOTO: MICHAEL PROBST/ASSOCIATED PRESS

By [JAMES MACKINTOSH](#)

Updated March 21, 2016 3:18 p.m. ET

Are central banks heading back to an era of rationing money?

The question may sound daft when policy makers are pumping gushers of cash into several of the world's major economies. **But as the central banks become more desperate to boost inflation and growth, they are starting to break one of the modern tenets of the profession by funneling that cash directly to what they regard as "good" uses.**

**The past two weeks brought interventions by the [Bank of Japan](#) and European Central Bank, which would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.**

The Bank of Japan's conditions for companies to qualify for exchange-traded funds it would like to buy sound like they come from a well-meaning government minister, **not a monetary authority concerned about overall growth and inflation.** Companies could qualify by offering an "improving working environment, providing child-care support, or expanding employee-training programs."

The central bank wants financiers to create a new breed of ETFs it would like to buy. **The ETFs would hold only shares of companies that are increasing capital spending, expanding spending on research and development or boosting what the Bank of Japan calls "human capital."** The latter means pay raises for staff, taking on more people or improving human resources.

**All these are eminently reasonable things to demand of companies, especially Japanese firms. All would probably be good for the economy, too.**

**However, they have nothing to do with monetary policy.** The basic aim of central banks is to adjust the overall economy while leaving the market and government to decide the best use of capital, decisions that are inherently political. The problem, as Neal Soss, vice chairman of research at [Credit Suisse Group](#) AG, puts it, is "these are very, very challenging times for the economic orthodoxy," and if governments won't step up with an expansionary fiscal policy, central banks have little choice but to fill the gap.

**To be fair, Bank of Japan Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda is hardly drawing up a Soviet-style five-year plan.** Only ¥300 billion (\$2.7 billion) a year will be spent “with the aim of supporting firms that are proactively investing in physical and human capital.”

**The worry is that the Bank of Japan has only just begun.**

**“It’s a massive politicization of credit:** Here are the legitimate things for lending, and here are the illegitimate things,” said Russell Napier, an independent strategist and author of “Anatomy of the Bear,” a study of 70,000 Wall Street Journal articles during major bear markets. **“It’s capitalism with Chinese characteristics.”**

**Consider the ECB. It plans to pay banks to borrow from it for up to four years so long as they use the money to help the “real” economy, meaning that they don’t simply pump up the housing markets by offering more mortgage finance.** It has carried out targeted longer-term refinancing operations before, but in the past charged the banks the same rate as for standard weekly loans. **This time it will cut the interest rate to as low as minus 0.4%—the ECB paying the banks—if the banks lend more to the real economy than a benchmark amount linked to their recent loans.**

The tension between central banks and the market is real. Policy makers have been trying to push households and companies to consume more and take more risk by lowering rates, making saving less appealing and pushing investors into riskier assets.

Even so, policy makers tried to leave the details of capital allocation to the markets, with most intervention in “safe” government debt.

But the global mind-set remains one of caution. Investors pushed out of government bonds have bought corporate bonds and the least-risky shares with the most reliable dividends, ones that look most like bonds. In turn, shareholders have pushed executives to avoid investing in new assets and either return cash via buybacks or bid up the price of existing assets.

**“The market would much rather companies take the ECB’s cheap money and use it to buy each other,”** said Robert Buckland, an equity strategist at [Citigroup](#) Inc.

**For the past seven years, the correct bet has been that the central banks will fail to stimulate the economy.** Shares of companies with solid dividends and strong balance sheets have beaten the wider market, along with those that restricted investment and boosted buybacks.

There is no sign that central banks are giving up. **Last week, both Mr. Kuroda and ECB chief economist Peter Praet insisted their interest rates could go even more negative.** One company, at least, already is preparing. **German reinsurer Munich Re said it plans to store more than €10 million (\$11.3 million) of physical bank notes in vaults to test the feasibility of avoiding negative rates.**

The more speculators, consumers and corporate executives try to minimize the impact of central-bank policies, the more policy makers will channel money directly to the uses they want. **We aren’t turning into the U.S.S.R., but central banks are less committed than they used to be to the free-market capitalism that has prevailed since the 1980s.** Investors betting that central banks will fail should beware.

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## Terror in Belgium

[All latest updates](#)

# Days after the arrest of Europe's most-wanted terrorist, Islamic State appears to have struck back

Bombs in Brussels airport and metro kill at least 26  
Mar 22nd 2016 | [Europe](#)

AFTER the arrest in Brussels last week of Salah Abdeslam, a chief suspect in the attacks in Paris that killed 130 people on November 13th, there was every reason to fear other Islamist terrorists might strike again quickly. Belgium's interior minister, Jan Jambon, had given warning that stopping one terrorist cell "can push others into action".

A day later, on March 22nd, they acted. At least one suicide bomber, who reportedly shouted in Arabic and fired shots before setting off an explosive device, struck the crowded departures hall at Brussels Zaventem airport, at 8am. A second explosion was reported moments later, apparently as panicking crowds ran from the scene of the first explosion. By mid-morning the death toll at the airport had reached at least 11.

Roughly an hour later at least one other attacker detonated a bomb on a train carriage inside the Maelbeek metro station, close to the head offices of several European institutions. The Belgian authorities, who had closed the metro for several days following the Paris attacks in November, apparently failed to shut down public transport quickly after the airport bombings. Reports suggest at least 15 people have died in the underground.


Terrorists intent on striking civilians to induce fear and spread propaganda for their group—the latest attackers are assumed be some offshoot of Islamic State (IS)—have no lack of soft targets in cities such as Brussels. As airlines and airports improve security measures to prevent attacks on planes, for example, they create queues and crowded areas at the entrances to airports or at airline check-in desks. Similarly, it is almost impossible to install sufficiently effective security measures to make metros and buses secure against bombers. In some cities, such as Delhi, airport-style scanners are used at entrances to metro stations. Yet these simply create long queues and crowds of delayed passengers. In Europe, despite the frequent terrorist attacks over the past year—including the attacks in Paris on the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists and journalists in January last year, and on cafés and a concert hall in November—it appears security most depends on those in authority gathering good intelligence to foil attacks before they are launched.

A key factor is gaining the trust of local communities. Where they have efficient and trusting relations with police, intelligence can be strikingly effective at preventing attacks. In Britain, for example, officials suggest that many would-be terrorist incidents have been foiled in the past couple of years because of information passed from minority communities to officials. The problem in Belgium appears to be that the police and other authorities are simply unable to gather enough information. This is especially true in areas of Brussels such as Molenbeek which are heavily populated by migrants from north Africa and the Middle East.

## Fifteen years of terrorism

Main attacks in western Europe, September 11th 2001 - March 22nd 2016

Attacks causing two or more deaths □ =1 killed Perpetrators: ■ Islamist ■ other ■ unknown affiliation



Attacks causing one death

Cumulative total: Austria 1; Belgium 1; Britain 14; France 6; Greece 5; Ireland 2; Italy 3; Netherlands 3; Spain 9; Sweden 1

Sources: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland; press reports; *The Economist* \* Latest reports as of 12pm GMT March 22nd

Economist.com

The fact that Salah Abdeslam could remain on the run, hidden in central Brussels, from November until March, suggests that families, friends and neighbours served as a support network for him, and failed to tip off police. Matters are not helped by a political culture that is suspicious of intelligence and security work, and political fragmentation that afflicts all aspects of the Belgian government.

Disruption to travel in Europe, by air, train and more, is a certainty, and is likely to continue for some days. Police and others will need to prepare against more possible attacks—co-ordinated or opportunist, to build on the shock now felt in Europe—and see whether any conspirators choose this moment to flee across borders. But a certain weary regularity is also becoming apparent. Shock is followed by public dismay, defiance and resignation. Terror alerts are raised and daily routines are disrupted, as analysts point out that living with the threat of further assaults is inevitable.

Large numbers of young men have gone from Europe to fight in Syria with IS and other militant groups. Some of them have returned with the aim of carrying out attacks in Europe, like those seen in Brussels and Paris. The terrorists' goals were threefold. First was the propaganda coup of dominating the world's headlines for several days, distracting from news of the setback of the arrest of Salah Abdeslam. Second, if the attacks were already being planned, the terrorists might have feared that Abdeslam was spilling information under interrogation from Belgian authorities and decided to act quickly. Last, they aim to inspire other young Europeans to support jihadists. Though IS appears to be weakening in Syria and Iraq, its ideas continue to inspire young men to strike fear at the heart of Europe.



## Wake up — Britain is heading for Brexit

Gideon Rachman



**The British debate about Brexit, at the moment, reminds me of the discussions I heard in the US, late last year, about Donald Trump. Back then the opinion polls said that Mr Trump was well ahead in the race. But the conventional wisdom in Washington was that he would never win the Republican presidential nomination. Everybody told me that, once voters focused on the race, Mr Trump's lead would crumble.**

In Britain today, there is a similar unwillingness among mainstream political analysts to believe the warning signs from the opinion polls. Several recent polls have shown small majorities in favour of the UK leaving Europe when the country holds its referendum on June 23. But most political pundits I speak to still think it is pretty unlikely that Britain will really vote to leave. When it comes to both Mr Trump and Brexit, the political establishments in Washington and London find it hard to believe the public will ultimately make a choice that the establishment regards as self-evidently stupid.

**However in Britain, as in the US, politics has taken a populist and unpredictable turn.** The financial crisis and its aftermath have undermined faith in the judgment of elites. High levels of immigration and fear of terrorism have increased the temptation to try and pull up the drawbridge and retreat behind national frontiers.

Britain's Leave campaign will put immigration and border controls at the centre of its campaign — and that could be a winning tactic. The polls suggest the public is overwhelmingly sympathetic to the idea that Britain needs to restrict immigration. Prime Minister David Cameron's attempted renegotiation of the terms of Britain's membership of the EU was unable to deliver much on this score. The principle of free movement of labour within the EU remains untouched — and the Leave campaign will make sure every voter knows that.

Unfortunately, the coalition that was meant to drive the Remain campaign is failing to come together. Pro-Europeans always assumed they would be able to rely on the support of the opposition Labour party, the Liberal Democrats, the mainstream of the Conservative party and most of British business. But the Labour party is now led by Jeremy Corbyn, a closet Brexiteer who will not lift a finger to rally his party behind the pro-EU cause. The Liberal Democrats were virtually wiped out at last year's general election. And civil war has broken out among the Tories, with several leading figures joining the Leave campaign.

Meanwhile big business is being much less vocal than the Remain camp had hoped. A pro-EU letter was signed by just over one-third of the heads of the FTSE 100 — most hung back, either out of conviction or for fear of antagonising shareholders or customers. The City of London is largely in favour of staying inside the EU. But, in the current climate, the support of Goldman Sachs is not necessarily a plus.

**The Leave campaign also has the advantage of simple slogans that are easy to understand: control our borders, make our own laws, get our money back from Brussels.** The Remain campaign's responses to these demands, by contrast, are complicated. They point out that, if Britain wants to retain full access to the EU

single market, it will almost certainly have to accept free movement of people as the price of entry, along with single-market regulations. They explain that, while Britain's contribution to the EU budget sounds like a big number, it is actually a very small part of overall government spending.

**These are intellectually solid arguments. But they are also unhelpfully convoluted. And in politics, as the saying goes: "If you are explaining, you are losing."** Ominously, early focus groups suggest that, when undecided voters are exposed to the arguments of both sides of the debate, they are more likely to move towards a vote to leave. The polls also show that anti-EU voters are more likely to vote than the pro-EU camp. Meanwhile, Europe is looking like an increasingly tough sell, what with the euro crisis and the refugee one.

Faced with these problems, the Remain campaign is left relying to an unnerving extent on the authority of the prime minister. Two general election victories suggest Mr Cameron is a formidable campaigner. But he cannot do it alone. With business and the other political parties so far disappointing, he may have to look abroad for support.

The news that [President Barack Obama will visit the UK](#) next month and is likely to endorse the campaign to keep Britain inside the EU has provoked fury from the Vote Leave campaign. Their outrage is telling. The US president is still a popular figure in much of the UK.

What is more, the Leave campaign has always argued there is a big world beyond Europe that is just waiting to embrace Britain once it leaves the EU. Nobody is better placed than the US president to gently puncture that idea. In the weeks following his visit, Downing Street should encourage other foreign leaders — from Beijing to Vatican City — to make their hostility to Brexit known.

Many foreign leaders will hesitate to intervene in an internal British debate. Some may have been lulled into believing Brexit is highly unlikely, anyway. Like the British political elite, they need to be disabused of that comforting notion — and fast.

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Anschläge von Brüssel

## Wieder ins Herz

Nur wenige Tage nach der Festnahme eines der Pariser Terroristen folgt die Vergeltung. Die Attentate von Brüssel zeigen abermals die Verwundbarkeit westlicher Metropolen. **Mit dieser tödlichen Gefahr darf sich Europa nicht abfinden.** Ein Kommentar.

22.03.2016, von KLAUS-DIETER FRANKENBERGER

Es ist ein schwarzer Tag für Europa, es ist ein furchtbarer Morgen für Belgien. Mehr als zwei Dutzend Menschen verloren ihr Leben, unzählige wurden verletzt bei koordinierten Anschlägen auf den Flughafen der belgischen Hauptstadt und auf eine U-Bahn-Station.

Mutmaßlich islamistische Terroristen schlugen zu, wieder gegen „weiche“ Ziele, nur wenige Tage nach der Festnahme eines der mutmaßlichen Terroristen von Paris. Die Sicherheitsbehörden hatten zwar mit Anschlägen gerechnet, aber dass die „Vergeltung“ quasi auf dem Fuß folgen würde, damit war nicht zu rechnen.

**Allein das zeigt den Organisationsgrad der Terroristen, ihre Vernetzung, ihre Reaktionsschnelligkeit und die Fähigkeit, an fast jedem Ort anzugreifen. Wer noch immer nicht wahrhaben will, mit welchem Gegner man es zu tun hat – einem Gegner, der seine blutige Spur durch Europa zieht –, dem ist nicht mehr zu helfen.**

Gegen die islamistischen Feinde der freiheitlichen Welt stehen die Sicherheitsbehörden zwar nicht auf verlorenem völlig Posten, aber zu beneiden sind sie nicht.

### Viele laufen unter dem Radar durch

Schon die kleinste Panne kann tödlich enden. Hunderte, tausende Dschihadisten sind von den nahöstlichen Kampf- und Terrorschauplätzen nach Europa zurückgekehrt; viele von ihnen traumatisiert, viele jedoch radikalisiert, kampferprobt und zu allem entschlossen.

Nicht wenige sind Polizei und Geheimdiensten bekannt, aber eben nicht alle. Unter dem Radar laufen, logischerweise, zudem viele derer durch, die neu in den islamistischen Milieus radikalisiert und rekrutiert werden. **Es ist in hohem Maße besorgniserregend, wie groß offenkundig die Netzwerke des Terrors sind, die in unseren Metropolen wüten, und wie schnell sie mobilisiert werden können.**

### Zusammenarbeit muss so eng wie möglich werden

Es ist nicht Ausdruck von Fatalismus, wenn man feststellen muss, dass es einen vollkommenen Schutz dagegen vermutlich nicht gibt. **Unsere Infrastruktur bietet ein teuflisch verlockendes Ziel und ist verwundbar.**

**Aber einfach abfinden mit der angeblichen „neuen Normalität“ des Terrorismus darf man sich um Himmels Willen nicht; das käme einer Selbstaufgabe gleich.** Die internationale Zusammenarbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden muss so eng wie möglich werden.

**Die Milieus, die den islamistischen Terrorismus gebären, sind noch intensiver zu überwachen. Ja, und die Milizen des Terrorismus müssen vernichtet werden. Sonst tragen sie den Terror ins Herz Europas, immer wieder.**

143,20

## Attentats de Bruxelles : «Un pied de nez à la France et à la Belgique»

Par [Caroline Piquet](#)

Publié le 22/03/2016 à 11:38



Journée cauchemar à Bruxelles. Plusieurs personnes ont trouvé la mort dans des attentats coordonnés dans la capitale européenne. Le dernier bilan annoncé par le premier ministre belge Charles Michel indique que les attaques ont fait au moins 26 morts et des dizaines de blessés. Une première attaque a eu lieu à l'aéroport de Bruxelles vers 8H00 ce matin. Deux explosions ont été entendues. Plus tard, le procureur du Roi a annoncé qu'il pourrait s'agir d'un attentat suicide. Vers 9H30, une autre explosion a eu lieu à la station Maalbeek du métro de Bruxelles. Ces attentats n'ont pour l'heure pas été revendiqués. Analyse de Mathieu Guidère, islamologue et spécialiste du monde arabe et musulman.

**LE FIGARO. - Pensez-vous qu'il s'agisse d'attaques perpétrées par Daech?**

**Mathieu Guidère. - C'est probablement l'Etat islamique.** On est sur une copie des attentats de Paris avec des attaques coordonnées, dans des lieux publics emblématiques. C'est le même mode opératoire, le même type de cibles qu'à Paris, la même signature. Repérages des lieux, mise au point des explosifs, location de voiture...Ce sont des attaques très préparées, avec beaucoup de logistique mais pas nécessairement beaucoup de monde pour les passages à l'acte. Comme à Paris, il est probable qu'on soit sur des commandos de deux trois personnes. Et ça, c'est une marque de fabrique de Daech. Avant on avait peu de monde pour la logistique mais beaucoup de monde pour le passage à l'acte. Eux préparent très bien leurs attentats et mobilisent beaucoup d'individus en amont.

**Pensez-vous que l'arrestation de Salah Abdeslam la semaine dernière ait un lien avec ces attentats?**

Son arrestation a sûrement précipité les opérations qui étaient prévues de longue date. Il est tout à fait possible que l'interpellation ait donné le top départ: «Si je tombe, allez-y». Mais je pense surtout que c'est un pied de nez fait à la France et à la Belgique qui avaient crié victoire après sa capture. **Selon moi, le message envoyé par Daech, c'est: «Vous n'avez attrapé qu'un second couteau. Vous allez voir les professionnels maintenant».** Ce qui est certain, c'est que **les responsables politiques, belges comme français, en ont trop fait.** Tout comme les médias. **Les services franco-belges se sont concentrés sur Salah Abdeslam qui n'est qu'un kamikaze raté, menacé de mort par l'Etat islamique. On en a fait une star alors que ce n'est qu'un adjudant de la logistique. Et pendant ce temps-là, un attentat coordonné se préparait alors même que la vigilance était à un très haut niveau.**

**Selon vous, s'agit-il de terroristes qui étaient dans l'entourage de Salah Abdeslam?**

Pour moi, ce sont d'autres cellules qui ont été activées à Bruxelles. Ces commandos ont été armés, entraînés dans une logique militaire. Le cerveau des opérations a sûrement fait un séjour en Irak. Quant aux exécutants, il est possible que certains n'aient jamais quitté la Belgique ou la France.

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## **‘Why do they hate us so much?’**

**How the Brussels attacks strike at the heart of Europe and shake its political foundations.**

3/22/16, 2:08 PM CET

Even before the smoke clears at the Brussels airport and over the EU quarter, this much is certain: the [second major terror attack](#) on Europe in just four months will upend the politics of everything from refugee policy to security to Brexit.

**Like the assaults that [struck Bohemian Paris in November](#), leaving 130 dead, Tuesday’s coordinated attacks were intended to remind Europeans of their vulnerability.**

**On that score, the terrorists succeeded.**

As medics carted blood-soaked corpses from the bowels of the Brussels metro, EU officials were holed up in their glass-fronted offices overlooking the sidewalk, watching in disbelief.

**“So many times I passed by these locations. Why do they hate us so much?” asked Franziska Brantner, a German Green MP and former member of the European Parliament, on Twitter.**

**The attacks, as one commentator on the scene put it, “hit the middle of Brussels’ heart.”**

**And Europe’s too.**

“This terror assault was not only directed at Belgium but at our freedom, our freedom of movement, our mobility and everyone who is part of the EU,” German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière said in Berlin.

**That the assaults occurred within days of the arrest of [Europe’s most wanted terror suspect in Brussels](#), in what authorities at the time described as a major blow to the terrorists, **will only increase a growing sense of helplessness.****

The question now is whether the EU’s 28 members respond to the threat — after the initial expressions of shock and promises of solidarity — as allies with a common sense of purpose or by retreating along national lines.

The answer will go a long way toward determining the Union’s future or if it even has one.

There’s no good time for a terrorist attack, but Wednesday’s assaults could hardly have come at a less opportune moment for the EU.

**Even as the bloc navigates the refugee crisis, it’s also trying to prevent its network of open borders from collapsing and keep the U.K., its second largest member, from breaking away altogether.**

**At the same time, wide swaths of the EU are struggling with high unemployment and prolonged economic stagnation, further denting public confidence in Europe’s institutions.**

**Rise of the populists**

**If the recent past is a guide, Europeans will have difficulty moving beyond the politics of fear that has permeated the bloc’s recent debates. France, for example, reacted to the November attacks by [re-imposing border controls](#) and making it clear that it has very little appetite to accept Syrian refugees. While that reaction is understandable, it’s not conducive toward finding common EU solutions.**

Like Paris, the Brussels attacks present a feeding **frenzy for secessionists and the resurgent anti-immigrant populists.**

They wasted little time in seizing the opportunity.

**“This horrific act of terrorism shows that Schengen free movement and lax border controls are a threat to our security,”** said U.K. Independence Party Defense spokesman Mike Hookem, an MEP.

He cited Interpol’s estimate of 5,000 jihadists who have entered the EU from Syria, noting that 100 of them are believed to be living in Brussels’ infamous [Molenbeek](#) neighborhood.

**“Brussels, de facto capital of the EU, is also the jihadist capital of Europe. And the Remainers dare to say we’re safer in the EU,”** tweeted Telegraph columnist Allison Pearson Wednesday morning, before the blood had even been mopped off the floor.

In another indication that the **attacks could boost the [Brexit](#) camp**, the pound sank against the euro.

Another job for Merkel

Challenging that narrative, which will undoubtedly seep into national debates across the EU, will require convincing leadership and resolve. **As on so many other fronts in Europe these days, only one leader possesses the requisite political skill and stature for that role — Angela Merkel.**

In Brussels on Friday, Merkel predicted that the EU’s latest [refugee pact with Turkey](#) would face many serious challenges. It’s unlikely a major terrorist attack directed at the EU was part of her calculus.

Her first challenge will be to convince the rest of Europe to honor the controversial deal to extend Turkish citizens visa-free travel and take in more Syrian refugees.

As part of the agreement, Europe pledged to accept a larger portion of the 2.7 million Syrian refugees now stranded in Turkey once Ankara has shown that it can secure its coastal border and prevent people from fleeing across the Aegean.

**But the terror attacks could spook Europe into closing its doors even tighter.** Whether the attackers turn out to be refugees or not is beside the point. **Across Europe, the big fear is one of Islamization.**

That’s even the case in Germany, where concerns over the long-term impact of accepting more than one million Muslim refugees last year is fueling a backlash against Merkel’s policies.

“It’s enough!” tweeted Marcus Pretzell, a regional leader with the right-wing Alternative for Germany, a party that opposes accepting more refugees.

**Even if Merkel succeeds in keeping the EU’s refugee strategy on course, the Schengen treaty may be on its last legs.**

Many view the open border pact that allows for passport-free travel across most of the Continent as the essence of EU membership.

Yet it is difficult to defend in the face of terror. A number of countries, including Germany, have already reintroduced perfunctory checks at many borders.

Earlier this month, European leaders presented a plan to restore open borders by the end of the year.

The Brussels attacks will likely dash that hope. **Just as Schengen allows for the free movement of goods and people, it also allows terrorists move seamlessly from one jurisdiction to another.**

**In the wake of Brussels, it will be difficult for even the most liberal European politician to oppose calls for stricter controls.**

# Le populisme qui vient

Par [Romain Huret, Directeur d'études à l'EHESS et directeur du Centre d'études nord-américaines](#) — 21 mars 2016 à 17:51

## Le phénomène Trump est le résultat d'un militantisme conservateur acharné sur le terrain.

Le populisme qui vient

Des femmes pestant contre l'intrusion de l'Unesco dans les manuels scolaires de leurs chères têtes blondes, des hommes raillant les féministes dans les rues de San Francisco, d'autres rêvant d'un monde sans impôts ou refusant l'inscription de l'égalité hommes-femmes dans la Constitution. Ces formes de contestation sont omniprésentes aux Etats-Unis depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et nous invitent à cesser de penser le phénomène Trump en termes psychologiques ou complotistes.

Ces deux explications ont été mobilisées dans les sciences sociales pour comprendre l'incompréhensible : le populisme aux Etats-Unis. Dans les années 50, les chercheurs utilisaient des outils psychologiques pour analyser le maccarthysme. «*Paranoïa*», «*malaise*», «*frustration*» étaient les termes les plus usités. Le concept, cher à l'Ecole de Francfort, de «*personnalité autoritaire*» semblait offrir des clés pour expliquer l'inexplicable : les délires machistes, antisémites et racistes d'une Amérique dite «profonde» pour mieux la reléguer aux oubliettes de l'histoire. La permanence du mouvement et ses triomphes dans les années 80 permirent la victoire d'une autre hypothèse : celle du complot et de la manipulation. Des élites cyniques instrumentalisent les peurs et les frustrations des petits Blancs en déroulant une litanie apocalyptique sur la fin des valeurs, de l'autorité et de la domination blanche et masculine. Si j'en juge par les commentaires médiatiques, les modèles psychologiques et complotistes ont toujours la vie dure, mais chassent trop souvent l'ombre pour la proie.

Le phénomène Trump est le résultat de décennies de mobilisation d'hommes et de femmes conservateurs dans les banlieues états-uniennes. Leur militantisme est permanent, chevillé au corps, et rendu souvent plus agressif par Internet. Chaque jour, ils scrutent les votes au Congrès, décortiquent les textes de loi et envoient des courriers pour protester contre les votes de tel ou tel élu. Dans les réunions de parents d'élèves, au cours de barbecues entre amis, sur les terrains de football et de base-ball, ils débattent, s'insurgent et parviennent souvent à convaincre de futurs militants. En cela, Trump leur ressemble, et leur choix n'a rien d'une folie ou d'une manipulation. Si la dérégulation du financement des campagnes et le délire médiatique ambiant ont facilité ses desseins présidentiels, ils ne seraient rien sans ces petites mains conservatrices qui labourent le terrain depuis longtemps.

Dans son étude sur le mouvement Tea Party, la politiste de l'université Harvard Theda Skocpol s'excusait auprès de son lectorat d'avoir à admettre que les conservateurs étaient le principal mouvement social dans l'Amérique du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Le Tea Party a mis dans la rue plus de monde que son pendant à gauche Occupy Wall Street. Les conservateurs ont repris en main les fondements de tout mouvement social : travail de terrain, campagne permanente, lutte acharnée. Tout comme le Tea Party, qui pour l'heure lui monnaie ses suffrages, Trump n'est donc pas le fruit d'une Amérique paranoïaque ou d'un complot de milliardaires ; il est la conséquence du militantisme d'une Amérique populiste. A l'heure de mouvements similaires en France, à l'instar de Jour de colère, il est important de ne pas céder aux explications simplistes et de regarder en face l'Amérique dont Trump est le nom.

Dernier ouvrage paru : *American Tax Resisters* (Harvard University Press, 2014).

[Romain Huret Directeur d'études à l'EHESS et directeur du Centre d'études nord-américaines](#)

## Why was Belgium targeted by the bombers?

Poor integration, political instability and growing evidence of extremism mean the Brussels attacks come as little surprise

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### Jason Burke

Tuesday 22 March 2016 14.08 GMT Last modified on Tuesday 22 March 2016 14.11 GMT  
[Belgium](#) seems an unlikely location for the epicentre of European extremist violence. But there are good reasons for the concentration of radical activity in the small state. Many of the problems that lead to militancy are common across the world, developing and developed, and though they may differ in severity, have the same consequences.

**These include a sizeable and poorly integrated Muslim minority, high levels of youth unemployment in that community, the availability of arms, a highly developed communications and transport network passing through the country, authorities that have been often complacent, and always under-resourced and domestic political instability.**

Like other countries, Belgium has also seen the apparently inexorable spread of a violent ideology through social media and among peers which, if it does not directly encourage violence, certainly promotes a hate-filled, intolerant and deeply conservative worldview.

The historic roots of the current problem are deep. As elsewhere in [Europe](#), Belgium suffered waves of terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s linked to unrest in the Middle East. “There is a very long history of connection between Belgium and France in the realm of terrorism,” said Rik Coolsaet, an expert in terrorism at the University of Ghent.

In the 1990s, militancy in northern France connected to the Algerian civil war spilled over into Belgium. At least one preacher expelled from France arrived in Brussels. When locals expressed concern, officials told them the cleric was “marginal”, Johan Leman, a veteran anti-racism activist who works in Molenbeek, the Brussels neighbourhood where many of the Paris attackers came from and where Salah Abdeslam was arrested last week, said in November.

In the first half of the last decade, as European security services struggled to understand the new threat they faced, and bombs exploded in Madrid and London, Belgium was largely ignored, despite mounting evidence of extremist networks based in the country.

If only a few score Belgians made their way to Iraq, this was still a sizeable contingent in relative terms. The volunteers included a convert from Charleroi, who died in 2005 while bombing a US convoy in Iraq, [becoming the first European woman](#) to launch a suicide attack.

Others travelled to Afghanistan. In 2008, a network sending young Belgian Muslims to al-Qaida training camps was broken up. Many appeared disappointed by [what they found in the combat zone](#) but that did not seem to stem the flow. Several returned with the intention of committing attacks at home, prosecutors claimed.

In Belgian cities, ostensibly non-violent radical networks flourished. One particular group attracted the attention of authorities, eventually prompting a vast trial.

However, as in other European countries, it was the the war in Syria that catalysed deep existing problems. By some estimates, Belgium has supplied the highest per capita number of fighters to Syria of any European country. Experts say about 450 out of a total population of 11 million that includes fewer than half a million Muslims have travelled. A [“high-end estimate”](#) by Belgian researcher Pieter van ostaeyen is 562. Most join the Islamic State, while some opt for the al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. More than 80 have been killed, many in recent battles in eastern Syria.

Molenbeek, a borough of 90,000 in the capital where some neighbourhoods are up to 80% Muslim, is seen by many as a particular problem. Some commentators have claimed Molenbeek is a virtual no-go area where “police have little grip”. But interviews on the ground reveal a diverse community struggling to come to deal with a significant problem.



Leman, the activist who also works there, said recruiters often told teenagers their parents do not know “true Islam”. “They give a typical adolescent process [of rebellion] an Islamic dimension,” Leman said.

[Research from Oxford University](#) confirms the importance of social networks, showing friends or peers played a primary role in the recruitment of three-quarters of foreign fighters to Isis. Family members accounted for a fifth of recruits, mosques for just one in 20.

Montasser AlDe'emeh, a researcher in Molenbeek who counsels former and current fighters, said he personally knew one of two people who fought in Syria who were killed in January in a shootout with Belgian police in the town of Verviers.

“He used to come into the cafe where I go from time to time. Everyone knows everybody round here. They talk, share videos, make plans. That’s how it works ,” said AlDe'emeh.

The role of mosques is controversial. AlDe'emeh said he knew of several clerics preaching in mosques who travelled to Syria last year. “Imagine what they were telling their congregations,” he said.

AlDe'emeh believes there are two profiles of militants: the naive idealists who were the first wave to travel to Syria, and a second wave of much more violent extremists prepared to strike in their homeland. The latter have often long histories of involvement in sometimes serious crime.

But Abdelilla, a social worker with 20 years’ experience in Molenbeek, said mosques, whether officially registered or not, were not a major problem. And one mother whose son was killed fighting for Isis in Syria last year said he never attended mosques but had got involved with people “on the street”.

Nor is poverty an explanation. Many of the Paris attackers were relatively well off. There is much activity beyond Molenbeek, too, even if several of the attackers who killed 130 in Paris last year grew up and lived there.

One of those who escaped a dragnet early last year that rolled up most of a network of Belgians who had returned from Syria and were preparing to launch a series of attacks, was Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He went on to organise the attacks in Paris.

In the aftermath of that attack, Brussels authorities closed down the city for almost a week, shutting schools, offices and cultural buildings. Sporting events were cancelled and the army, with armoured vehicles, was deployed on to the streets.

But few were reassured as a wavering government of a country that has always had difficulty reconciling its French- and Flemish-speaking communities and is prone to political instability, made a series of seemingly contradictory announcements about the security situation.

Belgian security services appeared – despite the quality of many individual officials – overwhelmed. It was revealed that a few hundred agents were supposed to watch over thousands of potential militants. “We are simply exhausted,” one senior security official said in an email. A £200m counter-terrorism package was announced last month. It was too late.

Once again it was the one who got away who may have led to many more deaths. Salah Abdeslam, a French national who grew up in Molenbeek, was the sole survivor of the group sent to gun down and bomb revellers in Paris. He fled back to Belgium and was finally caught on Friday. Local officials admitted on Tuesday they were well aware of what sympathisers might do in response to that arrest. Over coming days, and years, they will have to explain why they failed to stop an attack they knew was coming.

143,26

## **Brussels attacks: Terrorism could break the EU and lead to Brexit**

**Another shocking security lapse in Brussels makes the arguments for European unity and ideals harder to defend**

By [Peter Foster](#), Europe Editor

12:34PM GMT 22 Mar 2016

Another **explosion shatters the morning commute** of a major European city; the railway concourses of Antwerp and Paris echo to the clatter of army boots; the borders of the Netherlands, Belgium and France slam shut once more in the hope of stopping terrorists.

While all immediate thoughts go out to the people of Brussels today, **the reality is that this latest terror outrage delivers a triple blow to Europe and its cherished notions of open borders, free movement, tolerance and free speech.**

Political leaders will call for courage from the public to resist turning inwards, to refuse to allow the terrorists to divide and rule us, **but the failure yet again to prevent a major attack makes such calls ever harder to heed.**

Firstly, the sight of European borders closing again **puts another dent in Schengen, the no-borders agreement that facilitates European cross-border trade and travel, but – as the public well understands after the Paris attacks – the free movement of terrorists too.**

Just four days after **the capture of the main Paris attacker Salah Abdeslam** – a belated victory, as it seemed, for Franco-Belgian security – the jihadist Hydra sprouts another head, commits another atrocity.

No one underestimates the difficulty of stopping random terror attacks on the open street from committed suicide attackers, but these outrages took place at an airport and a metro station - controlled spaces where travelers should expect to feel safe.

*"Downing Street had hoped to make security a key plank of its campaign to remain in the EU, but on days like today, the very phrase "European security" sounds like a bad joke."*

Secondly, if – as happened after Paris – **it emerges that those responsible for these Brussels attacks were among the migrants who were "waved through" into Europe in the last 12 months, attitudes to migration and multi-culturalism risk hardening still further.**

More immediately, while these attacks **are likely to drive up public support for the EU-Turkey deal to deport migrants from Greece back to Turkey, they will also undermine a key component of that agreement.**

Namely, **that Turkey agreed to take back the migrants in exchange for visa-free travel to Europe for Turkish tourists and businessmen.** France and Spain were already openly dubious about the wisdom of this *quid pro quo*; **these attacks are likely to render the idea still-born, both practically and politically.**

The EU-Turkey deal was always a long shot, but given the closure of the Balkan Route had already choked off numbers, there was a faint chance that a display of determination to deport migrants back to Turkey might have sent the message to the refugees not to bother coming.

With these attacks, the chances of success for the deal become more remote, building further pressure on Europe and Greece over migration at a time when Europe, for the sake of its credibility and unity, desperately needs a deal – **however legally dubious and ugly – to stick.**

**Lastly, looking still further towards the dark horizon, these attacks are likely to sow yet more seeds of doubt in the minds of British voters on June 23.**

**Downing Street had hoped to make security a key plank of the campaign to remain in the EU, but on days like today, the very phrase “European security” sounds like a bad joke.**

Mr Cameron wants to argue that we need to remain part of European agencies like Europol and Eurojust precisely to **prevent terrorist atrocities in Britain**, but in the rough and tumble of the campaign that counter-intuitive argument will be hard to make.

**Inevitably, attacks such as this** – striking at the very capital of the European project – **risks deepening the urge among some British voters to retreat behind our borders, throwing up the “Brexit” sign as we go.**

Mr Cameron and other leaders will argue that would be a short-sighted mistake – unraveling the same Europe now under terrorist assault – **but every new attack renders the argument that the EU makes us safer a little harder to make.**

143,28

## **Border tensions rumble over ageing Belgian nuclear reactors**

Decision to restart 40-year-old nuclear reactors places strain on relations between European

**Arthur Neslen** in Brussels

Wednesday 3 February 2016 00.38 GMT Last modified on Wednesday 3 February 2016 16.42 GMT

Belgium's decision to restart two 40-year-old nuclear reactors is putting pressure on northern Europe's political fault lines, with [Germany](#) announcing that it would send experts to inspect the plants.

Concerns have been stoked by the discovery of thousands of defects in the reactors' pressure vessels, a fire, and one unresolved [sabotage incident](#) at the plants, which also border Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

In December, the Doel 3 reactor on the Dutch border had to be turned off just one week after it was switched back on, following repairs that lasted 21 months, due to a water leaking on a (non-nuclear) generator.

Two nearby cities, Maastricht in the Netherlands and Aachen in Germany, are said to be [considering legal action](#) to force plant safety – or closure, and on Tuesday the German environment minister waded into the row.

Barbara Hendricks said that she would accept the nuclear status quo “for now”, after Jan Jambon, the Belgian interior minister, refused her request for a joint environmental risk assessment at a meeting in Brussels. But she immediately took to twitter to express German frustrations.

“A transboundary assessment of the environmental impact should not only be mandatory when it comes to new builds of plants but also when the lifetime of aging nuclear power plants is being extended,” Hendricks tweeted.

A German press statement spoke of “significant deviations” from required safety procedures at the Tihange 2 plant on the Dutch border, and Doel 3, which is also close to Germany and [Luxembourg](#).

[Belgium](#) depends on seven nuclear reactors for around 60% of its electricity, although it says it will phase these out by 2025.

After the Fukushima accident in Japan, Germany began mothballing its entire nuclear fleet, but some of its citizens fear they could still be at risk from nuclear accidents across the border with Belgium.

One of them, Simon Sybertz, a student in Aachen, said that fears among local people in the city were growing. “People are starting to realise what's happening across the border,” he said. “They're scared because nobody is really prepared for something happening in Tihange. We don't even have iodine. I want the Belgian government to shut the reactor.”

More than 825,000 people have signed [an Avaaz petition](#) calling for the two reactors to be mothballed. German government sources say that Hendricks told Jambon that if Brussels was serious about shutting its reactors, it should start now.

Brussels' landmark bronze sculpture Manneken Pis is pictured with a gas mask on a banner. Photograph: Emmanuel Dunand/AFP/Getty Images

“We didn't get the impression that the Belgians really have a plan to phase out nuclear within a fixed time schedule,” one source at Tuesday's meeting told the Guardian.

European nuclear industry groups insist that plant safety is a strictly national affair under EU law, and say that EU stress tests of three Belgian nuclear reactors after the Fukushima disaster – as well as Belgium’s more recent examinations of its reactors – should give confidence in plant safety.

Jean-Pol Poncelet, the director general of Foratom, Europe’s nuclear trade association, said that Belgian reactors were “considered safe not just by the Belgian authorities but by their partners in the EU”.

“It is amazing to see that there are complaints from the [Netherlands](#),” he said. “The Dutch are operating a reactor in Borssele which is expected to run longer than the Belgian ones – they recently received permission to operate for up to 60 years!”

The Dutch environment minister, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, [recently declared](#) her “certainty” that the plant was now safe.

One international expert who has advised the Austrian government on reactors situated across its borders, told the guardian that there was no question of an imminent reactor failure in Belgium.

Equally though, [the analysis that Ilse Tweer conducted for the Green party](#) found claims by the Belgian authorities that reactor defects were created over 30 years ago, probably at the time of manufacture, not credible because sonic tests had not discovered them at the time.

The attendant risks now were very real, she argued: “In a loss of coolant accident, cold water has to be injected as an emergency safety measure for core cooling. This cold water will induce thermal stresses in the vessel wall because of the extreme contrast in temperature and could trigger an uncontrolled growth of cracks inside the vessel wall.

“That has to be excluded as otherwise you could have a meltdown and there are no systems that could manage that.”

## Keine Energiewende: Frankreich setzt voll auf die Atomkraft

[Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten](#) | Veröffentlicht: 28.02.16 21:54 Uhr

Angela Merkel bleibt auch mit der Energiewende allein in der EU: Frankreich will den Atomkonzernen erlauben, ihre Atomkraftwerke auch noch weiter zu betreiben. Damit bleibt die Gefahr bestehen, die diverse veraltete Kernkraftwerke an der deutsch-französischen Grenze darzustellen.



Energieministerin Segolene Royal und Präsident Francois Hollande. (Foto: dpa)

Die französische Energieministerin Ségolène Royal hat sich für eine Verlängerung der Laufzeiten von Atomkraftwerken um zehn Jahre ausgesprochen. Sie sei bereit, „grünes Licht zu geben“, sofern die Atomaufsicht ASN der Verlängerung von 40 auf 50 Jahre zustimme, sagte Royal am Sonntag dem Sender France 3. Sie hob hervor, dass so der Strom billiger werde. Die Grünen in Deutschland kritisierten das Vorhaben.

Eine Verlängerung der Laufzeiten um zehn Jahre werde bei bereits amortisierten Atomkraftwerken dafür sorgen, dass „der Strom billiger produziert“ werde, sagte Royal auf France 3. Nach der geltenden Rechtslage soll der Anteil der Atomenergie an der gesamten Stromproduktion Frankreichs bis 2025 auf 50 Prozent gedrosselt werden. Die Verringerung von 75 auf 50 Prozent solle „den Erneuerbaren zum Durchbruch verhelfen“, sagte Royal.

Der staatliche Energieversorger EDF soll zwei Reaktoren stilllegen, möglicherweise die beiden Reaktoren des Atomkraftwerks Fessenheim an der deutsch-französischen Grenze. Nach den derzeitigen Planungen soll 2018 ein neuer Reaktor vom Typ EPR (Europäischer Druckwasserreaktor) im nordfranzösischen Flamanville ans Netz gehen.

Die atompolitische Sprecherin der Grünen im deutschen Bundestag, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, reagierte mit scharfer Kritik auf die Ankündigung aus Frankreich. „Der geplante Überaltungsbetrieb für die französischen Atomkraftwerke ist eine miserable, gefährliche Idee“, erklärte Kotting-Uhl in Berlin. Die französischen „Schrottmeiler“ Cattenom und Fessenheim an der Grenze zu Deutschland erfüllten „nicht einmal die europäischen Mindestanforderungen an Alt-Akw“ und müssten daher sofort stillgelegt werden.

Die Grünen-Politikerin sieht auch die Bundesregierung in der Pflicht. Diese müsse „sich endlich für verbindliche AKW-Mindestanforderungen in Europa einsetzen und dafür, dass die gefährlichsten Meiler sofort abgeschaltet werden“. „Indifferenz oder diplomatische Hasenfüßigkeit ist angesichts der Gefährlichkeit von Atomkraft fehl am Platz, erst recht bei einem grenznahen Akw“, warnte Kotting-Uhl.

143,31

25. FEBRUAR 2016

FRANZÖSISCHES ATOMKRAFTWERK

## **Cattenom gefährdet Deutschland**

Von JOACHIM WILLE

Das künstliche Bassin des Mirgenbach-Sees dient den Reaktoren des Atomkraftwerks Cattenom in Lothringen als zusätzliches Kühlwasser. Foto: REUTERS

**Das französische Atomkraftwerk Cattenom in der Nähe der deutschen Grenze gilt als Sicherheitsrisiko. Schon zur Bauzeit wären die Reaktoren in Deutschland wohl nicht genehmigt worden. Trotzdem wird die Laufzeit des Kraftwerks wohl verlängert.**

Das Atomkraftwerk Cattenom steht an der Mosel in Lothringen, nur zwölf Kilometer von der deutschen Grenze entfernt. Die Städte Saarbrücken und Trier sind 58 respektive 48 Kilometer entfernt. In den 30 Jahren Betriebszeit seit 1986 hat es dort rund 800 meldepflichtige Zwischenfälle gegeben, darunter Brände, Notabschaltungen und Strahlenunfälle. Ein neues sicherheitstechnisches Gutachten zeigt nun, dass die vier Reaktoren der Anlage nicht den heute in Europa gültigen Sicherheitsstandards entsprechen und auch nicht auf dieses Niveau nachgerüstet werden kann.

Laut der Untersuchung ist Cattenom nicht ausreichend gegen Kernschmelzen und den Austritt von Radioaktivität ausgelegt. „Das Durchschmelzen des Containments (Sicherheitsbehälters, Red.) im Fall eines Kernschmelzunfalls kann ... nicht verhindert werden“, heißt es darin. Defizite gebe es unter anderem beim Schutz gegen Erdbeben, Flugzeugabstürze und Überflutungen.

Die Sicherheitsauslegung der Reaktoren sei deutlich niedriger als hierzulande und inzwischen auch in Frankreich vorgeschrieben, urteilt der Kerntechnik-Experte Professor Manfred Mertins, der das Gutachten im Auftrag der Grünen-Bundestagsfraktion angefertigt hat. „Die Reaktoren wären auch zur Bauzeit in Deutschland nicht genehmigt worden“, sagte er der FR. Mertins ist einer der profiliertesten Experten für nationale und internationale AKW-Sicherheitsanforderungen. Er hat 25 Jahre bei der Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gearbeitet, die das Bundesumweltministerium berät. Auf europäischer Ebene war er bei der Wenra, einem Gremium europäischer Atomaufsichts- und Genehmigungsbehörden, an der Erarbeitung der Mindestanforderungen an laufende AKW beteiligt.

Auch die französische Atomaufsicht hat Defizite bei den Cattenom-Reaktoren identifiziert, und zwar aufgrund des „Stresstests“, der nach dem Fukushima-Super-GAU 2011 von der EU-Kommission für die AKW in Europa durchgeführt wurde. Die Anlagen werden nachgerüstet, aktuell baut man dort Schutzvorrichtungen gegen extreme Regenfälle, die zu Überflutungen führen könnten. Mertins hält es allerdings für „völlig ausgeschlossen, dass die Sicherheitsstandards erreicht werden, die auch die französische Atomaufsicht für nötig hält“. Grundsätzlich würden inzwischen auch in Frankreich „sehr scharfe Sicherheitsregeln gelten“, die sich an der modernsten Reaktorgeneration, dem EPR, orientierten, und die bestehenden AKW sollten an diese „herangeführt werden“. Um das tatsächlich zu erreichen, müssten die Anlagen eigentlich abgerissen und neu aufgebaut werden, so Mertins.

### **Tabletten zum Schutz**

Frankreich hat jetzt die fünfte Kampagne zur Ausgabe von Jodtabletten zum Schutz der Bürger vor Radioaktivität bei einem Super-GAU gestartet. Alle Einwohner im Umkreis von zehn Kilometern eines AKW

erhielten eine Benachrichtigung, mit der sie die Tabletten in einer Apotheke gratis bekommen können. In ganz Frankreich wurden 500 000 Haushalte angeschrieben.

Begonnen wurde in Frankreich mit der Jodverteilung nach der Tschernobyl-Atomkatastrophe 1986. Die Tablettenvorräte müssen etwa alle fünf Jahre erneuert werden. Bei der letzten Ausgabe 2009 verzichtete die Hälfte der Berechtigten darauf, sich das Jod zu besorgen, das die durch Strahlung besonders gefährdete Schilddrüse schützen soll. Laut einer Umfrage gaben 67 Prozent als Grund an, sie glaubten, nach einer Reaktorkatastrophe ohnehin zu sterben – ob mit oder ohne Tabletten. (jw)

Ziel des Direktors des AKW, Guy Catrix, ist es allerdings, eine Laufzeit der Reaktoren „von mehr als 40 Jahren“ zu erreichen – „natürlich im Rahmen des geltenden Rechts“, wie er jüngst vor der Presse sagte. Derzeit beträgt die gesetzliche Laufzeit für Atomkraftwerke in Frankreich 40 Jahren. Cattenom-Reaktor 1 müsste danach 2026 vom Netz. Es wird jedoch erwartet, dass die französische Umweltministerin Ségolène Royal demnächst einer Verlängerung der Laufzeiten zustimmt.

Die atompolitische Sprecherin der Grünen, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, warnt davor. „Der vom Betreiber EDF geplante Langzeitbetrieb Cattenoms ist unverantwortlich. Dieser alte Risikomeiler muss im Gegenteil sofort für immer vom Netz.“ Cattenom sei so gefährlich, dass die Reaktoren „nach dem Prinzip Gefahr in Verzug sofort stillgelegt werden müssten“, wenn sie auf der deutschen Seite der Grenze stünden.

Kotting-Uhl forderte die Bundesregierung auf, mit Frankreich Verhandlungen zur unverzüglichen Stilllegung Cattenoms aufzunehmen. „Sie darf sich nicht mit dem Verweis auf die Aufsichtsbehörde in Paris wegducken“. Aufgrund des Moselverlaufs und der vorherrschenden Windrichtung trügen das Saarland und Rheinland-Pfalz mit das höchste Risiko, von den Folgen eines Super-GAU in dem lothringischen AKW betroffen zu sein.

AUTOR [Joachim Wille](#)



## Terror in Belgium

# The Brussels attacks show that Islamic State is still growing in ambition and capability

## Europe must confront the possibility of such attacks on a regular basis

Mar 22nd 2016 | [Europe](#)

BELGIUM'S satisfaction at finding Salah Abdeslam, the man believed to have been the Islamic State (IS) logistics chief behind the Paris terror attacks, which took the lives of 130 people four months ago, was always likely to be fleeting. That it had taken so long to track Mr Abdeslam down was worrying. That he was found staying in the apartment of a friend's mother in Molenbeek, the district of Brussels that is probably home to the highest concentration of jihadist sympathisers in Europe, is an indication of chronic intelligence failure on the part of Belgian's State Security Service and the police.

But perhaps the biggest worry is the discovery that IS's network in Belgium, and perhaps across Europe, is so extensive. To be able to conduct serial complex attacks—such as the multiple bombings in Brussels' international airport and metro system, which killed at least 34 people on the morning of March 22nd—suggests IS can draw on perhaps hundreds of supporters, some of whom have reliable bomb-making expertise and know how to communicate securely.

Some will argue that timing of the attacks on Brussels, coming so soon after the arrest of Mr Abdeslam, is a coincidence. But that probably underestimates the scale of the IS operation in Belgium. Indeed, Mr Abdeslam's arrest may well have been the trigger for another cell to go into action with a plan that had been some weeks or months in preparation.

There are still hopes that Mr Abdeslam's arrest and almost certain extradition to France will yield information that fills in the gaps in what is known about the Paris and Brussels attacks. But what has been learned so far by French investigators after the interrogation of witnesses and investigation of both the crime scenes and places where the terrorists had lived is disturbing enough.

An overriding concern is the extent of the network across Europe that IS appears to have been building for at least the past three years as a platform for sustaining a series of major terrorist outrages in different cities. There are known to be 18 people being held in six countries who are suspected of helping the Paris attackers. That is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg.

Intelligence services are faced with a lethal combination: thousands of European citizens radicalised on the internet and drawn to IS by its military and propaganda successes; battle-hardened fighters returning from Syria and Iraq who have received expert training; and the opportunities to infiltrate back into Europe unnoticed amid the huge flows of genuine refugees.

French investigators have also been taken aback by the sophistication of the IS external operations wing. It appears from the traces left by the Paris suicide bombers that IS bomb-makers in Europe have mastered manufacturing explosive devices that use triacetone triperoxide, known as TATP, whose precursors can be found in easily available products such as nail polish remover and hair lighteners. Making multiple TATP

devices that detonate reliably requires a good deal of skill, but police have yet to locate either a bomb factory or any of the bomb-makers, some of whom are likely to have been sent directly from Iraq or Syria.

Another sign of their competent tradecraft is the discipline of their communications security. The French authorities had no clue of what was to unfold on the evening of November 13th and there seems to have been no actionable intelligence before the attacks earlier today, despite warnings from the Belgian interior minister that more attacks were likely. Sim cards taken from “burners” (pre-paid mobile phones that are used only once before being discarded) show no evidence of text messaging, e-mails or chat-room use. The conclusion is that the terrorists are using encryption for all their electronic communication, but precisely what kind may still not be known.

Finally, it increasingly looks as if IS operational planning always aims at carrying out multiple, sequenced attacks to spread confusion and to stretch the ability of emergency services to respond. Over the weekend, there were reports that London’s police and the army’s SAS special forces are now working on the possibility that the capital could be hit by up to 10 attacks, all occurring on the same day. It is also clear that such attacks will be against soft targets with the aim of causing as many casualties as possible.

Europe now has to confront the possibility that IS has acquired the capability to make devastating attacks on what amounts to a fairly regular basis. Yet faced with such a threat, it is still far from certain that Europe can react in the way that America did in the aftermath of September 11th 2001, when it was quickly understood that the failure of different agencies to pool and share intelligence had been instrumental in allowing the plot to proceed. America’s long run of preventing another foreign-borne attack on its soil is an indication of how well the lessons were learned. In Britain too, with its experience of combating IRA terrorism for decades, the security agencies and the police have shown how it should be done.

But to replicate that example across all the countries of the European Union is a tall order, even though the open borders of the Schengen passport-free zone should have suggested the need for joined-up intelligence long ago. In Belgium itself, politically riven between two language groups, inter-agency co-operation is known to be dire. Europol, the law-enforcement agency of the EU, does a useful job in facilitating information exchange and analysis. But it has no executive powers to carry out investigations and has an annual budget of less than €100m (\$112m).

The threat from IS is belatedly forcing national intelligence agencies to co-operate in ways they have not previously done, but there is a huge range in capabilities and IT systems, some pretty antiquated, that cannot yet share data effectively. Another question that may need to be answered at the European level is whether mass data collection on the American model is acceptable in terms of privacy and human rights. Having lived under Nazi and communist totalitarian states, Germans, in particular, are deeply opposed to the notion of the surveillance state.

No doubt, the political imperative to be seen to be doing something will result in some improvements in Europe’s ability to foil mass terror attacks. It may also be that as IS experiences further defeats on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria (it has lost about 40% of the territory it held in the former and about 15% in the latter), some of its sheen will disappear and it will no longer be a magnet for every budding jihadist. But for now, the flaws in Europe’s security remain gaping, while IS shows every sign both of increasing ambition and the capability to go with it.

# Bombers take advantage of Belgium's history as a country divided

[Martin Kettle](#)

It will take weeks of scrutiny to find out exactly what happened in the Brussels attacks, but the country's past and its unique situation within Europe have made it a terrorist target

Terrorist violence is a global problem. Cities across the world all have to be on their guard. Although it is [Brussels](#) that dominates the headlines now, the explosions there came only hours after [jihadi gunmen attacked an EU military training base in Bamako in Mali](#). Yet while the problem may be global, the ingredients are almost always specific and local too.

Any authoritative explanation of [what happened in Brussels](#), and how and why, will require weeks of patient granular forensic scrutiny and information gathering on the ground. But there may, in addition, also be a longer view to take in order to more fully understand how the capital city of Belgium is currently so often in the terrorist front line. [Why Belgium?](#)

It surely matters to some degree that Belgium is a “weak” nation state embodying a precarious national idea. Julius Caesar may have fought the tribes [he called the Belgae](#), but in historical terms Belgium is also a recently invented country, with shallower roots and more conditionally constructed institutions than many other European states. In some ways Belgium resembles the kind of country that colonial powers created in 19th-century Africa and the Middle East, a country drawn on a map to suit the interest of powerful others.

In Belgium's case, the most important of these powerful others was Britain. In the aftermath of the Brussels uprising of 1830 – probably the only political revolution in European history to begin in a riot in an [opera house](#) – Britain moved decisively to oversee the creation of Belgium as a buffer state between France and the Netherlands. Britain did this to ensure that Antwerp and the mouth of the river Scheldt did not come under hostile control or become “a standing menace to the Thames”, as the Victorian prime minister Lord Salisbury once put it. Belgian independence and neutrality was even guaranteed by a [treaty of London](#), crafted by Lord Palmerston in 1839, in defence of whose principles Britain went to war in 1914. The country may be Belgium – but it was Made in Britain.

Belgium's weak state reflects the fundamental fact that roughly three-fifths of Belgium's modern population lives in Flanders, is Flemish speaking, and has deep cultural connections with the modern Netherlands to the north; meanwhile the other two-fifths are French speaking Walloons, once prosperous but now increasingly economically marginalised and linked culturally with France to the south. The result from day one of Belgium's history has been a compromised federal state, loosely held together by a constitutional monarchy originally installed by the British.

Belgium's institutions inescapably reflect that disjunction. In the political crisis of 2010-11, the country had no elected government for 589 days because of the enduring cultural divide. Almost every aspect of lived experience in Belgium – politics, work, media, universities and civil society – is divided on linguistic grounds. Two-thirds of the inhabitants of Flanders expect the country to fall apart, [according to a 2007 poll](#). The

looseness of these ties means that Belgium may lack some of the tools and resiliences that other more unified states possess – even if they do not always use them very well – to deal with terrorism.

This has created three consequences that surely have some bearing on the emergence of Brussels as such an important incubator of the terrorist problems of the last few months. The first is the relative weakness and mutual suspicion between Belgian security institutions, which are notoriously reluctant to share information with another, in part because they reflect and are answerable to differing constituencies and conceptions of Belgian security.

The second is Belgium's long-standing relaxation of borders with its neighbours, reflected first in the Benelux customs agreement [dating from 1944](#) and now in the EU's Schengen visa-free travel area. The result of this is that Belgium has always been one of the easiest European countries to enter and leave, with very little defence not just against the movement of undesirables – which is accentuated by the rivalries between institutions within Belgium and across the EU – but also against the traffic of arms and explosives.

The third is that Belgium, as the prototypical post-national state within an EU that is itself conceived almost as a Greater [Belgium](#), is now established as the home to most of the institutions of the EU. This makes Brussels a target for jihadi terrorists who want to ferment a conflict in Europe between the states and institutions of Europe on the one hand, and Muslims on the other.

None of this is to say that terrorists are incapable of mounting attacks which take much stronger states than Belgium by surprise. France, after all, is a classic “strong” state with strong institutions and a unified sense of nationhood. But Belgium's inherent weakness, which dates from a distant era in European politics, is also now Europe's weakness too – and on Tuesday the terrorists showed that they know how to take advantage of it.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/12201246/Brussels-attacks-Belgium-corrupt-and-fragmented-is-a-breeding-ground-for-extremism.html>

143:37

## Brussels attacks: Belgium, corrupt and fragmented, is a breeding ground for extremism

Corruption in public service; the fragmentation of police forces; tolerance of criminality: a toxic combination that makes areas of Belgium ungovernable

By Tim King

1:42PM GMT 22 Mar 2016

[The explosions in Brussels are sickening and shocking](#), even if we residents sensed that they were coming.



Chaos inside Brussels' Zaventem Airport after the explosions

[In the wake of November's attacks in Paris](#), it seemed that the whole world discovered that Belgium was a breeding ground for radical jihadism. The security lockdown in Brussels that famously followed those attacks was not just an admission of the links between the perpetrators of the Bataclan and Stade de France massacres and Belgium. It was also a public declaration that Brussels was a target – and that the city's luck could not hold forever.

Brussels had, until now, escaped lightly, by the crude arithmetic of death-counts. Four people were shot dead at the Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014, but the incident faded quickly from the public memory, partly because the alleged perpetrator was picked up very shortly afterwards in Marseille.

After that, the drama moved elsewhere, though generally with a link to the Belgian capital. The weapons used in the Charlie Hebdo attacks had come from Brussels. The man who was overpowered on a Thalys high-speed train in France had links to Belgium. In Verviers, an old industrial town in the east of Belgium, [the security services shot dead jihadists](#) who, it was said, were planning attacks on those who distributed Charlie Hebdo. The dead men, it transpired, came from the [Molenbeek suburb of Brussels](#).

Since these recent attacks, a picture has emerged of how terrorist networks put down roots in Belgium – a country with the unenviable record of the highest relative numbers of people going off to Syria to fight and then return home.

This relatively modern development came on top of older Belgian problems – corruption and nepotism in public service (resulting in a lack of confidence in the police and the judicial system); the fragmentation of police forces and city government; and tolerance of low-level criminality.

Belgium's long-running tensions between different language groups complicate any attempts to improve public administration. The trend of the last 30 years has been to devolve power down to the three regions – Dutch-speaking Flanders in the north, francophone Wallonia in the south, and the bilingual Brussels region in the centre – but that leaves Brussels underfunded to address the pockets of poverty where Islamic radicalism breeds, and the federal government short of staff and money to tackle, for example, radicalisation in the prisons.

It doesn't help that the political culture in Belgium is overly respectful of the various layers of authority – boroughs, regions, federal government – and the linguistic divisions between them. In hindsight, one can see that the federal or regional authorities should have stepped in long ago to sort out Molenbeek, but that goes against a deeply ingrained political tradition of respecting local power-bases.

Effective counter-terrorism, on the other hand, requires efficient liaison between all arms of the state, gathering good intelligence and convey it to the right place. Belgium has some good technology and some highly skilled people at the centre, but they sit on top of a pyramid, whose base is low-skill and low-tech.

[The arrest of Salah Abdeslam](#) was a moment of rare public success for the Belgian security services. They had caught alive one of the alleged participants in the Paris attacks – albeit after four months of delay – with every prospect of bringing him to trial. Moreover, although police had been injured earlier in the week, in a raid that seems to have led directly to Friday’s capture, the anti-terrorist operation was executed with no injuries to innocent civilians.

The country breathed a collective sigh of relief – and basked just a little in that congratulatory phone call to Prime Minister Charles Michel from President Barack Obama. That seems a distant memory now.

The capture of Abdeslam clearly put Belgium in the frontline, but could not in itself redress the country’s longer-term problems with its police and security infrastructure, or reduce Brussels’ vulnerability to attack. For all that soldiers have been deployed since November to patrol the streets and guard public buildings, Brussels residents are not accustomed to a terrorist threat. They have remained, for the most part, relaxed, easy-going and tolerant. These attacks will prove a brutal awakening.



International

## **Depuis 15 ans, Molenbeek nourrit le djihad en Europe et dans le monde**

Berthemet, Tanguy

LA THÉORIE de la Belgique, foyer du radicalisme musulman en Europe, vient de se renforcer. Les autorités de ce royaume, longtemps réticentes à le reconnaître, ont fini, après les attaques parisiennes du 13 novembre, par se rendre à la réalité, résumée en une phrase : « *des attentats pensés en Syrie, préparés en Belgique, exécutés à Paris* » .

Un temps désemparé, le gouvernement a de nouveau tourné son regard vers Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, quartier désormais célèbre de Bruxelles, en plein naufrage. Analystes et hommes politiques ont reconnu la dangerosité de ces lieux, où vivent aujourd'hui près de 100 000 habitants. Le chômage y est élevé, la proportion d'étrangers est également forte, tout comme la réislamisation active des populations. Ainsi, selon la police locale, 16 des 24 mosquées du quartier fonctionnent en dehors de tout cadre officiel. Au-delà, c'est toute la Belgique qui prend conscience depuis un an de la radicalisation d'une petite minorité de ses citoyens. En janvier, la Sûreté d'État dénombrait 494 « *djihadistes belges* » : 272 étaient en Syrie ou en Irak, 75 étaient morts ou présumés morts, 134 étaient revenus et 13 en route. Un ratio de djihadiste par habitant le plus élevé d'Europe.

D'après le procureur fédéral belge Frédéric Van Leeuw, la justice a ainsi ouvert 315 dossiers pour terrorisme en 2015, et déjà 60 en 2016.

Les signes avant-coureurs de cette dérive étaient pourtant là depuis longtemps. L'un des assassins du commandant Massoud, le chef afghan tué le 9 septembre 2001, le Tunisien Dahmane Abd el-Satar, avait longtemps vécu à Molenbeek, où il avait fréquenté le centre islamique belge. Il était entré en Afghanistan à l'aide d'un vrai-faux passeport belge. L'information fut cependant vite noyée par les attentats contre New York et Washington, deux jours plus tard. Bruxelles était alors connue, et ce depuis les années 1990, pour être une plaque tournante de divers trafics, comme ceux de la drogue ou des armes. Les experts de l'ONU qui enquêtaient sur la provenance des armes arrosant certains conflits africains retombaient souvent sur la Belgique. Tout comme ceux qui s'intéressaient au commerce illégal de diamants.

Les salafistes radicaux vont profiter de ce contexte propice à la contrebande, comme de la bienveillance des autorités à leur endroit, pour implanter discrètement leurs réseaux. L'arrestation d'Hassan el-Haski, un des responsables des attaques de Madrid le 11 mars 2004, attire un peu l'attention sur le phénomène. Ce Marocain a plus d'attaches en France, mais il a séjourné un bon moment à Molenbeek. Il y a fréquenté Khalid Oussaih, un membre du Groupe islamique combattant marocain (GICM), condamné par défaut en 2006 par la justice belge pour son appartenance à ce mouvement proche d'al-Qaïda. Treize autres prévenus ont eux aussi été condamnés. Un an auparavant, la presse avait découvert atterré l'histoire de Muriel Degauque, une vendeuse d'une boulangerie de Charleroi convertie et mariée à un Marocain, partie comme kamikaze en Irak. Ce parcours, que l'on croyait unique, annonçait ce qui allait devenir, dix ans plus tard, une épidémie.

La présence de terroristes en Belgique est de plus en plus évidente à partir de 2011. Les affaires s'enchaînent. Rachid Benomari est alors arrêté. Ce Français reconnaît être parti de Molenbeek pour rejoindre en Somalie les

miliciens d'al-Shabab. Il avoue aussi avoir structuré une filière de djihadistes vers la Corne de l'Afrique, mais aussi vers la Syrie. Plus tard, la police se rendra compte qu'il était en contact avec un autre Molenbeekois, un certain Khalid Zerkani, alias papa Noël, interpellé fin 2015 pour avoir envoyé 18 personnes en Syrie, dont un Français.

Les Français radicalisés sont nombreux en Belgique, où ils pensent être moins surveillés que chez eux. Ainsi Hakim Benladghem, tué en mars 2013 par la police sur l'autoroute en Bruxelles-Lille. Cet ancien légionnaire d'origine algérienne, installé à Anderlecht depuis 2008, projetait de commettre un attentat. Chez lui, les enquêteurs ont découvert un arsenal dont des kalachnikovs et des munitions. Mehdi Nemmouche a les mêmes origines et a vécu plusieurs semaines à Molenbeek, avant d'organiser la tuerie du Musée juif de Bruxelles, le 24 mai 2014. Même quand les terroristes ne séjournent pas directement à Bruxelles, les réseaux d'aide se prolongent parfois dans le royaume. Amedy Coulibaly, le tueur de l'Hyper Cacher en janvier 2015, s'était procuré ses armes en Belgique.

Quelques jours après ce massacre, les investigations conduisaient les policiers belges vers la cellule de Verviers et son cerveau, Abdelhamid Abaaoud. Les enquêteurs ne parviennent pas à remonter le fil à temps. En août, Ayoub El Khazzani monte dans le Thalys à la gare Bruxelles-Midi avec un véritable arsenal. Des passagers déjoueront ses projets. Il séjournait depuis des semaines à Molenbeek, chez sa soeur. À quelques rues de là, Abaaoud et ses complices préparaient sans doute déjà les assauts contre Paris.



143,41

**The New York Times (web site)**

Tuesday, March 22, 2016 - 10:52 UTC -0400

## **Brussels Attacks Underscore Vulnerability of an Open European**

### **Society**

By ADAM NOSSITER

In an age of easy travel and rising militancy, intelligence experts fear that terrorist attacks have become an unavoidable part of life in Europe.

PARIS — Since the November attacks in Paris, the Belgian authorities have conducted dozens of raids, combed whole neighborhoods for well-known militants, and even locked down the capital for days, all part of promises to step up efforts to root out jihadists.

Yet none of that evidently disrupted plans for the attacks on Tuesday at Brussels's main international airport and a central subway station in the heart of the capital of the European Union.

The new attacks again underscored again not only the weaknesses of Belgium's security services, but also the persistence and increasingly dangerous prospect of what several intelligence experts described as a sympathetic milieu for terrorist cells to form, hide and operate in the center of Europe.

The attacks have set off a new round of soul-searching about whether Europe's security services must redouble their efforts, even at the risk of further impinging civil liberties, or whether such attacks have become an unavoidable part of life in an open European society.

At the very least, they have exposed the enduring vulnerability of Europe to terrorism in an age of easy travel and communications and rising militancy.

Even before the Belgian authorities captured Salah Abdeslam last Friday for his suspected role in the Nov. 13 Paris attacks, which killed 130 people, they had detained or arrested scores of suspects directly or peripherally connected to what they described as a terrorist network linked to the Islamic State.

But despite the success in arresting Mr. Abdeslam, Tuesday's attacks showed that Belgium continues to present a special security problem for Europe.

The country of just 11.2 million people faces widening derision as being the world's wealthiest failed state — a worrying mix of deeply rooted terrorist networks, a government weakened by divisions among French, Dutch and German speakers, and an overwhelmed intelligence service in seemingly chronic disarray.

It is also home to what Bernard Squarcini, a former head of France's internal intelligence, described as “a favorable ecosystem: an Islamist milieu, and a family milieu,” that played an important role in sheltering Mr. Abdeslam and also perhaps in Tuesday's attacks.

“It shows that they were in a neighborhood that can shelter cells for months, because it is a neighborhood that is favorable to them,” he said, referring to Molenbeek, the Brussels district where the Paris attackers lived and where Mr. Abdeslam was able to hide among family and friends.

The cultural code of silence in the heavily immigrant district, as well as widespread distrust of already weak government authorities, has provided what amounts to a fifth column or forward base for the Islamic State.

For weeks intelligence operatives had warned that the next major terrorist attack on European soil was simply a matter of time. Even before Tuesday's attacks, Mr. Squarcini predicted, "there will be an even more serious attack," because, he said, "there are already the people in place."

Indeed, the presumed orchestrator of the Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who lived in Molenbeek, boasted to his cousin before he was killed that "90" operatives were dormant, ready for another attack.

Tuesday's blasts were seen by some security and intelligence experts as proof that Europe's open societies, even under states of emergency, will never be risk-free.

But the risks are fatally compounded, some said, by European-wide failures in intelligence sharing and the weakness of a Belgian intelligence service that Mr. Squarcini said lacks the capacity to pick up the "weak signals" of emerging plots.

"The Belgians are too limited to be able to treat several objectives at once," Mr. Squarcini said in an interview weeks ago.

"After a weekend of mutual congratulations" over the arrest of Mr. Abdeslam, he said Tuesday, "manifestly we didn't see the second wave."

But political and social failures have allowed militant cells to become deeply rooted, experts warned, and they were equally or even more worrying. Belgian officials spent weeks looking for Mr. Abdeslam, yet failed to turn up Tuesday's bombers.

"The mode of action was structured and agreed," said Ralf Jäger, interior minister in North Rhine-Westphalia, the German state next to Belgium. "That presumes the formation of a cell. And that is what is frightening: that such a cell could not be discovered."

Those who are in place in Europe may now possess improved bomb-making skills and tactics, which can be adapted easily to additional security measures put in place by police and government authorities.

For instance, striking the check-in counter at the airport in Brussels inflicted serious casualties and disrupted air travel while circumventing the millions spent on added security screening before passengers actually board planes.

Mr. Squarcini said that airport security may now have to be revised Continent-wide, to take in even the approach to check-in counters — as is already the case in some parts of the world.

Others emphasized that progressive layers of new security measures can only go so far. Absent a military-style occupation, the threat from a well-established network with some degree of local complicity can never be completely forestalled, experts said.

"This shows the limits of the actions you can undertake in a state of emergency," like the one Belgium had in place for weeks, said Philippe Hayez, a former official with the D.G.S.E., the French external intelligence service.

"These are time-specific, superficial," added Mr. Hayez, who has written extensively on Europe's intelligence challenges. "But unless you occupy it militarily, you don't hold a town just by circulating police cars. We're talking about guerrilla terrorism. And there's a population that's complicit."

That complicity may be most worrying, he and others said. "We are paying for our naïveté," said Jacques Myard, a French parliamentarian who sits on his country's intelligence oversight committee. "It's not a weakness in intelligence. It's a weakness in society."

“The sleeper cells have been there, and they are well implanted,” said Mr. Myard, a member of the conservative Republican party. For two years, the intelligence services “have been telling us: we’ve never seen such an influx” of terrorist operatives.

It was unclear whether Tuesday’s bombings were a response to Mr. Abdeslam’s arrest, or long in the works. In either case, said Alain Juillet, who helped reorganize the French external intelligence service as a top official there, “it’s not surprising.”

“That’s the only thing one can say,” he said. “We can easily see that Belgium has become a hub.”

“So that when you arrest someone, there will be a reaction,” Mr. Juillet said, referring to Mr. Abdeslam.

“All of this is to say that the implantation of the network is more firm than we thought,” Mr. Juillet added. “The police were efficient — and yet this happened. So, there is a very strong implantation in Belgium.”

But the fatal paradox for Europe is that on a border-free Continent, such problems are played out transnationally. One country’s failures are necessarily amplified.

Now the problems in Belgium are threatening not only lives across Europe, but also the Continent’s experiment at integration. Whether the European Union, with its commitment to open borders, is strong enough to withstand the strains on top of years of economic crisis already is an ever more open question.

“It seems that the clear targets of the attacks — an international airport, a metro station close to E.U. institutions — indicate that this terrorist attack is not aimed solely against Belgium,” Germany’s interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, said at a news conference in Berlin. “But against our freedom, freedom of movement, mobility and everyone in the E.U.”

Emergency workers on Rue de la Loi in central Brussels on Tuesday after an explosion at the Maelbeek subway station. OLIVIER HOSLET/EUROPEAN PRESSPHOTO AGENCY

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## From Syria to Brussels

Terrorism spreads from the failure to destroy Islamic State.

Editorial

March 22, 2016 7:29 p.m. ET

[52 COMMENTS](#)

Authorities warned for months that Brussels was likely to be the target of an Islamist terrorist attack, but that didn't lessen the shock when it happened Tuesday morning. At least 30 were killed by a suicide bomber at the Brussels airport and in another bombing barely an hour later on a subway train near the European Union's main office complex. Dozens more were injured.

The attacks follow Friday's arrest in Brussels of Salah Abdeslam, an alleged ringleader of November's Islamic State-inspired terror attacks in Paris, and Islamic State claimed responsibility for the Brussels bombings. Tuesday's murders may be retaliation for the arrest, or perhaps a push to execute a long-planned attack before police could use intelligence from Abdeslam to thwart the plot.

**The immediate temptation will be to point to Belgium's many and well-known policing failures, and authorities deserve the heat.** Multiple local and federal police departments with ineffective coordination struggle to track terror cells, or other organized crime. After Abdeslam's capture, at least one Belgian official over the weekend professed surprise the terrorist was still in Belgium—the government thought he was long gone.

**Belgium, like many other European countries, has allowed to develop what amounts to a parallel Islamist society.** Multiple raids in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels have uncovered large stockpiles of weapons, and Belgian officials said this weekend they were surprised by the number of people from whom Abdeslam received support as a fugitive.

**But Tuesday's Brussels attacks, and Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., before, are mainly an indictment of Western foreign-policy failures in Syria.** Terrorists linked to **Islamic State**, which Western governments initially ignored and now claim to be “degrading and destroying,” **are perpetrating one large attack after another in the West.** **Islamist attacks large and small around the world have become a daily occurrence.**

**In part this is because the perception that Islamic State is winning increases its appeal among Western-born potential followers.** European officials have warned repeatedly of the danger of European citizens, radicalized at home or abroad, who travel to Syria for terrorist training and then return. Several Paris attackers followed that path.

**Islamic State also is exploiting the instability it creates, especially through refugee flows.** Authorities have confirmed that two of the Paris attackers entered Europe by pretending to be refugees and followed the so-called Balkan route to Austria from Greece before reaching Belgium and France. **German police said last month that a married couple from Algeria alleged to have planned an Islamic State-inspired attack in Berlin had entered the country posing as Syrian refugees.** Germany's domestic intelligence chief, Hans-Georg Maassen, said at the time that officials across Europe have “seen repeatedly that terrorists are being smuggled in, camouflaged as refugees.”

**Europe seems determined to keep treating this as a policing problem, or at least as anything other than a call to bolster military efforts in Syria.** Officials dispatched more police to transport hubs across Europe and an all-points-search is underway for a man who is suspected of participating in the airport attack.

**There's a role for policing in a counterterror strategy, but also a limit.** Brussels, where authorities closed the subway system for several days in November, can't live in perpetual lockdown. **Until the West is prepared to fight this terrorist threat at the source, Tuesday's victims in Brussels won't be the last.**

143,45


March 22, 2016 5:54 pm

## Brussels attacks show that terrorists can strike at will

Raffaello Pantucci

*The writer is director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute and author of 'We Love Death As You Love Life: Britain's Suburban Terrorists'*

The surveillance problems can no longer be described as Belgian alone, writes Raffaello Pantucci



It is still unclear exactly [what Brussels has faced](#) just prior to Easter. The random nature of the date and targeting suggests a plot that may have been brought forward, while the scale of the attack suggests it must have been in the pipeline for some time. The Isis network, also linked to November's [Paris attacks](#), has claimed responsibility. The bigger issue, however, is not who is to blame for this atrocity but rather how much Europe will warp to address an acute terrorist threat, with cells apparently able to launch large-scale atrocities on an increasingly regular basis.

The first questions raised will focus on Belgium's response to the problem on their home ground. Authorities may have scored a victory by [capturing Salah Abdeslam](#), one of the Isis-aligned plotters linked to the Paris attacks, but they missed a network planning an atrocity with heavy weapons and explosives. This suggests gaps in the understanding and surveillance of the terrorist threat. Given that Brussels sits at the political heart of Europe, this points to a problem that can no longer be described as Belgian alone.

While for some the terrorist atrocities in Paris was a wake-up call, for security forces it had been expected for a while. Terrorist groups, from al-Qaeda to Isis, have long sought to launch a terrorist attack in the style of the [2008 Mumbai attacks](#), and a string of plots have been disrupted or launched from a francophone network emanating from Brussels. The Paris attack was the realisation of these fears from a depressingly predictable place.

The networks of radicalised individuals with links to Isis have grown as the group continues to hold sway on the battlefield and send back people and plots to their original bases in western Europe. Given the tempo of attacks and the ease with which the networks appear able to acquire weapons and move freely around the continent, Europeans will ask themselves how much longer they will face this threat. Is this the start of a regular diet of such atrocities or the breaking of a wave? Given that terrorist groups have been able to launch three big, ambitious plots in Europe in the past year and half, the sense will be that we are in the thick of this threat with no end in sight.

The choice of targets is predictable. Terrorist groups have long fetishised aviation as a target, both as a way of visibly lashing out against the globalised political establishment but also for the high impact. Mass transport systems by their very nature have to be open to the public, which makes them tempting targets as they offer an easy opportunity to strike at the heart of a society. Questions will be asked about ramping up security levels but this will bring costs and further inconvenience to the daily lives of citizens. Think of the ramifications of a plot

in 2006 where a cell planned to use [liquid bombs](#) on a series of transatlantic flights. Liquids are still banned on aircraft today.

The Brussels attacks will also play badly against the backdrop of Europe's migration crisis. It will not be entirely surprising if elements close to the recent attacks found ways of slipping into the country alongside refugees from the Middle East. An already tense situation in Europe will grow more fraught, and this will have inevitable political ramifications too.

This is the biggest problem with which security planners will have to contend. It is often said that the best response to a terrorist threat is to keep calm and carry on. This is sage advice but in the face of a network that appears able to strike with impunity, and a political environment growing more toxic by the day, it will be ever harder for security forces and politicians to ensure that Europe maintains its values in the face of the terrorist threat from within.

143,47

## Brussels attacks: The EU aspires to be a state but fails to deal with the enemy within

Terrorist attacks in Brussels will raise more questions about how we respond to extremism

By [Philip Johnston](#)

4:09PM GMT 22 Mar 2016

Madrid, London, Paris. [Now Brussels must be added to the lengthening list](#) of European capitals targeted by Islamist fanatics in recent years. It will be no surprise if the bombers who killed dozens in the Belgian city came from [its Molenbeek district](#), where at the weekend police shot and arrested the key suspect in November's Paris attacks.

The Brussels attackers will also almost certainly have fought for the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (Isil) and returned home, possibly hiding among the tide of migrants arriving in Europe to avoid being picked up by police on the lookout for returnees. Or they may just have wandered in and out of Belgium, France and the rest of continental Europe unmolested because the Schengen agreement's open borders made [normal counter-terrorist policing difficult, if not impossible](#).

*"Horrors such as those visited upon Brussels will inevitably feed into the debate about this country's future in Europe"*

It is tempting to see recent attacks in the context of the great migration crisis that has engulfed Europe in the past year. An area without internal frontiers relies for its security upon the strength of its external borders; and those of the European Union have been woefully inadequate to the task. But the Islamist terrorist menace predates the migration crisis, the Syrian civil war and the rise of Isil.

The four suicide bombers from Yorkshire who killed 52 people on the London transport system in July 2005 were not spawned by the uprising against the Assad regime in Damascus. There are parallels, however: the 7/7 ringleaders were coached by al-Qaeda at camps in Pakistan, just as the current crop of Isil-linked bombers will have received training and orders from Islamist leaders outside Europe.

Similarly, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 which killed 192 people and injured more than 1,800 – the bloodiest attack on European soil – were directed by al-Qaeda. It makes little difference to the victims whether al-Qaeda or Isil is behind these murderous assaults: the fact remains that the threat is here, now and getting worse. So what is to be done?

The obvious problem is that transport networks are easy targets for suicide bombers. In a major city it is simply not feasible to check everyone getting on the subway or boarding a train. Keeping terrorists off aircraft is possible with scanners, yet we all know most of this is a charade: it is now suspected the bomb that brought down a [Russian airliner over the Sinai Desert in October](#) was planted by a mechanic on the other side of the security checkpoints. And if bombers are simply going to detonate their devices in the departure hall, what then? Will we all have to go through scanners before entering the airport itself?

*"It is one thing for young Muslims to become radicalised at home... but the ingredient that makes them truly dangerous is being schooled in Syria on how to access and use guns and explosives"*

The basic requirements for dealing with this menace are good intelligence, diligent policing, public vigilance and a large amount of luck. At risk of giving a hostage to fortune, it is noteworthy that since 2005 there has been no mass-casualty attack in this country, and that is not for want of trying by jihadist groups. But the rise of Isil has made the jobs of MI5 and counter-terrorist police in keeping tabs of the jihadists increasingly problematic.

It is one thing for young Muslims to become radicalised at home, either through the Internet, or by someone they have met at the mosque or, as is far too often the case, in prison. But the ingredient that makes them truly dangerous is being schooled in Syria or another failed state on how to access and use guns and explosives.

This is the deadly legacy of the would-be caliphate and it is why we have been mad to allow British jihadists who went to Syria to return. It is estimated that some 800 have made the journey in the past six years, with possibly 100 killed in the fighting. Some 400 have come back to the UK but few have been prosecuted, even though it is an offence to support Isil.

There have been about 50 prosecutions, usually of people who have helped jihadists on their way. Those who return and are identified are redirected into de-radicalisation programmes. But it only needs a handful to slip through the net to bring about carnage.

Moreover, we are better at doing this than most other European Union countries, not least because people coming into the UK have to pass through a physical frontier and always run the risk of being stopped. On the continent, even if internal borders have been going up again in response to the migration crisis and the Paris attacks, even the most wanted man in Europe was able to live for months under the noses of Belgian police in Brussels.

Here in the UK, cooperation is good between the intelligence agencies and the police; but this is not the case in some EU countries, including Belgium, where divisions between competing agencies and linguistic groups have been hard to break down despite recent reforms and attempted integration.

The growth of Molenbeek into a hotbed of Islamist radicalism and lawlessness has come as no surprise to people in Brussels; but the problem was ignored by successive Belgian governments – when the country had one at all.

There is also a grisly symbolism about this atrocity happening in Brussels, the administrative and spiritual centre of another failing political construct, the EU, for which the free movement of people is a fundamental and non-negotiable principle.

Why should we be facilitating the movement of people who would do us harm? François Hollande of France called the Brussels murders “an attack on Europe”. David Cameron said Europe must “stand together.” Yet while the EU aspires to the trappings of a state it fails to fulfil the basic function of one, which is to protect its citizens from harm.

Indeed, in attempting to forge a state by removing its internal borders without first securing its outer frontiers the EU has arguably increased the dangers to its people. Of course, ending free movement by leaving the EU will not deal with jihadists here already, whom we inexplicably allowed back into Britain. But if we stay in, the tide of migration into Europe – which last week’s deal with Turkey looks unlikely to halt – will bring security risks to our shores unless it is contained.

Horrors such as those visited upon Brussels will inevitably feed into the debate about this country’s future in Europe, even if we know that the enemy is already inside the gates.



## **Editorial : « une épreuve de vérité »**

Le Monde.fr | 23.03.2016 à 06h46 • Mis à jour le 23.03.2016 à 07h31 | Par Jérôme Fenoglio (Directeur du "Monde")

Editorial du « Monde ». Cette fois, c'est Bruxelles, le cœur de l'Europe, qui a été frappé par les terroristes islamistes. Ils ont visé cette ville libre, où l'humour, l'irrespect, une manière belge de ne pas se prendre au sérieux, est à l'opposé de ce que ces barbares ont dans la tête : des certitudes de pacotille, la haine de l'autre, la violence des « purs ». Le galimatias mortifère que véhiculent ces djihadistes venus d'Europe est le contraire de ce que représente Bruxelles la cosmopolite, capitale d'un projet européen symboliquement pris pour cible.

A chaque fois, cette violence, pas si aveugle que ça, nous surprend. Cela ne devrait pas. Après, Madrid, après Londres, après Paris, deux fois durement touchée l'an passé, aujourd'hui Bruxelles, nous savons. Nous ne pouvons pas ignorer que le terrorisme va durer. Ce n'est ni jouer les Cassandre ni les apprentis sorciers que de mettre en avant cette réalité : la bataille contre le djihadisme sera longue.

Nul dénigrement du travail des services de police et de renseignement dans ce constat – qu'ils sont d'ailleurs les premiers à faire. Chaque démantèlement d'une cellule terroriste, chaque arrestation, celle du Français Salah Abdeslam, à Bruxelles justement, la semaine dernière, suscite un soulagement bien naturel. La force des sociétés démocratiques est de continuer comme « avant ». Elles déjouent ainsi l'ambition des djihadistes : susciter des réactions de représailles contre les musulmans européens, créer autant de mini-guerres civiles en Europe.

### Demi-mensonge

Mais il ne faut pas entretenir de faux espoirs. La lutte contre le terrorisme djihadiste prendra du temps avant de le vaincre – sans doute faut-il compter en années. Les politiques, les gouvernants devraient le dire. Ils ne le font pas assez, ce qui revient à masquer une partie de la vérité. Dans des démocraties saines, les opposants devraient aussi le reconnaître. Ils ne le font pas assez, ce qui revient à participer à un demi-mensonge.

Il n'y a ni recette magique ni solution à portée de main, tout ce à quoi nous sommes habitués dans nos sociétés de consommateurs impatientes.

Ceux des partis ou des candidats protestataires – cela va du Front national français à Donald Trump, aux Etats-Unis, en passant par quelques autres – qui prétendent le contraire mentent de façon irresponsable. Ils jouent avec la douleur des victimes. Dire qu'il suffirait d'écraser sous les bombes les villes tenues par l'organisation Etat islamique en Syrie et en Irak est une absurdité, cela gonflerait plutôt les rangs des candidats au djihad. Dire comme le FN qu'il suffirait de rétablir les frontières à l'intérieur de l'Union européenne pour venir à bout du djihadisme européen est d'un simplisme mystificateur; il y a beau temps qu'armes et explosifs pullulent d'un pays à l'autre, cependant que les réseaux numériques véhiculent les modes d'emploi. Dans la bataille en cours, on n'a pas besoin de vendeurs d'illusions.

### L'Europe absente

Mieux vaut reconnaître la complexité du phénomène, à un double niveau. Sur la scène européenne, l'EI a vraisemblablement tissé des réseaux logistiques sophistiqués, en vue de perpétrer des attaques simultanées dans différentes capitales du continent. Pas d'angélisme ici : la lutte passe par des moyens accrus pour les services de police et de renseignement. L'efficacité commanderait sans doute une coordination renforcée au niveau européen. Hélas, l'Union, déjà incapable de solidarité face au drame des réfugiés, est dans une phase régressive, ce qui la rend plus vulnérable encore.

Mais le djihadisme européen, même s'il a des causes endogènes, se nourrit aussi du chaos moyen-oriental. L'extinction du terrorisme chez nous passe par le règlement des tragédies syrienne et irakienne. Là encore, il faut sans doute compter en années. Là encore, en dépit de la part de responsabilité qu'ont pu avoir les Occidentaux dans les drames en cours, l'Europe est absente. Elle n'existe pas en tant qu'acteur aux côtés des Etats-Unis et de la Russie, ou si peu. Elle a montré son inaptitude à la moindre vision stratégique, au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs. Cela ajoute à sa vulnérabilité.

Pour notre continent, la bataille contre le terrorisme est une épreuve de vérité.

143,51

## • **Terroranschläge in Brüssel**

In Brüssel sind bei der Anschlagsserie am Dienstag mindestens 34 Menschen getötet und 230 verletzt worden. Zu den Attentaten im Flughafen und in einer Metrostation bekannte sich die IS-Terrormiliz. Kommentatoren kritisieren das Versagen von Belgiens Polizei und Geheimdiensten und rufen mehrheitlich dazu auf, besonnen auf die erneuten Anschläge zu reagieren.

Debatte teilen auf



ALLE ZITATE ÖFFNEN/SCHLIESSE

**THE INDEPENDENT (GB)** / 23. März 2016

### **Quittung für Scheitern des belgischen Staats**

Die jahrelangen Spannungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Regionen Belgiens haben das Land entscheidend geschwächt, analysiert die linksliberale Tageszeitung The Independent:

„In den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten sind Teile des belgischen Bundesstaats ins Chaos abgeglitten und verfallen, weil die wahre politische Macht und Schirmherrschaft auf die auf Sprache basierenden Regionen Flandern, Wallonien und Brüssel übergegangen sind. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Polizeikräften einerseits sowie zwischen der Polizei und den Sicherheits- und Geheimdiensten andererseits ist mittlerweile ein Witz. Der schwelenden Radikalisierung in muslimisch dominierten Bezirken Brüssels wie Molenbeek wurde nichts entgegengesetzt. ... Ultrationalisten in Frankreich und EU-Gegner in Großbritannien können auf Belgien als Beispiel dafür zeigen, was passiert, wenn ein starkes Nationalbewusstsein stirbt und starke staatliche Institutionen versagen.“

• [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



**DIE PRESSE (AT)** / 23. März 2016

### **Geschwächte IS-Miliz wird gefährlicher**

Die Anschläge von Brüssel sind das Ergebnis militärischer Erfolge gegen die Terrororganisation Islamischer Staat, glaubt die konservative Tageszeitung Die Presse:

„In Syrien und im Irak hat er [der IS] weite Gebiete verloren. Er bunkert sich in seinen Hochburgen Raqqa und Mossul ein, wartet auf die Gegenoffensiven kurdischer Einheiten und der irakischen Armee. Je mehr der IS jedoch auf den Schlachtfeldern ins Hintertreffen gerät, desto stärker wird er versuchen, 'weiche Ziele' anzugreifen - also Attentate in Europa durchzuführen. Das soll von seinen Niederlagen ablenken, ihn weiterhin für ausländische Kämpfer attraktiv halten. ... In Europa müssen zugleich größere Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um junge Männer und auch Frauen davon abzuhalten, sich extremistischen Gruppen anzuschließen. Und die Behörden müssen für weitere Attentate gewappnet sein: Denn der IS kämpft in Syrien und im Irak ums Überleben. Und das könnte ihn in Europa noch gefährlicher werden lassen als bisher.“

• **Wieland Schneider**

• [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



**L'OBS (FR)** / 22. März 2016

### **Europäische Reaktion auf Anschläge nötig**

Die Anschlagsserie in Brüssel gilt ganz Europa, ist das linksliberale Wochenmagazin L'Obs überzeugt und fordert die europäischen Staaten daher zu einem kraftvolleren gemeinsamen Handeln auf:

„Kein Land hat ausreichend finanzielle oder militärische Mittel, um allein handeln zu können. ... Einer gemeinsamen Bedrohung kann man nur gemeinsam begegnen. Europa muss schneller auf eine bessere und weitreichendere Integration zusteuern: Es muss seine Außengrenzen besser schützen, die innereuropäische Zusammenarbeit von Polizei, Justiz und Überwachungsdiensten verstärken, einen gemeinsamen Plan für die Kontrolle des illegalen Waffenhandels verabschieden, international mit einer Stimme sprechen und unser Sozialmodell stärken. Europa darf nicht hinnehmen, dass ganze Viertel vernachlässigt werden. ... Dieser Weg ist komplexer und härter als der, den die nationalistischen und autoritären Vorschläge vorgeben. Doch wenn das Ziel darin besteht, unser Leben und unsere Werte zu schützen, ist das der beste Weg.“

- **Pascal Riché**
- [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



[DE STANDAARD \(BE\)](#) / 23. März 2016

## Nicht in Wut erstarren

Angst und Wut dürfen nach den Anschlägen nicht siegen, mahnt die liberale Tageszeitung De Standaard:

„Die Wut ist gerechtfertigt. Aber sie muss Anlass für ein konstruktives Projekt sein. ... Wir werden von denen angegriffen, die sich dafür entschieden haben, unsere Feinde zu sein, sagte Premier Charles Michel gestern. Diese Beschreibung ist klug und richtig. Sie geht von einem Selbstbewusstsein aus und das 'Wir' lässt jeden zu, der zu unserer Demokratie gehören will. Aber das nimmt die Spannungen nicht. ... Den Terror kann man nicht abwehren, ohne die Radikalisierung und ihren Nährboden in den muslimischen Gemeinschaften anzugehen. Gerade nach solchen Anschlägen fordert unsere Demokratie Respekt für Normen und Freiheiten. Dieser Forderung müssen wir nun mit einer breiten sozialen Wende Nachdruck verleihen. ... Die muslimischen Gemeinschaften müssen dabei eine Hauptrolle spielen - nicht weil sie verdächtig sind, sondern weil wir gemeinsam eine Gesellschaft bilden wollen.“

- **Karel Verhoeven**
- [zur Homepage](#)

Teilen auf



[TAGESSCHAU.DE \(DE\)](#) / 22. März 2016

## Hetze gegen Islam ist Nährboden für Terror

Unmittelbar nach den Anschlägen von Brüssel haben zahlreiche Menschen im Netz Stimmung gegen Flüchtlinge und den Islam gemacht. Das ist kontraproduktiv, warnt das öffentlich-rechtliche Portal tagesschau.de:

„Was diese [Kommentatoren] nicht begreifen, ist, dass sie damit das Geschäft der Attentäter betreiben. Das Ziel des selbst ernannten 'Islamischen Staates' ist es schon lange, dass Moslems in den westlichen Gesellschaften möglichst stark an den Rand gedrängt werden. Wer hier keine Chance hat, so das Kalkül, ist leichte Beute für die Terroristen. Abgehängte Viertel wie Molenbeek oder die Pariser Banlieus sind nicht umsonst ideale Brutstätten, um Nachwuchs für den Terror zu rekrutieren. Dass der sogenannte 'Islamische Staat' mit dem Islam von Millionen Moslems wenig zu tun hat, verwischen die Fanatiker bewusst. Wer das Geschäft dieser Terroristen nicht unterstützen will, sucht jetzt erst recht den Schulterchluss mit allen friedliebenden Menschen - egal welcher Religion.“

- **Monika Wagener**
- [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



[NOVI LIST \(HR\)](#) / 23. März 2016

## Angriff auf die tolerante Gesellschaft

Hetze gegen Muslime infolge der Brüsseler Anschläge könnte einen Keil zwischen Christen und Muslime treiben, fürchtet die linksliberale Tageszeitung Novi list:

„Jetzt wird wieder die anti-muslimische Hysterie aufwind bekommen, dabei ist es doch gerade eines der Hauptziele der Terroristen, Spannungen zwischen Christen und Muslimen zu schaffen. Das Ziel der Bombenleger von Brüssel waren nicht die Christen und ihr Gott, sondern die Idee, dass Christen, Muslime und Anhänger anderer Glaubensrichtungen in Europa zusammenleben können. Miteinander oder Nebeneinander, aber in jedem Fall ohne sich gegenseitig abzuschlachten. Die Idee von Toleranz und Zusammenleben ungeachtet der religiösen und nationalen Zugehörigkeit - ist das nicht der eigentliche Kern des vereinten Europas? Eine Idee, die angesichts einer Ideologie der Intoleranz, der Ausschließlichkeit und der Panik zu scheitern droht.“

- **Denis Romac**
- [zur Homepage](#)

Teilen auf



**NEWS.BG (BG)** / 22. März 2016

## **Liberaler Weicheier gefährden Sicherheit der EU**

Nach den Attentaten in Brüssel fragt das Nachrichtenportal News.bg wütend:

„Madrid, London, Paris, Brüssel: Was muss noch alles geschehen, damit die politische Elite Europas endlich die Sicherheit ihrer Bürger zu ihrem Anliegen macht, anstatt nur von der Erhaltung von Werten zu sprechen? Die Werte, Prinzipien und demokratischen Grundlagen unserer Gesellschaften sind das Papier nicht wert, auf dem sie geschrieben sind, wenn wir nicht bereit sind, sie zu verteidigen. Europa, das der Welt die moderne Zivilisation geschenkt hat, die Menschenrechte, den Respekt vor der Freiheit, ist zum Gespött geworden für arrogante Diktatoren, mit denen Merkel und Co. glauben, Abkommen schließen zu können. Die Rettung liegt nicht in der Wiedererrichtung nationaler Grenzen. Die Rettung liegt darin, dass wir an die Spitze Europas wieder Menschen wählen, die die Kraft und den Willen haben, Europa zum Sieg zu führen gegen die dritte satanische Anti-Utopie, der es in den vergangenen 100 Jahren anheimfällt.“

- **Ognyan Mintchev**
- [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



**BASLER ZEITUNG (CH)** / 23. März 2016

## **Europa ist mit seinem Latein am Ende**

Die Anschläge von Brüssel zeigen die Hilflosigkeit westlicher Staaten gegenüber den IS-Terroristen, meint die rechtskonservative Basler Zeitung:

„Solcher Wahnsinn, so scheint es, kann weder mit Bomben unsererseits noch mit Hätschel-Sozialpolitik, noch mit Geheimdienstmassnahmen und dem Verwandeln von Städten in Hochsicherheitszonen bekämpft und ausgerottet werden. Und das Implantieren einer humanistischen Vernunft oder von, ja, Anstand, das Bekanntmachen des Unterschiedes von Schuldigen und Unschuldigen verspricht bei diesen Verblendeten in etwa so viel Erfolg, wie aus einer Bombe eine Friedenstaube zu basteln. Es spielt auch keine Rolle, wie viel Mitschuld die westliche Politik am Terror in Europa trägt, weil es nichts gibt, was solche Massaker im Namen Allahs oder von sonst was rechtfertigen würde. So sieht es aus, heute am 23. März 2016: Wir sind am Ende unseres Lateins, wir sind besiegt.“

- **Michael Bahrerth**
- [Zum Originalartikel](#)

Teilen auf



**BLOG CSIBAKATALIN (HU)** / 22. März 2016

## **Belgier reagieren auf Terror wie Manneken Pis**

Trotz der verheerenden Anschläge in Brüssel sind die Belgier in verblüffender Weise gelassen geblieben, meint die in Brüssel lebende Bloggerin Katalin Csiba in ihrem Blog:

„In einem sind die belgischen Staatsbürger besonders zu bewundern. Sie verfallen nicht in Panik. Es ist denn auch schwierig, sie zu erschrecken. Kennen Sie den Manneken Pis, das nationale Symbol? Ich habe irgendwie das Gefühl, dass die Belgier die Haltung des kleinen Jungen mit langem Strahl auch gegenüber den Terroristen an den Tag legen. ... Sie haben aus unerklärlichen Gründen keine Angst. Und diese verblüffende Angstlosigkeit ist in der gesamten Stadt spürbar. ... Die Kraft der Furchtlosigkeit ist insofern enorm wichtig, als sie dabei hilft, die Muslime und Flüchtlinge vor jenen skrupellosen Politikern in Belgien zu schützen, die sie nun wohl wieder heftig unter Beschuss nehmen werden.“

## Terrorist attacks in Brussels

A series of attacks in Brussels on Tuesday has left at least 34 people dead and 230 injured. The IS terrorist organisation has assumed responsibility for the attacks at Brussels Airport and in a metro station. Commentators criticise the Belgian police and intelligence services and many call for a calm response to these latest attacks.

OPEN/CLOSE ALL QUOTES

**THE INDEPENDENT (GB)** / 23 March 2016

### Paying for the Belgian state's failures

The years of tension between Belgium's different regions have done much to weaken the country, the centre-left daily The Independent contends:

“In the past two decades, parts of the federal Belgian state have fallen into chaos and disrepair as real political power, and patronage, passed to the language-based regional structures of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. Co-operation between police forces, and between police and intelligence and security forces, has become a standing joke. The festering radicalism of Muslim-dominated boroughs in Brussels, like Molenbeek, went unchallenged. ... Ultra-nationalists in France and anti-Europeans in Britain can point to Belgium as an example of what happens if a strong sense of national identity dies and strong national institutions fail.”

- [Original article](#)

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**DIE PRESSE (AT)** / 23 March 2016

### Weakened IS more dangerous

The Brussels attacks are the consequence of the military victories against the terrorist Islamic State, the conservative daily Die Presse believes:

“In Syria and in Iraq [the IS] has lost vast areas. It has retreated to its strongholds Raqqa and Mossul to wait for the counter-offensive of Kurdish units and the Iraqi army. But the more the IS falls behind on the battlefields the more it will try to attack 'soft targets' - or in other words carry out attacks in Europe. This strategy aims to divert attention from its defeats and maintain its appeal for foreign fighters. ... In Europe greater efforts must be made to stop young men and women from joining extremist groups. And the authorities must be prepared for further attacks because the IS is fighting for survival in Syria and Iraq. And this could make it even more dangerous in Europe than it was before.”

- **Wieland Schneider**

- [Original article](#)

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**L'OBS (FR)** / 22 March 2016

### Pan-European response to attacks needed

The series of attacks in Brussels is aimed at all of Europe, the centre-left weekly magazine L'Obs is convinced, and urges the European states to deliver a joint and vigorous response:

“No country has sufficient financial or military resources to act alone. ... Faced with a common threat, Europe must come up with a joint response. It must move faster - and further - in the direction of better integration: better control of its external borders; stronger cooperation among police agencies, national justice systems and the intelligence services; a joint plan for the controlling of the illegal trade in weapons; a single voice on the international stage; a stronger social model and measures to combat the neglect of entire neighbourhoods. ... This path is more complex

and harder to follow than nationalist and authoritarian demands. But if the goal is to protect our lives and our values, it is the better path.”

- [Pascal Riché](#)
- [Original article](#)

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[DE STANDAARD \(BE\)](#) / 23 March 2016

## Don't let anger cripple us

Fear and anger must not gain the upper hand after the attacks, the liberal daily De Standaard warns:

“The anger is justified. But it must be channelled into a constructive project. ... We are under attack from those who have chosen to be our enemies, Prime Minister Charles Michel said yesterday. This statement is wise and apt. It is based on self-assurance, and the 'we' admits all those who want to belong to our democracy. But that doesn't ease the tensions. ... We can't counter terrorism without tackling the problem of radicalisation and its breeding grounds in Muslim communities. Especially after such attacks our democracy demands respect for its rules and freedoms. This demand must be given force through broad-based social reform. ... The Muslim communities must play a key role here - not because they are under suspicion but because together we want to build a new society.”

- [Karel Verhoeven](#)
- [to the homepage](#)

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[TAGESSCHAU.DE \(DE\)](#) / 22 March 2016

## Anti-Islam hype a breeding ground for terror

Many people voiced their rejection of refugees and Islam on the Internet immediately after the Brussels attacks. Such messages are counterproductive, the public broadcaster tagesschau.de warns:

“What these people don't understand is that they are only playing into the hands of the attackers. The goal of the so-called 'Islamic State' has long been to see Muslims marginalised as much as possible in Western societies. Those who have no opportunities here will be more open to the terrorists' ideas, or so the reasoning goes. It's no coincidence that neglected neighbourhoods like Molenbeek and the Paris banlieues are breeding grounds for new terrorist recruits. The fanatics are deliberately blurring the fact that the so-called 'Islamic State' has little to do with the Islam practised by millions of Muslims. Those who do not want to support these terrorists should join forces with all peace-loving people - no matter what their religion.”

- [Monika Wagener](#)
- [Original article](#)

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[NOVI LIST \(HR\)](#) / 23 March 2016

## An attack against tolerant society

Inciting hatred against Islam after the Brussels attacks could drive a wedge between Christians and Muslims, the centre-left daily Novi list fears:

“Now the anti-Muslim hysteria will gain fresh impetus even though one of the terrorists' main goals is to create tension between Christians and Muslims. Those who planted the bombs in Brussels were not targeting the Christians and their God but the idea that Christians, Muslims and other religions in Europe can coexist either side by side or in separate communities without slaughtering each other. The idea of tolerance and peaceful coexistence regardless of religious or national background - is this not the very core of a united Europe? An idea that now threatens to fail in the face of intolerance, exclusivity and panic.”



- Denis Romac

- [to the homepage](#)

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**NEWS.BG (BG)** / 22 March 2016

## Liberal softies putting EU in danger

After the attack in Brussels the news portal News.bg asks angrily:

“Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels: what must happen for Europe's political elite to finally start paying attention to the safety of their populations, instead of blabbering the whole time about preserving our values? The values, principles and democratic foundations of our society are not worth the paper they're written on if we're not ready to defend them. Europe, which gave the world modern civilisation, human rights and respect for freedom, has become a source of ridicule for the arrogant dictators with whom Merkel and her clique believe they can sign agreements. Salvation does not lie in re-establishing national borders. It lies in once again electing people to Europe's top posts who have the power and the will to lead Europe to victory against the third Satanic anti-Utopia it has fallen victim to in the past century.”

- Ognyan Mintchev

- [Original article](#)

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**BASLER ZEITUNG (CH)** / 23 March 2016

## Europe at its wits' end

The Brussels attacks highlight the weakness of the states of the West vis-à-vis the IS terrorists, writes the conservative daily Basler Zeitung:

“Neither bombs nor pampering social policy nor counter-intelligence activities nor turning cities into high-security zones can combat or eliminate such madness, it seems. And in the face of such blindness implanting a humanist sense of reason and decency, or teaching the difference between guilty and innocent, promises to be about effective as making a bomb out of doves of peace. Nor does the extent to which Western policies are to blame for the terror in Europe make any difference, because there is nothing that can justify such massacres, whether they are carried out in the name of Allah or anyone else. This is the way it looks on 23 March 2016: we are at our wits' end; we are defeated.”

- Michael Bahnerth

- [Original article](#)

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**CSIBAKATALIN (HU)** / 22 March 2016

## Belgians reacting to terror like Manneken Pis

Despite the devastating attacks in Brussels the Belgians have remained surprisingly calm, Brussels-based blogger Katalin Csiba writes in her blog:

“One thing we must really admire in the Belgian citizens is that they don't panic. They're not easily frightened. Have you heard of Manneken Pis, their national symbol? I somehow get the feeling that the Belgians are adopting the same attitude towards the terrorists as the little boy with his long stream [of urine]. ... For some inexplicable reason they are not afraid. And this astounding lack of fear is tangible all over the city [of Brussels]. ... The power of fearlessness is enormously important because it will help to protect the Muslims and refugees against the unscrupulous politicians in Belgium who will now fiercely attack them.”


143,58

Ex-EZB-Chefvolkswirt Issing

## „Helikoptergeld“ wäre Bankrotterklärung

Soll die Zentralbank Geld verschenken, um die Wirtschaft anzukurbeln? Das ist die Idee hinter dem sogenannten „Helikoptergeld“. Der ehemalige Chefvolkswirt der EZB findet sie „besorgniserregend“.

23.03.2016



© DPA „Was ich vor allem beklage ist, dass die wirtschaftliche Lage in der Welt in ein Chaos hineingeredet wird, von dem keine Rede sein kann“: Otmar Issing

Der ehemalige Chefvolkswirt der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB), **Otmar Issing**, warnt vor Geldgeschenken der Notenbank in Form von „Helikoptergeld“. „Die ganze Idee des helicopter money halte ich für besorgniserregend, für geradezu verheerend. Denn das ist ja nichts anderes als eine Bankrotterklärung der Geldpolitik“, sagte Issing der Deutschen Presse-Agentur in Frankfurt. **„Eine Notenbank, die Geld verschenkt, wird kaum mehr die Kontrolle über die Notenpresse wiedererlangen können.“**

Mit „Helikoptergeld“ sind zielgenaue Finanzspritzen an Unternehmen und Verbraucher direkt von der Zentralbank unter Umgehung des normalen Bankensektors gemeint. **EZB-Präsident Mario Draghi hatte diese Idee auf Nachfrage als „sehr interessantes Konzept“ bezeichnet.** Der Rat der Notenbank habe solche Ideen allerdings bisher nicht genauer erörtert. **„In der Wissenschaft kann man sich alles Mögliche überlegen, da gibt es kein Tabu. Aber diese Debatte hat ja den öffentlichen Raum erreicht. Ich halte das für eine totale Geistesverwirrung“,** kritisierte Issing.

„Technisch gibt es keine Grenze für die Munition, inhaltlich stellt sich schon die Frage, was man mit immer expansiveren Mitteln der Geldpolitik erreichen will. Meine Besorgnis kann ich nicht verhehlen“, sagte Issing, der nach acht Jahren als Chefvolkswirt der Deutschen Bundesbank anschließend in gleicher Position beim Aufbau der **EZB** eine maßgebliche Rolle spielte. **„Was ich vor allem beklage ist, dass die wirtschaftliche Lage in der Welt in ein Chaos hineingeredet wird, von dem keine Rede sein kann“,** betonte der Wirtschaftsprofessor.

143,59

• [OPINION](#)

• [COMMENTARY](#)

## Global Jihad's Deadly Calendar

**There's not a day that goes by without an Islamist attack somewhere.**

Editorial Page Writer Sohrab Ahmari on Tuesday's Islamic State terrorist attacks. Photo credit: Getty Images.

By [SOHRAB AHMARI](#)

Updated March 22, 2016 7:31 p.m. ET

Islamist terror struck at the heart of the European Union on Tuesday. Islamic State jihadists staged a triple-bombing in the Belgian capital—two at the Brussels airport and a third at a metro station downtown—that killed at least 30 people combined. It was the latest reminder that Islamic terrorism is now a permanent and ubiquitous hazard to life in every city, on every continent.

In coming days European authorities will level reproaches about the missed warning signs, security lapses and the larger failure to integrate Belgian Muslims. Commissions will be formed. Sympathetic memes will proliferate on social media. *Je suis Belge*.

This routine has become numbingly familiar. And these habitual responses, while understandable, defer a reckoning with a larger truth: Not a single day now goes by without an Islamist suicide bombing, rocket attack, shooting spree, kidnapping or stabbing somewhere in the world.

Consider the past 10 days.

On *Sunday, March 13*, jihadists sprayed gunfire on sunbathers in Grand Bassam, a resort town in the Ivory Coast popular with Westerners and wealthy Ivorians. The attack, which was claimed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, killed 16 people, including Burkinabe, Cameroonian, French, German, Ivorian and Malian citizens.

On *Monday, March 14*, two Palestinians fired on Israelis waiting at a bus stop in Kiryat Arba, in the West Bank, wounding one soldier before Israeli forces killed both. A third Palestinian terrorist rammed his car into an Israeli army vehicle in the area and was shot dead. Israel has suffered a wave of Arab knife-and-car attacks for six months, known as the stabbing intifada.

On *Tuesday, March 15*, al Qaeda's Somali franchise, al-Shabaab, kidnapped three Red Crescent aid workers in the country's southwest, according to local media. The abductions followed al-Shabaab's seizure of a village in central Somalia, amid a broader Islamist resurgence in the Horn of Africa. The aid workers were freed a day later after local villagers pleaded for their release.

On *Wednesday, March 16*, a pair of female suicide bombers blew themselves up at a mosque in Nigeria, killing 24. No group has claimed credit, but the bombing took place in Nigeria's Borno state, the birthplace of Boko Haram, an Islamic State affiliate that is Africa's most savage terror outfit.

On *Thursday, March 17*, the stabbing intifada claimed a fresh victim when a pair of Palestinian terrorists jumped and wounded an Israeli soldier with a knife in Ariel, in the West Bank. Israeli security forces killed both assailants.

On *Friday, March 18*, suspected al Qaeda fighters fired rockets at the Salah gas facility in Algeria. No one was injured, but BP and Norwegian oil giant [Statoil](#), which operate the facility, withdrew some staff and suspended operations.

On *Saturday, March 19*, a bomb went off in a tony shopping district of Istanbul, killing three Israelis (two of whom were U.S. citizens) and one Iranian, and wounding 39 others. This was the fifth mass-casualty terrorist bombing in Turkey in as many months, most of them claimed by or attributed to Islamic State. The same day, a mortar assault on a checkpoint in El-Arish, Egypt, killed 15 policemen. A Sinai-based Islamic State affiliate claimed responsibility.

On *Sunday, March 20*, al-Shabaab overran a Somali military base just 28 miles from the capital, Mogadishu, killing at least one person and seizing several vehicles. Also on Sunday, the Istanbul governorate canceled a hotly anticipated soccer match after receiving “serious intelligence” regarding a planned terror attack.

On *Monday, March 21*, Islamist fighters likely affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb targeted a hotel in the capital of Mali, Bamako, that houses a European Union military-assistance mission. EU personnel were unharmed, and one attacker was killed by hotel security.

Brussels was the first major terrorist incident in the West since November’s jihadist killing spree in Paris and December’s in San Bernardino, Calif. You could create a calendar like this one that stretches back for weeks and months, and the above doesn’t even include the civil wars and humanitarian calamities in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan.

The Syrian vortex is especially perilous. It has been drawing the barely stable nations that surround Syria into its spin and spewing out battle-hardened jihadists along with millions of legitimate refugees. The biggest refugee crisis since World War II was bound to pose serious security threats to Europe. Meanwhile, the longer Islamic State and al Qaeda thrive in Syria and Iraq, the stronger their adherents and affiliates elsewhere will become.

*Mr. Ahmari is a Journal editorial writer based in London.*

## Defeats in Mideast Raise ISIS Threat to the West

Peril grows even as military campaigns against the group show signs of progress



ENLARGE

A woman covers her face Wednesday near the Maelbeek subway station in Brussels as she reacts to the previous day's attacks in the Belgian capital. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

By [YAROSLAV TROFIMOV](#)

Updated March 23, 2016 10:24 a.m. ET

BAGHDAD—When European Islamists started streaming into Syria and Iraq a few years ago, some European counterterrorism officials viewed it as a blessing in disguise. Better to have them pulverized on a Middle Eastern battlefield, they argued, than dispersed and plotting mischief at home.

Today, that battlefield has become more dangerous than ever for Islamic State, which is being buffeted by U.S.-backed military campaigns in Syria and Iraq. **While Islamic State isn't facing imminent collapse, one consequence of this battering is that trained and battle-hardened foreign fighters from Europe are more likely to [head back to home ground](#).**

That is the alarming paradox of the U.S.-led campaign against the radical group: In the months and even years ahead, an Islamic State faced with defeat in a conventional war may pose a far greater danger to the West than when it was focused on conquering villages in the Euphrates river valley or the hill country of Aleppo.

"It's going to get worse before it gets better," said Bruno Tertrais, senior fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris and a former policy adviser at the French Defense Ministry.

"If you manage to deflate Islamic State's narrative of inevitable expansion, this would eventually reduce its attractiveness, at least for some recruits. But in the short term, as it finds itself in difficulty on one field, it will try attacking another," Mr. Tertrais said.

In the long run, of course, protecting Europe and the U.S. completely from the kinds of [attacks in Brussels](#) and Paris is impossible without strangling Islamic State in its cradle.

"The frequency and magnitude of these operations is increasing as refugees are flooding Europe and elsewhere, and as [Islamic State] recruits and brainwashes people already in Europe," said Ayad Allawi, the former Iraqi prime minister who heads a major parliamentary bloc. "This will have to be dealt with at source, and the source is here in the greater Middle East."

In the region, there is no doubt that Islamic State's mantra of "persisting and advancing," which fueled its aura of invincibility just a year ago, no longer reflects reality on the ground.

In Iraq, Islamic State has lost some 40% of its territory, as government security forces, aided by the U.S., slowly close in on the group's stronghold of Mosul in northern Iraq and make major advances in Anbar province following the retaking of Ramadi.

In Syria, too, Kurdish militias in recent weeks have pushed closer to Islamic State's de facto capital of Raqqa, while the moderate opposition has made gains in northern Aleppo and Russian-backed regime forces advance to the outskirts of Palmyra.

Probably Islamic State's highest-ranking foreign fighter, a former Georgian soldier known as Abu Omar al Shishani, was killed in a recent U.S. airstrike.

"ISIS was born in Iraq and Syria, and it is getting defeated in Iraq and Syria," a senior European official said.

Islamic State, however, has shown itself resilient and adaptable, and is far from being vanquished. Emile Hokayem, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Bahrain, said conventional measures of battlefield progress against it may be misleading.

"If you measure the campaign against ISIS in terms of loss of territory or number of fighters killed, these are reassuring metrics but they don't tell us much," he said. "A group like ISIS will morph and transform, and it will become more lethal in other battlefields."

At least 5,000 people from Western Europe have traveled to fight with Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and several hundred of them since returned to Europe, according to Western officials. Many others have moved to Islamic State's new North African strongholds in Libya, much closer to Europe's shores.

"You now have the phenomenon of these returnees in Europe. While Western governments have been aware of it for some time, there is a degree of critical mass now in the scale of these returns, and that is very alarming," said Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for the Near East.

The carnage in Brussels on Tuesday and in Paris in November demonstrated the ability of these networks to inflict mass casualties in the heart of Europe despite massive counterterrorism and intelligence efforts deployed against the group. These sophisticated, complex attacks wouldn't have been possible without the training received in Islamic State camps in Syria or Iraq, said Guido Steinberg, expert at the German Institute for International and Strategic Affairs and former adviser on international terrorism at the chancellery in Berlin.

No matter how crucial it is to roll back Islamic State-controlled territory, doing so would no longer be sufficient, he said.

"We're already late. ISIS has been training people for two years now, and there is such a tremendous number of Europeans there," Mr. Steinberg said. "It's extremely dangerous both because of the sheer number of people, which is unprecedented, and because it is clear that the organization has made a strategic decision to attack Europe."

143,63

**The New York Times (web site)**

Wednesday, March 23, 2016 - 18:01 UTC -0400

## **As Terrorists Cross Borders, Europe Sees Anew That Its Intelligence Does Not**

By ADAM NOSSITER

PARIS — If another example of the failure of European intelligence services to share and act on information about potential terrorists was needed, Wednesday's identification of the bombers in the deadly Brussels attacks the day before certainly provides it.

At least one of the attackers, Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, had been deported by Turkey to the Netherlands last year with a clear indication that he was a jihadist.

“Despite our warnings that this person was a foreign terrorist fighter,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey told a news conference in Ankara on Wednesday, “the Belgian authorities could not identify a link to terrorism.”

By now it is abundantly clear that the terrorists who work for the Islamic State think, cooperate and operate across borders, ignoring national boundaries. The increasingly urgent question for Europe in its struggle against them is, Can it do the same?

The outlook is not promising. On Wednesday there were renewed calls for a pan-European intelligence agency that would effectively share information from different countries. Members of the European Parliament took to the airwaves and print to denounce, again, the lack of coordination.

Yet the hurdles are as basic as national pride and bureaucratic turf protection, with experts pointing out that even within nations, intelligence-gathering agencies — France alone has some 33 of them — have trouble cooperating.

“Is it not in the nature of intelligence agencies to keep the information for themselves?” asked Jean-Marie Delarue, who until recently headed the French agency that reviews surveillance requests from these intelligence services.

“Information is power,” Mr. Delarue said in a recent interview. “In intelligence, one only has enemies, no friends.”

Cross-border cooperation would probably have helped prevent Tuesday's attacks. Mr. Erdogan said Wednesday that both the Netherlands and the Belgian authorities had been informed of Mr. Bakraoui's deportation, since he was a Belgian citizen.

What intelligence services in either country did with that information — and whether they shared it with one another or neighboring countries — was not immediately clear.

Yet it is certain that the absence of inter-European help was deeply harmful not only in Brussels but also in staving off the massacres in Paris last November.

The Paris plotters slipped easily in and out of Europe, then hatched their plans in one country, Belgium, before carrying them out in another, France. Then one slipped across the border again, taking advantage of the openness that is foundational to the European Union.

“We were victims of solidarity with the European Union,” Mr. Delarue said of the Paris attacks.

“We think there should be cooperation,” he added. “We rely on what the other countries give us. We are dependent on what they give us. And I don’t think the Belgians gave us precise information.”

A former top official with France’s external intelligence agency, Alain Juillet, said that the “big lesson” was to “restore the frontiers and establish better cooperation.”

“There needs to be a permanent liaison with the Belgians,” he added.

But if neighbors with a common language, a long common border, and common enemies cannot work together, who can?

Europe has had a “counterterrorism coordinator” for much of the last 10 years, but this fact-finding institution was dismissed as “weak” in a recent French parliamentary report, and as “having no operational capacity to offer.”

In the absence of an effective centralized European counterterrorism agency, it is up to the member states to cooperate with one another. Yet they do so only haphazardly.

There are plenty of databases, for instance, but the information they contain is either incomplete or inaccessible, numerous officials complained.

A fundamental one that contains criminal suspects’ surveillance records — the Schengen Information System, or SIS — is only weakly supported by most of the member countries. The French parliamentary report last month said that the French internal intelligence agency “is the only one that regularly feeds this database,” and criticized “the very spotty nature of the information furnished by” other European nations.

“There is nothing automatic about what goes into the SIS,” said François Heisbourg, a French intelligence expert. He said that a decade of European squabbling over the issue had still not resulted in the creation of a minimal tool, the Passenger Name Record, of airplane travelers.

In addition, European Union rules forbid the use of the SIS system for spot-checks on individuals at Schengen’s borders, according to the parliamentary report.

“On the one hand, there is a tension between the need to cooperate, which is recognized,” said Thomas Renard, a terrorism expert at Belgium’s Egmont Institute. “On the other hand, there is the lack of confidence that the different services have in each other.”

“Everyone knows we need to work together,” he added. “But for each specific case, they will say, ‘We can’t give up the information, because we are still working on the investigation.’”

It is not just the main SIS database that is woefully lacking.

Some 5,000 European Union citizens are known to have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join the Islamic State and other groups. Yet the Europol database “contains only 2,786 verified foreign terrorist fighters entered by E.U. member states,” the counterterrorism coordinator pointed out in a recent report.

“I think the biggest problem lies in the different levels of professionalism among the security services in Europe,” Guido Steinberg, of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told German public broadcaster ARD on Wednesday.



“We have an enormous number of well-equipped states such as France and Great Britain, to those who are weaker such as Germany, to those who are completely overwhelmed such as Belgium,” Mr. Steinberg said.

Another European database contains 90,000 fingerprints “but there is no search possibility yet,” the counterterrorism coordinator pointed out.

“We must have a permanent exchange on the European level,” Elmar Brok, a European Parliament member close to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, told ARD Wednesday.

The February French parliamentary report ruefully acknowledged, without citing a specific assault, systematic “gaps in the transmission of information, which, if they had been realized in time, could have forestalled the attack” in Paris.

The cross-border cooperation failures in the case of the November Paris attacks are a telling case study.

Ex-intelligence officials here said that the Belgians were apparently unaware that the presumed ringmaster of the attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, one of the most wanted terrorists in Europe, was on their soil before the attacks.

Mr. Abaaoud had indeed boasted, both in the Islamic State magazine and to a cousin, Hasna Aïtboulahcen, about how easy it was for him to slip in and out of Europe.

“These were people who crossed frontiers, and they weren’t even seen,” said Mr. Juillet, the ex-official in the French foreign intelligence agency.

Bernard Squarcini, ex-head of French internal intelligence, asked, “What did the foreign intelligence service give us, what did the Belgian agencies give us?”

“Either we get organized, or we get eaten up,” Mr. Squarcini said.

**The New York Times (web site)**

Tuesday, March 22, 2016 - 18:24 UTC -0400

## **Editorial: Standing With Brussels Against Terrorism and Fear**

The impulse to rein in civil liberties and freedoms after a barbaric attack only serves the terrorists'

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD

This time the bombs exploded in Brussels, at the airport and on a metro train, brutally snuffing out at least 30 lives and wounding hundreds. The airport and much of the city were shut down, the police dragnets spread and the anguished questions arose: Why? How did the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility, plan this attack? Was this retaliation for the arrest last week of the last surviving Paris bomber? What have we missed?

With time we will have some answers, but in the end they are details to the central fact: Brussels, Europe, the world must brace themselves for a long struggle against this form of terrorism. That means intensified counterterrorism efforts and a far higher degree of cooperation among threatened nations. That means courage and steadfastness in the face of a threat that will take many years to eliminate. It emphatically does not mean hysterical fearmongering of the sort promptly voiced by politicians like Donald Trump.

**On the most immediate level, security operations in Belgium must be raised to a far higher standard. Brussels is best known as the de facto capital of Europe, but it is also fast becoming the capital of Islamic radicalism in Europe. Compared with other European countries, Belgium is the biggest per capita provider of fighters to Syria; several of the killers in last November's terrorism attacks in Paris came from the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek, and it was there last week that the police finally captured Salah Abdeslam, a Belgian-born French citizen of Moroccan ancestry, thought to be the only surviving perpetrator of those attacks.**

**Yet Belgium has a notoriously weak counterterrorism apparatus, and the deep divide between the country's French and Flemish populations has further weakened federal institutions such as the police, the judiciary and intelligence services.** The authorities quickly shut down the airport and much of the city after the attack, **but the country must seriously bolster its security services, drawing on its European neighbors for experience and help.**

**With porous internal borders in Europe, security simply cannot be left in the scattered and ill-coordinated condition that exists today.** Yet sound preparations and police work can never eliminate the possibility of a murderous zealot with a belt of explosives.

**The impulse after a barbaric attack is always to rein in civil liberties and freedoms.** In the United States, the Patriot Act hurriedly enacted after the attacks of 9/11 led to abuses of the surveillance powers granted to the government. **The French government declared a controversial state of emergency hours after the Paris attacks in November, which has been extended into May.** In the wake of the Brussels attacks, Mr. Trump was quick to renew his calls for keeping Muslim refugees out of America and for a revival of torture, while his rival Senator Ted Cruz called for police patrols in Muslim neighborhoods in the United States.

**But such measures only serve the terrorists' end, which is to weaken Western society by spreading fear and panic, turning citizen against citizen, feeding xenophobic sentiments and further alienating and radicalizing Muslim youths. Changes to security, policing and investigative practices are necessary, but they must be made cautiously, after serious debate and with due regard for civil rights and the law.**

The Belgian people and their European neighbors have responded to this latest act of murder with solidarity in sorrow and determination to persevere. Authorities must do everything in their power to apprehend the perpetrators and to defend against more such acts. **But the response to terrorism must also be a reaffirmation of core democratic values and a rejection of demagogues and xenophobes who would exploit public fears and tears.**

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# Europe's Underbelly: Brussels Is the Ultimate Soft Target

A Commentary by [Peter Müller](#) in Brussels

**The terrorists on Tuesday clearly wanted to target the heart of the European Union. But there was another reason they chose Brussels. Nowhere in Europe is it easier to plan and carry out a terrorist attack.**

They were so proud last Friday when police managed to apprehend Salah Abdeslam. Finally, Europe's most-wanted terrorist was locked away. The Belgian government was so relieved that they immediately released a photo to the world showing Prime Minister Charles Michel, with French President François Hollande seated next to him, speaking on the phone with US President Barack Obama. Both congratulated the Belgian leader on the investigation's success.

**And now this.**

Not four days later, all that remains of that feeling of triumph is a bitter aftertaste. At least 31 people were killed and 230 injured in attacks on the airport and on a subway station in the heart of the European quarter on Tuesday. **Belgium simply can't seem to get a grip on its terror problem. At least when it comes to the Belgian security apparatus, the small country in the center of Europe is essentially a failed state.**

There will be much written about how the terrorists targeted Europe's heart and why they put a bull's eye on the European Union and its capital. None of that is incorrect, but it misses the larger point.

**In truth, the attackers didn't target Brussels because the EU is based here. They targeted Brussels because nowhere else in Europe is it so easy to plan and carry out an attack.**

## Europe Condensed

**Brussels is a great city.** It is a place where the French mix with the Congolese, EU bureaucrats with Moroccans, young anarchist artists with established gallery owners -- and it has a wild concert scene. Over a morning coffee, one speaks French, at lunch it's English and in the evening, beer in hand, German. **It is Europe condensed into a single city.**

The people here don't despair of Belgium's often impenetrable bureaucracy. Instead, they undermine it with a significant helping of humor and charm. Brussels is a lively village, a place where it is easy to find friends. **Not even the so-called jihadist stronghold of Molenbeek, by now notorious the world over, is a ghetto. It is separated only by a canal from the popular nightlife district of Dansaert.**

**Unfortunately, though, the city is also a good place for people looking to hide or to plan deadly attacks. Some neighborhoods in the city (not just Molenbeek) have become home to radicalized milieus, which makes life easier for criminals and terrorists, as do fragmented political structures and a splintered police apparatus. Describing the situation as Kafkaesque hardly does it justice. It's not a coincidence that the trail of most large terror attacks in recent years has led back to Brussels: from the train attack in Madrid in 2004 to *Charlie Hebdo* and the Nov. 13 attacks in Paris.**

Of course it would be unfair to say that Brussels alone is to be blamed for the fact that violence-prone Islamists have made the city their home. But it would also be incorrect to say that Brussels and its Byzantine structures (19 municipalities and six police departments) are blameless.

## Undisturbed by the Authorities

**Belgium's society, government and structures spent years, perhaps decades, underestimating the problem posed by violent Islamists. Salah Abdeslam, who was involved in the Paris attacks, was able to hide out here for four months after the attack with friends, family and acquaintances. He was even seen at the barber getting his hair cut and at a shop buying clothes. Apparently nobody thought to notify the police.**

Accomplices of those who carried out the Paris attacks were apparently able to spend months planning new horrors, undisturbed by the authorities -- attacks that seem to have been hurriedly carried out on Tuesday. **That demands an explanation, as does the fact that Belgium, relative to its population, sends more young Islamist radicals into the Syrian civil war than any other European country.**

Ever since the attacks in Paris, Belgians have been concerned that they too could be targeted. Now they have been. The people of Brussels have been astonishingly calm in the face of violence. People have taken stranded tourists into their homes and teachers wrote emails to parents on Tuesday evening assuring them they would do all they could to make the last three days before Easter vacation as normal as possible for the children. It shows the people's courage.

**Unfortunately, the brave Belgians don't have the government they deserve.** Since the attacks in Paris, Belgian officials and politicians have seemed unable to cope. **That applies not just to the terror investigations; it also applies to the way in which the authorities have communicated with the populace.** Last November, the government put Brussels on lockdown and the terror alert was raised to its highest level, as it was after Tuesday's attacks. Schools and subways remained closed. But it was never communicated where the danger was coming from and how people should act. The result was that schools reopened of their own accord even as the terror alert remained extreme.

Now we are seeing a repeat. **Last weekend, the Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders said that Abdeslam had been "ready to restart something from Brussels."** How are people supposed to deal with a statement like that? **Don't leave the house on Sunday? Ignore panic and take the children to school anyway?**

**Either the authorities know something, in which case they should take swift action. Or they don't know anything, or not enough, in which case they should stop fomenting fear and anxiety. But in Brussels, the government seems primarily worried about itself -- and making sure that, after an attack takes place, they can't be accused of having remained silent.**

*Peter Müller is DER SPIEGEL's Brussels bureau chief.*

## **Tahar Ben Jelloun : « Les parents des terroristes ont leur part deresponsabilité »**

**Pour l'écrivain Tahar Ben Jelloun, les pères et les mères des djihadistes n'ont pas su ou pu transmettre à leurs enfants les valeurs de leur double culture, qui sont pourtant des remparts contre la barbarie.**

Les attentats à Bruxelles sont une suite logique et quasi attendue de ce qui s'est passé le 13 novembre à Paris. C'est une même rage, une haine sans limite de l'Occident qui animent ces enfants européens issus de l'immigration maghrébine. Pourquoi tant de cruauté? Pourquoi ces assassinats aveugles? Comment devient-on un monstre qui sacrifie sa vie en tuant le maximum de personnes autour de soi?

Beaucoup d'éléments et de facteurs divers contribuent à fabriquer un monstre, c'est-à-dire quelqu'un qui renie son humanité et fait le malheur autour de lui. La plupart des terroristes qui ont commis des attentats en Europe sont des enfants d'immigrés. C'est un constat. Ces individus n'ont jamais reçu ou n'ont jamais inculqué les valeurs que porte la civilisation d'où viennent leurs parents. Ces derniers, aussi impuissants que les services de sécurité, ont leur part de responsabilité dans ce qui arrive même s'ils sont plutôt à plaindre. Parce qu'ils n'ont aucune autorité sur leurs enfants, ils ont raté leur éducation. Ils n'ont pas su ni pu leur transmettre la valeur culture, meilleur barrage contre la barbarie. Ils n'ont pas su ni pu les protéger contre le mal absolu, un fanatisme enrobé dans un drap islamiste.

L'immigration est une rupture et un arrachement; c'est comme un arbre qu'on a arraché et qu'on plante dans une autre terre, mais qui tient à peine debout, car à l'instar d'une greffe les racines ne se replantent pas facilement en dehors de la terre d'origine. La culture qu'ils apportent avec eux en terre étrangère tient en peu de chose, elle est assez pauvre, même la religion se résume à quelques rites qui se confondent avec des coutumes et traditions. On peut être illettré et avoir une assise culturelle féconde et solide.

Quand on ne peut pas transmettre à sa progéniture une culture vive et sereine, on se contente de ce qui reste. Place au flou d'une vue brouillée par un environnement pas toujours amical. On est pris par le découragement et peu à peu on renonce à donner à ses enfants les ingrédients d'une éducation forte et utile. On laisse faire la rue, le hasard, le destin. C'est ainsi que les enfants de l'immigration - pas tous, heureusement, mais quelques-uns parmi eux - se trouvent en mal de culture et de valeurs qui les rassurent et leur donnent une sécurité ontologique, c'est-à-dire de leur être et de leur identité.

Une Europe pleine de trous

L'ontologie est ce qui constitue notre être, ce que nous sommes. Notre identité est ce qui nous détermine: un nom, un prénom, une famille, un pays, une nationalité, des références culturelles et éventuellement religieuses, des repères qui rassurent et désignent le chemin à prendre. Si notre être ne sait pas qui il est, d'où il vient et à quelle culture il appartient, il perd l'équilibre et devient disponible pour remplir cette case avec ce qu'on lui proposera.

Les parents ont subi ce qui arrive et se sont tus. Les pères ne furent pas des héros; ils ont renvoyé à leurs enfants une image défaite et d'impuissance. Certains de ces enfants, consciemment ou inconsciemment, ont voulu les «venger» tout en les quittant. Ils ont créé le chaos et le malheur,

tuant des innocents. Je ne suis même pas certain qu'ils pensent ce qu'ils font. Ils ne s'appartiennent plus; ils sont dans un délire qui convient parfaitement à leur état d'esprit qui est plein de trous, des trous béants que le discours religieux va vite combler.

Un certain nombre d'enfants d'immigrés souffrent d'insécurité ontologique et pourtant ils ne prennent pas les armes pour tuer des innocents. C'est là qu'intervient l'Etat islamique avec sa propagande diabolique. Dans ses discours, il parle de vengeance et de mort. Il promet un avenir radieux à ces enfants abandonnés par «l'Europe mécréante», il leur offre une issue, un projet doué d'un sens. Il leur dit: vous n'avez pas trouvé de sens à votre vie, l'Etat islamique vous propose de donner un sens à votre mort en luttant dans la «voie de Dieu» (*fi sabilillah*) qui mène au paradis. Il présente l'Occident comme un pays uniquement matérialiste, sans spiritualité, sans les valeurs divines qui sont le début et la fin de l'humanité.

Ce discours-là, des jeunes gens issus de l'immigration l'entendent et le suivent. Ils étaient disponibles pour le croire et passer à l'action, obéissant aux ordres d'une organisation structurée et qui va jusqu'au bout de ses promesses et de ses menaces. Elle mène une guerre partout où elle trouve des failles.

L'Europe, entité faible et sans consistance, est justement pleine de trous. L'Etat islamique les a investis depuis longtemps. Des soldats, promis au statut de martyr, attendent un signal pour créer le chaos et répandre la terreur. Ils le font sans hésiter ou presque parce qu'on a su les convaincre que mourir c'est mieux que de vivre dans des pays présentés comme «hostiles à leur foi», en outre, ils seront récompensés par Dieu.

**Par Tahar Ben Jelloun**

143,72

## France's National Front

Eyes on the prize

### For Marine Le Pen's party, regional elections are just a stepping-stone

Dec 12th 2015 | HÉNIN-BEAUMONT | From the print edition



IT IS market-day in this red-brick former mining town in northern France. Stall-holders wrap up fat slices of rabbit terrine, or flog discounted hairspray and nail varnish. Outside the town hall, workmen are putting up wooden chalets for the Christmas market. Inside, the National Front (FN) mayor has installed a Nativity scene with life-size figures. French public buildings are meant to be strictly secular, but Steeve Briois insists he is just bringing back a French “tradition”. Last year he was elected mayor with 50.3% of the vote. On December 6th in the same town, Marine Le Pen, the FN leader running for president of the surrounding region, got 59%.

Ms Le Pen heads into the second round of regional elections on December 13th on the back of resounding first-round scores. The far-right FN came top countrywide with 28%, beating its previous national record of 25% in European elections last year, and more than doubling its result in regional elections in 2010. Her party finished first in six of France's 13 regions, including some, such as Burgundy or the Loire valley, with no strong history of supporting the FN. In both Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie, where Ms Le Pen is running, and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in the south, where her niece Marion Maréchal-Le Pen is the candidate, the party grabbed fully 40%.

Up to a point, the French saw this coming. Since she took over in 2011 from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who founded the party in 1972, Ms Le Pen has racked up electoral successes. Polls have long suggested that she could top first-round voting at France's next presidential vote, in 2017, securing a place in the run-off, as her father did in 2002. For months Manuel Valls, the Socialist prime minister, has warned that the FN is “at the gates of power”.

But France has been shaken nonetheless. Unlike Mr Le Pen, who traded in outrage and provocation (and whom she evicted from the party for it), Ms Le Pen is intent on appearing respectable—and on governing. The northern region alone is more populous than Denmark. *Le Monde* called the result an “earthquake”. Mainstream parties are scrambling for a way to thwart her. Mr Valls ordered three Socialist candidates who came third to step down (one refused), and urged voters to back the centre-right instead. For the long-ruling Socialists in the north, asked to tread pavements and hand out leaflets for the centre-right, this was a cruel defeat indeed.

Polls suggest the run-off will be tight, and the FN may struggle to win even a couple of regions. But that would still be historic. Should Ms Le Pen or her niece fail to win, the party will play the victim card and denounce the ruling elite for ganging up on it. In his turreted grey-stone town hall, Mr Briois says with a grin: “We win either



way.” For these elections are part of a long-term strategy: to build up a network of local officials, and a record of government, as a stepping-stone to the Élysée Palace. An FN poster says it all: *Marine, présidente*.

To this end, Ms Le Pen has distanced herself from the ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic rhetoric of her father and told her 11 FN mayors to concentrate on making their towns work properly. In Hénin-Beaumont, where she was once a councillor, the Nativity scene—a thinly veiled reaffirmation of Catholicism—is about the most controversial move by Mr Briois, along with a cut to subsidies for a human-rights group. The Christmas market is popular; so are policies such as installing more speed bumps. “He’s put in more flowers and mended the roads,” says Mahir Kurtul, who runs a Turkish kebab shop. “Maybe they want it to be a model for the FN.”

### **Le Pen, mightier than the scimitar?**

Above all, there seems to be an urge for an alternative to the Fifth Republic’s two-party dominance. Recent crises over migrants and terrorism have played into Ms Le Pen’s hands. For years she has been treated as hysterical by polite society for railing against radical mosques and leaky borders. An FN election poster in the Paris region trades on fear of Islamism by portraying a woman in a face-covering burqa. Yet today it is a Socialist president, François Hollande, who has introduced a state of emergency, reintroduced border controls and shut down three Islamist mosques.

Still, there is also popular disillusion with the unkept promises of the Paris-based elite. Unemployment rose in the third quarter to 10.6%, its highest level for 18 years. The FN is now the most popular party among working-class voters and those who left school without qualifications—the “forgotten people of the republic”, says Ms Le Pen. Next to a former president (Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the centre-right) and the current one (Mr Hollande), Ms Le Pen, who learned politics at her father’s knee, appears positively fresh. “We’ve tried the right, we’ve now got the left, why not try something else?” shrugs a voter at a café in Hénin-Beaumont.

The FN’s success in playing the people against the elites is confounding not only the left. Mr Sarkozy’s refusal to withdraw candidates in order to block the FN has dismayed those in the party who fear it hands the moral high ground to the left. Between Mr Hollande’s tough security line and Ms Le Pen’s anti-immigration agitation, Mr Sarkozy’s space has been squeezed. Whatever the final result, both left and right have some deep thinking to do. “People see Marine Le Pen as a life-belt,” says a forlorn Eugène Binaisse, the former left-wing mayor of Hénin-Beaumont. “It’s dramatic what’s happening to France.”

**The New York Times (web site)**

Thursday, March 24, 2016 - 03:21 UTC -0400

## **Contributing Op-Ed Writer: Can the European Center Hold?**

**The Brussels attacks may be the last step toward the dissolution of the dream of Continental integration.**

By JOCHEN BITTNER

*Jochen Bittner is a political editor for the weekly newspaper Die Zeit and a contributing opinion writer.*

Hamburg, Germany — “RUN!” shouts a voice, captured, for all the world to hear, on cell phone images shot in the seconds after two bombs exploded at Brussels Airport on Tuesday morning. Travelers from around the world flee a shattered building, fearful of more bombs.

The videos from Brussels are a momentous shock, but also a momentous reflection of a state of mind. Run! Get away from this madness.

**The bombings, as well as a third inside a Brussels subway car, hit the capital of the European Union at a time when its member states themselves had begun to fear the increasingly shaky supranational construction they had spent decades building. They fear that the union is being pushed into chaos by Germany, its de facto leader, whose bounteous generosity toward migrants is attracting the terrorists of today and tomorrow.**

Everyone has his own solution, none of them good. Eastern European leaders have come up with an easy equation: No Muslim immigration equals no terrorist attacks. **On Wednesday, Poland said it was shutting its doors. Why, these countries ask, should we be forced to repeat Western Europe’s mistake: preach religious tolerance, embrace multiculturalism and end up with hate-breeding parallel societies?**

The skeptical **British**, meanwhile, wonder why they should have to fund, and depend on, Europol, the union’s weak security agency — and have to work with countries like **Germany, which seem allergic to any sort of surveillance**. Better, they feel, to leave the union, retake control over their own security, and rely instead on the world’s most powerful intelligence alliance, the American-led “Five Eyes.”

And so the detonations continue. **Should the British vote in June to leave the union — the so-called Brexit — other nations, such as Hungary and Poland, will be tempted to follow.** The European Union could dissipate faster than even its detractors could have dreamed.

**So are Germany’s critics right? Is it reasonable to pull up the drawbridge?**

In a way, the very question shows the disproportionality of the thought — unless you think it’s worth sacrificing 60 years of peace and international cooperation to the depredations of terrorists. It’s what they want; European disunity, confusion and extremism put them a step closer to the all-out war between Muslims and non-Muslims they so desperately seek.

**And yet the opposite of anger, apathy and self-delusion, is also the wrong answer. For the sake of social peace, after the Sept. 11 attacks, and later after the Madrid and London bombings, we told ourselves that Islam and Islamism had nothing to do with each other. But sadly, they do. The peaceful religion can sometimes serve as a slope into a militant anti-Western ideology, especially when this ideology offers a strong sense of belonging amid the mental discomfort of our postmodern societies.**

**Brussels in particular is a city of bubbles, with parallel communities untouched by any sense of national identity.** When I was a correspondent there, the sharp difference between the prosperous city center and its depressed western and northern fringes, where a majority of the city's poor immigrants live, represented the worst kind of ghettoization. **And it mirrored Belgium's national split, between Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking Walloons, making it difficult to direct allegiance anywhere.** As a Walloon socialist told King Albert I in 1912: **"Il n'y a pas des Belges" — There are no Belgians.**

**In turn, Belgium's predicament mirrors Europe's. Official Europe has worked hard to move past nationalism, so that there is no German or French Dream. But there's no European Dream, either, not yet. So new migrants have no spirit to tap into, as they do in the United States. Instead, some Muslims find it more attractive to give their loyalty to Allah, their fellow believers or the Islamic State.**

Intelligence services estimate that up to **6,000 jihadists from Western Europe have traveled to join the Islamic State.** This enormous figure does not illustrate merely the failures of integration policy. It also **shows the failure of mainstream European Muslims to keep their youth immune from extremism.**

A result of this mutual apathy is **too many Islamists, and too few police and intelligence officers — particularly in Belgium, but not just there.** **We may have a common European currency, but we still do not have a common European terrorism database. Islamists in Western Europe seem better coordinated than the European authorities hunting them.**

There are serious grounds for the alienation between the German chancellor, **Angela Merkel**, and her European partners. There are many practical things she can do in response, but also some big-picture steps. She should speak honestly about Europe's illusions, past and present. She should lead Europe past its outmoded data-protection concerns and push for coordination among security services. **And she should make integration and opportunity a common value for everyone in Europe — a European dream that is more appealing to immigrants than any afterlife kingdom could possibly be.**

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## **Editorial: Steps That Europe Must Take Now After Brussels**

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD

The nature and full extent of the connection between the terrorist attacks in Brussels on Tuesday and the arrest, last Friday, of Salah Abdeslam, suspected of handling the logistics in November's Paris attacks, is still unknown. Didier Reynders, Belgium's deputy prime minister, said Mr. Abdeslam was planning to "restart something" in Brussels.

What is known is that Mr. Abdeslam had been the subject of a worldwide manhunt since November, hiding out in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels where he grew up and easily eluding authorities in a city where police and intelligence agencies are fragmented, fractured by language differences and badly in need of repair.

Beyond an obvious need to improve policing in Belgium, the European Union must quickly tighten security at airports, in train stations, and in urban metro and intercity rail systems. On Tuesday, the French interior minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, announced that France was ordering 1,600 police officers to guard border crossings and transportation hubs. Germany announced that it, too, was clamping down on its border with Belgium.

**Belgium and France have increased counterterrorism efforts. But often, these efforts are plagued by interagency rivalries for legal, practical or territorial reasons. E.U. members have yet to fully carry out the European Agenda on Security directive, adopted by the European Commission last April, which is specifically intended to improve counterterrorism cooperation among European nations and to criminalize activities like traveling abroad for terrorist purposes.**

**And even stronger measures won't work unless attention is paid to the causes that make too many young European citizens of immigrant origin vulnerable to the lure of the Islamic State**, which claimed responsibility for the Paris and Brussels attacks. The profile that has emerged of the terrorists involved in recent attacks is of **young men, born in Europe, who grew up in poor, Muslim-majority immigrant neighborhoods and who had engaged in petty crime and drug dealing before turning to terrorism.**

In these neighborhoods, the police are typically seen as threats, which only makes apprehending terrorists like Mr. Abdeslam harder. **And relentless ethnic profiling by the police and violent raids on Muslim homes and businesses, as have been taking place in France and Belgium since November, have further alienated these communities.** ??????????????????

But these communities also hold the key to foiling terrorists. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the mastermind of the Paris attacks, was found in a rented apartment just outside Paris after his cousin's friend met him and alerted the French police. Likewise, Mr. Abdeslam was, according to the French newspaper Le Monde, apprehended after he called a friend asking for help finding a hide-out, and that friend alerted the police.

The young woman who turned in Mr. Abaaoud has said she lost her home and her job as a result, and is receiving scant support from French authorities. **Europe's national witness protection programs, where they do exist, do little to protect witnesses and their families, which discourages cooperation with law enforcement.**

While Europe must take urgent action to protect citizens, **the key to thwarting terrorism is to build trust with the vast majority of Europe's Muslim citizens, who are, as Britain's home secretary, Theresa May, said on Wednesday, "as concerned as everybody else" with the terrorist threat.**

## Belgium's Tragic Terror Lessons

Why Brussels has become ground zero for European jihad.

**American Islamic Forum for Democracy Founder and President Dr. Zuhdi Jasser on the ideological war against radical Islam in Europe.**

March 24, 2016 7:11 p.m. ET

Shortly after 9/11, a self-deprecating joke circulated that Belgium was impervious to a similar attack. The terrorists might hop in a cab whose ornery driver would only speak Flemish. Or take the wrong exit in Brussels's confusing underground tunnels. Or board a Sabena jet, only to learn that the bankrupt national carrier had grounded all flights.

**The joke worked because Belgium's dysfunctions were legendary.** Today the dysfunctions remain but the sense of security does not. Following Tuesday's jihadist attacks in Brussels, we've learned that one of the bombers, Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, had been arrested last year by Turkish police near the Syrian border on suspicion of belonging to Islamic State. He was deported to the Netherlands but freed because "Belgium wasn't able to make the terrorism connection," according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Another bomber, Ibrahim's brother Khalid, was wanted on international and European arrest warrants issued last December by a Belgian judge investigating November's terrorist attacks in Paris. Belgian prosecutors had said earlier that neither man had known prior links to terrorism.

Khalid's name was on the lease of a Brussels apartment where police found fingerprints of Salah Abdeslam, the alleged mastermind of the Paris attacks, whose arrest last week may have prompted the Brussels bombers to hasten their plans. Yet Politico quotes three sources as saying Belgian officials questioned Mr. Abdeslam for only an hour after he was captured.

All of this has caused a political storm in Belgium, considering that the Paris attacks made clear that Brussels was ground zero for European jihad. "If you put all things in a row, you can ask yourself major questions" about the government's decisions, admitted Belgian Interior Minister Jan Jambon, whose offer to resign this week was turned down by Prime Minister Charles Michel.

The latest attacks also raise questions about Europe's broader approach to security. Belgium was widely mocked after the Paris attacks when it turned out that a law forbidding police raids between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. may have allowed one of the attackers to escape a police dragnet. The law is finally on its way to the dustbin, but what really needs to go is the mentality that spawned it.

Take passenger name records, or PNR, a plan to collect personal data for any airline traveler in the European Union. Attempts to collect, and share, PNR have been in the works since at least 2007. But the effort has been stalled in the European Parliament, where even the Brussels attacks seem to have made no dent in the thinking of privacy fanatics. "Reflexively demanding for measures of mass surveillance does not prevent such attacks," Jan Philipp Albrecht, a member of the Parliament's Civil Liberties committee, said this week.

Then there is Europe's unwillingness to invest resources in intelligence. The French and British have relatively robust capabilities, but Germany only recently overcame its post-Edward Snowden fit about the U.S. National Security Agency by resuming intelligence sharing with the U.S. after an eight-month break.

The talk now is of breaking down “stove-pipes” currently dividing European intelligence agencies, justice ministries and national police to better track threats. Similar walls between the CIA and FBI were a big reason the U.S. missed the 9/11 plotters, so it’s good to see that Europeans are at last alert to the breadth of the Islamist threat.

Europe will also have to do more to surveil heavily Muslim enclaves such as the Molenbeek neighborhood where Mr. Abdeslam was able to hide for four months. One current difference between ISIS terror in Europe and America is that the U.S. has so far experienced only lone-wolf attacks, since there are few Muslim neighborhoods in the U.S. big enough to support the terror cells that have hit Paris and Brussels. But that could change.

Events in Europe should also remind the U.S. Congress of its mistake last year in replacing the Patriot Act with the weaker Freedom Act. [Ted Cruz](#) is now leading the charge in the wake of Brussels to “patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become radicalized.” But the point of the Patriot Act was to give law enforcement adequate tools to identify terror suspects and prevent attacks without having to “secure” entire neighborhoods.

Any country can be hit, and probably will be, by the spreading jihadist contagion of Islamic State. But the minimum requirement for public safety is to treat terrorism as a systemic national-security threat that requires the full array of intelligence, surveillance and interrogation tools to prevent attacks. Europe is now relearning that lesson, and let’s hope the U.S. doesn’t have to as well.

## Bombings in Brussels

### The new normal

# Europe has suffered another series of murderous attacks by jihadists. They will not be the last

Mar 26th 2016 | [From the print edition](#)



ON THE streets of Brussels they had been dreading the next attack. But when Islamic State (IS) eventually struck, on March 22nd at Zaventem airport and then, just over an hour later, in the city's metro system, anticipation did nothing to diminish the shock or the suffering. As we went to press, the death toll was over 30; at least 200 were injured, some of them critically (see [article](#)). Belgium's prime minister, Charles Michel, called the bombings "blind, violent and cowardly".

Over the coming days Europe will once again pass through terrorism's stages of grief: despair over innocent lives cut short; anger towards the young men and women (some of them citizens) who kill in the name of *jihād*; questions about the grip of the police and intelligence services; and eventually, as news bulletins and headlines subside, a weary resignation.

Yet even now, immediately after the attack, two lessons are clear. One is that, despite being at the top of the most-wanted list for years, IS remains resourceful enough to mount synchronised bombings in the heart of Europe. The other, which flows from this, is that big cities in Europe and America will have to get used to a long campaign of terror in which all are targets.

### Havens and have nots

IS's resilience will cause alarm and rightly so. The Brussels bombers struck days after police arrested Salah Abdeslam, a chief suspect in last year's attacks in Paris in which 130 people died. For four months he had found haven with sympathetic friends and neighbours just a few streets away from his home in Molenbeek, a Brussels suburb. Plainly, some people are prepared to endorse Mr Abdeslam's methods even if they are not yet ready to dip their own hands in their compatriots' blood.

As well as enjoying some support, IS commands expertise and recruits. Across six European countries 18 jihadists are known to be under arrest, suspected of a hand in the Paris attacks. Even so, IS could muster enough jihadists to mount a complex, co-ordinated operation under the nose of the authorities in Brussels, possibly at short notice. French officials have concluded that IS has learnt how to make bombs from commonplace chemicals such as hair dye and nail-polish remover. They have yet to find any of the group's bombmakers and struggle to penetrate the jihadists' communications.

The threat is not about to diminish. Some would-be terrorists will be recruited locally. Thousands of men and women have left Europe for IS's self-styled caliphate in Syria and Iraq, where they have received training and indoctrination. Libya is seething. Al-Qaeda and IS are competing to prove their jihadist credentials. The near-certainty is of more attacks in more cities.

**How should governments respond?** The starting point is an awareness that terrorists set out to provoke an overreaction. They exult when politicians like Donald Trump vow to exclude Muslims from the United States; when leaders from eastern Europe say they will accept migrants from Syria only if they are Christian; or when Marine Le Pen, leader of the French National Front, compares Muslims praying in the street to the Nazi occupation. Such intolerance helps turn discontents into sympathisers and radicals into bombers. Equally, IS rejoices when Western countries dwell on scores of people dying at home rather than the hundreds of Muslims killed by bombs in Beirut and Turkey or the millions mouldering in refugee camps and suffering in Syria's civil war. Policy should aim to split radicals off, not force the mainstream into their arms.

Another priority—which goes some way to preventing an overreaction—is to reassure ordinary people that the government is working to protect them. Some politicians think that popular fears of perishing in a terrorist attack are irrational. Barack Obama, in a recent interview in the *Atlantic*, explained how he likes to remind his staff that more Americans die from falling over in the bath. But terrorism is different from accidental death or even from random murder. The public react to terrorism so strongly because they sense that their government cannot fulfil its basic duty to keep them safe from such enemies. The fear that terrorism provokes is not just a statistical delusion but also an inkling that people who know no limits are organising a conspiracy against the state.

Asked to offer reassurance without straying into overreaction, governments struggle. France, which has suffered grievously in two attacks, is still living under a state of emergency in which the police can search houses without a warrant and place suspects under house arrest. President François Hollande and his prime minister still frequently declare that France is at war. Strong words and the suspension of normal rights were understandable just after the attacks in November. They may now be counterproductive (see [article](#)).

## Grains of sand

The best protection would be peace in the Middle East—a distant dream, alas. The coalition has made progress against IS in its caliphate, which is shrinking and losing people. But eradicating it needs Iraqi troops (as yet unprepared) and ground forces in Syria (as yet non-existent). Meanwhile, IS's ability to command and inspire terrorists will persist and, anyway, the West has its own, self-radicalised jihadists to deal with.

And so the police and intelligence services need to operate in every sphere at home, from surveillance to deradicalisation. One thing that can be fixed quickly is underinvestment. Antiquated IT systems hinder collaboration. The security services also need to penetrate jihadist networks and their supporters, using human recruits and enhanced signal intelligence. Inter-agency co-operation has improved, but privacy-protection still hinders the sharing of data. Jihadists work across borders more easily than the security services do. (Brexit could well be a further obstacle.) Better policing and prisons can help stop petty criminals being radicalised. The economic and cultural isolation of districts like Molenbeek must end. It is a long, hard toil and much of it must go on unobserved—except when it fails.

Many will dread the struggle ahead and regret the never-ending contest between security and liberty. But as long as jihadists threaten the West, there is no escaping the need to act. Welcome to the new normal.



## Brussels bombings

Not again

### After a top fugitive is arrested, jihadists strike once more

Mar 26th 2016 | BRUSSELS AND PARIS | [From the print edition](#)

WHEN the leaders of Belgium and France announced the arrest of Salah Abdeslam on March 18th, they made sure not to sound too triumphant. Mr Abdeslam was Europe's most-wanted terror suspect; he is believed to have been the Islamic State (IS) logistics chief behind the attacks that killed 130 people in Paris in November. But he had evaded a police dragnet in Brussels' Molenbeek district for four months. That suggested shoddy Belgian police work and a deep and dangerous IS network. On March 21st Jan Jambon, Belgium's interior minister, warned that terrorists might strike in response. The next day they did, carrying out suicide attacks at Brussels' Zaventem airport and in a downtown metro station.

The strikes showed the same worrying sophistication as those in Paris. At the airport two jihadists, later identified as brothers, set off bombs in the departure lounge, killing at least 11 people. (Police found and neutralised another bomb; as *The Economist* went to press, they were searching for a third attacker identified as Najim Laachroui, also linked to the Paris attacks.) The bomb an hour later in Maalbeek metro station killed at least 20 people, forcing the evacuation of nearby EU headquarters buildings.

The timing of the attacks is unlikely to have been coincidental. Mr Abdeslam's arrest may have triggered another cell to act on an existing plan. Or perhaps he planned to take part himself, and his capture forced co-conspirators to bring the attack forward. Either way, the sophistication of the attacks suggests that Europe must prepare for a "new normal" of periodic terrorism. On Brussels' Place de la Bourse, where locals gathered after the attacks to light candles and lay flowers, the mood was sombre. "We thought it was over because they caught the terrorist," said one mourner. "Now we know it is not."

Authorities remain optimistic over Mr Abdeslam's arrest because it provides a rare chance to interrogate a prominent living jihadist. France has asked for his extradition, hoping he will fill gaps in what is known about the Paris and Brussels attacks. But what French investigators have learned so far is disturbing. For at least the past three years, IS appears to have been building a network across Europe to carry out terrorist outrages in different cities. Currently 18 people detained in six countries are suspected of helping the Paris attackers. That may be the tip of the iceberg. This week Belgian police identified yet another suspect whom they believe was in telephone contact with the Paris attackers. French investigators have been taken aback by the sophistication of IS operatives. The group's bomb-makers in Europe are apparently able to make explosives using triacetone triperoxide, or TATP, whose precursors can be found in common products such as nail polish remover. Another sign of competent tradecraft is the discipline of their communications. The French authorities had no clue of what was to unfold on November 13th, and there seems to have been no actionable intelligence before the attacks in Brussels. The terrorists apparently use encryption for all their electronic communication. And IS increasingly carries out multiple, sequenced attacks against soft targets to spread confusion and stretch emergency services thin.

The most critical problem European security agencies face in responding to this threat is failure to pool information. In linguistically divided Belgium, inter-agency co-operation is known to be dire. At the European level, Europol, the law enforcement agency of the EU, does a useful job in facilitating information exchange, but it has no executive powers to carry out investigations. And intelligence co-operation had been slowed by the legacy of totalitarianism, which has left many Europeans, the Germans in particular, with a deep aversion to the

surveillance state. France has been pushing hard for a common European registry of passenger names to help track terror suspects' movements ever since the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in early 2015; the European Council agreed to the measure in December. Yet the European Parliament, concerned over data privacy, has failed to ratify it.

A terrorist strike just metres from their own offices may help EU legislators see the urgency. **Yet better security will not heal the social and ethnic divisions that have made Europe fertile ground for Islamic extremism.** In the hours after the attacks, the capital transformed into a diorama of these tensions. In the city centre EU bureaucrats in suits and ties were trapped in their gleaming steel-and-glass offices as police cleared the streets.

Among the run-down brick apartments of the Vierwindenstraat in Molenbeek, meanwhile, where Mr Abdeslam was arrested last week, no one would talk about the bombings. **A middle-aged resident named Mehmet said he understood why local youth turn to extremism: "It's a *poubelle* (dustbin) here." On a nearby garage door, someone had scrawled the words *mort aux keuf* (death to the police).**

143,83

## Attentat après attentat, Daech poursuit son offensive hors de ses frontières

Par [William Plummer](#), [Blandine Le Cain](#)

Mis à jour le 25/03/2016 à 14:09

Publié le 25/03/2016 à 12:09

**FOCUS** - Depuis la proclamation du «califat», l'organisation terroriste multiplie ses attaques hors de la Syrie et de l'Irak. Avec les attentats de Bruxelles, Daech réaffirme sa stratégie de «djihad global», notamment permise par le soutien d'autres organisations djihadistes. Cartes à l'appui, *Le Figaro* fait le point.

Du «djihad régional» au «djihad global». La [série d'attentats qui a touché Bruxelles](#), mardi 22 mars, coûtant la vie à plusieurs dizaines de personnes et en blessant plusieurs centaines, démontre une nouvelle fois la volonté de l'Etat islamique de répandre la terreur au-delà de son territoire d'origine. Dès la proclamation du Califat, le 29 juin 2014, par le leader de l'organisation État islamique (EI), Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, l'idée est claire: régner sur un État musulman s'étendant de l'Afrique du Nord à l'Asie centrale et dans un second temps étendre ses frontières. À cette date, l'organisation terroriste est alors en possession d'un territoire à cheval sur l'Irak et la Syrie.

Très vite, invoquant l'essor d'une coalition internationale destinée à l'éliminer, l'EI internationalise son action. «La marche de l'État islamique ne s'arrêtera pas et son expansion se poursuivra, si Dieu le veut» pouvait-on lire dès juillet 2014 dans la revue de l'EI, [Dabiq](#). Cette stratégie s'est également ressentie dans le recrutement de nombreux combattants étrangers. Plus de 80 nationalités sont représentées parmi les quelque 30.000 djihadistes. «Les combattants étrangers sont dans une perspective beaucoup plus globalisante et peuvent faire pencher la balance vers une extension du conflit», expliquait en juin 2015, [sur Francetvinfo](#), Myriam Benraad, chercheuse spécialiste du Moyen-Orient et auteure de *Irak, la revanche de l'histoire: de l'occupation étrangère à l'État islamique*.

### Une vingtaine de pays visés

Pour parvenir à leur fin, les attentats revendiqués à travers le monde par l'EI se sont nettement multipliés depuis la proclamation du califat. En 2014, d'après le décompte de l'[Institute for the Study of War](#), six pays ont été le théâtre d'actes terroristes contre plusieurs dizaines en 2015 et 2016: la France, avec les attentats de janvier et de novembre 2015, la Belgique, plus récemment, mais aussi les États-Unis, avec la fusillade de San Bernardino en décembre, et de nombreux pays d'Afrique, principalement le Nigeria, où sévit Boko Haram, [affilié à l'EI](#).

### Plus de 1500 victimes en deux ans

L'accent sur l'Europe en termes de propagande et d'actions [est revendiqué](#). Sur ce territoire, les attentats de janvier et novembre 2015 en France, de Copenhague en février 2015 et de Bruxelles mardi ont causé la mort de 168 personnes. Le bilan aurait pu être plus important: plusieurs attaques ont été stoppées avant ou pendant leurs réalisations. De même, les enquêteurs cherchent actuellement à savoir pourquoi l'un des trois terroristes de l'aéroport de Bruxelles a abandonné son sac rempli d'explosifs [alors qu'il contenait la charge la plus lourde](#).

Malgré ces opérations avortées, la Belgique et la France figurent dans les États ayant payé le plus lourd tribut en termes de victimes depuis 2014, après seulement trois attentats. De quoi traduire la violence des attaques. Ces bilans humains restent toutefois inférieurs à ceux, très lourds, du Nigeria et de l'Égypte, pourtant certainement sous-estimés. En Turquie également, la violence de l'offensive de Daech s'affirme particulièrement depuis 2014. Le groupe djihadiste y revendique rarement ses attaques [-son influence est assurée dans tous les cas-](#) mais celles qui lui sont attribuées ont tué plus de 140 personnes. Au total, les attentats recensés sur cette période ont fait au moins 1570 personnes.

*\*Les chiffres du Nigéria, de l'Égypte et de la Libye sont à considérer avec prudence. Les nombreux attentats perpétrés au Nigéria ne sont pas tous recensés. En Égypte, le gouvernement considère une partie des attaques attribuables à Daech comme du «vandalisme», ce qui en masque une partie. Quant à la Libye, la situation instable du pays empêche un recensement exhaustif, de nombreuses actions terroristes relevant d'actes de guerre.*

## Des soutiens multiples

Cette multiplication des attaques s'explique aussi partiellement par le fait que plusieurs organisations islamistes ont rejoint l'action de Daech. Boko Haram donc, mais aussi les «Soldats du califat» ou «Province du Sinaï» sont autant de groupes islamistes **ayant prêté allégeance à l'EI**, qui les a officiellement reconnus. D'autres groupes, sans être officiellement considérés par Daech, ont également apporté leur soutien à l'organisation terroriste. C'est le cas de la «Phalange Okba Ibn Nafaâ» en Tunisie ou du groupe Ansar Dawlat al-Khilafa («les partisans du califat») au Liban.

L'implantation de ces groupes correspond en partie aux zones les plus touchées par des attentats. Le Nigeria, l'un des pays les plus concernés hors Syrie et Irak, subit quasi-quotidiennement des attaques-suicides attribuées à Boko Haram, dont le fief est situé dans l'État de Borno, près de la frontière avec le Tchad. Les revendications officielles sont rares, mais les attentats portent la même signature: des kamikazes, souvent des femmes, souvent très jeunes, qui se font exploser sur des lieux fréquentés comme des marchés ou des points de passage.

En déclenchant une nouvelle attaque terroriste à Bruxelles, mardi, l'EI a réaffirmé cette stratégie de frappes hors de son territoire. Appuyée par ses soutiens dans différents territoires instables, l'organisation se détache du territoire du «califat» pour aller frapper loin et fort, et assurer sa propagande. Avec toujours **l'Europe en ligne de mire**.

## Les sites nucléaires belges, cibles potentielles des terroristes

LE MONDE | 26.03.2016 à 07h50 | Par Marie-Béatrice Baudet



Les indices recueillis au fil de plusieurs enquêtes laissent de moins en moins planer le doute : le nucléaire belge pourrait être l'une des cibles des terroristes. Quatre sites sont potentiellement concernés : les centrales de Tihange et de Doel, le Centre d'études nucléaires (CEN) de Mol, et l'Institut national des radioéléments situé à Fleurus. Tous sont protégés aujourd'hui par des militaires lourdement armés.

Deux éléments appellent en effet à la vigilance. Le premier est une vidéo de dix heures retrouvée lors de la perquisition, le 30 novembre 2015, du domicile bruxellois de Mohamed Bakkali, soupçonné d'être l'un des logisticiens de la cellule de Molenbeek. Le film montrait les allées et venues du physicien qui dirige le CEN, où sont notamment stockées de faibles quantités d'uranium, qui pourraient servir à fabriquer « une bombe sale ». Ce point de l'enquête n'a fuité dans la presse belge qu'en février.

### Craintes de complicités intérieures

Le second concerne le retrait, quelques heures après les attentats du 22 mars, de quatre « habilitations sécurité » accordées à des travailleurs de la centrale de Tihange, près de Liège. L'information a été confirmée, vendredi, lors des auditions de plusieurs membres du gouvernement par une commission parlementaire. Didier Reynders, ministre des affaires étrangères et dont les services pilotent l'Autorité nationale de sécurité (ANS) chargée de délivrer les accréditations, a expliqué devant la commission que trois retraits déjà en cours avaient été accélérés à la suite des attaques terroristes de Bruxelles et qu'un autre avait été décidé en urgence, car un employé avait réagi très positivement aux attentats.

Là réside le danger : des complicités à l'intérieur des sites. Pas question évidemment de négliger l'hypothèse d'une attaque externe – un corps spécial de la police fédérale est en train d'être constitué pour protéger les quatre entités nucléaires – mais, comme l'indique Sébastien Berg, porte-parole de l'Agence fédérale de contrôle nucléaire, « *compte tenu des doubles enceintes, il est invraisemblable qu'un engin explosif placé à l'extérieur des murs d'une centrale puisse causer des dégâts majeurs* ». Pour provoquer une catastrophe, il faut agir au plus près des réacteurs.

Si les noms des quatre personnes privées d'accès n'ont pas été révélés – « *pour des raisons de protection de la vie privée* », indique-t-on à l'ANS -, le député Jean-Marc Nollet, chef du groupe écologiste au parlement, pense en savoir plus. L'élu de 46 ans est l'un des meilleurs experts du nucléaire belge. « *Parmi les hommes exclus du site, il y aurait un contremaître-adjoint, employé d'Electrabel, et deux ouvriers de Cofely Fabricom, une entreprise sous-traitante. Ce qui intrigue le plus, c'est que le contremaître serait le frère d'un des employés de Cofely Fabricom...* » Des frères ? Comme les Kouachi, auteurs de la tuerie à

Charlie Hebdo ? Les Abdeslam ? Les El Bakraoui ? De quoi mettre en alerte les enquêteurs belges si l'information était confirmée.

## Sabotage

Depuis quatre ans, d'autres événements les avaient déjà inquiétés. Ainsi, parmi les premiers combattants du groupuscule salafiste Sharia4Belgium partis pour la Syrie en 2012, on compte un certain Ilyass Boughalab, 24 ans, qui y mourra deux ans plus tard. Auparavant, le djihadiste avait travaillé pendant trois ans à la centrale de Doel pour Vinçotte, l'un des grands noms de la sous-traitance nucléaire en Belgique. C'est aussi à Doel qu'un autre incident s'est produit en 2013 : le licenciement pour «*radicalisation*» d'un ingénieur qui avait refusé de serrer la main à sa supérieure. Or, début 2016, on apprenait que ce cadre formé pour devenir l'un des conducteurs de la centrale, était le beau-frère d'Azzedine Kbir Bounekoub, lui aussi un membre de Sharia4Belgium qui a rejoint la Syrie. Connu sous le nom d'Abou Abdullah, il a appelé après l'attentat en mai 2014 contre le musée juif de Bruxelles, à d'autres actions terroristes en Belgique.

Mais il est une affaire plus préoccupante : le sabotage qui a eu lieu le 4 août 2014 sur le réacteur numéro 4 de Doel. Un ou plusieurs employés ont volontairement vidangé les 65 000 litres d'huile – une action autorisée uniquement en cas d'incendie - qui permettent de lubrifier la turbine pour éviter toute surchauffe. Le pire a été évité. La turbine est seulement sortie de son axe mais les dégâts furent considérables. L'enquête menée par le parquet fédéral est en cours. Une trentaine d'employés ont été soumis au détecteur de mensonges, mais d'autres ont refusé.

La sûreté de l'Etat n'est pas la seule à se soucier de cet incident. Jan Bens, directeur général de l'Agence fédérale de contrôle nucléaire, expliquait à son conseil d'administration réuni le 16 septembre 2014 – *Le Monde* a pu prendre connaissance du procès verbal de la réunion – que «*la question du redémarrage du réacteur risquait d'être délicate si la ou les personnes qui avaient manipulé la vanne n'étaient pas identifiées d'ici là*». Et pourtant : Doel 4 a été relancé en décembre 2014. Le ou les coupables y travaillent peut-être encore.



**Marie-Béatrice Baudet**  
Journaliste au Monde

143,87

WIRTSCHAFT

EZB

03:00

# Deutschland probt den Aufstand gegen das Helikoptergeld

Mit ihrer lockeren Geldpolitik hat sich die EZB in Deutschland noch nie Freunde gemacht. Doch die Idee vom Helikoptergeld lässt die Stimmung unter vielen Politikern und Ökonomen endgültig kippen.

• 27. März

Von Anja Ettl, Olaf Gersemann, Martin Greive, Anne Kunz



Die lockere Geldpolitik der EZB steht in der KritikFoto: Getty Images/Photodisc

Fragen zur Geldpolitik lassen deutsche Politiker meist unbeantwortet. Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) sei unabhängig, Kommentare oder gar Ratschläge tabu, heißt es immer. An diese Regel hält sich dem eigenen Bekunden nach auch Wolfgang Schäuble.

Er sei in dieser Hinsicht "gut erzogen", sagte der Bundesfinanzminister diese Woche – um die EZB dann doch zu kritisieren. Ihre ultralockere Geldpolitik stelle "Bankenaufsicht und Finanzregulierung vor ganz neue Herausforderungen", warnte der CDU-Politiker.

Schäuble ist nicht der Einzige, der die EZB derzeit unter Beschuss nimmt. Schon die [jüngsten weiteren geldpolitischen Lockerungen](#) haben viele deutsche Politiker entsetzt. Seit EZB-Präsident Mario Draghi dann auch noch [die Idee vom Helikoptergeld](#), also die direkte Versorgung von Unternehmen und Bürgern mit Zentralbank-Geld, als "sehr interessant" bezeichnete, droht das Fass überzulaufen.

FDP-Chef Christian Lindner fordert die Bundesregierung sogar unverblümt auf, Draghi Einhalt zu gebieten. "Ich teile die kritische Position von Bundesbank-Präsident Weidmann. Ihm sollte die Bundesregierung offensiv den Rücken stärken", sagte Lindner der "Welt am Sonntag".

Mehr Gewicht für Deutschland

**Auch Ifo-Präsident Hans-Werner Sinn drängt die Bundesregierung zum Handeln: "Da der Protest der Bundesbank nichts hilft, sollte Deutschland eine Änderung der Maastrichter Verträge verlangen." Deutschland hat bei Abstimmungen im EZB-Rat in der Regel eine Stimme, wie jedes andere Euro-Mitglied auch; seit 2015 muss Bundesbank-Chef Jens Weidmann sogar gelegentlich aussetzen, weil nun ein Rotationsprinzip gilt. Dies will Sinn ändern: "Es kann nicht sein, dass Deutschland als größte Volkswirtschaft der Euro-Zone so viel zu sagen hat wie Malta."**

Das sehen Wirtschaftspolitiker von Union und SPD ebenfalls so. **"Wir müssen aus der Euro-Krise den Schluss ziehen, dass es eben keine unabhängigen Experten sind, die im EZB-Rat sitzen. Darauf muss man mit**

neuen Entscheidungsregeln reagieren, etwa mit unterschiedlichen Stimmgewichten", sagt Carsten Linnemann, der Chef der CDU-Mittelstandsvereinigung.

**"Die größte Volkswirtschaft des Euro-Raums, die mit ihrer Bonität auch der Rettungsanker der gemeinsamen Währung ist, muss gemäß ihrem wirtschaftlichen Gewicht an allen Abstimmungen teilnehmen",** sagt auch Wolfgang Steiger, der Generalsekretär des CDU-Wirtschaftsrats. "Das alte, festgelegte Verfahren ist nicht mehr vermittelbar."

Enttäuschung über nationalstaatliche Interessen

Beim Koalitionspartner zeigt man sich offen. In der jetzigen Situation ergebe es keinen Sinn, über neue Abstimmungsregeln zu verhandeln, sagt SPD-Haushaltsexperte Johannes Kahrs, fügt aber an: "Das kann man machen, wenn die betroffenen Institutionen und Akteure entspannter sind und sich nicht mitten im Krisenmanagement befinden."

Vonseiten der deutschen Finanzwirtschaft käme wohl Unterstützung. **Alexander Erdland, Präsident des Gesamtverbands der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (GDV), hält das derzeitige Abstimmungsverfahren sogar für "zutiefst undemokratisch".**

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**Der Einsatz von negativen Zinssätzen wird im wirtschaftshistorischen Rückblick als einer der größeren politischen Fehler der letzten 50 Jahre betrachtet werden**

“

David Folkerts-Landau

Chefvolkswirt der Deutschen Bank

**Die breite Kritik reflektiert auch Enttäuschung darüber, dass sich die Mitglieder des EZB-Rates, anders als von den Gründervätern des Euro intendiert, vielfach von nationalstaatlichen Interessen leiten lassen. "Es zeigen sich in der heutigen Geldpolitik die Grenzen der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbanken", sagte Jürgen Stark, ein früherer Chefvolkswirt der EZB, der "Welt am Sonntag". "Regierungen berufen Persönlichkeiten in diese Führungspositionen, von denen sie Wohlverhalten erwarten", so Stark. "Aber gerade da müsste man stringent und kompromisslos sein."**

**Starks Vorgänger Otmar Issing sieht das ähnlich. "Das Problem ist, dass nationale Überlegungen eine Rolle spielen, wo sie keine Rolle spielen sollten."** In dem Moment, in dem die EZB darüber entscheidet, von welchem Land sie wie viele Staatsanleihen kauft, werde die Geldpolitik politisiert, sagt Issing. **"Das Problem wird erst dann entschärft, wenn die EZB zu einer konventionellen Geldpolitik zurückkehrt."**

**Helikoptergeld verschärft die Debatte**

Nur sieht es danach im Moment nicht aus, ganz im Gegenteil. **"Die EZB-Politik übertüncht die derzeitige schwierige Situation in vielen Ländern der Euro-Zone",** sagt zum Beispiel Uwe Fröhlich, der Präsident des Bundesverbands deutscher Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken. **"Gehen die Staaten nicht bald ihre Probleme an, verkehrt sich die Wirkung der Geldpolitik immer mehr ins Negative. Langfristig riskiert man damit ein Auseinanderbrechen der Währungsunion."**

Noch harscher ist das Urteil der Deutschen Bank. Zentralbanken würden heute "dominiert von Volkswirten, die sich am vorherrschenden aggregierten makroökonomischen Dogma orientieren", sagt Chefvolkswirt David Folkerts-Landau. **Der Einsatz von negativen Zinssätzen in einer wirtschaftlichen Situation wie der**



**heutigen, glaubt Folkerts-Landau, werde "im wirtschaftshistorischen Rückblick als einer der größeren politischen Fehler der letzten 50 Jahre betrachtet werden".**

Mit dem Helikoptergeld würde die Debatte weiter verschärft. "Grundsätzlich sollte die EZB bei geldpolitischen Entscheidungen unabhängig sein, auch wenn die Politik Kritik üben darf", sagt Michael Heise dazu, der Chefökonom der Allianz. **"Anders ist es, wenn die EZB ihr Mandat überschreitet." Das sei beim Einsatz von Helikoptergeld der Fall, so Heise: "Dabei handelt es sich entweder um direkte Staatsfinanzierung oder um direkte Geldgeschenke an die Bevölkerung. Beides hätte schwere Konsequenzen und würde einen Systembruch bedeuten. Dann wäre es legitim und dringend notwendig, dass die Politik Druck ausübt."**

Erhebliche Nebenwirkungen der lockeren Geldpolitik

**Auch Isabel Schnabel, als Mitglied des Sachverständigenrats eine der fünf Wirtschaftsweisen, findet die Vorstellung, dass gleichsam Geld aus dem Hubschrauber über die Euro-Zone abgeworfen werden könnte, "beunruhigend".** Dies, so die Wirtschaftsprofessorin, **"würde die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank infrage stellen und eine Rückkehr zur geldpolitischen Normalität für lange Zeit unmöglich machen".**




Foto: Infografik Die Welt

**Schon jetzt sehe der Sachverständigenrat "die extrem lockere Geldpolitik der EZB mit großer Sorge, denn es ist mit erheblichen Nebenwirkungen zu rechnen, sowohl auf die Finanzstabilität als auch auf die Reformbereitschaft im Euro-Raum".** Schnabel hielte es dennoch für "falsch, zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt das Mandat der EZB zu ändern". Das würde die Glaubwürdigkeit der EZB beschädigen. "Eine Änderung des Stimmrechts, beispielsweise durch eine Verschiebung der Stimmgewichte, halte ich ebenfalls für nicht zielführend."

**Ex-Zentralbanker Issing sieht das ähnlich: "Selbst wenn Herr Weidmann das dreifache Stimmrecht hätte, würde das wenig ändern", sagt er.** Den Wirtschaftsprofessor, gerade 80 Jahre alt geworden, beunruhigt aber schon die Debatte an sich: "Es ist besorgniserregend, wenn man vonseiten der Politik die Notwendigkeit sieht, der Bundesbank Flankenschutz zu geben."

[https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/european-union-not-security-union?utm\\_source=freelist-f&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=EUisnotsecuritySundayContent&utm\\_content=button&hsenc=p2ANqtz--43dm6rEEboM3XssoFmPHu6iHxkl67Nh\\_reY6AdO-UpIjmZPGSnHtetUGb06NP-nvwCCpIM33anvv8XRrRr2emx3UuAA&hsmi=27720557&hsCtaTracking=b5d0d694-dfa0-4f6e-9c0b-0bf20fc6cb00%7C77ae1307-d589-4041-b9c1-c3196328b1db](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/european-union-not-security-union?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EUisnotsecuritySundayContent&utm_content=button&hsenc=p2ANqtz--43dm6rEEboM3XssoFmPHu6iHxkl67Nh_reY6AdO-UpIjmZPGSnHtetUGb06NP-nvwCCpIM33anvv8XRrRr2emx3UuAA&hsmi=27720557&hsCtaTracking=b5d0d694-dfa0-4f6e-9c0b-0bf20fc6cb00%7C77ae1307-d589-4041-b9c1-c3196328b1db)

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# The European Union Is Not a Security Union

Analysis

MARCH 25, 2016 | 09:01 GMT

## Summary

In the wake of any shocking event, national governments and officials of the European Union invariably call for more cooperation between member states to prevent anything similar happening in the future. The response to the March 22 [terrorist attacks in Brussels](#) has been no different.

Following the attacks, the governments of Germany, Italy, France and members of the European Commission demanded a global response to the terrorist threat. The commission's president, Jean-Claude Juncker, even proposed the creation of a "security union" to combat terrorism at the continental level. In a March 24 meeting, ministers at the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council highlighted the need to share information among member states to fight terrorism. But despite the calls for greater cooperation among EU members, the national interests of individual member states will prevail in the long run, limiting the possibility of integration within the bloc on security issues.

## Analysis

As it stands, the European Union already has several continent-wide security structures in place. The European Police Office (Europol) handles criminal intelligence and combats international organized crime, while Frontex manages cooperation between the national border guards that secure the European Union's external borders. Eurojust, in turn, coordinates investigations and prosecutions among EU members, especially for transnational crimes. Because their duties are mainly logistical, coordinating efforts and resources among states, these agencies have little staff and equipment of their own.

The European Union faces obstacles to establishing a unified security network. For one thing, the organization's 28 member states have different priorities, resources, and levels of expertise when it comes to fighting international crime and terrorism. Large countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany have significant counterterrorism experience and enough human and material resources to maintain sophisticated intelligence and anti-terrorism agencies. This is not true of smaller countries with less expertise and smaller budgets — and even less so during economic crises, when smaller governments must weigh financing their security apparatus against controlling fiscal deficits.

The [Brussels attacks](#) revealed the shortcomings of the Belgian security establishment, which is relatively small compared to the growing numbers of jihadists returning from abroad authorities must now monitor — on top of a large number of potential terrorists radicalized domestically. For EU member states, the terrorist threat justifies a return to public spending after years of austerity. But even wealthy members are dealing with limited resources: On March 23, the German government announced a plan to increase its domestic security budget by 2.1 billion euros (around \$2.3 billion) by 2020, but the deputy chairman of the German Federal Police warned the additional funds were far from adequate.

## Barriers to Coordination

Along with budgetary concerns — a challenge for most security agencies in the world — EU members also contend with an environment where people move freely between countries, yet government intelligence does not. In the hours and days that followed the Brussels attacks, several EU governments stated that member countries should share more information about potential security threats, as they did in the wake of the November Paris attacks. But German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere admitted that EU governments don't want to share all of their information with their peers, further noting that the EU and national governments have separate data pools that are not linked.

The fact that one of the Belgium suicide bombers had been arrested in Turkey and deported to the Netherlands, where he was released, highlights the failure to coordinate. Translation issues between European governments only exacerbate the problem, and EU members use varying systems to transliterate Arabic names, which can lead to clerical errors.

## A Question of Sovereignty

On the surface, enhanced intelligence sharing makes sense. In a continent where goods, people and services are already allowed to move freely from one nation to another, a freer exchange of information would be a logical step. However, Europe's limited cooperation in security matters is a reminder that, even after six decades of integration, the EU remains, to a certain extent, [a pact among nation states](#). Though member countries are willing to give up sovereignty on issues such as trade or labor, they have trouble making concessions in sensitive areas such as national security. EU treaties recognize this, which explains why issues related to the monetary union or the free trade zone are voted by qualified majority, while security or foreign policy issues are decided unanimously — thus giving veto power to each member.

There is an argument that an era of global threats — ranging from terrorism to trade competition — calls for a global reaction. But the European Union has reached a point where further integration among member states will require them to give up prerogatives that are just [too crucial](#). And the problem extends well beyond security issues: EU members are also struggling to create a system in which wealth from Northern Europe is redistributed to the south and member states lose control of fiscal policy. Since the European Union is unlikely to evolve into the "United States of Europe," the continent is also unlikely to have a European Federal Bureau of Intelligence, let alone a federal military. (Most EU members participate in NATO, but this is not the same as dissolving their national militaries into an EU military.) Creating continent-wide structures such as these would require a treaty change, a decision that member states are unlikely to make, given the rise of [nationalist sentiments in Europe](#).

Europe's economic crisis quickly evolved into an unemployment crisis and then into a political crisis. Immigration and terrorism are only adding to Europe's political fragmentation, and member states are having more and more difficulty coming up with coherent responses. In this context, national decisions [are replacing EU policy](#). For example, individual member states are opposing the introduction of refugee quotas and fighting to preserve border controls. Moderate political parties still defend the merits of the Schengen Agreement and the free movement of labor in Europe, but a burgeoning nationalist opposition movement demands reinstatement of national borders and tougher laws on immigration. And as terrorism and immigration cause voters to fear for their jobs and personal security, their voices will grow louder.

Despite the discord, additional cooperation on security issues is not impossible for the European Union. In the months to come, agencies such as Europol and Frontex will probably be given more resources, and the European Union will discuss plans for a stronger continental border and coast guard. The European Commission will also push for greater integration among security databases and an increase in security measures at airports. But the bloc will continue to encounter problems related to its fragmented security environment, simply because its very nature makes achieving a coherent response elusive. In fact, future EU governments may choose to reverse some aspects of continental integration to improve domestic security.

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## En repli en Syrie, Daech harcèle ses ennemis en Occident

Par [Marie-Laetitia Bonavita](#)

Publié le 25/03/2016 à 17:26

**FIGAROVOX/ENTRETIEN.** Après les attentats de Bruxelles, le chercheur français, spécialiste du djihadisme, fait un point sur les forces et faiblesses de l'État islamique.



Romain Caillet, chercheur et consultant sur les questions islamistes, est un historien spécialiste de la mouvance djihadiste globale (Organisation de l'État islamique et al-Qaïda). Il a vécu de nombreuses années au Moyen-Orient: trois ans au Caire, deux ans à Amman et près de cinq ans à Beyrouth.

**Romain CAILLET.- Les attentats de Bruxelles ont été revendiqués par l'État islamique. Peut-on parler en Europe d'un réseau très structuré de terroristes piloté par l'État islamique (EI)?**

**LE FIGARO.-** Effectivement, il existe aujourd'hui un large réseau de jihadistes ayant la volonté de commettre des attentats terroristes dans toute l'Europe pour le compte de l'EI. Ce terrorisme est le résultat de la convergence entre d'une part le sentiment de haine éprouvée par certains jihadistes envers leurs sociétés et de l'autre la logique d'une organisation, l'État islamique, déterminée à frapper les pays participant à une coalition qui, depuis plus d'un an et demi, lui a porté des coups très sévères à travers ses bombardements. Évidemment, les jihadistes français n'avaient pas besoin de ces bombardements pour détester leur pays et vouloir y commettre des attentats mais c'est parce que l'État islamique avait inscrit sur son agenda la volonté de frapper la France que ces jeunes ont pu bénéficier d'une telle structure pour mener à bien leurs projets terroristes.

**Ces attentats en Europe sont-ils le signe de la perte de terrain militaire de l'EI au Moyen-Orient?**

En effet, une perte de contrôle territorial oblige nécessairement à réemployer ses forces dans la clandestinité pour harceler ses ennemis, moins l'EI tiendra de territoire plus il commettra des attentats et des assassinats ciblés. En Syrie et en Irak, les jihadistes étrangers, en particulier les Européens, peuvent difficilement se fondre au sein de la population pour mener des opérations clandestines. Dans un contexte de repli généralisé, est donc tout à fait rationnel que l'EI renvoie ses recrues dans leurs pays d'origine pour commettre des attentats.

**Cela signifierait alors que pour faire cesser les attentats djihadistes en Europe, il suffirait de laisser l'EI essaimer au Moyen-Orient?**

En réalité, les choses sont beaucoup plus compliquées. Tout d'abord, l'Occident ne peut agir contre ses propres intérêts. Ceux-ci passent, dans un premier temps, par son besoin d'approvisionnement en pétrole. Si les États-Unis sont intervenus en 1991 contre l'Irak, c'est parce que son président Saddam Hussein venait quatre mois plus tôt d'envahir le Koweït, riche de ses réserves pétrolières. Le début de l'entrée en guerre de la coalition avec les premières frappes américaines contre l'EI, qui menaçait la ville de Erbil et les réserves pétrolières du Kurdistan irakien, relève de cette logique. Aujourd'hui, le pire cauchemar des dirigeants occidentaux serait que l'EI s'étende jusqu'en l'Arabie Saoudite, premier producteur mondial de pétrole.

Le deuxième frein pour l'Occident, et notamment pour la France, d'un retrait du Moyen-Orient ou plus largement du monde arabe concerne sa relation compliquée avec ses anciennes colonies, comme par exemple

[l'Algérie](#) ou la [Tunisie](#). La prise de contrôle d'une partie du territoire tunisien par l'EI aurait des conséquences terribles en matière de flux migratoires. La France ferait alors face à une nouvelle vague de migrants, provoquant inévitablement la colère de l'opinion publique.

**Déchoir de la nationalité française les binationaux revenus légalement des terres de jihad comporte un indéniable intérêt du point de vue des services de renseignements : réduire sensiblement le volume de personnes à «déradicaliser» ou tout simplement à surveiller, une fois leurs peines de prison accomplies.**

**Que pensez-vous de la déchéance de nationalité?**

Retirer la nationalité française aux jihadistes partis en Syrie ou en Irak n'empêchera pas les plus déterminés d'entre eux de revenir en France munis de faux passeports, à l'instar d'une partie des terroristes du 13 novembre. Néanmoins, déchoir de la nationalité française les binationaux revenus légalement des terres de jihad comporte un indéniable intérêt du point de vue des services de renseignements: réduire sensiblement le volume de personnes à «déradicaliser» ou tout simplement à surveiller, une fois leurs peines de prison accomplies. Certains objecteront le nombre important des jihadistes «convertis» donc n'ayant que la nationalité française pour remettre en cause l'efficacité de la déchéance des jihadistes binationaux. C'est méconnaître la sociologie de ce milieu. Les [Français de souche](#) jihadistes sont une minorité. La bonne partie des «[convertis](#)» descend d'[immigrés](#) africains de tradition chrétienne. Leur pays d'origine les reconnaît comme des citoyens de chez eux. Dès lors, ils bénéficient d'une autre nationalité que française.

**Manuel Valls vient de dénoncer l'excès de communautarisme dont a fait preuve la France.**

**Communautarisme et terrorisme sont-ils liés?**

Là encore, il me semble que les choses soient plus compliquées. Effectivement le communautarisme provoque des tensions et des clivages, susceptibles de fragiliser la société mais ne produit pas nécessairement des terroristes. Au contraire, j'aurais tendance à penser que l'encadrement communautaire limiterait le développement du courant jihadiste, qui s'oppose radicalement à toute forme d'[islam](#) institutionnel. Enfin, rappelons que les salafistes quiétistes sont très hostiles aux jihadistes, qu'ils voient comme leurs pires rivaux et sont souvent les meilleurs indicateurs des [services de renseignements](#).

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René Jacobs im Gespräch

## Die Choräle sind wir alle

Für das Label Harmonia Mundi hat der belgische Dirigent, Sänger und Musikwissenschaftler René Jacobs die Johannes-Passion in zwei verschiedenen Versionen neu eingespielt. Wozu der Aufwand?

27.03.2016



© MUSEUM DER BILDENDEN KÜNSTE LEIPZIG Bachs Vorbild, das Dreifaltigkeitsmotiv von Lucas Cranach.

**Herr Jacobs, wieso haben Sie so lange einen Bogen gemacht um die Johannes-Passion? Das war **Bachs** erste Passionsmusik. Aber Sie nehmen sie als Letztes auf. War Ihnen diese Musik zu krass?**

Nein, so kann man das nicht sagen. Es stimmt, ich habe lange bis zu dieser Aufnahme gewartet, aber dirigiert habe ich beide oft. Es war dann der Wunsch der Plattenfirma, dass ich zuerst die große Matthäus-Passion einspielen soll. Dann haben wir ein bisschen Zeit ins Land gehen lassen bis zur Johannes-Passion, damit sich das nicht in die Quere kommt.

**Also banale editionslogistische Gründe?**

Ja, wie das meistens so ist. Die Matthäus-Passion verkauft sich leichter, sie ist nun mal viel populärer. Die Johannes-Passion weniger, und das finde ich sehr schade.


**Schon Robert Schumann fand die Johannes-Passion viel interessanter, ja, besser, weil sie dunkler ist, romantischer ...**

Besser nicht, aber anders. Schumann hat seine eigne Fassung erstellt, mit romantischer Instrumentation. Mir wäre es am liebsten gewesen, wenn ich von den vier Fassungen, die es von Johann Sebastian Bach gibt, diese beiden, die geläufige von 1748 und diese selten gespielte von 1725 direkt nebeneinander hätte aufnehmen dürfen, so, dass man beide von Anfang bis Ende durchhören kann. Sie ist so interessant, diese zweite Fassung! Die Uraufführung hatte ja 1724 in der Nikolaikirche stattgefunden. Ein Jahr später, zu **Ostern** 1725, führt Bach das Werk noch einmal auf, diesmal in der Thomaskirche, und er tauscht Anfang und Schluss aus, außerdem noch vier weitere Nummern. Der neue Eingangsschor steht in Es-Dur, dunkel und geheimnisvoll, alles konzentriert sich sofort auf das Thema der Sünde: „Oh Mensch, bewein' dein Sünde groß“. Man kann sich keinen größeren Kontrast vorstellen zu dem triumphalen „Herr, unser Herrscher“-Chor der Erstfassung als diesen. Noch viel rätselhafter und schöner ist in der zweiten Version der Schlusschor. Da geht es um das „Lamm Gottes“, also, das lateinische Agnus Dei, mit der Schlussformel: „Dona nobis pacem“, in der Übersetzung von Martin Luther. In diesem Chorsatz kehrt Bach am Ende nicht zur Haupttonart zurück. „Gib uns Frieden“, diese Bitte wird am Ende nicht erhört. Es bleibt sozusagen eine offene Frage stehen.

**Warum hat Bach für die Thomaskirche eine andere Version geschrieben als für die Nikolaikirche?**

Dazu gibt es viele Theorien. Eine hat zu tun mit dem Bild von Lucas Cranach dem Älteren, das damals in der Nikolaikirche hing. Bach kannte es gut. Es zeigt eine Art Kreuzabnahme, allerdings als Dreifaltigkeit. Gottvater hält den toten Christus in den Armen, der heilige Geist sitzt als Taube auf dessen linkem Knie, rundherum Engelschöre. In der Johannes-Passion findet die eigentliche Passionsgeschichte bekanntlich erst im Mittelteil statt. Am Anfang ist alles Freude, Glück, Triumph der Trinität und eine Verherrlichung Gottes! Cranachs Bild können Sie, wenn Sie wollen, in Bachs Musik wiederfinden: In „Herr, unser Herrscher“ klagt die Oboemelodie vom Leiden Christi. Die Wellenbewegung, die darunterliegt, von den Geigen gespielt, das ist der Flügelschlag der Taube, die Schwingen des Heiligen Geistes. Und Gottvater, der bildet das Fundament, das sind natürlich die Bassfiguren.



© JOSEP MOLINA  Auf der CD gibt es beide Fassungen nur als Appendix, im Netz hingegen komplett: Da ist

René Jacobs ganz Musikwissenschaftler.

**Sie haben in Ihrer Aufnahme diese Bässe stark herausgearbeitet. Zum ersten Mal habe ich bemerkt, dass hier der Rhythmus des Herzschlags zu hören ist, wenn auch leise am Anfang.**

Ich wollte pianissimo anfangen und den Klang dann langsam wachsen lassen. Die Herrschaft Gottes ist ewig, allumfassend, allgegenwärtig. Ich habe also zu den Musikern gesagt, sie sollen sich vorstellen, dass die Musik lange vorher angefangen hat. Dieser Triumph, dieser Engelsjubel, all das war schon ewig da, nur eben für uns nicht wahrnehmbar. ANTWORT: Wenn wir zum ersten Mal einsetzen, muss das wie aus dem Nichts kommen. Dann steigert sich das, aus dem Pianissimo ins Forte, und am Schluss geht Jesus dann ein zum Vater: Da hat ein Da capo endlich mal eine sinnvolle dramaturgische Funktion!

**Aber warum brauchte Bach für die Aufführung in der schlichteren Thomaskirche dann unbedingt einen anderen Eingangsschor?**

Unbedingt vielleicht nicht. Manchmal hatte Bach ganz banale Gründe, etwas zu ändern, und wir müssen gar nicht so weit suchen. Wenn er die Besetzung nicht zur Verfügung hatte, die er braucht, dann schrieb er das eben um. In der Zweitfassung der Johannes-Passion war es wohl so geplant, dass sie sich als österliche Passionsmusik in einen Kantatenzyklus mit Choralbearbeitungen einfügen sollte. Der neue Eingangsschor in Es-Dur ist jetzt also eine Choralbearbeitung, der Schlusschor ebenso. Und es gibt noch eine weitere Choralbearbeitung, die in der Mitte neu eingefügt ist: „Himmel reiße, Welt erbebe“ mit einem Sopran-Cantus firmus und dem Bass, der kommentiert.

**Die Gerichtsszene in der Johannes-Passion ist spannender als jede Opernszene. Pilatus versucht hartnäckig immer wieder, Jesus freizusprechen. Was, wenn es ihm gelungen wäre? Wenn die Kreuzigung nie stattgefunden hätte?**

Aber sie muss doch stattfinden! Genau das ist die theologische Idee. Man wünscht sich die Umkehrung der Geschichte, man ringt darum, dass dieser Kelch an uns vorübergeht, und weiß zugleich, wie unvermeidlich es ist. In der Matthäus-Passion hat Bach übrigens exakt denselben Konflikt komponiert, verteilt auf die beiden Chöre. Die habe ich deshalb damals sehr weit auseinander gesetzt. Der zweite Chor versucht immer wieder, auszusteiern. „Hört auf, Ihr Henker“, rufen sie den anderen zu. Aber es passiert, was passieren muss, damit die Menschheit erlöst wird.

**Ganz schön archaisch, diese theologische Idee. Sie verspricht Erlösung im Jenseits durch Menschenopfer im Hier und Jetzt. So haben es schon die Mayas gehalten. Auch die Selbstmordattentäter in Brüssel töten für eine Idee.**

Glücklicherweise ist es lange her, dass im Namen des Christentums gemordet wurde. Und glücklicherweise kam dann die Aufklärung.

**Auf die Gerichtsszene folgt die Auspeitschung, da wird der blutgefärbte Rücken besungen, der dem Regenbogen gleicht. Welche Rolle spielt Gewalt in Bachs Musik?**

Diese Arientexte stammen von Barthold Heinrich Brockes. Ja, sie sind drastisch, brutal, fast sadistisch. Ich glaube, Bach hat all diese barocken Vergleiche von Brockes nicht sehr gemocht. Er hat ja auch nie eine ganze Brockes-Passion vertont, wie es damals Mode war und wie es Telemann und viele andere gemacht haben. Und er hat die schlimmsten Stellen weggelassen oder abgemildert. Die Bildersprache von Brockes wird gerne als antisemitisch aufgefasst, weil er diejenigen, die Jesus töten, als Monster schildert. Ich finde das übertrieben, es sei denn, man verständigt sich darauf, dass alle Passionsgeschichten antisemitisch sind. In der Johannes-Passion wird jedenfalls an keiner Stelle gesagt, dass es die Juden waren, die Jesus getötet haben. Wir selbst sind es: Das wird gesagt! Und zwar in den Chorälen. Die, finde ich, sind das Schönste an der ganzen Johannes-Passion!

**Ich dachte immer eher, Choräle sind Bremsklötze ...**

O nein! Diese Choräle sind fast immer in Ich-Form gesungen. Wer da singt, das wir heute, das ist die ganze Gemeinde. Deswegen habe ich bei dieser Aufnahme auch Knabensopranen dazugenommen. Die Choräle geben Antworten auf alle wichtigen theologischen Fragen. „Wer hat dich so geschlagen?“ „Ich war's!“ Und was bei Bach dabei harmonisch passiert, das ist so wunderbar, das verlangt unbedingt nach einer sehr subjektiven Interpretation. Oft wird das leider viel zu zügig gesungen, immer im gleichen Mezzoforte, mit kleiner Besetzung. Das ist viel zu objektiv, es klingt kalt. Und was dabei auch noch total übersungen wird, das sind die Fermaten am Ende jeder Zeile. Man muss innehalten und still stehen. Man braucht Pausen, um nachzudenken. Natürlich müssen solche Denkpausen ungleich lang und individuell unterschiedlich sein.

**Wieso hat Bach keine Oper komponiert?**

Ich denke, er war kein Gegner der Oper an sich. Dazu ist seine eigne Musik viel zu malerisch und theatralisch. Aber das Opernleben, all diese weltlichen Eitelkeiten nach italienischer Art hätte er vielleicht eher nicht so geliebt. In Hamburg wurde an der Gänsemarktoper in deutscher Sprache gesungen. Bach hatte sich auch mal nach Hamburg um eine Stelle beworben, und wäre nicht Telemann genommen worden damals, sondern er, dann hätten wir vielleicht heute ein paar schöne Bach-Opern. Aber ich bin eigentlich ganz froh, dass er nicht umgezogen ist nach Hamburg! Wir hätten sonst keine Johannes-Passion.

**In diesem Jahr proben Sie Oper zu Ostern. Dirigieren Sie keine Passion diesmal? Erstmals Auferstehung ohne Bach?**

Ja, ich bin ein großer Sünder. Ich weiß nicht, ob mir das verziehen werden kann. Aber am Ostersonntag dirigiere ich in Paris das „Stabat mater“ von Pergolesi. Das ist sicher nicht genug, aber, immerhin, etwas.

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Postcard from a Failed State?

## Attacks Cast Light on Belgium's State Crisis



AFP

**With bombs set off in the airport and the subway system, the deadly Islamic State attacks on Brussels have struck the heart of the European Union. Belgium, once the nucleus of Europe, will now have to combat its reputation as a failed state. By SPIEGEL Staff**

Bart De Wever doesn't have much faith in his country. In fact, you can hardly call it a country, this artificial construct created sometime in the 19th century as the result of an accident of history, a power struggle among major powers. The centralized Belgian state is "slow, complicated and inefficient," says De Wever, one of the most powerful men in Belgian politics.

He represents a party that went into the last election campaigning for an end to this centralized state, and for an independent Flanders, which it argued would be more viable than Belgium, a broken construct.

De Wever heads the strongest party, the conservative right-wing New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). He is not part of the government, but rather the mayor of Antwerp, and yet he knows that people in Belgium pay very close attention to what he says. He's sitting under chandeliers in the Gothic city hall, in a room with dark wooden wall panels. It's a sunny Tuesday in February, four weeks before the Brussels attacks. Salah Abdeslam is still on the run, and police haven't tracked him down in Brussels' Molenbeek neighborhood yet. The government is still searching for the sole surviving Paris attacker but have been unsuccessful so far. The government is trying, but it hasn't turned up much yet. Belgium is receiving poor grades, but so is Europe.

De Wever calls German Chancellor Angela Merkel's refugee policy an "epochal mistake," and he complains that integration in Belgium already isn't working today. "This is our problem," he says. "We were unable to offer them a Flemish version of the American dream." His message is that Antwerp is still better off than Brussels, which could be called a cesspool.

De Wever likens the way politics is done in Brussels to the manner in which workers renovate the city's crumbling art nouveau buildings: some new wiring here, something patched up there. "Politicians in Belgium often work like craftsmen in old houses: they putter away without any sort of blueprint." De Wever, sitting in his office on a spring day in Antwerp, has little faith in this country. He doesn't know yet that his lack of confidence will later be confirmed in the worst of ways.

The attack on Brussels, on March 22, 2016, came from inside the country. More than 31 people died and more than 270 were injured, and the victims included people from more than 40 nations.

In the apartment where one of the perpetrators, Ibrahim El Bakraoui, had lived, at Rue Max Roos 4 in the Schaerbeek neighborhood of Brussels, police found about 200 liters of chemicals, detonators, a suitcase full of nails, an Islamic State (IS) flag and 15 kilograms of acetone peroxide, an explosive material. Najim Laachraoui, 24, who also lived there, was apparently a bombmaker of sorts for IS. Forensic investigators found his DNA on two of the explosive belts after the Paris attacks. The two men took a taxi to Brussels' Zaventem Airport, where they allowed no one to touch their luggage. Then, at 7:58 a.m., they blew themselves up. A nail bomb was detonated at Gate B, near the American Airlines ticket counter.

Khalid El Bakraoui, 27, Ibrahim's brother, blew himself up in a subway car at the Maelbeek metro station, near the European Commission building. It was 9:11 a.m.

The killers chose places of transit, sites where anyone could be targeted. An airport and a metro station are places where everyone goes. No place is safe. Forget it. That was their message.

### IS Infrastructure in Europe

The attacks were delivered four days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam. Investigators now know that it was a mistake to assume that IS, which claimed responsibility for the attack, favored the "lone wolf" approach. Since the Brussels bombings, it is clear that Islamic State has created its own infrastructure in Europe, under the radar of most intelligence services, cells consisting of first, second and third-tier militants. If the first tier is unable to act, the second tier takes over and prepares the next attack. The Brussels bombers were already involved in the Paris attacks. There were logistics experts who provided them with apartments and weapons, there were explosives experts and there were people who maintained communications with IS in Syria.



It's clear that there was a network on which Salah Abdeslam could rely. Documents from the Belgian and French authorities paint a picture of a tightknit group in which everyone protected everyone else, and that made the Belgian security forces look like fools. Salah apparently moved about freely in Molenbeek, where he even went to a barber. The mayor of Molenbeek says there is an "*omertà*" in the community, a code of silence reminiscent of the Mafia.

The groups are part of international networks, and the terrorists had an advantage over security services: They were perfectly in command of cooperation across European national borders. Najim Laachraoui traveled straight across Europe. The authorities had already identified him as a potential threat, and yet he was able to move about freely with forged documents. For instance, the explosives expert of the Belgian terror cell spent the night in Bavaria's Kitzingen district while traveling from Hungary to Belgium in September 2015, together with Salah Abdeslam, the Paris attacker who has since been arrested.

### **Concerns about German Security**

It wasn't the first time Abdeslam stayed in Germany. Last year, he too traveled freely throughout Europe, including Germany. In October 2015, at least two people were picked up at an Ibis Hotel in the southern German city of Ulm, in a car rented by Abdeslam. Last year, the presumed leader of the Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, bragged in an IS propaganda publication about how he had traveled back and forth, unobstructed, between Europe and Syria: "All of this shows that a Muslim has nothing to fear from the intelligence services of the Crusaders."

In the wake of the Brussels attacks, the fact that the terrorists spent time in Germany raises the question of how strong that country's security provisions actually are, as well. There was a potential threat shortly after the bombings in Belgium. Using a German-language Facebook account, Erhan A. wrote that he hoped there would be more attacks. According to an internal analysis by the German Criminal Police Office (BKA), there was an attempt to launch "a French-language hashtag campaign" on Twitter, in which Germany was named as the next target of attacks. "Expect more bombs, more dead! Next time in #Germany too!" wrote the author, who has not yet been traced by law enforcement. German officials are also apparently unaware of any plans for an attack.

Nevertheless, German authorities launched an investigation, and on Thursday they uncovered information suggesting Germany may also have been targeted. In the summer of 2015, when Khalid El Bakraoui was deported from Turkey to Amsterdam on suspicion of involvement in the Syrian civil war, the authorities placed another man on a plane for the same reason: Samir E., now 28, from the Düsseldorf area. He was arrested by a special police unit on Thursday. According to security experts, he and his brother were part of the Salafist scene in the western German state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

On Wednesday evening, federal police detained a man in the vicinity of Giessen, north of Frankfurt. When they examined his mobile phone, they found two suspicious text messages from the day of the attacks. One contained the name of the Brussels Metro station bomber, and the other consisted of one word, "fin," French for "the end." The messages were apparently received three minutes before the bomb exploded in the Metro station.

### **False Notions of Tolerance?**

Perhaps Germany has simply been lucky so far. German authorities warn of the possibility of future attacks, and they see Belgium as a warning sign.

In Belgium, the jihadists were able to recruit new members while going undetected by the authorities. Per capita, [more people from Belgium have gone to fight in the Syrian civil war](#) than from any other European country -- reportedly 500, and about 130 have apparently returned to Belgium.

"One in three of these people is dangerous," says Jaak Raes, head of the Belgian state intelligence service. The two Belgian intelligence services ought to be keeping a close eye on them and on many other suspicious individuals at all times. But the number of agents alone -- of which there are theoretically 700 -- shows why this is an impossibility. In fact, about 150 positions were not filled at the time of the Paris attacks, and the security budget was only about €50 million. This corresponds to nothing more than the editorial budget of a large newspaper, Belgian journalists recently noted with consternation.

One problem, says Bernard Snoeck, who used to work for the Belgian military intelligence service SGRS, is that "politicians have no idea how we work. And they don't want to know, either. In my more than 20-year career, I never saw a single member of parliament in our offices." Because of a false notion of tolerance, he says, Belgians are "unwilling to touch jihadism. It reminds me of the period after 9/11. We had information about Islamists in the army. We wanted to investigate this more closely, but the Defense Ministry stopped the investigation."

The Belgian intelligence services were not entirely unsuccessful, as evidenced by their discovery of a terror cell in January 2015, in Verviers near the German border. Three of the Paris attackers were also being tracked by law enforcement, at least intermittently. The phone of one of the men was tapped, and the Abdeslam brothers were detained at a Belgian police station when one of them unsuccessfully tried to reach Syria. In the end, however, the Belgians lacked the legal grounds and the necessary personnel for long-term surveillance.

Salah Abdeslam managed to remain in hiding. And Ibrahim El Bakraoui, Khalid El Bakraoui and Najim Laachraoui were able to pass undetected as they prepared for their act of mass murder in Brussels.

### **Ineffective European Cooperation**

Counterterrorism is treated as a national matter, and European cooperation exists only on a voluntary basis, making it relatively ineffective. "Most police officers are still very unfamiliar with the multilateral exchange of information," says Max-Peter Ratzel. "They prefer to hoard their information instead of sharing it." Ratzel, the former head of the European police agency, Europol, calls for a radical change in the mentality of authorities, "away from the need-to-know principle, in which each official decides which data he or she shares with other agencies, and toward a need-to-share principle." At a hastily convened meeting on Thursday evening, EU interior ministers pledged, once again, to improve cooperation. "Many national authorities don't want to share their information with everyone else," said German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, a member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). "We need to change this mentality. The problem is that we have too much separate data, and that it isn't sufficiently linked together."

It isn't as if the EU hadn't reacted to the threat. Europol now has a European Counter Terrorism Center, and the individual intelligence services have joined forces to form the Counter Terrorism Group. But these efforts are also all entirely voluntary. The group is not subordinate to EU control, and there is no political control.

All criticism aside, we need to remind ourselves that nothing and no one can absolutely prevent attacks -- neither the most reliable police force nor the most effective security plan. But Tuesday's attacks also represent a poor performance on the part of the authorities, especially those in Belgium, a perception that is now beginning to take hold in the country. Two days after the attacks, the interior and justice ministers offered their resignations because warnings issued by Turkey about Ibrahim El Bakraoui, who had been arrested in Gaziantep, had reportedly been ignored. According to Belgian media reports, the prime minister has initially declined accept the resignations, but there is growing dissatisfaction with the government.

### **Is Belgium a Failed State?**

It is also important to ask the question of whether a special Belgian problem is making a difficult situation even worse. It may seem cold to pose this question now, at a time when a country is in mourning, candles have been lit on Place de la Bourse and many people are pausing to reflect about what happened. At the same time, though, in Belgium, as well as in Europe in general, we must learn from our mistakes as quickly as possible, in order to avoid recurrences. And those who have a better grasp of Belgium's problems also have a better idea of what Europe lacks.

Belgium, a country of 30,000 square kilometers, the size of the eastern German state of Brandenburg, is famous for comics, beer, chocolate, French fries and scandals.

The scandals include the troubled nuclear reactors at Tihange and Doel, which remained connected to the grid despite the discovery of cracks. The food scare of 1999 in which PCB was detected in chicken. The Marc Dutroux case, which still casts a shadow over the country 20 years later. The fact that the child killer had been able to catch girls, abuse, imprison and eventually murder them, even though there were plenty of clues leading to him, has repeatedly tarnished confidence in Belgian law enforcement.

And now, again and again: terrorism. The barely thwarted attack on a high-speed Thalys train traveling between Amsterdam and Paris in August. The Paris attacks and their Belgian perpetrators. And the horrors committed in Brussels on Tuesday.

Failed state is the term used to describe a state that is dysfunctional and unviable. Is this what Belgium is, a failed state?

"It's an artificial state." The man saying this was the mayor of Molenbeek for three-and-a-half years, a white-haired man with the Belgian Socialist Party (BSP), which speaks critically about Belgium and Europe and, in this respect, is surprisingly close to his political antipode, conservative right-winger Bart De Wever. "Unfortunately, Europe is developing into a large Belgium, instead of Belgium developing into a small Europe," N-VA party leader and Antwerp Mayor De Wever believes:

Philippe Moureaux once believed that the nation-state in Europe would fade away and that a unified Europe would remain and assume its function -- a democratic and just Europe. "Not," he says, "what we have today."

On this day, Moureaux is not the former mayor, and not the former Belgian interior minister, but instead is the history professor he once was. He's not the political pragmatist he has just written about in his book "The Truth About Molenbeek," one of the few who made an outstanding contribution to integration.

### **Belgians Lack Common History**

Moureaux lives in Molenbeek, on the fifth floor of a building that looks like it could be low-income housing, in an apartment with a living room and a study with dark books and dark-red leather sofas. He sits there, looking back at a state that came into being as a compromise, in 1830. It was a construct that optimistically fused together regions that lacked a common history: Flanders, Francophone Wallonia and eastern Belgium, where 76,000 people speak German. It is a construct that now has a poor south that requires support, and a wealthy north where the grumbling is getting louder and louder. It's a familiar principle. It's called Europe.

Belgium has a fractured administration, confusing relationships among the various government levels and inefficient bureaucratic structures that sometimes must make allowances for grotesque regional disputes. To prevent this fragile nation from breaking apart, the constitution has been reformed several times and central power has been weakened. The result is that everything in Belgium exists in multiples: There's a Flemish prime minister, a Wallonian prime minister and a prime minister who represents all of Belgium. In Belgium, it takes months instead of weeks to form a government. About four years ago, the state simply continued to exist for 541 days without a government.

Over the years, the people of Belgium have developed a certain distance from their authorities. As Moureaux puts it, Belgians have achieved this by becoming "a little rebellious, a little anarchistic." One reason they are anarchistic, he says, is "that this region has been occupied again and again," by the Burgundians, the Spaniards, the Austrians and the French. "A tradition here is to say: An authority? That will resolve itself. It will pass."

### **Social Injustices**

Belgium could have become a model of successful coexistence, but it didn't, and not even Moureaux wants to romanticize anything. Instead, the country became the nucleus of Europe and received "the institutions," as the headquarters of the EU's governing bodies -- the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council -- are called. They are now there, with their glass towers, and some perceive this is as some form of colonization.

The heart of Europe is, well, a cold heart, at least from the perspective of the Brussels poor. They see none of the money "from Brussels," as it is put elsewhere, or "from the eurocrats," as they say in Brussels.

It's about four kilometers from the European Parliament to the so-called jihadist hotspot in Molenbeek, and yet there is virtually no connection between Europe and the troubled district on an everyday basis. In the European quarter, laws are written for an entire continent, while jihadists nearby plan ways to fight this continent and destroy its freedom and values.

Moroccans from Brussels immigrant families work in the European district as drivers, doormen, cleaning personnel or in cafeterias. These are the only points of contact between the two worlds. Many cite the significance of the time of the attack in the Maelbeek metro station. It happened at shortly after 9 a.m., when the European bureaucratic elite are typically traveling to work. An hour earlier, cleaning women and night watchmen would have been on their way home from work.

Most of the immigrants living in the area aren't qualified to work in the law firms and lobbying firms that are thriving in Brussels. Nevertheless, in the last few years, the European Parliament chose to buck the trend and not farm out service jobs, such as drivers, to subcontractors, but instead brought them back into regular employment contracts.

The step was also taken in the interest of security, because full-time employees can be monitored, whereas it is never entirely clear who a subcontractor is employing at any given time. European Parliament President Martin Schulz has just announced a new, overdue initiative for young people from troubled neighborhoods. "We should think about how we can use the enormous potential of the European institutions to help correct social injustices in Brussels," says Schulz.

The European district sticks out like a UFO in Brussels. The lawmakers could just as easily be meeting in Palermo, and yet the malicious remarks, rants and contact to the city would be about the same. The city suffers from stranger anxiety.

The Brussels metropolitan area is already difficult to govern. With a population of 1.1 million, it isn't particularly large. Unfortunately, that population is divided up among 19 municipalities. Six police districts are responsible for security, the regional and central governments putter away in parallel and they communicate too little. The Belgian capital is in Flanders, and yet most people there speak French, so that hardly anyone feels truly responsible. And the police and security services are busy protecting the large number of international facilities, from NATO to the European Union buildings east of the downtown area and across its borders.

### **Loving an Unloved Country**

Is it possible to like this city? This country?

Yes, says a man who is an unlikely supporter.

This unlikely confession of love for an unloved country comes from Philippe Blondin at the Jewish Museum. It is shortly after the Paris attacks, and he meets with us in a building that is effectively hidden on a small street near the luxurious Grand Sablon, a square with expensive antique stores, long-established restaurants and outposts of many of the city's world-famous chocolatiers.

Almost two years ago, on May 24, 2014, a young man pulled out an assault rifle in the museum, and shot and killed four people. The attacker, a French national of Algerian origin who had returned after spending time in Syria, lived in Molenbeek, just a few kilometers from the scene of the attack. It was that year, and not just last Tuesday, that Brussels got added to the European terror map -- and not just as a place where the attackers came from.

Blondin doesn't need a secretary today to register visitors. The soldiers guarding the museum entrance do that now. Visitors are asked for identification, and then whether they have an appointment. Only then are they accompanied up to Blondin's office by a soldier in camouflage fatigues. A few bullet holes are still visible on the way there.

The president of the Jewish Museum is a distinguished man with a confession to make. "I am a citizen of Belgium," he says. "I have this country to thank for everything." He goes on to explain that his family came to Belgium in search of a better life in the same way the Turks and the Moroccans did during the 1960s and 1970s. His father owned a shoe store and he himself was able to go to university. He enjoyed the kind of rise in society that is denied to many immigrants today. The old man also makes a plea for a country that has many quite perplexed these days.

Blondin wants to promote understanding between cultures and peoples. The museum, which is collecting dust in its current location, plays an important part in his vision. There are plans for one more major exhibition with young artists, a night of music and talks under the theme "100 Artists, 100 Freedoms." After that, the building will be torn down.

A new museum building will be filled with touchscreens and modern museum education techniques in tune with the times. It will also feature a section devoted to Muslims in Brussels. "Things can only be made possible through learning and joint dialogue," says Blondin, before adding with a slight hint of resignation: "My only worry is that the people who will be willing to talk to each other don't have a problem with each other anyway." He says he's familiar with all the disadvantages -- the parallel societies, the school dropouts, the lack of economic opportunities -- but argues that these in no way provide any justification for bombing attacks.

Blondin also says he doesn't want to be held responsible as a Belgian for actions taken by others in his country. "Are we supposed to apologize for something?" he asks. "No, the terrorism isn't our fault." He says he doesn't want to be defined by terrorism.

It actually is possible to find people who like living in this country, with its improvisations, its incompleteness and its self-irony.

They include people like Jan Bucquoy, a cheerful anarchist who mounts his own performance art coup d'état against the royal family once a year -- always on May 21, the calendar day in which it is statistically least likely to rain.

Then there's David Helbich, a hoodie-wearing artist who is known for works like his photo series "[Belgian Solutions](#)," which pokes fun at the odd, makeshift solutions Belgians find to everyday problems -- solutions sometimes so bizarre that it takes quite a bit of generosity to understand them as such. His work casts light on the somewhat chaotic and dilapidated nature of Belgium. The images include things like staircases on buildings leading to nowhere or a ramshackle house with a perfectly manicured hedge in front of it.

## **Illusory Solutions**

This is the charming side of the illusory solutions, the improvisation, the jury-rigged nature of things here. The less charming side can be found 70 kilometers (44 miles) southeast of Brussels in Wallonia, the location of the three reactor blocks of the incident-prone Tihange nuclear power plant. Tihange 2 had to be shut down and tested before it could be restarted following the discovery of cracks. And the German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate have also issued complaints with the EU about the operation of Tihange 1, a matter over which the EU has little authority.

Fears seem to be greater in Germany about Belgium's nuclear power plants than in the country itself. Belgians tend to get used to things, that's the habit. They tend to respond in ways similar to Françoise Georis, who opened up her Bio, dis-moi organic supermarket directly across the street from Tihange, because this type of store didn't exist within a 15 kilometer radius of the nuclear power plant. She says she's pleased to have plant workers among her customers, since "not everyone has their heart in the job that they do." In general, she says, her customers are more afraid of genetically modified food than they are of radioactivity. Speaking a week before the terrorist attacks, she said she hardly even notices the nuclear power plant -- and that's the case for most here.

But the one thing she said did concern her on that Tuesday, was terrorism.

A week later, Tihange was partly evacuated because the authorities fear that radical Islamists may have the plant in their sights. Investigators have serious concerns about the possibility of a dirty bomb attack after finding footage from a security camera during a search of a terror suspect's home. They show the director of research for the Belgian nuclear program.

Given that the nuclear power plants are now being guarded by the military, it has become a lot harder not to think about them.

It's even more difficult to get used to it. It's harder yet to somehow improvise and think that things will be normal again.

In the future, we will have to keep a much closer eye on things -- not just in Belgium, but in all of Europe -- an eye on a problem that was allowed to grow in the cities and suburbs to the point it was so large that people no longer seemed to notice it.

**By Melanie Amann, Maik Baumgärtner, Sven Becker, Jörg Diehl, Martin Knobbe, Katrin Kuntz, Peter Müller, Fidelius Schmid and Barbara Supp**

143,101

## Terror Expert Neumann

# Even Germany Is Doing Too Little'

### About Peter Neumann

**Peter Neumann**, 41, is a professor for security studies at King's College in London. In his latest book published in Germany, "The New Jihadists," he warns that Europe is facing a wave of terrorism that will haunt us for decades to come.

Interview By [Martin Knobbe](#)



DPA

Terrorism Expert Peter Neumann: IS can draw on a four-digit number of potential fighters in Europe.

**In an interview following the Brussels attacks, terrorism expert Peter Neumann discusses the growing threat in Europe. Data sharing between police and intelligence agencies must be vastly increased, he argues.**

SPIEGEL: We have now seen attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*, then again in Paris on Nov. 13 and this week in Brussels. Have we underestimated the Islamic State (IS) in Europe?

Neumann: We long assumed that, in the West, IS would focus on inspiring single, independent attackers, the so-called "lone wolves." As a result, many security services were taken by surprise that IS could organize relatively complex attacks so quickly and aggressively.

SPIEGEL: Were all security services wrong in their estimation of IS?

Neumann: A high-ranking official of an intelligence service told me that no one apart from the British had anticipated anything like what we have seen. The Americans were aware of course as well, but they always warn of so many scenarios that they at times aren't even taken seriously anymore.

SPIEGEL: Is the "lone wolf" theory -- the idea that an individual can be radicalized and act without instruction -- still accepted?

Neumann: No, but it was never really plausible that this was IS' sole strategy. In January 2015, IS put together teams in Syria which were then sent back to Europe and tasked with carrying out acts of violence. These developments simply went unnoticed.

SPIEGEL: Are there individuals in Germany who have returned from Syria with such missions?

Neumann: Of course.

SPIEGEL: What size are IS' reserves? How many suicide bombers are waiting for their call to action?

Neumann: There are around 5,000 to 6,000 Europeans who have traveled to IS in Syria or in Iraq. Around 15 percent of those are likely to have been killed; between 25 and 50 percent will already have returned. Not every returnee is willing to fight. But, to contrast the situation with al-Qaida, who 10 years ago had perhaps 200 fighters, the number of people they are potentially able to draw upon is a four-digit figure. There aren't just the returnees, but also the supporters in Europe who have never traveled to Syria -- such as the captured Salah Abdeslam.

SPIEGEL: The exchange of information about suspects at the European level is still lacking, despite the establishment of the European Counter Terrorism Center at Europol, the European police agency, and cooperation between intelligence services.

Neumann: Yes, we have no central database in which all the names of individuals likely to threaten public safety or formal suspects are listed. The Left Party in Germany's parliament, the Bundestag, made a small information request last year, and it emerged the database for foreign fighters contained around 2,000 names -- not even half the number of European jihadists who are fighting abroad. And only five countries provided data at all. Even the Interpol database of stolen and lost passports is rarely used by European countries. We're not talking about a technical problem here, but a political one. If we want the Schengen area to have open borders, then we need to cooperate within it. Even Germany is doing too little in this regard.

SPIEGEL: On top of this is the fact that police forces and security services have different ways of collecting and interpreting data.

Neumann: In part they're even forbidden from sharing data. In Germany, there is a data separation rule (a post-World War II law that stipulates the separation of the work done by police and intelligence services), which is historically justified. We have to accept though that the vast majority of information about jihadist terrorists is in the hands of the secret services. I think it's sensible that the police have greater access to this information. At the moment we have a situation in Europe where the intelligence services' anti-terror task forces are not working with Europol's anti-terror department. In light of the threat posed, this is absurd.

143,103

March 26, 2016 3:31 pm

## Isis in Europe: the race to identify attack cells

Sam Jones, Defence and Security Editor

### Returning fighters have recruited a sprawling web of jihadis



Dozens of attack cells and hundreds of jihadis are probably at large in Europe, as intelligence from the Brussels attack point to a sprawling [terror network](#) Isis has been shaping for years.

European and Middle Eastern intelligence and counter-terrorism officials — some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity — talk of a dynamic, multi-faceted threat that law enforcement agencies are struggling to get to grips with, after Isis' core leadership moved months ago to funnel significant resources into exporting violence to its enemies abroad.

[Arrests](#) in France and Germany quickly followed Tuesday's attacks in Belgium, as police widen their net. But even as they do so, the Isis network is proving an evasive and adaptable target.

Bernard Squarcini, France's spy chief under former president Nicolas Sarkozy, says: "It's like shaking a bagful of fleas."

He points to the events that followed the Verviers raids in January, when Belgian police cracked down on a terror cell connected to November's Paris attacks. "The Belgians foiled [another] major attack and arrested a number of suspects, but some escaped and regrouped, and that's enough to do harm," says Mr Squarcini.

The network [Isis](#) has built is "light and nimble" he adds, taking instructions from the group's external attack planning operation, or "matrix", in Syria.

Unravelling the ambitions and capabilities of that matrix is not easy. No single mastermind is behind it. A number of groups directed to plan operations in Europe appear to be working independently of each other, each affiliated with different Isis military units, said one middle eastern intelligence official.

Sir John Sawers, a former head of British foreign intelligence MI6, talks of a "central leadership" that gives a "broad strategic direction to their people and allowed them to make their own decisions".

"That was the case with the hostages and beheadings. That was clearly given strategic direction, but the tactical implementation of that seems to have been left to the field — left to individual units or cells to take initiative on," says Sir John.

Without detailed evidence of structured plots from Syria and Iraq, western intelligence assessments for months misjudged Isis's ambitions to dedicate resources into hitting them back.

"We began to reassess our intelligence characterisation of Isis and where they really wanted to attack in the middle of last year," says one senior British security official.

“What we began to realise then was that there was more to Isis’s propaganda than we had perhaps credited. They really were throwing resources into trying to hit us in Europe — or to hit westerners where they could, with far bigger attacks than we had seen so far.”

The turning point was in June, when on the eve of Ramadan there were simultaneous attacks in Tunisia and Kuwait, which left scores dead. This displayed an operational capability that Isis had not deployed far beyond its borders before.

Until then, many intelligence assessments heavily weighted Isis’s focus on fighting its so-called near enemies — using its resources to seize physical territory for its caliphate and foster sectarian tensions through brutality.

Isis’s efforts to hit the west were seen as being primarily about motivating so-called lone wolves that it could inspire to do random acts of terror cheaply through its powerful online messaging and narrative.

It was a prescription spelt out explicitly by Isis spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in September 2014. “If you can kill a disbelieving American or European — especially the spiteful and filthy French . . . kill him in any manner or way, however it may be,” he said. “Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict.”

But Isis’s leadership had secretly begun to think on a grander scale.

“At the very least since January 2015 if not earlier, Isis has been sponsoring foreign attack cells,” says Harleen Gambhir, counter-terrorism analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

Attacking Europe, Ms Gambhir says, has become one of Isis’s top three priorities. “They have three simultaneous campaigns: defend territory in Iraq and Syria, attack regional states to try to foster broader disorder, and attack the west to punish and polarise.”

By the time European spy agencies began viewing Isis as a far more dangerous domestic adversary, the jihadis were months into the construction of networks within the EU’s borders.

[Abdelhamid Abaaoud](#), the Belgian-Moroccan who organised the cell responsible for the November Paris attacks, was at work building contacts in Europe in early 2014.

Attacks that authorities had previously viewed as lone wolf incidents, such as the shooting of four visitors to the Jewish museum in Brussels by Mehdi Nemmouche, had a directed dimension to them. Nemmouche and Abaaoud had been in contact with each other while Abaaoud was in Syria.

A senior British counter-terrorism official describes the threat as now manifesting itself in three dimensions: Isis seeks to “direct, encourage and inspire”, he says.

The group’s greatest advantage is the sheer number of potential terrorists it can draw on to build its European capabilities.

At the core of concerns are European passport holders who have returned from Syria. Some returnees pose no threat at all, but most are more likely than not to be radicalised, trained in combat, hardened by war and possessed of an extensive, international set of contacts.

There are well over 1,200 returnees inside the EU’s borders. Britain has about 350, France 250 (plus another 250 believed to be on their way back), Germany 270, Belgium 118, and Scandinavia about 200, according to official intelligence figures.

Robert Wainwright, director of Europol, has said his agency has a database of 5,000 Europeans known to have travelled to Syria who may seek to come back. More worrying, is the way in which Isis has been able to fuse with existing radical networks in Europe.



Returning fighters, often seen as heroes, become nodes capable of building new cells and connecting individuals they may have a history with, in the communities they came from.

“The US military usually uses a cancer analogy when it’s talking about the spread of Isis, but the analogy we like to use is that of a virus,” says Ms Gambhir. “A strain that infects weak immune systems — individuals coming in, then spreading the infection among existing, susceptible networks and groups.”

For example, in Belgium, the Molenbeek cells behind the [Paris and Brussels attacks](#) appear to be drawn from individuals well-known in the existing Sharia4Belgium radical network. Returnees such as Abaaoud or Najim Laachraoui, suspected of being one the Brussels suicide bombers, have been able to establish contacts with individuals such as the [El Bakraoui brothers](#), the other suspected Brussels suicide bombers, and build attack cells, which can be equipped and mobilised at short notice.

Effectively, says one senior counterterrorism official, Isis has been able to put its recruiting networks into reverse: “All the contacts individuals had that got them out to Syria are now the bones of Isis’s network in Europe as they send more and more skilled fighters back.”

Analysts say focusing on each attack cell is the wrong approach.

“You have the foreign fighters that are deploying to Europe. You have individuals that are actively involved in the operational preparation. And you have supportive home networks who are individuals who knew a kid from his school days or something and will help them,” says Ms Gambhir. “In asking how big is a network you almost have to ask which element you are talking about. Abdelhamid Abaaoud had around 90 operatives. So if you expand that out, 400-600 in some way being connected and aiding them probably isn’t a ridiculous number.”

The key to disrupting Isis’s European operations, say experts, will be in winnowing through such large numbers to try to target the individuals who form the most deeply embedded and covert support network.

Operational experts in matters such as bombmaking, secure communications and logistics are the backbone of Isis’s capacity to bring terror into Europe. Isis has so far proved adept and keeping them hidden.

Members of attack cells may not know or ever meet their [bombmaker](#), and might simply receive instructions to turn up at a set location and a set time to pick up their weapons.

The death of Laachraoui, who French and Belgian prosecutors say was responsible for bombmaking activities, in the Brussels attacks is only some consolation, say experts.

“It’s unusual for a group’s bombmaker to blow himself up,” the Soufan Group, a terrorism security company, noted on Friday. “Either he believed he was likely to be captured in the aftermath of the attacks, or the group has another member capable of constructing vests and suitcase bombs.”

The Belgian network is just one part of a larger organisation. Its members are known to have travelled throughout Europe, meeting other returnees and radicals. Law enforcement agencies are rushing to find out who they have been in contact with.

The independent and semi-autonomous nature of Isis’s European groups means that is a no easy task.

The jihadis have lost about a fifth of their territory since January last year, according to IHS Jane’s, the defence information group.

Squeezed in their heartland, the campaign in Europe is only likely to increase in importance.

*Additional reporting by Anne-Sylvaine Chassany in Paris*

143,106

March 20, 2016 6:57 pm

## **The EU sells its soul to strike a deal with Turkey**



Wolfgang Münchau

It will be interesting to see whether the bloc reneges on its promises if Ankara fails to deliver



Turkey's prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, left, announces the deal with the EU last week, alongside Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker

The EU had two assets I have always considered unassailable, however much I may have questioned various decisions. The first is a lack of alternatives. How else can Europeans confront climate change, a refugee crisis or an over-assertive Russian president if not through the EU?

The second is the moral high ground. Compared with the majority of its member states, the EU is less corrupt, more principled and rules-driven. Whereas the world of national politics is full of tacticians out to seek short-term gain, the bloc manages a better mix of politics and policies. It builds broad coalitions and formulates strategic policy objectives. Its horizon extends beyond the life of a parliament.

**Within a few years those assets have been demolished. The mismanagement of the eurozone crisis made it possible to formulate a rational economic argument for an exit.**

**Then, on Friday the EU lost its other key asset. The deal with Turkey is as sordid as anything I have seen in modern European politics. On the day that EU leaders signed the deal, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, gave the game away: “Democracy, freedom and the rule of law . . .”** For us, these words have absolutely no value any longer.” At that point, the European Council should have ended the conversation with Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish prime minister, and sent him home. But instead they made a deal with him — money and a lot more in return for help with the refugee crisis.

**Turkey will relocate some 72,000 refugees to the EU — a one-for-one swap for every illegal immigrant whom the Turks pick up on smuggler boats in the Aegean Sea. In return, the EU is paying Turkey €6bn and opening up a new chapter in EU accession negotiations — this with a country whose leadership has just abrogated democracy. The EU is further set to allow visa-free travel to 75m inhabitants of Turkey. The EU not only sold its soul that day, it actually negotiated a pretty lousy deal.**

I am not in a position to judge whether this deal complies with the Geneva Convention and other parts of international law. I assume that the European Council has made sure it would stand up in court. But even if it is judged to be legal, I have doubts whether it can be implemented. It will be interesting to watch whether the EU will renege on its promises to Turkey if Ankara fails to deliver.

### **Your opinion**

Even if the deal is implemented in full, it will not lighten the pressure much. The expected number of refugees making their way into the EU will be a large multiple of the 72,000 agreed with Turkey. **A German think-tank**

**has done the maths on refugee flows for this year and has come up with an estimated range of 1.8m-6.4m.** The latter figure is a worst-case scenario that would include large numbers from Northern Africa.

The closure of the west Balkan route for refugees — from Greece through Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and then into Austria and Germany — brought short-term relief to north Europeans but there are numerous alternative routes refugees can take. **They can go through the Caucasus and the Ukraine, or through the Mediterranean into Italy and Spain.** If countries close their borders, they do not reduce the stream of refugees but simply divert them. It is a classic example of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. This shows that the case for anchoring refugee policy at EU level is overwhelming.

One of the most egregious cases of unilateral action is Austria's border closures. The country will now reintroduce controls at its main border post to Italy — on the Brenner motorway. This is one of the busiest routes between southern and northern Europe. Once the refugees arrive in Italy, expect more action at its northern borders. France, Switzerland and Slovenia can be counted on to reintroduce controls at that point. Italy would then be cut off from the Schengen passport-free travel area, of which it is a member, and Schengen would become a small club of north European countries — possibly a model for a future eurozone. This would be the first step in the fragmentation of the EU.

The agreement with Turkey will also have an impact on the UK referendum debate. Would the camp in favour of leaving the EU not have something to say about visa-free travel for 75m Turks? Anyone who cares about democracy and human rights will hate this deal. So will anyone who fears German dominance of the EU, since it was initiated by Angela Merkel. The German chancellor needed it badly to get her out of a hole of her own making. It was her unilateral decision to open Germany's borders that turned a manageable refugee crisis into an unmanageable one.

It is not easy to make a purely rational case for Britain's exit from the EU. But when the EU loses its moral high ground, we should not be surprised that people begin to question what it stands for, and why it is needed.

143,108

March 27, 2016 3:11 pm

## A history of errors behind Europe's many crises



Wolfgang Münchau

I would not trust with my security somebody who cannot even contain a medium-sized financial event

**For the first time in my life, there is a chance that European integration may take a step backwards. I cannot forecast whether there will be further terrorist attacks, whether the British will leave the EU, how many refugees will come this year or next, or whether the eurozone crisis will return. But I am confident that the probability of at least one of these crises spinning out of control is very high indeed.**

**With hindsight, the EU was wrong to construct a single currency without a proper banking union. It was wrong to create a passport-free travel zone without a common border police force and immigration policy. I would add EU enlargement to this list — not the principle but the haste with which it was pursued.**

**The cardinal mistake of our time was the decision to muddle through the eurozone crisis. Europe's political leadership failed to generate the public support for what was needed: creating a political and economic union. Instead, the European Council did the minimum necessary for the system to survive to the next day.**

There are four channels through which that policy contributed to the broader instability of the EU today.

The first, and most obvious, is that the EU has the capacity only to deal with one big crisis at a time. The EU is not a government. The Commission is part executive, part administration and part guardian of the European treaties. The European Council is not a government in situ but a group of national leaders who come together a few times a year to take decisions. I would never bet against the European Council finding minimal compromises but would always bet against its ability to solve real-world problems. Effective crisis resolution requires executive power — something the EU lacks.

The second channel occurs through the conflation, real or imaginary, of two more crises. The Greek economy continues to contract, and [refugees](#) have been trapped in Greece in ever greater numbers since Macedonia closed the border. This is an instance of two real crises coming together.

But then there are the fake connections. Poland has used last week's Brussels bombings as a pretext for questioning a commitment to accept 7,000 refugees under a previously agreed quota system. Another example is an interaction between the [terrorist attacks and the prospect of British exit](#) from the EU. They are factually unrelated but this has not stopped some [Brexit](#) campaigners using the attacks for their own narrow political purposes.

The third channel is economic. The output of several eurozone countries has yet to return to pre-crisis levels. Security, both internal and external, was among the areas most affected by austerity. Many governments found it easier to cut spending on the police and military than on social programmes.

Another economic factor that has hindered Europe's crisis resolution efforts is the widening income gap between rich and poor — and north and south. This reduced the willingness of the wealthier northern states to accept fiscal transfers because they would be large and permanent.

The fourth channel is the most important: a generalised loss of trust and political capital. With each unresolved crisis, the degree of Euroscepticism in the population rises. If the EU is seen as failing to resolve problems, people naturally become reluctant to bestow the bloc with new powers. Populist parties on the left and the right are exploiting the union's failures. I would not be surprised to see one of these parties win an election in a big European country one day.

The combination of these four channels frustrates perfectly good ideas for further projects aimed at European integration — those that would benefit everybody, such as central agencies to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism and to deal with the influx of refugees. If the EU had not messed up the previous crises, people would look at a European immigration policy or an antiterrorism task force with a more open mind.

But would you trust with your own security somebody who cannot even contain a medium-sized financial crisis? I personally would not, which is why my own preference is for the Schengen system of passport-free travel to be suspended indefinitely, or at least until the sovereignty over borders, immigration and the fight against terrorism are fully shifted to EU level — something I do not expect to happen.

Economic history has shown time and again that efforts to muddle through financial crises never work — think of the Great Depression or Japan's lost decades. For the EU it was a catastrophic policy error. It has not only given us an economic depression from which many countries have not yet recovered. It has also destroyed public confidence in the EU and in the very idea of European integration.

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143,110

- [OPINION](#)
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## Unite to Defeat Radical Jihadism

It will require Western elites to form an alliance with the citizens they've long disrespected.



ENLARGEAt a vigil in London's Trafalgar Square following the March 24 terror attacks in Brussels.

By [PEGGY NOONAN](#)

Updated March 25, 2016 4:27 p.m. ET

[1404 COMMENTS](#)

These things are obvious after the Brussels bombings:

In striking at the political heart of Europe, home of the European Union, the ISIS jihadists were delivering a message: They will not be stopped.

**What we are seeing now is not radical jihadist Islam versus the West but, increasingly, radical jihadist Islam versus the world. They are on the move in Africa, parts of Asia and of course throughout the Mideast.**

**Radical jihadism is not going to go away, not for a long time, probably decades.** For 15 years it has in significant ways shaped our lives, and it will shape our children's too. They will have to win the war.

**It will not be effectively fought with guilt, ambivalence or double-mindedness. That, in the West, will have to change.**

**The jihadists' weapons and means will get worse. Right now it's guns and suicide vests. In the nature of things their future weapons will be more sophisticated and deadly.**

The usual glib talk of politicians—calls for unity, vows that we will not give in to fear—will produce in the future what they've produced in the past: nothing. “The thoughts and the prayers of the American people are with the people of Belgium,” said the president, vigorously refusing to dodge clichés. “We must unite and be together, regardless of nationality, race or faith, in fighting against the scourge of terrorism.” It is not an “existential threat,” he noted, as he does. But if you were at San Bernardino or Fort Hood, the Paris concert hall or the Brussels subway, it would feel pretty existential to you.

**There are many books, magazine long-reads and online symposia on the subject of violent Islam. I have written of my admiration for “What ISIS Really Wants” by Graeme Wood, published a year ago in the Atlantic.** ISIS supporters have tried hard to make their project knowable and understood, Mr. Wood reported: “We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change . . . and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.” ISIS is essentially “medieval” in its religious nature, and “committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people.” They intend to eliminate the infidel and raise up the caliphate—one like the Ottoman empire, which peaked in the 16th century and then began its decline.

When I think of the future I find myself going back to what I freely admit is a child's math, a simple 10% rule.

There are said to be 1.6 billion Muslims in the world. Most are and have been peaceful and peaceable, living their lives and, especially in America, taking an admirable role in the life of the nation.

But this is a tense, fraught moment within the world of Islam, marked by disagreements on what Islam is and what its texts mean. With that context, the child's math: Let's say only 10% of the 1.6 billion harbor feelings of grievance toward "the West," or desire to expunge the infidel, or hope to re-establish the caliphate. That 10% is 160 million people. Let's say of that group only 10% would be inclined toward jihad. That's 16 million. Assume that of that group only 10% really means it—would really become jihadis or give them aid and sustenance. That's 1.6 million. That is a lot of ferociousness in an age of increasingly available weapons, including the chemical, biological and nuclear sort.

**My math tells me it will be a long, hard fight. We will not be able to contain them, we will have to beat them.**

We must absorb that central fact, as Ronald Reagan once did with a different threat. Asked by his new national security adviser to state his exact strategic goals vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Reagan: "We win, they lose."

That's where we are now. The "they" is radical Islamic jihadism.

**Normal people have seen that a long time, but the leaders of the West—its political class, media powers and opinion shapers—have had a hard time coming to terms. I continue to believe part of the reason is that religion isn't very important to many of them, so they have trouble taking it seriously as a motivation of others.** An ardent Catholic, evangelical Christian or devout Jew would be able to take the religious aspect seriously when discussing ISIS. **An essentially agnostic U.S. or European political class is less able. Thus they cast about—if only we give young Islamist men jobs programs or social integration schemes, we can stop this trouble. But jihadists don't want to be integrated. They want trouble.**

**Our own president still won't call radical Islam what it is, thinking apparently that if we name them clearly they'll only hate us more,** and Americans on the ground, being racist ignoramuses, will be incited by candor to attack their peaceful Muslim neighbors.

All this for days has had me thinking of Gordon Brown, which is something I bet you can't say. On April 28, 2010, in Rochdale, England, Britain's then prime minister accidentally performed a great public service by revealing what liberal Western leaders think of their people.

At a campaign stop a 65-year-old woman named Gillian Duffy approached him and shared her concerns regarding crime, taxes and immigration. Mr. Brown made a great show of friendliness and appreciation. Then, still wearing a live mic, he got into his Jaguar, complained to his aides about "that woman" and said, "She's just a sort of bigoted woman who said she used to be Labour."

That was the authentic sound of the Western elite. Labour lost the election. **But the elites have for a long time enjoyed nothing more than sneering at the anger and "racism" of their own people. They do not have the wisdom to understand that if they convincingly attempted to protect the people and respected their anxieties, the people would feel far less rage.**

I end with a point about the sheer power of pride right now in Western public life. Republican operatives and elected officials in the U.S. don't want to change their stand on illegal immigration, and a key reason is pride. They're stiff-necked, convinced of their own higher moral thinking, and they will have open borders—which they do not call "open borders" but "comprehensive immigration reform," which includes border-control mechanisms. But they'll never get to the mechanisms. They see the rise of Donald Trump and know it has something to do with immigration, but—they can't bow. Some months ago I spoke to an admirable conservative group and said the leaders of the GOP should change their stand. I saw one of their leaders wince, as if I had made a faux pas. Which, I understood, I had. I understood too that terrorism is only making the border issue worse, and something's got to give.

But I doubt they can change. It would be like . . . respecting Gillian Duffy.

Though maybe European leaders can grow to respect her, after Brussels. Maybe the blasts there have shaken their pride.

143,112

## What ISIS Really Wants



- [GRAEME WOOD](#)
- [MARCH 2015 ISSUE](#)

## WHAT IS THE ISLAMIC STATE?

Where did it come from, and what are its intentions? The simplicity of these questions can be deceiving, and few Western leaders seem to know the answers. In December, *The New York Times* published **confidential comments by Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East**, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State's appeal. **"We have not defeated the idea," he said. "We do not even understand the idea."** In the past year, President **Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as "not Islamic" and as al-Qaeda's "jayvee team,"** statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may **have contributed to significant strategic errors.**

The group seized Mosul, Iraq, last June, and already rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been its leader since May 2010, but until last summer, his most recent known appearance on film was a grainy mug shot from a stay in U.S. captivity at Camp Bucca during the occupation of Iraq. Then, on July 5 of last year, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations—upgrading his resolution from grainy to high-definition, and his position from hunted guerrilla to commander of all Muslims. The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume, and is continuing.

Our ignorance of the Islamic State is in some ways understandable: It is a hermit kingdom; few have gone there and returned. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. But his address, and the Islamic State's countless other propaganda videos and encyclicals, are online, and the caliphate's supporters have toiled mightily to make their project knowable. **We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.**

The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than **like the realization of a dystopian alternate reality** in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.

**We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways.** First, we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al-Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as "Sheikh Osama," a title of honor. **But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda's heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group's priorities and current leadership.**

Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. **The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. (Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces.)**

**We are misled in a second way, by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State's medieval religious nature.** Peter Bergen, who produced the first interview with bin Laden in 1997, titled his first book *Holy War, Inc.* in part to acknowledge bin Laden as a creature of the modern secular world. Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently. On Mohamed Atta's last full day of life, he shopped at Walmart and ate dinner at Pizza Hut.

**There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.**




The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the Islamic State's officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to "moderns." **In conversation, they insist that they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often speak in codes and allusions that sound odd or old-fashioned to non-Muslims, but refer to specific traditions and texts of early Islam.**

**To take one example:** In September, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State's chief spokesman, called on Muslims in Western countries such as France and Canada to find an infidel and "smash his head with a rock," poison him, run him over with a car, or "destroy his crops." To Western ears, the biblical-sounding punishments—the stoning and crop destruction—juxtaposed strangely with his more modern-sounding call to vehicular homicide. (As if to show that he could terrorize by imagery alone, Adnani also referred to Secretary of State John Kerry as an "uncircumcised geezer.")

But Adnani was not merely talking trash. **His speech was laced with theological and legal discussion,** and his exhortation to attack crops directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which case Muslims in the lands of *kuffar*, or infidels, should be unmerciful, and poison away.

**The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.**

Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, "**the Prophetic methodology,**" which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. **Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn't actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it.** We'll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State's intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.



Control of territory is an essential precondition for the Islamic State's authority in the eyes of its supporters. **This map,** adapted from the work of the Institute for the Study of War, **shows the territory under the caliphate's control as of January 15, along with areas it has attacked. Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications.**

## I. Devotion

In November, the Islamic State released an infomercial-like video tracing its origins to bin Laden. It acknowledged Abu Musa'b al Zarqawi, the brutal head of al-Qaeda in Iraq from roughly 2003 until his killing in 2006, as a more immediate progenitor, followed sequentially by two other guerrilla leaders before Baghdadi, the caliph. Notably unmentioned: bin Laden's successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, the owlish Egyptian eye surgeon who currently heads al-Qaeda. Zawahiri has not pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, and he is increasingly hated by his fellow jihadists. His isolation is not helped by his lack of charisma; in videos he comes across as squinty and annoyed. **But the split between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has been long in the making, and begins to explain, at least in part, the outsize bloodlust of the latter.**

Zawahiri's companion in isolation is a Jordanian cleric named Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, 55, who has a fair claim to being al-Qaeda's intellectual architect and the most important jihadist unknown to the average American newspaper reader. On most matters of doctrine, Maqdisi and the Islamic State agree. Both are closely identified with **the jihadist wing of a branch of Sunnism called Salafism, after the Arabic *al salaf al salih*, the "pious forefathers."** These forefathers are the Prophet himself and his earliest adherents, whom Salafis honor and emulate as the models for all behavior, including warfare, couture, family life, even dentistry.

# The Islamic State awaits the army of “Rome,” whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.

Maqdisi taught Zarqawi, who went to war in Iraq with the older man’s advice in mind. In time, though, Zarqawi surpassed his mentor in fanaticism, and eventually earned his rebuke. At issue was Zarqawi’s penchant for bloody spectacle—and, as a matter of doctrine, his hatred of other Muslims, to the point of excommunicating and killing them. In Islam, the practice of *takfir*, or excommunication, is theologically perilous. “If a man says to his brother, ‘You are an infidel,’” the Prophet said, “then one of them is right.” If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation. The punishment for apostasy is death. And yet Zarqawi heedlessly expanded the range of behavior that could make Muslims infidels.

Maqdisi wrote to his former pupil that he needed to exercise caution and “not issue sweeping proclamations of *takfir*” or “proclaim people to be apostates because of their sins.” The distinction between apostate and sinner may appear subtle, but it is a key point of contention between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Denying the holiness of the Koran or the prophecies of Muhammad is straightforward apostasy. But Zarqawi and the state he spawned take the position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam. These include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election—even for a Muslim candidate—and being lax about calling other people apostates. Being a Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of imams and public self-flagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example of the Prophet.) **That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death. So too are the heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God.**

**Following *takfiri* doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people.** The lack of objective reporting from its territory makes the true extent of the slaughter unknowable, but social-media posts from the region suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks. **Muslim “apostates” are the most common victims. Exempted from automatic execution, it appears, are Christians who do not resist their new government. Baghdadi permits them to live, as long as they pay a special tax, known as the *jizya*, and acknowledge their subjugation.** The Koranic authority for this practice is not in dispute.

**CENTURIES HAVE PASSED since the wars of religion ceased in Europe, and since men stopped dying in large numbers because of arcane theological disputes. Hence, perhaps, the incredulity and denial with which Westerners have greeted news of the theology and practices of the Islamic State. Many refuse to believe that this group is as devout as it claims to be, or as backward-looking or apocalyptic as its actions and statements suggest.**

**Their skepticism is comprehensible.** In the past, Westerners who accused Muslims of blindly following ancient scriptures came to deserved grief from academics—notably the late Edward Said—who pointed out that calling Muslims “ancient” was usually just another way to denigrate them. Look instead, these scholars urged, to the conditions in which these ideologies arose—the bad governance, the shifting social mores, the humiliation of living in lands valued only for their oil.

Without acknowledgment of these factors, no explanation of the rise of the Islamic State could be complete. But focusing on them to the exclusion of ideology **reflects another kind of Western bias: that if religious ideology doesn’t matter much in Washington or Berlin, surely it must be equally irrelevant in Raqqa or Mosul.** When a masked executioner says *Allahu akbar* while beheading an apostate, sometimes he’s doing so for religious reasons.

**Many mainstream Muslim organizations have gone so far as to say the Islamic State is, in fact, un-Islamic.** It is, of course, reassuring to know that the vast majority of Muslims have zero interest in replacing Hollywood movies with public executions as evening entertainment. **But Muslims who call the Islamic State un-Islamic are typically, as the Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel, the leading expert on the group’s theology, told me, “embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion” that neglects “what their religion has historically and legally required.” Many denials of the Islamic State’s religious nature, he said, are rooted in an “interfaith-Christian-nonsense tradition.”**

**Every academic I asked about the Islamic State’s ideology sent me to Haykel.** Of partial Lebanese descent, Haykel grew up in Lebanon and the United States, and when he talks through his Mephistophelian goatee, there is a hint of an unplaceable foreign accent.

**According to Haykel, the ranks of the Islamic State are deeply infused with religious vigor. Koranic quotations are ubiquitous. “Even the foot soldiers spout this stuff constantly,” Haykel said. “They mug for their cameras and repeat their basic doctrines in formulaic fashion, and they do it all the time.” He regards the claim that the Islamic State has distorted the texts of Islam as preposterous, sustainable only through willful ignorance. “People want to absolve Islam,” he said. “It’s this ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ mantra. As if there is such a thing as ‘Islam’! It’s what Muslims do, and how they interpret their texts.” Those texts are shared by all Sunni Muslims, not just the Islamic State. “And these guys have just as much legitimacy as anyone else.”**

All Muslims acknowledge that Muhammad's earliest conquests were not tidy affairs, and that the laws of war passed down in the Koran and in the narrations of the Prophet's rule were calibrated to fit a turbulent and violent time. **In Haykel's estimation, the fighters of the Islamic State are authentic throwbacks to early Islam and are faithfully reproducing its norms of war. This behavior includes a number of practices that modern Muslims tend to prefer not to acknowledge as integral to their sacred texts. "Slavery, crucifixion, and beheadings are not something that freakish [jihadists] are cherry-picking from the medieval tradition," Haykel said. Islamic State fighters "are smack in the middle of the medieval tradition and are bringing it wholesale into the present day."**

Our failure to appreciate the essential differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda has led to dangerous decisions.

The Koran specifies crucifixion as one of the only punishments permitted for enemies of Islam. The tax on Christians finds clear endorsement in the Surah Al-Tawba, the Koran's ninth chapter, which instructs Muslims to fight Christians and Jews "until they pay the *jizya* with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." **The Prophet, whom all Muslims consider exemplary, imposed these rules and owned slaves.**

**Leaders of the Islamic State have taken emulation of Muhammad as strict duty, and have revived traditions that have been dormant for hundreds of years. "What's striking about them is not just the literalism, but also the seriousness with which they read these texts," Haykel said. "There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness that Muslims don't normally have."**

Before the rise of the Islamic State, no group in the past few centuries had attempted more-radical fidelity to the Prophetic model than the Wahhabis of 18th-century Arabia. They conquered most of what is now Saudi Arabia, and their strict practices survive in a diluted version of Sharia there. Haykel sees an important distinction between the groups, though: "The Wahhabis were not wanton in their violence." They were surrounded by Muslims, and they conquered lands that were already Islamic; this stayed their hand. **ISIS, by contrast, is really reliving the early period." Early Muslims were surrounded by non-Muslims, and the Islamic State, because of its *takfiri* tendencies, considers itself to be in the same situation.**

If al-Qaeda wanted to revive slavery, it never said so. And why would it? Silence on slavery probably reflected strategic thinking, with public sympathies in mind: when the Islamic State began enslaving people, even some of its supporters balked. Nonetheless, the caliphate has continued to embrace slavery and crucifixion without apology. **"We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women," Adnani, the spokesman, promised in one of his periodic valentines to the West. "If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market."**

In October, *Dabiq*, the magazine of the Islamic State, published "The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour," an article that took up the question of whether Yazidis (the members of an ancient Kurdish sect that borrows elements of Islam, and had come under attack from Islamic State forces in northern Iraq) are lapsed Muslims, and therefore marked for death, or merely pagans and therefore fair game for enslavement. A study group of Islamic State scholars had convened, on government orders, to resolve this issue. If they are pagans, the article's anonymous author wrote,

Yazidi women and children [are to be] divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations [in northern Iraq] ... Enslaving the families of the *kuffar* [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Koran and the narrations of the Prophet ... and thereby apostatizing from Islam.

## II. Territory

Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die.

Peter R. Neumann, a professor at King's College London, told me that online voices have been essential to spreading propaganda and ensuring that newcomers know what to believe. Online recruitment has also widened the demographics of the jihadist community, by allowing conservative Muslim women—physically isolated in their homes—to reach out to recruiters, radicalize, and arrange passage to Syria. Through its appeals to both genders, the Islamic State hopes to build a complete society.

In November, I traveled to Australia to meet Musa Cerantonio, a 30-year-old man whom Neumann and other researchers had identified as one of the two most important "new spiritual authorities" guiding foreigners to join the Islamic State. For three years he was a televangelist on Iqraa TV in Cairo, but he left after the station objected to his frequent calls to establish a caliphate. Now he preaches on Facebook and Twitter.

Cerantonio—a big, friendly man with a bookish demeanor—told me he blanches at beheading videos. He hates seeing the violence, even though supporters of the Islamic State are required to endorse it. (He speaks out, controversially among jihadists, against suicide bombing, on the grounds that God forbids suicide; he differs from the Islamic State on a few other points as well.) He has the kind of unkempt facial hair one sees on certain overgrown fans of *The Lord of the Rings*, and his obsession with Islamic apocalypticism felt familiar. He seemed to be living out a drama that looks, from an outsider's perspective, like a medieval fantasy novel, only with real blood.

Last June, Cerantonio and his wife tried to emigrate—he wouldn't say to where ("It's illegal to go to Syria," he said cagily)—but they were caught en route, in the Philippines, and he was deported back to Australia for overstaying his visa. Australia has criminalized

attempts to join or travel to the Islamic State, and has confiscated Cerantonio's passport. He is stuck in Melbourne, where he is well known to the local constabulary. If Cerantonio were caught facilitating the movement of individuals to the Islamic State, he would be imprisoned. So far, though, he is free—a technically unaffiliated ideologue who nonetheless speaks with what other jihadists have taken to be a reliable voice on matters of the Islamic State's doctrine.

We met for lunch in Footscray, a dense, multicultural Melbourne suburb that's home to Lonely Planet, the travel-guide publisher. Cerantonio grew up there in a half-Irish, half-Calabrian family. On a typical street one can find African restaurants, Vietnamese shops, and young Arabs walking around in the Salafi uniform of scraggly beard, long shirt, and trousers ending halfway down the calves.

Cerantonio explained the joy he felt when Baghdadi was declared the caliph on June 29—and the sudden, magnetic attraction that Mesopotamia began to exert on him and his friends. "I was in a hotel [in the Philippines], and I saw the declaration on television," he told me. "And I was just amazed, and I'm like, *Why am I stuck here in this bloody room?*"

The last caliphate was the Ottoman empire, which reached its peak in the 16th century and then experienced a long decline, until the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, euthanized it in 1924. But Cerantonio, like many supporters of the Islamic State, doesn't acknowledge that caliphate as legitimate, because it didn't fully enforce Islamic law, which requires stonings and slavery and amputations, and because its caliphs were not descended from the tribe of the Prophet, the Quraysh.

Baghdadi spoke at length of the importance of the caliphate in his Mosul sermon. He said that to revive the institution of the caliphate—which had not functioned except in name for about 1,000 years—was a communal obligation. He and his loyalists had "hastened to declare the caliphate and place an imam" at its head, he said. "This is a duty upon the Muslims—a duty that has been lost for centuries ... The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it." Like bin Laden before him, Baghdadi spoke floridly, with frequent scriptural allusion and command of classical rhetoric. Unlike bin Laden, and unlike those false caliphs of the Ottoman empire, he is Qurayshi.

The caliphate, Cerantonio told me, is not just a political entity but also a vehicle for salvation. Islamic State propaganda regularly reports the pledges of *baya'a* (allegiance) rolling in from jihadist groups across the Muslim world. Cerantonio quoted a Prophetic saying, that to die without pledging allegiance is to die *jahil* (ignorant) and therefore die a "death of disbelief." Consider how Muslims (or, for that matter, Christians) imagine God deals with the souls of people who die without learning about the one true religion. They are neither obviously saved nor definitively condemned. Similarly, Cerantonio said, the Muslim who acknowledges one omnipotent god and prays, but who dies without pledging himself to a valid caliph and incurring the obligations of that oath, has failed to live a fully Islamic life. I pointed out that this means the vast majority of Muslims in history, and all who passed away between 1924 and 2014, died a death of disbelief. Cerantonio nodded gravely. "I would go so far as to say that Islam has been reestablished" by the caliphate.


I asked him about his own *baya'a*, and he quickly corrected me: "I didn't say that I'd pledged allegiance." Under Australian law, he reminded me, giving *baya'a* to the Islamic State was illegal. "But I agree that [Baghdadi] fulfills the requirements," he continued. "I'm just going to wink at you, and you take that to mean whatever you want."

To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law—being a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent; exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity; and having *'amr*, or authority. This last criterion, Cerantonio said, is the hardest to fulfill, and requires that the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law. Baghdadi's Islamic State achieved that long before June 29, Cerantonio said, and as soon as it did, a Western convert within the group's ranks—Cerantonio described him as "something of a leader"—began murmuring about the religious obligation to declare a caliphate. He and others spoke quietly to those in power and told them that further delay would be sinful.

Social-media posts from the Islamic State suggest that executions happen more or less continually.

Cerantonio said a faction arose that was prepared to make war on Baghdadi's group if it delayed any further. They prepared a letter to various powerful members of ISIS, airing their displeasure at the failure to appoint a caliph, but were pacified by Adnani, the spokesman, who let them in on a secret—that a caliphate had already been declared, long before the public announcement. They had their legitimate caliph, and at that point there was only one option. "If he's legitimate," Cerantonio said, "you must give him the *baya'a*."

After Baghdadi's July sermon, a stream of jihadists began flowing daily into Syria with renewed motivation. Jürgen Todenhöfer, a German author and former politician who visited the Islamic State in December, reported the arrival of 100 fighters at one Turkish-border recruitment station in just two days. His report, among others, suggests a still-steady inflow of foreigners, ready to give up everything at home for a shot at paradise in the worst place on Earth.



Bernard Haykel, the foremost secular authority on the Islamic State's ideology, believes the group is trying to re-create the earliest days of Islam and is faithfully reproducing its norms of war. "There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness" about the group's dedication to the text of the Koran, he says. (Peter Murphy)

IN LONDON, a week before my meal with Cerantonio, I met with three ex-members of a banned Islamist group called Al Muhajiroun (The Emigrants): Anjem Choudary, Abu Baraa, and Abdul Muhid. They all expressed desire to emigrate to the Islamic State, as many of their colleagues already had, but the authorities had confiscated their passports. Like Cerantonio, they regarded the caliphate as the only righteous government on Earth, though none would confess having pledged allegiance. Their principal goal in meeting me was to explain what the Islamic State stands for, and how its policies reflect God's law.

Choudary, 48, is the group's former leader. He frequently appears on cable news, as one of the few people producers can book who will defend the Islamic State vociferously, until his mike is cut. He has a reputation in the United Kingdom as a loathsome blowhard, but he and his disciples sincerely believe in the Islamic State and, on matters of doctrine, speak in its voice. Choudary and the others feature prominently in the Twitter feeds of Islamic State residents, and Abu Baraa maintains a YouTube channel to answer questions about Sharia.

Since September, authorities have been investigating the three men on suspicion of supporting terrorism. Because of this investigation, they had to meet me separately: communication among them would have violated the terms of their bail. But speaking with them felt like speaking with the same person wearing different masks. Choudary met me in a candy shop in the East London suburb of Ilford. He was dressed smartly, in a crisp blue tunic reaching nearly to his ankles, and sipped a Red Bull while we talked.

Before the caliphate, "maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives," Choudary told me. "These laws are in abeyance until we have *khilafa*"—a caliphate—"and now we have one." Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens. In theory, all Muslims are obliged to immigrate to the territory where the caliph is applying these laws. One of Choudary's prize students, a convert from Hinduism named Abu Rumaysah, evaded police to bring his family of five from London to Syria in November. On the day I met Choudary, Abu Rumaysah tweeted out a picture of himself with a Kalashnikov in one arm and his newborn son in the other. Hashtag: #GenerationKhilafah.

The caliph is required to implement Sharia. Any deviation will compel those who have pledged allegiance to inform the caliph in private of his error and, in extreme cases, to excommunicate and replace him if he persists. ("I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility," Baghdadi said in his sermon.) In return, the caliph commands obedience—and those who persist in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates.

Choudary said Sharia has been misunderstood because of its incomplete application by regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which does behead murderers and cut off thieves' hands. "The problem," he explained, "is that when places like Saudi Arabia just implement the penal code, and don't provide the social and economic justice of the Sharia—the whole package—they simply engender hatred toward the Sharia." That whole package, he said, would include free housing, food, and clothing for all, though of course anyone who wished to enrich himself with work could do so.

Abdul Muhid, 32, continued along these lines. He was dressed in mujahideen chic when I met him at a local restaurant: scruffy beard, Afghan cap, and a wallet outside of his clothes, attached with what looked like a shoulder holster. When we sat down, he was eager to discuss welfare. The Islamic State may have medieval-style punishments for moral crimes (lashes for boozing or fornication, stoning for adultery), but its social-welfare program is, at least in some aspects, progressive to a degree that would please an MSNBC pundit. Health care, he said, is free. ("Isn't it free in Britain, too?," I asked. "Not really," he said. "Some procedures aren't covered, such as vision.") This provision of social welfare was not, he said, a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy *obligation* inherent in God's law.

### III. The Apocalypse

All Muslims acknowledge that God is the only one who knows the future. But they also agree that he has offered us a peek at it, in the Koran and in narrations of the Prophet. The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist movement in believing that it is written into God's script as a central character. It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly distinctive from its predecessors, and clearest in the religious nature of its mission.

In broad strokes, al-Qaeda acts like an underground political movement, with worldly goals in sight at all times—the expulsion of non-Muslims from the Arabian peninsula, the abolishment of the state of Israel, the end of support for dictatorships in Muslim lands. The Islamic State has its share of worldly concerns (including, in the places it controls, collecting garbage and keeping the water running),

but the End of Days is a leitmotif of its propaganda. Bin Laden rarely mentioned the apocalypse, and when he did, he seemed to presume that he would be long dead when the glorious moment of divine comeuppance finally arrived. “Bin Laden and Zawahiri are from elite Sunni families who look down on this kind of speculation and think it’s something the masses engage in,” says Will McCants of the Brookings Institution, who is writing a book about the Islamic State’s apocalyptic thought.

During the last years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Islamic State’s immediate founding fathers, by contrast, saw signs of the end times everywhere. They were anticipating, within a year, the arrival of the Mahdi—a messianic figure destined to lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world. McCants says a prominent Islamist in Iraq approached bin Laden in 2008 to warn him that the group was being led by millenarians who were “talking all the time about the Mahdi and making strategic decisions” based on when they thought the Mahdi was going to arrive. “Al-Qaeda had to write to [these leaders] to say ‘Cut it out.’”

For certain true believers—the kind who long for epic good-versus-evil battles—visions of apocalyptic bloodbaths fulfill a deep psychological need. Of the Islamic State supporters I met, Musa Cerantonio, the Australian, expressed the deepest interest in the apocalypse and how the remaining days of the Islamic State—and the world—might look. Parts of that prediction are original to him, and do not yet have the status of doctrine. But other parts are based on mainstream Sunni sources and appear all over the Islamic State’s propaganda. These include the belief that there will be only 12 legitimate caliphs, and Baghdadi is the eighth; that the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and that Islam’s final showdown with an anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period of renewed Islamic conquest.

The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo. It named its propaganda magazine after the town, and celebrated madly when (at great cost) it conquered Dabiq’s strategically unimportant plains. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo or its Antietam.

“Dabiq is basically all farmland,” one Islamic State supporter recently tweeted. “You could imagine large battles taking place there.” The Islamic State’s propagandists drool with anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon. The state’s magazine quotes Zarqawi as saying, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify ... until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” A recent propaganda video shows clips from Hollywood war movies set in medieval times—perhaps because many of the prophecies specify that the armies will be on horseback or carrying ancient weapons.

Now that it has taken Dabiq, the Islamic State awaits the arrival of an enemy army there, whose defeat will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse. Western media frequently miss references to Dabiq in the Islamic State’s videos, and focus instead on lurid scenes of beheading. “Here we are, burying the first American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive,” said a masked executioner in a November video, showing the severed head of Peter (Abdul Rahman) Kassig, the aid worker who’d been held captive for more than a year. During fighting in Iraq in December, after mujahideen (perhaps inaccurately) reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts or hostesses upon the arrival of the first guests at a party.

The Prophetic narration that foretells the Dabiq battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Who “Rome” is, now that the pope has no army, remains a matter of debate. But Cerantonio makes a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last self-identified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely.

After mujahideen reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts upon the arrival of the first guests at a party.

After its battle in Dabiq, Cerantonio said, the caliphate will expand and sack Istanbul. Some believe it will then cover the entire Earth, but Cerantonio suggested its tide may never reach beyond the Bosphorus. An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the caliphate’s fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus—the second-most-revered prophet in Islam—will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory.

“Only God knows” whether the Islamic State’s armies are the ones foretold, Cerantonio said. But he is hopeful. “The Prophet said that one sign of the imminent arrival of the End of Days is that people will for a long while stop talking about the End of Days,” he said. “If you go to the mosques now, you’ll find the preachers are silent about this subject.” On this theory, even setbacks dealt to the Islamic State mean nothing, since God has preordained the near-destruction of his people anyway. The Islamic State has its best and worst days ahead of it.



Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared caliph by his followers last summer. The establishment of a caliphate awakened large sections of Koranic law that had lain dormant, and required those Muslims who recognized the caliphate to immigrate. (AP)

## IV. The Fight

The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group's actions. Osama bin Laden was seldom predictable. He ended his first television interview cryptically. CNN's Peter Arnett asked him, "What are your future plans?" Bin Laden replied, "You'll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing." By contrast, the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by listening carefully, we can deduce how it intends to govern and expand.

In London, Choudary and his students provided detailed descriptions of how the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy, now that it is a caliphate. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as "offensive jihad," the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. "Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves," Choudary said; without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph.

Choudary took pains to present the laws of war under which the Islamic State operates as policies of mercy rather than of brutality. He told me the state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies—a holy order to scare the shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.

Choudary's colleague Abu Baraa explained that Islamic law permits only temporary peace treaties, lasting no longer than a decade. Similarly, accepting any border is anathema, as stated by the Prophet and echoed in the Islamic State's propaganda videos. If the caliph consents to a longer-term peace or permanent border, he will be in error. Temporary peace treaties are renewable, but may not be applied to all enemies at once: the caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest, or he will fall into a state of sin.

One comparison to the Islamic State is the Khmer Rouge, which killed about a third of the population of Cambodia. But the Khmer Rouge occupied Cambodia's seat at the United Nations. "This is not permitted," Abu Baraa said. "To send an ambassador to the UN is to recognize an authority other than God's." This form of diplomacy is *shirk*, or polytheism, he argued, and would be immediate cause to hereticize and replace Baghdadi. Even to hasten the arrival of a caliphate by democratic means—for example by voting for political candidates who favor a caliphate—is *shirk*.

It's hard to overstate how hamstrung the Islamic State will be by its radicalism. The modern international system, born of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, relies on each state's willingness to recognize borders, however grudgingly. For the Islamic State, that recognition is ideological suicide. Other Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, have succumbed to the blandishments of democracy and the potential for an invitation to the community of nations, complete with a UN seat. Negotiation and accommodation have worked, at times, for the Taliban as well. (Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan exchanged ambassadors with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, an act that invalidated the Taliban's authority in the Islamic State's eyes.) To the Islamic State these are not options, but acts of apostasy.

THE UNITED STATES and its allies have reacted to the Islamic State belatedly and in an apparent daze. The group's ambitions and rough strategic blueprints were evident in its pronouncements and in social-media chatter as far back as 2011, when it was just one of many terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq and hadn't yet committed mass atrocities. Adnani, the spokesman, told followers then that the group's ambition was to "restore the Islamic caliphate," and he evoked the apocalypse, saying, "There are but a few days left." Baghdadi had already styled himself "commander of the faithful," a title ordinarily reserved for caliphs, in 2011. In April 2013, Adnani declared the movement "ready to redraw the world upon the Prophetic methodology of the caliphate." In August 2013, he said, "Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn't recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology." By then, the group had taken Raqqa, a Syrian provincial capital of perhaps 500,000 people, and was drawing in substantial numbers of foreign fighters who'd heard its message.

If we had identified the Islamic State's intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq's third-largest city. Yet, just over a year ago, Obama told *The New Yorker* that he considered it to be al-Qaeda's weaker partner. "If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn't make them Kobe Bryant," the president said.

Our failure to appreciate the split between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and the essential differences between the two, has led to dangerous decisions. Last fall, to take one example, the U.S. government consented to a desperate plan to save Peter Kassig's life. The plan facilitated—indeed, required—the interaction of some of the founding figures of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and could hardly have looked more hastily improvised.

Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it appears the best of bad military options.

It entailed the enlistment of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, the Zarqawi mentor and al-Qaeda grandee, to approach Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State's chief ideologue and a former student of Maqdisi's, even though the two men had fallen out due to Maqdisi's criticism of the Islamic State. Maqdisi had already called for the state to extend mercy to Alan Henning, the British cabbie who had entered Syria to deliver aid to children. In December, *The Guardian* reported that the U.S. government, through an intermediary, had asked Maqdisi to intercede with the Islamic State on Kassig's behalf.

Maqdisi was living freely in Jordan, but had been banned from communicating with terrorists abroad, and was being monitored closely. After Jordan granted the United States permission to reintroduce Maqdisi to Binali, Maqdisi bought a phone with American money and was allowed to correspond merrily with his former student for a few days, before the Jordanian government stopped the chats and used them as a pretext to jail Maqdisi. Kassig's severed head appeared in the Dabiq video a few days later.


Maqdisi gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State's fans, and al-Qaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology, read Maqdisi's opinion on Henning's status and thought it would hasten his and other captives' death. "If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn't be killed," he told me, "I'd kiss my ass goodbye."

Kassig's death was a tragedy, but the plan's success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world's two largest jihadist organizations. It's possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America's two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment.

CHASTENED BY OUR EARLIER INDIFFERENCE, we are now meeting the Islamic State via Kurdish and Iraqi proxy on the battlefield, and with regular air assaults. Those strategies haven't dislodged the Islamic State from any of its major territorial possessions, although they've kept it from directly assaulting Baghdad and Erbil and slaughtering Shia and Kurds there.

Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims' front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.

One way to un-cast the Islamic State's spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. Al-Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State's obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover.



Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.

And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. The provocative videos, in which a black-hooded executioner addresses President Obama by name, are clearly made to draw America into the fight. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide: irrespective of whether they have given *baya'a* to the caliph, they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day Crusade and kill Muslims. Yet another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment. Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance. The rise of ISIS, after all, happened only because our previous occupation created space for Zarqawi and his followers. Who knows the consequences of another botched job?

Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it, through air strikes and proxy warfare, appears the best of bad military options. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia will ever subdue and control the whole Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq—they are hated there, and have no appetite for such an adventure anyway. But they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government failing to bring prosperity to its people.

The humanitarian cost of the Islamic State's existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaeda's core is rare among jihadist groups for its focus on the "far enemy" (the West); most jihadist groups' main concerns lie closer to home. That's especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology. It sees



enemies everywhere around it, and while its leadership wishes ill on the United States, the application of Sharia in the caliphate and the expansion to contiguous lands are paramount. Baghdadi has said as much directly: in November he told his Saudi agents to “deal with the *rafida* [Shia] first ... then *al-Sulul* [Sunni supporters of the Saudi monarchy] ... before the crusaders and their bases.”

Musa Cerantonio and Anjem Choudary could mentally shift from contemplating mass death to discussing the virtues of Vietnamese coffee, with apparent delight in each.

The foreign fighters (and their wives and children) have been traveling to the caliphate on one-way tickets: they want to live under true Sharia, and many want martyrdom. Doctrine, recall, requires believers to reside in the caliphate if it is at all possible for them to do so. One of the Islamic State’s less bloody videos shows a group of jihadists burning their French, British, and Australian passports. This would be an eccentric act for someone intending to return to blow himself up in line at the Louvre or to hold another chocolate shop hostage in Sydney.

A few “lone wolf” supporters of the Islamic State have attacked Western targets, and more attacks will come. But most of the attackers have been frustrated amateurs, unable to immigrate to the caliphate because of confiscated passports or other problems. Even if the Islamic State cheers these attacks—and it does in its propaganda—it hasn’t yet planned and financed one. (The *Charlie Hebdo* attack in Paris in January was principally an al-Qaeda operation.) During his visit to Mosul in December, Jürgen Todenhöfer interviewed a portly German jihadist and asked whether any of his comrades had returned to Europe to carry out attacks. The jihadist seemed to regard returnees not as soldiers but as dropouts. “The fact is that the returnees from the Islamic State should repent from their return,” he said. “I hope they review their religion.”

Properly contained, the Islamic State is likely to be its own undoing. No country is its ally, and its ideology ensures that this will remain the case. The land it controls, while expansive, is mostly uninhabited and poor. As it stagnates or slowly shrinks, its claim that it is the engine of God’s will and the agent of apocalypse will weaken, and fewer believers will arrive. And as more reports of misery within it leak out, radical Islamist movements elsewhere will be discredited: *No one has tried harder to implement strict Sharia by violence. This is what it looks like.*

Even so, the death of the Islamic State is unlikely to be quick, and things could still go badly wrong: if the Islamic State obtained the allegiance of al-Qaeda—increasing, in one swoop, the unity of its base—it could wax into a worse foe than we’ve yet seen. The rift between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has, if anything, grown in the past few months; the December issue of *Dabiq* featured a long account of an al-Qaeda defector who described his old group as corrupt and ineffectual, and Zawahiri as a distant and unfit leader. But we should watch carefully for a rapprochement.

Without a catastrophe such as this, however, or perhaps the threat of the Islamic State’s storming Erbil, a vast ground invasion would certainly make the situation worse.

## V. Dissuasion

It would be facile, even exculpatory, to call the problem of the Islamic State “a problem with Islam.” The religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate’s practices written plainly within them.

Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate *now*, and that crucifixion is wrong *at this historical juncture*. Many say precisely this. But they cannot condemn slavery or crucifixion outright without contradicting the Koran and the example of the Prophet. “The only principled ground that the Islamic State’s opponents could take is to say that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid,” Bernard Haykel says. That really would be an act of apostasy.

The Islamic State’s ideology exerts powerful sway over a certain subset of the population. Life’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies vanish in its face. Musa Cerantonio and the Salafis I met in London are unshakable: no question I posed left them stuttering. They lectured me garrulously and, if one accepts their premises, convincingly. To call them un-Islamic appears, to me, to invite them into an argument that they would win. If they had been froth-spewing maniacs, I might be able to predict that their movement would burn out as the psychopaths detonated themselves or became drone-splats, one by one. But these men spoke with an academic precision that put me in mind of a good graduate seminar. I even enjoyed their company, and that frightened me as much as anything else.

NON-MUSLIMS CANNOT TELL Muslims how to practice their religion properly. But Muslims have long since begun this debate within their own ranks. “You have to have standards,” Anjem Choudary told me. “Somebody could claim to be a Muslim, but if he believes in homosexuality or drinking alcohol, then he is not a Muslim. There is no such thing as a nonpracticing vegetarian.”

There is, however, another strand of Islam that offers a hard-line alternative to the Islamic State—just as uncompromising, but with opposite conclusions. This strand has proved appealing to many Muslims cursed or blessed with a psychological longing to see every jot and tittle of the holy texts implemented as they were in the earliest days of Islam. Islamic State supporters know how to react to Muslims who ignore parts of the Koran: with *takfir* and ridicule. But they also know that some other Muslims read the Koran as assiduously as they do, and pose a real ideological threat.

Baghdadi is Salafi. The term *Salafi* has been villainized, in part because authentic villains have ridden into battle waving the Salafi banner. But most Salafis are not jihadists, and most adhere to sects that reject the Islamic State. They are, as Haykel notes, committed to expanding *Dar al-Islam*, the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation—but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals—such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship—is forbidden.

They live among us. Last fall, I visited the Philadelphia mosque of Breton Pocius, 28, a Salafi imam who goes by the name Abdullah. His mosque is on the border between the crime-ridden Northern Liberties neighborhood and a gentrifying area that one might call Dar al-Hipster; his beard allows him to pass in the latter zone almost unnoticed.

A theological alternative to the Islamic State exists—just as uncompromising, but with opposite conclusions.

Pocius converted 15 years ago after a Polish Catholic upbringing in Chicago. Like Cerantonio, he talks like an old soul, exhibiting deep familiarity with ancient texts, and a commitment to them motivated by curiosity and scholarship, and by a conviction that they are the only way to escape hellfire. When I met him at a local coffee shop, he carried a work of Koranic scholarship in Arabic and a book for teaching himself Japanese. He was preparing a sermon on the obligations of fatherhood for the 150 or so worshipers in his Friday congregation.

Pocius said his main goal is to encourage a halal life for worshipers in his mosque. But the rise of the Islamic State has forced him to consider political questions that are usually very far from the minds of Salafis. “Most of what they’ll say about how to pray and how to dress is exactly what I’ll say in my *masjid* [mosque]. But when they get to questions about social upheaval, they sound like Che Guevara.”

When Baghdadi showed up, Pocius adopted the slogan “Not my *khalifa*.” “The times of the Prophet were a time of great bloodshed,” he told me, “and he knew that the worst possible condition for all people was chaos, especially within the *umma* [Muslim community].” Accordingly, Pocius said, the correct attitude for Salafis is not to sow discord by factionalizing and declaring fellow Muslims apostates.

Instead, Pocius—like a majority of Salafis—believes that Muslims should remove themselves from politics. These quietist Salafis, as they are known, agree with the Islamic State that God’s law is the only law, and they eschew practices like voting and the creation of political parties. But they interpret the Koran’s hatred of discord and chaos as requiring them to fall into line with just about any leader, including some manifestly sinful ones. “The Prophet said: as long as the ruler does not enter into clear *kufir* [disbelief], give him general obedience,” Pocius told me, and the classic “books of creed” all warn against causing social upheaval. Quietist Salafis are strictly forbidden from dividing Muslims from one another—for example, by mass excommunication. Living without *baya’a*, Pocius said, does indeed make one ignorant, or benighted. But *baya’a* need not mean direct allegiance to a caliph, and certainly not to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It can mean, more broadly, allegiance to a religious social contract and commitment to a society of Muslims, whether ruled by a caliph or not.

Quietist Salafis believe that Muslims should direct their energies toward perfecting their personal life, including prayer, ritual, and hygiene. Much in the same way ultra-Orthodox Jews debate whether it’s kosher to tear off squares of toilet paper on the Sabbath (does that count as “rending cloth”?), they spend an inordinate amount of time ensuring that their trousers are not too long, that their beards are trimmed in some areas and shaggy in others. Through this fastidious observance, they believe, God will favor them with strength and numbers, and perhaps a caliphate will arise. At that moment, Muslims will take vengeance and, yes, achieve glorious victory at Dabiq. But Pocius cites a slew of modern Salafi theologians who argue that a caliphate cannot come into being in a righteous way except through the unmistakable will of God.

The Islamic State, of course, would agree, and say that God has anointed Baghdadi. Pocius’s retort amounts to a call to humility. He cites Abdullah Ibn Abbas, one of the Prophet’s companions, who sat down with dissenters and asked them how they had the gall, as a minority, to tell the majority that it was wrong. Dissent itself, to the point of bloodshed or splitting the *umma*, was forbidden. Even the manner of the establishment of Baghdadi’s caliphate runs contrary to expectation, he said. “The *khalifa* is something that Allah is going to establish,” he told me, “and it will involve a consensus of scholars from Mecca and Medina. That is not what happened. Isis came out of nowhere.”

The Islamic State loathes this talk, and its fanboys tweet derisively about quietist Salafis. They mock them as “Salafis of menstruation,” for their obscure judgments about when women are and aren’t clean, and other low-priority aspects of life. “What we need now is fatwa about how it’s haram [forbidden] to ride a bike on Jupiter,” one tweeted drily. “That’s what scholars should focus on. More pressing than state of Ummah.” Anjem Choudary, for his part, says that no sin merits more vigorous opposition than the usurpation of God’s law, and that extremism in defense of monotheism is no vice.

Pocius doesn’t court any kind of official support from the United States, as a counterweight to jihadism. Indeed, official support would tend to discredit him, and in any case he is bitter toward America for treating him, in his words, as “less than a citizen.” (He alleges that the government paid spies to infiltrate his mosque and harassed his mother at work with questions about his being a potential terrorist.)

Still, his *quietist* Salafism offers an Islamic antidote to Baghdadi-style jihadism. The people who arrive at the faith spoiling for a fight cannot all be stopped from jihadism, but those whose main motivation is to find an ultraconservative, uncompromising version of Islam have an alternative here. It is not moderate Islam; most Muslims would consider it extreme. It is, however, a form of Islam that the literal-minded would not instantly find hypocritical, or blasphemously purged of its inconveniences. Hypocrisy is not a sin that ideologically minded young men tolerate well.

Western officials would probably do best to refrain from weighing in on matters of Islamic theological debate altogether. Barack Obama himself drifted into *takfir* waters when he claimed that the Islamic State was “not Islamic”—the irony being that he, as the non-Muslim son of a Muslim, may himself be classified as an apostate, and yet is now practicing *takfir* against Muslims. Non-Muslims’ practicing *takfir* elicits chuckles from jihadists (“Like a pig covered in feces giving hygiene advice to others,” one tweeted).

I suspect that most Muslims appreciated Obama’s sentiment: the president was standing with them against both Baghdadi and non-Muslim chauvinists trying to implicate them in crimes. But most Muslims *aren’t* susceptible to joining jihad. The ones who are susceptible will only have had their suspicions confirmed: the United States lies about religion to serve its purposes.

WITHIN THE NARROW BOUNDS of its theology, the Islamic State hums with energy, even creativity. Outside those bounds, it could hardly be more arid and silent: a vision of life as obedience, order, and destiny. Musa Cerantonio and Anjem Choudary could mentally shift from contemplating mass death and eternal torture to discussing the virtues of Vietnamese coffee or treacly pastry, with apparent delight in each, yet to me it seemed that to embrace their views would be to see all the flavors of this world grow insipid compared with the vivid grotesqueries of the hereafter.

I could enjoy their company, as a guilty intellectual exercise, up to a point. In reviewing *Mein Kampf* in March 1940, George Orwell confessed that he had “never been able to dislike Hitler”; something about the man projected an underdog quality, even when his goals were cowardly or loathsome. “If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it seem like a dragon.” The Islamic State’s partisans have much the same allure. They believe that they are personally involved in struggles beyond their own lives, and that merely to be swept up in the drama, on the side of righteousness, is a privilege and a pleasure—especially when it is also a burden.

Fascism, Orwell continued, is

psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life ... Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet ... We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal.

Nor, in the case of the Islamic State, its religious or intellectual appeal. That the Islamic State holds the imminent fulfillment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succor if it stays true to the Prophetic model. Ideological tools may convince some potential converts that the group’s message is false, and military tools can limit its horrors. But for an organization as impervious to persuasion as the Islamic State, few measures short of these will matter, and the war may be a long one, even if it doesn’t last until the end of time.

## Les politiques cherchent les «Molenbeek français»

Par [Tristan Quinault Maupoil](#)

Publié le 27/03/2016 à 14:28



LE SCAN POLITIQUE - Selon le ministre de la Ville, il y a «une centaine de quartiers en France» qui présentent des «similitudes potentielles avec Molenbeek», le quartier bruxellois connu pour être un foyer du terrorisme islamiste.

C'est un constat qui ne devrait pas apaiser les peurs. Dimanche, le ministre de la Ville, Patrick Kanner, a reconnu qu'une [centaine de quartiers en France](#) présentent «des similitudes potentielles avec Molenbeek», quartier bruxellois frappé par la pauvreté et le communautarisme, qui a acquis une réputation de fief djihadiste depuis les attentats parisiens de novembre. «Mais il y a une différence énorme aussi (...), nous prenons le taureau par les cornes dans ces quartiers», a juré le socialiste.

«Molenbeek c'est quoi? C'est une concentration énorme de pauvreté et de chômage, c'est un système ultra-communautariste, c'est un système mafieux avec une économie souterraine, c'est un système où les services publics ont disparu ou quasiment disparu, c'est un système où les élus ont baissé les bras», a égrené Patrick Kanner interrogé au Grand Rendez-Vous Europe 1-ITélé-*Le Monde*. Pour le ministre, «les émeutes de 2005 ont permis manifestement un développement du salafisme» dans les quartiers populaires en France. «Il y a eu un développement du salafisme international» et, «en 2005, il y a eu une fragilisation d'une partie de la jeunesse à travers ces émeutes urbaines», et c'est «dans ce cadre-là que nous avons vu des prédateurs s'installer dans les quartiers», a-t-il indiqué.

La recherche des “Molenbeek français” agite de plus en plus les responsables politiques français. Jeudi soir, alors que la police découvrait une planque terroriste à Argenteuil (Val d'Oise), le porte-parole des Républicains Guillaume Larrivé a pointé du doigt sur ITélé cet «endroit où la situation a dérivé», reprenant à son compte la formule également utilisée par Bruno Le Maire. «Il y a l'équivalent de Molenbeek en France, dans certains quartiers», a prévenu [sur LCP](#) le candidat à la primaire de la droite.

### Les maires des communes concernées s'agacent

Une appellation qui offusque les maires des communes concernées. L'élue LR d'Argenteuil, Georges Mothron a juré que sa commune «n'est pas Molenbeek». «Il est fort regrettable que des membres de mon parti puissent faire une telle comparaison», a-t-il rétorqué vendredi sur Europe 1. Edile de Sevrans, Stéphane Gatignon (écologiste) a trouvé «très violent» que «certaines communes» (dont la sienne) aient pu être présentées ainsi. «Si on commence à stigmatiser des villes, où va-t-on?», a-t-il lancé mercredi sur Canal +. Jeudi sur BFMTV c'est le maire de Sarcelles (Val d'Oise) qui disait «ne pas croire» à l'existence d'un “Molenbeek français”. Quant à Yves Jégo, maire UDI de Montereau-Fault-Yonne (Seine-et-Marne), il a critiqué sur Facebook la «communication tonitruante, stigmatisante et pour le moins anxio-gène du ministre». «L'immense majorité de ceux qui vivent à Molenbeek ou dans nos banlieues sont des citoyens comme les autres qui respectent les lois et les valeurs de l'Europe», ajoute le député.

Dimanche, le premier secrétaire du Parti socialiste Jean-Christophe Cambadélis a taclé sur France 5 l'aveu de Patrick Kanner. «Je ne suis pas pour ce discours», a déclaré le député de Paris qui a peur qu'il «stigmatise» les musulmans. «On dissout la concorde nationale», a-t-il poursuivi, indiquant qu'il aurait préféré que le ministre dise «qu'il y a des poches, des immeubles mais qu'il n'y a pas de quartiers» semblables à Molenbeek. «Dans les quartiers il y a des réussites et des diplômés», a-t-il dit.

Même critique du conseiller régional PS d'Île-de-France Julien Dray. S'il reconnaît l'existence d'une «ghettoïsation urbaine» dans laquelle progresse les «problèmes sociaux qui sont même parfois devenus des problèmes ethniques», il met en garde contre la désignation de “Molenbeek français”. «On croit qu'avec des formules on résout les problèmes. On cède aux facilités de la communication et ça ne livre aucune information réelle», a-t-il réagi dimanche lors du Grand Jury RTL-LCI-*Le Figaro* tout en admettant la présence de «noyaux islamistes qui essaient d'utiliser ces problèmes sociaux (et) de les instrumentaliser».

## Langes Leiden unter billigem Geld

Die ultralockere Geldpolitik hat über Umverteilungseffekte einschneidende gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen. Das zeigt sich in Japan in aller Deutlichkeit. Welche Lehren sollte die Europäische Zentralbank daraus ziehen?

27.03.2016, von GUNTHER SCHNABL

Die geldpolitische Bazooka, die Notenbankchef Mario Draghi seit 2012 aufgefahren hat, greift nicht. Die Inflationsrate verharrt weiterhin nahe null. Mit ihrer geldpolitischen Entscheidung vom 10. März hat die [Europäische Zentralbank](#) deshalb nachgeladen: [Der Leitzins wurde auf 0 Prozent gesenkt](#), das Volumen der monatlichen Anleihekäufe auf 80 Milliarden Euro angehoben und der Strafzins auf Einlagen bei der Europäischen Zentralbank auf minus 0,4 Prozent gedrückt. Wie der italienische Notenbankchef Ignazio Visco jüngst anmerkte, sind die Mittel der EZB noch lange nicht ausgeschöpft. [Die Bank von Japan hat es vorgemacht](#), die EZB folgt immer entschlossener.

Die Bank von Japan bekämpft seit 25 Jahren die anhaltende Krise mit einer Politik des billigen Geldes. Mit den Abenomics, einem wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmenpaket aus expansiver [Geldpolitik](#), kreditfinanzierten Konjunkturprogrammen und Strukturreformen, [hat Notenbankchef Haruhiko Kuroda seit 2013 die Geldschwemme nochmals deutlich forciert](#). Frankreichs Notenbankchef François Villeroy de Galhau hat betont, dass das, was die japanische Zentralbank seit langem tut, für Europa nicht falsch sein könnte. Immerhin sei eine schädliche Deflation verhindert worden.

Frankreichs oberster Währungshüter spricht nicht von den [zahlreichen einschneidenden unerwünschten Nebeneffekten der japanischen Geldpolitik](#).

Denn trotz der Geld-Tsunamis ist die japanische Volkswirtschaft weder merklich gewachsen, noch hat sich Inflation gezeigt. Stattdessen ist die Staatsverschuldung explodiert, die Löhne sinken, und die Verteilungsungleichheit wächst. Wie hängt das alles mit der Geldpolitik zusammen?

Billiges Geld erzeugt Blasen, die zunächst mit Euphorie und dann mit einschneidenden Krisen verbunden sind. Wie sich aus der Konjunkturtheorie von [Friedrich August von Hayek](#) ableiten lässt, schafft billiges Geld Anreize zu Überinvestition und Spekulation. Es werden Investitionsprojekte auf den Weg gebracht, die zwar unter den aktuellen Finanzierungskosten profitabel wirken, auf lange Frist aber nicht tragfähig sind. Wenn die Zentralbank den Zins wieder anhebt, weil die Inflation steigt, dann folgen unweigerlich der Abbruch der Investitionen und die Krise.

### Auf billiges Geld folgte der Spekulationsboom

So auch im Fall der japanischen Blasenökonomie: Im September 1985 versuchten die G-5-Staaten mit dem Plaza-Abkommen durch eine starke Yen-Aufwertung, das Handelsungleichgewicht zwischen Japan und den Vereinigten Staaten zu beseitigen. Da die Aufwertung Japan in die Krise stürzte, senkte die Bank von Japan 1986/87 den Leitzins auf ein historisches Tief. Die Zinssenkungen halfen nicht nur die Aufwertung auszubremsen und die Produktionskosten der Exportunternehmen zu senken. Das billige Geld setzte auch einen zügellosen Spekulationsboom auf den Aktien- und Immobilienmärkten in Gang, der im Dezember 1989 seinen spektakulären Höhepunkt erreichte. Der Aktienindex Nikkei hatte sich verdreifacht. Dem Kaiserpalast wurde ein höherer Wert als ganz Kalifornien zugeschrieben.

Als die Zentralbank mit einer Zinserhöhung die Blase zum Platzen brachte, schlitterte das Land in eine schmerzhaft Rezession. Aktien- und Immobilienpreise verfielen. Die Haushalte konsumierten weniger. Die Investitionen der Unternehmen stockten, und die Banken schränkten die Kreditvergabe ein. Auch als die lockere Geldpolitik im Frühjahr 1991 wiedereinsetzte, erholte sich das Wachstum nicht. Stattdessen trug die neue Geldflut zu neuen Blasen außerhalb Japans bei: Kapital wurde zu niedrigen [Zinsen](#) in Japan aufgenommen und ins Ausland transportiert. Kapitalzuflüsse aus Japan haben maßgeblich einen Überinvestitionsboom in Südostasien (1993 bis 1997) gespeist. Auch an den wiederkehrenden Boom-Phasen auf dem amerikanischen Aktienmarkt und am chinesischen Wirtschaftswunder war japanisches Kapital beteiligt.

Solange die übergroße Zuversicht auf den ausländischen Vermögensmärkten anhielt, ließ sich auch in Japan eine leichte wirtschaftliche Erholung vermelden. Wenn die Blasen platzten, folgten schmerzhaft Rückschläge. Das deutlichste Beispiel ist die Asien-Krise (1997/98), die dem südostasiatischen Wirtschaftswunder ein Ende setzte. Über neue faule Kredite des japanischen Bankensektors und einen Nachfrageeinbruch für Exportunternehmen zog die Asien-Krise die japanische Finanzmarktkrise (1998) nach sich. Ebenso stürzten das Ende der Dotcom-Blüte und des amerikanischen Hypothekenmarktbooms Japan in die Krise.

Immer wieder waren billiges Geld und wachsende Staatsausgaben die Krisentherapie. Kurzfristig konnte zwar Schlimmeres verhindert werden, langfristig wurde die Lage noch aussichtsloser gemacht. Nach Hayek verhindern billiges Geld und keynesianische Konjunkturprogramme den Ausleseprozess der Krise. Strukturelle Verzerrungen werden zementiert, die notwendige Neuausrichtung der Produktionsstruktur bleibt aus. Weder das Absenken der Leitzinsen von 8 Prozent im Mai 1991 auf 0 Prozent im März 1999 noch das Aufblähen der Zentralbankbilanz um stolze 700 Prozent, noch ein Anheben der Staatsverschuldung auf 250 Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts haben Japan die versprochene Erholung gebracht.

Der Kern des Problems ist der Finanzsektor, der seines traditionellen Geschäftsmodells beraubt wurde. Die Nullzinspolitik hat nicht nur die Differenz zwischen Kredit- und Einlagenzinsen, aus denen sich Banken finanzieren, von etwa 3,5 Prozentpunkten auf rund 0,5 gedrückt. Sie hat auch die Kreditnachfrage vieler Großunternehmen geschrumpft, weil geringe Zinsen und geldpolitisch getriebene Abwertungsphasen des Yens die Gewinne erhöhten. Da das traditionelle Kreditgeschäft schrittweise ausgehöhlt wurde, wurden die Banken von der kostenlosen Liquidität der Zentralbank abhängig, die vermehrt in Staatsanleihen angelegt wurde. [Man spricht von „Zombie-Banken“](#).

### Staatliche Nachfrage ersetzt Sachinvestitionen

Die Unternehmen, die noch auf Kredite angewiesen blieben, waren und sind oft Klein- und Mittelunternehmen. Diese sind in Japan weniger renditestark als in Deutschland. Die anhaltende Rezession machte diesen besonders stark zu schaffen, weil sie weniger als die Großunternehmen im Ausland tätig sind. Die Banken scheuten es, die Kreditlinien von unrentablen Unternehmen zu schließen, weil sonst noch mehr faule Kredite sichtbar geworden wären. Darüber hinaus verpflichtet ein Gesetz, die Kredite an Klein- und Mittelunternehmen zu geringen Zinsen aufrechtzuerhalten. Die Literatur nennt das „nachsichtige Kreditvergabe“ an „immergrüne Zombie-Unternehmen“.

Das erinnert an die mittel- und osteuropäischen Planwirtschaften: Staatlich kontrollierte Banken gewährten den Unternehmen Kredite unabhängig von der Profitabilität, um Arbeitslosigkeit vorzugreifen. Die sogenannten Soft Budget Constraints (Janos Kornai) lähmten das Streben nach Gewinn, Innovation und Effizienz. Ein ähnliches Muster lässt sich nun in Japan beobachten, wo seit Beginn der neunziger Jahre die ehemals beeindruckenden Produktivitätsgewinne gegen null konvergieren. Sachinvestitionen gehen kontinuierlich zurück und werden durch staatliche Nachfrage ersetzt.

Trotz der nun zweieinhalb verlorenen Dekaden ist in Japan die Arbeitslosigkeit nie ernsthaft angestiegen. Der Höhepunkt lag im Jahr 2009 bei 5,6 Prozent, jüngst sogar nur noch bei knapp über 3 Prozent. Das sind aus europäischer Sicht Traumwerte. Denn in der konsensorientierten japanischen Gesellschaft wurden drohende Entlassungen umgangen, indem die Löhne gesenkt wurden. Da Produktivitätsgewinne Grundlage für Lohnerhöhungen sind, hat sich der Spielraum für Lohnerhöhungen immer weiter eingeeengt. Seit der Finanzmarktkrise ist das reale Lohnniveau durchschnittlich um etwa ein halbes Prozent pro Jahr gefallen.

Die ultralockere Geldpolitik hat über Umverteilungseffekte einschneidende gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen. Die Umverteilung geht in Japan nicht, wie in den Lehrbüchern angenommen, den Weg über Inflation, sondern über unterschiedliche Einkommensentwicklungen. Die Lohnzurückhaltung in der Krise hat die Kaufkraft der unteren und mittleren Lohngruppen ausgehöhlt. Auch die Einkommen aus risikoarmen Vermögensklassen wie Spareinlagen und Staatsanleihen, die gerne von der Mittelschicht gehalten werden, wurden von der Bank von Japan dramatisch gedrückt.

Gewonnen haben vor allem die Menschen, die ihre Ersparnisse risikoreich im Ausland, zum Beispiel in den florierenden Aktienmärkten der Vereinigten Staaten, angelegt haben. Ebenso konnten die Angestellten der großen Exportunternehmen gewinnen, weil insbesondere die Großunternehmen vom Boom in China profitierten. Politikerfamilien, die Baukonglomerate kontrollieren, haben bei den zahlreichen keynesianischen Konjunkturprogrammen Kasse gemacht.

Die daraus resultierende wachsende Einkommensungleichheit im bisher verteilungsgerechten Japan setzt sich in einem Wandel der Beschäftigungsverhältnisse fort. Die lebenslange Beschäftigung, wie sie in der Phase des schnellen Wachstums üblich war, ist ein Auslaufmodell. Es sind kurzfristige Verträge mit geringer sozialer Absicherung gefragt. Seit dem Platzen der Blase hat sich der Anteil der Beschäftigten mit prekären Beschäftigungsformen von 20 Prozent auf knapp 40 Prozent erhöht. Betroffen sind immer mehr junge Menschen.

### **In Tokio pulsiert nach wie vor das Leben**

Zu den ohnehin widrigen Lebensbedingungen im Großraum Tokio gesellen sich damit trübe Zukunftsperspektiven. Da jeder für sich persönlich die Last der Krise zu vermindern sucht, gehören Kinder oft nicht mehr zum Lebensentwurf der jungen Generation. Der wohlstandsbedingte Rückgang der Geburtenraten wird durch die geldpolitisch verlängerte Krise verstärkt. Die Zahl der Geburten pro Frau liegt heute auf dem Niveau des kinderarmen Deutschlands.

Die deshalb schnell voranschreitende Alterung der Gesellschaft zeigt sich aber nicht im Großraum Tokio. Dort pulsiert nach wie vor das Leben. Da die wirtschaftlichen Perspektiven vergleichsweise gut sind, wandern die jungen Menschen aus den wirtschaftlich schwachen Regionen im Norden, Süden und Westen Japans zu. Die jungen Zuwanderer müssen in Tokio oft für geringe Löhne hart arbeiten, um hohe Mieten zu bezahlen. An der Peripherie bleiben in den schrumpfenden Kleinstädten und Dörfern die Alten und leere Häuser zurück.

Die schwelende Frustration vieler Japaner spiegelt sich wie in Europa in der Politik wider. Die seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg dominierende konservative Liberaldemokratische Partei (LDP) sitzt fest im Sattel. Denn sie versteht es, die Wähler am rechten Rand an sich zu binden. Im Konflikt mit China um einige Felsen im Ostchinesischen Meer schlägt die Regierung gerne markige Töne an. Präsident Shinzo Abe betont die kulturelle Identität Japans und den Anspruch seines Landes auf eine Führungsrolle in Asien und der Welt. Die Regierung verschließt sich einer Einwanderung, die die Alterung der Bevölkerung abmildern könnte. Das kommt in Japan, wo die Menschen stolz auf die Homogenität der Gesellschaft sind, gut an.

Am linken Rand verhindert die Zerstrittenheit der Opposition das Entstehen eines ernstzunehmenden Gegengewichts. Die linksorientierte Demokratische Partei Japans (DPJ) ist zu konzeptlos, um eine stabile Opposition zu etablieren. Viele ziehen sich deshalb in die schnell wachsende Gruppe der Nichtwähler zurück. Statt sich politisch zu engagieren, sucht man Zuflucht in alternativen Lebenskonzepten. Der „Aufstand der Amateure“ (Shiroto no Ran) zeigt sich im Engagement für Recycling, ökologische Landwirtschaft und die Share Economy. Man entwickelt Überlebensstrategien für Arme und protestiert gegen die gnadenlose Arbeitswelt.

Die LDP hat es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, vor allem die Frustration der Alten und der Menschen in der wirtschaftlich schwachen und politisch überrepräsentierten Peripherie in Schach zu halten. Seit dem Platzen der Blase hat sie die Subventionen für die sozialen Sicherungssysteme und den regionalen Finanzausgleich hoch gehalten. Da die Steuerquellen immer weniger sprudeln, ist der Anteil dieser Subventionen an den Steuereinnahmen stetig gewachsen. Das hat die japanische Staatsverschuldung auf Weltrekordniveau getrieben.

### **Ein Abwertungswettlauf deutet sich an**

Vor allem der hohe öffentliche Schuldenstand erzeugt aber Druck auf die Zentralbank, immer mehr Staatsanleihen zu kaufen. Nur so ist die Zinslast des immensen Schuldenbergs noch erträglich. Nur so wird einer Staatsschuldenkrise vorgebeugt. Das Inflationsziel von zwei Prozent ist nur ein Feigenblatt, um die ultralockere Geldpolitik trotz der einschneidenden Nebenwirkungen zu rechtfertigen. Da die Umverteilungswirkungen der Geldpolitik die Kaufkraft der Mittel- und Unterschicht immer weiter aushöhlen, steigen trotz Geld-Tsunamis die Konsumentenpreise nicht. Der Zusammenhang zwischen expansiver Geldpolitik und Inflation (wie er auch von europäischen Zentralbankern angenommen wird) ist längst nicht mehr gültig. Je mehr Anleihen gekauft werden, desto geringer (und nicht höher!) ist der Inflationsdruck. Zentralbankpräsident Kuroda kann so unbegrenzt weitermachen.

Beim großen Nachbarn China wird vor allem die starke Abwertung des Yens im Zuge der Abenomics mit wachsendem Argwohn gesehen. Seit Januar 2013 bis zu den ersten Abwertungsschritten Chinas im Juli 2015 hat der Yen um 40 Prozent gegenüber dem chinesischen Yuan abgewertet. In China mehren sich seither die Anzeichen, dass in den vergangenen 15 Jahren spekulative Kapitalzuflüsse (nicht zuletzt aus Japan) zum Aufbau von Überkapazitäten im Exportsektor und im Immobilienmarkt beigetragen haben. Diese Blasen sind nun geplatzt, auch das Reich der Mitte schlittert in die

Krise. Chinas Regierung ist deshalb immer weniger gewillt, die Abwertungsstrategie Abes zu dulden, weil sie den Export schwächt. Es deutet sich ein Abwertungswettlauf in Ostasien an, der Japan und China schaden wird.

Die japanische Geldpolitik ist damit mehr wirtschaftspolitisches Kamikaze als eine Therapie für den krankenden Riesen. Die Kosten für einen Großteil der Bevölkerung sind hoch, weil die marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung im Land der aufgehenden Sonne schleichend unterhöhlt wird. Das Haftungsprinzip ist ausgesetzt. Die Zinsen signalisieren kein Risiko mehr. Der Zins trennt nicht mehr gute Investitionsprojekte von schlechten. Die versteckte Verstaatlichung von Banken, Industrie und Nachfrage bremst Innovation und Wettbewerb. Der Wohlstand verfällt. Diejenigen, die Japan schon immer als kommunistisches Land mit kapitalistischem Gesicht angesehen haben, können sich bestätigt fühlen. Nur so ist es zu erklären, dass der hohe Arbeitseinsatz der sehr gut ausgebildeten Bevölkerung seit nunmehr 25 Jahren ins Leere läuft.

Und die Lehren für die europäische Geldpolitik? Japan zeigt sehr deutlich, dass das geringe Zinsniveau nicht als Folge einer - beispielsweise alterungsbedingten - Wachstumsschwäche zu sehen ist. Vielmehr muss die Wachstumsschwäche als Konsequenz der Politik des billigen Geldes verstanden werden. Die säkulare Stagnation ist selbstgemacht. Obwohl in vielen Ländern der Europäischen Union die von billigem Geld genährten Blasen erst 15 Jahre später als in Japan geplatzt sind, zeichnen sich schon in vielen Aspekten ähnliche Entwicklungen ab.

In den europäischen Krisenländern dient die Geldpolitik immer mehr der versteckten Finanzierung maroder Banken, unrentabler Unternehmen, nicht nachhaltiger sozialer Sicherungssystemen und überschuldeter „Zombie-Staaten“. Eine nachhaltige Erholung ist unwahrscheinlich. Für Deutschland ist die europäische Geldpolitik derzeit zu expansiv, so dass wie im Japan der achtziger Jahre eine Blase entstanden ist. Am deutlichsten zeigt sich diese bei den Immobilienpreisen der Ballungszentren. Die Herausforderungen für Europa dürften größer werden, wenn eines Tages die deutsche Blase platzt.

In allen Teilen der Währungsunion trägt das billige Geld über ähnliche Transmissionskanäle wie in Japan schon lange zu wachsender Ungleichheit bei. Das nährt überall in Europa die politische Polarisierung. Es ist ungewiss, wie sich dies auf das gesellschaftliche und politische Klima in Europa und auf den europäischen Integrationsprozess auswirken wird. Nur eines ist sicher: Die japanischen Bürger haben das lange Leiden unter dem billigen Geld mit sehr viel Geduld ertragen. Damit sollten die europäischen Geldpolitiker lieber nicht rechnen.

#### Der Autor

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**The New York Times (web site)**

Sunday, March 27, 2016 - 21:02 UTC -0400

## Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues

By MATT APUZZO

WASHINGTON — The brothers who carried out suicide bombings in Brussels last week had long, violent criminal records and had been regarded internationally as potential terrorists. But in San Bernardino, Calif., last year, one of the attackers was a county health inspector who lived a life of apparent suburban normality.

And then there are the dozens of other young American men and women who have been arrested over the past year for trying to help the Islamic State. Their backgrounds are so diverse that they defy a single profile.

What turns people toward violence — and whether they can be steered away from it — are questions that have bedeviled governments around the world for generations. Those questions have taken on fresh urgency with the rise of the Islamic State and the string of attacks in Europe and the United States. Despite millions of dollars of government-sponsored research, and a much-publicized White House pledge to find answers, there is still nothing close to a consensus on why someone becomes a terrorist.

“After all this funding and this flurry of publications, with each new terrorist incident we realize that we are no closer to answering our original question about what leads people to turn to political violence,” Marc Sageman, a psychologist and a longtime government consultant, wrote in the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence* in 2014. “The same worn-out questions are raised over and over again, and we still have no compelling answers.”

When researchers do come up with possible answers, the government often disregards them. Not long after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, for instance, Alan B. Krueger, the Princeton economist, tested the widespread assumption that poverty was a key factor in the making of a terrorist. Mr. Krueger’s analysis of economic figures, polls, and data on suicide bombers and hate groups found no link between economic distress and terrorism.

More than a decade later, law enforcement officials and government-funded community groups still regard money problems as an indicator of radicalization.

When President Obama announced plans in 2011 to prevent homegrown terrorism, the details were sketchy, but the promise was clear. The White House would provide warning signs to help parents and community leaders.

“It’s going to be communities that recognize abnormal behavior,” Denis McDonough, the deputy national security adviser at the time, said. As an example, he cited truancy, which he said was an indicator of possible gang activity. “Truancy is also going to be an early warning sign for violent extremism,” he said.

But the years that followed have done little to narrow the list of likely precursors. Rather, the murky science seems to imply that nearly anyone is a potential terrorist. Some studies suggest that terrorists are likely to be educated or extroverted; others say uneducated recluses are at risk. Many studies seem to warn of the adolescent condition, singling out young, impatient men with a sense of adventure who are “struggling to achieve a sense of selfhood.”

Such generalizations are why civil libertarians see only danger in government efforts to identify people at risk of committing crimes. Researchers, too, say they have been frustrated by both the Bush and Obama

administrations because of what they say is a preoccupation with research that can be distilled into simple checklists, even at the risk of casting unnecessary suspicion on innocent people.

“They want to be able to do things right now,” said Clark R. McCauley Jr., a professor of psychology at Bryn Mawr College who has conducted government-funded terrorism research for years. “Anybody who offers them something right now, like to go around with a checklist — right now — is going to have their attention.

“It’s demand driven,” he continued. “The people with guns and badges are so eager to have something. The fact that they could actually do harm? This doesn’t deter them.”

Europe, too, is grappling with these questions, but there is no clear answer. Hans Bonte, the mayor of the Belgian town of Vilvoorde, attended a White House summit meeting on radicalization last year and described efforts to stem a steady tide of angry young men leaving to join the Islamic State. In Britain, the government encourages or requires people to alert the authorities about people who could become risks. That has spurred debate abroad, and has raised questions in the United States about whether the Constitution would allow the government to keep tabs on lawful political or religious speech.

“I understand, from an American standpoint, that can be troubling,” said Lorenzo Vidino, the director of the Program on Extremism at the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University. “But the European model, for most countries, is to intervene early, as soon as you see the first sign of extremism.”

Researching terrorism is admittedly difficult. It involves tough questions about who qualifies as a terrorist, or as a rebel or a soldier. Nelson Mandela? Palestinian suicide bombers? The Taliban of today? The Afghan mujahedeen when the C.I.A. supported them?

Researchers seldom have access to terrorists, and scientific methods, such as control groups, are rare. In 2005, Jeff Victoroff, a University of Southern California psychologist, concluded that the leading terrorism research was mostly just political theory and anecdotes. “A lack of systematic scholarly investigation has left policy makers to design counterterrorism strategies without the benefit of facts,” he wrote in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

When the government does give advice about what to look for, the origin of that information is often impossible to know. A 2012 National Counterterrorism Center report, for instance, declared that anxiety, unmet personal needs, frustration and trauma helped drive radicalization. “Not all individuals who become radicalized have unmet personal needs, but those who do are more vulnerable to radicalization,” the document said, citing no sources.

Finding terrorism’s roots was supposed to help turn people away from violence. But even when someone comes to the government’s attention, there is no policy on what the response should be. The Obama administration envisions a network of counselors, religious figures and experts who can step in to help. With rare exceptions, such a network has not materialized.

The White House recently put the Department of Homeland Security in charge of a task force to coordinate those efforts, an acknowledgment that the loose alliance of the past several years had suffered from a lack of goals and coordination. George Selim, the Homeland Security official leading the effort, said the administration had never intended to dictate policies. The government, Mr. Selim said, has successfully started conversations and fostered relationships between communities and law enforcement groups.

In Minneapolis, one of the pilot cities for the administration’s counter-radicalization efforts, Andrew M. Luger, the United States attorney for Minnesota, has built relationships with the Somali community. He said that a prevention program was coming soon, and that interventions were farther off.

“It’s taken a lot of time,” he said. “We’re at a point where a lot of it is beginning to come to fruition.”

Though the government plays down its use of checklists, the Justice Department offers grants for the development of “a rapid assessment” tool to help the authorities “gauge the potential” for extremism. Last year, the Intercept news organization revealed a government checklist to score people in terrorism investigations based on factors, including whether they feel mistreated by the government, distrust law enforcement or suffer from discrimination.

Mr. McCauley said many of his colleagues and peers conducted smart research and drew narrow conclusions. The problem, he said, is that studies get the most attention when they suggest warning signs. Research linking terrorism to American policies, meanwhile, is ignored.

As a practical matter, scientists note, checklists are mathematically certain to fail. Even a test with 99 percent accuracy would be wrong far more often than right. It is a counterintuitive thought, but in a country with a huge population and a tiny number of terrorists, even a nearly perfect test would flag many more innocent people than actual terrorists.

In social services, this problem all but disappears. There are few consequences for seeking help for someone who appears to be suicidal but is not. When the F.B.I. is the only option, the ramifications can be severe.

“We talk a very good game,” said John Horgan, a professor at Georgia State University who has conducted numerous government-funded studies. “But from the national security standpoint, we still have a scorecard mentality of early identifications and sting operations.”

In Montgomery County, Md., a Washington suburb, a Muslim-led interfaith organization called Worde thinks it may have a solution. Organizers have provided families and faith leaders with lists of warning signs: depression, trauma, economic stress and political grievances. Anyone who spots these indicators signs can call Worde, which will arrange mental health or religious counseling.

Police officers become involved only when there is a threat of imminent danger, said Hedieh Mirahmadi, the group’s president. Ideally, she said, people get help without being stigmatized or placed on government watch lists.

The program is unproven; a nearly complete study on its effectiveness gives it high marks for building community relationships but does not assess whether the group reduces violent extremism. And while Ms. Mirahmadi said “nobody would disagree” with her warning signs, researchers are far less certain that they are indicators of potential radicalization. Still, the Obama administration believes Worde could be a model and has awarded it \$500,000 in grants.

Faiza Patel, a lawyer with the Brennan Center for Justice, remains skeptical. Worde has not released its intervention protocols or its method for assessing things like political grievances. Ms. Mirahmadi said such tools would be too easily misunderstood.

But, she said, it is a start. She said her group had counseled about 20 people, providing help that otherwise did not exist. Whether any of these people would have become violent, she said, is impossible to know.

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The National Counterterrorism Center in 2005. People arrested for terrorism-related crimes defy a single profile. MARK WILSON/GETTY IMAGES

Years and millions of dollars later, ‘no closer to answering our original question.’

143,132

Ursachen des Terrors

## Töten im Namen Gottes

Was sind die wahren Ursachen für den islamistischen Terror? Wirklich die Religion oder der Zorn von ökonomisch Marginalisierten? Sicher ist: Das Beschwören westlicher Werte fruchtet nicht. Ein Gastbeitrag.

29.03.2016, von FRIEDRICH WILHELM GRAF



© REUTERS/Kriegsbegeisterte Anhänger des Islamischen Staates in Rakka: Junge Menschen werden von der symbolhaften Zeichensprache religiöser Gewalt angezogen.

Unter dem Eindruck der Pariser Terroranschläge vom 13. November vorigen Jahres wiederholte der einflussreiche französische Politikwissenschaftler Olivier Roy seine schon mehrfach formulierte These, dass der von radikalisierten Salafisten ausgehende Terror in Europas Städten nur sehr wenig mit Religion und [Islam](#) zu tun habe. Man müsse solche Attentate als eine neue Jugendrevolte gegen die herrschende Kultur deuten, als pathetisch inszenierten Bruch mit den Konventionen jener Welt, in der die jungen Täter aufgewachsen seien. Die in den Medien weitverbreitete Rede vom „politischen Islamismus“ sei irreführend. Man müsse stattdessen von „islamisierter Radikalität“ reden.

In Büchern wie „Der falsche Krieg. Islamisten, Terroristen und die Irrtümer des Westens“ (2008) oder „Heilige Einfalt. Über die politischen Gefahren entwurzelter Religionen“ (2010) entwirft Roy Psychogramme der Täter, die das herrschende Bild vom fanatischen Superfrommen, der aus primär religiösen Motiven gewalttätig wird, in Frage stellen. Die meisten Täter seien Angehörige der zweiten Generation von Einwanderern oder aber Konvertiten aus europäischen Familien der Mittel- oder Unterschichten. Oft hätten sie eine Karriere als Drogenhändler und Kleinkriminelle hinter sich. Weder seien sie in Kindheit und Jugend besonders fromm gewesen, noch hätten sie Kontakte zu irgendeiner Moschee gehabt.

Islamforscher sieht Frustration als Antrieb des Terrors

Roy bestreitet nicht, dass für die Selbstdeutung der Täter die religiöse Symbolsprache eine wichtige Rolle spielt. Aber die religiöse Sprache diene diesen zumeist gescheiterten, aus der Bahn geworfenen, von Frustration über ihr Lebensunglück und Hass auf die Gesellschaft geprägten jungen Menschen nur dazu, endlich ihrem Leben einen Sinn geben zu können.

Wie einst deutsche Pietisten oder protestantische Evangelikale in Amerika nutzten diese gesellschaftlichen Loser die Sinn-Ressourcen religiöser Überlieferungen, um ein wahres, besseres Selbst entwerfen und kontrafaktisch ihr Leben als Erfolg deuten zu können. Dass sie sich dabei auf islamische Vorstellungen stützten, sei eher zufällig. Der Islam biete sich in Europa derzeit eben an.

Roys Thesen blieben nicht ohne scharfen Widerspruch. Vor allem der französische Sozialwissenschaftler Gilles Kepel hat immer wieder, zuletzt 2015 in „Terreur dans l’Hexagone“, die hohe Bedeutung genuin religiöser Motive für die Terrorattacken europäischer [Muslime](#) betont. Natürlich weiß er um sozialstrukturelle Prägekräfte wie die elementare Exklusion, die junge französische Muslime in der Banlieue der großen Städte fortwährend erlitten. Aber die hier bei vielen Jugendlichen vorherrschenden Gefühle von Ausschluss aus dem Arbeitsmarkt,

Benachteiligung in den Bildungsinstitutionen und Missachtung durch die Mehrheitsgesellschaft würden primär religiös artikuliert und schafften so eine gegen den laizistischen Staat gerichtete kollektive Glaubensidentität der Muslime, die die „Werte“ der Republik mit ihren Versprechen von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit nur als blanken Hohn empfinden könnten.

Wie lässt sich die Terror-Gefahr minimieren?

Kepel weist zudem auf die 2005 im Internet veröffentlichte 1600-seitige Kampfschrift des syrischen **Islamisten** Abu Musba Al-Suri hin, die sich wie ein Handbuch für die Terroranschläge der vergangenen Jahre liest. Allerdings lehnte Al-Suri, einst Berater von Usama bin Ladin, die Gründung eines „Islamischen Staates“ ab. Ob die Chefpropagandisten des „Islamischen Staates“ die Schrift wirklich gelesen haben, ist unklar.



© DPA Produkt der Marginalisierung: Armut fördert Gewalttendenzen. Hier das Versteck der Attentäter in Schaerbeek

In den Kontroversen um Genese und Eigenart „islamistischen Terrors“ in Europa geht es um mehr als nur einen Streit der Gelehrten. Mit der Frage nach den „eigentlichen Ursachen“ der Attentate stehen auch die Chancen zukünftiger Prävention und die Prioritäten staatlicher Sicherheitspolitik zur Debatte.

Man kann das Problem in ökonomischer Sprache formulieren: Wo muss eine Gesellschaft welche Mittel investieren, um die Bedrohung durch religiös inszenierten Terror zu minimieren? Was sollte der freiheitliche Rechtsstaat auf jeden Fall tun? Und wo liegen mögliche Grenzen der Staatstätigkeit? Auf welche Investments kann verzichtet werden?

Globaler Religionsmarkt für Sinnprodukte

Jede Analyse muss zunächst ein Spezifikum religiöser Symbolsprachen und den Gestaltwandel von Religion in der okzidentalen Moderne seit 1800 in den Blick nehmen. Religiöse Sprache ist, ähnlich wie ästhetische Sprache, von hoher Interpretationsoffenheit geprägt. Grundsymbole wie „Gott“, „die Gemeinschaft der Heiligen“, „der Prophet“ oder „der Glaubenszeuge“ lassen sich von konkurrierenden Akteuren je nach Ort, Zeit und Interesse ganz unterschiedlich auslegen und aneignen.

In der Moderne gibt es keinerlei autoritative Instanz mehr, die frommen Individuen oder einer Gemeinschaft von Gläubigen vorschreiben könnte, wie sie überkommene religiöse Symbolbestände auszulegen haben. Diese Individualisierung des Religiösen führt auch zur verstärkten Pluralisierung und der Entstehung eines globalen Religionsmarktes für Sinnprodukte unterschiedlicher Art. Und sofern alle religiösen Anbieter Sinnorientierung offerieren, stehen sie in Konkurrenz zueinander und müssen sich gegeneinander profilieren. Wie auf anderen Märkten geht es um die demonstrative Zurschaustellung des eigenen Sinnangebotes.

Dies erklärt zumindest partiell die Faszinationskraft religiös inszenierter Gewalt: Wer im Namen Gottes zu morden behauptet, macht – leider auf grausame Weise – erfolgreicher als der Beter im stillen Kämmerlein auf sich aufmerksam.

Staatliche ausgebildete Religionslehrer sind ein Anfang

Jede Analyse muss sodann berücksichtigen, dass die Steuerbarkeit religiösen Bewusstseins Grenzen hat. Gottesglaube ist eine notorisch ambivalente, darin höchst gefährliche Gestalt des Bewusstseins. Er kann starke Solidarität mit Schwachen, Armen und Bedrängten stiften, aber auch Hass säen und Feindschaft begründen.

Fast alle europäischen Staaten haben deshalb versucht, die destruktiven Elemente religiösen Bewusstseins zu neutralisieren und den Glauben zu zivilisieren. Dazu sollten die Pfarrer studieren und in akademischen Institutionen die Fähigkeit erwerben, auf den Kanzeln eine unfanatische Frohbotschaft zu verkündigen.

Die Bundesrepublik folgt dieser religionspolitischen Zivilisierungsstrategie nun auch mit Blick auf den Islam. Mit der Schaffung islamisch-theologischer Fakultäten und universitärer Einrichtungen zur Ausbildung muslimischer Religionslehrerinnen und -lehrer will man sicherstellen, dass deutsche Muslime im Lande selbst (und nicht mehr in der Türkei oder in Ägypten) die Kompetenz zur hoffentlich kritischen Kommunikation ihrer Glaubensüberlieferungen erwerben können.

Dies ist gewiss sinnvoll investiertes Steuergeld. Aber man muss die Erwartungen zügeln, dass sich durch besseren Religionsunterricht bei jugendlichen Muslimen religiöse Radikalisierungsprozesse verhindern lassen. Die Kommunikation in der eigenen „peer group“ und inzwischen wohl auch im Internet ist in aller Regel sehr viel wirkmächtiger als die wohlmeinende Belehrung durch Ältere.

Ähnlichkeit mit den internationalen Brigaden im spanischen Bürgerkrieg

Keine noch so gute Religionskunde kann außerdem etwas daran ändern, dass in der Moderne des 21. Jahrhunderts sich jeder seine Glaubenswelt aus Elementen höchst unterschiedlicher Überlieferungen selbst zusammenbasteln kann. Es gibt gerade für Labile, Verunsicherte, Entwurzelte zudem eine Faszination der Gewalt, die oft stärker sein dürfte als die Kraft ziviler Selbstbegrenzung. Bildung hat jedenfalls nicht verhindern können, dass hochgebildete RAF-Mitglieder zu Mördern wurden.

Religiös inszenierte Gewalt ist kein Spezifikum des Islams. Gewalt hat es in allen Glaubensüberlieferungen gegeben, und sie prägt auch gegenwärtig noch einige afrikanische Christentümer, ostasiatische Buddhismen und den Hindu-Nationalismus. Auch Gotteskrieger, die um der von ihnen für gerecht gehaltenen Sache willen in den „Heiligen Krieg“ ziehen, sind aus den Geschichten diverser Christentümer und des Judentums vielfältig bekannt. Dass nun junge europäische Muslime beiderlei Geschlechts, gerade auch Konvertiten, in den „Islamischen Staat“ reisen, um hier für die Errichtung des Kalifats zu kämpfen, ist insoweit kein neues Phänomen.

Sie erinnern in ihrer Kriegsbegeisterung und den kognitiven Strukturen der Rechtfertigung ihres Handelns stark an jene jungen Europäer, die einst auf der Seite der politisch Linken oder der Gegenseite der Faschisten in den Spanischen Bürgerkrieg zogen.

Den Islam gibt es nicht

Es dient nicht der Entschuldigung der derzeit im Namen Allahs ausgeübten Verbrechen, mögliche historische Parallelen sichtbar und auf die Gewaltpotentiale in allen Religionen aufmerksam zu machen. Aber es verhindert eine falsche, essentialistische Sicht auf den Islam, den es so wenig wie das Christentum gibt. Die muslimischen Religionskulturen in Europa sind in sich höchst vielfältig und durch ganz unterschiedliche kollektive Erfahrungen geprägt. Muslime in Kreuzberg, deren Eltern oder Großeltern einst aus der Türkei kamen, teilen nicht die traumatisierenden Erinnerungen an koloniale Fremdherrschaft, die für viele französische, noch vom Algerien-Krieg geprägte Muslime kennzeichnend sind.

Nach den Anschlägen von Paris und nun auch Brüssel ließ sich im politischen Betrieb eine Reaktion beobachten, die nur als falsches semantisches Investment bezeichnet werden kann: Staatspräsidenten, Regierungschefs und Parteivorsitzende beschworen einhellig „die Werte Europas“ oder „des Westens“, die man gegen alle terroristischen Angriffe verteidigen werde.

Wertbegriff wirkt automatisch exkludierend

Nun ist es gut und ökonomisch langfristig sinnvoll, wenn der freiheitliche Rechtsstaat jene Bürokratien stärkt, die für die Sicherheit seiner Bürger zuständig sind. So dürfte etwa der Aufbau eines Zentrums zur Terrorabwehr geboten sein, in dem interessierte EU-Staaten enger als bisher miteinander kooperieren. Aber mit Werte-Rhetorik ist niemandem geholfen.

„Wert“ war ursprünglich ein Begriff der ökonomischen Sprache, und seine Einwanderung in ethische Debatten und juristische Diskurse hat nur dazu geführt, die freiheitsdienliche Unterscheidung von gesetzlich kodifizierten Rechtsnormen und moralischen Verbindlichkeiten zu unterlaufen. Deshalb ist es fatal, wenn Vertreter des Rechtsstaates diesen im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus nun als eine „Wertegemeinschaft“ deuten.



Anschlägen von Paris, wirkt exkludierend.



Nutzlose Symbolpolitik: Das Beschwören westlicher Werte, wie hier bei dem Demonstrationzug von Politikern nach den

Der Wertbegriff trägt immer schon die Unterscheidung von „wert“ und „unwert“ in sich, und er wirkt unausweichlich exkludierend: Manche teilen bestimmte „Wertüberzeugungen“, andere lehnen sie ab. Moralische Dissense sind in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft der Regelfall und legitim. Deshalb werden nur Minderheiten ausgegrenzt, wenn die „Werte“ der Mehrheit als die gemeinschaftlichen Überzeugungen aller gelten sollen.

Für wirklich alle gilt allein das Recht, und deshalb sind Rechtsbrecher zu verfolgen und zu bestrafen. Aber dies hat nichts damit zu tun, ob irgendwelche jungen Muslime die „Werte“ von älteren Katholiken, Protestanten oder Agnostikern teilen. Eine inflationär gebrauchte, darin nur Hilflosigkeit bekundende Werte-Rhetorik verstärkt bloß die Gefühle der Exklusion, die sich bei manchen jungen Muslimen in Europa beobachten lassen.

Muslimische Lebenswelten sollten besser erkundet werden

Es dürfte keine kluge Politik sein, von Seiten des Staats Erfahrungen (oder auch nur eingebildete Erfahrungen) von Ausgrenzung zu verstärken – oder gar wie in Frankreich einem Teil der eigenen Bevölkerung den Krieg zu erklären.

Langfristig klug ist es allein, neben der Stärkung der Sicherheitsbehörden in besseres Verständnis dessen, was derzeit leider der Fall ist, zu investieren. Nur durch mehr gelehrte Expertise wird man auch seriös entscheiden können, ob im Namen des Propheten inszenierter Terror primär aus Glaubensgründen motiviert ist – oder ob die Sprache der Religion hier, wie so oft schon in der modernen europäischen Geschichte, vor allem der Artikulation von Leid, Entfremdung und Marginalisierung dient. So sollte der Rechtsstaat mehr in die analytische Erkundung muslimischer Lebenswelten investieren, um Radikalisierungsprozesse bei Jugendlichen besser zu verstehen.

Nur was man begriffen hat, lässt sich präventiv bekämpfen - etwa durch eine bessere, ökonomisch effizientere Integrationspolitik. Gerade deshalb bedarf es einer besseren Erforschung der Frage, wie religiöser Glaube tief frustrierte Menschen dazu motiviert, mit subjektiv gutem Gewissen die Grenzen staatlichen Rechts zu überschreiten.

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## «Radicalisations» et «islamophobie» : le roi est nu

Par Gilles Kepel, Professeur des universités, Sciences-Po - Ecole normale supérieure (dernier ouvrage paru : «Terreur dans l'Hexagone, genèse du djihad français», éd. Gallimard, 2015, 352 pp., 21 €) et Bernard Rougier, Professeur des universités Sorbonne-Nouvelle — 14 mars 2016 à 17:41

**Le succès du slogan «Islamisation de la radicalité» et le refus des chercheurs, par peur d'être soupçonnés d'islamophobie, d'analyser la spécificité du jihadisme confortent la doxa médiatico-politicienne dans son ignorance de la réalité sociale et son arrogance intellectuelle.**

L'une des premières victimes collatérales des attentats de 2015 est l'université française. Alors que les sciences humaines et sociales sont concernées au premier chef pour fournir les clés d'interprétation du phénomène terroriste d'une ampleur inouïe qui a frappé l'Hexagone, les institutions universitaires sont tétanisées par l'incapacité à penser le jihadisme dans notre pays. Cela provient pour une part d'une politique désinvolte de destruction des études sur le monde arabe et musulman - la fermeture, par Sciences-Po en décembre 2010, le mois où Mohamed Bouazizi s'immole par le feu à Sidi Bouzid, du programme spécialisé sur ces questions est l'exemple le plus consternant : ont été éradiqués des pans entiers de la connaissance et notamment la capacité des jeunes chercheurs à lire dans l'original arabe la littérature de propagande salafiste et jihadiste. Mais cela provient aussi d'un interdit idéologique : entre le marteau de la «radicalisation» et l'enclume de «l'islamophobie», il est devenu très difficile de penser le défi culturel que représente le terrorisme jihadiste, comme une bataille à l'intérieur même de l'islam au moment où celui-ci est confronté à son intégration dans la société française.

«Radicalisation» comme «islamophobie» constituent des mots écrans qui obnubilent notre recherche en sciences humaines. Le premier dilue dans la généralité un phénomène dont il interdit de penser la spécificité - fût-ce de manière comparative. Des Brigades rouges et d'Action directe à Daech, de la bande à Baader à la bande à Coulibaly ou Abaaoud, il ne s'agirait que de la même «radicalité», hier, rouge, aujourd'hui, peinturlurée du vert de l'islamisation. Pourquoi étudier le phénomène, apprendre des langues difficiles, mener l'enquête sur le terrain dans les quartiers déshérités où les marqueurs de la salafisation ont tant progressé depuis trente ans, puisqu'on connaît déjà la réponse ? Cette posture intellectuelle, dont Olivier Roy est le champion avec son slogan de «L'islamisation de la radicalité», connaît un succès ravageur car elle conforte la doxa médiatico-politicienne dans son ignorance de la réalité sociale et son arrogance intellectuelle - toutes deux suicidaires. Le corollaire de la dilution du jihadisme dans la radicalisation est la peur de «l'islamophobie» : l'analyse critique du domaine islamique est devenue, pour les nouveaux inquisiteurs, *haram* - «péché et interdit». [On l'a vu avec l'anathème fulminé lors du procès en sorcellerie intenté au romancier algérien Kamel Daoud pour ses propos sur les violences sexuelles en Allemagne, par une douzaine de chercheurs auxquels le même Olivier Roy vient d'apporter sa caution \(1\).](#)

[Le rapport que vient de publier le président du CNRS sous le titre «Recherches sur les radicalisations» participe de la même démarche.](#) On aurait pu s'attendre, de la part d'une instance scientifique, à une définition minimale des concepts utilisés. Il n'en est rien. Le postulat des «radicalisations» est à la fois le point de départ et d'arrivée d'un catalogue des publications et des chercheurs où la pondération des noms cités montre, sans subtilité, le parti pris idéologique des scripteurs. Emile Durkheim, bien oublié par une sociologie française dont il fut pourtant le père fondateur, avait établi l'identité de la démarche scientifique par sa capacité à distinguer les concepts opératoires des «prénotions». Il qualifiait ces dernières de «sortes de concepts, grossièrement formés», qui prétendent élucider les faits



sociaux, mais contribuent, en réalité, à les occulter car ils sont le seul produit de l'opinion, et non de la démarche épistémologique de la recherche. Or, l'usage *ad nauseam* des «radicalisations» (le pluriel en renforçant la dimension fourre-tout) illustre à merveille le fonctionnement des prénotions durkheimiennes par ceux-là mêmes qui en sont les indignes - fussent-ils lointains - héritiers.

Cette prénotion-ci est d'origine américaine. Diffusée après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, elle prétendait rendre compte des ruptures successives du «radicalisé» par rapport aux normes de la sociabilité dominante. Les analyses qui s'en réclament partent du même postulat propre à la société libérale - celui d'un individu abstrait, sans qualités, atome détaché de tout passé et de tout lien social. L'interrogation initiale porte la marque de l'école américaine des choix rationnels : pourquoi pareil individu décide-t-il de tuer et de mourir ? Son intérêt bien compris n'est-il pas plutôt de vivre le bonheur de l'*American Way of Life* ? Un commencement d'explication relève des aléas de la biographie individuelle. On présume que l'intéressé a vécu une rupture initiale (humiliation, racisme, rejet...) à l'origine de sa «radicalité», voire de son basculement ultérieur. La révolte attend alors sa mise en forme idéologique.

Pour résoudre l'énigme, l'analyse se tourne alors vers le rôle de l'offre. C'est ici que les postulats de la sociologie individualiste coïncident avec les fiches signalétiques de l'analyse policière. En effet, l'offre en question est incarnée par des «cellules de recrutement» sophistiquées, animées par des «leaders charismatiques» dont le savoir-faire repose sur un jeu subtil d'incitations religieuses, d'explications politiques et de promesses paradisiaques. Resocialisé par l'organisation réseau, l'individu adopte progressivement les modes de perception et d'action qui lui sont proposés. A la fin, il est mûr pour le passage à l'acte. Il est «radicalisé». Le recours fréquent au lexique de la «dérive sectaire» ou de la «conversion religieuse» (même lorsque l'individu en question est déjà musulman) inscrit le phénomène dans un *continuum* absurde reliant le terroriste Abaaoud au «Messie cosmo-planétaire» Gilbert Bourdin. La messe est dite, si l'on ose dire. Et les crédits de recherches dégagés par l'administration américaine sont allés aux think tanks de Washington où personne ne connaît un mot d'arabe ni n'a jamais rencontré un salafiste.

Venus d'outre-Atlantique et hâtivement mariés par une partie de la recherche universitaire française généraliste et ignorante de la langue arabe elle aussi, le couple «radicalisation - islamophobie» empêche de penser la manière dont le jihadisme tire profit d'une dynamique salafiste conçue au Moyen-Orient et porteuse d'une rupture en valeurs avec les sociétés européennes. L'objet «islamophobie» complète le dispositif de fermeture de la réflexion, car son objectif vise à mettre en cause la culture «blanche néocoloniale» dans son rapport à l'autre - source d'une prétendue radicalité - sans interroger en retour les usages idéologiques de l'islam. Il complète paradoxalement l'effort de déconstruction de la République opéré par les religieux salafistes, main dans la main avec les Indigènes de la République et avec la bénédiction des charlatans des «postcolonial studies» - une autre imposture qui a ravagé les campus américains et y a promu l'ignorance en vertu, avant de contaminer l'Europe.

Quelle alternative, face au défi jihadiste qui a déclenché la terreur dans l'Hexagone ? Le premier impératif est, pour la France, de prendre les études du monde arabe et de sa langue au sérieux. Les mesurette du ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, qui vient de créer quelques postes dédiés à «l'analyse des radicalisations» (la doxa triomphe rue Descartes) et aux «langues rares» (*sic* - l'arabe compte plusieurs centaines de millions de locuteurs) - relèvent d'une thérapie de l'aspirine et du sparadrap (et une opacité de mauvais aloi a orienté le choix des heureux bénéficiaires). Pourtant, c'est en lisant les textes, et en effectuant des enquêtes de terrain dans les langues locales que l'on peut mettre en perspective les événements des décennies écoulées, comprendre comment s'articulent les mutations du jihadisme, depuis le lancement américano-saoudien du jihad en Afghanistan contre l'URSS en 1979 jusqu'à la proclamation du «califat» de Daech à Mossoul en 2014, avec celles de l'islam *en* France, puis *de* France. Repérer les articulations, les charnières, comme cette année 2005 où Abou Moussab al-Souri publie son «Appel à la résistance islamique mondiale» qui érige l'Europe, ventre mou de l'Occident, en cible par excellence du jihad universel, et où les grandes émeutes de l'automne dans les banlieues populaires permettent, à côté de la participation politique massive des enfants de l'immigration

musulmane, l'émergence d'une minorité salafiste visible et agissante qui prône le «désaveu» (*al bara'a*) d'avec les valeurs de l'Occident «mécréant» et l'allégeance exclusive (*al wala'*) aux oulémas saoudiens les plus rigoristes. Analyser les modes de passage de ce salafisme-là au jihadisme sanglant, qui traduit en acte les injonctions qui veulent que le sang des apostats, mécréants et autres juifs soit «licite» (*halal*).

A cette fin, toutes les disciplines doivent pouvoir contribuer - à condition d'aller aux sources primaires de la connaissance, et non de rabâcher des pages Wikipédia et des articles de presse. Les orientalistes, médiévistes comme contemporanéistes, les sociologues, les psychologues et cliniciens, les historiens, les anthropologues, mais aussi les spécialistes de datascience ont devant eux un champ immense à défricher - qui ne concerne pas seulement l'étude des ennemis de la société qui ont ensanglanté la France, mais aussi l'étude de la société même dont les failles ont permis à ces derniers de s'y immiscer et d'y planter leurs racines. Il est temps d'en finir avec la royale ignorance qui tétanise les esprits et fait le jeu de Daech.

(1) Libération du 10 mars.

Gilles Kepel et Bernard Rougier ont présenté la communication dont ce texte est le résumé au séminaire «Violence et Dogme», qu'ils animent avec Mohammad-Ali Amir-Moezzi (directeur d'études, Ecole pratique des hautes études, EPHE), à l'Ecole normale supérieure, le 8 mars.

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## **France's Oedipal Islamist Complex**

The country's jihadi problem isn't about religion or politics. It's about generational revolt.

• BY [OLIVIER ROY](#)

• JANUARY 7, 2016



France is at war! Perhaps. But against whom or what?

Last November, when the Islamic State staged the shootings that killed 130 in Paris, it did not send Syrians. A year ago, when al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula purportedly ordered the deadly attack on the office of *Charlie Hebdo*, it did not send gunmen from Yemen. Rather, both groups drew from a reservoir of radicalized French youth who, no matter what happens in the Middle East, are already disaffected and are seeking a cause, a label, a grand narrative to which they can add the bloody signature of their personal revolt.

The rallying cry of these youth is opportunistic: Today it is the Islamic State; yesterday, they were with al Qaeda; before that, in 1995, they were subcontractors for the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, or they practiced the nomadism of personal jihad, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, by way of Chechnya. Tomorrow they will fight under another banner, so long as combat death, age, or disillusion do not empty their ranks.

There is no third, fourth, or *n*th generation of jihadis. Since 1996, we have been confronted with a very stable phenomenon: the radicalization of two categories of French youth — second-generation Muslims and native converts. The essential problem for France, therefore, is not the caliphate in the Syrian desert, which will disappear sooner or later, like an old mirage that has become a nightmare. The problem is the revolt of these youth. And the real challenge is to understand what these youth represent: whether they are the vanguard of an approaching war or, on the contrary, are just a rumbling of history.

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Two readings of the situation dominate at the moment and are shaping the debates on television and in the opinion pages of newspapers: These are, basically, the cultural explanation and the Third World explanation.

The first puts forth that recurring and nagging “war of civilizations” theory: The revolt of young Muslims demonstrates the extent to which Islam cannot be integrated into the West, at least not so long as theological reform has not struck the call of jihad from the Quran. The second interpretation evokes post-colonial suffering, the identification of these youth with the Palestinian cause, their rejection of Western intervention in the Middle East, and their exclusion from a French society that is racist and Islamophobic. In short, the old song: So long as we haven’t resolved the Israel-Palestine conflict, there will be a revolt.

But the two explanations run up against the same problem: If the causes of radicalization are structural, then why do they affect only a tiny fraction of those in France who call themselves Muslims? Only a few thousand, among several million.

But these young radicals have been identified! All the terrorists who have actually taken action were, notoriously, in the “S File” — that is, on the government’s watch list. I don’t wish to get into a discussion here of prevention — I simply note that the information about them is there, and it is accessible. So let us look at who they are and try to draw some conclusions.

Nearly all the French jihadis belong to two very precise categories: They are either “second-generation” French — that is, born or raised from a very young age in France — or they are “native” French converts (whose numbers have increased with time, but who already constituted 25 percent of radicals at the end of the 1990s). This means that, among the radicals, there are practically no “first-generation” jihadis (including recent arrivals), but especially no “third-generation” jihadis.

The third-generation category in France is growing: The Moroccan immigrants of the 1970s are now grandparents. But one does not find their grandchildren among the terrorists. And why do converts, who never suffered from racism, wish to brutally avenge the humiliation experienced by Muslims? Especially since many of these converts — like [Maxime Hauchard](#), the Normandy-born man who appeared in the Islamic State’s beheading videos — come from rural France and have little reason to identify with a Muslim community that for them exists only in theory. In short, this is not a “revolt of Islam” or one of Muslims, but a specific problem concerning two categories of youth, the majority of whom are of immigrant origin.

### **This is not, then, the radicalization of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism.**

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What is the common ground between the second generation and the converts? It is, first of all, a question of a generational revolt: Both have ruptured with their parents or, more precisely, with what their parents represent in terms of culture and religion.

Members of the second generation do not adhere to the Islam of their parents, nor do they represent a tradition that is rebelling against Westernization. They are Westernized. They speak better French than their parents. They have all shared in the youth culture of their generation — they’ve drunk alcohol, smoked weed, flirted with girls in nightclubs. A large number of them have spent time in prison. And then one morning, they (re)converted, choosing Salafi Islam, which is to say, an Islam that rejects the concept of culture, an Islam possessing of norms that allow them to reconstruct the self all by themselves. Because they want nothing of the culture of their parents or of the Western culture that has become a symbol of their self-hatred.

The key in this revolt is the absence of the transmission of a religion that is culturally integrated. It’s a problem that concerns neither the first generation, whose members bring cultural Islam from their country of origin but who haven’t been able to pass it down, nor the third generation, who speak French with their parents and who have, thanks to them, a familiarity with how Islam can be expressed in French society. If it is true that there are fewer Turks than North Africans within the radical movements, it is undoubtedly because the transition has been smoother for the Turks, since the Turkish state took it upon itself to send teachers and imams to its overseas communities (which poses other problems, but allows the Turks to avoid the adherence to Salafism and violence).

Young converts, similarly, adhere to a “pure” form of religion; cultural compromise is of no interest to them (which is completely different from previous generations who converted to Sufism). In this they join the second generation in their allegiance to an “Islam of rupture” — generational rupture, cultural rupture, and, finally, political rupture. It serves no purpose to offer them a “moderate Islam”; it is the radicalism that attracts them in the first place. Salafism is not only a matter of sermonizing financed by Saudi Arabia — it’s also the product that suits these youth, who are at odds with society.

What’s more — and this is the greatest difference from the circumstances of young Palestinians who take up diverse forms of intifada — the Muslim parents of radicalized second-generation youth do not understand the revolt of their progeny. More and more, as with the parents of converts, they try to prevent the radicalization of their children: They call the police; if the children have left the country, they follow to try to bring them back; they fear, with good reason, that the older children will draw in their younger siblings. Far from being the symbol of the radicalization of Muslim populations as a whole, the jihadis explode the generational gap, which is to say, quite simply, the family.

The jihadis are on the margins of Muslim communities: They almost never have a history of devotion and religious practice. Quite the opposite. Journalists' articles all resemble each other in their astonishment. After each attack, they question the inner circle of the murderer, and there is always the same sense of surprise. *"We don't understand; he was a nice boy (or a variation: "just a harmless juvenile delinquent"). He wasn't observant: He drank, he smoked joints, he went out with girls.... Ah, yes, it's true, in the last few months he changed — he let his beard grow and began to inundate us with religion."* For the feminine version, see the plethora of articles about [Hasna Aït Boulahcen](#), "Miss Frivolous Jihad."

This cannot be explained by the idea of *taqiyya*, or concealment of one's faith, because once they are "born again," these youth do not hide anything, but rather display their new conviction on Facebook. They exhibit their new almighty selves, their desire for revenge for their suppressed frustrations, the pleasure they derive from the new power lent them by their willingness to kill, and their fascination with their own death. The violence that they subscribe to is a modern violence; they kill in the manner of mass shooters in America or Anders Breivik in Norway — coldly and calmly. Nihilism and pride are profoundly tied to each other.

The fanatical individualism of these youth goes back to their isolation from Muslim communities. Few among them regularly attend a mosque. The religious leaders they eventually choose to follow are often self-proclaimed imams. Their radicalization arises around the fantasy of heroism, violence, and death, not of sharia or utopia. In Syria, they only fight war; none integrate or interest themselves in civil society. And if they take sexual slaves or recruit young women on the Internet to become the wives of future martyrs, it's because they are in no way socially integrated in the Muslim societies that they claim to defend. They are more nihilist than utopist. Even if some of them have spent time with Tablighi Jamaat (a movement that preaches fundamentalist Islam), none of them have joined the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, and none have participated in a political movement or undertaken efforts to support Palestine. None took up community service: delivering meals for the end of Ramadan, preaching in mosques, or going door to door. None have undertaken serious religious study. And none have taken an interest in theology, not even in the nature of jihad or of the Islamic State.

They were radicalized within a small group of "buddies" who met in a particular place (neighborhood, prison, sport club); they recreate a "family," a brotherhood. There is an important pattern that no one has studied: The brotherhood is often biological. There is very often a pair of "bros" who take action together (the [Kouachi](#) and [Abdeslam](#) brothers; Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who "kidnapped" his [little brother](#); the [Clain brothers](#), who converted together; not to mention the [Tsarnaev brothers](#), the authors of the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013). It is as though radicalizing a sibling (sisters included) is a way to underscore the generational dimension and the rupture with the parents. The cell members make an effort to create emotional ties among themselves: A member will often marry the sister of a brother in arms. The jihadi cells do not resemble those of radical movements inspired by Marxism or nationalism, such as the Algerian FLN, the IRA, or the ETA. Founded on personal relationships, they are more difficult to infiltrate.

The terrorists therefore are not the expression of a radicalization of the Muslim population, but rather reflect a generational revolt that affects a very precise category of youth.

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Why Islam? For members of the second generation, it's obvious: They are reclaiming, on their own terms, an identity that, in their eyes, their parents have debased. They are "more Muslim than the Muslims" and, in particular, than their parents. The energy that they put into reconverting their parents (in vain) is significant, but it shows to what extent they are on another planet (all the parents have a story to tell about these exchanges). As for the converts, they choose Islam because it's the only thing on the market of radical rebellion. Joining the Islamic State offers the certainty of terrorizing.

*A version of this article originally appeared in Le Monde on Nov. 24, 2015. It has been translated from the French by Elisabeth Zerofsky.*

Photo credit: CARL COURT/AFP/Getty Images